UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
EUGENE R. DANIELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
H. MOORE, Lieutenant; M. BROWN,
Correctional Officer; A. SMITH,
Correctional Officer; SCOTT
JOHNSON, Grievance Clerk,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-6624

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(CA-01-583-9)
Submitted: May 30, 2002
Decided: June 19, 2002
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL
Eugene R. Daniels, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Thomas King, Jay Hupfer, WILLCOX, BUYCK & WILLIAMS, P.A., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.

DANIELS v. MOORE

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Eugene R. Daniels appeals from the district courts order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 (West Supp. 2001)
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Prison
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires that a prisoner exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a 1983 action concerning his
confinement. 42 U.S.C.A. 1997e(a) (West Supp. 2001). In Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the PLRA
requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies regarding his
excessive force claims, even if the prisoner seeks only money damages and such relief is not available under the administrative process.
Id. at 741. More recently, in Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.
Ct. 983 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the PLRAs exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether
they allege excessive force or some other wrong. 534 U.S. at ___, 122
S. Ct. at 992.
There is evidence in the record that Daniels pursued administrative
remedies and it is not clear from the district courts opinion whether
the district court considered this evidence. Therefore, although we
express no opinion as to whether Daniels in fact has demonstrated
exhaustion of administrative remedies, we vacate the district courts
order dismissing the action without prejudice and remand to enable
the district court to make such a determination. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED