6. Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, Dec.

12, 1995
FACTS:
Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member R
afael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Ma
gno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman f
or the Visayas, were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended, 5 A
rticles 170 6 and 171 7 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713.
Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in cons
piracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 b
y increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,00
0.00 without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
A day after the filing of the complaints, HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, petitioner ordered
respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue
City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten
(10) days from receipt of the order.
Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the preventive suspension of respondent
officials in the separately docketed administrative case.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials,
on 05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the
administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Gove
rnment Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanction
s against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension
, had now been vested with the Office of the President.
Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not have
repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Const
itution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all pub
lic officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate l
ocal officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991.
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended
the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pe
dro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by
the Ombudsman. 10 Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive sus
pension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order 11 of 21 September 1992.
On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of prel
iminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent offi
cials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Acting favorably on the ple
as of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restrainin
g order directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or imple
menting the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-0
15."
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, denied the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
HON. GOZO-DADOLE ruled that, it is the finding of this Court that since the inve
stigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague and gives wider
discretion to disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions against
a responsible public official or employee while that of Section 60 of the New Lo
cal Government Code provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon whi

ch a local elective official can be subjected to administrative disciplinary act

ion, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be an exception to th
e authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigatio
n against local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct
administrative investigation against local elective officials is already lodged
before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Local Government Code repealed the Ombudsman Act of 19
89, regarding the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative invest
igations over local elective officials?
HELD:
NO.
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) A
rticle XI, of the 1987 Constitution.
While his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in
Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials
who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentaliti
es and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government...
Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends
that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree pre
ventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it.
the Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as having con
ferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the v
arious Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He pos
its the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretof
ore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate. In passing
, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy that should
have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before th
is Court rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Tria
l Court.
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has re
pealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsma
n Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsiste
nt, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down
the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are no
t favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application.
17 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, 18 and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. 19 The rule
is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interp
retendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 20 The fundament is th
at the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the sub
ject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. 21 Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, 22 and all efforts should be exerted in ord
er to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 23