9)

GAUDENCIO T. CENA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission,

FACTS:
-

Petitioner Cena when he filed the petition worked in the government for 11 years, 9
months and 6 days. Before reaching the age of 65, he requested the Sec. of Justice
thought the Land Registration Authority that he be allowed to extend his service to
complete the 15 year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of
old-age pension under Sec. 11(b) of PD 1146 (otherwise known as the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977).

The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission
whether or not to allow the extension. The LRA Administrator observed that if
petitioner's service would be extended to 15 years, he would have to retire at the age
of 68.

The CSC denied the petition declaring that Cena shall be considered retired upon
reaching the age of 65, unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of
office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.

Cena filed a motion for reconsideration but the CSC only allowed 1 year extension of
his service under Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

Hence, Cena filed the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil
Service Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
extension of petitioner's service for a period of only one (1) year pursuant to the
Memorandum, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to complete the 15year service requirement.

Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of Memorandum

Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a compulsory retiree for a period
not exceeding one (1) year is both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and
munificent intentions" of Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b),
Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the maximum number of years
the retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of service.

The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned
provision being generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146 has general
application, thus respondent CSC has no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 27 the privilege under said section to government employees who lack
just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.

The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent CSC is
the central personnel agency of the government, it is vested with the power and
authority, among others, to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement
age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). In interpreting Section 11
par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That
if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the

service to complete the fifteen years", is qualified by the clause: "Unless the service
is extended by appropriate authorities," which means that the extension of service
must be first authorized by the Commission, as the appropriate authority referred to
in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of a compulsory retiree (one who
has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years of service) can be
extended.
ISSUE:
May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age
of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable
him
to
retire
with
the
benefits
of
an
old-age pension under PD 1146.
RULING:
Yes.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to
limit to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said
limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be
carried into effect.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides thus:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;
As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize the
modification of an express provision of a special law (Revised Government Service Insurance
of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement and pension of
the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered
nugatory and meaningless.
While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service Commission
the authority "to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in
the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the said provision
cannot be extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977. The authority referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect
what the special law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement
law being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations
adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions.

The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into
effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived
omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself can not be
extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress."
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the
"Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1)
year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or
connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was
an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil
Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.
The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his
11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service consistent with the
beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion of the
government office concerned.

10)
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS:
-

Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking

corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax
returns for the First and Second quarters of 1985 and also paid its income tax.

The taxes due were settled by applying PBCom's tax credit memos and accordingly,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Tax Debit Memos.

Subsequently, PBCom suffered losses so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax
Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net
loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year.

But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties
which the lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes.

PBCom then requested the CIR among others, for a tax credit representing the
overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, PBCom
filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property
rentals.

Pending the investigation of the respondent CIR, petitioner PBCom instituted a

Petition for Review before the CTA. The CTA denied the petition for a tax refund or
credit on the ground that it was filed beyond the 2-year reglementary period provided
for by law.

Thereafter, PBCom filed a petition for review of said decision and resolution of the
CTA with the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
CTA's resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax
refund or tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite petitioner's reliance on RMC No.
7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years?
Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by prescription
relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1,
1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year
prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits
for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code. The pertinent portions of the circular reads:
RULING:
No.
After a careful study of the records and applicable jurisprudence on the matter, we find that,
contrary to the petitioner's contention, the relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is
not warranted as it disregards the two-year prescriptive period set by law.
Basic is the principle that "taxes are the lifeblood of the nation." The primary purpose is to
generate funds for the State to finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the
common weal. 13 Due process of law under the Constitution does not require judicial
proceedings in tax cases. This must necessarily be so because it is upon taxation that the
government chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost
importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of taxes levied should be
summary and interfered with as little as possible. 14
From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised within the
time fixed by law because the BIR being an administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its
functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters.
Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977 (now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997)
provides for the prescriptive period for filing a court proceeding for the recovery of tax
erroneously or illegally collected, viz.:
Sec. 230. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in
any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax,
penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceedings shall begun after the expiration of two years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may
arise after payment;Provided however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written
claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment
was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit with the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is

commenced. The two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed from the time
of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of the tax for the year.
When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax
payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977
NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines
contrary to the statute passed by Congress.
It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative
rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are
issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that
the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce
it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not
conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. 20 Thus, courts will not
countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in
harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement. 21
Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. 24 As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of
RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative
interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. for being contrary to the
express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do
so would, in effect, amend the statute.

11)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., vs. HON. RUBEN D.
TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION

FACTS:
-

PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment

agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic
helpers.

On June 1991, DOLE Sec. Torres issued Departnment Order No. 16, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino Domestic
helpers going to HK. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of
deploying such HK-bound workers. This is due to published stories regarding the
abuses suffered by Filipino Housemaids employed in Hong Kong.

Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30
providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino
domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment
agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.

The MC No. 30 contains provisions among which is the creation of a joint POEAOWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU). Moreover, Recruitment agencies
in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with

the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong
Kong.
-

Thereafter, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, on the
processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. The circular
further requires all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines
shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the
POEA.

Consequently, petitioner PASEI filed this petition for prohibition to annul the DOLE
and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation.

ISSUE:
W/N the responded DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars and that
the circulars are contrary to the Constitution, unreasonable and oppressive.

RULING:
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulatethe recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this
title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue
orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by
Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas
employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment
Services was the power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private
sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ."
(Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and
duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a
government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . .
(Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing
complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More
and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified
activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A
careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within
the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred"
upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and
regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of
Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p.
62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the
scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the
"mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for
Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and
other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the
rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and
other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying
domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general
welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is
conducted today, is affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in
Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been
attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby
"temporarily suspendedeffective July 1, 1991."
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers
going to Hongkong only.
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to
the executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of publication
and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations

shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers
of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center,
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity
of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of
any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in
cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
(Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced
and implemented.

12)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
R.O.H. AUTO PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC. and THE HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS:
-

On August 22, 1986, the President promulgated EO 41 declaring one-time tax

amnesty on unpaid income taxes which was later amended to include estate and
donors taxes and taxes on business for the taxable years 1981-1985.

To avail of the said amnesty, R.O.H Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed its Amnesty
Returns and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due.

However, prior to the above availment, petitioner CIR had already assessed the
R.O.Hs deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal year 1981 and 1982. ROH
wrote back to state that it had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, hence, the
deficiency tax notice should be cancelled and withdrawn.

This, however, was denied on the ground that Memorandum Order No. 4-87 which
implemented EO 41 had construed the amnesty coverage to include only

assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of the EO and not to
assessments theretofore (before that time) made.
-

ROH appealed the Commissioner's denial to the Court of Tax Appeals.

The CTA ruled in favor of ROH. It ruled that the plain provisions in the statute granting
tax amnesty for unpaid taxes for the period January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1985
shifted the burden of proof on the CIR to show how the issuance of an assessment
before the date of the promulgation of the executive order could have a reasonable
relation with the objective periods of the amnesty, so as to make petitioner still
answerable for a tax liability which, through the statute, should have been erased
with the proper availment of the amnesty.

The CTA deemed that the rule in Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87 promulgating
that only assessments issued after August 21, 1986 shall be abated by the amnesty
is beyond the contemplation of Executive Order No. 41, as amended. 2

The CA affirmed the CTAs decision. The CA found nothing which justifies petitioner
Commissioner's ground for denying respondent taxpayer's claim to the benefits of
the amnesty law.

ISSUE:
W/N the position taken by the Commissioner coincides with the meaning and
intent of executive Order No. 41.
RULING:
NO. The authority of the Minister of Finance (now the Secretary of Finance), in conjunction
with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations
for the effective enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it
be disputed that such rules and regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings,
ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much more fundamental than
either of the above, however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must remain
consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative
rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
We agree with both the court of Appeals and court of Tax Appeals that Executive Order No.
41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a simple application of its
provisions.
If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include
1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law
could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is
unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a
general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.

13)
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs. HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
FACTS:
-

Pursuant to Sec.19 1 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER),

a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the
Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent Home Development Mutual Fund (hereafter
HDMF) because of a superior retirement plan. 2
-

On September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 1011
amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742.

Among the amendments was a provision which requires that for a company to be
entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for
both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the
Pag-IBIG Fund.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or
Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan. 4 In support of
said application, PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995
Amendments to the Rules are invalid.

The application was DISAPPROVED on the ground that the requirement that there
should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of
the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules Implementing RA 7742 did not amend nor
repeal Sec. 19 of PD 1752 but merely implemented the law.

Consequently, PETITIONER filed a petition for review 9 before the CA but was
dismissed ruling that the amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
7742 are valid. Moreover, the Board of Trustees of the HDMF is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations, as well as amendments thereto, concerning the
extension, waiver or suspension of coverage under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

ISSUE:
W/N the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan providing for both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage
under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended is valid.
RULING:
No.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section
51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules
and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. 20
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII
of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that
employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees
in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996
Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent
repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the
Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not

consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override,
supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry
out. 21 Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.

15)
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. vs.
COMMISSION and MANILA STOCK EXCHANGE

SECURITIES

AND

EXCHANGE

FACTS:
-

The SEC issued a resolution which denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. the
permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its
board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. objected to the resolution contending that the
Commission has no power to impose the same for it is illegal, discriminatory and
unjust.

Under the law, no stock exchange may do business in the Philippines unless it is
previously registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the
information described in Sec. 17 of the Securities Act (Commonwealth Act 83, as
amended).

It is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if the section is complied
with; if not, it may refuse. And there is now no question that the section has been
complied with, or would be complied with, except that the Makati Stock Exchange,
upon challenging this particular requirement of the Commission (rule against double
listing) may be deemed to have shown inability or refusal to abide by its rules, and
thereby to have given ground for denying registration. [Sec. 17 (a) (1) and (d)].

ISSUE:
W/N the Commission may "in the public interest" prohibit (or make
impossible) the establishment of another stock exchange (besides the Manila Stock
Exchange), on the ground that the operation of two or more exchanges adversely affects the
public interest.
RULING:
No. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly
granted to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no provision
expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is "necessary for the
execution of the functions vested in it"; but it makes no explanation, perhaps relying on the
reasons advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in two or
more stock exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors, besides contravening public
interest.
According to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which the Commission
has (Sec. 33) does not imply authority to prohibit." 7
The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally
obtain a permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the
existence of two competing exchanges jeopardizes public interest which is doubtful let
the Congress speak. 12 Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendation of the Commission

will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual
enterprise and business opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of
exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the
establishment of other stock exchanges and thereby contravening:
(a) the organizers' (Makati's) Constitutional right to equality before the law;
(b) their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade; and
(c) the investor's right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select the
brokers in his employment. 13
And no extended elucidation is needed to conclude that for a licensing officer to deny
license solely on the basis of what he believes is best for the economy of the country may
amount to regimentation or, in this instance, the exercise of undelegated legislative powers
and discretion.
Thus, it has been held that where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly
authorize the officer in charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground
that a sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have already been
issued. (53 C.J.S. p. 636.)

16)
PEDRO W. GUERZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF ENERGY
UTILIZATION,
F.
C.
CAASI
JR.,
and
PILIPINAS
SHELL
PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
-

Guerzon and Basic Landoil Energy Coporation executed a Service Station Lease
which was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. The service
was for a period of 5 years. They likewise executed a Dealers Sales Contract for
the same period.

The Bureau if Energy Utilization approved the Dealers Sales Contract to which
Guerzon was appointed dealer of SHELL's gasoline and other petroleum products. The
BEU also issued a certificate of authority in Guerzons favor, which had a 5-year
period of validity, in line with the terms of the contract which includes the terms of its
cancellation or termination of the Dealers Sales Contract which shall be an automatic
cancelation of the Lease.

When the period to which the contract is to end was nearing, respondent shell
informed Guerzon that the Company was not renewing the Dealers Sales Contract
and reminded Guerzon to take appropriate steps to wind up his business and to hand
over the station with all its facilities and equipment to Shell.

Thereafter, respondent BEU issued an order directing the petitioner to vacate and
turn over the station to Shell.

Subsequently, respondent SHELL, accompanied by law enforcement officers, was

able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question together with the
requisite equipments and accessories, and turned them over to the control of the
personnel of respondent SHELL who accompanied them.

Consequently, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental a
complaint for certiorari, injunction and damages with preliminary mandatory
injunction to annul the disputed order but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to
annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the Regional Trial
Court.

Guerzon filed in the CA but it was also dismissed the petition after holding the
disputed order valid and the proceedings undertaken to implement the same is
sanctioned by Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended.

ISSUE:

W/N it is within the jurisdiction of the BEU to issue the above order.

RULING:
No.
Even on the assumption that petitioner's continued occupancy and operation of the service
station constituted a violation of a law or regulation, still the Court has no recourse but to
rule against the legality of the order, the Bureau of Energy Utilization not being empowered
to issue it. Section 7 of P.D. No. 1206, as amended, is very clear as to the courses of action
that the Bureau of Energy Utilization may take in case of a violation or non- compliance with
any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by the Bureau or any of its
orders, decisions, rules or regulations. The Bureau may: (1) impose a fine not exceeding
P1,000.00; and (2) in case of failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the
violation or non-compliance, order the suspension, closure or stoppage of operations of the
establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is limited to these two (2) options. It can do no
more, as there is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the Bureau to issue
an order to vacate in case of a violation.
As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil
courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or accion publiciana [Secs. 19(2) and
33(2), B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.] There is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would
suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to the Bureau of Energy
Utilization. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as
are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof [Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. L23004, June 30,1965,14 SCRA 620; Sy v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-41480, April 30, 1976, 70
SCRA 570.] That issuing the order to vacate was the most effective way of stopping any
illegal trading in petroleum products is no excuse for a deviation from this rule. Otherwise,
adherence to the rule of law would be rendered meaningless.
Moreover, contrary to the Solicitor General's theory, the text of the assailed order leaves no
room for doubt that it was issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual
dispute between respondent Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization,
like its predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide
contractual disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an
express provision of law granting to it such power [see Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Oil
Industry Commission, G.R. No. L-41315, November 13, 1986,145 SCRA 433.] As explicitly
stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau's
jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or
condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions,
rules or regulations.

Viewed from any angle, respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., in issuing the assailed order, acted beyond
his authority and overstepped the powers granted by P.D. No. 1206, as amended. The
assailed order was, therefore, null and void.

17)
ROLANDO SIGRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES, as coadministratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay,respondents.
FACTS:
-

Ernesto Sigre was private respondent Lilia Gonzales tenant in an irrigated rice land.
He was previously paying private respondent a lease rental of sixteen (16) cavans
per crop or thirty-two (32) cavans per agricultural year.

In the agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private
respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the Department of
Agrarian Reform's Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the
guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries
under the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27.

According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed
the 3-year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per
hectare,2 and the value of the land was pegged at Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred
Five Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P13,405.67). 3 Thus, the petition filed before the
Court of Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6, but
also the constitutionality of P.D. 27.

The appellate court declared Memorandum Circular No. 6 null and void. 4 The LBP was
directed to return to private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre, while Sigre
was directed to pay the rentals directly to private respondent. 5

In declaring Memorandum Circular No. 6 as null and void, the appellate court ruled
that said circular is in conflict with P.D. 816 which provides that payments of lease
rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the latter, being a statute, must prevail
over the circular;7 that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for
determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of
determining just compensation;8 and that it is no longer applicable, with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.9

ISSUE:

W/N the circular is null and void.

RULING:
No.
The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. 14 One such
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez
v. Zobel,15 emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by
transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they're tilling.

The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when
it stated that "(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental
payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the
land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer's lease
rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of
the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price." 16 Since the assailed
Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore
valid.17 Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect. 18
The Court cannot see any "irreconcilable conflict" between P.D. No. 816 19 and DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer
(agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property
has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand,
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer
shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determined.
In other words, the MAR Circular merely provides guidelines in the payment of lease
rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and the MAR
Circular, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the land is
established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank (LBP).
The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial payment of the land transferred to
tenant-farmers."21

18)
FREEMAN, INC., FREEMAN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., vs. THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SAW MUI, RUBEN SAW, DIONISIO SAW,
LINA S. CHUA, LUCILA S. RUSTE and EVELYN SAW, respondents.
FACTS:
-

Sometime in 1986 and 1987, Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN), was granted a loan by
Equitable Banking Corporation (EQUITABLE) as evidenced by two (2) promissory
notes. Saw Chiao Lian, President of Freeman, Inc., signed as co-maker in both
promissory notes.

When FREEMAN failed to pay its obligations, EQUITABLE instituted collection suit
against FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian. 1 EQUITABLE also prayed for preliminary
attachment.

Subsequently, the collection case was terminated when the parties entered into a
compromise agreement. However, Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN) and Saw Chiao Lian,
defendants in the trial court, failed to comply with the judgment.

Consequently, a writ of execution was issued. Two (2) parcels of land belonging to
FREEMAN covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220 were levied upon and sold at public
auction on 31 March 1989. The highest bidder was one of the petitioners, Freeman
Management and Development Corporation (FREEMAN MANAGEMENT), which
thereafter registered its certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds.

Before FREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the properties
purchased at the auction sale, private respondents, representing the minority
shareholdings of FREEMAN, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) seeking the dissolution of FREEMAN, accounting and reconveyance

of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220. 3
-

On 5 April 1990, private respondent filed a similar complaint against petitioners with
the RTC. The complaint sought to annul the compromise agreement between
EQUITABLE on one hand and defendants FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian on the other,
as well as the promissory notes executed by Saw Chiao Lian, the auction sale, and
the sheriff's certificate of sale of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 34219 and 34220.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same was
a duplication of the case pending in the SEC. But the motion was denied. Petitioners
went up on certiorari to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court and
directed the dismissal of the complaint by reason of the pendency of the case. 5

Meanwhile, the SEC Hearing Officer Juanito B. Almosa, Jr., issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the consolidation of ownership of petitioner FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the auction sale.

On 22 April 1993, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari questioning
the order of the SEC. However, it was dismissed.

Hence, petitioners filed the present petition containing the matters omitted in the
petition earlier dismissed. Petitioners allege that the SEC committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the order of its Hearing
Officer granting the writ of injunction

Petitioners argued that the assailed order of the SEC violated the basic principle that
the SEC, being a coordinate body with the Regional Trial Court, could not interfere in
the proceedings held therein, and neither could it review the issues passed upon by
the said court. They likewise maintain that although SEC Case No. 3577 could still
proceed as to the dissolution of FREEMAN, the two (2) properties of the latter which
were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT are already excluded from the
corporate assets of FREEMAN; and, that these properties could no longer be the
subject of the action for reconveyance in the SEC because they had been the subject
of execution to enforce the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44404 which
had already attained finality.

ISSUE:
W/N the SEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction.
RULING:

YES!

First, that administrative agencies like the SEC are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as
such can exercise only those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling
statutes. 14 Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, provides the cases over which the SEC
has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide. These include controversies
arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders,
members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and,
between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns
their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. Section 6 of the same decree
empowers the SEC to issue preliminary or permanent injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction.

The action for dissolution of FREEMAN filed by its minority stockholders is well within the
jurisdiction of the SEC to resolve in accordance with P.D. No. 902-A. However, the inclusion in
the SEC case of FREEMAN MANAGEMENT of which private respondents are not stockholders
for the purpose of compelling it to reconvey to FREEMAN the properties originally owned by
the latter but were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT in a public auction is a
matter outside of the limited jurisdiction of the SEC. The petition for reconveyance of
properties against FREEMAN MANAGEMENT is not an intra-corporate controversy since
private respondents have no shares or interests whatsoever in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT, a
corporation separate and distinct from FREEMAN, which is undergoing dissolution
proceedings in the SEC.
The second basic principle is the doctrine of non-interference which should be regarded as
highly important in judicial stability and in the administration of justice whereby the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by
any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 15 The SEC is at the very least co-equal with
the Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have no power to control the other. 16 Moreover,
in the instant case, judgment was rendered by the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44404
approving the compromise agreement between EQUITABLE on one hand, and FREEMAN and
Saw Chiao Lian on the other. A writ of execution was issued against the defendants to
enforce the judgment and two (2) properties of FREEMAN were levied upon and sold to
FREEMAN MANAGEMENT as highest bidder in the public auction.
Finally, the judgment was fully satisfied and a certificate of sale was issued to FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT. It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is
deemed terminated once and for all. 17 It cannot be modified or altered. Hence, the
properties sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT are now considered excluded from the corporate
assets of FREEMAN and can no longer be the subject of the proceedings in the SEC for the
dissolution of the latter. Therefore SEC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a writ of
injunction enjoining FREEMAN MANAGEMENT from consolidating its ownership over the two
(2) parcels of land it acquired as highest bidder in the execution sale.

BPI LEASING CORPORATION vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF

TAX APPEAL AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
-

BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. 3 For the calendar
year 1986, BLC paid the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of
P1,139,041.49 representing 4% "contractors percentage tax" then imposed by
Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals
from equipment leasing for the said year.

Thereafter, the CIR issued Revenue Regulation 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided
that finance and leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be
subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that
companies registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for
"contractors percentage tax" under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to "gross
receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC had earlier
paid the aforementioned "contractors percentage tax," it re-computed its tax
liabilities under the "gross receipts tax" and arrived at the amount of P361,924.44.

Consequently, BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of
P777,117.05, representing the difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as
"contractors percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it should have paid for "gross receipts
tax."5 Four days later, to stop the running of the prescriptive period for refunds,
petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA. 6

The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund. The CTA held that
Revenue Regulation 19-86, as amended, may only be applied prospectively such that
it only covers all leases written on or after January 1, 1987.

The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows
that this was derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not
covered by the revenue regulation.

ISSUES:
1) WHETHER REVENUE
LEGISLATIVE OR INTERPRETATIVE IN NATURE.

REGULATION

19-86,

AS

AMENDED,

IS

2) WHETHER REVENUE REGULATION 19-86, AS AMENDED, IS PROSPECTIVE OR

RETROACTIVE IN ITS APPLICATION.

RULING:
BLC attempts to convince the Court that Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative rather than
interpretative in character and hence, should retroact to the date of effectivity of the law it
seeks to interpret.
Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and substance:
legislative and interpretative. A legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation,
designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An
interpretative rule, on the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.15
The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of
Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of
the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of
Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the NIRC. Verily, it cannot be disputed that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was
issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance, thus making it
legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.
BLC further posits that, assuming the revenue regulation is legislative in nature, it is invalid
for want of due process as no prior notice, publication and public hearing attended the
issuance thereof. To support its view, BLC cited CIR v. Fortune Tobacco, et al., 17 wherein the
Court nullified a revenue memorandum circular which reclassified certain cigarettes and
subjected them to a higher tax rate, holding it invalid for lack of notice, publication and
public hearing.
The doctrine enunciated in Fortune Tobacco, and reiterated in CIR v. Michel J. Lhuillier
Pawnshop, Inc.,18 is that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the

means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law
and substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly
informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law. In Lhuillier and Fortune
Tobacco, the Court invalidated the revenue memoranda concerned because the same
increased the tax liabilities of the affected taxpayers without affording them due process. In
this case, Revenue Regulation 19-86 would be beneficial to the taxpayers as they are
subjected to lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is invoking Revenue Regulation 19-86 as the
very basis of its claim for refund. If it were invalid, then petitioner all the more has no right
to a refund.
After upholding the validity of Revenue Regulation 19-86, the Court now resolves whether its
application should be prospective or retroactive.
The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations,
operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by
express terms or by necessary implication. 19 In the present case, there is no indication that
the revenue regulation may operate retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express provision
stating that it "shall take effect on January 1, 1987," and that it "shall be applicable to all
leases written on or after the said date." Being clear on its prospective application, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without further interpretation. 20 Thus, BLC is not in a
position to invoke the provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for lease rentals it received
prior to January 1, 1987.