#20 PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER v ROXAS

FACTS:
1. Respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) entered
into a contract with respondent Westinghouse Electric
S.A. (WESA), an affiliate or subsidiary of respondent
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE),
to supply equipment, machineries and services
therefor.
2. Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 55,
which was later amended by E.O. No. 98, transferring
ownership of the already constructed power plant,
which had become known as the Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant.
3. In 1988, the Aquino administration instituted a
complaint against WESTINGHOUSE in New Jersey,
U.S.A. Westinghouse later filed an arbitration case in
Geneva, Switzerland.
4. On September 27, 1995, President Fidel Ramos
authorized the following government officials as
members of a Government Panel to conduct
exploratory discussions with WESTINGHOUSE for the
possible settlement of pending legal proceedings.
5. Having in mind the uncertainty of the results of the
arbitration, the possibility that some of Westinghouse's
counterclaims may partly offset any recovery, the
prospect that even a favorable arbitration award could
be limited to the $40 million cap under the original
BNPP contract and that even if the government
eventually wins the appeal of the New Jersey verdict,
substantial costs would have to be incurred to pursue
a new trial, which result is also uncertain;
6. On November 14, 1995, petitioners, as taxpayers, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a
Complaint against herein private respondents, for
declaration of nullity of the BNPP contract with
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON the validity of the Contract and the contracts of
loan entered into by the Republic and NPC with foreign banks
to finance the construction of the BNPP, and the propriety of

entering into a Settlement Agreement are subject to judicial

review. YES
HELD:
The general rule is that in the absence of fraud or
collusion a judgment for or against a governmental
body in such an action is binding and conclusive on all
residents, citizens and taxpayers with respect to
matters adjudicated which are of general and public
interest.
Granted that petitioners were initially unaware of the
existence of the first set of cases, albeit their counsel
was one of the petitioners therein, such fact was
already brought to their attention during the hearing of
their application for a temporary restraining order
conducted after the filing of their Complaint. When
petitioners
subsequently
filed
their
Amended
Complaint, however, they failed to report the
pendency of the petition for mandamus before the
appellate court bearing on the dismissal by the Manila
RTC of the complaint filed by the Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines, Inc. Public respondent's dismissal of
the Amended Complaint on the ground of forum
shopping is thus in order.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied.

#25 FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. AGCAOILI

FACTS:
1. FDC was the owner and developer of a condominium
project known as Fedman Suites Building. FDC
executed a Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions and formed Fedman Suite Condominium
Corporation [FSCC] to manage the SB and hold title
over its common areas.
2. Interchem Laboratories Inc purchased FSBs Unit 411
under a contract to sell and subsequently transferred
all its rights to respondent Agcaoili.
3. As consideration for the transfer, Agcaoili agreed:
a. To pay Interchem 150,000.00 upon signing of
the deed of transfer;
b. to update the account by paying to FDC the
amount of 15,473.17 through a 90 daypostdated check; and
c. to deliver to FDC the balance of 137,286.83 in
135 equal monthly installments of 1,857.24
effective October 1980, inclusive of 12% interest
per annum on the diminishing balance.
4. In 1983, the centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs
fourth floor broke down. Agcaoili demanded for the
repair of the air-conditioning unit. Not getting any
immediate response, Agcaoili sent follow-up letters to
FSCC but the letters were unheeded. He then informed
FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the payment of
his condominium dues and monthly amortizations.
5. FDC cancelled the contract to sell involving unit 411
and cut-ogg the electric supply of the unit. Agcaoili
sued FDC and FSCC for injunction and damages in the
RTC.
6. Parties executed a compromise agreement approved
by RTC wherein Agcaoili paid the sum of amortizations
upaid unti the agreement and accrued condominium
dues and other payables. FDC reinstated contract to
sell and allowed Agcaoili to temporarily install 2
window-type aircons.
7. FDC agains disconnected the electric supply of the
unit. Agcaoili lodged a complaint for damages against
FDC and FSCC.

a. Disconnection has unjustly deprived him of the

use and enjoyment of the unit, seriously
affected his law practice, and caused him
sufferings, inconvenience and embarrassment.
b. FDC and FSCC violated the compromise
agreement
c. He was therefore entitled to 21626.60 actual
damages, moral and exemplary damages and
attys fees.
8. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Agcaoili, holding
that his complaint was not barred by res judicata, that
he was justified in suspending the payment of his
monthly amortizations, that FDC and FSCC had no
separate personalities; and Agcaoili entitled to
damages.
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading
and the payment of the prescribed docket fee are the
acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
claim.
In an action where the reliefs sought are purely for
sums of money and damages, the docket fees are
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount being
claimed.
Ideally, the complaint or similar pleading must specify
the sums of money to be recovered and the damages
being sought in order that the clerk of court may be
put in a position to compute the correct amount of
docket fees.
The non-specification of the amounts of damages does
not immediately divest the trial court of its jurisdiction
over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent
to defraud the Government on the part of the plaintiff.
The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of
docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial
court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the
fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant,
barring prescription.
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion - the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of

9.

the prescribed docket fees vested a trial court with

jurisdiction over the claim, and although the docket
fees paid were insufficient in relation to the amount of
the claim, the clerk of court or his duly authorized
deputy retained the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment, and the party filing the action
could be required to pay the deficiency, without
jurisdiction being automatically lost.
The docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient
considering that the complaint did not specify the
amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that
Agcaoili paid the assessed docket fees. Such payment
negated bad faith or intent to defraud the
Government. Nonetheless, Agcaoili must remit any
docket fee deficiency to the RTCs clerk of court.

#30 MONTEFALCON V. VASQUEZ

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Dolores Montefalcon filed a complaint for
acknowledgment and support against Ronnie Vasquez
before RTC of Naga. She alleges that her son Laurence
is the illegitimate child of Vasquez and she prayed that
Vasquez be obliged to give support to Laurence whose
certificate of live birth he signed as a father.
2. Sheriff tried to serve summons and complaint on
Vasquez and his grandfather received them as he was
in Manila. Vasquezs mother returned the documents
to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the
non-service of summons.
3. Petitioners filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default.
Denied for lack of service of summons.
4. Court issued an alias summons on Vasquez upon
motion of the petitioners. Deputy sherriff served it by
substituted service on Vasquezs caretaker. The
sheriffs return incorrectly stated Lazaro as Vasquezs
surname.
5. Another alias summons was issued an was also
received by Vasquezs caretaker.
6. On petitioners motion, TC declared Vasquez in default
for failure to file an answer. Vasquez was furnished
with court orders and notices but these were returnes
as he had allegedly moved to another address.
7. Court granted petitioners prayers.
a. Acknowledge Laurence as his illegitimate child;
give support of 5k monthly from June 1 1993
and end of each month beginning July 31, 2001,
and every end of the month thereafter; and pay
sum of 10k, 3k and 1k for attys and appearance
fees, litigation expenses.
8. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice
of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was
granted.
a. He argued that TC erred in trying and deciding
the case as it never acquired jurisdiction over
his person. Appellate court noted that the
service of summons on Vasquez was defective
as there was no explanation of impossibility of

personal service and an attempt to effect

personal service.
9. Petitioners filed a MR. they argued that personal
service was unnecessary because Vasquez already left
for abroad. DENIED.
ISSUE/S: WON there is a valid substituted service of
summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction
over his person.
HELD:
To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant,
service of summons must be personal, or if this is not
feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted
service.
It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are
contractual employees. They go back to the country once
their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another
contract with the same or new manning agency and
principal if they wish.
It is common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has
a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro
Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold
offices, aside from his home address in the province
where he originates. Notice may then be taken that he
has established a residence in either place.
As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident
temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of
summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of
the Rules of Court1. Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses
the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other
methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules
may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
defendant-seaman.
Personal service of summons was not practicable since
the defendant was temporarily out of the country.

1 SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of
the Philippines, as under the preceding section.

There was no undue haste in effecting substituted

service. The fact that the Naga court allowed a
reasonable time to locate Vasquez to as far as Taguig
shows that there was indeed no precipitate haste in
serving the summons.
Substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified
because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to
serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were
evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs
in the performance of their official duty. Also, the person
who received the alias summons was of suitable age and
discretion, then residing at Vasquezs dwelling.
Montalban v. Maximo - the normal method of service of
summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted
service because personal service abroad and service by
publication are not ordinary means of summoning
defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against a
temporarily absent resident may be by substituted
service as domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to
suits in personam therein.
Residence is the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made,
even though he may be temporarily out of the country at
the time. A plaintiff is merely required to know the
defendants residence, office or regular business place. He
need not know where a resident defendant actually is at
the very moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound
to ensure that the person upon whom service was
actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or
informs him about it. The law presumes that for him. It is
immaterial that defendant does not receive actual notice.

Absence in the final sheriffs return of a statement about the

impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove
that the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly
prejudice petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact
done. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have
been submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any
incident assailing the validity of the substituted service had
Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard.

#35 OMBUDSMAN v. SISON

FACTS:
1. Isog Han Samar Movement filed a letter-complaint
addressed to then Ombudsman Marcelo, accusing Gov.
Tan and other local officials of Samar including
respondent Sison [provincial budget officer] of highly
anomalous transactions entered into by them involving
several millions of pesos.
2. The complaint stemmed from an audit investigation
made by Legal and Adjudication Office which found
that various purchases amounting to 29.34M went
without proper bidding procedures and documentation,
and the purchases using the calamity funds were
severely overpriced.
3. OB found basis to proceed with the administrative
case.
4. Sison in his counter-affidavit denied the accusations in
the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence.
5. OB rendered a decision finding Sison and several local
officials guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and dismissed him from service.
6. Sison appealed to the CA via Petition for Review under
Rule 43. CA reversed and set aside the OB decision
against Sison.
7. OB filed an ombinus motion for intervention and to
admit attached MR which was denied.
8. CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to
intervene, because :
a. The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third
party who has a legal interest in the
administrative case against petitioner;
b. The Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed
after the CA rendered its Decision; and
c. The Office of the Ombudsman was the quasijudicial body which rendered the impugned
decision.
ISSUE/S: WON the OB may be allowed to intervene and seek
reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by CA. NO.
HELD: Intervention is discretionary upon the Court.

It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of

a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third
persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming
an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in
order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its
main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single
judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole
controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, two requisites must concur:
o Movant has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; and
o Intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor
should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being
properly
decided
in
a
separate
proceeding.
The interest, which entitles one to
intervene, must involve the matter in
litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment.
OB not an appropriate party to intervene in this case.
It must remain partial and detached. Likewise, this
case was elevated to the CA via Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the ROC and SC AC No. 1-95.
o Both rules provide that petition for review shall
state the full names of the parties without
impleading the court or agencies either as
petitioners or respondents. The only parties in
such an appeal are the appellant as petitioner
and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this
case, the administrative agency that rendered
the judgment appealed from, is not a party in
the said appeal.
MOTION FOR INTERVENTION WAS NOT FILED ON TIME

Rules provides explicitly that a motion to

intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court.
o In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for
Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008,
after the Decision of the CA was promulgated on
June 26, 2008.
o Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the
appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court
provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing
a verified petition for review with the CA, with
proof of service of a copy on the court or
agency a quo.
o the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time
within which to file a motion to intervene. As
such, its failure to do so should not now be
countenanced
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
o

#40 GONZALES V. BUGAAY

FACTS:
1. Deceased spouses Ayad had 5 children: Enrico,
Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximiniano, and Mariano.
Mariano, who was single predeceased his parents.
2. Enrico remained single. Encarnacion died and is
survived by her children who are the petitioners in this
case. Consolacion was married to the late Imigdio
Bugaay. Their children are the respondents in this
case.
3. In their amended complaint for partition and
annulment of documents with damages, petitioners
allege that the only surviving children of spouses Ayad
are Enrico and Consolacion, and that during spouses
Ayads lifetime, they owned several agricultural as well
as residential properties.
4. They aver that Enrico executed fraudulent documents
covering all properties owned by Sps. Ayad in favor or
Consolacion and respondents completely disregarding
their rights. They prayed for the partition of Sps.
Ayads estate, and award of damages and attys fees.
5. Enrico, Consolacion and Respondents claimed that
petitioners had long obtained their advance
inheritance from the estate of spouses Ayad, and the
properties sought to be partitioned are now
individually titles in respondents names.
6. RTC rendered a decision awarding pro-indiviso
share of the estate to Enrico, Maximiniano,
Encarnacion and Consolacion, exclusing Mariano who
predeceased
them.The
deed
of
extrajudicial
settlement and partition executed by Enrico and
respondents declared null and void.
7. Respondents filed a MR and/or MNT. RTC issued an
order which reads:
a. in the event that within a period of one (1)
month from today, they have not yet settled the
case, it is understood that the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial is submitted for
resolution without any further hearing.
8. Without resolving the foregoing motion, the RTC,
noting the failure of the parties to submit a project of

partition, issued a writ of execution giving them a

period of 15 days within which to submit their
nominees for commissioner, who will partition the
subject estate.
9. RTC subsequently discovered the pending MR and/or
MNT. Judge Angeles granted respondents MR and/or
MNT for the specific purpose of receiving and offering
for admission the documents referred to by the
respondents.
10.However, instead of presenting the documents
adverted to, consisting the documents to be annulled,
respondents demurred to petitioners evidence which
the RTC denied.
11.Respondents elevated the case to the CA on certiorari
for imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in denying their demurrer notwithstanding
petitioners failure to present documents sought to be
annulled. CA granted the petition.
ISSUE/S: WON CAs dismissal of the amended complaint in
accordance with law, Rules of procedure and jurisprudence.
HELD:
The RTC Orders assailed before the CA basically involved the
propriety of filing a demurrer to evidence after a Decision
had been rendered in the case.

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff

has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal was reversed he shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago - A
demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented
after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by
one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient

in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a

case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated
by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the
merits of the case.

In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised

in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient proof to
sustain the judgment. Being considered a motion to
dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be
filed before the court renders its judgment.
Respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after
the RTC promulgated its Decision.
While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of
receiving and offering for admission the documents
not presented at the trial. As respondents never
complied with the directive but instead filed a
demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed
abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision
stands.
The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an
available remedy to respondents and should not have
been granted, as the RTC had correctly done.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted.

#46 SEVILLENO v. CARILO

FACTS:
1. Pamela and Purita both surnamed Sevilleno, filed with
the RTC a complaint for damages against spouses
carilo, respondents. Petitioners prayed for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorneys
fees.
2. Respondents seasonably filed their answer with
compulsory counterclaim. They prayed that TC dismiss
the case for lack of cause of action.
3. RTC motu poprio dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter. Petitioners filed a MR
but was denied.
4. Petitioners appealed to the CA but was dismissed for
being the wrong mode of appeal.
a. Since the issue raised is the jurisdiction of RTC
over the subject matter, which is a question of
law, appeal should have been elevated to the SC
under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction over the case. NO.
HELD:
A courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action is conferred only by the Constitution or by
statute.
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the
action is a matter of law. Consequently, issues which
deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of a case are pure questions of law.
Petitioners appeal solely involves a question of law,
they should have directly taken their appeal to this
Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, not an ordinary appeal with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41.
CA did not err in holding that petitioners pursued the
wrong mode of appeal.

Section 2, Rule 502 of the same Rules provides that an

appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals raising
only questions of law shall be dismissed; and that an
appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall
be dismissed outright.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.

2 Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.

An appeal under
Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues of pure law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from
the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright.

#52 FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V. RTC OF MAKATI

BRANCH 66
FACTS:
1. GPS agreed to transport 30 units of Condura S.D. white
refrigerators in one of its Isuzu trucjs driven by Eroles
from the plant site of Concepcion Industries Inc., in
Alabang to Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City.
2. On its way to the destination, the truck collided with
another truck resulting to damage of the said
properties.
3. FGU Insurance Corp, the insurer of the damaged
refrigerators, paid CII the value of the covered
shipment worth 204,450. In turn, FGU sought
reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.
4. FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of
contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles for its
failure to reimburse the amount the former paid to CII.
5. GPS filed a MTD by way of demurrer to evidence, RTC
granted the demurrer.
a. FGU failed to adduce evidence that GPS was a
common carrier and that its driver was negligent
6. CA affirmed RTC.
7. Case was elevated to SC. SC rendered a decision
agreeing with the lower courts that GPS was not a
common carrier, but nevertheless held it liable under
the doctrine of culpa contractual. Affirmed only insofar
as Eroles is concerned but reversed with regard to
GPS. Hence, the latter was ordered to pay FGU the
value of damaged and lost cargoes. MR was denied.
8. An entry for judgment was issued. FGU filed a motion
for execution with the RTC.
9. GPS filed its opposition to Motion for Execution praying
that the motion for execution be denied on the ground
that FGUs claim was unlawful, illegal, against public
policy and good morals, and constituted unjust
enrichment.
a. GPS alleged that it discovered, upon verification
from the insured, that after the insureds claim
was compensated in full, the insured transferred
the ownership of the subject appliances to FGU.
FGU sold the same to third parties thereby

receiving and appropriating the consideration

and proceeds of the sale.
10.Thereafter, GPD filed its comment with Motion to Set
Case for Hearing on the Merits. RTC granted the
motion to set case for hearing.
11.FGUs MR denied. Hence, this petition for mandamus.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON RTC unlawfully neglected the performance of its
duty when it reopened a case, the decision of which
has already attained finality.
2. WON RTC unlawfully neglected the performance of a
ministerial duty when it denied the issuance of a writ
of execution.
HELD:
Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a
higher court has become final and executory and has
been returned to the lower court, the only function of
the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the
decision and issuing the writ of execution.
A final and executory judgment can no longer be
amended by adding thereto a relief not originally
included. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the
winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the
issuance thereof becomes a court's ministerial duty.
The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the
superior court or reexamine it for any other purpose
other than execution; much less may it review the
same upon any matter decided on appeal or error
apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle
so much as has been demanded.
Doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment - a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court
that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
Any act which violates this principle must immediately
be struck down.
EXCEPTIONS:

o
o
o

correction of clerical errors;

so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party;
void judgments; and

whenever circumstances transpire after the

finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.
There is indeed a need to find out the whereabouts of
the subject refrigerators.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DISMISSED.
o