TodayisThursday,February18,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.185969November19,2014
AT&TCOMMUNICATIONSSERVICESPHILIPPINES,INC.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONEROFINTERNALREVENUE,Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ,J.:
BeforetheCourtisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariseekingtoreverseandsetasidethe24September2008
Decision1andthe13January2009Resolution2oftheCourtofTaxAppeals(CTA)EnBancinC.T.A.EBNo.381
which affirmed the Decision and Resolution dated 12 December 2007 and 12 March 2008, respectively, of the
FirstDivisionoftheCTA(CTAinDivision)3inC.T.A.CaseNo.7221,dismissingthepetitionforlackofmeritand
accordingly,deniedpetitioner'sclaimfortherefundorissuanceofataxcreditcertificate(TCC)intheamountof
P3,003,265.14 allegedly representing excess or unutilized input ValueAdded Tax (VAT) attributable to its zero
ratedsalesofservicesfortheperiodcovering1January2003to31December2003.
TheFacts
The factual antecedents of this case reveal that petitioner AT&T Communications Services Philippines, Inc.
(petitioner), being a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of rendering information,
promotional, supportive and liaison service, entered into a Service Agreement with AT&T Communications
Services International, Inc. (AT&TCSI), a nonresident foreign corporation, on 1 January 1999, whereby
compensationforsuchservicesispaidinUSDollars.4
Petitioner has an Assignment Agreement with AT&T Solutions, Inc. (AT&TSI) where the latter assigned to
petitioner the performance of services AT&TSI was supposed to provide Mastercard International, Inc. (a non
residentforeigncorporation)underaVirtualPrivateNetworkServiceAgreement.Likewise,thecompensationfor
such services is paid in US Dollars to be inwardly remitted to the Philippines by AT&TSI, which acts as the
collectingagentofpetitioner.5
Thereafter, a second Assignment Agreement was executed and entered into by petitioner with AT&TSI for the
purpose of performing the latters obligation to Lexmark International, Inc. (also a nonresident foreign
corporation)byprovidingservicestoitsaffiliatesinthePhilippines,namely:LexmarkResearchandDevelopment
Corporation and Lexmark International (Philippines), Inc. (both Philippine Economic Zone Authority [PEZA]
registered enterprises). Payment of petitioners aforesaid services is as well paid in US Dollars through
telegraphictransfer.6
Consequently,petitionerfileditsQuarterlyVATReturnswiththeBureauofInternalRevenue(BIR)forthetaxable
yearperiodcovering1January2003to31December2003,detailedhereunderasfollows:
DateofFiling

PeriodCovered

22April2003

1stQuarter

23July2003

2ndQuarter

22October2003

3rdQuarter

26January2004

4thQuarter7

On5February2004,petitionerfileditsfirstAmendedQuarterlyVATReturnfortheFourthQuarteroftaxableyear

2003whileon26April2004,petitionerfileditsAmendedQuarterlyVATReturnsfortheFirsttoFourthQuarters
ofthetaxableyear2003.8
Petitionerfiledon13April2005withtheBIRanapplicationforrefundand/ortaxcreditofitsunutilizedVATinput
taxes for the aforesaid taxable period amounting to P3,003,265.14. However, there being no action on said
administrativeclaim,petitionerfiledaPetitionforReviewbeforetheCTAinDivisionon20April2005(orexactly
seven [7] days from the time it filed its administrative claim) in order to suspend the running of the prescriptive
periodprovidedunderSection229oftheNationalInternalRevenueCode(NIRC)of1997,asamended.9
TheRulingoftheCTAinDivision
In C.T.A. Case No. 7221, the CTA in Division rendered a Decision dated 12 December 200710 dismissing
petitioners claim for the refund or issuance of a TCC. It ruled that in order to be entitled to its refund claim,
petitioner must show proof of compliance with the substantiation requirements as mandated bylaw and
regulations.Therefore,consideringthatthesubjectrevenuespertaintogrossreceiptsfromservicesrenderedby
petitioner, valid official receipts and not mere sales invoices should have been presented and submitted in
evidence in support thereof. Without proper VAT official receipts, the foreign currency payment received by
petitionerfromservicesrenderedforthefour(4)quartersoftaxableyear2003cannotqualifyforzeroratingfor
VATpurposes.SinceitisclearfromtheprovisionsofSection112(A)oftheNIRCof1997,asamended,thatthere
mustbezeroratedsalesoreffectivelyzeroratedsalesinorderforarefundclaimofinputVATcouldprosper,the
claimedinputVATpaymentsallegedlyattributabletheretointheamountofP3,003,265.14cannotbegranted.11
On 12 March 2008, the CTA in Division denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit
considering that no new matter was raised which were not taken into consideration in arriving at the subject
Decisionthatwouldwarrantitsreversalormodification.12
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the CTA En Bancpursuant to Section 18 of RepublicAct
(R.A.)No.1125,asamendedbySection11ofR.A.No.9282,docketedasC.T.A.EBNo.381.13
TheRulingoftheCTAEnBanc
Findingnomeritinpetitionerscontentions,theCTAEnBancrenderedtheassailed24September2008Decision
which affirmed both the Decision and Resolution rendered by the CTA in Division in C.T.A. Case No. 7221. It
categorically pronounced that official receipt cannot be interchanged with sales invoice.14 It further emphasized
that proof of inward remittances like bank credit advices cannot be used in lieu of VAT official receipts to
demonstrate petitioners zerorated transactions. Under Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,
irrespective of the nature of transaction, be it taxable, exempt orzerorated sale, the law mandates that the
taxpayer "for every sale, issue an invoice or receipt." Thus, the enumerated zerorated transactions under
Sections106and108arethosewhicharedulycoveredbyVATinvoices(inthecaseofsalesofgoods),andVAT
officialreceipts(inthecaseofsalesofservices).15 In other words, the law itself clearly specified that an official
receipt shall cover sales of services, and did not provide for any other document which can be used as an
alternativetoorinlieuthereof.
UpondenialofpetitionersMotionforReconsiderationthereof,itfiledtheinstantPetitionforReviewonCertiorari
before this Court seeking the reversal of the aforementioned Decision and the 13 January 2009 Resolution16
renderedinC.T.A.EBNo.381.
Insupportthereof,petitionerraisesthefollowinggrounds:(1)theNIRCof1997,asamended,doesnotlimitthe
proof of input or output VAT to a single document. There is no distinction of the evidentiary value of the
supporting documents. Hence, it is clear that invoices or receipts may be used interchangeably to substantiate
VAT(2)theuseoftheVATofficialreceiptasproofofpaymentofthesaleofservicelosesitssignificancedueto
the requirement that petitioner must prove the validity of its inward remittances (3) petitioner presented
substantial evidence that unequivocally proved its zerorated transactions for the taxable year 2003 and (4) in
civil cases, such as claims for refund or issuance of a TCC, a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice to
justifythegrantoftheclaim.17
TheIssue
The sole issue for this Courts consideration is whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund or issuance of a
TCCinitsfavoramountingtoP3,003,265.14allegedlyrepresentingunutilizedinputVATattributabletopetitioners
zeroratedsalesfortheperiodof1January2003to31December2003,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthe
NIRCof1997,asamended,otherpertinentlaws,andapplicablejurisprudentialproclamations.
OurRuling
Atthisjuncture,itbearsemphasisthatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterornatureofanactionisfundamental
foracourttoactonagivencontroversy,18andisconferredonlybylawandnotbytheconsentorwaiverupona

court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence,
acquiescence,orevenbyexpressconsentoftheparties.19Ifthecourthasnojurisdictionoverthenatureofan
action,itsonlyjurisdictionistodismissthecase.Thecourtcouldnotdecidethecaseonthemerits.20Needlessto
state,toobviatethepossibilitythatitsdecisionmayberenderedvoid,theCourtcan,byitsowninitiative,raisethe
questionofjurisdiction,althoughnotraisedbytheparties.21Asacorollarythereto,toinquireintotheexistenceof
jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatteristheprimaryconcernofacourt,forthereonwoulddependthevalidityofits
entireproceedings.22Therefore,eveniftherewasnojurisdictionalissueraisedbyanyparty,theCourtmaylook
intoitatanytimeoftheproceedings,evenduringthisappeal.
IthaslongbeenestablishedthattheCTAisacourtofspecialjurisdiction.Assuch,itcanonlytakecognizanceof
suchmattersasareclearlywithinitsjurisdiction.23Hence,whenitappearsfromthepleadingsortheevidenceon
recordthatthecourthasnojurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,thecourtshalldismisstheclaim.24
Relevantthereto,theCourtsittingEnBanchasfinallysettledtheissueonproperobservanceoftheprescriptive
periodsinclaimingforrefundofcreditableinputtaxdueorpaidattributabletoanyzeroratedoreffectivelyzero
ratessales.Thus,inviewofthejurisprudentialpronouncementsrenderedinCommissionerofInternalRevenuev.
San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Philex
MiningCorporationv.CommissionerofInternalRevenue(SanRoquecase),25thisCourtfindsitimperativetofirst
look into the factual findings of the CTA for the purpose of achieving a complete determination of the issue
presented,particularlyastothetimelinessofitsadministrativeandjudicialclaims.
InC.T.A.CaseNo.7221,theCTAinDivisionsolelyruledonpetitionersnoncompliancewiththesubstantiation
requirements,expressingthattheevidencesubmittedbypetitionertoproveitszeroratedsaleswereinsufficient
so as to entitle it to the claim for refund or issuance of a TCC. Similar declaration was made by the CTA En
Bancintheassailed24September2008Decisionand13January2009ResolutioninC.T.A.EBNo.381.
Nonetheless,althoughitistruethatthesubstantiationrequirementsinestablishingarefundclaimisavalidissue
for this Court to rule upon, the prior determination of whether or notthe CTA properly acquired jurisdiction over
petitioners claim covering the four (4) quarters of taxable year 2003, taking into consideration the timeliness of
thefilingoftheadministrativeandjudicialclaimspursuanttoSection112oftheNIRCof1997,asamended,and
consistentwiththepronouncementsmadeintheSanRoquecase,isstillourprimaryconcern.Clearly,petitioners
claimcanonlyproceeduponcompliancewiththeaforesaidjurisdictionalrequirement.
Section112oftheNIRCof1997,asamended,reads:
SEC.112.RefundsorTaxCreditsofInputTax.
(A) Zerorated or Effectively Zerorated Sales. Any VAT registered person, whose sales are zerorated or
effectivelyzeroratedmay,withintwo(2)yearsafterthecloseofthetaxablequarterwhenthesalesweremade,
applyfortheissuanceofataxcreditcertificateorrefundofcreditableinputtaxdueorpaidattributabletosuch
sales,excepttransitionalinputtax,totheextentthatsuchinputtaxhasnotbeenappliedagainstoutputtax:xxx
xxxx
(D)26PeriodwithinwhichRefundorTaxCreditofInputTaxesshallbeMade.Inpropercases,theCommissioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsection(A)hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissionertoactontheapplicationwithintheperiodprescribedabove,thetaxpayeraffectedmay,withinthirty
(30)daysfromthereceiptofthedecisiondenyingtheclaimoraftertheexpirationoftheonehundredtwentyday
period,appealthedecisionortheunactedclaimwiththeCourtofTaxAppeals.
xxxx(Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied)
As mentioned earlier, the proper interpretation of the aforequoted provision was finally settled in the San
Roquecase27 by this Court sitting En Banc. The relevant portions of the discussion pertinent to the focal issue
presentedinthiscasearequotedhereunder,towit:
First,Section112(A)clearly,plainly,andunequivocallyprovidesthatthetaxpayer"may,withintwo(2)yearsafter
the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refundofthecreditableinputtaxdueorpaidtosuchsales."Inshort,thelawstatesthatthetaxpayermayapply
with the Commissioner for a refund or credit "within two (2) years," which means at anytime within two years.
Thus,theapplicationforrefundorcreditmaybefiledbythetaxpayerwiththeCommissioneronthelastdayof
the twoyear prescriptive period and it will still strictly comply with the law. The twoyear prescriptive period is a

graceperiodinfavorofthetaxpayerandhecanavailofthefullperiodbeforehisrighttoapplyforataxrefundor
creditisbarredbyprescription.
Second, Section 112(C) provides that the Commissioner shall decide the application for refund orcredit "within
onehundredtwenty(120)daysfromthedateofsubmissionofcompletedocumentsinsupportoftheapplication
filed in accordance with Subsection (A)." The reference in Section 112(C) of the submission of documents "in
supportoftheapplicationfiledinaccordancewithSubsectionA"meansthattheapplicationinSection112(A)is
the administrative claim that the Commissioner must decide within the 120day period. In short, the two year
prescriptiveperiodinSection112(A)referstotheperiodwithinwhichthetaxpayercanfileanadministrativeclaim
fortaxrefundorcredit.Statedotherwise,thetwoyearprescriptiveperioddoesnotrefertothefilingofthejudicial
claimwiththeCTAbuttothefilingoftheadministrativeclaimwiththeCommissioner.AsheldinAichi,the"phrase
withintwoyearsxxxapplyfortheissuanceofataxcreditorrefundreferstoapplicationsforrefund/creditwith
theCIRandnottoappealsmadetotheCTA."
xxxx
Section112(A)and(C)mustbeinterpretedaccordingtoitsclear,plain,andunequivocallanguage.Thetaxpayer
canfilehisadministrativeclaimforrefundorcreditatanytimewithinthetwoyearprescriptiveperiod.Ifhefileshis
claimonthelastdayofthetwoyearprescriptiveperiod,hisclaimisstillfiledontime.TheCommissionerwillhave
120daysfromsuchfilingtodecidetheclaim.IftheCommissionerdecidestheclaimonthe120thday,ordoes
notdecideitonthatday,thetaxpayerstillhas30daystofilehisjudicialclaimwiththeCTA.Thisisnotonlythe
plainmeaningbutalsotheonlylogicalinterpretationofSection112(A)and(C).28(Emphasessupplied)
Itwasmoreoverpronounced:
The Atlas doctrine, which held that claims for refund or credit of input VAT must comply with the twoyear
prescriptive period under Section 229, should be effective only from its promulgation on 8 June 2007 until its
abandonmenton12September2008inMirant.TheAtlasdoctrinewaslimitedtothereckoningofthetwoyear
prescriptive period from the date of payment of the output VAT. Prior to the Atlas doctrine, the twoyear
prescriptiveperiodforclaimingrefundorcreditofinputVATshouldbegovernedbySection112(A)followingthe
verbalegisrule.TheMirantruling,whichabandonedtheAtlasdoctrine,adoptedtheverbalegisrule,thusapplying
Section 112(A) in computing the twoyear prescriptive period in claiming refund or credit of input VAT.29
(Emphasisandunderliningsupplied)
Applyingtheforegoingpronouncements,andconsideringthatpetitionersadministrativeclaimwasfiledbeforethe
promulgationoftheAtlascase,30itisclearthatpetitioneronlyhadaperiodoftwo(2)yearsfromthecloseofthe
taxablequarterwhenthezeroratedoreffectivelyzeroratedsalesweremade,tofileanadministrativeclaimfor
refund or issuance of a TCC in its favor. As aptly found by the CTA in Division and the CTA En Banc, the
administrativeclaimcoveringallfour(4)quartersoftaxableyear2003,wasfiledbypetitioneron13April2005.
However, although petitioners administrative claim was filed within the prescribed 2year period under Section
112(A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, insofar as to the Second, Third, and Fourth Quartersof taxable year
2003areconcerned,itappearsthatitsclaimcoveringtheFirstQuarteroftaxableyear2003wasbelatedlyfiled,
detailedhereunderasfollows:
Taxableyear2003(closeoftaxable Lastdayoffiling
quarters)
administrativeclaims
(withinthe2yearperiod
fromthecloseofthe
taxablequarters)
1stQuarter(31March2003)

30March200531

2ndQuarter(30June2003)

29June2005

3rdQuarter(30September2003)

29September2005

4thQuarter(31December2003)

30December2005

Filingdateoftheadminist
rativeclaim

13April
2005

Clearly,theCTAhadnojurisdictiontoruleonpetitionersrefundclaimcoveringtheFirstQuarteroftaxableyear
2003sinceitsadministrativeclaimwasfiledbeyondthe2yearprescriptiveperiodasmandatedbylaw,orexactly
fourteen(14)daysafterthelastdaytofilethesame.
Ontheotherhand,astopetitionersclaimscoveringtheremainingquartersoftaxableyear2003,theCourtfinds
thatpetitionerhasindeedproperlyfileditsjudicialclaimbeforetheCTA,evenwithoutwaitingfortheexpirationof
theonehundredtwenty(120)dayperiod,sinceatthetimepetitionerfileditspetition,BIRRulingNo.DA48903
issuedon10December2003wasalreadyineffect.Thisrulingisnotwithoutanylegalbasis.Thus:

LikeSanRoque,TaganitoalsofileditspetitionforreviewwiththeCTAwithoutwaitingforthe120dayperiodto
lapse. Also, like San Roque, Taganito filed its judicial claim before the promulgation of the Atlas doctrine.
Taganito filed a Petition for Review on 14 February 2007 with the CTA. This is almost fourmonths before the
adoption of the Atlas doctrine on 8 June 2007. Taganito is similarly situated as San Roque both cannot claim
beingmisled,misguided,orconfusedbytheAtlasdoctrine.
1 w p h i1

However, Taganito can invoke BIR Ruling No. DA48903 dated 10 December 2003, which expressly ruled that
the"taxpayerclaimantneednotwaitforthelapseofthe120dayperiodbeforeitcouldseekjudicialreliefwiththe
CTAbywayofPetitionforReview."TaganitofileditsjudicialclaimaftertheissuanceofBIRRulingNo.DA48903
butbeforetheadoptionoftheAichidoctrine.Thus,xxxTaganitoisdeemedtohavefileditsjudicialclaimwiththe
CTAontime.32(Emphasissupplied)
xxxx
Torepeat,aclaimfortaxrefundorcredit,likeaclaimfortaxrefundexemption,isconstruedstrictlyagainstthe
taxpayer.OneoftheconditionsforajudicialclaimofrefundorcreditundertheVATSystemiscompliancewith
the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is
necessaryforsuchaclaimtoprosper,whetherbefore,during,oraftertheeffectivityoftheAtlasdoctrine,except
fortheperiodfromtheissuanceofBIRRulingNo.DA48903on10December2003to6October2010whenthe
Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.33
(Emphasissupplied)
Withoutdoubt,itisevidentfromtheforegoingjurisprudentialpronouncementsthatasageneralrule,ataxpayer
claimantneedstowaitfortheexpirationoftheonehundredtwenty(120)dayperiodbeforeitmaybeconsidered
as "inaction" on the partof the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). Thereafter, the taxpayerclaimant is
given only a limited period of thirty (30) days from said expiration tofile its corresponding judicial claim with the
CTA. However, with the exception of claims made during the effectivity of BIR Ruling No. DA48903 (from 10
December2003to5October2010),34petitionerhasindeedproperlyandtimelyfileditsjudicialclaimcoveringthe
Second,Third,andFourthQuartersoftaxableyear2003,withintheboundsofthelawandexistingjurisprudence.
Now,thesignificanceofthedifferencebetweenasalesinvoiceandanofficialreceiptasevidenceforzerorated
transactions.
Thisisnotnovel.
For emphasis, even prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9337,35 which clearly delineates the invoice and official
receipt,ourTaxCodehasalreadymadethedistinction.
Section113oftheNIRCof1997,asamendedisthefocalprovision,towit:
SEC.113.InvoicingandAccountingRequirementsforVATregisteredPersons.
(A)InvoicingRequirements.AVATregisteredpersonshall,foreverysale,issueaninvoiceorreceipt.Inaddition
totheinformationrequiredunderSection237,thefollowinginformationshallbeindicatedintheinvoiceorreceipt:
(Emphasissupplied)
xxxx
Althoughitappearsundertheabovequotedprovisionthatthereisnocleardistinctionontheevidentiaryvalueof
aninvoiceorofficialreceipt,itisworthytonotethatthesaidprovisionisageneralprovisionwhichcoversallsales
ofaVATregisteredperson,whethersaleofgoodsorservices.Itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatthelegislature
intended to use the same interchangeably. The Court therefore cannot conclude that the general provision of
Section113oftheNIRCof1997,asamended,intendedthattheinvoiceandofficialreceiptcanbeusedforeither
sale of goods or services, because there are specific provisions of the Tax Code which clearly delineates the
differencebetweenthetwotransactions.
Inthisinstance,Section108oftheNIRCof1997,asamended,provides:
SEC.108.ValueaddedTaxonSaleofServicesandUseorLeaseofProperties.
xxxx
(C)DeterminationoftheTaxThetaxshallbecomputedbymultiplyingthetotalamountindicatedintheofficial
receiptbyoneeleventh(1/11).(Emphasissupplied)
Comparatively,Section106ofthesameCodecoverssaleofgoods,thus:
SEC.106.ValueaddedTaxonSaleofGoodsorProperties,

xxxx
(D) Determination of the Tax. The tax shall be computed by multiplying the total amount indicated in the
invoicebyoneeleventh(1/11).(Emphasissupplied)
Apparently,theconstructionofthestatuteshowsthatthelegislatureintendedtodistinguishtheuseofaninvoice
from an official receipt. It is more logical therefore to conclude that subsections of a statute under the same
headingshouldbeconstruedashavingrelevancetoitsheading.ThelegislatureseparatelycategorizedVATon
saleofgoodsfromVATonsaleofservices,notonlybyitstreatmentwithregardtotaxbutalsowithrespectto
substantiationrequirements.HavingbeengroupedunderSection108,itssubparagraphs,(A)to(C),andSection
106,itssubparagraphs(A)to(D),havesignificantrelationswitheachother.
Legislativeintentmustbeascertainedfromaconsiderationofthestatuteasawholeandnotofanisolatedpartor
aparticularprovisionalone.Thisisacardinalruleinstatutoryconstruction.Fortakenintheabstract,awordor
phrasemighteasilyconveyameaningquitedifferentfromtheoneactuallyintendedandevidentwhentheword
orphraseisconsideredwiththosewithwhichitisassociated.Thus,anapparentlygeneralprovisionmayhavea
limitedapplicationifviewedtogetherwiththeotherprovisions.36
Settledistherulethateverypartofthestatutemustbeconsideredwiththeotherparts.37Accordingly,thewhole
of Section 108 should be read in conjunction with Sections 113 and 237 so as to give life to all the provisions
intendedforthesaleofservices.Thereisnoconflictbetweentheprovisionsofthelawthatcoversaleofservices
thataresubjecttozeroratedsalesthus,itshouldbereadaltogethertorevealthetruelegislativeintent.
To finally settle this matter, this Court declared in KEPCO Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,38thattheVATinvoiceistheseller'sbestproofofthesaleofthegoodsorservicestothebuyerwhile
theVATreceiptisthebuyer'sbestevidenceofthepaymentofgoodsorservicesreceivedfromtheseller.Thus,
theHighCourtconcludedthatVATinvoiceandVATreceiptshouldnotbeconfusedasreferringtooneandthe
samething.Certainly,neitherdoesthelawintendthetwotobeusedinterchangeably.Accordingly,weagreewith
therulingoftheCTAinDivision,aswellasthatoftheCTAEnBanc,insofarastoitsdiscussionontherelevancy
oftheaforesaidsubstantiationrequirements.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice
Chairperson
PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.*
AssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*

PerSpecialOrderNo.1870dated4November2014.

Rollo,pp.6887PennedbyAssociate.JusticeJuanitaC.Castaneda,Jr.withAssociateJusticesLovellR.
Bautista,ErlindaP.Uy,CaesarA.CasanovaandOlgaPalancaEnriquez,concurringandPresidingJustice
ErnestoD.Acosta,dissenting.

Id.at8896.

Id.at210229,259264PennedbyAssociateJusticeLovellR.BautistawithAssociateJusticeCaesarA.
CasanovaconcurringandPresidingJusticeErnestoD.Acostadissenting.
4

Rollo,pp.210211.

Id.at211.

Id.at211212.

Id.at212.

Id.

Id.at214.

10

Id. at 210229 Penned by Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista with Associate Justice Caesar A.
Casanova,concurringandPresidingJusticeErnestoD.Acosta,dissenting.
11

Id.at221222.

12

Id.at259264CTAinDivisionResolution.

13

Id.at271311.

14

Id.at78CTAEnBancDecisiondated24September2008.

15

Id.at81.

16

Id.at8896.

17

Id.at2728.

18

CommissionerofInternalRevenuev.Villa,etal.,130Phil.3,4(1968).

19

Laresmav.Abellana,484Phil.766,778(2004).

20

PleaserefertoLt.Col.DeGuzmanv.JudgeEscalona,186Phil.431,438(1980).

21

Ker&Company,Ltd.v.CourtofTaxAppeals,114Phil.1220(1962).

22

CommissionerofInternalRevenuev.Villa,etal.,supranote18.

23

Ker&Company,Ltd.v.CourtofTaxAppeals,supranote21.

24

Section1,Rule9,RulesofCourt.

25

G.R.Nos.187485,196113,and197156,12February2013,690SCRA336.

26

PresentlySection112(C)upontheeffectivityofRepublicActNo.9337on1November2005.

27

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(San Roquecase), supra note 25. See also Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and Mindanao I Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
Nos.193301and194637,11March2013,693SCRA49.
28

Id.at390392.

29

Id.at397.

30

AtlasConsolidatedMiningandDevt.Corp.v.CommissiononInternalRevenue,551Phil.519(2007).

31

Consideringthattaxableyear2004wasaleapyear.

32

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
supranote25at388.

33

Id.at398399.

34

"BIR Ruling No. DA48903 does provide a valid claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the
Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. DA48903 expressly states that the taxpayerclaimant need not wait for the
lapseofthe120dayperiodbeforeitcouldseekjudicialreliefwiththeCTAbywayofPetitionforReview."
SeeCommissionerofInternalRevenuev.SanRoquePowerCorporation,TaganitoMiningCorporationv.
Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, and Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
supranote25at401.
35

AnActAmendingSections27,28,34,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,116,117,119,121,
148, 151, 236, 237 and 288 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended, and for Other
Purposes.
36

AboitizShippingCorp.,et.al.v.CityofCebu,etal.,121Phil.425,429(1965).

37

PlantersAssociationofSouthernNegrosInc.v.Hon.Ponferrada,375SCRA901,913(1999).

38

G.R.No.181858,24November2010,636SCRA166,182.

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