G.R. No.

L-2256

July 6, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUIS NAVEA, defendant-appellant.
Minerva R. Inocencio-Piguing for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for
appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgement of the People's Court finding the appellant guilty of
treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with corresponding accessory penalties,
and to pay a fine of P10,000, plus the costs, the appellant being entitled, however, to the
benefit of one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
The appellant was charged with six counts but was found guilty of three, 1, 2, and 4.
Under count No. 1, the appellant is alleged to have been a member of a party of Filipinos who
captured in the latter part of November, 1944, Lieutenant Leslie of the American Air Force
who Bailed out from his plane between Binangonan and Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The capturing
party delivered the flier to the Japanese soldiers who liquidated him. The skull of Lieutenant
Leslie was found only after the liberation of Sta. Rosa. The witness for the prosecution
presented in support of this count were unanimous in testifying that the only part taken by the
appellant was to pilot the banca in which the capturing party of Lieutenant Leslie rode. The
evidence for the defense tends to show the appellant was compelled to pilot the banca by the
Japanese soldiers. In our opinion, the appellant at least is entitled to the benefit of a
reasonable doubt, as he merely piloted the banca used by the rescuing party and did not
even go with the Japanese soldiers when the latter took over the American Flier. No active
part is therefore attributable to the appellant in the delivery or liquidation of Lieutenant Leslie.
Under count No. 2, it is alleged that on or about two o'clock in the morning of November 16,
1944, the appellant and David Cose, both armed and clad in Japanese uniforms and army
caps, went to the house of the spouses Wenceslao Carpena and Maxima Bato in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. Upon arrival, they took hold of Reynaldo Carpena, son of Wenceslao, and after he
was tied, Reynaldo was brought down to the place where appellant's companions were
waiting with Captain Maykawa of the Japanese Army. Thereafter, the appellant And David
Cose went up the house, tied the hands of Wenceslao, and dragged him down. The appellant
and his companions left, bringing with them Wenceslao Carpena. Nothing was heard from

Wenceslao since then, and it was known that he was killed only after the liberation When his
remains were discovered. Wenceslao Carpena, according to the evidence for the
prosecution, was apprehended for being a guerrilla suspect. This count is supported by the
testimony of Maxima Bato and Reynaldo Carpena, wife and Son respectively of Wenceslao
Carpena.
Under count No. 4, it is alleged that on February 14, 1945, the appellant, together with Martin
Laurel, Filemon Alitaptap, Tiburcio Alitaptap and Higino Sigue, found Agustin Ramirez riding
on a bicycle. Thereupon they arrested him. After Agustin's hands had been tied, the group
took him to a yard in front of the house of Buenaventura Dichoso where he was forced to
kneel down on the edge of a prepared grave and bayoneted to death by Tiburcio Alitaptap
and Martin Laurel. Agustin Ramirez was suspected of being a guerrilla. This count is
supported by the testimony of Buenaventura Dichoso and Canuto Velandres.
We are convinced that the appellant is guilty under counts No. 2 and 4. At least two witnesses
testified in support thereof. It is true that, as pointed out in the lengthy brief of appellant's
counsel de oficio, there are some discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution witness,
but as they refer to minor details, said discrepancies rather lead to the conclusion that the
witnesses were not fabricated. In view of the lapse of time and different capacities for
observation, the witnesses cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity minor
matters connected to the main overt acts. The trial court saw and observed the witnesses
during the trial, and we have found no good reason for overruling said court when it gave
weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and refused to believe the testimony of
the witnesses for the defense. At any rate, the witnesses for the prosecution have not been
shown to have had any motive for falsely testifying against the appellant.
The Solicitor General recommends that the appellant be sentenced for the complex crime of
treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that where, as in the present case, the
killing is charged as an element of treason it "becomes identified with the latter crime and
cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides."
Being conformity with the facts and the law, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with
costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-855

April 28, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TROADIO BUTAWAN, defendant-appellant.
Juan Nabong for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court convicting theappellant Troadio
Butawan of the crime of treason to death by electrocution, topay a fine of P2,000, plus the
costs.
The information charged eight count, but the prosecution was able to present evidence in
support of only counts 1, 5 and 6. The People Court found the appellant guilty of these three
counts.
Under count 1, the appellant is charged with having adhered to the enemy and given her aid
and comfort by serving as a detachment commander of the Bureauof Constabulary under the
Japanese Military Forces. Under count No. 5, the appellant is charged with having shot and
killed at about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 18, 1944, Zoilo Calimutan, a member of the
guerilla organization known as the "Bolo Battalion," while the latter was distilling tuba near his
house in Rosario, Cortes, Bohol, with his back towards the appellant. Under count No. 6, the
appellant is accused of having apprehended, maltreated and tortured, on February 22, 1944,
Gabriel Lumba, Maximo Buyoand Apolinario Igpit, also members of the "Bolo Battalion."
There is no dispute that the appellant served as a detachment commander of the Bureau of
Constabulary during the Japanese occupation, and that his duty was to protect the lives and
properties of, and pacify, the civilians. Evenso, mere membership in said Bureau of
Constabulary, without more, did notconstitute treason, for as held inPeople vs. Albano (82
Phil., 767), "possibly, under certain circumstances, members of the police force during the
occupation who merely urged guerrillas to keep the peace and to stop theiractivities did not
commit treason; but when it is shown by positive evidencethat said officers were not content
to render lip service to the enemy in making pleas for public order, but went further and
tortured their countrymenwho were guerrillas or guerilla sympathizers, a verdict of guilt
mustinevitably be returned."

The appellant, however, did not merely perform pacification work, but, as charged in count
No. 5, he shot and killed his countryman Zoilo Calimutan, a guerilla member; and, as charged
in count No. 6, he apprehended and maltreated Gabriel Lumba, Maximo Buyo and Apolinario
Igpit, likewise members of theguerrillas organization known as the "Bolo Battalion." these
overt acts wereproved by the testimony of two or more witnesses who have been
demonstrated to have had any motive for incriminating the appellant. Adherence to the
enemy is to be inferred from the fact that when said overt acts were committed, he was in
company of Japanese soldiers and constabulary patrols, and from the fact that the victims
were guerrillas. That Zoilo Calimutan was shot is even admitted by the appellant who,
however, alleges that he was shotby a Japanese. His testimony is not worthy of credence. It
is noteworthy that the appellant admits that, when the mother of Zoilo Calimutan was begging
for medicine from the appellant with which to cure her wounded son, the appellant answered
that he would give her bullets.
The appellant does not deny that he was with combined Japanese and Constabulary patrol
on February 22, 1944, when several people, among whom were Gabriel Lumba, Maximo
Buyo and Apolinario Igpit, were apprehended and maltreated, although the appellant claims
that it was the Japanese who were responsible the therefor. Appellant's pretense cannot
negative the effect of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Counsel for the appellant has stressed the fact that the Filipino citizenshipof the appellant
was irregularly proven, in that the prosecution rested its case without establishing said
citizenship, although the prosecutor thereaftersuccessfully maneuvered to extract from
appellant's lawyer an admission ofappellant's Filipino citizenship, which admission was
confirmed in open court by the appellant. As the appellant and his attorney virtually stipulated
as to the question of citizenship, they cannot now be permitted to withdraw therefrom. In view
of said stipulation, it became unnecessary for the prosecution to submit proof on the point.
Upon the whole, we conclude that the appellant is guilty of treason, not complexed by murder
and illegal detention, since these offenses are elementsand the very overt acts of treason.
There being no aggravating or mitigatingcircumstances, the penalty provided by article 114 of
the Revised Penal Codeshould be imposed in the medium degree.
It being understood, therefore, that the appellant is sentenced to reclusionperpetua, the
appealed judgment, as thus modified, is hereby affirmed,with costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes,
JJ., concur

G.R. No. L-456

March 29, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.
C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for
appellee.
REYES, J.:
We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000
imposed by the People's Court upon the appellants who was charged with treason but
convicted of what the said court terms "complex crime of crime of treason with murder
robbery and rape."
The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended
contains the following counts:
1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3, 1945
in the city of Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate
Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there
wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become a member of the so-called
Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored military organization knowing fully well that
the aims and purposes of said organization are among other to extend every aid and
cooperation with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of
America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a
member of said enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary the said accused further
adhering to the enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to them
did go out on numerous patrol in company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and
other elements and other elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.
2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and May 3,
1945, and the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Forces with
treasonable to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in violation of his allegiance
and fidelity to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines did then
and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police

otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T. Yushida, performing the
function and duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said
military police and did during the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said
enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and comfort to them did
in company with other member of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to apprehend
guerrilla as they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians and otherwise
commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile design of the enemy and to weaken the
cause of the United States of America in the Philippines.
3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the
Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did
give aid and comfort to said enemy in his capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored
constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of the Japanese Army
Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army did then and there
wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called mopping up
operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other element engaged in resistance
against said enemy and as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.
4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and November
1944 in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese
Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then
and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help in the a construction of air raid
shelters for the protection of Japanese soldier against allied air raids and did help in the
acquisition of as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation against the
expected landing of America forces.
5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu
Philippines the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did aid and comfort to the said
enemy in company with Japanese Military soldier of the Japanese Military Police and other
Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest
maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to force the latter to disclose
the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to
confess his guerrilla activities.

6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial
Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy
in company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the Japanese Military Police and other
enemy spices and informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said Francisco Larrobia
strike him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently bayoneting and killing said
Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a guerrilla.

undercover man informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District
in company with other informers said Military Police, did then and there apprehend and arrest
Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez as
to the whereabouts of her husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division
Cebu Area Command and when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid
husband's whereabouts herein accused did slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by
the arms strike her on the breast with his revolver threaten her with a dagger pointed at her
throat and otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.

7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of Cebu,

Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy in his capacity as chief undercover man
for the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with Japanese soldier and Santiago
Bernaba another Japanese spy did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and
treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter taking said
Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and thereat herein accused did investigate said
Numeriano Bellesa about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up
arms in gathering up arms in furtherance of their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano
Bellesa on the face and body and otherwise maltreat him in the course of said investigation.

10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial of Japan its Imperial Japanese Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort said enemy in company with five
Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the
Kempei-Tai and his capacity Military Police for the Cebu District did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one
Juan Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike
said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn over said
Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said
person were guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia have
not been heard of ever since then.

8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla Province of
Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan
adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces with treasonable intent to
give as he did give aid he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as
chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District and in
company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese Military Police did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and did investigate the
latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement officer
of the guerrilla and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused did
torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter by the arms so that his body dangled
down striking his stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on his head and finally
striking his mouth with a flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.
9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed forces with treasonable intent
to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief

11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile
designs of said enemy.
12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy
of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn company with Japanese soldier, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest one Jose Murillo on
suspicion that the latter was a guerrilla.

13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did and
comfort to said enemy, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend
and arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the Japanese Military
Police and thereat herein accused did question and investigate said Basilia Arong as to the
whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said Basilia Arong denied
knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her
of her clothing, severely beat her and otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong
to sign a letter addressed to her aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report
top the Japanese Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said
headquarters in compliance of said letter, he not been seen ever since.
14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering
to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable to give
as he did give aid comfort to, said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man,
informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of Cebu District and in company with
Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did question the latter as the
whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of
said investigation, the accused did hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with
clubs and an iron pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on his head for the latter's refusal to
divulge said guerrilla whereabouts.
15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu Philippines
and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the
enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover
man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in
company with two Japanese soldiers and three other Japanese informers and spies, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Marciano
Alejandro, Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos
Numera, and wounding said Jose Rada on the charge that said person had contact with
guerrillas.
16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering

to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent
to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as an informer
and spy of said enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for the latter's guerrilla activities and
resistance to said enemy.
17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of Cebu,
Philippines, particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, thee
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did
give aid and comfort to said enemy, as member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary and as
informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonable join and take part in the general mopping up operation conducted by the
Japanese Army under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of
Tubonok to Minglanilla for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements
engaged in resisting said enemy.
18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering
to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer
and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in company with the
member of said Japanese Military Police under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida of the
Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest,
maltreat and torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and some Filipino girls
naked, raping them, and, did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said
Martin Francisco:
2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch
P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring
on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.

19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the
Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did
give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as an informer to the enemy and in company with
soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and as a
result of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was
captured.
20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire
of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give, as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy
of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla with a baseball bat, hang said
Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract confession of the
latter's connection with guerrillas.
21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District,
in company with Japanese soldier and other agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise
known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up the hands of
said persons, severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as
consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter.
22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as did give and
comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer, spy and undercover man of
the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, did and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously
arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and "John Doe" her husband, on suspicion that
said persons were cooperating and helping the guerrillas and did thereafter bring said Paulita
Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused
did torture them by hanging them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them.

23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of
Japan and Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines
Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to
the said enemy.
By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the
information. But he now pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower
court erred:
1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1)
voluntary surrender; (2) the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness
by the CIC in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission; on and
(3) the facts that the accused helped and saved the lives of many civilian and from death in
the hands of the Japanese;
2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant on the
strength of the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed upon him;
3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and
unnecessary cruelty;
4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with
murder, rape and robbery;
5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.
Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should
not have been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and
rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not
as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is
being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general charge, they can not be
used in combination with treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be
held guilty of treason only.
Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other
hand, his admission that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC,

is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked (People vs.Conwi,2 40 Off. Gaz. [14th
Supp.], No. 23, p. 166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.)
The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his
countrymen have not been established by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be
considered as mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that he
would not be sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is
denied by both the prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in its order denying
appellant' motions for reconsideration that "No responsible judge can or would advance his
opinion in connection with the decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly
deliberated on the merit of the same."
There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery
and abuse of superior strength should not have been considered. These circumstances are
"by their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the
penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts alleged in the information show that
appellant in committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being
unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of
torture and finally putting them to death, and as appears in count No. 18, he also chose to
add ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by
stripping his wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly
shown as they are by the allegations of the complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's
plea of guilty, these two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may
be appreciated against him. As this said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to
the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human
treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties
are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately
augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of
article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant
is beyond doubt guilty, fall within the term of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are adsorbed in
treason characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other and other accompanying

crimes should be taken in to consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal
responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule
treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are
denied simple murderers. To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will
be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and harm to
which the culprit has exposed his exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and
injuries that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code
just penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into
execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is
inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to
fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice
and consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a fine of
not to exceed P20,00 Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of
ignominy and unnecessary cruel, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But
since five member of this court are opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in this
case, the appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.
Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of
treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this
instance de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-369

March 13, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.
Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and
costs, Carmelito Victoria comes to us to seek for the reversal of the decision of the People's
Court.
He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling
Victoria, Carlos Victoria of the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
committed as follows:
That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December, 1944, more
specifically on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereunder
stated, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a
foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, in violation of his said duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the following
manner, to wit:
1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit attached
to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give
said enemy aid and comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies
and a Japanese soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking
Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said
patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when some guerrillas appeared and killed one of
the spies and the patrol left; that said accused directed several men in the patrol in picking up
the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of the same day, the same
party of spies, including the accused and eight members of the Japanese Military Police,

went again to the house of Federico Unson and did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and
treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at
the house; that with their hands bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said
patrol after setting fire on the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found
lying nearby with numerous bayonet wounds; and that Ruben Godoy was taken to the
Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed.
2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies,
Pedro Raviera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and
others who were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy
aid and comfort, went to the house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said
Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short
wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at the same time
supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same day, but on the next day he was
again arrested and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose
Unson never returned.
3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with Jacinto Pineda,
Leonardo Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviera, all members of the
Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai, were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San
Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the
Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves near the house of
Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him.
4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused,
accompanied by two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, for the purpose
of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of
Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that
said two Japanese Military Police and the accused conducted a search of the house and
afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to inhuman
torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting
as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably cause the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended
Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and
there torture and unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944.

6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed group of undercover
operatives, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went
to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison
in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese
party, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined the Makapili organization
designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies; that
he took military training from the Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a
Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning
of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried
ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista to the mountains of Susong
Dalaga and Mt. Malipuo, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the Japanese Army in
Mount Malipuo, where he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and
deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission
thereof.
Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court
found that the mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias Perez were found rotting
in the vicinity of the houses of the victims which were burned and looted by the same hands,
on the day following the arrest, effected by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier
and several spies of the enemy. The body of Unson which was still tied to a tree showed that
it had been disemboweled by several bayonet thrusts and the corpse of Perez appeared
ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at the same times as Unson and
Perez, since he was imprisoned in the garrison of the Japanese kempei, was never heard of.
Appellant's testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the previous morning
raid, he did not come along with party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual
arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took place, was not given by the lower court enough
weight to prevail over that of the prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the
first count.
With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused admitted having
taken part in the raid of the house of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but claims that he
tried to save Unson, only the latter was accepted by the lower court, in view of appellant's
behaviour as recalled by witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon
Unson. The last that was seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in

Lukban, several months after the arrest, the exhumation having been effected with the aid of
those who claimed to have seen how his life was ended. These facts relate to the second
count.
With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar,
the lower court found that on February 10, 1945, in the company of Japanese kempei and
Filipino spies, the accused raided the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and arrested
him as alleged guerrilla. The accused simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date
he was in Gagalagin, Manila.
In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked by the
Japanese kempei to accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes Caluag's house and
admitted that he was present throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who,
according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes, but
the lower court did not accept this defense, considering it rather as corroborative of the facts
alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth count, according
to the lower court, has been abundantly established, disbelieving appellant's feigned
ignorance of the arrest because appellant himself testified that he promised to see what he
could do about Labalan and accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to
the interpreter at the kempei office.
Counts five and seven were not proven.
Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's conclusions on the overt acts alleged in
counts one, two, three, four, and six of the information are fully supported by the evidence. A
perusal of appellant's brief alone, in taken. It is highly significant that, although appellant's
brief compromises one hundred thirty printed pages, it failed completely to point out any
specific error in the conclusions of fact of the lower court, counsel limiting himself into raising
legal questions, maintaining that the penalty imposed is unjustified, and that the acts
committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes against the
victimized persons.
Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable,
counsel wants us to consider what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of
his criminal responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public
vengeance, but to attain the correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained
with appellant's death as decreed by the lower court.

Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in
their raids only because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the
Japanese garrison he did it either in obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to
intercede in behalf of some prisoners; that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor
Constancia, who appealed to him not to go to the mountains so he may continue helping
those who were detained by the Japanese; and that in October 1943, he was arrested by the
Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was released only after he had been made to
promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the involuntary promise
exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept this
testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive, and straightforward declarations
of the witnesses, for the prosecution. Appellant's claim that he, too, was a guerrilla, had
helped the resistance movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino
prisoners, does not relieve him from criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed as
alleged in the counts in the information which were declared proven by the People's Court.

deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission
thereof.

The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in
the commission of wrongs, and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one
persons, if he had caused the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the
enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was already said that: "For whosoever shall keep the
whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10).

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not
punishable as treason and that the People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they
being merely upshots of the wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty.

FERIA, J., concurring:

Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower
court, there is disagreement as to the penalty that should be imposed, because, while nine of
the ten members taking part in the decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the death
penalty imposed by the lower court, the writer of this opinion takes the position that the
penalty the accused deserves is that of reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty provided by
law.
The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as follows:
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and

The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as
aggravating, while the undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in
question are essential elements of the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a
nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series
thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes as was
held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are some
accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number
not changing the nature of the offense committed.
For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the
imposition of the death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.

Separate Opinions

I concur with the majority (except Mr. Justice Perfecto) that find the appellant guilty of the
crime of treason as alleged in the information, that is, with two aggravating circumstances.
Among the atrocities committed by the appellant and companions stand, in bold relief, those
testified to by Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr., and Dolores Calacasan and related in the same
decision of this Court, to the effect that Federico Unson, Jr., was crucified against and tied to
a tree, and then disemboweled with bayonet thrusts; and that Isaias Perez's body was
mutilated with his ankles severed from the trunk and thrown around the place where the
crime was committed. And I dissent from the dissenting vote of the writer of the decision, Mr.
Justice Perfecto, which prevented the imposition by this Court of the death penalty imposed
upon the appellant by the lower court.
The killing of the victim was unquestionably attended by treachery, that is, by means, method
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly to insure its execution without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make, and by a deliberate

augment of the wrong done by the offense by causing other wrongs not necessary for its
commission. But the writer of the opinion says:
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as
aggravating, while the undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in
question are essential elements of the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a
nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series
thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crime as was
held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are some
accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number
not changing the nature of the offense committed.
The reason or ground on which the dissenter bases his conclusion that the aggravating
circumstances above specified cannot be taken into consideration in the present case, is
clearly wrong. Said aggravating circumstances have nothing to do with the integral elements
of the crime of treason as charged and committed by the appellant. The fact that the crime of
treason may be committed by a single overt act or a series of overt acts, committed at one
and the same time or at different times, does not, by any means, make those circumstances
essential elements of the offense committed by the appellant. Said circumstances were not
even inherent in or included by the law in defining the crime of treason. The words "treason"
as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is completely different and independent
from "treachery" as an aggravating circumstance provided for in the same Code.
The crime of treason is committed by a citizen, not by merely adhering to the enemy and
giving the latter aid and comfort in abstract, but by committing one or more overt acts which
constitute aid and comfort to the enemy to which the traitor adheres; and evidently, the
commission of such overt act as the killing of the victim in aid of the enemy may be attended
by the aggravating circumstances above specified, for they were not necessary in order to
give aid and comfort to the enemy. Of course, if one of the aggravating circumstances
provided by law is inherent or included in the overt acts charged as in aid or comfort of the
enemy, it cannot be taken into consideration as aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of that particular crime of treason.

PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur partly in the result. The information and the evidence sufficiently make out at least a
case of murder, qualified by treachery. Appellant had committed other atrocities for which he
could correspondingly be convicted under the information and evidence of record. As spy, he
may also be tried in a military tribunal and, if found guilty, sentenced accordingly. While he
might be guilty of a violation of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, I hold, in conformity
with my dissenting opinion in Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil., 856), that said legal provisions was
not in force at the time of the commission of the crime. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is in
accordance with the law, but the provision regarding payment of a fine should be eliminated
and the appellant sentenced to indemnify in the proper amount the heirs of the victim.

G.R. No. L-778

October 10, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NEMESIO L. AGPANGAN, defendant-appellant.
Alfredo Gonzales for appellant.
Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for
appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:
Appellant stands accused of treason, committed between December, 1944, and January,
1945, in the Province of Laguna, on only one count alleged in the information as follows:
That on or about December 20, 1944, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a subversive
pro-Japanese organization, joined the Pampars, a military organization supporting the
Imperial Japanese Army and designed to bear arms against the army of the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the guerrillas in the Philippines; that he was
equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber .30, and was made to undergo 10 days training,
consisting of military drill, manual of arms, and target practice; and that from or about January
12, 1945 to March 15, the said accused was assigned to guard duty once a week; that he
was armed with a rifle with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners whom he was
guarding who might attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American soldier who might
approach the Japanese garrison.
The lower court found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.
Three witnesses testified for the prosecution.
Tomas C. Serrano, 46, farmer, resident of Siniloan, Second Lieutenant in the Marking's
guerrilla organization, testified that on December, 1944, he saw the accused in the Japanese
garrison in Siniloan, "he was a member of the Makapili organization;" "he was doing guard
duty, with a rifle, with a bayonet at his side;" "he was at the entrance of the garrison and he
made all civilians passing through the entrance bow to him." If they did not bow, "he dragged
them by the arms and brought them to the captain of the garrison;" he served as guard "since
November, 1944, when the Japanese garrison was established in Siniloan, up to the time I
was arrested on March 25, 1945;" he saw the accused on guard duty in the garrison "many

times;" "I often saw him confiscating foodstuffs such as rice, fruits, calabasa, and other
vegetables, for the support of the Japanese soldiers;" "he was with arms accompanied by
Japanese soldiers and other members of the Makapili;" "I often saw him accompanied by
Japanese soldiers and other Makalipi members, arresting suspected guerrillas and
sometimes they were patrolling or camping in the hideouts of the guerrilla forces, I cannot tell
how many times, but I often saw him;" the witness was arrested on March 25, 1945, by the
Japanese soldiers and Makapilis, with whom the accused was; "the next morning we, the
thirteen prisoners, were brought to the place where we were to be executed; but luckily while
we were on our way to the barrio, the American planes came roaring, so the guards took
cover;" "they were pulling the rope that tied us, and luckily I was able to slip away because I
was the second to the last man in the line, and the rope was cut;" "I could not run fast
because I was lame;" the rest were executed, naming the following: "Alejandro Serrano,
Custodio Adaro, Emilio Javier, Peter Sardal, Elias Rodolfo, Ignacio Cavano, Biato Optis,
Napoleon Pagtakhan, Bienvenido Agpangan, and myself;" Miguel Palma "was in my back to
the last, so we two remained, and Pacifico (Adopina) remained untied" because he was
carrying food, and when the Japanese ran, "he escaped." Asked to explain that he knew
about the lot of those who were executed, the witness said that he went home when the town
was liberated, and he visited the place "because I know the place," and we reached the spot
"I smelled very bad odor, and I recognized the soil which swelled, so I said to myself that this
is the place where our son was buried;" "I went home and I told the other parents of the
victims" about the spot; " the next month, about thirty days," the witness and the other parents
requested the municipal authorities to be allowed to exhume the bodies; when his son is
being taken to the place of execution. "I had not seen him that time;" the witness based his
knowledge as to appellant's being a Makapili on Exhibit A and he saw him armed, guarding
the Japanese garrison, confiscating foodstuffs for the Japanese, and arresting guerrilla
suspects in the town; Bienvenido Agpangan, one of those who were executed by the
Japanese, "was the son" of appellant; "I can not tell you whether he (appellant) was reporting
to his officers any guerrilla;" Angel Javier and Custodio Adaro were arrested by a party of
which the accused was a member, and "I know because he was with them when they were
arrested;" the witness does not know whether the accused was present during the execution
"because there was nobody present; only God had witnessed the killing of those persons."
Mauricio Adaro, 47, farmer, resident of Siniloan, testified that in December, 1944, he saw the
accused in the Japanese garrison in Siniloan; " he was mounting guard;" asked from what
date to what date he saw him in the garrison, the witness answered that "I cannot remember
the month in 1944 because we used to go out of Siniloan every time;" appellant "was getting
food supplies from the civilians and giving them to the Japanese;" "the accused and the
Japanese companions of his arrested my son (Custodio) in our house;" the witness was not

arrested, "because I was able to hide;" he saw defendant mounting guard in the Japanese
garrison "many times;" "more than ten times;" the garrison was located "in the school
building."
Delfin Redor, 55, mayor of Siniloan, since 1937, testified hat appellant "has been my barrio
lieutenant;" he belongs to Pampar Makapili, and Pampar and Makapili, "I believe are the
same;" from December, 1944, to March, 1945, the witness saw the accused "in
the Makapili garrison, in the Siniloan plaza;" "I believe that he was a member of the Makapili;"
"Sometimes he was detailed as guard in front of the garrison with arms and ammunitions
bayonet;" he saw as such "many times;" the witness was not a mayor during the Japanese
occupation because "in 1944, March, I escaped because, you know, I was wanted by the
Japanese because I was also a guerrilla; before that "I was mayor of the town;" during
December, 1944, up to March, because you know, I left the office, I was still in the town of
Siniloan collecting some supplies for the guerrillas;" after abandoning the office of mayor, the
witness "remained living in the poblacion of Siniloan;" he "never stopped living in
the poblacion;" "I had three times seen the accused accompanied by the Japanese in raiding
outside poblacion;" the accused commandeered foodstuffs "and took them to the garrison for
food;" "the Japanese garrison was in the Intermediate Building and the Makapili garrison is in
Baybay Academy, about one kilometer distant;" the witness saw the accused
"in Makapiligarrison;" the witness was a captain of the guerrillas and was arrested by the
Japanese four times, and in those occasions he did not see the accused in the garrison; the
witness does no know of anybody who had been pointed out by the accused to the Japanese
and was arrested by the same.
The Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to
be innocent until the contrary is proved." (Article II, section 1 [17].) To overcome this
constitutional presumption, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable
doubt. The evidence presented by the prosecution in this case does not offer that degree of
proof. None of the several overt acts alleged in the information has been proved in
accordance with the two-witness rule provided in the article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is imputed to the appellant, in the first place, that he is a member of the Ganap, "a
subversive pro-Japanese organization," and "joined the Pampar, a military organization
supporting the Imperial Japanese Army and designed to bear arms against the Army of the
United States in Commonwealth of the Philippines and the guerrillas in the Philippines." No
witness has testified that appellant is the member of the Ganap. Only one witness, Redor,
testified that appellant belonged to Pampar, but he did not testify as to its nature.

The next allegation of the information is that appellant "was equipped with a 1903 Springfield
rifle, caliber 30, and was made to undergo ten days training, consisting of military drill,
manual of arms, and target practice. "No evidence has been presented in support of this
allegation.
The third allegation against appellant is that "from or about January 12, 1945, to March 15,
1945, the said accused was assigned to guard duty once a week." The fourth and the last
allegation is that "he was armed with a rifle with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners
whom he was guarding who might attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American
soldier who might approach the Japanese garrison." In connection with these two allegation,
the only thing that the prosecution attempted to prove is that appellant did guard duty and
was armed with rifle. But the attempt does not meet the test under the two-witness rule.
The first two witnesses for the prosecution testified that they had seen the accused doing
guard duty in the Japanese garrison in Siniloan "many times," more than "ten times," but
neither of them has mentioned any specific time, day and hour. They were able to mention
only years and months. There is no way of concluding the two witnesses testified about the
same overt act. The "many times" or more than "ten times" mentioned by them may refer
either to two different sets of moments, not one instant of one set coinciding with any one of
the other, or to only one and identical set of instances or, although referring to two sets, some
of the instances are the same in both. As there is no basis on record upon which we may
determine which, among the two alternatives, is the correct one, the doubt must be decided
by taking the first alternative, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence stated in
the fundamental law. The case for the prosecution is further weakened by the fact that it is
first two witnesses are contradicted by the third, who testified that appellant did guard duty
"many times," more than "ten times," in the Makapili garrison, located in the Baybay
Academy, one kilometer from the Intermediate School building, where the Japanese garrison
was located.
To meet the test under two-witness rule, it is necessary that, at least, two witnesses should
testify as to the perpetration of the same treasonous overt act, and the sameness must
include not only identity of kind and nature of the act, but as to the precise one which has
actually been perpetrated. The treasonous overt act of doing guard duty in the Japanese
garrison on one specific date cannot be identified with the doing of guard duty in the same
garrison in a different date. Both overt acts, although of the same nature and character, are
two distinct and inconfusable acts, independent of each other, and either one, to serve as a
ground for conviction of an accused for treason, must be proved by two witnesses. That one
witness should testify as to one, and another as to the other, is not enough. Any number of

witnesses may testify against an accused for treason as to a long line of successive
treasonous overt acts; but notwithstanding the seriousness of the acts nor their number, not
until two witnesses, at least, shall have testified as to the perpetration of a single but the
same and precise overt act, can conviction be entertained.
In justice to appellant, we feel it necessary to state that our decision to acquit him is not only
based on the reasonable doubt we entertain as to his guilt, because the prosecution has not
satisfied the requirements of the two-witness rule, but because we are rather inclined to
believe his testimony to the effect that a guerrilla member, Vicente Auxilio, was caught by the
Japanese in appellant's house, tortured and, finally, killed. For said reason, appellant was
called by the Japanese, investigated, and then told to do some work in the garrison,
otherwise he would have the same fate that befell Vicente Auxilio. "To save my life, I accepted
the order and worked there," he testified, adding: "The Japanese, not being contended with
my work, they got my carabao and on March, 1945, they got my son, who was tortured and
killed."
This son is the same Bienvenido Agpangan who, according to the first witness for the
prosecution, was executed by the Japanese with several other victims. We do not believe that
appellant could have adhered to the Japanese, the same who tortured and killed his own son.
We do not believe that, in the absence of proof, he can be such a monster.
The decision of the People's Court is reversed and appellant is acquitted. He shall be
released from the custody of the agent of the law upon the promulgation of this decision.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuazon, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The information filed against the appellant with the People's Court contains only one count to
wit:
That on or about December 20, 1944, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a subversive
pro-Japanese organization, joined the Pampars, a military organization supporting the
Imperial Japanese Army and designed to bear arms against the army of the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the guerrillas in the Philippines; that he was

equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber 30, and was made to undergo 10 days training,
consisting of military drill, manual of arms, and target practice; and that from or about January
12, 1945 to March 15, 1945, the said accused was assigned to guard duty once a week; that
he was armed with a rifle with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners whom he was
guarding who might attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American soldier who might
approach the Japanese garrison.
From the above it clearly appears that defendant is charge with having committed only overt
act, that is, with having joined or become an active member of the Pampars, "a military
organization supporting the Imperial Japanese army and designed to bear arms against the
army of the United States and the guerrillas in the Philippines." The allegations "that he was
equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber .30, and was made to undergo 10 days training
consisting of military drill, manual of arms, and target practice," and that "from January 12,
1945 to March 15, 1945, the said accused was assigned to guard duty once a week," do not
constitute to overt acts separate and independent from the treasonous or over act of joining
and becoming an active member of the said military organization named Pampars. Each one
of those facts is a part and parcel of said treasonous act, since by becoming an active
member or soldier of said military organization, the appellant must have necessary been
armed, undergone training and done guard duty.
In the case of People vs. Alarcon, G.R. No. L-407, 1 already decided by this Court the
defendant appellant Alarcon was charged with the crime of treason consisting, according to
the information, of several overt acts alleged separately in several counts. In the first count he
was charged with having joined and acted as a member of the pro-Japanese military
organization name Makapili; and in the fourth having retreated in December 1944 with the
Japanese forces towards Bogabong, Nueva Ecija, before the arrival of the American Forces
in Cabanatuan. This Court in decision unanimously concurred in by all the members who
voted, including the Justice who pens the decision of the majority in this case, held that "the
acts alleged in the fourth count constitute only a part of the overt act charged in the first
count, since the appellant, as one of the members of said Makapili organization, had to
retreat with the Japanese soldier and other Makapilis to the mountains."lawphil.net
In view of the foregoing, it is that the following fundamental conclusion in the majority decision
is erroneous and misleading. The conclusion says: "The treasonous overt act of doing guard
duty in the Japanese garrison on one specific date can not be identified with the doing of
guard duty in the same garrison on a different date. Both overt acts, although of the same
nature and character, are two distinct and inconfusable acts independent of each other,
and either one, to serve as a ground for conviction of an accused for treason, must be proved

by two witnesses." We say that it is erroneous and misleading, because the mere act of doing
guard duty member in a Japanese garrison, independent from that of being a member of the
Japanese Army or a military organization of Filipino civilians and allied with the Japanese
forces, does not of itself constitute an overt act. Doing guard duty in a Japanese garrison on a
specific date, and standing guard in the same or another Japanese garrison on a different
date, are but parts or bits of the continuous treasonous act of being an active member of such
organization. The mere acceptance of a commission in a traitorous army is not sufficient to
constitute overt act of treason. To be so, there must be at least an attempt to act as such.
(U.S. vs. Manalo, 6 Phil., 364; U.S. vs. Villario, 5 Phil., 697; U.S.vs. De los Reyes, 3 Phil.,
349; U.S. vs. Magtibay, 2 Phil., 703.)
In view of the failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the treasonous overt act, and
of each part or bit therefore charge in the information against the appellant, by the testimony
of the two witnesses, the decision of the People's Court appealed from is reversed and the
appellant acquitted. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-477

June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing
the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines
by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the
Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to
the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance,
did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan
in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war,
giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist
and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war
efforts and operations against the United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore
arm and joined and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed
conflicts and engagements against the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the
Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of
Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and
April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged
except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court
found is that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in
confiscation of personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not been
established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of
adherence to the enemy. But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so we

infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at
Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed
with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during
the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as
sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that
upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other
Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand,
later surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of
two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various
acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused
took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and military
drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses
coinciding in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it
is that the defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms.
Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if
corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular
thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his
will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the
purposes for which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to
accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance
with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to
eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly
with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common
enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses.
Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the
nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65
Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary,
except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to
battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason
was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the
opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership

by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort
in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It
furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his
courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused
and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no
difference from that of enlisting in the invader's army.

Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal
Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its
setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason
must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."

But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two
witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness
requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili
uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial
court. To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion
savors of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of
which our treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the rule
"severely restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the
amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one
of them is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to
discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by
the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural
inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy
witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in
the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for
guidance from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been
placed on the two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have
commented on it. We cull from American materials the following excerpts which appear to
carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the
same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another
witness to another overt act of the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been
intimated that the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so
succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering
the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting
them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional
provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the
same overt act. This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p.
271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there
must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed
the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may
be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of
two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by
a literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American
government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of
the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said, attracted the
members of the Constitutional Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to
be guaranteed against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p.
272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice
Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not
difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the
farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in
psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such
a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of
innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the
treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however,
that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may
sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult as in a
traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in spite of
the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or

by accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that
"prosecutions for treason were generally virulent.'"

consciousness, a manifestation of the will. (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed.,

unabridged, p. 25.)

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By
extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must
be understood to have intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and
rigidity as the American forefathers meant.

There can, therefore, be no question that being a member of the Makapili was an overt act of
the accused. And the fact that no two witnesses saw him being such a member on any single
day or on the selfsame occasion does not, in my humble opinion, work against
the singleness of the act, nor does the fact that no two witnesses have testified to that same
overt act being done on the same day or occasion argue against holding the two-witness rule
having been complied with.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., dissenting:
Being unable to bring myself agree with the majority upon the application of the two-witness
rule herein, I am constrained to dissent.
As I see it, being a member of the Makapili during the Japanese occupation of those areas of
the Philippines referred to in the information, was one single, continuous, and indivisible overt
act of the present accused whereby he gave aid and comfort to the Japanese invaders. That
membership was one and the same from the moment he entered the organization till he was
captured. The fact that he was seen on a certain day by one of the state witnesses being a
member of the Makapili, and was seen by another state witness but on a different day being a
member of the same organization, does not mean that his membership on the first day was
different or independent from his membership on the other day it was the selfsame
membership all the way through. A contrary construction would entail the consequence that
the instant defendant, if we are to believe the allegations and proofs of the prosecution,
became or was a member of the Makapili as many times as there were days from the first to
the last.
T.E. Holland defined "acts" in jurisprudence as follows:
Jurisprudence is concerned only with outward acts. An "act" may therefore be defined . . . as
"a determination of will, producing an effect in the sensible world". The effect may be
negative, in which case the act is properly described as a "forbearance". The essential
elements of such an act are there, viz., an exercise of the will, an accompanying state of

My view is that, the act being single, continuous and indivisible, at least two witnesses have
testified thereto notwithstanding the fact that one saw it on one day and the other on another
day.

FIRST DIVISION

regularly constituted government in said Islands.

[G.R. No. 1434. February 23, 1904. ]

The defendant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of twenty years and to pay a fine of $5,000.

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. ANTONIO DE LOS REYES, DefendantAppellant.

The evidence upon which the court below based this conviction is substantially as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Claudio Gabriel, for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION. Testimony by an officer as to
a confession made to him by the accused will not support a conviction of treason, as a
confession of this crime, to be effective, must be made in open court.
2. ID.; ID.; OVERT ACT. The defendant accepted from the self-styled "secretary of war" of
the Katipunan Society a commission as a captain in the "Filipino army," but never made any
attempt to act as such: Held, That the mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant,
nothing else being done, was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the law.
DECISION
McDONOUGH, J. :

A constabulary detective testified that he met the defendant in Bacord, city of Manila,
November 21, 1902; that a companion of the witness told him that the defendant was a
captain in the Katipunan Society; that thereupon they detained the defendant and took him
aside into a clump of trees where they talked to him and got him to admit that he was an
officer of the Katipunan. The officers took the defendant to his house, where they searched
his trunk and found in it and took away a revolver and a captains commission, under seals.
The following is a copy of this commission:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SUPREME PRESIDENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS"
"By reason of the qualifications of Antonio de los Reyes and the good service rendered by
him to the fatherland, the supreme president has seen fit to appoint him captain in the regular
army of these Islands.
"It is therefore ordered that all persons render him the corresponding honors and obey all
orders which he may issue for the good of the service.
"K. K., the 30th of August, 1902.

The defendant is charged with the crime of treason, committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
That on November 21, 1902, in Manila, he did feloniously, treasonably, etc., levy war against,
adhere to and give aid and comfort to the enemies of, the United States and of the Philippine
Islands, in that on or about August 30, 1902, he accepted a commission in the regular army of
the "Filipino republic" and served as a captain and carried arms in such army and continued
in such office and continued to carry arms as aforesaid between the said dates of August 30,
1902, and November 21, 1902, the said "Filipino republic" being an attempted government
organized by various persons against the authority of the United States Government and that
of the Philippine Islands and having for its object the overthrow by armed insurrection of the

"CENON NIGDAO,
"S. K., Minister of War.
"A. G. DEL ROSARIO,
"S. K., Supreme President.
"To DON ANTONIO DE LOS REYES,

"Appointed Captain in the Regular Army of these Philippine Islands."cralaw virtua1aw library
This Constabulary detective further testified that one Cenon Nigdao was a lieutenant-colonel
in command of the whole Katipunan forces, but at that time had been captured and was a
prisoner at Pasig.
The witness was asked what this Katipunan Society is, and in reply stated that it is an
organization for forming an independent government for the Philippines, not letting their
headquarters or whereabouts be known to the American Government, and to gain forces and
arms by any means they can; sometimes they use force in securing members.
When asked if he knew any of the armed forces of the society, he said that they made an
attack on May 30 upon a Government upon a government force of the United States Army.
He said he had not seen the defendant with the insurgent forces.
Another witness for the prosecution testified that he had been informed of this so-called
government known as the Tagalog republic, or Katipunan, through captured documents; that
they had armed forces approximating 300 men, and that he knew their sales and recognized
the seals on Exhibit A, the commission of the defendant, as those of the organization.
The next witness called by the prosecution was Cenon Nigdao, who stated that he was a
tailor, 28 years of age, and secretary of war of the Katipunan. He identified the signatures on
Exhibit A. He states that the Katipunan is the national party. Its purpose is to defend the rights
of the country and to ask of the American Government the freedom of this country.
He further stated that when he gave this commission to the defendant he told him to keep it,
and when the time came for them to ask for liberty the people could not do him any harm.
The witness named the secretary of the National Party, the minister of the interior, the
minister of the state, minister of war, and minister of justice of the association.
On cross-examination this "secretary of war," who had held office only for one week, testified
that he commanded no forces; did not know that defendant made any use of his commission;
that they did not take up arms because they were here in Manila; and that he was living in the
same house with the defendant and gave him the commission there.
Another witness sworn for the prosecution stated that he was not a member of the Katipunan,

but was a member of the National party ever since he left Bilibid Prison; that the "secretary of
war" appointed him a lieutenant-colonel and he held the commission three months but had no
soldiers to command; and that there was no army when Cenon Nigdao was living at Bacord.
He said he was sent out to Baliuag by one Santiago and stayed there about three months,
and when he found out that there was nothing doing he surrendered himself and one revolver
to the president.
If we reject, as we must, the confession of the defendant made to the Constabulary officer,
because it was not made in open court as required by law (sec. 9, act of Congress passed
March 8, 1902), we have put very little in the case upon which to base a charge of treason.
Even what there is contradictory. The charge is that the defendant took arms against the
government in the regular army of the "Philippine republic," whereas one witness for the
prosecution swears that the Katipunan is the treasonable organization, another says that
body is known as the "Tagalog republic," and another, the so-called secretary of war, who
commanded no troops, but to whom the Government presumably gave credit because he
testified for the prosecution, stated that the Katipunan was the "National party" and the object
of that party was to obtain from the United States, by peaceable means, the independence of
the Philippine Islands.
The confession of the accused being disposed, the only other question to be considered is
whether the testimony of one witness that he issued to the defendant the captains
commission above-mentioned, and the testimony of another witness that he found this
commission in the defendants trunk, is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute that
"no person in the Philippine Islands shall under the authority of the United States be
convicted of treason . . . unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no proof whatever that the accused did any other act in connection with this charge
than to receive this commission. On the contrary the "secretary of war" testified that they did
not take up arms because they remained her in Manila.
I am of the opinion that the mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant, nothing
else being done, was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the law. Blackstone
says that "as treason is the highest civil crime which (considered as a member of the
community) any ,an can possibly commit, it ought, therefore, to be the most freely
ascertained."cralaw virtua1aw library

The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence the playing of the game of government, like
children, the secretaries and colonels and captains, the pictures of flags and seals and
commissions all on paper, for the purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant and the
vicious should not be dignified by the name of the treason.
Those engaged in this plotting and scheming in the pretense of establishing an independent
government in these Islands, with nothing behind them, without arms or soldiers or money,
and without the possibility of success, are simply engaged in deluding themselves and
perhaps innocent followers and in filling the cells of Bilibid Prison.
Even though not guilty of treason, they may be tried for other lesser crimes.
The case of the United States v. Magtibay, 1 recently decided by this court, involved much the
same question as this, and is followed.
The judgment below is therefore reversed and the defendant acquitted, but without prejudice
to the prosecuting authorities to proceed against the defendant for such other crime or crimes
as the evidence discloses. The costs are adjudged de oficio.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., disqualified.

G.R. No. L-2998

May 23, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOAQUIN FLAVIER, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for plaintiff
and appellee.
Ignacio Lugtu for defendant and appellant.
PARAS, C. J.:
This an appeal taken by the defendant, Joaquin Flavier, for a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, finding him guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment,
with legal accessories, and to pay a fine of P15,000. The information contained ten counts,
but the appellant was found guilty of only counts 1, 2, 7, 8, and 10.
Count No. 1 accuses the appellant of having given aid to the Japanese Imperial Forces by
serving as an officer to the United Nippon Organization, established to counter act the
guerrilla movement and the American liberation forces Lopez Tayabas. Under, Count No. 2,
the appellant is charged with having killed three guerrillas known as Monosea, Talavera and
Ramos, in Lopez, Tayabas. Count alleges that the appellant arrested Florentino Salumbides
in his house in Lopez, Tayabas, on suspicion of being a guerilla spy, the said Florentino
Salumbides having been taken to the Japanese garrison and detained therein for a period of
twenty-two days. Count 8 refers to the apprehension by the appellant of Gerudio Villanesa in
his house in Lopez, Tayabas. On suspicion of being a guerilla, and his house in Lopez,
Tayabas, on suspicion of being a guerilla, and his torture by the appellant in the Japanese
garrison. Count 10 alleges that the appellant arrested Aniceto Iglesia on suspicion of being a
guerilla in barrio Dalangan, Lopez, Tayabas, he having been brought to the Japanese
garrison.
Counsel for appellant argues that appellants citizenship was not duly proven and that none of
the overt acts charged against him and of which he was convicted by the trial court is
supported by the evidence. Appellants Filipino citizenship is, however, satisfactorily shown by
the official record in the Bureau of Prisons, Exhibit "A", which was admitted in evidence
without who have known the appellant to have been born in the Philippines of Filipino
parents. Appellant's pretense that he did not know whether his parents were Filipinos, is
absurd, if not unbelievable, he being a high school graduate and having been a high school
teacher and a candidate for municipal vice-president and senator. The case of Jose Tan

Chiong vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 47616, invoked by the appellant in support of his
contention that mere birth in the Philippines is not sufficient to confer Filipino citizenship, is
not applicable, for the reason that said case involved and alien born of an alien father and
Filipino mother.
We agree with counsel for the appellant that count No. 1 was not duly proven. But we are
convince that appellant conviction on the other counts is well founded. The evidence for the
prosecution, with reference to count 2, is to the effect that in an encounter between a number
of guerrillas and the enemy forces in the town of Lopez, three guerrillas members, namely
Monosea, Talavera and Ramos, were killed. Florentino Salumbides, Epifanio Ardiente, Felipe
Cargan, Francisco Caldecara and Lorenzo Ambas, testified about the encounter, in which the
appellant fought on the side of the enemy. It is true that there is no direct proof that the
appellant actually killed the three guerrillas, but said facts does not exculpate him from
criminal liability resulting from his participation on the enemy's side.
With reference to the arrest of Florentino Salumbides as charged in account No. 7, two
prosecution witnesses, Florentino Salumbides himself and his brother Dominador
Salumbides, testified. The appellant claims that it was Lamberto San Juan who actually
arrested Florentino Salumbides, as shown in the transcript. As the two Salumbides brothers
have known the appellant since boyhood, it is unlikely that they could have mistaken the
appellant for another; and the appearance of the name of San Juan in the transcript must
have been an obvious clerical error, especially in view of the alleged denial of San Juan that
he ordered the arrest and subsequent release of Florentino Salumbides.
The arrest of Gerundio Villanisa by the appellant is confirmed by Gerundio Villanisa himself
and Santiago Surbano. Appellant defense against this count No. 8 is that while he was
present at the time of the arrest, it was Lamberto San Juan who actually made the arrest.
Appellants allegation is not again sufficient to exculpate him from criminal liability, as he acted
knowingly in conjunction with Lamberto San Juan. Neither is there merit in appellants
pretense that Villanisa was arrested because of crime, and not because of his guerilla
activities, since the crime imputed to Villanisa consisted in the hold-up of the Japanese
trucks.
The arrest and subsequent torture of Aniceto Iglesia by order of the appellant, as charged in
count 10, is testified to by Aniceto Iglesia himself and David Villapane. There is no point in
appellants contention that, according to David Villapane himself, the latter was arrested by
the "companions of Profirio Jimenez" and not by the appellant, because the appellant was a
companion of Profirio Jimenez and the overt act charged in count 10 is the arrest and torture
of Aniceto Iglesia, not of David Villapane. Aniceto Iglesia and David Villapane both testified

that the appellant was present when Aniceto was arrested and it was the appellant who
ordered their captives to be hog-tied and tortured in the garrison.
The appealed judgment being in accordance with the facts and the law, the same is hereby
affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-322

July 28, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.
J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for
appellee.
HILADO, J.:
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the
high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having
been apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him
with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or
presence of a band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine
of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third
paragraph of the decision, and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong
Tindahan, Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a
number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived
the diabolical idea of killing the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits
A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions,
armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel
on January 29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled
included men, women and children mostly women (Exhibits A, C, amd C-1; pp. 3-16, 29,
30, 65, 102, t.s.n.).
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women the prosecution
star witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ).
Presently, the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp.
14, 48, 70, 71, 103, t.s.n.), and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting
the small children, thus killing, among others, those known by the following names: Patricia,
Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang,
Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).

Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom he
bayoneted to death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez,
respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant
for mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous answer that no mercy would be
given them because they were wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t.s.n.).

crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two
sworn statements one made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment
Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made
on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
(Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).

Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino
if he had been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had been butchered,
he proposed to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children
knew nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal,
arguing that the children would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew up, but the
Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t.s.n.).

In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a
member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the
jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost
his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We
cannot uphold either contention. We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although
organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war,
was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to
loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. He
invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63,
providing:

The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-witnesses
Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas to the ruthless massacre of Banaban.
There is a complete absence of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these
witnesses for falsely testifying against appellant such a motive is not even insinuated by
the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute
the findings of fact of the People's Court." Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria,
both aged ten years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the
following to say:
The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They are simple
barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred or
revenge or by any desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward and
frank in their testimony and did not show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the
court. They could not have been mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for
they know him so well that they referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro,
the painter. They could not have erred in the narration of the salient phases of the tragic
events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses to and were
involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the massacre committed by the
accused and his Japanese masters took place in broad daylight and were not consummated
in a fleeting moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a
trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could not help but witness.
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear, positive and
convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further corroboration. Yet,
there is ample corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the
corpses of the massacred residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the heinous

. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign

country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
xxx

xxx

xxx

(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy,
or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted.
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he
subscribed an oath before he was admitted into theMakapili association, "the aim of which
was to help Japan in its fight against the Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel
contends from this that the oath was in fact one of allegiance to support the constitution and
laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The members of
the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to
support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely

aided China in her war with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese
constitution and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During the first World War
the "National Volunteers" were organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight
on the side of the Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission
although the war ended before this could be done they surely did not have to take an oath
to support the constitution or laws of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply
these examples, for they illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military,
naval, or air service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a deserter in
the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy,
or Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary
principles governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article
II, section 2, of said constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service."
(Emphasis supplied.).
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is brought more
immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved in war. During such a
period of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered
free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed,
without reflecting on the patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating
Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not
declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional
precept could be effectively cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the simple
expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in the military,
naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the
very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and

thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime
would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a
divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They
would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might
disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a
dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country. (Moore, International Law Digest,
Vol. III, p. 731.)
696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his nationality, shall
take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he
does not strictly observe this duty. (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth
Italian Edition by Borchard.)
As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it is
improper to separately take into account against appellant he aggravating circumstances of
(1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the
crime. We likewise are of the same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14
of the Revised Penal Code providing that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall
have acted together in the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have been
committed by a band," the employment of more than three armed men is an essential
element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of a band the
employment of more than three armed men is automatically included, there being only the
aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that
appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from
criminal liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service
for Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of
our Revised Penal Code compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any
more than obedience to an illegal order. The construction contended for by appellant could
entail in its potentialities even the destruction of this Republic.
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters
under pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed
under the impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is
no less repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined theMakapili with full knowledge of its avowed
purpose of rendering military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected if

the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about
himself freely and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor
General well remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with gusto during the butchery of
Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more cruelty than the very ruthless
Japanese masters so fate willed it were the very ones who saved the little girls, Clarita
Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses against him on
the day of reckoning.

Q. You said that you are ten years old, do you know what is the meaning of telling a lie? A.
I do not know.

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the
crime of treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating
circumstance, that of "armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance
considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment appealed
from, imposing the death penalty, convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of
P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third
paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice
Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable legal
provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be inflicted,
and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an
indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the
lower court's decision, and the costs. So ordered.

Q. How to read. A. No, Sir.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Q. Do you know the difference between falsity and truth? A. I do not know.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Do you know how to read? What, Sir?

Q. Do you know how to pray? A. I forgot how to pray."(Pages 44 and 45, t.s.n.)
From the testimony of Clarita Perez, we quote:
Q. Please state your name and your personal circumstances. A. Clarita Perez, 10 years of
age, and resident of the Sitio of Banaban.
Q. What town? A. I do not know.
JUDGE NEPOMUCENO:
Q. Is Banaban a sitio in the town of Malolos, or Quigua, or Bigaa? A. I do not know, sir.
Q. You do not know? A. I do not know, sir.
JUDGE ABAD SANTOS:
Q. What province? A. I do not know, sir. (Page 4, t.s.n.)

PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result because I am convinced that the appellant is guilty of multiple murder
and he even deserves the maximum penalty.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The main facts in this case upon which the prosecution relies are based on the testimonies of
three witnesses, two ten-year-old girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, and Policarpio Tigas.
From the testimony of Maria Paulino we quote:

Witness Policarpio Tigas, municipal policeman, testified that about sixty persons, including his
sister Eufemia, were killed in Banaban, but he was not killed "because I was with my guerrilla
outfit then." He saw the killing "because on the 29th day of January, I came down from the
mountains and went to the barrio to see my family to take them away from the place, but
upon arriving there I saw that the people were being gathered and placed behind the chapel.
After placing the people behind the chapel I saw the massacre of the group begun. In my
interest to ascertain the fate of my sister and so that I would not be seen, I crept to a creek
and stayed there to find out what would be the end of it all. While I was thus hiding in that
creek I saw my sister killed by Pedro Manayao, the painter. After that, convinced of the fate of
my sister and knowing the one who killed her was Pedro Manayao, and because I was afraid
that if I stayed there longer I might be caught by the people and knowing that if I would be
caught I would also be killed, I left the place." (Page 102, t.s.n.) He was fifty meters away

from the place of the massacre. "The dead bodies were burned. I left to go to the mountains. I
first put my mother in a safe place, and after that I joined my companions and together we
returned to the town." Eufemia "was buried by my father" on the "second day after the killing".
(P. 103, t.s.n.)
The above are the facts testified in the direct testimony of the witness. That he should come
from the mountains and arrive at the place at the very instant when the massacre was about
to be executed; that he should have remained hidden in a creek, fifty meters away, to find out
the final fate of his sister; that, instead of remaining to witness the gory scene, he did not
depart to call his co-guerrilleros who, according to him, were well armed, in order to attack the
mass killers and try to save those who were gathered to be killed; that he left precisely after
he saw his sister decapitated, notwithstanding which he testified that the corpses were
burned but that the body of his sister was buried by his father the day after the killing,
these, besides other details, are things that lead us to doubt the veracity of the testimony of
this witness, thus leaving to be considered only the testimonies of the two girls.
Although we are inclined to believe that the appellant must have been seen by the two girls at
the place of the massacre in the company of the Japanese, we cannot reconcile ourselves in
believing all the details as narrated by them, so as to justify the inflicting of the supreme
penalty upon appellant. Although we are constrained to believe in the substantial truthfulness
of the two grills, considering their tender age which makes them highly susceptible to
suggestions, and the additional significant fact that Maria Paulino does not know "the
meaning of telling a lie" nor "the difference between falsity and truth," and history and
experience have time and again shown that human fallibility is more pronounced in children
of tender age, we vote for the modification of the appealed decision in the sense that
appellant be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in
return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State
Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases
of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be

destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of
the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of
the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim,
6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44,
45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253,
decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not
of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de factotherein and its power to
promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the
theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of
an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case,
the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion
or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present
case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim
and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory
occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such
allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the
protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and
permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own

government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may

be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way
an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter
by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign
country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection
he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not
be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because
the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties
and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military
occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as
they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not
applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country,
flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition,
and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they
bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the
legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant,
because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra);
and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated,
unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter
was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article
114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied
territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers

of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make
new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare
76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those
which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a
positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving
the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action
is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of
the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or
sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled
illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and
comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto
without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to
the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to
legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their
own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even
compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all
of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of
invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious
task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined
and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime
against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United
States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of
the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in
1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the
people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof,
which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or
officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and
incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the
Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law
above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them"
(section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late
President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the
status as a government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of complete
and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is
a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in
the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question
of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides
that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All
citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the
people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of
the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way

treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty
of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and
that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be
stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs.
Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a
separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time.
While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns.
Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war
has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense
and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until
the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any
lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with nationalharakiri. All war
efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by
citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this
would certainly be the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy
occupation is advanced in support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with
obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the Commonwealth were
suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the
theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual
owes to his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.
"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of
which the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.
"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of
obedience of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is." United
States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on
him who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the
federal government. It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from
the political relations between the government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa.
(8 Wright), 492, 501.
By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he
receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and
temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and
becomes a citizen or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while
domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous during his
residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.
"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the
King, in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both
expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being
perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within
the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are
under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently
founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an
implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will
demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they
acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their
own misbehaviour; but the rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only
by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an alien could acquire a permanent property
in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which would probably be

inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation
might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians
within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for
they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in
allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3 Words
and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)
Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or
subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him
who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal
government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives;
that duty is reciprocal to the right of protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the
right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
Classification. Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that which
arises by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through some circumstance
or act other than birth, namely, by denization or naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that
arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal
allegiance that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common law,
the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years.
(3 C.J.S., p.885.)
Allegiance. the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives.
15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).
"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his
state the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political
person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this
allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who
operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state utters
or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its
sovereignty. (W.W. Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International
Law, 1 American Journal of International Law, p. 915.).
The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in
character. This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of
the member and a duty protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations,
one being a compensation for the other. (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed.,
p.6.)
Allegiance. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection
which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign,
correlative with the protection received.
It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege
(ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and
qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
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Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and

temporary one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by
some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary
and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall.
[U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view
of the revolutionary insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1, Article
II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the
idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people
themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people and only
the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the
tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by
sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed
in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or
group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and in opposition to the
people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern
democracies in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the
pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our people.
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there
may be some plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy
occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have been suspended, because

our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under
our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic
philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy
occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as
"suspended life." There is no possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is
the very essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the
possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time
during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our
Constitution.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty
to her husband. Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband
from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of
the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may
she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the
assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home,
may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is
unacceptable. We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p.
752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth.
The advent of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the
withdrawal by the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the
Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That
sovereignty, following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began
to exist. It has been recognized by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when
President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevelt, as
spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty
resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of
independence on July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had
been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War Council, and in June,
1945, the same Filipino people took part outstanding and brilliant, it may be added in
the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of
the future democratic federal constitution of the world government envisioned by all those

who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously
desired by all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in
Congress. Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by
the Election Code to the President to suspend the election in certain districts and areas for
strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been
exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all laws
violative of the Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or
declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be
included among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his theory of suspended allegiance
and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the Japanese
occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to
Australia, and later to Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino
renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By
petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or
sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the
untenability of the theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of
Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes more imperative in time
of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the
allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation?
The framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for the moment the absurdity
that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the
defense of the survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such
suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service may claim
exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues
that the Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to
protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said government. The
proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the
existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the
existence of the latter is the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be
no question that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power

of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their
government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of
maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of
attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue, irrespective
of the ability or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal
protection.
After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the
Japanese regime, whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the
puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison (75,
Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we
cannot consistently accept petitioner's theory.
If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we
cannot imagine the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino
people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and
the only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance
to the enemy. To give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested
that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's
proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its
synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration,
respect, veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or
some of the feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of
allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate,
anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural
incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies between our people and the
Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside
from the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by
the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon
soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.
Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be
further slapped, may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is
necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial decisions deal
with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not

natural. As long as human pyschology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it
possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of
international law, could not have established in our country any government that can be
legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that
banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance even a temporary one from a
decent people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in
case of invasion, are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody
will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of small nations and peoples, by
whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the
imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away
their arms to rally behind the paladium of the invaders.
Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's
theory since September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By
said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime against national
security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the
legislative and executive departments have jointly declared that during the period above
mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against
national security, including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had
remained in full effect and should be enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the
time the act was being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever
dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime which, as claimed
by petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been
suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact
shows universal and unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth
were not suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought
provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason cases at any cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally
accepted principles of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's
admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but harmful to small and weak
nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value
the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended

sovereignty are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter
forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it
seems that there is no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of
suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in
nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the
Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the
offspring devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a
moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of
government, even since the Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would
not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy occupation. It must be
remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the
archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had
already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we
approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during
the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to
continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided
that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the
Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as
scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy.
Everybody was then convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of
repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of
suspended allegiance will cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now
under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their country, because
their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves.
Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong,
history will indiscriminality classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to

their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go
down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their
own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process
of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as
such during the critical period of test.
HILADO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called
Japanese occupation of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of
Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which constituted the minor area of
the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government
and to the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period
there was no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set
them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a
hundred-fold in World War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came
to be known as International Law, governing their conduct with each other and toward their
respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in
time of war. During the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments
had no realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be
capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently
justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an
instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us
now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its
existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was,
employed for entirely different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to
previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially changed
as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on
land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian
populations and to their properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in
neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to
formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928.
As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the

United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of
June 7, 1945:
International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously
sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought
about by the action of governments designed to meet a change circumstances. It grows, as
did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled
principles to new situations.
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After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the
earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to
power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war
by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to
those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle
that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.
The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the
most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in
common with the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as
an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by
pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.
Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and
comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States
Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, "war between
nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has
become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and
subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and
the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete
many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of re-examining many of
its Codes and treaties.
This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought
international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is
a crime.
Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-

eight governments, which declared that "a war of aggression constitutes .. an International
crime. . . .
The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the
representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of
aggression constitutes aninternational crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928,
the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "war of
aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."
xxx

xxx

xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern
international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in
legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of peace.
("U.S.A. An American Review," published by the United States Office of War Information,
Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of
international law" and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind
no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a
distinction between the just and the unjust war the war of defense and the war of
aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice
Jackson says that "international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th
century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he
says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact
constitutes a reversal of the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law
into harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he
mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an
international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of
aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American conference of 1928,
which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an
international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt
at an exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States,
and later, in rapid succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and

utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides,
was its attack against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain
areas thereof.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner
herein in support of his theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted
during those periods of the history of nations when all war was considered legal, as stated by
Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really
justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive
war which threw the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941
of the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war
as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes
with other nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that
modification of the then existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter.
With the modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound
themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the outlawing, prescription and
renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus
outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saving that the rules and
principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were
automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the
ban and condemnation of the pact.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if
such a war is an international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a
foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or
positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such
occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain
portions of its territory during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense
and only this sense should we speak here with respect to this country and its citizens,
any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to
exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the
owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the part
of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same
as in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of
legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to
prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and

Japan, and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it
not be forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted
and conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact
that this government has a representative in the international commission currently trying the
Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is
in entire accord with the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan
as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war
already renounced war as an instrument of national policy (Constitution, Article II, section 2),
thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to
apply to the occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules
and principles of international law which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring
in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in
that occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said international
commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against
humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was
but part and parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an
effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis and not more than a mere hypothesis that when Japan
occupied the City of Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a
justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not hold good. The continuance
of the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship
which the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with.
. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus
forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of
their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the
individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance
to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions,
personal service, and connection with or residence in the occupied territory.
The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to
swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp.
1898-1899.)

. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the
authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to
him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344.)
The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the
occupied territory is but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful
sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful
sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and
pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of
the occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the
other hand, he may compel them to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality'
. . . willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate
commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is
applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws;
and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of
obedience to his laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the
inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he can exact
from them, does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the
one's country is unable to afford him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the
sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when his country is in such
distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country
should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth
offspring. The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or
thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish
nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable
consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of
the spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit
contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country
and say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader
and, in consequence was disabled from affording them protection, they were released from
their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to its
enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only
tend to aggravate their crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people
before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the
Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of
independence that sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law.
Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall
be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines." Under this provision the Government of the Philippines
immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter
only the name of that government was to be changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines
were and are always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The
People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was already true in
prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government
of the Philippines" spoken of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the
Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of
the Constitution which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws
to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution"
of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the
Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided
and resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from
that people they are the same people who preserve it to this day. There has never been
any change in its respect.
If one committed treason againsts the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he
continues to be criminally liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the
literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution, that accused
owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in
the textual words of the Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same
government which after independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines."
The most that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and
absolute after independence that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor.
But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his
becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the

Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they
acquire this status? The offended party continues to be the same only his status has
changed.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were
suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law
adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of the Nation.
Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political
nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124),
and that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered
suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the
civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil.,
875, 881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant
will naturally suspends all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and
safety of his command, such action to be made known to the inhabitants.(United States Rules
of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element
in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position
in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted
and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the
Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be
inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1brought to our attention, which, moreover,
have entirely different factual bases.
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of
its Commander in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese
Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Philippines has
completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under
martial law over the district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said
Commander in Chief of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative
organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders,
ordinances and customs until further orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the
present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the
explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the Philippines has
been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and

regulations which are not proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military
Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes."
The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane.
The latter phase outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting
the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It thus consoling to note
that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not
forget to declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the
humanity and the over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in case not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the occupied
territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and
by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . .
the occupant is likely to regard to himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate
the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that
endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are
permitted to retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law,
Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of
the invading power, whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the
displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from
the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the
maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States
Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a
nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations
against their own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by
the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the
occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose,
and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the
territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces,
and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under
all circumstances or conditions." (Peraltavs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing
United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II.
Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)

He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an
occupied territory were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize
our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:
To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to
the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two
puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would
have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted
to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative
enactments and institutions on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the
United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if
only temporary, to Japan.
The only sensible purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out
of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent
occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupant
(Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), must be the preservation of the nation,
certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those
who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by
the de juregovernment or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise
stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect,
the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the
fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority
in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take
the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If
we were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to accept the absurd
proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It
should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to
control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive
one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete with it on an even plane.
Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to
weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts,
while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-legislative
decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience to
such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from the
prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition,
1945, p. 1886.)

As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and
punish the inhabitants for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and
necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be
protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they
may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal
Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed
against the belligerent occupant.
In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the
Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States," and the
meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page
298):
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our
Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of the accused under that Constitution,
because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as
we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of
the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a
constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear
intention that it should have a retrospective effect," (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially as regards
laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the
Japanese military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government,
because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal
provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex
post facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall
have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to
enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code in the aforesaid of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the
suspension was good only as to the military occupant?
The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our
position. As analyzed and described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case
"was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States the court of highest human

authority on that subject and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of
the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence
of the war out of which it grew; and while no department of this Government was inclined to
magnify the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government, there can be no
suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no
doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case
grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in
September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and
held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the
United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties to the
United States. At the close of the war the place by treaty restored to the United States, and
after that was done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws
of the United States, they would have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its
laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the time held by the British forces
in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced
there; and that a court of the United States (the power of that government there having since
been restored) was bound so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was
dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of
the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single
question is whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable
to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States.. We
are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. . . . The sovereignty of the
United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States
could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who
remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a
temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such
only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be
obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected our
revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were
subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in
no correct sense imported into the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the
case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the
United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case
they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and
upon principles of public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the
conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be

decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this
case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerents
occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in
terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and
accomplished Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so
adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory;
that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former
government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of
reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory of its former
sovereign, the United States."
But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United
States vs. Rice should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if
sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the adoption of the
Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important
significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial
whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point
cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of
the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of
the majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to,
that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the
laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial
sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may the
doctrine in the United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without repudiating
the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military occupant to
suspend all laws of a political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to take
an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309). In fact, it is a
recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation
of a territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but
that the inhabitants of the occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native
State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection
of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying
to argue that the law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese

occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but
an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military
occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign to the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a
power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is in the territory of a power
which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of
his own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power
is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect
from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States
the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial
limits of such other States, should insist that States should provide system of law and of
courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to
alien residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its
borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants to its own
citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have
such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined,
and, when thus determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public
Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent occupation must have been
contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect
purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to
pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The
Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under
occupation can no longer be "delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable
the military occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government,
without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is not correct, because the
suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations
(article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the
population "in the obligation of taking part military operations against their own country."
Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much
less from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own

country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be corrected by such
world agency as the United Nations organizations.

the merits of the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945],
Vol. III, p. 1879.)

It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the
collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the
ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if the
Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any
Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to
and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas after the formal surrender of our
and the American regular fighting forces, they would have faced certain annihilation by the
Japanese, considering that the latter's military strength at the time and the long period during
which they were left military unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make
reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction.

Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production
of traitors, have a wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their
countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no amount of laws or
judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base
as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages.
Our patriots who fought and died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have
survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing
as the treason law. The Filipino people as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime,
not out of fear of a treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic
and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs.
Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will
unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of
warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations,
likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties injured
by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning
sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese
army, may be prosecuted under the municipal law, and under this group even the spies and
informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made answerable for any act
offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to
reckon with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases,
those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the
Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war against the
United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the
Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The
recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the
furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed
by them upon the real traitors.

If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation
of the Philippines, it was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them
to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If they were able to survive,
it was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in
cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their
ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of
this line of thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice
any such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is
the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military
force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with each other. Fear for their
own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to
interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its
passions and cause to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by
such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict may,
under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions,
proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military
achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It
should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months; it
extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the
"presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines
whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent
on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.)
The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of

It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that
the obedience and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in
complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere physical presence
implied force and pressure and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the
Philippine Government that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international
law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense
indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and

obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be
counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially,
however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order
prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid
and comfort to the enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the
Philippines ineffective during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only
after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws
now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force
and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and
the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the
Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the
President of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population
to take oath to the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the
inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter continue to be bound
to the political laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague
Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend
all the laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an
oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already
stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving
the protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under
the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience.
Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to
deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the
population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the
Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for
their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better position to
know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government.

"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned
against the use of judicial process for non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no
reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot
Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind
a court. If you are determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial;
the word yields no respect for courts that are merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may
have got his just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in
mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict
guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty
men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our
best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the editorial
appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the
Japanese military occupation, they were at most borrowing the famous and significant
words of President Roxas errors of the mind and not of the heart. We advisedly said
"feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or
sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had
always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese
military occupation, the present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute treason
committed against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth Government
which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held
that, upon a change of sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such
subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43
Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did
not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said
declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subervient to and
controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its many
provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that
the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The
framers of the Constitution had to make said declaration of principle because the document
was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not
have announced that one of the purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino
people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose, will dare

allege that the Philippines was an independent country under the Commonwealth
Government.

government be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of

Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75.).

The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under
the Jones Law, but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was
enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.

The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the
States of the American Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although
limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively stated that the
Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they
now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of
the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign
status of the individual States is no longer contested.

The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. It has already been seen that the exercise
of sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which,
collectively, constitute the Government. For practical political reasons which can be easily
appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated and
executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the
control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life
which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the governmental
agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in
the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States,
those governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery
of the State whose sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to
be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the State by which they were originally
created.
By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and
the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself
the exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States
may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to
themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise
a rare and improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist,
and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing
consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is
complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not
political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the socalled Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central
Government the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their
several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty
of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an
amplitude of powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the
characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed, when of any considerable size,
efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of local self-

It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such
autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the
constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or electing
the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the States
act, ad hoc, as agents of the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts
of Public Law [1931], p.250.)
This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the nonsovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The
Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this
Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of
Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known
as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government
under the Republic of the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot
agree. While the Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and
exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an
instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp.
74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or
sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or against
its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess,
sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent
Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the
Constitution applicable to the Republic.

Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the
Philippines Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended,
altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to
the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the
laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the
Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is
obvious. The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is not
inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that said penal provision is
fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder
should owe allegiance to the United States or the government of the Philippines, the latter
being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under
the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not
required to owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed
to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as
thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and
application of an ex post facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has
held in the case of Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines
had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be
taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap
Co. vs. United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the
sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result
that the earlier case only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the
Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United States.

No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12,

1943, that "the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as
a government of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes of complete and
respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date,
much less as a formal proclamation of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the
Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United
States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the
United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and
not President Osmea who was with him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official
participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and
not the Commonwealth Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and VicePresident of the Philippines.
The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the
State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained, treason against either
is not and cannot be treason against the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the
Philippines.

G.R. No. L-3607

August 27, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NORBERTO E. BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for appellee.
Mariano L. Mercado for appellant.
REYES, J.:
Charged with treason on four counts in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, the accused
Norberto E. Bernardino alias Monkey was, after a joint trial with the indictees in two other
treason cases, found guilty on only one court and sentenced to 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, a fine of P5,000, and the costs. The accused appealed to this Court.
The count on which appellant was convicted charges him with having, with intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy, ordered the apprehension of Adriano Valdez and Tranquilino de la
Rosa, who were thereafter tortured by his men and investigated by himself for guerrilla
activities.
The evidence shows that on February 15, 1944, Adriano Valdez, a captain in the intelligence
division of the Subic guerrilla sector, was sent by his commanding officer to the barrio of
Agosohim at that time known as "Little Tokyo," in the municipality of Subic, Zambales, to spy
on the enemy defenses and size up the strength of the pro-Japanese elements there. Taking
along with him Tranquilino de la Rosa, a private in the same guerrilla outfit, Valdez proceeded
to the said barrrio and got there with his companion at about 11 o'clock in the morning of that
day. To conceal his mission, Valdez went to a firewood dealer, his compadre Juan Fausto,
alias Juan Taga, whom he found splitting wood near his house, and tried to impress him with
the idea that he had come to buy firewood. While they were conversing, two armed men
came, one of whom, Isidro Fausto alias Hitler, a son of Juan Fausto and accused in one of
the treason cases above mention, told Valdez and De la Rosa that they were wanted by
appellant and Jorge Lopera (the accused in the third treason case) and then escorted them to
where the latter two were. There appellant asked Valdez and De la Rosa what business had
brought them to Agosohim. Valdez explained that he and De la Rosa were there to buy
firewood. But appellant was not convinced, and so he told them to go up the house of Juan
Fausto and had them guarded. There the two remained until 10 o'clock at night, when a
guard ordered them to come down, and once on the ground they were bound by Jorge
Lopera, who, together with appellant and other solders, thereafter took them to a place under

a mango tree where Lopera, with appellant standing by, maltreated and tortured De la Rosa,
hoisting him up the mango tree several times in an effort to make him admit that he and
Valdez were guerrillas who had come to Agosohim to spy. As De la Rosa would not admit that
fact, he was taken to the barracks for further investigation by the appellant, while Valdez was,
on his part, taken to another place and also investigated. But the two would not confess, and
so they were released the following day.
Appellant denied having had anything to do with the apprehension, investigation, and
maltreatment of Valdez and De la Rosa and claimed that he could not be pro- Japanese,
having been himself maltreated or tortured by the enemy during the occupation. But the trial
court did not believe his story, and it does not appear that there is sufficient reason to
impeach the declaration of those who testified to his treasonous acts.
While the evidence does not show that appellant had himself laid hands on either Valdez or
De la Rosa, there is no denying the fact that he was present when they were maltreated, that
he took active part in the investigation, and that it was he who had Valdez and De la Rosa
apprehended and detained under guard in the house of Juan Fausto. These facts were
established by the combined declaration of Valdez and De la Rosa, who testified to the same
overt acts which took place before they were separated for further investigation. In addition
there is also proof of appellant's adherence to the enemy, for he had been seen armed and
dressed in Japanese military uniform and to be among those who surrounded and guarded
the guerrillas when the latter surrendered in mass in 1943.
Our conclusion is that on the evidence of record appellant has been rightly convicted of the
crime of treason. And the penalty imposed upon him by the lower court being adequate, the
sentence below is affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-433

March 2, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for
appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to
death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of
the penalty is the sole question put in issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu,
Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy
and her military forces said accused being a member of the Philippines Constabulary did then
and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other
member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did apprehend and
arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas and of being the Father of two guerrilla
men; that the herein accused after maltreating said Paulino Osorio did detain him in the
municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same date the accused and his companions did
apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person who were also tortured for being
guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused herein with his firearm did shoot
Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province of
Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy and her military forces said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary
did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of
13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas
and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut
a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe especially with respect to Antolin
Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said tortures administered by the accused.

3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a
soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and
treasonable accompany a group of Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other
parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former USAFFE soldier for being a
guerrilla, and there herein accused and his companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio
Padilla detain him at the Constabulary Headquarters for several days after which he was
taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with
murders with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be
imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying
circumstances the court believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killing were
murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation
superior strength cruelty and an armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and
formed part of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous
intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and
sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The
defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court
against its sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer
to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in which this question was discussed and decided. There
we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior
strength treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the
crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may
not taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy
is in many cases as in this a long continued process requiring for the successful
consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective and persistent determination and
planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged
in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements

which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the use of a large force and
equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the
personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force which enabled him to
overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not
expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even terms according to he
romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to
the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human
treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties
are condemned and the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances
of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective
under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above
mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall within the terms of the above
paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed
inn treason characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime
should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal
responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule
treason the highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator advantage that are
denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and injustice the penalty in treason will be
adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code to the danger and harm and to
which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that
resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust
penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution.
Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable as in
the case of homicides connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment
with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency
and in the furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants
spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The
appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with
the legal accessories and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-1656

January 7, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
ROMAN VILO, defendant-appellant.
Felix D. Agcaoili for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court convicting the appellant, Roman Vilo,
of the complex crime of treason with murder and imposing upon him the death penalty and a
fine of P10,000 with costs.
Appellant's attorney de oficio admits that the People's Court correctly found the appellant
guilty of the following overt acts: (1). The apprehensions and torture on April 15, 1944,
Carcar, Cebu, of Amando Satorre, Ireneo Medel, Maximo Satorre and Eusebio Rezada, and
the killing of Mando Satorre, all due to their connection with the resistance movement. (2).
The apprehensions on April 15, 1944, in Carcar, Cebu, of Laureano Raponoya, suspected
guerrilla member, and his delivery to the Japanese who tortured him. (3). The apprehension,
torture and killing of one Segundo in March, 1944, in Pinamungahan, Cebu, because the
latter was a guerrilla volunteer guard. And the only plea invoked in behalf of the appellant is
that he acted under duress.
In support of this plea, it is alleged that on March 25, 1942, the appellant was inducted into
the USAFFE organization; that after four months he was arrested, with forty-two others, by
the Japanese who tortured them, as a result of which the appellant was hospitalized for two
months; that he was thereafter made to join the puppet Philippine Constabulary, with station
at different places in the Province of Cebu. Even if these allegation are true, they are not
sufficient to show that, when the appellant committed the acts imputed to him, he was acting
under any apparent threat of harm from the Japanese, much less from any Filipino superiors.
That the appellant had previously been arrested or made to join the Constabulary, did not
amount to an order to our threat upon him, leaving him without any choice other than to
perform the specific acts of which he was convicted, especially when the specific acts of
which said acts took place about two years after appellant's alleged torture by the Japanese.
Moreover, the way the appellant killed his victims by bayoneting them and by further
slashing the knees of one so as to make the latter's body fit into his grave, is rather
inconsistent with the attitude of one who might have acted reluctantly and under compulsion.

Upon the other hand, it is admitted in the brief for the prosecution that the count regarding the
arrest by the necessary two witnesses. Even so, the other two counts warrant appellant's
conviction. Adherence to the enemy is of course deducible from appellant's overt acts,
particularly from the circumstances that all those apprehended, tortured and killed were
members of or suspected of having connection with the guerrilla movement.
The People's Court, however, erred in the classifying the crime as treason with murder. The
killing of Amando Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it
therefore "becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provided." (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329.1 See
alsoPeople vs. Labra, L-386, 46 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], 159) 2, This notwithstanding, the
death penalty is still imposable upon the appellant in view of the presence of two proven
aggravating circumstances, namely armed band and the use of torture and other atrocities on
the victim, Instead of the usual and less painful method of execution; but on the ground
presently to be stated, said penalty necessarily has to be lowered to reclusion perpetua.
Eight Justice, including the writer of this opinion, believe that the appellant merits the death
penalty, but one Justice disagree. Under article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed when all the Justices are not unanimous
in their voting as to the property of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death
cannot be imposed upon the appellant. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (No. 296), approved on
June 17, 1948, however, provides that "whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes
the death penalty, the case shall be determined by eight Justices of Court," and that, "when
eight Justices fail to reach a decision as herein provided, the penalty next lower in degree
than the death penalty shall be imposed" (section 9), with the result that under this legal
provision the death penalty is impossible as long as there are eight Justices voting therefore.
The majority of this Court are of the opinion that the new law may be given retroactive effect
so as to cover the case at bar involving an offense committed prior to the enactment of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. They argue that the matter referring to the number of Justices
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty is merely one of procedure, and that
unanimity was previously required in view merely of the small composition of this Court, a
person that has ceased to exist because there are now eleven Justices.
The writer hereof believes, upon the other hand, that the new law should not be given
retroactive effect if it is not be to ex post facto. After the inclusion of the provisions of article
46 in Revised Penal Code, no, accused could be sentenced to death except when there was
unanimity among the Justices as to the propriety of the penalty; and this requisite

correspondingly accorded the accused a substantive right. It is plain, and therefore easy to
see, that there can be no more substantive legal provision than that which determines the
question whether or not an accused will be sentenced to death. The provision can indeed de
likened to that referring to mitigating or aggravating circumstances upon which the proper
period of the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code is dependent. In my opinion,
article 47 required unanimity in order to give the assurance that, when a death sentence is
meted out, there can absolutely be no room for any doubt as to the propriety of the penalty,
implied from the absence of any dissent. The following may be cited in support of the theory
of the writer of this opinion:
The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of the
Philippine Commission, which went into effect on the 11th of October 1907. Although the
complaint was filed by the fiscal on the 18th of January, 1908, it is not lawful; to attribute
retroactive effect to the said Act of the Philippine Commission for the reason that, even
though it refers to a matter of procedure, it does not contain any clauses making it retroactive
in its effects, and furthermore, the provisions thereof if applied now are prejudicial to the
accused.
Hence, in view of the terms of the aforesaid article 433 of the Penal Code, the proceedings
instituted by virtue of the complaint file by the fiscal can not be sustained, as they were
brought without the necessary previous complaint of the aggrieved husband, and in violation
of the criminal law; therefore, the said proceedings, together with the judgment rendered
therein, are decidedly null and void. (U. S. vs. Gomez and Coronel, 22 Phil., 279, 282- 283.)
To give effect to the view that the Judiciary Act of 1948, should be given only prospective
application, the writer hereof is constrained to switch his vote to the imposition of reclusion
perpetua upon the appellant who otherwise should have deserved the penalty of death.
With the modification that the appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the appealed
judgment is affirmed.
So ordered with costs.
Pablo, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Moran, C. J., Bengzon, and Montemayor JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

We concur in the findings of fact made, and in the result of the decision penned, by Mr.
Justice Paras.
We also agree with his view that the provision in section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 (known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948) regarding the required number of votes for the imposition of the
death penalty, has no, and cam never have, retroactive effect. Otherwise, it would be ex post
facto and, therefore, violative of one of the express prohibitions of the Constitution.
We dissent, however, from the pronouncement in the decision to the effect this because
appellant committed the crime with the aid of an armed hand and with torture two aggravating
circumstances should be considered against him. We are of opinion that the two
circumstances just mentioned should not be considered as modifying circumstances but as
essential elements of the treason committed by appellant, following the doctrine laid down in
our decision in People vs. Victoria, (44 Off. Gaz., [7] 22301). We may take judicial notice of
the fact, borne out by almost all the many treason cases we have considered and decided,
that those who committed such a crime used to follow the pattern set by the Japanese in their
campaign for the brutal suppression of guerrillas and other members of the resistance
movement, and the aid of armed bands and employment of torture are among the
characteristics elements of said pattern.
FERIA, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the decision which, in its pertinent part reads as follows:
The People's Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with murder, The
killing of Amando Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it
therefore "becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides." (People vs. Prieto, L- 399, 45 Off Gaz., 3329. 2 See,
also People vs, Labra, L-884, 46 Off Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 159.) 3 This notwithstanding, the
death penalty is still imposable upon the appellant in view of the presence of two proven
aggravating circumstances, namely, armed band and the use of torture and other atrocities
on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution; but on the ground
presently to be stated, said penalty necessarily has to be lowered to reclusion perpetua.
Eight Justices, including the write of this opinion, believe that the appellant merits the death
penalty, but one Justice disagrees. Under article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. which
provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed when all the Justices are unanimous in

their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death
cannot be imposed upon the appellant. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (No. 296), approved on
June 17, 1948, however, provides that "whenever, the case shall be determined by eight
Justices of the Court," that case shall be determined by eight Justices of the Court," and that,
"when eight Justices fail to reach a decision as herein provided, the penalty next lower in
degree than the death penalty shall be imposed" (sec. 9), with the result that under this legal
provision the death penalty is imposable as long as there are eight Justices voting thereof.
The majority of this Court are of the opinion that the new may be given retroactive effect so as
to cover the case at bar involving an offense committed prior to the enactment of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The writer hereof believe, upon the other hand, that the new law should not be given
retroactive effect if it is not to be ex post facto. After the inclusion the of the provisions of
article 47 in the Revised Penal Code, no accused could be sentenced to death except when
there was unanimity among the Justice as to the property of the penalty; and this requisite
correspondingly accorded the accused a substantive right. .
xxx

xxx

xxx

To give effect to the view that this Judiciary Act of 1948, should be given only prospective
application, the writer hereof is constrained to switch his vote to the imposition of reclusion
perpetua upon the appellant who otherwise should have deserved the penalty of death.
With the modification that the appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the appealed
judgment is affirmed. So ordered with costs.
Before the deliberations of the case at bar, and for the purpose of applying the decision of this
Court or the majority thereof to cases coming up to us on appeal or for revision after the
approval of the Judiciary Act of 1948. On June 17, 1948, we have discussed and the majority
of this Supreme Court has arrived at the conclusion and resolved that section 9 of said Act
providing that "whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case
shall be determined by eight Justice of the Court. when eight Justice fail to reach a decision
as herein provided, the penalty next lower in degree than the death penalty shall be
imposed," is applicable to criminal cases pending at the time the Judiciary Act was enacted
although the crime had been committed prior thereto, because said provision is procedural in
character, and the application thereof to crimes committed before the promulgation of said Act
would not make the law unconstitutional or ex post facto, in accordance with the almost
unanimous decision of the courts of last resort in the States of the Union, after the
Constitutions of which ours is patterned.

It is well settled that a law is said to be ex post facto when it penalizes as a public offense an
act which was not at the time of its commission; when it aggravates or makes a crime greater
than it was when committed; when it changes the punishment and inflicts a greater on than
the law annexed to the offense when committed, and when it alters the rules of evidence, and
requires less testimony or evidence than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense, order to make the conviction more easy: in short, when the law, in relation to the
offense and its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his advantages. (11 Am. Jur.,
section 348).
But it is also firmly established that the prohibition as to the passage of ex post facto laws has
no application to changes which relate exclusively to the remedy or modes of procedure, for a
person has no vested right in any particular remedy. and can not insist on the application to
the trial of his case of any other than the existing rules of procedure. So a change in the law
requiring the jury instead of the court to fix the punishment, as well, one which makes the
court instead of the jury judge of the law, and a law that makes changes as to the number of
judges not unconstitutional as being ex post facto. (11 Am. Jur., section 357, 361).
In the case of Marion vs,. State, 20, Neb., 233; 29 N.W., 91; 57 Am. Rep., 825, it was held
that "under the principle permitting the substitution of law, the legislature may repeal
provisions existing at the time of the commission of an offense which direct that juries shall be
judges of the law as well as of the facts, and may require that all question of law shall,
following such repeal, be tried by the judge." In re Com. vs. Phelps, 210 Mass., 78; 96 N. C.,
346; 37 L.R.A. (N.S.), 567, the Court held that a statue providing that capital cases may be
tried before one judge, instead of two or more as therefore, is not ex post facto as applied to
a prior offense, though it leaves matters of discretion for decision by one presiding judge,
where prior thereto such matters were decided by two or more judges." And the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S., 377; 38 Law. ed.,
485; 14 S. Ct., 570, laid down the ruling that "a statute dividing the Supreme Court of a state
into divisions, whereby a person convicted can have a review of his conviction by only part of
the judges who constituted the appellate court when the crime was committed, is not an ex
post facto law."
The question involved in the present case is substantially identical to that of a law which after
the commission of an offense, changes the previous one by decreasing the number of judges
who shall preside and decide the case, whereby instead of the old law which required several
judges to concur in the decision, the new law only requires one or less number of judges to
decide and convict the defendant or of a law which divides the Supreme Court into divisions
after the commission of an offense whereby the defendant will have a review of his conviction

by only a part of the Justices who constituted the appellate court when the crime was
committed.
There is nothing wrong in that the writer of the decision has to state therein that he is one of
the Justice who dissented from the opinion of the majority, in a resolution previously adopted
by this Court, and his reasons to justify his dissenting opinion; but what is wrong is that,
notwithstanding the opinion of this Court or the majority as to applicability of the above quoted
provision of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 to cases like the present, because said
provision requires only the concurrence of eight Justices for the imposition of death penalty,
and according to the decision, "eight Justices, including the writer of this opinion believe that
the appellant merits the death penalty," the writer of the decision "switches his vote for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua upon the defendant," for the purpose of defeating or
thwarting the decision of the majority of this Court, which everybody, from the humblest
citizen to the highest magistrate of the nation, must respect in accordance with the express
mandate of the Constitution, alleging as reason for doing so that the death penalty cannot be
imposed, because one of the nine Justices dissented, and the new law should not be given a
retroactive effect according to his dissenting opinion.
In the history of the Philippine judiciary, particularly of this Supreme Court, there have been
case in which a Justice who had dissented from the opinion of the majority on the resolution
of a legal question, had to act in accordance with the opinion of the majority, out of respect to
it, in the resolution of subsequent cases reserving or without waiving his own opinion. But
there has not been, up to the present, a case in which in a single Justice has so insisted as to
make his dissenting opinion prevail over the decision of the majority, as to defeat or thwart
said decision on the same case.
As on of those who are of the opinion the provision of section 9 of the new Judiciary Act,
which superseded the article 47 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing to eight the number
of Justices of this Court as the majority required for the imposition of death penalty, because
to concur even in the result of dispositive part thereof, would be tantamount to concurring with
the write of the decision in the nonapplicability to the present case of the said provisions of
section 9 of the New Judiciary Act, for the writer of the decision does not disagree with the
other seven Justices in that "the death penalty is still imposable upon the appellant in view of
the presence of two proven aggravating circumstances, namely, armed band and the use of
torture and other atrocities on the victims, instead of the usual and less painful method of
execution; but on the ground presently to be stated, said penalty necessarily has to be
lowered to reclusion perpetua," that, is, although "eight Justices, including the writer of this
opinion, believe that the appellant merits the death penalty," as one of the none Justices

disagrees, "under article 47 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the death penalty
shall not be imposed when all the Justices are not unanimous in their voting as to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death can not be imposed upon
the appellant," and for that reason he "is constrained to switch his vote to the imposition
ofreclusion perpetua upon the appellant who otherwise should have deserved the penalty of
death." Inasmuch as eight Justices, including the writer of the decision, are of the opinion that
the death penalty is "imposable upon the appellant in view of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances" or "believe that the appellant merits the death penalty," under the provisions
of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as construed finally by this Court by the votes of the
majority of its members before the deliberation of the case at bar, the death penalty must be
imposed although one of the nine Justices taking part in the consideration and adjudication of
the case dissents from the judgment.
The fact that the writer of the decision has dissented from the majority who have held that the
above quoted provisions of section 9 of the new Judiciary Act, and not article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, is applicable to cases like the present, does not authorize him to go
against or nullify the result of the deliberation and conclusion reached by the eight Justices
including him, on the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the appellant. He
can do so only if he dissents form the conclusion that the commission of the offense at bar
was attended by mitigating and not by any aggravating and therefore death penalty can not
be imposed.
The dissenting opinion or vote referred or alluded to in article 47 of the Revised Penal Code
and section 9 of the Judiciary Act above quoted, is one based on the ground that, according
to the offense charged and the evidenced as well as the provisions of Chapter IV of the
Revised Penal Code on the application of penalties, and in view of the circumstances
attending the commission thereof, death penalty can not be imposed upon the defendant or
appellant. This Court having already and finally decided, prior to the deliberation of this case,
that section 9 of the new Judiciary Act is applicable to pending cases for offenses committed

prior to the promulgation thereof, the writer of the decision can not, legally and properly,
reiterate in the present case his dissenting opinion on that question already decided by this
Court, and much less consider it as, or legal factor for, lowering to reclusion perpetua the
death penalty that he himself believes imposable upon the appellant or the latter deserves, in
view of the two aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the crime of
treason of which the appellant is decreed guilty. He can not do so because that question is no
longer an open but a closed one by virtue of the principle of stare decisis, and it cannot be
properly raised by a member of this Court, and become involved in the present case, for the
purpose of determining the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the
appellant. The vote of the writer of the decision for the imposition of cadena perpetua should
therefore be considered as of no effect to change his opinion that the appellant deserves the
death penalty, and that this penalty is imposable upon the appellant with the concurrence of
seven other Justices.
Only the vote of the majority of the members of this Court is required to declare that the last
paragraph of section 9, Judiciary Act of 1948, is applicable to cases for offenses committed
prior to the date said Act became effective, for it is not a case of declaring a law
unconstitutional, and said decision must be respected by everybody, specially by members of
this Court. To support the theory of the writer of the decision in the present case would be
subversive to the conclusiveness of this Court's decisions unless and until it is reconsidered
and reversed, for any one of the dissenters, like the writer of the decision, might render said
decision opinion on the applicability of said section 9 in a clear case in which his vote is
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.
In view of all the foregoing, the death penalty must be considered as imposed upon the
appellant, and therefore the judgment of the lower court imposing said penalty must be
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.