Agustin vs Edu

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires
all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early
warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring
public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And
that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose
cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking
lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this
country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers
passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all
about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the
mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is
the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it
has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as
noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable
powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order,
and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate
a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-

existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived
with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

United States vs Luis Toribio

Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because
his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He
was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law
mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public use, within the
meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain
such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the community.

White Light Corp., vs City of Manila

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an
operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of
the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of
police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates
the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said
ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought
to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that
individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein
abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a
monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between
the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute
must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

175 SCRA 343 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Valid Classification
Eminent Domain Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No.
6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State
of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for
the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries
of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing
the mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in
R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7
hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to
their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws
already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that
only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in
cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program.
Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars
and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different
treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of

implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a
wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which
prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount
agreed upon by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR
can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What
is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The
agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all
compensation have to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence,
bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of
Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still
in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been
ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are
a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at
Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi
and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating
the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the
Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code.
Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the
provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is
necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but
that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In
this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class
legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila

Police Power Due Process Clause
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor
Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1 st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2 nd class
(taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It
compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate
impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as
well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun
Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a
stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police
Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any

business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police
power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which
is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be
vague.