1.

301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the
phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun
as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials
and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of
penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975,
as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes
rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not
being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which
is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge
set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

Case: JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865)Date:

March 26, 2001Ponente: J. Ynares- SantiagoFacts:
2.

Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national
who was employed asan Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce
Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City.The MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA
that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed thecriminal informations against him.
The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTC

s dismissal. Hence, Liang filed apetition for review before the SC which was denied ruling that the
immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is notabsolute; it is limited to acts performed in an
official capacity. Hence, the present MR.
Issue:
WON Liang is immune from suit
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision.
The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot beconsidered as falling within the purview of
the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.
The issue of whether or not Liang

s utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine
J. Puno

s concurring opinion:
Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a
political question
. It is solely within theprerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts.
Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADBCharter and the Headquarters Agreement is
absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of international organizations
against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow
suchorganizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this
immunity is when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by
statute. The exception allegedly has no application to the case atbar."
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunityis essentially a political question

and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of thegovernment,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
governmentas in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by theprincipal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case,
or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, inadherence to the settled principle that courts may
not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as toembarrass the executive
arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases
the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and
will not embarrass the latter by assuming anantagonistic jurisdiction."
Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is
not absolute.
Under theVienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State for allacts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be
arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit,unless his diplomatic immunity is
waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities,that is,
only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its
purposes. This is thereason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant
immunity from legal process to bank officers andemployees only with respect to acts performed by
them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and
employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts,
notwithstandingthe absence of a waiver of immunity.
Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process"
accorded to ADB as aninternational organization.
The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restrictedonly
to official acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against
his secretary.Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in
his official capacity, it becomesnecessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the
defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation tohis official functions as a senior
economist.
3. PEOPLE V. AVECILLA
GR117033; Feb.15, 2001

Accused was charged of qualified illegal possession of a firearm; accused willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously with intent to kill, and actually killing a victim as a consequence, possess and
carry an unlicensed firearm.
ISSUE: Conviction and Retroactivity of RA8294 (An act Amending the Provisions of PD 1866)
HELD: SC dismissed the case. Originally he could have been convicted of illegally possessing a
firearm separately from his conviction on the killing that occurred as a consequence thereof,
which happened in 1991. With the passage of RA 8294 in 1997 amending PD1866, the

possession of an unlicensed firearm has become merely an aggravating circumstance to a

murder or homicide charge. As a general rule, penal laws have prospective effect EXCEPT
where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, as in this case, sparing him of two
separate convictions.
4.

DE JOYA vs. JAIL WARDEN OFBATANGAS CITY

December 10, 2003(SUPREME COURT, 417 SCRA 638)
Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus
Parties:DJ = Norma De Joya,
petitioner
Facts:1 . 1 9 9 4
D J
w a s
c h a r g e d separate
ly on two counts forv i o l a t i o n o f B P 2 2 . D u r i n g arraig
n m e n t , D J p l e a d e d n o t g u i l t y a n d j u m p e d b a i l d u r i n g trial.2 . D e c i
s i o n s
o n
t w o
c a s e s promulgated
i n a b s e n t i a ,
finding DJ guilty and sentencedto 1 year imprisonment for
eachc o u n t + d a m a g e s . ( 1 9 9 5 a n d 1997)3 . D J m a d e n o
a p p e a l s . R e m a i n e d at
large.4 . C o u r t i s s u e s S u p r e m e C o u r t Administrative Circular N
o. 12-2000 on November 2000
i
.5 . A f t e r 5 y e a r s , p e t i t i o n e r w a s arrested. (Detained at
BatangasCity Jail on Dec 3, 2002)Procedural History1 . O n 2 0 0 3 , D J f i l e s u r g e n t
motionasking court to apply
Circular
retroactively pursuant to Article22 of RPC
ii
.2 . P u b l i c p r o s e c u t o r o p p o s e d t h e m o t i o n . T C d e n i e d m o t i o n
o n three grounds: (a) decision of c o n v i c t i o n l o n g f i n a l a n
d e x e c u t o r y, ( b ) t h e S C C i r c u l a r should be applied prospectively,
( c ) t h e S C C i r c u l a r d i d n o t amend BP Blg. 22, but
m e r e l y e n c o u r a g e s t o h a v e u n i f o r m imposition of
fine.Issue1 . D o e s p e t i t i o n f o r
habeas corpus
have merit?2 . I s S C A d m i n . C i r c u l a r N o . 1 2 2 0 0 0 a p p l i c a b l e r e t r o a c t i v e l y p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e 2 2 o f t h e RPC?
Holding and Ruling1 . N o .
iii
DJ was arrested
pursuantt o
j u d g m e n t s
o f
M T C
o f
Batangas
City.2 . N o . A r t i c l e 2 2 r e f e r s t o p e n a l laws. SC Admin Circular No. 122000 is not a penal law. Also, itl a ys d o w n a
rule of preferencein the application of penalties

,n o t a m e n d B P B l g . 2 2 . I t d o e s not remove imprisonment as apossible

penalty. JudgmentE v e n i f C o u r t a p p l i e s C i r c u l a r r e t r o
a c t i v e l y, p e t i t i o n I s d i s m i s s e d . P e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t o f f e r e v i d e
nced
u
r
i
n
g
t
r
i
a
l
.
J u d g m e n t o f c o u r t b e c a m e f i n a l a n d executory upon her
failure to appealt h e r e f r o m . W o r s e , t h e p r i s o n e r remained at
large for five years
5. Joemar Ortega vs people
6. G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008

People of the Philippines

vs.
Beth Temporada
Facts:
Beth Temporada is an accused for the crime of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in which
the prosecution alleged that the accused recruited and promised overseas employment,
for
a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad
Atle,
Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong.
After collecting the alleged placement fees amounting to P282,160, it was also noted
that
such placement fees are in excess of or greater than that specified in the scheduled of
allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and without reasons and without fault of the said
complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse them the expenses
they incurred in connection with the documentation and processing of their papers for
purposes of their deployment. The accused-apellant now contends that the prosecution
failed to establish all the elements of the offense that were charged to them.
Issue:
What constitutes the crime of Illegal Recruitment?
Held
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thusly:
ART. 13. Definitions. x x x

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a
fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
It was held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must
concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him
to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes
any
of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

7. Case: Julius Amaquiton vs. People G.R. No. 186080, August 14,
2009Facts: Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay Western
Bicutan, Taguig,Metro Manila. As a purok leader and barangay tanod, he was
responsible for the maintenanceof cleanliness, peace and order of the community. He
was accused of Violations of Section 10(a) Article VI, Republic Act No. 7610 in relation
to Section 5 (j) of R.A. No. 8369 committed asfollows:That on the 30th day of October,
2001, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused inconspiracy with one another,
armed with nightstick, did then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence, a form of physical abuse, upon the personof
Leoselie John A. [Baaga], seventeen (17) years old, a minor, by then and there
manhandlinghim and hitting him with their nightsticks, thus, constituting other acts of
child abuse, which is
inimical or prejudicial to childs development, in violation of the above
-mentioned law.On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty beyond
reasonable doubtof the crime charged. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was
given due course. On August28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision which affirmed the

conviction and increased the penalty.Issue: Whether or not petitioner Julius Amanquiton
has been proven guilty beyond reasonabledoubt in violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI
of RA 7160 in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. No.8369.Ruling: No! Because the
Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, theaccused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. An accused is entitled to anacquittal
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. It is the primordial duty of
theprosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction
becomes the onlylogical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. The great goal
of our criminal law and
procedure is not to send people to the jail but to do justice. The prosecutions job is to
prove
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on
the strengthof the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Thus, when the
evidence of theprosecution is not enough to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected
and the accused absolvedand released at once.
8. Candao vs. people
9. Arsenia Garcia,

petitioner
vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of thePhilippines
, respondents
(484 SCRA 617)
FACTS:
On May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during in the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, Election Officer Arsenia Garcia, together with Romero,
Viray and
other Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, conspiring together,w i l l f u l l y a n d u n
l a w f u l l y d e c r e a s e d t h e v o t e s r e c e i v e d b y s e n a t o r i a l c a n d i d a t e Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. from 6,998 votes (as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in 159
precincts) to 1,921 votes.During the trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was
indeed one who announced the figure 1921 instead of 6998, which was
subsequently entered bythen accused Viray in his capacity as the secretary
of the board. Petitioner alsoadmitted that she was the one who prepare the COC,
though it was not her task. The trial court sentenced Garcia with indeterminate sentence
and is to sufferdisqualification to hold public office. She is also deprived of her
right of suffrage.Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification,increasing the minimum penalty of 6 months to one year.
ISSUE:
W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e a v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 2 7 ( b ) o f R e p u b l i c Ac t
N o . 6646 is under mala in se or mala prohibita
HELD:
Mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
P e n a l Code, while Mala Prohibita are those deemed inherently immoral, even punished
byspecial law. Section 27(b) of RA No. 6646 provides that Any member of the board

of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases or decreases

thevotes received by the candidate in any election or any member of the
board whorefuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or
deductsuch tampered votes. Clearly, the acts prohibited in the said RA are
mala in se.Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes
an actwhich the law punishes
RULING:
The instant petition is denied. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum
penalty inher sentence to one year of six months is affirmed.
10.

PEOPLE VS PUGAY

GR No. L-74324November 17, 1988THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. FERNANDOPUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA,
accused-appellantsPonente: Medialdea, J.
SHORT VERSION:
Samson and Pugay were charged with the crime of murder.
Samson and Pugay, committed the crime with the qualifyingcircumstance of treachery
and the aggravating circumstanceof evident premeditation and superior strength.
FACTS:
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta was held in the public plaza ofRosario, Cavite. Sometime
after midnight, Eduardo Gabionwas sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book.
Later, Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived atthe scene seemingly
drunk.
The group saw Bayani Miranda and started making fun ofhim by tickling him with a
piece of wood.
Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline and poured itscontents on Miranda. Gabion
asked Pugay to stop duringthe process of pouring the gasoline.
Then Samson set Miranda on fire.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON Pugay and Samson are guilty of the crime murder.(NO)
RATIO:
There was no evidence found that Pugay and Samson planned to kill Miranda. Their
meeting was accidental and the accused were merely making fun of the deceasedvictim.

Criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson are counted as individual acts and they
are held liable only for the acts they committed individually.
Pugay should have known that what he was pouring onMiranda was gasoline because
of its smell. He failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid the consequences of his
actions and exposed Miranda to danger and injury.
Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
Samson just wanted to set Mirandas clothes on fire but this doesnt relieve him of
criminal liability (Art. 4).
Samson is guilty of homicide credited with ordinary mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Gabion testified that accused were stunned when they noticed Miranda burning.