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Indonesia - Pancasila

Pancasila
Indonesia Table of Contents
In its preamble, the 1945 constitution sets forth the Pancasila as the embodiment of basic
principles of an independent Indonesian state. These ve principles were announced by
Sukarno in a speech known as "The Birth of the Pancasila," which he gave to the
Independence Preparatory Committee on June 1, 1945. In brief, and in the order given in
the constitution, the Pancasila principles are: belief in one supreme God; humanitarianism;
nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice.
Sukarno's statement of the Pancasila, while simple in form, resulted from a complex and
sophisticated appreciation of the ideological needs of the new nation. In contrast to Muslim
nationalists who insisted on an Islamic identity for the new state, the framers of the
Pancasila insisted on a culturally neutral identity, compatible with democratic or Marxist
ideologies, and overarching the vast cultural differences of the heterogeneous population.
Like the national language-- Bahasa Indonesia --which Sukarno also promoted, the
Pancasila did not come from any particular ethnic group and was intended to dene the
basic values for an "Indonesian" political culture.
While the Pancasila has its modern aspect, Sukarno presented it in terms of a traditional
Indonesian society in which the nation parallels an idealized village in which society is
egalitarian, the economy is organized on the basis of mutual self-help (gotong royong), and
decision making is by consensus (musyawarah-mufakat). In Sukarno's version of the
Pancasila, political and social dissidence constituted deviant behavior. Suharto modied
this view, to the extent that one of the criticisms of his version of the Pancasila was that he
tried to Javanize it by asserting that the fundamental building block of the Pancasila was
theilmu kasunyatan(highest wisdom) that comes from the practices ofkebatinan.
One reason why both Sukarno and Suharto were successful in using the Pancasila to
support their authority, despite their very different policy orientations, was the generalized
nature of the principles of the Pancasila. The Pancasila was less successful as a unifying
concept when leadership tried to give it policy content. For example, in 1959 Sukarno
proclaimed a new unity in an important slogan called Nasakom--a state trinity of
nationalism, communism, and religion--as the revolutionary basis for a "just and
prosperous society." To oppose the PKI, under this model, was to be anti-Pancasila.
However, the principal opponent to this kind of ideological correctness was ABRI, creating
political problems for Sukarno within the military. Suharto, on the other hand, gained the
support of the military because he did not require ideological conformity. ABRI, while not
necessarily actively promoting the Pancasila, shared rather than contended for power.
Suharto noted this cooperation in his National Day address of August 16, 1984, when he
said that ABRI, with its dual function, was "a force which preserves and continuously
refreshes Pancasila democracy."
Unlike Sukarno, whose use of ideological appeals often seemed to be a cynical and
manipulative substitute for substantive achievements, even at times an excuse for policy
failure, the Suharto government sought to engage in policies and practices that contributed
to stability and development. The 1973 reorganization of political parties--from the nine
(plus Golkar) that contested the 1971 elections to two (plus Golkar)--was justied as a step
in the direction of Pancasila democracy. Beginning in 1978, a national indoctrination
program was undertaken to inculcate Pancasila values in all citizens, especially school
children and civil servants. From an abstract statement of national goals, the Pancasila was
now used as an instrument of social and political control. To oppose the government was to
oppose the Pancasila. To oppose the Pancasila was to oppose the foundation of the state.
The effort to force conformity to the government's interpretation of Pancasila ideological
correctness was not without controversy. Two issues in particular persistently tested the
limits of the government's tolerance of alternative or even competitive systems of political
thought. The rst issue was the position of religion, especially Islam; the second issue was
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the role of legal opposition in Pancasila democracy.

From the very outset of independence, Islam and the Indonesian state had a tense political
relationship. The Pancasila's promotion of monotheism is a religiously neutral and tolerant
statement that equates Islam with the other religious systems: Christianity, Buddhism, and
Hindu-Balinese beliefs. However, the Muslim political forces had felt betrayed since
signing the 1949 Jakarta Charter, under which they accepted a pluralist republic in return
for agreement that the state would be based upon belief in one God with Muslims obligated
to follow the sharia. The government's failure to follow through constitutionally and
legally on this commitment set the agenda for future Islamic politics. At the extreme was
the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s, that sought to establish a Muslim theocracy.
The New Order's emphasis on the Pancasila was viewed by orthodox Muslim groups as an
effort to subordinate Islam to a secular state ideology, even a "civil religion" manipulated
by a regime inherently biased against the full expression of Muslim life. Indeed, in 1985
the government capped its effort to domesticate all elements in society to the Pancasila
with legislation requiring all voluntary organizations to adopt the Pancasila as their sole
ideological principle, and providing for government supervision, intervention, and, if
necessary, dissolution of organizations to guarantee compliance. Proclaimed as a
"perfection" of Pancasila democracy, the Mass Organizations Law's intent went to the heart
of religiously based groups. This decision was forced on the Muslim-oriented PPP at its
1984 national congress, which was stage-managed by the government. For some Muslims
it was the last straw. The government's assurance that Muslims were not threatened by the
law seemed hollow because the new law restricted the practices of Islam to family,
mosque, and prayer, rather than allowing Islam to enfold the fullness of human activity,
including politics. An environment was exacerbated in which more radical Muslims,
incited by ery clerics, prepared for direct opposition, including political violence. The
government's stern reaction to dissidence--swift arrest, trial for subversion, and long prison
terms--soon inhibited any open public interest in confrontation.
On the other hand, by the 1980s, within the legal and politically acceptable boundaries of
Muslim involvement, the state had become a major promoter of Islamic institutions. The
government even subsidized numerous Muslim community activities. Within the overall
value structure of the Pancasila, Islamic moral teaching and personal codes of conduct
balanced the materialism inherent in secular economic development. Suharto himself went
to great lengths to demonstrate that he was a good Muslim, including making the hajj to
Mecca in May 1991. In August 1991, he pledged Rp3 billion to a new Islamic bank (Bank
Muamalat Indonesia) and declared he would encourage other wealthy Muslims to
contribute. By wooing Islamic leaders and teachers, the state won broad support for its
developmental policies. There is no question but that Islam was a state-favored religion in
Indonesia, but it was not a state religion. Nor, if the New Order prevails over the long term,
will it be. That reality dened the most critical political issue for many orthodox Muslims.
Moreover, the question remained how opposition--religious or secular--could legally be
expressed in the workings of Pancasila democracy.
More about theGovernment and Politics of Indonesia.

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