5.

Right to Confrontation
6. Right to have compulsory processes to secure the attendance of witnesses
C. Trial in Absentia

G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO
ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO
MABUHAY, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.

CRUZ, J.:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he
could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. 1 As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not
guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first
information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering
his release; and so he escaped. 3 The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal
bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the
hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances. 5 The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until
the return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now before us on certiorari and mandamus. 7
The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by
the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its
intendment.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as
follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be
indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old
case ofPeople v. Avancea 8 required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to
be discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his right to be

present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to
the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long
as he had not been recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia,
Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual
conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his
failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of
the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the
fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this
escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In
the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect
ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally
speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue even
in his absence and most likely result in his conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution
intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section 19, the defendant's escape
will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice.
The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping,
placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the
accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the
instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge
should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the
illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture
of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf
and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction.
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and
not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme
for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only
learning but also vision.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city
court of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his
investigation within sixty days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in
absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case
against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988

FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE
LA VEGA, JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Victor de la Serna for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The first is
whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the
custody of the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and
the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.
On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the
hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused including
private respondent, were duly informed of this.
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center
and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners
herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused
praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified. (Emphasis supplied.) *
Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but
nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows
up in court. 1

After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against
the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The
dispositive portion is as follows:
WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula Fernando
Cargando and Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City
Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby ordered to release these accused if they are no
longer serving sentence of conviction involving other crimes.
The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has
escaped on August 30,1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the
said accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his
defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person. 2
On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted
dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in
absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22,
1973.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners,
expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the private respondent,
who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and
present his evidence. 3 The reasoning of the said court is that under the same provision, all accused
should be presumed innocent. 4Furthermore the lower court maintains that jurisdiction over private
respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to cross-examine and present
evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired. 5
We disagree.
First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accusedprivate respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by
his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law
and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently
ruled in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but
continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment
and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this
continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in
absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment;
(2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the
private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty.
He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced
by his signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. 7 It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to
appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence
unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly
proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of
private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and
rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in
court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who who escape from custody finally decides
to appear in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of
proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it
has been aptly explained:
. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were quite a
number of reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to be
stayed indefinitely because of his non- appearance. What the Constitution guarantees
him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be
proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot
justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both
society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should
not go unpunished.9
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be
violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of
conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the
opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and
to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he
virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same vein, his right to
present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by
him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the
intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit:
... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular
date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during
that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and
escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on
all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained....

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in
absentiawaives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him. 11
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so
far as it suspends the proceedings against the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is
reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence
or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the evidence adduced
and the applicable law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECTION 15 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
G.R. No. L-14639

March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application
forhabeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch
of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront
of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount
purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The
primary question is Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws
to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable
reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila,
Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women
of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the
police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau
of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the
use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled
some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.

The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that
they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that
region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests
were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night
of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for
as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo.
The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification
that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to
these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are
not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married,
others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities,
others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao,
the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an
application forhabeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through
stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to
Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including
them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women
were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before
the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts
relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First
Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the
women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the
boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170
women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In
open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had
been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that
directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to
bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2,
1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion
of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose
behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of
those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police
and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a
telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto,
and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in
Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao
and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to
fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they

were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers.
Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that
therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December
10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the
original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that
those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales,
and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before
the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the
respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was
further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be
decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives
and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court
sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity.
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had
returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further
endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated
that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao
with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they
desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements;
that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit
memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the
police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney
for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal
requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated
January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the
final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were isolated
from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or
to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown.
Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case
is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary
and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed,
this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law did the
Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to
another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The
Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No.
519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide
for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No.
899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy,

to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of
Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities
compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which
even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of
the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal
law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation,
compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found
in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a
principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to
require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President
of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no
such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a
municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at
their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines
have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can
do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to
do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another
within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any
other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
(Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is
above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish
official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting
office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee
[1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another
case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356,
370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the
very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a
government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are
three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended
effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force
in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers
distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twentyfive and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any
public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal
prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that
the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the
instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to "It
would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to
his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be
continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal
procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by
decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the
Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of
their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of
police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women
from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends
of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the
women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by
persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The
law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.)
Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao
or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid
unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest
judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made
returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme
Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court
of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their
plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the
two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties

situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken
cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to
consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the
writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for,
says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed,
were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city
limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found
to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region,
deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed
in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of
going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold
his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong
that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to
return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The
great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous
case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not
a writ ofhabeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State
to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be
detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It
was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question
presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the
writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with
whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell
was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter

appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the
opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on
the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have
been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its
many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna
Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits
and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be
discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life
and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt
they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment
within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our
jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction
to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to
compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is
directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former
except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and
set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the
means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the
ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to
those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the
guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to
release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being
beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is,
where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex
parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of
English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the
application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at
chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated
that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no
longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in
contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal
Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being

taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed,
unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be
shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the
issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an
answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does
not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts
have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the
purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But
the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether
there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in
obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the
same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the
defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause
of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as
slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia
before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his
custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they
would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that
Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce
them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or
be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon
the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in
Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5
Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on
Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents
constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme
Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt
should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano
Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was
dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply
with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of
the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who
desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts.
The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court
on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could
have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the

bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested.
Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in
Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought
back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number
either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in
finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order.
Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must
be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the
Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must
take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he
must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that
the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That
the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the
public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired
to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and
to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the
constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested
case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment
with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this
effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If
any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any
particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing
further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax,
members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor,
Feliciano Yigo, anhacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that
respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is
commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court
must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either
imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas
corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns
[1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot
say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the
court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only
followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate
them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to
have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The
city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his countermotion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the
official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish
the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his
power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city
of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates
to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to
the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in
addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It
would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second
order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined
to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of
respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his
conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive such an
amount is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of
court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city
of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is
granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this
decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual
liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986

EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE
CASTRO,respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:
A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained undiminished up to the
present. The respondents' contention that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily
be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to
his temporary release, however, preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule
warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such
restraints as may be illegal.
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at
the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15
Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was
a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued
against him and eight (8) other persons.
After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of
Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of
Quezon City, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization.
Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms
and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of
firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City
Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885
as amended. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised AntiSubversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further
proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower
court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that
the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily
released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the
President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the
respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar
cases.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of
the petitioner's temporary release.
It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These
are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents
for any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case
petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview
conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information
that is inimical to the interest of national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.
The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual
detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his
freedom.
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic
but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the
conditions imposed by the respondents."
We agree with the petitioner.
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner
constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the
petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to
Davao were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change
their domicile without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila.
Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of
Manila and expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
government of laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and
academic. Other precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting.
The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact
that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to
transfer from one place to another, from to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost
due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in

the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a
person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice
as much as the individual who is illigally deprived of liberty by deprived or physical
coercion.
In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:
Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners
could once again enjoy their full freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as
it could be withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the
hearing was held on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio
V. Tupaz could have academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the above allegations
in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for
petitioners, while conceding that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged
that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as labor union leaders to the
premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in
Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting was to take place in the business
firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever efforts they could have exerted. To that
extent, and with the prohibition against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was
undeniable. If so, the moot and academic character of the petition was far from clear.
More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release from detention
renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the
petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily
released from detention. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that the petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become moot
and academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be considered moot and academic
only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for the petitioners, we said:
Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint
on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so
held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The
question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person
for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the
petitioners being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime
despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a
reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this
principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be
detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary
that it needs no elaboration.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and
academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the
person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's
freedom of movement should not be lifted.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the
petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No
costs,
SO ORDERED.
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN v JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY
BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON,
June 29, 2010

PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65[1] of the Rules of Court assailing the
Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding
No. 08-119132 which denied the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri
Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan [2] (PO1 Ampatuan).
Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat
Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial
Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1
Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao
without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound
for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen
of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto
Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested
for the killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police
Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor
Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden
D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turnedover to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in CampBagong Diwa, Taguig City.[3]
Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the
release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. [4] The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of
Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson
refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch
37.[5]
Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at around
7:08 oclock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar
and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD)
Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1
Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his PreCharge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with

Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary
hearing.
On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
CHARGE SHEET
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named
respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to
Section 52 of R.A. 8551[6] in relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024,
committed as follows:
That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and
Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active member of
the PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr.,
COMELEC official on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his death.
Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.[7]
Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr.
directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1
Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus:
1.

Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of
PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty.
Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.

2.

This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52

of RA 8551, to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the
filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.

3.

In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser

Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee
Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive custody.

4.

For strict compliance.[8]

On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent Police
Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of
PO1 Ampatuan.[9]
On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acua,
placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April
2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:
Restrictive Custody
PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the
Regional Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum from
CPNP dated 18 April 2008).

BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:[10]

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against
PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is
being held for other charges/legal grounds.[11]
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys Prosecution Office, petitioner,
who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the
RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and
was raffled to Branch 37.
On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent Judge
Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpuscommanding therein respondents to
produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are
withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. [12]
On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:
Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being
illegally detained by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim that as of April 23,
2008, no administrative case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan.
Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1
Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an
administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge
Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position, respondents
cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming
that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim
that this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief
of PNP to place thePNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of
administrative case for grave misconduct.
Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan
was ante-dated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before April 23, 2008.
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of ones detention,
meaning, if there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to
discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the
nature of illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual and
effective, not nominal or moral.
Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot
simply ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot
be denied that the PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly
pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan
under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.
The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by
thePNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1
Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could not
be accepted by this Court. It must be stressed that the resignation has not been acted

(sic) by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was
filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED.[13]
Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:
I.
THE RESPONDENT
COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION
WHEN
IT
FAILED
TO
CONSIDER
THAT
THE
ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE
WITHOUT ANY WARRANT ANDTHEREFORE, ILLEGAL;
II.
THE RESPONDENT
COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT
AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE
AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS;
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF
PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG
PULIS.[14]
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty.[15]
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the
writ. The Rule provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court
of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the
court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for
hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance,
or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and

that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If
it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at
the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ ofhabeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. [16]
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the
person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. [17]
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
[18]
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be
in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. [19]
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ ofhabeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient.[20]
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise,
again the writ will be refused.[21]
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must
be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the
writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or
the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. [22]
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of respondents on
20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against him. When the release order of Chief
Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no
administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1
Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial
authority against him.
On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment [23] filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said
recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the
prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held
under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,[24] where this Court held that a petition
for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained
of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. [25]
The Solicitor General is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic
Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998),
clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery
of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive
custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a
matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:

Sec. 52 x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of
dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof
for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the
Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under
restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed
against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against
such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.[26]
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeascorpus. It is
neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are
always accounted for.[27]
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against
him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To
date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his
restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of
Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:
SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP

for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown
by evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court
may order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That
the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in
the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the
respondent: Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by
the court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have
to dismiss the petition.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance
of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that
the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

In the Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of the person of ARMY MAJOR JASON
LAUREANO AQUINO, PA MARIA FE S. AQUINO, Petitioner,
versus
LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, AFP,* in his capacity as Commanding General, Philippine
Army, and the Custodial Officer or Commander, Army Detention Center, G2-21D, Camp Capinpin,
Tanay, Rizal August 31, 2007
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking to nullify the Decision[1] dated 31 August 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 95341,
which denied petitioner Maria Fe S. Aquinos Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the
person of her husband, Army Major Jason Laureano Aquino (Major Aquino) of the First Scout Ranger
Regiment, Special Operation Command of the Philippine Army, and the Resolution [2] dated 5 October
2006, of the same court which denied reconsideration of its earlier Decision.
The facts leading to the arrest of Major Aquino, as set forth in the Solicitor Generals brief, [3] show
that on 3 February 2006, Major Aquino, along with several military men, namely, Major Leomar Jose M.
Doctolero, Captain Joey T. Fontiveros, Captain Montano B. Aldomovar,[4] Captain Isagani Criste, and
Captain James Sababa, allegedly met at the resthouse of Captain Aldomovar near Camp Tecson, San
Miguel, Bulacan to plot a breach of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to

take over Camp Aquinaldo, as well as the Headquarters of the Philippine Army. On 26 February 2006, in
the wake of the groups alleged withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines chain of
command and the current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was
ordered arrested and confined at the Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig, upon the order of Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, (Lt. Gen. Esperon) who was then the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the Army
Inspector General to conduct an investigation to determine: 1) the circumstances attending Major
Aquinos alleged withdrawal of support; 2) the veracity of reports anent the alleged troop movement [5] of
some Philippine Military personnel from their respective stations to Manila to join the protest march at
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue on 24 February 2006 with Brigadier General Danilo Lim (Brig. Gen. Lim);
and 3) the participation, responsibility and culpability of all Philippine Military personnel involved, if
any. For this purpose, a panel of investigators [6] was formed. During the investigation, Major Aquino
denied the accusations hurled against him. He intimated, inter alia, that he had no plan nor did he make
any pronouncement of withdrawing support from the chain of command, and that he pledged to continue
to support the same and the duly constituted authorities. [7]
On 4 March 2006, the panel of investigators submitted its Investigation Report to the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. In its report, the panel of investigators found that the troop
movement[8] by some military personnel from their respective stations to Manila was illegal, implicating
Major Aquino therein, thus:
14.2 Based on the account of MAJ AQUINO, it may be reasonably observed that
said Officer and BGEN LIM were closely coordinating the progress of the latters talks
with CSAFP [Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines] on the night of 23
February 2006. Moreover, there are other circumstances which seem to indicate that the
leadership of FSRR [First Scout Ranger Regiment] was preparing some of its personnel
to move should the talks succeed, i.e. movement of the 7SRC & 9SRC personnel
to Manila. Notedly, the following attendant circumstances put to doubt the real intention
of FSRR in ordering the aforementioned troop movement, to wit:
i) There is no indication that CO, 3SRB sought clearance or informed CO,
901st Bde or CG, 91 D of said troop movement;
ii) There was no order or call from HPA or SOCOM for the immediate fill up or
augmentation of the 10th SRC at Fort Bonifacio;
iii) There is no showing that the troop movement was coordinated, approved
and/or cleared with the AOC, the AFPCC or SOLCOM, AFP;
iv) When CO, 901st Bde called CO, 3SRB to inquire about any troop movement,
the latter answered in the negative and immediately ordered his men to go back
to command post
v) When the twenty six (26) 7SRC personnel were apprehended, they were in
civilian attire but brought with them their bandoleer with magazines and
ammunitions which were placed inside their backpack.[9]
The panel of investigators recommended that: 1) all implicated officers therein mentioned be
immediately relieved from their respective posts; and 2) appropriate charges be filed before the General
Court Martial against Major Aquino, among other military officers/personnel, for violations of Article
67[10] (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny); and Article 97 [11] (Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to Good
Order and Military Discipline) of the Articles of War, to wit:
15.3.1 In addition to the relief of BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP which in itself is
already a disciplinary action, recommend that subj Officer and MAJ JASON
LAUREANO Y AQUINO O-10503 (INF) PA be charged before the PAGCM for
violation of AW 67 (CAUSING OR EXCITING A MUTINY) and AW
97(DISORDERS AND NEGLECTS PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND
MILITARY DISCLIPLINE.)[12]

Further, the panels Investigation Report was referred by Lt. Gen. Esperon to the Judge
Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) of the Philippine Army for review. On 17 March 2006, the JAGO
found the existence of probable cause against Major Aquino, among other military officers, for violations
of Article 96[13] (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), Article 97 (Disorders and Neglects
Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), and Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny)
of the Articles of War.
The JAGOs recommendation reads:
6.3. For publishing, distributing and discussing the pamphlet entitled The New Order
The Solution to the Filipino Political Problem, which publication is not sanctioned as
an official publication of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine Army,
and which material tends to urge or incite other military officers and enlisted men to
collectively or concertedly defy standing and lawful orders of the Commanding
General, Philippine Army as well as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, MAJ AQUINO should likewise be charged of (sic) violating AW
96(CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN) and AW
97(Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) under
a separate specification.
6.4. In the (sic) light of the new averments revealed in the Supplemental Affidavit of 1Lt
REYES, there is now basis for charging MAJ AQUINO, MAJ DOCTOLERO, CPT
FONTIVEROS, CPT ALDOMOVAR, CPT CRISTE, CPT SABABAN for violation
ofAW 67 (ATTEMPT TO CREATE A MUTINY). Per said Supplemental Affidavit, it
was revealed that subj Officers met at the resthouse of CPT ALDOMOVAR near the
so-called tower area in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, on the evening of 03
Feb 2006, discuss and plot their plan to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo and hatch a plan to take over Camp Aguinaldo and [the]
Headquarters [of the] Philippine Army. x x x. [14]
On the basis of JAGOs recommendations, Col. Jose R. Recuenco (Col. Recuenco), then Army
Provost Marshal, signed under oath a charge sheet [15] against Major Aquino, charging the latter with
violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) [16] and Article 96[17] (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, which was indorsed to the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
On 12 July 2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order [18] to the Commanding Officer, 191st, MP Bn
to exercise custodial responsibility of Major Aquino, together with the other implicated military personnel
who withdrew their support from the chain of command in February 2006, and to place them in
confinement at the Philippine Army Detention Center,Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal. The same Order also
designated the aforementioned Commanding Officer to exercise direct supervision and control over the
concerned detainees.[19]
On 20 July 2006, the charge sheet against Major Aquino was amended to set forth more
detailed specifications of the charges. [20] It, however, retained the charges against Major Aquino as
stated in the original charge sheeti.e. violation of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create a Mutiny)
and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On 20 July 2006, the Judge Advocate General of the AFP General Headquarters of the AFP
issued Office Order Number 14-06, creating a Pre-trial Investigation Panel [21] for the case of Major
Aquino, et al.
On 21 July 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus[22] with the Court of Appeals,
praying that the AFP Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are
acting in their place and stead, be directed to immediately produce the body of Major Aquino and explain

forthwith why he should not be set at liberty without delay. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
95341.
In the meantime, the Pre-trial Investigation Panel of the AFP issued a Subpoena/Notice of Pretrial Investigation[23] to Major Aquino, summoning him to appear in person before the panel and to submit
his counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses.[24]
After hearing,[25] the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [26] dated 31 August 2006, denying the
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Court of Appeals held that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is futile because charges
had already been preferred[27] against Major Aquino.[28] In tracing the factual antecedents leading to the
preferment of charges against Major Aquino, the Court of Appeals significantly noted that after the
Investigating Panel found probable cause against him for violation of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or
Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, Lt.
Gen. Esperon forwarded the panels recommendation to the JAGO for review, which sustained the same.
[29]
In view of such developments, a charge sheet against Major Aquino was signed under oath by Col.
Recuenco, then Army Provost Marshall. The latter, thereafter, endorsed the charge sheet to the AFP
Chief of Staff for appropriate Action. Then, the Pre-trial Investigation Panel conducted a pre-trial
investigation whereby Major Aquino appeared before the said body. The Court of Appeals said:
Significantly, even if at the time Major AQUINO was arrested there was yet no
formal charge filed against him, however[,] the remedy of habeas corpus being resorted
to by the Petitioner is still unavailing, considering that, as the records disclosed, charges
have been preferred against him even before the filing by the Petitioner of the instant
petition. Basic is the rule that once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no
longer question his detention via a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. [30]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 31 August 2006 Decision, but, the Court of
Appeals denied the same and found no reason to disturb its judgment. [31]
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
For this Courts consideration, petitioner elevates three issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PREFERMENT OF THE CHARGE SHEET AGAINST ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IS
EQUIVALENT TO FORMALLY CHARGING THE LATTER AS CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS
LEGAL BASIS IN PLACING ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A
MAXIMUM SECURITY DETENTION FACILITY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT ARMY
MAJOR AQUINOS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY
DETENTION FACILITY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 70
OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR.[32]

The paramount issue posed for resolution is whether the confinement of Major Aquino is legal.
Anent the first issue, petitioner assails the legality of Major Aquinos confinement on the ground that
the latter had not been formally charged. It is petitioners theory that charges can only be deemed
formally filed after a thorough and impartial investigation shall have been made. [33] Thus, petitioner
suggests that the word charge as used in Article 70[34] of the Articles of War means that a person is
formally charged only after the conduct of a mandatory pre-trial investigation. According to petitioner, the
charge sheet and the furnishing thereof to any person subject to military law is the act of preferment,
which act is evidently different from the act of filing. Otherwise stated, the charge sheet is not the
charge contemplated in Article 70 of the Articles of War for the arrest or confinement of any person
subject to military law. Thus, according to petitioner, the filing of a formal charge can only be done after
the conclusion of the pre-trial investigation, when the case is referred to the general court-martial, akin to
the conduct of a preliminary investigation in civilian courts. [35]
We are not persuaded.
First, it is established that Major Aquino is governed by military law. Article 2 of the Articles of
War[36] circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law only over persons subject thereto. Major Aquino, G3
of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) of the Special Operation Command of the Philippine Army, is
subject to military law. Thus:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to
these articles and shall be understood as included in the term any person subject to
military law or persons subject to military law, whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force,
from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty ; all trainees
undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered
into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the
terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared
though not otherwise subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).
As a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Major Aquino falls squarely under Article
2 of the Articles of War. Consequently, he is subject to the applicable provisions of the Articles of War and
Executive Order No. 178;[37] or the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army.
Second, a scrutiny of the confinement of Major Aquino proves that the same is valid.
Article 70 of the Articles of War governs the cases of arrest or confinement, viz.:
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Any person subject to military law charged with
crime or with a serious offense under these articles shall be placed in confinement or in
arrest, as circumstances may require; but when charged with a minor offense only, such
person shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement. Any person placed in arrest under
the provisions of this Article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent,
unless such limits shall be enlarged by proper authority. Any officer or cadet who breaks

his arrest or who escapes from confinement, whether before or after trial or sentence and
before he is set at liberty by proper authority, shall be dismissed from the service or suffer
such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and any other person subject to
military law who escapes from confinement or who breaks his arrest, whether before or
after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper authority, shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct.
Evidently, Article 70 of the Articles of War empowers the commanding officer to place, in
confinement or in arrest, any person subject to military law charged with a crime or with a serious offense
under the Articles of War. Article 70 is the authority for enabling the proper military personnel to put an
instant end to criminal or unmilitary conduct, and to impose such restraint as may be necessary upon the
person of a military offender, with a view of his trial by court-martial. [38]
We juxtapose Article 70 with Article 71 of the Articles of War. Under military law, the conduct of
investigations is governed by Article 71 of the Articles of War,[39] to wit:
Art. 71. Charges; Action Upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by
a person subject to military law, and under oath either that he has personal
knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same
are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a
thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This
investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges,
form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of
justice and discipline. At such investigation[,] full opportunity shall be given to the
accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the
investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the
charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a
statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides.
Before directing the trial of any charge by general court-martial[,] the appointing
authority will refer it to his Staff Judge Advocate for consideration and advice.
When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement
immediate steps will be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and
release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or
carrying the case to a final conclusion shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct. When a person is held for a trial by general court-martial, the commanding officer,
within eight days after the accused is arrested or confined, if practicable, forward the
charges to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction and furnish the accused
a copy of such charges. If the same be not practicable, he will report to superior authority
the reasons for delay. The trial judge advocate will cause to be served upon the
accused a copy of the charges upon which trial is to be had, and a failure so to
serve such charges will be ground for a continuance unless the trial be had on the
charges furnished the accused as hereinbefore provided. In time of peace[,] no
person shall, against his objection, be brought to trial before a general court-martial within
a period of five days subsequent to the service of charges upon him. (As amended by RA
242). (Emphasis supplied.)
The formal written accusation in court-martial practice consists of two parts, the technical charge
and the specification.[40] The charge, where the offense alleged is a violation of the articles, merely
indicates the article the accused is alleged to have violated while the specifications sets forth the specific

facts and circumstances relied upon as constituting the violation. [41] Each specification, together with the
charge under which it is placed, constitutes a separate accusation. [42] The term charges or charges and
specifications is applied to the formal written accusation or accusations against an accused. [43]
The first part of Article 71 of the Articles of War categorically provides that charges and
specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law, who under oath states that he either has
personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in
fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief. Further, the second paragraph of Article 71 explicitly
provides that no charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. A charge is made followed by a thorough and
impartial investigation and if the result of the investigation so warrants, the charge is referred to the
general court martial. Contrary to petitioners contention, Article 71 makes no qualification that there can
be a charge against a person subject to military law only if a pre-trial has been completed and the case
has been referred to a court martial. What Article 71 instructs is that no charges, i.e. charges and
specifications signed by a person subject to military law under oath, may be referred to a general courtmartial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. Article 71
does not make the thorough and impartial investigation a prerequisite before charges may be filed against
a person subject to military law. Clearly, the thorough and impartial investigation is a prerequisite not to
making a charge against a person subject to military law, but to the referral of the charge to the general
court martial. It is the charge which comes prior to the investigation, and which sets into motion the
investigation.
We find that there was compliance with the requirements of the Articles of War. As shown by the
evidence on record, the amended charge sheets [44] against Major Aquino, containing the charges and the
specifications for violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, were personally signed under oath by
Capt. Armando P. Paredes, a person subject to military law. The amended charge sheets were sworn to
by the accuser, Capt. Armando P. Paredes in the manner provided under Article 71. [45] As it is, Major
Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of the Articles of War.
In Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa,[46] this Court denied the writ of habeas corpus prayed for, and upheld the
legality of the confinement even when there was merely a substantial compliance with the procedural
requisites laid down in Article 71. In said case, the Court held that the fact that the charge sheets were
not certified in the manner provided by the pertinent law, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has
personally examined the affiant and is satisfied that the latter voluntarily executed and understood his
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. [47] With more reason do we herein uphold the validity of
the amended charge sheets against Major Aquino considering that they were executed in accordance
with the law, and without breach of Article 71 of the Articles of War. The preferment of charges under
Article 71 is a ground for the confinement or arrest [48] of Major Aquino pursuant to Article 70[49] of the
Articles of War.
It bears stressing that subsequent to the preferment of charges under Article 70, the Judge
Advocate General of the General Headquarters of the AFP, issued Office Order Number 14-06, creating a
Pre-trial Investigation Panel to investigate the case of Major Aquino and his co-accused. In addition, the
Office of the Judge Advocate General issued a subpoena and a notice of pre-trial investigation to Major
Aquino summoning him to appear in person before the Pre-trial Investigation Panel. Furthermore, Major
Aquino was given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and affidavits of his witnesses. More
significantly, Major Aquino was present during the scheduled investigation. His arrest and confinement
cannot be said to be without due process of law.
Perforce, we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners Petition
for Habeas Corpus for the person of Major Aquino. A writ of habeas corpusextends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. [50] As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will
not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. [51] Its essential object and purpose is to

inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal.
[52]
In the case at bar, Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of
Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman) of the Articles of War. The legality of Major Aquinos restraint having been settled, the
privilege of the writ is unavailing.
We proceed to discuss jointly the second and third issues raised by the petitioner before this
Court.
Petitioner contends that in his confinement, Major Aquino was not restricted to his barracks,
quarters or tent as mandated by Article 70 of the Articles of War; rather, he was placed in solitary
confinement in a maximum security detention cell. When petitioner proceeded to the detention cell, she
alleged that she was restricted from visiting her husband. [53] Petitioner asserts that these are extreme
punishments akin to treating Major Aquino as a convicted criminal. [54]
We are not impressed.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that respondents deny the solitary confinement of Major
Aquino.[55] According to respondents, Major Aquino is confined in a U-shaped building without any
division/partition.[56] The place is described as a long hall with 50 double-deck beds. [57] Respondents also
asseverate that Major Aquino is confined along with 16 other military personnel who were similarly
charged in the 23-24 February 2006 incident.[58]
While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire
into questions of violations of constitutional right, [59] this Court, however, does not find the conditions of
Major Aquinos confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the instant Petition.
This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement.
In Alejano v. Cabuay,[60] lawyers of soldiers and pre-trial detainees accused of coup detat before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati came to this Court bewailing the regulations adopted by the Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) who had custody over their
clients. Therein petitioners claimed that their constitutional rights were violated because they were
prevented from seeing the detaineestheir clientsat any time of the day or night. They also alleged
that the detainees constitutional right to privacy of communication were violated because ISAFP officials
opened and read the personal letters of some of the detainees. They also challenged, as unusual and
excessive punishment, the presence of the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the
boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood. In denying the petition, this Court declared that the
fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does
not convert those restrictions into punishment.[61] Said the Court in Alejano:
Bell v. Wolfish [441 U.S. 520 (1979)] pointed out that while a detainee may not be
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention
inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to live comfortably. The fact that the
restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably
does not convert those restrictions into punishment. It is when the restrictions are
arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer
intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Jail officials are
thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure. They must only
refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.
[62]
(Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, the following guidelines were given by the Court to determine if an action
constitutes punishment, to wit: (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or disability, and
(2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. [63] It is also an additional requisite that the harm or
disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.
[64]
We do not see the attendance of the foregoing factors in the instant case. There are no specific facts
that are brought to the attention of this Court to indicate the punitive character of the confinement. The
confinement is not herein imposed as a punishment. We do not see that the confinement of Major Aquino
causes him to suffer some harm or disability. There is no punitive hardship that exists in the case at
bar. In fact, petitioner does not even allege a single act which would show such harm or such disability
as to prove that the same is significantly greater than, or independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.
To be sure, the first part of Article 70 of the Articles of War grants discretion to military authorities
over the imposition of arrest or confinement of persons subject to military law charged with crime or with
serious offense, viz:
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Any person subject to military law charged
with crime or with a serious offense under these Articles shall be placed in
confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require, but when charged with a
minor offense only, such person shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement. Any
person placed in arrest under the provisions of this Article shall thereby be restricted to
his barracks, quarters, or tent, unless such limits shall be enlarged by proper
authority. Any officer or cadet who breaks his arrest or who escapes from confinement,
whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper authority,
shall be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a court-martial
may direct, and any other person subject to military law who escapes from confinement
or who breaks his arrest, whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at
liberty by proper authority, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Major Aquino is charged with violations of Article 67, for attempting to begin or create mutiny, and
Article 97, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. According to Article 67, any person
subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes or joins in any mutiny shall
suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. It cannot be gainsaid that in
determining the circumstances of arrest and confinement in Article 70 of persons charged with crime or
with serious offense, such circumstances as the gravity of the offense charged may be considered.
Anent petitioners allegation that she was restricted from visiting Major Aquino, the Court had in
the past underscored the hands-off doctrinea deference given by courts to military custodians over
prison matters, especially on blanket restrictions on contact visit.
In Alejano, we gave reasons for the allowance of such restrictions, thus:
Block v. Rutherford [468 U.S. 576 (1984)], which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld
the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to
maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are
exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent
offenses and may have prior criminal conviction. Contact visits make it possible for the
detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes. Contact visits also
leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other
contraband. The restriction on contact visit was imposed even on low-risk detainees as
they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons. The
security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to
outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational
connection to the legitimate goal of internal security. This case reaffirmed the handsoff doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on
the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in
deference to administrative expertise.[65]
As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of conditions of
confinement; but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint.[66] Its object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the
release of the detainee.[67] It is not a means for the redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief or
damages. We reiterate the pronouncement of this Court in Alejano:
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and
convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations
and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the
detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The
courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected
to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper
mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only
lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. [68] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In sum, we find the present Petition to be devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and
PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number, for their release from
imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes, they
would invoke the People v. Hernandez1 doctrine, negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that
unfortunately for them was not handed down until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this the
first instance, a proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2 likewise

a petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer given was in the negative.
Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would premise their stand on the denial of equal
protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the codal provision that judicial
decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, 3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion
that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of
the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a
final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same." 4 These arguments carry
considerable persuasion. Accordingly we find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion
perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the
same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each
of them has served more than 13 years.5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, 6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the information against the
accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such complex offense. 7 In the recently-decided
case of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of
the Solicitor General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the petitioners
that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could have been
imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal. 9
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas corpus proceeding
prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary,
discarded. We can resolve the present petition without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing,
there being a failure to invoke the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W.
Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious
jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already
sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. To repeat, these two grounds
carry weight. We have to grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under the
circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and detention be
avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes
on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation
of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a
valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any
deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision" in the
fundamental law.10 Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the principal safeguards to
personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against
arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick
echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel
made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is
assured.

A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty coupled with its
limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, 15 Avancea, 16 Abad
Santos, 17Paras, 18 Bengzon, 19 and the present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to
emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the
remedy came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent Mayor of Manila who,
for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of more than 150 inmates
of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and
existing "as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of
Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if presented in pleadings
on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through
Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its
allegations, this court, on its motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case
entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v.
Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a
disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused if
"restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter thus: "The writ of
habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from an
1869 decision 28 of the then Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries
esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years has only
served to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year, Justice Fortas
spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The scope
and flexibility of the writ its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts
and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected." 29 Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the great and
efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is
his adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms
and goes to the very tissue of the structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the
range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to
1902, 32 when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person detained was in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate. This is understandable, as during
the time the Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative
doctrines of constitutional law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As summarized by
Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground on which this court, or any court,

without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction
and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or
some other matter rendering its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction
and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection.
According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted by Courts of First Instance
for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under
which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has
not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in conscience, allow
petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people similarly situated were
not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required constitutional guarantee is the uniform
operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law
be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued incarceration after the
twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling
doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would
happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one
being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would
be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the petition before us, after our ruling
in People v. Lava, petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the
rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid their penalty to
society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In support of their contention,
petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v.
Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions
but to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to
deny its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously
noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as
legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-known dictum of
Bishop Hoadley:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke them." It is to be admitted
that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist John Chipman
Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above observations. We do not have

to go that far though. Enough for present purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code
allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive application.
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect petitioners had
served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate
remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as 1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced
in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45Thus: "The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes
punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and
some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable,
the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has
served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46 There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director
v. Director of Prisons 47where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of giving
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While
the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of
habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused
by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully
sustained the burden of justifying their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that petitioners be forthwith set
at liberty.

[G.R. No. 117078. February 22, 1995.]

In the matter of the petition of ALFREDO G. LAMEN and REYNALDO A. CORTES for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus for WILLY BAGAWE y PAGALLA; ALFREDO G. LAMEN and REYNALDO A.
CORTES,Petitioners, v. THE HON. DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINGLUPA,
METRO MANILA,Respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Availing of our decision in People vs. Simon, 1 the petitioners filed the instant petition to secure the
release of Willy Bagawe y Pagalla, who was earlier convicted of the violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A.
No. 6425, 2 as amended, for selling and delivering marijuana and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. The prohibited drugs involved consist of three matchboxes
containing marijuana flowering tops with a total weight of 3.5 grams, one matchbox with a marijuana
cigarette butt, and one brown paper bag containing 10 grams of marijuana flowering tops. 3
In our decision of 7 April 1992, 4 we affirmed in toto the aforesaid judgment of the trial court. 5 Our
decision became final on 11 May 1992. 6
Willy Bagawe y Pagalla is presently serving his sentence in the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila. He has been under incarceration since his arrest on 14 April 1987.

The petitioners contend that since the gross quantity of the marijuana involved in this case is only 13.6
grams, then in the light of People vs. Simon, the maximum term imposed on Bagawe should be reduced
to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional; and since he has already served
more than six years, he should be released from imprisonment.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioners that Simon should apply but
disagrees with their computation of the maximum penalty. It recommends that, following the penalties
imposed by us in Simon and in People vs. Saycon, 7 the proper penalty should be six (6) months
ofarresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, without fine.
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code operates to benefit Willy Bagawe since R.A. No. 7659 is favorable
to him and since he is not a habitual crime.
Following Simon, the penalty which could have been imposed on Willy Bagawe under R.A. No. 6425, as
further amended by R.A. No. 7659, would have been prision correccional and, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he would have been sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
Since the decision in G.R. Nos. 88515-16 had long become final and Willy Bagawe is in fact serving his
sentence, we cannot alter or modify the penalty therein imposed. Nevertheless, the writ of habeas corpus
comes to his rescue since he has undergone imprisonment for a period more than the maximum
imprisonment which could have been properly imposed on him taking into account the favorable statute,
R.A. No. 7659. In the 1932 case of Directo vs. Director of Prisons, 8 we ruled:
In view of the foregoing considerations we are of the opinion and hold: (1) that Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code which makes penal provisions retroactive so far as they favor the accused, provided he is not
a habitual criminal, does not authorize a court whose sentence has become final and executory to make a
substantial amendment, and any amendment made in such sentence, though it be to give effect to a
penal provision favorable to the accused, would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) that the
only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused when the trial judge
has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas corpus.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED and WILLY BAGAWE y
PAGALLA, Accused-Appellant.in G.R. Nos. 88515-16, is hereby ordered RELEASED from detention,
unless for any other lawful cause his further confinement is warranted.

JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN MENDOZA, petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BATANGAS BR. 05, LEMERY, THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, and THE HONORABLE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, in
their official capacities, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this Court every opportunity to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.[1]

The case before us is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jury Andal, Ricardo Andal and
Edwin Mendoza, all convicted of rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. 148-94 and 149-94, Regional
Trial Court, Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery, affirmed by this Court in a decision en banc promulgated on
September 25, 1997, and a resolution promulgated on February 17, 1998. They are scheduled for
execution on June 16, 17, and 18, 1999. Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim
of mistrial and/or that the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas, Branch 05, Lemery, was
void. They pray for a temporary restraining order to stay their execution and/or a preliminary injunction
enjoining their execution.
The petitioners rely on the argument that the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction to try their case
since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance of counsel and without a
valid waiver from the accused. The petitioners cite the case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 [2],
wherein in a separate opinion, Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that Once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgement is deemed ousted of its
jurisdiction andhabeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.
We agree with petitioners that the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
inquire into questions of violation of the petitioners constitutional rights and that this Court has jurisdiction
to entertain this review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has been expanded
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [3]
And under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
He may also avail himself of the writ where as a consequence of a judicial proceeding (a) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is
void as to such excess.[4]
However, in this case, we find that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. In fact, the petition may be viewed as an
attempt at a second motion for reconsideration of a final decision of the Court, disguised as one
for habeas corpus. The accused were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid
accusation, trial, and judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
The factual milieu does not show a mistrial or a violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused. As ruled by this Court, in its decision of September 25, 1997, the constitutional infirmity cannot
affect the conclusion since accused-appellants did not make any confessions or admissions in regard to
the crime charged. Further the earring recovered from Jury Andal was not obtained in the course of the
investigation itself, but obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest. [5]
The Court has held in a long cases, that any illegality attendant during the arrest is deemed cured
when the accused voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by entering their plea [6].
The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to try the case. The Court subsequently affirmed the
decision based on a careful consideration of the evidence presented both by the prosecution and the
defense. The absence of the testimony of Rufino Andal due to the failure of the defense counsel to
present him as a witness will not make the judgment of the lower court invalid or void. The case was

decided on the evidence presented, which this Court considered sufficient to support the judgment of
conviction.
The issue of DNA tests as a more accurate and authoritative means of identification than eyewitness identification need not be belabored. The accused were all properly and duly identified by the
prosecutions principal witness. Olimpio Corales, a brother in law of accused Jurry and Ricardo
Andal. DNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an objective and scientific basis of identification of
semen samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the victim are thus unnecessary or are
forgotten evidence too late to consider now.
The trial court imposed and this Court affirmed the correct sentence.
The death penalty is what the law prescribes in cases involving rape with homicide. [7]
We agree with the accused that they should be afforded every opportunity to prove their innocence,
especially in cases involving the death penalty; in this case, the Court can state categorically that every
opportunity was provided the accused. However, painful the decision may be in this case, we have
conscientiously reviewed the case.
Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position as to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 in so far as it prescribes the death penalty for certain heinous crimes; nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty may be
lawfully imposed in proper cases as the one at bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby resolve to DENY the petition for habeas corpus, and declare valid
the judgment rendered by the trial court and affirmed by this Court. This resolution is final.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS :
AZUCENA L. GARCIA, petitioner.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Azucena L. Garcia petitions this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in order to free, relieve and
exonerate her from the penalty of imprisonment adjudged and imposed upon her, in gross violation of her
constitutional rights to due process of law and other fundamental rights [1]pursuant to an allegedly void
judgment rendered on April 20, 1995 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 86, in
Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589.
The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
On October 27, 1989, herein accused, Azucena Locsin Garcia, filed an application for land registration
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 80) docketed as LRC Case No. 89-007 covering two
parcels of land identified as Lots Nos. 822-C-1 and 822-C-2 with an area of 32,350 and 28,750 sq. m.,
respectively. Appended to said application were the following documents, to wit: (1) Tax Declaration No.

2273 with PIN-21-11773-1 for Lot 822-C-1; (2) Tax Declaration No. 22732 with PIN-21-11773-2 for Lot
822-C-2; Subdivision Plan Psd-19954; (4) Technical Description of Lot 822-C-1; and Technical Description
of Lot 822-C-2.
There is no evidence as to the proceedings taken, if any, in the said application for land registration. It
would appear, though, as borne out by subsequent events, that said application was abandoned because
on May 8, 1991 accused, who is the applicant in the land registration case, filed an application this time
for administrative reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308462 with the Land Registration
Authority (Exh. F). Attached to the application for reconstitution, aside from the documents appended to
the previous application for land registration which were reproduced in the former, were the owners copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308462 (Exh. N for the prosecution which is similar to Exh. 2 for the
defense) in the name of the accused and Real Property Tax Bill-Receipts (Exhs. 12, 12-A to 12-G).
On June 7, 1991, at the request of the accused, Edgardo Castro, Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, issued a certification (Exh. B; Exh. 1) stating that the original of TCT No. 308462 was among
those burned during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988.
On June 20, 1991 (not 1992 as appearing in the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589), TCT No.
308462 was ordered reconstituted, along with other TCTs in the names of other applicants, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. Q-283(91) signed by Benjamin M. Bustos, Reconstituting Officer of the Land
Registration Authority (Exh. 6).
On September 10, 1991, complainant [Antonio de] Zuzuarregui wrote the Quezon City Assessors Office
(Exh. L) requesting for certification as to the authenticity of Declaration of Real Property No. 2273,
Property Index No. 21-11773-1 Piedad Estate (Exh. L-1) and Declaration of Real Property No. 22732,
Property Index No. 21-11773-2, Piedad Estate (Exh. L-2), both issued in the name of Domingo R. Locsin
and purportedly signed by Jose C. Gonzales, then acting City Assessor of Quezon City, because the lot
embraced by the said declarations are allegedly within the boundary of said complainants property per
his TCT No. 181095.
In reply to the above letter, Q.C. City Assessor Constantino P. Rosas wrote Zuzuarregui on September 11,
1991 stating that no such records (Declarations of Real Property Nos. 2273 and 22732) exist in their
office and the same appear to be spurious (Exhs. J and J-1).
Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, accused, thru counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw her application for
land registration with the RTC Q.C. (Br. 80) which was granted by the court in its Order dated September
25, 1991 (Exhs. I & 11).
On October 4, 1991, Zuzuarregui wrote another letter this time to Mrs. Brigida Llave, Technical Records
Section of the Bureau of Lands, NCR, Q.C. (Exh. C) requesting for certification as to the authenticity of
the documents attached to the letter, namely Annex 1 xerox copy of Plan Psd-19954 of Lot 822-C in
the name of Domingo R. Locsin; Annex 2 xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 822-C-1, Psd19954, also in the name of Domingo R. Locsin (Exh. C-2); and Annex 3 xerox copy of the technical
description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, likewise in the name of Domingo R. Locsin (Exh. C-3, all of
which were appended to and used in support of the above-mentioned application for administrative
reconstitution. Said xerox copies of the plan and technical descriptions were respectively referred to
Brigida Llave of the Technical Records Section and Engr. Elpidio de Lara of the Technical Services
Section of the Bureau of Lands, for their Comments (Exh. C-1).
In Llaves reply of October 7, 1991 (Exh. E), she stated that the alleged plan, Psd-19954, is non-existing
in their files and called attention to the fact that she has no signature over her stamped name Brigida R.
Llave on said plan. De Lara, for his part, in an interoffice memorandum dated October 14, 1991 (Exh.
D), disputed the authenticity of the technical descriptions (Annexes 2 and 3 to the letter of
Zuzuarregui) by stating that the signatures thereon are not his (T.S.N., April 1, 1994, p. 10.)

Based on the above developments tending to discredit the authenticity and credibility of the documents
presented by the accused in support of her application for reconstitution with the LRA, on complaint of
Zuzuarregui, Benjamin Bustos caused a review of his previous order giving due course to the
reconstitution of TCT No. 308462 and on the basis of his findings, recalled and set aside, said previous
order as far as TCT No. 308462 is concerned in a Supplemental Order dated October 8, 1991. From said
Supplemental Order, herein accused interposed an appeal to the LRA Administrator.
On or about November 11, 1991, Zuzuarregui instituted a criminal complaint with the Fiscals Office of
Quezon City charging the herein accused of falsifying the technical descriptions and tax declarations all
issued in the name of Domingo R. Locsin, father of the accused. Said complaint was dismissed in an
order dated May 15, 1992. On July 16, 1992, Zuzuarregui filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dismissal (Exh. 14).
xxx
Meanwhile, on August 14, 1992, Samuel C. Cleofe, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in his reply to a
letter from herein complainant Zuzuarregui, stated that per verification from their Control Log Book, TCT
No. 308462 is not shown as among those filed in their office (Exh. A).
On September 18, 1992, Zuzuarreguis Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing his criminal
complaint against the accused was granted in a resolution issued by Asst. City Prosecutor Dimaranan
Vidal (Exh. 15). Accordingly, herein accused was formally charged with three counts of falsification of
public documents in three separate criminal informations filed with the RTC of Quezon City and docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92, the first being for falsification of technical description of land and the
other two being for falsification of Declarations of Real Property (Exhs. 13; 13-B and 13-C).
In the meantime, upon request of certain Miguel V. Sison, Jr., Officer in Charge, Director IV, Office of the
Executive Secretary, Presidential Action Center, Malacaang, the National Bureau of Investigation
conducted an examination of both the specimen and questioned signatures of Vicente Coloyan, former
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the questioned signatures being those appearing on TCT No.
308462. On March 9, 1993, Director Epimaco Velasco of the NBI wrote Miguel V. Sison, Jr. (Exh. 3)
transmitting copy of their findings contained in a Questioned Document Report No. 151-393, dated March
9, 1993 (Exh. 4) signed by Rogelio G. Azores, Document Examiner IV of the NBI (Exh. 4-B), as
approved by Arcadio A. Ramos, Chief of the Questioned Document Division (Exh. 4-C) and noted by
Manuel C. Roura, Deputy Director, Technical Services (Exh. 4-D). The conclusion arrived at as per the
Report is that the questioned and standard signatures of Vicenter [sic] Coloyan were written by one and
the same person.
On October 13, 1993, in response to a request of Rogelio Azores who rendered the above Questioned
Document Report, Quezon City Assosor [sic] Constantino P. Rosas issued a Certification (Exh. K) to the
effect that Tax Declarations Nos. 22731 for Lot 822-C-1 Piedad Estate and 22732 for Lot 822-C-2 Piedad
Estate, both in the name of Domingo R. Locsin, do not appear in their Office Tax Map, Property Index
System as well as in the Assessment Roll.
On April 15, 1994, Assistant Quezon City Assessor Benjamin Kasala issued still another Certification to
the effect that per assessment records of their office, there is no property whether land or improvement
registered for taxation purposes in the name of accused Garcia (Exh. M).
Meanwhile, Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92 for falsification of public documents filed by the herein
complainant against the herein accused were raffled to Branch 85 of this Court then presided by the
Honorable Benjamin P. Abesamis and subsequently by the Honorable Judge Mariano M. Umali. In a
decision penned by the latter, dated May 17, 1994, the herein accused was acquitted of all the above
charges on reasonable doubt (Exh. 16-C).

On June 9, 1994, in the course of the trial of the present case, counsel for the accused, Atty. Ciriaco O.
Atienza, wrote the Land Registration Authority (Exh. 9) requesting, among others, clarification on the
finality of an order of reconstitution, apparently referring to the order of August 20, 1991 by Reconstituting
Officer Bustos (Exh. 6, supra.) which was later set aside in a Supplemental Order of the same officer
dated October 8, 1991. x x x
On August 5, 1994, herein complainant wrote another letter-request this time addressed to Mr. Ernesto
Erive, Land Management Services Chief of Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands (Exh. V), for the latter to
certify as to the authenticity of the technical description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, in the name of
Domingo Locsin attached to the letter-request which was one of the documents submitted by the accused
in support of her application for administrative reconstitution. In reply thereto, Erive wrote Zuzuarregui on
August 18, 1994 (Exh. U) informing the latter that their office (Department of Environment and Natural
resources, National Capital Region) has no record of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954 and, hence, said technical
description was not prepared by their office.
On September 30, 1994, the LRA Administrator Reynaldo Maulit came out with a Resolution (Exh. 20)
on the appeal interposed by the accused affirming the finality of LRA Administrative Reconstitution Order
No. Q-283(91) dated August 20, 1991 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reconstitute,
among others, the original of TCT No. 308462 in the name of petitioner-appellant Azucena L. Garcia,
accused herein and, therefore, the Supplemental Order dated October 8, 1991 could not have validly
amended the aforestated order of August 20, 1991. It added, however, that the reconstitution does not
confirm nor adjudicate ownership over the property subject thereof citing the case of Serra, Serra vs.
Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482 (Exh. S).[2]
Thus, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 with falsifying the entries in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308462, forging the signature therein of Vicente N. Coloyan, and introducing
or using said TCT in support of her application for reconstitution of title. Similarly, in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-94-53590 and Q-94-53591, petitioner was charged with falsifying the entries in Declaration of Real
Property Nos. 22731 and 22732, respectively, forging the signatures therein of Jose C. Gonzales, and
introducing or using the same in support of her application before the Land Registration Administration
(LRA).
In its Decision dated April 20, 1995, the trial court found petitioner guilty of three (3) counts of
falsification of public documents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, and
subsequently this Court, affirmed petitioners conviction. Entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999.
In the instant petition, petitioner only questions the validity of the judgment rendered in Criminal Case
No. Q-94-53589. She contends that where proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional
rights of the accused, the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary
legal remedy of habeas corpus. Hence, in her case, the fundamental unfairness of the judgment, when
viewed in light of the record, renders the same subject to attack for being violative of her right to due
process of law. Petitioner explains that this fundamental unfairness stems from the omission and failure
of the trial court, the prosecution and the defense counsel to formally project into the evidentiary stream
the evidence decisive on the merits of the case, consisting of official determinations and findings [3] on the
genuineness and authenticity of Vicente Coloyans signature on the owners copy of TCT No. 308462,
which underlay the different official acts of office holders participating in the proceeding on administrative
reconstitution of the original of said [TCT] No. 308462 of the Q.C. Register of Deeds. [4]
Petitioner explains that the disquisition of the trial judge was totally silent on the official findings and
determinations that Coloyans signature on the owners copy of the TCT No. 308462 was
genuine. Instead, the trial judge merely relied on the testimony of Coloyan that the signature appearing
on the photocopy of TCT No. 308462 is not his. Petitioner points out that the unfairness of such reliance
becomes apparent when official determinations and findings as to the genuineness of Coloyans signature
on TCT No. 308462 are considered.
Petitioner then alleges that the prosecution failed to call the attention of the trial court to these official
determinations and findings which constituted exculpatory evidence in her favor. Petitioner further faults

the prosecution in willfully presenting Coloyan as a witness to disclaim his signature notwithstanding
indications in the record that he was hired and was possibly a corrupt witness. She maintains that the
prosecution should have exerted their best efforts to safeguard the trial process against this type of
witness, who from all reasonable indicators is a paid and perjured witness. [5]
Petitioner likewise claims that she was denied due process of law by reason of her being
represented by ineffective counsel. Petitioner illustrates that her counsel failed to formally offer in
evidence exhibits, consisting of the official acts of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and officials of
the LRA,[6] for the specific purpose of proving the genuineness of Coloyans signature. Petitioners
counsel also took no steps to bar Coloyan from being presented as a witness for the prosecution and was
not especially alert to the danger or risk of a perjured witness. In this regard, petitioner maintains that her
counsel could have asked for a deferment of the trial to give him time to make a full investigation of the
circumstances attending the presentation of Coloyan as a witness.
Petitioner concludes that the foregoing arguments and precedents warrant the grant of preliminary
injunctive relief in the form of a status quo order, and, after consideration of the merits of the case, a writ
of habeas corpus annulling the judgment of conviction rendered against her.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, states that the writ of habeas corpus is
a remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. Consequently, a
person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ.
Furthermore, the ground invoked by petitioner pertains to the appreciation of evidence, a matter
which falls within the exclusive discretion and prerogative of the trial court. The OSG stresses that a writ
of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a
writ of error. As such, the writ will not lie to correct alleged mistakes of fact or of law committed by a court
in the exercise of its functions. The OSG also points out that the ground invoked by petitioner is one
which has been considered, passed upon and found to be without merit not only by the Court of Appeals
but by this Court as well. The OSG is of the view that the instant petition is merely intended to delay the
administration of justice.
We deny the petition.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. [7] Its object is to inquire into the legality of ones
detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. [8] However, it is equally well-settled that
the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, [9] or is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order.[10] In the case at bar, therefore, petitioner can no longer seek relief via a petition
for habeas corpus having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document
and use thereof. Said judgment is already final and executory. Petitioner even discloses that entry of
judgment was made on April 8, 1999, or eight (8) months prior to the filing of this petition. The OSG has
also pointed out that petitioner is still out on bail. To this petitioner merely replied that:
For purposes of habeas corpus, RESTRAINT is not confined to imprisonment or actual physical
custody. Recent federal jurisprudence has extended this to accused under final conviction, who are out
on bail, and to convicts on parole. Such jurisprudence is part of Anglo-American jueisprudence (sic),
which is highly persuasive in this jurisdiction because our law onHabeas Corpus is of Anglo-American
origin.[11]
Even if we disregard the fact that petitioner is out on bail, the writ prayed for should not be
granted. Indeed, we have held that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court
that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
to assail the legality of his detention. [12] Petitioner, however, has failed to persuade this Court that the
proceedings before the trial court were attended by violations of her right to due process, or for that
matter, other constitutional rights.

It is apparent from the arguments advanced by petitioner that the purpose of this petition is to cause
this Court to once again re-examine and pass judgment upon the trial courts appreciation of the evidence
presented, especially the credibility of Coloyan as a witness. The Decision dated April 20, 1995 of the
Court of Appeals, affirming the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, and the Resolution dated October 27,
1998 of the Third Division of this Court, finding that no reversible error was committed by the trial court,
should have impressed upon petitioner that issues relating to the trial courts appreciation of the evidence
have already been settled and thus, can no longer be reviewed anew by this Court. As early as the 1913
case of Trono Felipe v. Director of Prisons,[13] we have laid down the rule that an application for habeas
corpus cannot function as a writ of error. We explained therein that:
But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy for the correction of such errors. [14] Court cannot,
in habeas corpus proceedings, review the record in a criminal case after judgment of conviction has been
rendered, and the defendants have entered on the execution of the sentence imposed, to ascertain
whether the facts found by the trial court were in accordance with the evidence disclosed by the record, or
to pass upon the correctness of conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts thus found. Under
the statute, a commitment in due form based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant
in a criminal case is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it
appears that the court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction
in imposing the penalty. Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court
of its jurisdiction over the cause and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on
appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law.[15]
As to the charge that the prosecution committed manifest prosecutorial misconduct, we find the
same bereft of merit. First, the existence of exculpatory evidence is a matter of defense. As such, it is
principally the duty of the accused, not the prosecution, to bring its existence to the attention of the
court. Second, whether the Orders of Reconstitution issued by the reconstitution officer and the LRA
administrator on August 20, 1991 and September 30, 1994, respectively, as well as the reconstituted TCT
No. 308462 constitute sufficient evidence to exonerate petitioner from criminal liability, involves
appreciation and weighing of evidence, and for reasons already stated, this Court is proscribed from
again considering. Even petitioners accusation that Coloyan was a paid and perjured witness was not
supported by evidence.
Similarly, apart from her bare allegations, petitioner offered no convincing evidence to substantiate
her claim that the ineffectiveness of her counsel deprived her of her right to counsel. We specifically note
that petitioners own documentary evidence in support of the instant petition actually belies her allegation
that her counsel failed to adduce exculpatory evidence. Petitioners Formal Offer of Exhibits before the
trial court shows that among the evidence offered by her counsel were the following:
Exhibit(s)
xxx
3, 4 and 4-A 4-B,
4-C and 4-D

Description(s)
xxx
(a) NBI Directors
Letter dated March 9,
1993, (Exh. 3)
transmitting to Hon.
Miguel V. Sison, Jr
the NBI Questioned
Documents Report
No. 151-393
(b) Questioned NBI
Documents Report No.
151-391 dated March
9, 1993

Purpose(s)
xxx
(1) To prove that the NBI examined
TCT No. 308462 and the
signature of Vicente N. Coloyan
(2) To prove that the NBI
findings is that the signature
of Vicente N. Coloyan appearing
on (sic) TCT No. 308462 is written
by one and the same Vicente N.
Coloyan, Acting Register of
Deeds, whose standard signatures
appear on various titles on
file with the Registry of
Deeds, Quezon City
(3) to prove that this Questioned
Documents Report No. 151-393
submitted by Document Examiner

xxx
6

Rogelio G. Azores was approved

by NBI
(4) To prove that TCT No.
308462 is genuine, not falsified
xxx
xxx
Adm. Reconstitution
(1) To prove that the LRA
Order No. Q-283 (91)
approved the Administrative
issued on August 20, 1991
Reconstitution of the
by Land Registration
Accuseds TCT No. 308462
Authority (LRA) through
for Lot 822-C-1 and Lot
the Reconstitution Officer, Atty.
822-C-2, Piedad Estate
Benjamin Busto
(2) To prove that this Adm.
Reconstitution Order had
already acquired finality
when the reconstitution
of TCT No.308462
was recalled by Atty. Busto
(3) To prove that TCT
No. 308462 is genuine,
not falsified16 (Underscoring ours)

It appears, however, that these documents were among the official acts repeatedly cited by petitioner
as presupposing official determination and findings that Coloyans signature on TCT No. 308462 was
genuine and, therefore, allegedly constituted evidence exempting petitioner from criminal
liability. Petitioner faulted her counsel in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 for being ineffective in that her
counsel allegedly failed to formally offer in evidence the said documents but the record shows that her
counsel did not fail to do so.
Significantly, it is not disputed that petitioner appealed the adverse Decision or judgment of
conviction dated April 20, 1995 of the RTC of Quezon City to the Court of Appeals; that the Court of
Appeals and later this Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner; and that Entry of Judgment was
made on August 8, 1999. The petitioner, therefore, may not validly resort to this present petition for
habeas corpus in lieu of her lost or dismissed appeal in the said criminal case. The petition of herein
petitioner who is out on bail, appears to be patently intended for delay.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Azucena L. Garcia, having failed to establish sufficient cause to warrant
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL
WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused
will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a
writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty
of the prosecution as of the defense.

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the Eighth
Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus filed by
petitioner, and (2) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent appellate
court.
Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the present petition
are as follows:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present [1] by
reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps
Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City
Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,[2] but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed
the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the
submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.
[3]
It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were
missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the
records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries,
the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third
floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986. [4]
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus[5] with the
Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on
the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,[6] the Second Division of this Court resolved " x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of this case among the
incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled
to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and
decide the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH this Court with a copy of his
decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a RETURN of the Writ on or before the
close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and
PRODUCE the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of
hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General, Philippine
National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and
Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly
authorized representative(s) to APPEAR PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of
Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid date and time of hearing."
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on November 15,
1994, after hearing, issued an Order[7] dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records
of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner,

and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with
the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995, rendered the
assailed Decision[8] affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the interest of
orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to
the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision
and Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original records.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of merit, [9]petitioner is
now before us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:[10]
I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE,
WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE PETITIONERS
CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.
COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANTS PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A
SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR
HIS INCARCERATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE
LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required
by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, [11] and that the evidence considered by the trial
court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such
judgment. Petitioner further contends that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995
(1947), that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been modified or
abandoned in the subsequent case ofOrdonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein
we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be
blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records."
In its Comment,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas
corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that
public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioners
continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
Petitioners remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the reconstitution of
judicial records.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as
a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.[13] It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether
he is held under lawful authority.[14] Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive

penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. [15] Petitioners claim is anchored
on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a
copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record
to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner
made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".
In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding that - [16]
"During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his learned
counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the respondents, it
appears clear and indubitable that:
(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal
Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No.
60678 and Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. 60867. ... In Criminal
Case No. 60677 (Robbery with Homicide) the accused admitted in
open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court by a
personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him
to Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay)..." (emphasis supplied)
Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case
dated June 8, 1993,[17] petitioner himself stated that "COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and unto
this Honorable Court most respectfully move:
1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;
2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given a Life
Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (emphasis supplied)
3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel (sic)
that accused has the right to appeal the decision;
4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the accused
comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was when the decision
was promulgated.
5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts were made
to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the Bureau of Corrections
can be affected, but all in vain;"
Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Section 23 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself, unless such declaration were true, [18] particularly with respect to such grave
matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129,
"[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,

does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does
he deny making such admissions.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 [19] of then Judge
Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section
44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facieevidence of facts therein stated.
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985,
page 2,[20] issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper
articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed" [21] and are therefore not only inadmissible but
without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, [22] unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that
such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who
attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets
forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on
petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. [23] If
the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the
restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea.If it appears that the
prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall
be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his
liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of
the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts."
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioners release from
confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court which provides that "Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment."
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused was convicted by the trial court
of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of
Appeals, the records of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused
then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court
denied the petition, ruling thus:

"The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner
under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment.
The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction of
the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize
the prisoners release."
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already
become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is
so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.[24] Put
another way, in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be
void for lack of jurisdiction.[25] Thus, petitioners invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director of
Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and ordered the release of the
prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal
duly established by a competent authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no
copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available. And, indeed, petitioner
does not raise any jurisdictional issue.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of
the judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110, [26] the general law governing reconstitution of judicial
records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their finished
cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. [27] Judicial records are subject to
reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases. [28] There is no
sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as pending ones, as
evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated. [29]
Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute the missing
records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution
as of the defense."[30] Petitioners invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is
misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss of
records prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed
to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges
against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this case, the records were lost after petitioner,
by his own admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same
incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to
another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm,[31] the records of which could be of assistance in the
reconstitution of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.