THE ANALOGY OF BEING

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2007.

Analogy
Equivocal Terms. Equivocal terms are terms used with entirely different meanings. In
univocal terms the same term, in at least two occurrences of the term, has meanings completely
different from one another. Examples of equivocal terms: 1. Pen as in the writing instrument,
and pen as in pig pen which houses animals ; 2. Bill as in a piece of paper from a company
showing what you owe, and bill as in the parts of a birds jaws ; and 3. Seal an emblem or
figure used as evidence of authenticity, and seal the sea mammal that feeds on fish and has
limbs reduced to flippers. The Angelic Doctor writes: In the case of equivocity the same term is
predicated of various things with an entirely different meaning. This is clear in the case of the
term dog (canis), inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species of
animal.1
Univocal Terms. A term is univocal if it signifies exactly the same concept, or essence, in
(at least) two occurrences of the term. Univocal terms have one and only one meaning. They are
constantly used in an identical sense. For example, when I say A dog is an animal, and A cat
is an animal, animal in both propositions is univocal. Aquinas writes: In the case of
univocity one term is predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning;
for example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox, signifies a living,
sensory substance.2
Analogical Terms.3 Analogical terms, concepts, notions are predicated of their subjects
in a way that is partly the same and partly different. Good, for example, does not mean the
1

In XI, Metaph., no. 2197.

Ibid.
3
Studies on analogy: B. DESBUTS, La notion danalogie daprs Saint Thomas dAquin, Annales de philosophie
chrtienne, 151 (1906), pp. 377-386 ; F. A. BLANCHE, La notion danalogie dans la philosophie de S. Thomas
dAquin, Revue des sciences philosophiques et thologiques, 10 (1921), pp. 169-193 ; J. M. RAMREZ, De
Analogia secundum Doctrinam Aristotelico-Thomisticam, La Ciencia tomista, 24 (1921), pp. 20-40, 195-214, 337357, 25 (1922) 17-38 ; B. LANDRY, La notion danalogie chez S. Bonaventure, Revue no-scolastique de
philosophie, 24 (1922), pp. 137-169 ; B. LANDRY, Lanalogie de proportion chez S. Thomas, Revue noscholastique de philosophie, 24 (1922), pp. 257-280 ; B. LANDRY, Lanalogie de proportionalit chez S. Thomas,
Revue no-scholastique de philosophie, 24 (1922), pp. 454-464 ; M. DE MUNNYNK, Lanalogie mtaphysique,
Revue no-scolastique de philosophie, 25 (1923), pp. 129-155 ; N. BALTHASAR, Labstraction et lanalogie de
ltre, Estudios Franciscanos (Barcelona), 34 (1924), pp. 166-216 ; J. LE ROHELLEC, De Fundamento
Metaphysico Analogiae, Divus Thomas (Piac.), 29 (1926), pp. 77-101, 664-691 ; M. T.-L. PENIDO, Le rle de
lanalogie en thologie dogmatique, Paris, 1931 ; A. MARC, Lide thomiste de ltre et les analogies dattribution
et de proportionalit, Revue no-scholastique de philosophie, 35 (1933), pp. 157-189 ; M. T.-L. PENIDO,
Cajetan et notre connaissance analogique de Dieu, Revue Thomiste, 39 (1934-1935), pp. 149-192 ; N.
BALTHASAR, Labstraction mtaphysique et lanalogie des tres dans ltre, Louvain, 1935 ; J. JACQUES,
Abstraction et Analogie, Revue no-scholastique de philosophie, V. BRUSOTTI, Lanalogia di attribuzione e la
conoscenza della natura di Dio, Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 27 (1935), pp. 31-66 ; G. CERIANI, Teologia
e dottrina dellanalogia nel Tomismo, Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 28 (1936), supplement, pp. 55-65 ; A.
VAN LEEUWEN, Lanalogie de ltre. Gense et contenu du concept analogique, Revue no-scholastique de
2

philosophie, 39 (1936), pp. 293-320 ; A. VAN LEEUWEN, Lanalogie de ltre. Prcisions sur la nature de cette
analogie, Revue no-scholastique de philosophie, 39 (1936), pp. 469-496 ; E. LAURENT, Quelques rflexions
sur lanalogie, APARTSA, 5 (1938), pp. 169-184 ; E. T. FOOTE, Anatomy of Analogy, The Modern
Schoolman, 18 (1940), pp. 21-37 ; D. EMMET, The Use of Analogy in Metaphysics, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 41 (1940-1941), pp. 27-46 ; G. B. PHELAN, Saint Thomas and Analogy, Marquette
University Press, Milwaukee, 1941 ; J. F. ANDERSON, Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy in Thomas, The
Thomist, 3 (1941), pp. 564-579 ; L. BELLEFIORE, Univocit dellessere a analogia dellente, Rivista di filosofia
neo-scolastica, 33 (1941), pp. 222-228 ; W. ESDAILE BYLES, The Analogy of Being, The New Scholasticism,
16 (1942), pp. 331-364 ; L. BELLEFIORE, Le basi gnoseo-metafisiche dellunivocit e dellanalogia, Rivista di
filosofia neo-scolastica, 34 (1942), pp. 191-211 ; A. GAZZANA, Lanalogia in S. Tommaso e nel Gaetano. Nota
critica, Gregorianum, 24 (1943), pp. 367-383 ; C. RYAN, God and Analogy, Blackfriars, 25 (1944), pp. 137143 ; A. M. FARBER, The Extension of St. Thomass Doctrine of Knowledge by Analogy to Modern Philosophical
Problems, The Downside Review, 65 (1947), pp. 21-31 ; J. HELLIN, La analogia del ser y el conocimiento de
Dios en Surez, Madrid, 1947 ; I. M. BOCHENSKI, On Analogy, The Thomist, 11 (1948), pp. 424-447 ; P.
GRENET, Les origines de lanalogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon, Paris, 1948 ; J. GARCIA LOPEZ,
La analoga del ser, La Ciencia tomista, 76 (1949), pp. 607-625 ; E. MASCALL, Existence and Analogy. A
Sequel to He Who Is, London, 1949 ; O. N. DERISI, Esencia y significado de la analoga metafsica, La Ciencia
tomista, 76 (1949), pp. 298-312 ; J. PETRIN, Univocit et analogie dans les lois de la logique, Angelicum, 26
(1949), pp. 233-249 ; A. MacINTYRE, Analogy in Metaphysics, The Downside Review, 69 (1950), pp. 45-61 ; J.
F. ANDERSON, Analogy in Plato, Review of Metaphysics, 4 (1950), pp. 111-130 ; C. RYAN, The Reach of
Analogical Argument, The Downside Review, 4 (1951), pp. 102-118 ; H. LYTTKENS, The Analogy Between God
and the World. An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino, Uppsala,
1952 ; J. F. ANDERSON, G. B. BURCH, R. ROBINSON, and J. OWENS, Some Basic Propositions Concerning
Metaphysical Analogy, Review of Metaphysics, 5 (1952), pp. 465-472 ; J. HORGAN, Aspects of Cajetans Theory
of Analogy, Irish Ecclesiastical Record, 71 (1953), pp. 113-135 ; J. RAMIREZ, En torno a un famoso texto de
Santo Toms sobre la analoga, Sapienza, 8 (1953), pp. 166-192 ; J. F. ANDERSON, The Bond of Being: An
Essay on Analogy and Existence, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1954 ; H. T. SCHWARTZ, Analogy in St. Thomas and
Cajetan, The New Scholasticism, 28 (1954), pp. 127-144 ; G. CANALELLA, Analogia e causalit nel problema
dellessere, Educare, 5 (1954), pp. 226-235 ; A. MAURER, St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus, The New
Scholasticism, 29 (1955), pp. 127-144 ; A. NEMETZ, The Meaning of Analogy, Franciscan Studies, 15 (1955),
pp. 209-223 ; M. P. SLATTERY, Metaphor and Metaphysics, Philosophical Studies (Maynooth), 5 (1955), pp.
89-99 ; G. E. MUELLER, Analogia entis and dialectic, Sophia, 24 (1956), pp. 29-36 ; J. RIESCO TERRERO, El
objecto de la metafisica y la analogia del ente segn Escoto, Sapientia, 11 (1956), pp. 331-347 ; I. OBRIEN,
Analogy and Our Knowledge of God, Philosophical Studies (Maynooth), 6 (1956), pp. 91-104 ; G. P.
KLUBERTANZ, The Problem of the Analogy of Being, Review of Metaphysics, 10 (1956-1957), pp. 553-579 ; T.
M. FLANIGAN, The Use of Analogy in the Summa Contra Gentiles, The Modern Schoolman, 35 (1957), pp. 2137 ; R. McINERNY, The Logic of Analogy, The New Scholasticism, 31 (1957), pp. 149-171 ; O. A.
VARANGOT, Analoga de attribucin intrnseca en Santo Toms, Ciencia y Fe, 13 (1957), pp. 293-319, 467-485
; M. P. SLATTERY, Concerning Two Recent Studies in Analogy (A. Maurer and M. Schwartz), The New
Scholasticism, 31 (1957), pp. 237-246 ; R. J. MASIELLO, The Analogy of Proportion According to the
Metaphysics of St. Thomas, The Modern Schoolman, 35 (1957-1958), pp. 91-105 ; P. C. HAYNER, Analogical
Predication, The Journal of Philosophy (New York), 55 (1958), pp. 855-862 ; O. A. VARANGOT, El analogado
principal, Ciencia y Fe, 14 (1958), pp. 237-253 ; B. KELLY, The Metaphysical Background of Analogy, London,
1958 ; S. MOORE, Analogy and the Free Mind, The Downside Review, 76 (1958), pp. 1-28 ; S. Y. WATSON,
Univocity and Analogy of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus, Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association, 32 (1958), pp. 189-206 ; S. MOORE, Analogy. A Retraction and a Challenge, The
Downside Review, 76 (1958), pp. 125-148 ; C. ABRANCHES, Ser y analogia, Pensamiento, 15 (1959), pp. 3345 ; G. KLUBERTANZ, St. Thomas on Analogy, Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1960 ; W. L. REESE, Analogy,
Symbolism, and Linguistic Analysis, Review of Metaphysics, 13 (1960), pp. 447-468 ; Y. R. SIMON, On Order in
Analogical Sets, The New Scholasticism, 34 (1960), pp. 1-42 ; J. GOMEZ CAFFARENA, Analogia del ser y
dialctica en la afirmacin humana de Dios, Pensamiento, 16 (1960), pp. 143-174 ; B. MONDIN, Il principio
omne agens agit sibi simile e lanalogia dei nomi divini nel pensiero di S. Tommaso dAquino, Divus Thomas
(Piac.), 63 (1960), pp. 336-348 ; J. F. ROSS, Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language, International
Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1961), pp. 468-502 ; R. McINERNY, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of
Aquinas, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961 ; J. F. ROSS, Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,

same thing when it refers to an economic good, a moral good or a philosophical good. God is,
does not signify the same thing as the creature is; for the being of God is not the same as the
being of creatures, although neither is it absolutely different. The metaphysical foundation of
analogy lies in the different ways various subjects possess the same perfections: a different
manner of being brings about a different manner of signifying.

International Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1961), pp. 468-502 ; M. S. ONEILL, Some Remarks on the Analogy of
God and Creatures in St. Thomas Aquinas, Mediaeval Studies, 23 (1961), pp. 206-215 ; J. OWENS, Analogy as a
Thomistic Approach to Being, Mediaeval Studies, 24 (1962), pp. 303-322 ; J. F. ANDERSON, Reflections on the
Analogy of Being, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967 ; M. D. PHILIPPE, Analogon and Analogia in the Philosophy
of Aristotle, The Thomist, 33 (1969), pp. 1-74 ; L. DE RAEYMAEKER, Lanalogie de ltre dans la perspective
dune philosophie thomiste, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 23 (1969), pp. 89-106 ; R. McINERNY, Studies
in Analogy, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968 ; R. E. MEAGHER, Thomas Aquinas and Analogy: A Textual
Analysis, The Thomist, 34 (1970), pp. 230-253 ; J. C. CAHALAN, Analogy and the Disrepute of Metaphysics,
The Thomist, 34 (1970), pp. 387-422 ; S. M. RAMREZ, De Analogia, 4 vols, Instituto de Filosofa Luis Vives,
Madrid, 1970-1972 ; T. A. FAY, Analogy: The Key to Mans Knowledge of God in the Metaphysics of Thomas
Aquinas, Divus Thomas, 76 (1973), pp. 343-364 ; A. MOLINARO, Linguaggio, logica, metafisica. Il problema
dellanalogia in S. Tommaso dAquino, Aquinas, 17 (1974), pp. 41-96 ; S. SORRENTINO, La dottrina filosofica
dellanalogia in Tommaso dAquino, Sapienza,27 (1974), pp. 315-351 ; J. RICHARD, Analogie et symbolisme
chez saint Thomas, Laval Thologique et Philosophique, 30 (1974), pp. 409-423 ; B. MONDIN, Lanalogia di
proporzione e di proporzionalit nel Commento alle sentenze, Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 66 (1974), pp.
571-589 ; T. CHAPMAN, Analogy, The Thomist, 39 (1975), pp. 127-141 ; K. NIELSON, Talk of God and the
Doctrine of Analogy, The Thomist, 40 (1976), pp. 32-60 ; G. RIGHI, Studio sulla analogia in San Tommaso,
Marzorati, Milan, 1981 ; J. ROIG GIRONELLA, La analoga del ser y la originalidad de la intencin profunda del
Aquinatense, Espritu, 30 (1981), pp. 57-69 ; P. LEE, Language About God and the Theory of Analogy, The New
Scholasticism, 58 (1984), pp. 40-66 ; E. BERTI, Lanalogia dellessere nella tradizione aristotelico-tomistica, in
Metafore dellinvisibile, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1984, pp. 13-33 ; A. TOGNOLO, Analogia dellente in Tommaso
dAquino, in Metafore dellinvisibile. Ricerche sullanalogia, Contributi al XXXIII Convegno del Centro di Studi
Filosofici di Gallarate, Morcelliana, Brescia, 1984, pp. 97-119 ; W. R. DAROS, La analoga en el concepto de
ciencia aristotlico-tomista, Sapientia (Buenos Aires), 39 (1984), pp. 19-36 ; P. AUBENQUE, The Origins of the
Doctrine of the Analogy of Being, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 11 (1986), pp. 35-46 ; P. TIROT, Autour
du dbat sur lanalogie de proportionalit propre chez St. Thomas dAquin, Angelicum, 63 (1986), pp. 90-125 ;
G. BARZAGHI, Analogia, ordine e il fondamento della sintesi tomista, Sapienza, 40 (1987), pp. 65-97 ; E.
NICOLETTI, Lanalogia in S. Tommaso, in Origini e sviluppi dellanalogia, Edizioni Vallombrosa, Rome, 1987,
pp. 116-176 ; E. J. ASHWORTH, Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to
Aquinas on Analogy, Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 1 (1991), pp. 39-67 ; E. J. ASHWORTH, Analogy and
Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context, Mediaeval Studies, 54 (1992), pp. 94-135 ; R.
LEE, The Analogies of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas, The Thomist, 58 (1994), pp. 471-488 ; R. McINERNY,
Aquinas and Analogy, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1996 ; L. J. ELDERS, La analoga
en la Filosofa y en la Teologa segn Santo Toms de Aquino, Sapientia, 51 (1996), pp. 41-57 ; K. L.
FLANNERY, Aquinas on Analogy, Gregorianum, 79 (1998), pp. 381-384 ; G. KLIMA, Aquinas Theory of the
Copula and the Analogy of Being, Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 5 (2002), pp. 159-176 ; E. COSI,
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Analogical notions, in other words, apply to perfections which are realized in different
ways in different subjects. They reveal different degrees of participation in the same perfection.
Analogical concepts always involve: a) a sharing in the same perfection (being, goodness,
beauty, etc.); hence, the predicability of the same analogical concept to different subjects
(goodness can be predicated of men, bricks and apples) ; b) diversity in the manner of possessing
the perfection (there are different manners of being, of goodness, etc.) hence, there are different
meanings of the analogical concept.4
Being (Ens) is Analogical
When we say that God is Being and that man is a being, being here is predicated of
their subjects analogically. Not equivocally as many of the nominalists and atomistic empiricists
maintain. Nor univocally as Parmenides held, for if being were to be understood in a univocal
manner, then all reality would be deemed to be in the same manner, which would ultimately lead
to monism. Everything would be seen as identically one, and therefore, there would be no
difference between God and creatures (pantheism). Taking into account the analogical notion of
being, however, we can speak about God and creatures as beings, maintaining at the same time
the infinite distance between them. By way of analogy, created being leads us to the knowledge
of the divine being and its perfections. That is why this question is of utmost importance for
metaphysics and theology.5
Explaining how being (ens) is analogical, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo write: We have
already seen that being (ens) is predicated of various subjects in an analogical manner. we
shall strive to see in what sense being (ens)is analogically attributed to reality, and how this
analogy is based on the act of being (esse) which beings share in different degrees.
One and the same term is analogically attributed to two realities whenever it is
attributed to each of them in a way which is partially the same and partially different. This is
what happens in the case of being (ens). This term is attributed to everything which is, but it does
not apply to everything in the same way. As in the case in any other predication, the ultimate
basis of analogy lies in the very same realities to which the analogical term refers: they are partly
the same and partly different. Hence, being (ens) is attributed to God and to creatures
analogically, because there is a certain similarilty between creatures and the Creator, but it goes
with a dissimilarity which is equally clear: God and creatures are (similarity), but God is by
essence, whereas creatures are only by participation (dissimilarity). Even within the realm of the
categories, being (ens) is attributed analogically to substance and to accidents. They both are and
can, therefore, be called beings (similarity); the substance, however, is by itself, whereas the
accidents are in something else, namely, in a substance (dissimilarity).
The basis of the analogical predication of the notion of being (ens) is the act of being
(esse), since anything can be called being (ens) to the very extent that it has esse. Esse is
possessed either by essence or by participation, by the substance itself or in the substance,
actually or only potentially, and in the case of creatures, always as something received from God,
who is the Subsisting Esse. Whatever the relation each thing has to esse, it can to that extent, be
4
5

J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, pp. 62-63.

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 31.

called a being (ens): above all the substance, which has esse by itself, and then quantity, quality,
relation and other accidents.6
Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo affirm that the metaphysical foundation of analogy lies in
the way esse is found in each being (ens): God is act of being (esse) fully and by essence,
whereas creatures have the act of being by participation, in varying degrees of intensity and
levels of composition (of act and potency, substance and accidents, etc).7
Being (ens) is analogical by an analogy of proper proportionality8 and an intrinsic
analogy of attribution.9 Both Cornelio Fabro10 and Bernard Montagnes11 are in favor of the use
6

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 138-139.

Cf. T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 139.
8
A concept is predicated with an analogy of proportionality when several subjects possess a common perfection in
ways that are not exactly but only proportionately the same. There is but a certain similarity in the way the subjects
share in the perfection. The perfection of man, for example, is found univocally in all individual men; but the
perfection of intelligence is not found in an adult in the same way as it is found in a child; the same is true when
we compare the intelligence of a cultured person with that of a savage, or the intelligence of an angel with that of
man, or the intelligence of God with that of His creatures. In each of these cases, the same perfection (intelligence)
is found in a manner adequate (proportional) to the nature and special characteristics of the subject (cf. De Veritate,
q. 2, a 11; In Metaph., lect. 8).
Proportionality is used in philosophy to describe the different manners of being of things. For example, like
every inanimate being, every living being is one, but with a oneness that is far superior to that of inanimate beings.
The perfections of creatures, compared with the perfections of God, can be cited as another example. In spite of the
infinite distance separating God from His creatures, we can still attribute to Him perfections that we find in the
created order (wisdom, being, beauty, etc.), provided we do so proportionally, adapting them to His infinity (cf. De
Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9). Hence, we say: divine knowledge is to God as human knowledge is to man, but in an
incomparably superior way(J. J. SANGUINETI, op. cit., pp. 64-65).
9
The Analogy of Attribution. The analogy of proportionality is founded on the analogy of attribution. With the
former, we compare structural similarities (isomorphisms) between different kinds of beings. Similarities of this
sort, however, can sometimes be reduced to a single principle from which they really proceed. This principle can
either be an efficient, final or exemplary cause; or at least a subject whom we attribute properly and principally the
perfection that is found in the many.
The analogy of proportionality only compares different proportions, abstracting from the possible dependence of
one proportion on another (e.g., in the case of God and creatures, the analogy of proportionality expresses only the
eminently superior degree in which God possesses the perfections we find in creatures). The analogy of attribution
goes one step further, for it points to one of the terms of comparison as principle of the rest (hence, we say that God
is the cause and principle of created perfections). It is as though, when comparing the photographs, drawings and
paintings of a person, we refer all of them to a primary subject or final term the concrete individual represented by
these pictures.
Therefore, a perfection is predicated with analogy of attribution if, among several subjects of a common
perfection, there is one which possesses the perfection in all its fullness, while the rest possess it by participation or
in a derived fashion. We distinguish these perfections in two steps: First, we see that something is predicated of
many individuals in several senses. Good, for example, is predicated analogically of the means to an end, actions,
things, persons, creatures and God. Then, we detect an order between these different senses. Good is said of the
means, for example, inasmuch as the latter helps us reach the end; hence, the end is good in a more primary way
than the means (which we describe as a useful good). This order of dependence has its ultimate principle in God
who is Good by essence (cf. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, SEI, Turin, 1960, pp. 469-526).
St. Thomas Aquinas explains: If a name can be predicated of many analogically, it is because of the relation of
the many to one subject (per respectum ad unum). This subject must, therefore, be implied in the notion of all the
restIt follows that the name should be predicated principally (per prius) of the former and secondarily (per
posterius) of the latter, following an order determined by the degree to which all the other subjects approach that one
subject. For example, healthy, which is said of animals, is also applied to a medicine insofar as that medicine is
7

of both analogy of proper proportionality and the intrinsic analogy of attribution as regards the
analogy of being (ens).
able to cause health in animals; it is also applied to describe urine, inasmuch as urine is the sign of the animals
health(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 6).
The analogy of proportionality is, therefore, essentially characterized by the following properties: a) There is
always an ad unum a central and primary meaning upon which all the rest depend. In the example of St. Thomas
Aquinas, the principal meaning of healthy (viz., physical health) is what determines its other meanings when
predicated of medicine, the climate, or urine. The derived meanings always imply the principal meaning; hence, a
healthy climate is climate that is conducive to health.
b) The analogical concept is predicated per prius of the subject of the principal meaning. This subject is called
the principal analogate. Of the other subjects (called secondary analogates), the concept is predicated per posterius.
This analogy is called analogy of attribution because it involves the predication of a concept primarily to the
principal analogate, and its subsequent attribution to the other subjects by derivation.
The analogy of attribution can be extrinsic or intrinsic. It is extrinsic when only the principal analogate properly
and formally possesses the analogical perfection; the rest have it in an extrinsic and improper manner. This is the
case with the concept of health, for climate and medicine are said to be healthy only in an improper way not
because they have health, but because they are external causes of physical health.
More important because of its application to metaphysics is the intrinsic analogy of attribution. Here, the
analogical concept is properly predicated not only of the principal but also of the secondary analogates because the
former really causes the presence of the perfection of the latter. For example, in the substance is vis--vis the
accident is, being is principally attributed to the substance; but it is properly predicated of the accident by derivation
since the accident receives being by inhering in a substance. Another example: something is in potency vis--vis
something is in act: being is said primarily of act, and per posterius of potency (cf. In IV Metaph., lect. 1). Another
example: creatures are vis--vis God is: being is said principally of God, since He is being by essence; however, it
is properly predicated of creatures inasmuch as they receive being from God (creatures are beings by participation).
Still another example: God is Truth by essence, the origin of all truth; human judgments, though also properly called
true when they reflect reality, are only so by participation, for all truth found in creatures is a participated likeness of
the highest Truth.
The basis of intrinsic analogy of attribution is causality. Intrinsic analogy of attribution is a logical consequence
of the relations of causality among beings. It is based on the imperfect likeness of the effect to its proper cause.
Some remarks on this point:
a) Since one cannot give what one does not have, at least some perfections of the efficient cause will necessarily
be reflected in its proper effects. The efficient cause is, therefore, also an exemplary cause of its proper effects. It
follows that by studying the latter, we can, using the analogy of attribution, arrive at some knowledge of the former.
It is in this way that we arrive at an analogical knowledge of the nature of God on the basis of the manifold
perfections we find in creatures (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 2).
b) Consequently, analogy of attribution implies both similarity and dissimilarity. The analogical concept is
predicated per prius of the cause, and per posterius of the effects. It is partly attributed to the effects inasmuch as
they are similar to the cause; but it is partly not attributed to them since they are also unlike the cause. Hence, the
universe is, at one and the same time, like God and unlike Him.
c) The foundation of the analogy of attribution is not an abstract idea but a real cause, the cause of the
participated likenesses of the perfection in the secondary analogates. For example, if being is common to God and
the world, it is not because the abstract notion of being is found in both of them, but because the being of the world
points to the Being of God as its principle and cause. It would be an error to establish the foundation of this
analogical community of being on the most abstract concept of being-in-general (esse comune), which is necessarily
univocal.
d) The ontological priority of the principal analogate does not always mean gnoseological priority, for
sometimes it is only through their effects that we can acquire a knowledge of the causes. This is the case with our
knowledge of God, the principal analogate of being. Though first in the ontological order, God comes after creatures
in the noetical order since it is the latter that we first know and apply names to. In the order of knowledge, therefore,
the meaning of our notions of being, goodness and truth applies primarily to creatures(J. J. SANGUINETI, op. cit.,
pp. 65-69).
10
Cf. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, S.E.I., Turin, 1960, pp. 469-526.
11
Cf. B. MONTAGNES, La doctrine de l analogie de ltre daprs St. Thomas dAquin, Louvain, 1963.