PALS Criminal Law 2016 PDF

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS
BAR OPS PILIPINAS

2016
CRIMINAL
LAW
Prepared by: Dean Gemy Lito L. Festin and the students of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines
CRIMINAL LAW CASES

(June 2015 to February 2016)
PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 194129
June 15, 2015
Facts:
On May 27, 2000, petitioner assaulted and use personal violence upon Mario De Luna.
Petitioner fired his service firearm against the victim hitting the latter on the chest and other parts
of the body. The wounds were the direct and immediate cause of his death. Petitioner pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. He admitted to having shot the victim to death, but claimed to have
done so in self-defense. In support of this claim, defense witness Marita averred that the shooting
incident was precipitated by the victims unprovoked knife attack upon accused-appellant. The
Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner of homicide and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but modified some of the monetary damages awarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable.
doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Settled is the rule that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be met:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person engaged in self-defense.
In this case, petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first
element of self-defense. There was no showing of attack or assault that had placed petitioners
life in imminent or actual danger. Petitioners tale of self-defense is negated by the physical
evidence, specifically the trajectory of the bullets that penetrated the victims body. Where
the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the
physical evidence must be upheld.
With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court finds that the means
employed by petitioner was grossly disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful aggression.
The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in his chest and different parts of his body.
Indeed, the Advance Information prepared by the investigator of the case reveals that there was
no mention of either a stabbing incident that happened or a knife that was recovered from
the crime scene. Here, the wounds sustained by the victim clearly show the intent of petitioner
to kill and not merely to prevent or repel an attack.
Hence, the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUDY NUYOK

G.R. No. 195424
June 15, 2015
Facts:
The victim was 13 years old when the accused committed the rapes in June, July, August
and September of 2005. She resided in the house of her grandmother wherein the accused, her
paternal uncle, also lived. On June 25, 2005, as the victim was about to sleep, the accused laid
down beside her. She tried to escape, but he pulled her by the hair, slapped her, and punched her
in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, she noticed that her
panties had blood. The accused warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone, threatening to
kill her and her family if she did so. The victim finally reported the four rapes to her mother in
October 2005. The accused denied having raped and imputed ill motives to the victim insisting
that the victims mother had wanted to get back at him after he had told his brother, the victims
father, that he had caught the victims mother with a paramour. Both the RTC and CA found the
accused guilty of four counts of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the minority of the offended
party when the same was not indicated in the information.
Ruling:
No, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended party.
The Revised Penal Code provides that Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or
intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; (d)
When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances above be present.
The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not
ipso facto render the information defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of
rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a
female against her will through force or intimidation. Consequently, the date or the time of the
commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute
accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed
at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Secondly, the Prosecution
successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt the charges of rape against the accused. The victim
positively identified the accused as her rapist. Her account of his crimes was candid, and her
demeanor revealing. She could not control herself but cried in the course of her testimony
whenever she was made to recall her traumatic experiences at his hands. The testimony of a rape
victim that is consistent with the medical findings constitutes sufficient basis to conclude that
carnal knowledge occurred.
Hence, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended
party.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS (EN BANC)

G.R. No. 200942
June 16, 2015
Facts:
On April 2, 2003, Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City,
was on his way back to the company staff house on board his Isuzu pick-up after attending a
despedida for one of his employees. When he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he
was gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty, David
Azucena, who was then opening the gate identified one of the assailants as herein appellant.
During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant
taken during the preliminary investigation of the case, admitting the killing of Buensuceso.
However, when it was appellants turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he was
at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA found no
reason to depart from the trial courts findings.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Revised Penal Code provides the elements of murder, to wit: (1) Person was killed;
(2) Accused killed him; (3) Killing attended by any of the following qualifying
circumstances (b) in consideration of a price, reward or promise.
In the present case, the Court held that appellants contention that he lacked legal
intervention and assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial confession was totally belied by
the testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he rendered assistance to the appellant throughout the entire
proceedings and carefully explained to the latter the consequences of his admission. He informed
appellant of his rights and that anything he says may be used in evidence against him. Appellant
then proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Laranjo and Canadilla, for and in behalf of
a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to kill the victim for a fee.
Appellant then narrated how he met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo; how he received
payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how he executed the plan. Appellant
insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.
Notwithstanding, it must be stressed that appellants conviction was not based solely on
his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of
Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw appellant about five
meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black
motorcycle and was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at
the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from the appellant.
Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
Hence, the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 19952
June 22, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two criminal information for violation of
R.A. No. 9262. It is alleged in the information that he feloniously inflicts psychological violence
upon a woman with whom he has two children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and
public humiliation by repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and
insulting utterance directed against the victim. Dinamling pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA No. 9262.
Ruling:
The elements of the crime are;
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children.
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the womans child or children, they may be
legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode.
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through the acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to
the children or similar acts or omissions.
In this case, the elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that the
victim is a woman who has then in a five-year ongoing relationship with Dinamling and had two
common children. The woman is often in fear of petitioner due to latters physical and verbal
abuse.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (RA No. 9262) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. It is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. To establish psychological violence as the element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts. And to
establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present a testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical
violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as
defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical
violence done, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping her pants
and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological
violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in the victims public ridicule.
Accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts
of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of
causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the
physical violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's
mental or emotional well-being.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO

GR. No. 209338
June 29, 2015
Facts:
The appellant was charged with crimes of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of
R.A. No. 9165 for illegal sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
He was arrested by the police officer through a buy-bust operation. The appellant denied the
offenses charged and gave a different version of story.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of shabu.
Ruling:
Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs if the

following elements are present:
I. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
II. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto.
The prosecution duly established the identity of the buyer and the seller, appellant being
the seller and P/CI Chica as the poseur-buyer. The object of the transaction was a sachet of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As to the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefore, P/CI Chica categorically testified that he caught appellant in flagrante delicto selling
and delivering the shabu during a buy-bust operation.
It bears stressing that the sale of the illegal drugs in this case was brought about by a buybust operation a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals.
In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the elements are:
1. the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug;
2. such possession is not authorized by law; and
3. the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
These elements are also present in this case. P/CI Chica testified that after the appellant
sold him shabu, another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance was recovered by
Chairman Cruz from appellant at the time of his arrest. This too was submitted to the crime
laboratory for analysis, and was positively found to contain shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE BRONIOLA @ "ASOT"

G.R. No. 211027
June 29, 2015
Facts:
AAA, a Grade VI pupil, left her house for school in the morning of February 28, 2000.
She did not return home that day. Her lifeless body was found on February 29, 2000 in a grassy
lot near an uninhabited farm hut at Cotabato. The accused, armed with a bolo (Lagaraw), had a
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carnal knowledge with [AAA], minor, 13 years old, against her will, that after the occasion,
accused with intent to kill, attack, assault, hack and use physical violence to the victim, thus
inflicting upon her hack wounds on the different parts of her body, which is the direct and
proximate cause of her death.
Issue:
Whether or not, Abag, the accused, is guilty of rape with homicide.
Ruling:
The felony of rape with homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more crimes
that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single
criminal impulse. In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant
had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of
force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by
means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed the woman. Direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. As the Court held in People v. Pascua: It is settled that in the special
complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the Court has held that the crime of rape is difficult to
prove because it is generally not witnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for
herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as
here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the
requirements of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for conviction, viz:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
As regards the penalty imposed, R.A. No. 8353 provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.
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On the other hand, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines" provides:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides, "[p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464
July 1, 2015
Facts:
On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha
Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers
conducted initiation rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte was subjected to
physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was
ignored by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort,
they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to
the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing
Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not herein accused were guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Ruling:
Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite
for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing
can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and
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3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating

situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
Classes of direct participants are: the first class of principals would be the actual
participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites
suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity,
sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable
as principals. The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of
the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. The third class of
principals would be the officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority who
knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat due
to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing. The
next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser. The last class of principals
would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ROD FAMUDULAN y FEDELIN

G.R. No. 2121944
July 6, 2015
Facts:
Appellant, a 42-year old man, was accused and charged with the crime of statutory rape
against AAA. AAA, a 6-year old girl, testified that the appellant was her aunts neighbor.
`
The appellant cornered and ordered her to fellate him and he inserted his finger in her
vaginal orifice and thereafter his organ. Thereafter, he threatened to kill her if she would tell
anybody. She positively identified accused as her assailant in open court. The prosecution
presented AAA and Dr. Adelaido Malaluan as its witnesses. Dr. Malaluan examined AAA and
affirmed that he executed a Medico-Legal Report and that the injuries sustained by AAA may
have been caused by a blunt object such as a hard penis.
Appellant in his defense, claimed that on January 1, 2010, noontime, he was not in the
place where the crime happened for he was on a trip going to Batangas. The RTC gave credence
to AAAs testimony since she was a child of tender years. Moreover, the testimony was delivered
in a spontaneous and straightforward manner. On the other hand, appellants defense of denial
and alibi was left unsubstantiated by evidence. The RTC noted that Bansud is not too far from
Banus. In light of the credible testimony and positive identification of the appellant, by AAA and
appellants unsubstantiated defense, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of statutory rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTCs decision with modification for the
award of damages. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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The Supreme Court stated that it has been held that when a woman or a girl-child says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Appellants defense
of denial and alibi are inherently weak and self-serving, especially if uncorroborated. Denial
cannot prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a
positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Furthermore, the court is constrained to modify
the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Article 266-B provides that in cases of qualified
statutory rape the penalty imposed shall be death. However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9346 instead
prescribes that the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole be imposed in cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or the sentence will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
HERMIE OLARTE y TARUG and RUBEN OLAV ARIO y MAUNAO vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197731
July 6, 2015
Facts:
Petitioners Hermie Olarte y Tarug (Olarte) and Ruben Olavario y Maunao (Olavario),
together with Salvador Pasquin y Marco (Pasquin), were charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide. The prosecution averred that in the early morning of September 15, 2002, the victim
Eugene M. Villostas (Villostas) was fetched by his half-brother, Charlie Penilla (Penilla), from a
drinking session. On their way home, while Villostas decided to buy cigarettes from a nearby
videoke bar, three men who belonged to a group then singing and drinking suddenly stabbed him
on different parts of his body. They only stopped when bystanders started throwing stones at
them to which Penilla witnessed. During trial, Dr. Pascual testified that Villostas sustained
multiple stab wounds which according to him, could have caused Villostas death were it not for
the timely medical attention given him. The defense, on the other hand, alleged that at while
petitioners, Pasquin and some other companions were having a drinking spree inside a videoke
bar, several persons threw stones at them hitting Olarte and another companion. Olarte, together
with a certain Joni, went to the Barangay Hall to report the stoning incident. Upon arrival thereat,
however, they were surprised that Olarte, Olavario and Pasquin were being implicated in a
stabbing incident. The three were then brought to the Valenzuela General Hospital where
Villostas identified them as his assailants. Thereafter, they were arrested and detained at the city
jail. The RTC found petitioners guilty as charged. Subsequently, on their appeal, petitioners
questioned the credibility of Villostas and Penilla as prosecution witnesses for there was
inconsistencies in their testimonies respecting the victims degree of intoxication at the time of
the incident. Petitioners argued that such inconsistencies rendered doubtful their identification as
the culprits by said prosecution witnesses. However, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not acquitting petitioners of the crime of frustrated
homicide.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court enumerated the elements of frustrated homicide which are: (1) the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the
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Revised Penal Code exist. These elements were proved during trial. As for the first element, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim demonstrate petitioners intent to
kill. Next, the injuries suffered by Villostas were all fatal. Particularly critical were the 5centimeter wound below his left armpit, the 3.5-centimeter wound on the mid-part of his left
chest which required inserting a tube thereon to drain blood so as not to impede his breathing,
and the 5-centimeter stab wound on the right side of his abdomen which also injured his liver. As
testified to by Dr. Pascual, Villostas would have succumbed to death due to the said injuries if
not for the timely medical attention. Finally, no qualifying circumstance for murder was alleged
in the Information to have attended the commission of the crime. Hence, the trial court did not
err in not acquitting petitioners of the crime of frustrated homicide.
ALVIN MERCADO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167510
July 08, 2015
Facts:
The accused made an entry of various goods which consist of one 1 x 20 container of
assorted men's and ladies' wearing apparel, textile and accessories in 162 packages. Sensing a
possible violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), Atty. Angel L.
Africa, then the Director of the Customs Investigation and Intelligence Services, issued Alert
Order directing Customs Special Agent Roberto A. Tibayan to witness the 100% examination of
the shipment by the assigned customs examiner. Meanwhile, Al-Mer Cargo Management filed an
Informal Import Declaration and Entry (IIDE) and Permit to Deliver through its broker, Consular
Cargo Services, describing the items in the shipment as "personal effects, assorted mens and
ladies wearing apparels, textile and accessories;" However, upon examination of the shipment,
Customs Examiner Rogelio Dizon and SA Tibayan found the shipment to contain general
merchandise in commercial quantities instead of personal effects of no commercial value
resulting for its seizure. Petitioner then sought for settlement of the case in exchange for the
payment of the proper taxes and duties, plus 20% penalty. Customs Commissioner Titus B.
Villanueva approved the offer of settlement amounting to P85,000.00 and the release of the
shipment with the exception of the infringing Levi's jeans and assorted bags; that despite the
payment of the settlement, the petitioner and Sea were still charged with the violation of
Section 3602 of the TCCP, in relation to its Section 2503, and with the violation of the
Intellectual Property Code. In his defense, the petitioner asserted that he had only accommodated
the shipment upon the request of Sea and Apolonio Viray, President of Worth Brokerage
Corporation; that Sea had represented to him that the shipment contained only personal and
household effects. The RTC rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and
subsequently the CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held guilty of violation of Section 3602 in relation to
Section 2503 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP).
Ruling:
The Court holds that the petitioner deserved an acquittal because the Prosecution did not
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is undisputed that the customs documents (like the
IIDE and Permit to Deliver) were filed and the imported goods passed through the customs
authorities, thereby satisfying the first element of entry of imported articles. However, the second
and third elements were not established beyond reasonable doubt. Although there was a
discrepancy between the declaration made and the actual contents of the shipment, the petitioner
firmly disavowed his participation in securing the clearance for the shipment as well as in
preparing and filing the import documents. The petitioner's assertion that he had relied in good
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faith on the declarations made by his broker, who had based them on the information provided in
the shipping documents by the foreign exporter, stood unrebutted by the Prosecution. If that was
so, his intentional or deliberate participation in any misdeclaration or under declaration could not
be properly presumed. In so saying, the Court cannot but conclude that the trial court wrongly
found him criminally liable. Lastly, the petitioner's participation in the settlement payment and in
the release of the shipment could not be given any meaning or import adverse to his penal
interest. Such payment and release were actually irrelevant to the criminal act charged against
him. The Court emphasized that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send
people to the gaol but to do justice. The prosecution's job is to prove that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not on
the weakness of the defense - the obligation is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused, not on the accused to prove his innocence. Thus, when the evidence of the
prosecution is not enough to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the accused absolved
and released at once. Thus, accused was acquitted for failure of the State to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VINCENT GARRIDO y ELORDE

G.R. No. 191258
July 08, 2015
Facts:
The victim AAA, then 19 years old went to a retail shop with her sister's friend BBB to
submit her application for work. While inside the shopping center, they met BBBs friends herein
accused Garrido and a certain James. They talked with BBB and invited them to attend the
latter's birthday party. AAA initially declined to go, but upon BBB's prodding, she accepted the
invitation but upon arrival she was surprised to learn that it was a drinking session. Nevertheless
she stayed and drank upon prodding of others. Garrido offered to take AAA home but instead of
going straight to her house, Garrido decided to pass by his house and AAA trusted his concern
and agreed. Upon reaching the house, Garrido brought AAA, BBB and Vernel inside one of the
bedrooms. Upon Garrido's return, he turned off the lights and went on top of AAA and kissed her
on her lips and neck. She tried to resist him but Garrido was stronger hence he succeeded in a
sexual intercourse despite her resistance. AAA was raped several times by the accused. The next
morning, Garrido took her and BBB to the jeepney terminal. Upon reaching home, AAA took a
rest. Her sister CCC took notice of the marks all over her body, she narrated that she was raped
by Garrido. Out of anger, CCC cried and confided that Garrido was the same man who raped her
sometime in June 2004. Thus, the accused was charged with several counts of the crime of rape.
The accused however denied the charge of rape and maintained that the sexual
intercourse between him and AAA was consensual. He narrated that it was AAA who insisted to
stay in their house for the night after the drinking session to which was corroborated by Vernel,
his brother Vivence Garrido (Vivence) and mother Walita Garrido (Walita). Vernel testified that
he saw AAA and Garrido romancing each other in bed and were in an embrace during sleep.
Walita confirmed that her son, together with his companions including AAA, arrived at their
house to spend the night. When she woke up in the morning, she saw the group drinking coffee.
She denied any unusual action among the group; AAA in particular acted normally during the
conversation. Vivence verified the story that he was sleeping in the room when his brother
Garrido and his companions came. He was asked to go out to make room for his companions
AAA, BBB and Vernel. When he woke up, he saw his brother accompanying AAA and BBB to
the jeepney terminal. But before leaving, he saw AAA kiss her brother on the cheek. The RTC
found Garrido guilty and the CA affirmed said decision, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Garrido is guilty of the crime of rape.
Page | 11
Ruling:
The Court stated that it has the duty to scrutinize with caution the testimony of the victim
to rule a conviction. Jurisprudence lay down the following guidelines in evaluating the testimony
of the victim. First, while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; Second, in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and lastly, the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense. Guided by these principles, the Court find a nagging
doubt on the credibility of the testimony of AAA on what really transpired on those fateful hours
for there are inconsistencies with her narration of facts of what has transpired. On the other hand,
the defense's version provides a continuous chain of narration worthy of belief. Hence, after a
careful review, the Court reversed the finding of guilt and acquitted the accused of the offense
charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES vs. ESTANLY OCTA y BAS

G.R. No. 195196
July 13, 2015
Facts:
Johnny Corpuz and Mike Adrian Batuigas were on board a Honda Civic Car travelling on
Buenos Aires St., Sampaloc, Manila when their way was blocked by a Mitsubishi box type
Lancer car. Then four armed occupants of the latter alighted and forced Johnny and Mike Adrian
to come with them. The armed men asked for the names and telephone numbers of Johnnys
mother-in-law, and also communicated with Johnnys wife namely Ana Marie Corpuz. Johnny
and Mike Adrian was brought to a safe house. Ana Marie had several communications with her
husbands kidnappers. The latter started demanding the amount of P20 million for the release of
her husband and her brother but the amount was considerably reduced up to the time that Ana
Marie was able to raise the amount ofP538,000.00 which was accepted by the kidnappers. Ana
Marie delivered the money with a person which she later identified as Estanly Octa. Johnny and
Mike Adrian were released by their captors after the payment of ransom money. They were
detained for the duration of six days. The RTC ruled that the accused is guilty for the crime of
kidnapping for r ansom, which was affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is a principal to the crime charged.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the accused is liable as a principal for being a co-conspirator in the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A.No. 7659. Under the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In the case at bar, the accused
was the one who received the ransom money. The commonality of purpose of the acts of the
accused together with the other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the common
design or purpose to commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom. Moreover, at the time
accused-appellant received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing,
since both victims were still being illegally detained by the kidnappers. The positive
identification of the accused constitutes direct, and not merely circumstantial, evidence.
Page | 12
ROBERT CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 196853
July 13, 2015
Facts:
Chua and private complainant Philip See were long-time friends and neighbors. On
different dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PS Bank checks of varying
amounts to See. However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored
either due to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good
the checks. Hence, See filed a Complaint for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 (BP 22).
The MeTC, RTC and CA ruled that Chua violated BP 22, contending that the latter had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds for the payment of the checks upon their presentment,
based merely on the presumption that the date of the preparation of the letter is the date of receipt
by the addressee. On the other hand, Chua argues in this petition that the presumption that the
issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds only arises after it is proved that the issuer
actually received a notice of dishonor and within five days from receipt thereof failed to pay the
amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. The date when Chua allegedly
received the demand letter was not established by the prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution proved all the elements of the offenses charged.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offenses
charged. Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds,
which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of
dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check
or to make arrangements for its payment. In the case at bar, there is no way to ascertain when the
five-day period under Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when
Chua actually received the demand letter. It is plain that the stipulation only refers to the
existence of the demand letter and of Chuas signature thereon. In no way can an admission of
Chuas receipt of the demand letter be inferred therefrom. Hence, the Court cannot convict Chua
for violation of BP 22 with moral certainty.
AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185224
July 29, 2015
Facts:
An anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll
Desiree Tangan before the Ombudsman for participating in the scheme of questionable grants
and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds. As a result of this complaint, the COA
conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province. Among the irregularities discovered by the
Special Audit Team was a P20, 000.00 financial assistance given to Women in Progress (WIP), a
cooperative whose members were mostly government personnel or relatives of the officials of
Sarangani Province. Thereafter, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
charged the petitioner, Vice-Governor Felipe Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad, Maria Camanay,
and Teodorico Diaz with Malversation of Public Funds by Falsification of Public Documents
defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 171(2) and Article 48 of the
Page | 13
Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Sandiganbayan. The latter found the petitioner and
Bahilidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the crime charged.
Ruling:
The Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the petitioner of the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The elements
of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code have been established by the
prosecution. To wit: that it is undisputed that all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public
officers; that the funds misappropriated are public in character, as they were funds belonging to
the Province of Sarangani; that Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable
public officers; and that Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take the public funds when they signed Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822.
Moreover, the Court also agree with the Sandiganbayans ruling that falsification was a
necessary means to commit the crime of Malversation, under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 5 of
the same Code.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (EN BANC)

G.R. No. 213455
August 11, 2015
Facts:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against
Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis
before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent
Omnibus Motion (Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence on Record to Establish Probable
Cause and Ad Cautelam Motion for Bail), and (2) A Supplemental Opposition to Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest and for Dismissal of Information, on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014,
respectively.
The Sandiganbayan heard both motions on June 20, 2014. On June 24, 2014, the
prosecution filed a Consolidated Opposition to both motions. On July 3, 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the
plunder case against the accused.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars before the Sandiganbayan.
On the same date, he filed a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment. On July 11, 2014, Enrile was
brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayans order and his Motion for Bill of
Particulars was called for hearing.
PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Courts denial of Enriles Motion for Bill of Particulars
essentially on the following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are substantial reiterations of the arguments he raised
in his Supplemental Opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Page | 14
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of
Enriles Motion for Bill of Particulars. PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayans denial
of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars
despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is guilty of grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars.
Ruling:
POLITICAL LAW; Constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This right has long been
established in English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution.
This right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the
accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense
REMEDIAL LAW; Procedural Insufficiency of Evidence
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by
the prosecutor and filed with the court. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its
sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since
he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.
REMEDIAL LAW; Ultimate Facts versus Evidentiary Facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the
evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during
the trial.
Ultimate facts is defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. The
term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established. It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the
trial.
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts;
they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.
REMEDIAL LAW; Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he
has to face, to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt
with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. During arraignment, the accused is
granted the opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware
of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to
him.
Page | 15
REMEDIAL LAW; Bill of Particulars

In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an
action, which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly
plead and prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a
complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or more particularized
outline of a pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the
pleading. The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is to enable a party to
prepare his responsive pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the
Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to
enable an accused: to know the theory of the governments case; to prepare his defense and to
avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for
the same offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.
REMEDIAL LAW; Motion to Quash versus Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a
jurisdictional defect on account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an
offense
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. But if
the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot
prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy.
REMEDIAL LAW; POLITICAL LAW; Grave Abuse of Discretion
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where
the Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave
abuse of discretion is shown.
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that
amounts or is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. For the extraordinary writ of
certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.
CRIMINAL LAW; The Law of Plunder
The elements of plunder are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates,
or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
Page | 16
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of governmentowned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment
in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
Taking these elements into account, the Court hold that Enriles requested details on who
among the accused acquired the alleged ill-gotten wealth are not proper subjects for a bill of
particulars. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a
conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at
least P50 million. The Court point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a
crime by itself but only as the mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity
of reciting its particulars in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of
the following manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently
enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
In the light of all these considerations, the Court hold that the Sandiganbayans denial of
the petitioners motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be
itemized or specified are all evidentiary without any explanation supporting this conclusion
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the
scope of the proof; it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in
the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused to
move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be
lawfully introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less general terms which
sufficiently charges the defendants with a definite crime.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove
plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and
Page | 17
show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a
pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be established
as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not
preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he
is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of
particulars.
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this
reason, more process is due, not less. When a persons life interest protected by the life, liberty,
and property language recognized in the due process clause is at stake in the proceeding, all
measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.
JACKSON Q. PADIERNOS et al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181111
August 17, 2015
Facts:
The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber,
in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines.
The Regional Trial Court convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as
accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the
petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in violating
P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. The Regional Trial Court
disregarded the petitioners' defense that they did not intentionally take away the truck.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's decision and adopted its factual
findings, but modified the penalty imposed on the petitioners
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable as accessories to the crime.
Ruling:
Article 19, paragraph 2 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the
commission of the crime and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its discovery. Under this provision, the
punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the
crime.
In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber
- had already been discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the
confiscation of the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the
truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation.
In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the
Information as the legal definition of the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with the
factual allegations in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against the
petitioners.
Page | 18
The factual allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed by
accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, constitute instead the
criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829
entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to
obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
VICENTE H. MANULAT, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 190892
August 17, 2015
Facts:
On September 5, 2005, Genebe Manulat was found hanging from the ceiling on top of
her bed. Petitioner is the husband of the deceased Genebe Manulat. This case is about the prayer
of the petitioner for the reversal of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Petitioner claims there is no sufficient
evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that the circumstances
appreciated by the court a quo and sustained by the Court of Appeals as bases for conviction
invite two (2) inferences (e.g. suicide and parricide), hence, should be resolved in his favor as
they do not lead to a logical conclusion that petitioner feloniously killed his wife, but rather the
latter willfully took her own life.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide despite lack of direct evidence.
Ruling:
The Court held that, It is settled that the lack or absence of direct evidence does not
necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct
evidence. The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred
to as indirect or presumptive evidence. Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence,
the combined effect of the pieces of circumstantial evidence must inexorably lead to the
conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The series of circumstances duly
proved must be consistent with each other and must likewise be consistent with the accused's
guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the
possibility that some other person has committed the offense. Furthermore, it is the quality of the
circumstances, rather than the quantity, that will draw the line on whether the circumstances
presented, consist of an unbroken chain that will inescapably lead to the conclusion that the
accused is guilty without an iota of doubt.
In the case at bar, the records and evidences established an unbroken chain that
unquestionably lead this Court to conclude that the petitioner is responsible for the death of his
wife. Among others are these two essential records which lead the court to negate the possibility
of suicide: the autopsy record showing that the wound in the neck (because of the nylon string
used for hanging) of Genebe came about after she was already dead, and the testimony of a
witness saying that Genebe was hanged in a way her feet is touching the floor.
Hence, the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of parricide is affirmed.
Page | 19
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. RICARDO BACUS

G.R. No. 208354
August 26, 2015
Facts:
Herein appellant was charged by her daughter of two information. That sometime in
March 2004, and on December 30 2004, appellant with deliberate intent, by means of force and
intimidation, had carnal knowledge with her. Appellant was convicted of the crimes of Rape and
Acts of Lasciviousness against his own daughter, a 16-year old minor, by the Regional Trial
Court and Court of Appeals. Appellant contends that the conviction should be reversed because
the information is based on bad faith and hence pure allegations without bases.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the appellant is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes. It is a well entrenched principle that factual findings of the trial court are accorded
great evidentiary weight and utmost respect by the mere fact of the unparalleled opportunity of
observance and assessment of the demeanor of the witness firsthand to satisfactorily prove his
credibility. The RTC observed that the testimony of AAA is straightforward, graphic and
spontaneous whereas the accused-appellant simply denied the allegations against him. The act
of crying while testifying on the gruesome incident that AAA had undergone supports the fact
that crime indeed occurred. Such kind of testimony is enough to convict the accused-appellant
and supports the fact of commission of the crime. The Rules on Evidence provide that positive
testimonies prevail over mere denials and alibis.
It has become fundamental in rape cases that no woman of sound mind would be willing
to publicize her grueling experience and risk the ordeal of interrogation, were it not for the
purpose of vindicating her honor. The victim's willingness and courage to face the interrogation
and medical examination is a silent but eloquent proof of the truth. This of course, was taken
along with the testimonies of a medico-legal officer and other evidences.
Hence, the conviction is affirmed, with certain modifications as to the penalties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE

CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA AND EMERENCIANO ARCIAGA
G.R. No. 160619
September 09, 2015
Facts:
Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in
the May 1998 elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo
charging him with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 in relation to the
alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.
According to the Information, Castillo, while in the performance of his official functions
as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano
Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB). An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed
against Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the
Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and imposed the penalty of one
Page | 20
(1) month and one (1) day suspension. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
Castillo.
Issue:
Whether or not Castillo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.
Ruling:
Yes, Castillo violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, the elements of which
are as follows; The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
The Court finds that the foregoing Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements
of a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleged that Castillo
is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally gave
unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza
dumpsite, to the undue injury of the residents and students in the area who had to endure the illeffects of the dumpsite's operation.
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 need not state, to the point of
specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the
point of moral certainty, the undue injury caused. The Court has consistently and repeatedly held
in a number of cases that an Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the
offense and not the finer details of why and how the crime was committed.
As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by
Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable
laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents and students were made to endure
the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as the
specific peso amount actually received by the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation
of the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of damage caused to the residents and students) are
matters of evidence best raised during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information. For
purposes of informing the accused of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence of
unwarranted
benefits
and
undue
injury
under
the
Information
suffices.
Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one
considers the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's arraignment
and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to
require specific peso amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury to the point of moral certainty, no less at this stage of the criminal proceedings.
Page | 21
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO HIDALGO, DON JUAN HIDALGO AND

MICHAEL BOMBASI ALIAS "KABAYAN"(AT LARGE) v. ROBERTO HIDALGO
G.R. No. 203313
September 02, 2015
Facts:
AAA testified that she was hired by the spouses Roberto and Vivian Hidalgo as a house
helper and nanny of their child Joshua. She recalled that after putting Joshua to sleep at around 8
in the evening of 30 January 2000, she herself slept in sofa beds near where Joshua was
sleeping. While sleeping, she was awakened when Roberto and Bombasi tied both of her hands
at her back. She also noticed that a handkerchief was already tied in her mouth. Thereafter, both
men turned her around, touched her body and started to take her clothes off. Roberto took her
shorts and panty off and went on top of her. He then inserted his penis inside her vagina while
kissing and touching her. After satisfying his lust, he got off from AAA. Thereafter, Bombasi
took his turn and inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina while continuing to touch her body.
Finally, Don Juan went on top of AAA and kissed her shoulders and lips. Thereafter, he inserted
his penis inside AAA's vagina. During the whole time she was being raped by the three accused,
AAA pleaded for Roberto to stop what was happening but her pleas fell to deaf ears. Roberto
even shook her head from left to right while Joshua laughed at her side while she was being
touched. After satisfying their sexual desires, the three accused untied her and threatened to cut
off her tongue and kill her family in case she would tell them what happened. When they left the
house, she untied the handkerchief on her mouth and put her clothes on. After a while, Vivian
arrived. She caught AAA crying and asked her what was wrong. AAA, afraid to reveal what
happened,
just
asked
Vivian
for
permission
to
go
home.
For fear that the three accused would make true of their threats, it took AAA almost one
month to file a case and submit herself to medical examination. The accused were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it gave full faith and credence to the
private complainant's testimony.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that conspiracy was established
and found the accused-appellant liable for three (3) counts of simple rape.
Ruling:
No, the Court of Appeals did not err when it gave full faith and credence to the private
complainant's testimony. It did not also err when it ruled that conspiracy was established and
found the accused-appellant liable for three (3) counts of simple rape.
For the prosecution of rape to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the
use of force, threat or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
With all the cited circumstances, the Court is convinced that all the elements constituting
the crime of rape were sufficiently established.
The Court also finds that the prosecution was able to prove that the three accused
Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi conspired with one another to commit carnal knowledge of
AAA through the use of force and threat. Contrary to the allegation of Roberto that the narration
Page | 22
of AAA was too uniform, almost general and lacked specific details, the Court finds her
testimony sufficient in details to sustain conviction.
Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. In this case, the acts of Roberto, Don Juan
and Bombasi clearly demonstrated unity of action to have carnal knowledge of AAA: (1) Both
Roberto and Bombasi tied AAA's hands at her back, while a handkerchief was already tied in her
mouth; (2) Both men turned AAA around, touched her body and started to take her clothes off;
(3) Roberto succeeded in undressing AAA, went on top of her and placed his penis inside her
vagina; (4) After satisfying his lust, Roberto got off from AAA and Bombasi took his turn and
inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (5) After Bombasi, Don Juan went on top of AAA, kissed
her shoulders and lips and also inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (6) When they were
satiated in their sexual desires, the three accused untied the rope binding AAA and threatened to
cut off her tongue and kill her family in case she would tell them what happened. Unmistakably,
these
acts
demonstrated
a
concerted
effort
to
rape
AAA.
Since there was a conspiracy between Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi, the act of one of
them was the act of all and the three of them are equally guilty of all the crimes of rape
committed against AAA.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOCELYN POSADA Y SONTILLANO AND

FRANCISCO POSADA Y URBANO
G.R. No. 196052
September 02, 2015
Facts:
In its January 13, 2009 judgment, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found accusedappellant Jocelyn guilty of illegal possession of 2.2825 grams and accused-appellant Francisco
guilty of illegal possession of 24.2313 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as
shabu. The RTC held, among others, that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the search warrant, which led to the immediate
arrest of accused-appellants, valid and the chain of custody of the seized items preserved.
Issues:
Whether or not the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were established.
Whether or not the search warrant is valid.
Whether or not the chain of custody is preserved.
Ruling:
Yes, the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were established. For the
successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements
must be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a
prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely
and
consciously
possesses
the
said
drug.
The prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the required elements for
violation
of
Section
11,
Article
II
of
Republic
Act
No.
9165.
The presented evidence showed that early in the morning of April 8, 2006, police officers
went to the house of the accused-appellants in Virac, Catanduanes, to implement a search
warrant. After the search warrant was read, accused-appellant Francisco argued with the police
Page | 23
officers though later insisted that he be allowed to have breakfast before anything else. While
PO1 Jigger Tacorda (PO1 Tacorda) and Kagawad Eva Sarmiento (Kag. Sarmiento) were
escorting him to the nearby eatery, they saw him throw something on the pavement. PO1 Tacorda
immediately accosted and reprimanded accused-appellant Francisco while Kag. Sarmiento
picked up the plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance. A total of thirty-seven (37)
sachets were recovered from the pavement which were photographed by PO3 Raul Santos (PO3
Santos), and then were turned over to the crime laboratory for inventory, documentation, and
examination. The results of the examination of the contents of the thirty-seven (37) plastic
sachets done in the crime laboratory showed that these contained shabu.
Thereafter, Kag. Arcilla and accused-appellant Jocelyn accompanied P/Supt. Samuel
Villamer, PO1 Julius Jacinto (PO1 Jacinto), PO1 Arlan Sevilla (PO1 Sevilla), and PO1 Tacorda
to the place designated in the search warrant. While searching the kitchen, PO1 Jacinto came
upon a plastic bag of charcoal near the stove. He examined its contents and found a matchbox
hidden between the pieces of charcoal. Inside the matchbox were five (5) heat-sealed plastic
transparent sachets containing a white crystalline substance. PO3 Santos photographed the
plastic sachets and then turned these over for inventory and documentation. Upon examination of
the contents of the five (5) plastic sachets in the crime laboratory, the forensic chemist found that
they likewise contained shabu. When accused-appellant Jocelyn was asked during trial about the
picture showing the location of the charcoal stove, she categorically declared that it was
"charcoal and the place where I place the charcoal." Thus, the RTC correctly appreciated the
admission that she had control over this item.
From these established facts, it is clear that accused-appellants knowingly possessed
shabu a prohibited drug without legal authority to do so in violation of Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Court also finds that the chain of custody over the forty-two (42) plastic sachets of
shabu was not broken. Based on the records, PO1 Jacinto narrated how he found the five (5)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets and how he turned over said items to PO1 Sevilla after
they were photographed by PO3 Santos. Kag. Arcilla, who was present during the search,
corroborated his testimony. The RTC found that PO1 Jacinto properly placed all five (5) plastic
sachets in a transparent plastic bag which was sealed with masking tape and duly signed by him.
As for the thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets, PO1 Sevilla testified that Kag. Sarmiento saw
Francisco throw the plastic sachets on the pavement; and that Kag. Sarmiento and he picked up
said plastic sachets. The RTC found that all thirty-seven (37) plastic sachets were placed in a
transparent plastic bag which was sealed with masking tape duly signed by Kag. Sarmiento.
Finally, PSI Josephine Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen) narrated that the fortytwo (42) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances were turned over to
the crime laboratory for qualitative examination; that said confiscated items were thereafter
found positive for shabu, and were identified by PSI clemen herself before the RTC.
It is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of Section 21, Article II of RA
Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated
inadmissible. What is important is that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are preserved. The succession of events in this case show that the items seized were the same
items tested and subsequently identified and testified to in court. We thus hold that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants were duly proven not to
have been compromised.
The search warrant was valid. With regard to the designation of the place to be searched,
the RTC sufficiently justified that the search warrant particularly described the place to be
searched: a sketch showing the location of the house to be searched was attached to the
application and the search warrant pointed to only one house in the area.
Page | 24
A long-standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the

officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the
locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Taking from American Jurisprudence,
[t]he determining factor as to whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity is not whether the description is sufficient to enable the officer to
locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RANDY BAEZ Y BAYLON AND RAMIL

BAEZ Y BAYLON, AND FELIX RUFINO (AT LARGE)
G.R. No. 198057
September 21, 2015
Facts:
On October 8, 1999, at 5:00 a.m., Dominador Marcelino was plowing outside his house
in Sitio Ebenizer, Barangay Rang-ay, Banga, South Cotabato, when he heard Sevino Baylon
shouting, "I have no fault!" He then saw Rufino striking Baylon with an iron bar while brothers
Randy and Ramil Baez were holding each of the latter's arms behind his back. The accusedappellants thereafter dragged Baylon to Ramil's house, which was merely thirty (30) meters
away. Later that day, at around 5:00 p.m., Marcelino was asked to go to the house
of Kagawad Dory Marquez regarding the incident he witnessed earlier.
The next day or on October 9, 1999, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Kagawad Marao Olarte
went to Marcelino's house and invited him to search for Baylon, who had been reported missing.
Accompanied by the authorities, they immediately proceeded to search Ramil's house and the
area surrounding it. In the course of their search, they suddenly smelled a foul odor coming from
a pile of banana leaves, thirty (30) meters away from Ramil's house. Upon removing the leaves,
they found the missing body of Baylon lying face down, bearing several stab and hack wounds,
with both arms tied behind his back, and with a slit throat.
Dr. Ellen D. Quidilla, the medico-legal expert who conducted a postmortem examination
on the cadaver of the victim, found that the cause of his death was massive blood loss secondary
to multiple stab wounds.
For its part, the defense presented Marcelino's Affidavit of Retraction. He stated therein
that he was merely forced to testify against the accused due to threats he had received from
Baylon's family. The truth was, according to him, at the time of the incident, he was tending his
carabao far away from the scene of the crime. Likewise, Randy and Ramil Baez both testified
that they were somewhere else at the time of the commission of the crime. Randy claimed that he
was deeply saddened when he saw his house gutted by fire, but he left after two (2) hours
because he had to go with his wife to their house at Barrio 7, which is about two (2) kilometers
from the crime scene.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellants attack Marcelino's credibility, harping on the fact that the latter did not even
move, help, or run away from the crime scene, but simply chose to stay and continue plowing.
Page | 25
Marcelino's reaction, however, was not at all uncommon or unnatural so as to make his testimony
incredible. Placed in the same or a similar situation, some may choose to intervene, but others,
like Marcelino, would just opt to stay away and remain hidden. It is settled that there could be no
hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or behavior when confronted with a
startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this case. Witnesses of startling occurrences
react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form
of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable,
and people react differently to shocking stimulus some may shout, some may faint, and others
may be plunged into insensibility.
Further, the fact that Marcelino executed an Affidavit of Retraction should be given little
weight or scant consideration. As the trial court aptly observed, in his original testimony,
Marcelino described in full and vivid details what he saw and heard in the early morning of
October 8, 1999. Such a detailed testimony could not have been the subject of fabrication,
especially since the same survived the rigors of cross-examination. Besides, a mere retraction by
a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony, if credible. In cases
where a previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is
made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison,
coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly. And before this can be done, both the
previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or
motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. The unreliable character of the affidavit of
retraction executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that
after going through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by
the law enforcers, executing an affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against
the accused, said witness would later on declare that all the foregoing was actually a farce and
the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of retraction. The Court looks with disfavor
upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. The rationale for this is simple:
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a
monetary consideration. There is always the probability that, later on, it will be repudiated. It is
only when there exist special circumstances in a given case, which, when coupled with the
recantation, raise doubts as to the truth of the previous testimony given, can retractions be
considered and upheld. No such special circumstances are extant in the case at bar.
Also, the lower courts' resort to circumstantial evidence was perfectly in order. The lack
or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused can no
longer be proved by any other evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if
sufficient, can replace direct evidence. Said reliance on circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which, to warrant the conviction of an accused,
requires that: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the
crime. Here, there exist sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to the Baez brothers as
among the ones responsible for Baylon's death. The prosecution was able to establish that: (1) the
house of accused-appellant Randy Baez was burned just a few hours before the incident; (2)
Baylon shouted, "I have no fault!" when Rufino hit him with an iron bar, while the Baezes held
his arms; (3) the accused thereafter brought Baylon to the house of Ramil Baez; and (4)
Baylon's lifeless body was discovered the following morning near Ramil's house. Moreover,
accused-appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. There was likewise
motive on the part of the Baez brothers to hurt Baylon, since they had suspected him to have
Page | 26
been the one responsible for the burning of Randy's house. The totality of the aforementioned
facts point to them, to the exclusion of others, as the perpetrators of the crime.
PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE

B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182210
October 05, 2015
Facts:
In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Carmencita C.
Bumanglag (Bumanglag) in the amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on
November 30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a promissory note Bernardo and her husband
had executed, whereby the couple solidarity bound themselves to pay the loan with
corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon default. As additional security, Bernardo
gave Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title. Prior to the loan's
maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another
transaction. In place of the title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag five Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC) checks. Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they
were dishonored; the reason given was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a
notice informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went unheeded, prompting
Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint against Bernardo. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P. 22. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment
and in lieu thereof, imposed a fine. The CA also retained the civil indemnity that the lower court
imposed.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Bernardos criminal and civil liabilities because
the prosecution failed to prove her knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Court, it is entirely possible for
one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and to still be
liable civilly based on contract or by laws other than the criminal law. Such civil actions may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal
action, subject however, to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission.
The Court also held that Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action to
purely an enforcement of the civil liability incurred. In particular, the focal issue in the present
petition is no longer Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 but her civil liability,
which is principally based on contract and the corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered due to
Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense (that the checks
were presented beyond the 90-day period and that she never received a notice of dishonor) were
no longer relevant.
Page | 27
MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 206513
October 20, 2015
Facts:
After trial at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the petitioner Mustapha was convicted for
violation of Section 5 Paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. He was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. In addition, he was directed to pay a fine of P20,000.00, civil indemnity of
P25,000.00, and moral damages of P25,000.00.
Mustapha appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that even assuming he committed the
acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the same were done without the victims
consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her. The OSG, relying heavily on
People v. Abello, argued that Mustapha should only be convicted for Acts of Lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code in the absence of force or coercion because the victim
was asleep at the time the alleged acts were committed.
The Court of Appeals (CA) adopted the recommendation of the OSG, hence it modified
the penalty imposed on Mustapha, finding him guilty instead of Acts of Lasciviousness and
sentencing him to the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as maximum.
When Mustapha received a copy of the decision, instead of further appealing the case, he
filed before the CA a manifestation with motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand
of the case to the RTC, invoking the case of Colminares vs People which allowed petitioner
therein to apply for probation after his sentence was later reduced on appeal by the Supreme
Court.
The CA, however, denied the motion. It held that Colminares is not applicable to
Mustaphas case since in that case, the petitioner raised the sole issue of the correctness of the
penalty imposed. Instead, the CA viewed the appropriate case applicable as Lagrosa vs. People,
wherein the application for probation was denied because petitioners therein put in issue on
appeal the merits of their conviction and did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties
imposed. Mustapha moved to reconsider, but the CA denied, hence he sought recourse with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Mustapha may apply for probation.
Ruling:
No. Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation
Law o 1976, as amended by PD No. 1990 provides:
Grant of Probation.- Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation
for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best;
Provided, that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Page | 28
In the case at bar, Mustapha appealed to the CA arguing it was error on the part of the
RTC to have found him guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He argued
that the RTC should not have given much faith and credence to the testimony of the victim
because it was tainted with inconsistencies. Moreover, he went on to assert that even assuming
he committed the acts imputed on him, still there was no evidence showing that the lascivious
acts were committed without consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence because
the victim at that time was in deep slumber. It is apparent that petitioner anchored his appeal on a
claim of innocence and/or lack of sufficient evidence to support his conviction of the offense
charged, which is clearly inconsistent with the tenor of the Probation Law that only qualified
penitent offender are allowed to apply for probation. This clearly shows that Mustapha has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction and not on the sole issue of the correctness
of the penalty imposed as invoked in the case of Colminares vs People.
Therefore, the CA did not err in applying the similar case of Lagrosa v. People wherein
the protestations of petitioners therein did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties
imposed but meant a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON

G.R. No. 214506
October 19, 2015
Facts:
Parba and a John Doe were charged with the crime of Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in an Information dated March
14, 1997.
The prosecution alleged that at around 6:55 in the morning of January 6, 1997, Jesus
Catapan (Catapan), a security guard of the Salazar Institute of Technology (SIT) in Natalio
Bacalso Avenue, Labangon, Cebu City, was buying cigarettes from a vendor stationed near the
main gate of SIT Elementary Department. Suddenly, Parba, who was then seated beside the
vendor, stood up, pulled a gun from his belt bag, and shot a man at the back of the head while the
latter was helping his daughter disembark from a motorcycle. At that instance, the victim, later
on identified as Mark P. Navaja (Navaja), fell to the ground, while Parba and a companion exited
towards the highway, chased by Nestor Buenavista (Buenavista) and Fernando Cuizon (Cuizon),
fellow security guards of Catapan. As they were running, Parba pointed a gun at Buenavista and
Cuizon, prompting the two to seek cover. Parba then boarded a jeepney while Buenavista and
Cuizon followed via a separate jeepney and continued their pursuit. Eventually, Parba
disembarked at Tabada Street and the two security guards lost sight of him.
Upon arraignment, Parba pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In his defense, Parba denied committing the crime and interposed alibi, denial, and set-up
as defenses. He averred that on the date of the incident, he was sleeping in his house until 10
o'clock in the morning as he came from a drinking spree with his brother the night before. Later
in the afternoon, Jose Leeway Rivera (Rivera), a police officer, arrived and allowed Parba to test
a gun which the former promised to give him. After firing the gun, Rivera invited Parba to the
police headquarters where he learned for the first time that he was suspected of killing Navaja.
Parba admitted that he knew Navaja since they were neighbors and had been friends since
childhood, claiming that the latter was known as a tough guy who had many enemies because of
his attitude. However, Parba maintained that he held no personal grudge against Navaja.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Parba as charged, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
Page | 29
Navaja P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as

exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Parba's conviction but modified the
award of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Parba's conviction for Murder.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was able to establish the following
elements beyond reasonable doubt with the existence of treachery characterized by a sudden
attack of Parba on Navaja which caught the latter off-guard, the elements are: that a person was
killed; the accused killed him or her; the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and the killing does not constitute Parricide
or Infanticide.
NICANOR PINLAC Y RESOLME v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 197458
November 11, 2015
Facts:
On March 9, 1997, "AAA," a 14-year old boy, went with petitioner to the Kale Beach
Resort in Subic, Olongapo City for initiation rites in a fraternity founded by the latter. After
succumbing to petitioner's "persuasion" to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana, "AAA" lost
control of himself ("nawala ako sa sarili"). While in a daze, stupor, or near total unconsciousness,
petitioner isolated "AAA" from his companions and other fraternity recruits, forcibly disrobed
"AAA", and performed oral sex on him by sucking his penis until he ejaculated. The following
day or on March 10, 1997, petitioner again performed oral sex on "AAA" after convincing him
anew to ingest alcohol and to smoke marijuana.
Petitioner denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a candidate for
barangay kagawad at the time and that he was too pre-occupied then campaigning for that post,
so that he could find no time at all for some other activities, including the commission of the
alleged acts of lasciviousness imputed to him. He insisted that this case was instigated by
"BBB," "AAA's" mother, who was also running for the position of barangay kagawad.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of AAA which was further affirmed by
the Court of Appeals (CA).
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the trial court
which were affirmed by the CA. The CA Decision squares with the evidence and with the law as
well as with the jurisprudential doctrines laid down by the Court. Both the RTC of Olongapo
City, Branch 72 and the CA reached the correct conclusion that petitioner was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Section 5(b), RA 7610. The Court further contended,
as did the RTC and the CA, that the State had satisfactorily established the following elements
constitutive of the offense charged: "(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
Page | 30
lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age."
In this case "AAA" was 14 years and eight months old when he was subjected to sexual
abuse by the herein petitioner on March 9 and 10, 1997. This Court thus finds no reversible error
in the assailed Decision. Wherefore, the petitioners appeal was denied.
FRANCISCO T. INOCENCIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205760
November 09, 2015
Facts:
Petioner Francisco T. Inocencio, was an employee of Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) from April 1978 to August 1998. Petitioner's last position therein was manager of the
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Services Department Cash Management Division wherein he
had control, possession, and custody of bank money amounting up to One Hundred Million
Pesos. As an FEBTC employee, petitioner had an FEBTC payroll/ATM account.
Sometime in 1998, Liza Sarao (Sarao), an audit officer at FEBTC's Boni Avenue
[Mandaluyong City] branch, conducted a special audit on said branch to investigate reported
anomalous transactions performed by petitioner and the branch trade officer, Ma. Milagros T.
Clemente (Clemente).
Sarao alleged, inter alia, that: (1) on February 9, 1994, Clemente fraudulently credited the
amount of One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and
Seventy-Four Centavos (Php 1,150,634.74) to FEBTC Account No. 515-12910-8, belonging to
her relative, Theresa Clemente; (2) One Million Two Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Seventy-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (Php 1,262,774.50) was fraudulently
transferred to petitioner's FEBTC Account No. 5115-12827-6 in three (3) transactions: (a) Five
Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-Four Pesos and Fifty-Two Centavos (Php
562,774.52); (b) Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 400,000.00); and (c) Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php 300,000.00); and (3) Petitioner later withdrew the whole amount, as
evidenced by the deposit and withdrawal slips stored in FEBTC's Central Operations
Department.
On March 25, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the petitioner of two
counts of theft as charged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. MC 99-1456 and MC 991457 which was modified by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed serious and reversible error: (1) in deciding contrary to
the doctrines that (a) venue in criminal case is jurisdictional, and (b) criminal liability, absent any
conspiracy, is purely personal; and (2) in holding that the circumstances surrounding the instant
case should rule out his innocence.
Ruling:
The instant petition has no merit.
The Court need not delve on the jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner as the
arguments are trifling and the CA had already amply disposed of the same.
Page | 31
In the instant case, conspiracy is alleged only as a mode of committing the crime. The
Court finds that the Information filed against the petitioner adequately complied with the
requirements as set forth in Lazarte. The Information charges that the petitioner, with Clemente,
took FEBTCs money through fraudulent transfers to and withdrawal from the former's Account
Number 5115-12827-6. Although the words "conspire" and "confederated" do not appear in the
indictment, there is a clear allegation that the petitioner and Clemente were united in their
purpose of fraudulently taking FEBTC's money. The Information, thus, enables the petitioner to
amply prepare for his defense.
In Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the CA, the Court declared that "an information
alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot
pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information." Ideally, Clemente
and the petitioner should have been indicted together. However, the non-inclusion of Clemente
does not invalidate the Information filed against the petitioner especially since conspiracy is not
charged as a crime, but is merely alleged to show how criminal liability was incurred.
In addition to the circumstances which the CA had already considered in the
prosecution's favor, the Court finds the following as determinative of the petitioner's guilt as
well.
First, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that the
ordinary course of business has been followed. The petitioner in this case was a bank officer. He
can be reasonably charged with knowledge of banking procedures and the liabilities which mayattach to him by reason of maintaining current accounts. It perplexes the Court why he delivered
blank checks to Clemente and subsequently not even bothered to inquire about the status of the
said checks and his current account against which the checks may be drawn. The Court further
finds no credence in his claim that he received no statements or notices relative to his current
account in FEBTC's Boni Avenue branch. Bartolome testified that checks are microfilmed, and
thereafter, the originals are returned to the account holder. He also stated that bank statements are
sent to the account holders on or before every 15th day of the month. The petitioner ascribed no
ill motive against Bartolome and the former had not offered any evidence to show why FEBTC
would have treated his accounts as exceptions by not sending back to him the original check
which was cleared and the bank statements indicating any transactions relative to his accounts. It
bears stressing that the petitioner's employment was only severed in 1998 while the anomalous
transfers and withdrawal occurred in 1994. The petitioner had four years, more or less, to inquire
from FEBTC itself or from Clemente the details about the transfers and withdrawal. During the
trial, he pleaded lack of knowledge about the transactions. This does not inspire belief.
The Court, however, notes that while the fraudulent transaction which is the subject of
the instant petition occurred on February 9, 1994, the petitioner also testified that in September
of 1996, his payroll account was credited with P38,000.00 and P15,000.00. He withdrew the
amounts as they belonged to him as profits from their piggery business. While claiming that the
piggery business lasted only for three months, the petitioner at the same time alleged that after
more than two years, he still received profits from the said business. The inconsistencies fail to
lend credit to the petitioner's assertions.
The Supreme Court held that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by
the CA.
Page | 32
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAMUEL A. MAGNO

GR. No. 206972
December 2, 2015
Facts:
On 20 February 2000, BBB left her 5-month old baby, AAA to the care of her eldest
daughter CCC while she went to her mothers house to boil water. When BBB came back, AAA
has gone missing. A neighbor informed them that he saw an ice cream vendor carrying a baby
around the time when AAA went missing.
The incident was reported to the police. Meanwhile, a cargo truck driver narrated that
while on his way home, he saw a man abusing a baby on a bench in Plaza Libertad, Tacloban
City. He noticed that the babys private parts were bloodied. He beckoned four bystanders but
when they returned to the plaza, the man had already fled and left the baby lying on the bench.
The police proceeded to Plaza Libertad and found AAA thereat. Police Officer 2 Raul De
Lima (PO2 Delima) informed BBB of a possible sighting of AAA in the plaza. He then
accompanied BBB to the plaza. BBB confirmed that the baby lying on the bench is AAA.
Acting on a tip, the police proceeded to Barangay 37 in Seawall Area to apprehend
accused-appellant. The cargo truck driver positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant.
The accused-appellant denied raping AAA and claimed that he only came to know the
charges against him during arraignment.
On 3 September 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of the
crime charged.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of the
cargo truck driver who positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision with modification as to
the amount of civil liability and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape.
Ruling:
The evidence of the prosecution overwhelmingly establishes accused-appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
The testimony of the eyewitness, which was given full faith and credit by the lower
courts, clearly points to accused-appellant as the perpetrator.
The elements of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal;
and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer.
The prosecution has satisfied the constitutionally required proof that the accusedappellant is a private individual; that accused-appellant took AAA, a baby, without the
knowledge or consent of her parents; and that AAA was only five-months old at the time of the
kidnapping.
Page | 33
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the
latters liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof.
And in this case, the actual taking of the baby without the consent of her parents is clear
proof of appellants intent
to deprive AAA of her liberty.
Aside from the testimony of the eyewitness, rape was also proven by the medical findings
on AAA. As attested to by her physician,the Medico-Legal Report confirmed that AAA suffered
injuries in her vagina.
It has been established that appellant committed kidnapping and on the occasion thereof,
he raped AAA. He is thus found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346
entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of
death is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MIRAFLOR UGANIEL-LERIO

G.R.NO. 209039
December 9, 2015
Facts:
Miraflor Lerio, together with co-accused Relly Ronquillo Arellano (Arellano), were
charged with the crime of Kidnapping of Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
Accordingly, on 10 September 2005, around 5:30 in the morning, Anniban was in her kitchen
preparing milk for her infant child, Justin Clyde, when accused- appellant entered the house.
Accused-appellant then told her that she would take the infant outside to bask him under
the morning sun. Anniban refused this as the child had not yet been bathed. A few minutes later,
Anniban realized that accused appellant and her child were no longer in the house. A tenant of
Annibans informed her that she had seen accused-appellant quietly slip out of the house.
Anniban sought the help of her neighbor Virginia Baldoza (Baldoza) who had known
accused-appellant. Baldoza and her daughter thereafter accompanied Anniban to the South Bus
Terminal as they were informed that accused-appellant is heading to Toledo City. Thereat, a
dispatcher informed them that accused-appellant had been fetched by a tattoed man on board a
taxicab and that both headed for the pier to get on the M/V Asia Philippines.
Around three oclock in the afternoon, Anniban reported the incident to the Maritime
Police and requested assistance. Inside the ship, Anniban saw Arellano rocking her child in a
cradle. Certain that it was Justin Clyde, she took the child and told Arellano that the child is hers.
Both grappled for the baby.
The RTC found Miraflor Lerio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping of Minor.
Accused-appellant and Arellano were arrested on 10 September 2005.
On 19 September 2005, private complainant Aileen Anniban (Anniban) filed an Affidavit
of Desistance in favor of Arellano declaring her belief that the latter was innocent of the crime
charged. The police officers, however, insisted on impleading Arellano in the Information. Upon
reinvestigation, as ordered by the trial court, Public Prosecutor Atty. Ma. Luisa RatillaBuenaventura recommended the dismissal of the case against Arellano.
Page | 34
On 09 August 2011, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

kidnapping of a minor. The RTC ruled that accused-appellant's act of taking of the one-month old
infant, without the knowledge or consent of his mother, constituted the crime. It rejected
accused-appellant's denial and gave credence to the testimonies for the prosecution.
On 20 June 2013, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC but with modification on the
amount of exemplary damages. Accused-appellant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court
alleging that there had been no actual confinement or restraint imposed by her on the one-month
old baby and that there had been no intention on her part to deprive him of liberty.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping.
Ruling:
The Court finds no reason to reverse the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA. The prosecution has established the elements of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or
a public officer.
The prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proven that accused-appellant is a
private individual; that accused-appellant took one-month old baby Justin Clyde from his
residence, without the knowledge or consent of, and against the will of his mother; and that the
victim was a minor, one-month old at the time of the incident, the fact of which accusedappellant herself admitted.
To reiterate the time-honored maxim, unless there is a showing that the trial court had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight that would have
affected the result of the case, the Court will not disturb factual findings of the lower court.
Having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of witnesses while
testifying, the trial court more than this Court is in a better position to gauge their credibility and
properly appreciate the relative weight of the conflicting evidence for both parties. When the
issue is one of credibility, the trial court's findings are given great weight on appeal.
In addition, accused-appellant's defense of denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated, is impotent. It constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO PATEO DAYAPDAPAN

G.R. No. 209040
December 9, 2015
Facts:
On 25 March 2002 at around 10:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was awakened by
accused-appellant who removed her short pants and underwear. Accused-appellant likewise
took off his clothes. He threatened AAA with a scythe and ordered her to stay quiet. He then
mounted her and made pumping motions. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left without
saying a word. He proceeded to perform this bestial act on AAA for four (4) succeeding nights.
Page | 35
When AAA could no longer bear it, she left the house and stayed in the house of her
teacher from 30 March to 1 April 2002 where she intimated to the latter her harrowing
experience in the hands of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant admitted during the pre-trial conference that AAA was his daughter.
Thus, relationship between accused-appellant and AAA is established.
On 27 April 2007, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five
(5) counts of rape.
On 23 May 2013, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with modification as to damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for the crime of rape.
Ruling:
The appeal is without merit.
Accused-appellant insists that AAA's claim of sequent rape identically done is highly
improbable
and
contrary
to
human
experience.
In People v. Solomon, the Court held that the victim's uniform testimony regarding the
manner by which she was raped does not diminish her credibility. The Court explained, thus:
Men are creatures of habit and are bound to adopt a course of
action that has proven to be successful. As appellant was able to
fulfill his lustful designs upon complainant the first time, it comes
as no surprise that he would repeat the horrific acts when the
circumstances obtaining in the first rape again presented
themselves.
As in the aforestated case, AAA did not immediately report the incident to her teacher
and instead, she suffered for four more similar incidents before she broke her silence.
There is a plausible explanation for the conduct of the victim. The Court explained in
Solomon, viz.:
Complainant's youth partly accounts for her failure to escape
appellant's lust. A young girl like complainant cannot be expected
to have the intelligence to defy what she may have perceived as the
substitute parental authority that appellant wielded over her. That
complainant had to bear more sexual assaults from appellant
before she mustered enough courage to escape his bestiality does
not imply that she willingly submitted to his desires. Neither was
she expected to follow the ordinary course that other women in the
same situation would have taken. There is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. Verily,
under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to follow a
predictable path.Ch
Page | 36
AAA was only able to report the incident when she was away from the custody of
accused-appellant
and
when
she
felt
safe.
AAA's credibility was upheld by the trial court, which is in a position to observe the
candor, behavior and demeanor of the witness. Findings of the lower courts with respect to
credibility
of
the
rape
victim
are
conclusive.
The Court also cannot give credence to accused-appellant's claim that AAA was taking
revenge when she filed the rape charges against accused-appellant for allegedly castigating her.
No woman in her right mind, especially a young girl, would fabricate charges of this nature and
severity.
The RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the twin qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship. Accused-appellant admitted during the pre-trial conference that AAA was his
daughter. Thus, relationship between accused-appellant and AAA is established.
Anent the element of minority, the prosecution presented a certification from the UCCP
Office in Ayungon, Negros Occidental stating that AAA was baptized according to the rites and
ceremonies of the UCCP. The certification shows that AAA was born on 10 September 1987 to
accused-appellant and a certain Nely Fabel. A page of the UCCP Membership Book was
submitted bearing the same information. It was held that a birth certificate, baptismal certificate,
school records or documents of similar nature can be presented to prove the age of a victim. In
this case, the Membership Book, which is considered an entry in official records under Section
44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is admissible as prima facie of their contents and
corroborative of AAA's testimony as to her age. Moreover, entries in public or official books or
records may be proved by the production of the books or records themselves or by a copy
certified
by
the
legal
keeper
thereof.
Considering that accused-appellant committed rape qualified by the twin circumstances
of minority and relationship, the proper penalty to be imposed is death. Since the imposition of
the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, the lower courts properly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape.
ADINA B. MANANSALA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 215424
December 9, 2015
Facts:
On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy, Vice President for Finance of
UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation (UMC), instructed her secretary, Marissa Bautista, to
withdraw via Automated Teller Machine (ATM) the amount of P38,000.00 from her
Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista was not able
to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself to get such amount
from the petty cash custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy where she got the
money. On June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao informed Siy that
as per the Petty Cash Replenishment Report (subject report) of the same date prepared by
UMC Petty Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of
P38,000.00 which remained unliquidated. It was only then that Siy found out what Bautista
had done, and she immediately rectified the situation by issuing two (2) checks to
reimburse UMCs petty cash account. As the checks were eventually encashed resulting in
the replenishment of UMCs petty cash account, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise
Page | 37
the subject report by deleting the entry relating to Siys alleged cash advance, to which
Manansala acceded. On June 11, 1999, Lacanilao reported the incident to UMC President
Conrado G. Marty.
Sometime in March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report,
re-insert the entry relating to Siys alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch
paper, and repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject
document, Siy was administratively charged for using office funds for personal use. On April
18, 2000, Siy was terminated from her job and Lacanilao succeeded the former in the
position she left vacant.
In a Decision dated October 27, 2010, the MeTC both found Lacanilao and Manansala
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents.
Aggrieved, Manansala appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 142 (RTC). Records are, however, bereft of any showing that Lacanilao made any similar
appeal, thus, her conviction had lapsed into finality.
In a Decision dated October 20, 2011, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto. It held
that Manansala clearly falsified the subject report by inserting a statement therein which she
knew from the start to be untruthful - that Siy made a cash advance for her personal needs resulting in prejudice on the part of Siy.
In a Decision dated April 16, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA agreed with
the MeTC and RTC's findings that Manansala made untruthful statements in the subject report
which was contrary to her duty as UMC Petty Cash Custodian and that such findings were
utilized to the detriment of Siy who was terminated on the basis of said falsified report.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of appeals correctly affirmed Manansalas conviction for
Falsification of Private Documents.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC
are: (a) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171
(7) of the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c)
that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed
with intent to cause such damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article
171 (4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
Page | 38
narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian,
she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents she prepares in
connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made
any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite such
knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein a statement that
Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was
terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared. Basic is the rule that
findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the
results of the case or any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by
the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.
While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for
the MeTC to appreciate the "mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of
uncontrollable fear and for the RTC and the CA to affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling without
correcting the latter court's mistake.
To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the
mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance
provided under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be
appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is
greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough.
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in
committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions
of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that
matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence
of any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala
to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.
Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify Manansala's
criminal liability in this case - and also taking into consideration the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law - she must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FERNANDO RANCHE ABANA
G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016
v. FERNANDO
RANCHE
HAVANA A.K.A.
Facts:
The appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Page | 39
On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police
Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and reported to the duty officer SPO1 Vicente R.
Espenido, Jr. that the appellant was actively engaged in the illegal drug trade at SitioMangga,
Punta Princesa, Cebu City.
SPO1 Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team leader, the
civilian asset and with PO2 Enriquez, SPO1 Canete, and SPO1 Jasper C. Nuez as back-up. The
police team designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided him with
a PI00.00 marked money bill, with its serial number (SN003332) noted in the police blotter, to be
used for the purpose of buying shabu from appellant. The buy-bust operation was allegedly
coordinated with the Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). When the
police team reached the target area, the "civilian informant" went to the house of appellant and
called the latter. Hidden from view, some 15 meters away from the house, the back-up
operatives, PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Canete, saw the civilian informant talking with the
appellant. Not long after, they saw the "civilian informant" handling over the marked PI00.00 bill
to the appellant, who in exchange gave to the former a plastic pack containing 0.03 gram white
crystalline substance which these two suspected as shabu. The "civilian informant" then placed a
face towel on his left shoulder to signal that the sale had been consummated. SPO1 Espenido and
his two companions rushed towards the "civilian informant" and the appellant and arrested the
latter after apprising him of his constitutional rights. SPO1 Espenido recovered the P100.00
marked money from the appellant while the plastic pack was given by the "civilian informant" to
SPO1 Espenido.
The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. The P100.00 marked
money and the plastic pack containing the suspected shabu were turned over to SPO2 Nuez
who marked the plastic pack with "FA" the initials of herein appellant. He then prepared a letter
requesting for examination of the item seized from the appellant addressed to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. PCI Salinas, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Brgy. Apas, Cebu
City, testified that he conducted a laboratory examination of the recovered specimen that yielded
"positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.''
The appellant denied that he was a shabu-seller; he also denied that he was arrested in a
buy-bust operation. He claimed that on that evening of November 4, 2005 he was eating bread
when SPO2 Nuez barged inside his house, handcuffed him and brought him to the police
precinct. He claimed that he was mistaken for his neighbor "Narding" the real shabu-seller. His
daughter, Maria Theresa, corroborated him.
Issue:
Whether or not adherence to the chain of custody rule has been established.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the negative. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was reversed and set aside. Appellant Fernando Ranche Havana a.k.a. Fernando Ranche Abana
was acquitted of the charge, his guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides:
"In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence." The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the fact of
its delivery and/or sale are both vital and essential to a judgment of conviction in a criminal case.
And more than just the fact of sale, "[o]f prime importance therefore x xx is that the identity of
the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be
Page | 40
established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity
of
the
evidence
are
removed."
The prosecution failed to establish convincingly the chain of custody of the alleged
seized plastic pack subject matter hereof. In fact only PO2 Enriquez and SPOl Canete testified in
respect to the identity of the alleged evidence. However, from their testimonies, the prosecution
was not able to account for the linkages in the chain while the plastic pack was not or no longer
in their respective possession.
While both witnesses testified that after the sale and apprehension of the appellant, the
poseur-buyer turned over the subject pack of shabu to their team leader SPOl Espenido, there is
no record as to what happened after the turn-over. SPOl Espenido to whom the specimen was
allegedly surrendered by the poseur-buyer was not presented in court to identify the person to
whom it was given thereafter and the condition thereof while it was in his possession and
control. The prosecution's cause is also marred by confusion and uncertainty regarding the
possessor of the pack of shabu when it was brought to the police station. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to show how, when and from whom SPO2 Nuez or SPOl Canete received the
evidence. There was no evidence on how they came into possession of the pack of shabu. Again,
this is a clear missing link in the chain of custody of the specimen after it left the hands of SPOl
Espenido.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL

G.R. No. 210454
January 13, 2016
Facts:
Acting on a tip from an informant that a certain Edong was selling shabu in Barangay San
Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna, the Chief of Police of San Pedro Police Station, Police
Superintendent Sergio Dimandal formed a team to conduct surveillance on appellant. Upon
receiving a positive result, Senior Police Officer 4 Melchor Dela Pea (SPO4 Dela Pea)
prepared a pre-operation report which was sent to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA).
SPO4 Dela Pea then formed a buy-bust team. PO1 Signap, acting as the poseur-buyer,
was introduced to appellant by the informant as the buyer of shabu. He handed the marked
money, consisting of three (3) P100.00 bills, to appellant, who took a plastic sachet from his left
pocket and gave it to him. PO1 Signap made the prearranged signal of calling SPO4 Dela Pea.
The backup team rushed towards appellants house and arrested him.
Appellant, for his part, denied the charges of possession of shabu and its paraphernalia
and sale of shabu. Appellant testified that he was urinating at the back of his house on 21 July
2005 at around 12:00 pm when five (5) police officers barged into his house. Appellant claimed
that the police only planted evidence against him because they were not able to pin him down in
a robbery case.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
Page | 41
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale
of shabu, the following elements must be proven:
-the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
-the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore
On the other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must concur:
-the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug;
-such possession is not authorized by law; and
-the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO1 Signap,
the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person who sold him the white crystalline
substance in one plastic sachet and handed the marked money as payment in exchange of the
contraband.
All the elements in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia were likewise established. Found in appellants pocket after he was caught in
flagrante were two (2) more plastic sachets containing shabu, an improvised glass tooter
containing shabu residue and the rolled aluminum foil with shabu residue.
The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense. All told, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant sold
and possessed shabu and shabu paraphernalia.
HOWARD LESCANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 214490
January 13, 2016
Facts:
Howard Lescarno alias Tisoy was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2002. Howard Lescano was caught of selling 1
sachet and 4 grams of marijuana through a buy bust operation. The Regional Trial Court found
Lescano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Lescano appealed the decision contending that his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt since the requisites of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
was not complied with.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been a compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of RA No.
9165 so as to warrant petitioners conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
SEC. 21 of RA NO. 9165 provides for the Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
Page | 42
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance
of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
(2)
Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3)
A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s:
Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the
time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein
the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said
examination and certification.
Compliance with Section 21s requirements is critical. Noncompliance is tantamount to
failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, noncompliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.
In People v. Nandi, the Court explained that four (4) links should be established in the
chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
It is glaring that despite the prosecutions allegations that a buy-bust operation was
carefully planned and carried out, it admitted that Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act was not faithfully complied with. While an inventory was supposed to
have been conducted, this was done neither in the presence of petitioner, the person from whom
the drugs were supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his counsel or representative. Likewise,
not one of the persons required to be present (an elected public official, and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media) was shown to have been around during the
inventory and photographing.
Page | 43
Left with no other assurance of the integrity of the seized item other than the self-serving
claims of the prosecution and of its witnesses, these claims cannot sustain a conviction. As in
Garcia, the mere marking of seized items, done in violation of the safeguards of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEXANDER SANDER BANGSOY
G.R. No. 204047
January 13, 2016
Facts:
AAA testified that her uncle, herein appellant, inserted his penis inside her vagina on
two occasions. The RTC explained that AAA testified clearly despite her mental weakness,
and that she never wavered during cross-examination. It further held that the appellants
moral ascendancy over AAA, combined with the formers use of a deadly weapon and threats of
bodily harm, was more than enough to cow the victim into submitting to the appellants desires.
AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who sexually abused her on two
occasions in April 2004, and who threatened to kill her if she would report the incidents to her
father. When AAA pointed to the appellant in the courtroom as her sexual abuser, she even
stated that she filed a complaint so that he will not do it to anybody else anymore. Given the
victims mental condition, it is highly improbable that she could have concocted or fabricated
arape charge against the accused. Neither was it possible that she was coached into
testifying against appellant considering her limited intellect.
In its August 16, 2010 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of statutory rape. On appellate review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC's Joint Judgment. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to
prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of
age or was demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under
the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with a mental age of
below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape. Notably, AAA was also below 12 years old at the
time of the incident, as evidenced by the records showing that she was born on March 1, 1993.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty
shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In the present case,
however, the relationship of the appellant to the victim was not alleged.
Page | 44
Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a mental retardate and that the
appellant knew of this mental retardation. These circumstances raised the crime from
statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUELMACAL y BOLASCO

G.R. No. 211062
January 13, 2016
Facts:
For allegedly killing his spouse, Auria Ytac Macal (Auria), the accused-appellant was
charged with the crime of parricide in a February 13, 2003 Information. It states that on or about
the 12th day of February, 2003, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL MACAL y BOLASO, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and
deliberated to kill his wife, AURIA MACAL y YTAC, with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock, armed with an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle) and a kitchen knife, stab said
Auria Macal on the front portion of her body inflicting a fatal wound which caused her death,
which incident happened inside the bedroom of the house they are residing.
The accused-appellant did not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he
stabbed his wife, but interposes the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not intentional.
The accused-appellant claims that on February 12, 2003, the accused-appellant arrived
home in Tacloban City from Manila. Before the accused-appellant could reach the bedroom, he
was warned by Arvin, his brother-in-law, not to go inside the bedroom where his wife was with a
man for he might be killed. Ignoring Arvins admonition, the accused-appellant kicked the door
but it was opened from the inside. After the bedroom door was opened, the accused-appellant
saw his wife and a man seated beside each other conversing. Furious by what he had seen, the
accused-appellant went out of the room, got a knife and delivered a stab blow towards the man
but the latter was shielded by Auria. In the process, the stab blow landed on Auria.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of parricide. On appeal, the CA
affirmed with modification the RTC decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Among
the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial. This
relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In this case, the
spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute.
Page | 45
The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to release the
accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential requisites of
accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due
care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of
causing it.
The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. This certainly does not hold
true in the instant case based on the aforequoted testimony of the accused-appellant. Moreover,
the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing distance from the bedroom, testified
that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going to be killed by the accusedappellant.
Given these testimonies, the accused-appellants defense of accident is negated as he was
carrying out an unlawful act at the time of the incident.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN and three (3) other
unidentified companions
GR. No. 206291
January 18, 2016
Facts:
The above-named accused, being then armed with a .45 caliber pistol and other
handguns, conspiring and confederating (sic) together, mutually aiding and assisting one another,
by means of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with intent to
kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and shoot with the
use of said weapons ATTY. SEGUNDO SOTTO, JR. y GONZALO, employing means, manner
and form which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without any danger to the
persons of the herein accused, as a result of which attack, said Atty. Segundo Sotto, Jr. y Gonzalo
sustained mortal gunshot wounds on the fatal parts of his body which directly caused his death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
That the commission of the above-stated offense has been attended by the following
aggravating circumstances, to wit:
1. Use of unlicensed firearm; and
2. Use of motorcycle to facilitate not only the commission of the crime but also the
escape of the accused from the scene of the crime.
3. That the crime be committed at night time.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. Trial ensued
afterwards.
Appellant was also charged with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 20665 for
having fatally wounded Liezel Mae Java, the niece of the victim, during the same shooting
incident. Since Java was alleged in the Information to be a minor, the said case was transferred to
Branch 15 of the RTC of Zamboanga City, which is the only designated family court in the city.
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of murder.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court's decision by increasing the
civil indemnity. Hence, this appeal.
Page | 46
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of murder.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
It is well-settled that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled
to great respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they
gave their testimonies. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were
telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of
a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation. The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Two
conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.
In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was
attended by treachery because appellant shot the said victim suddenly and without any warning
with a deadly weapon.
The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be
appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung
to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution
to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.
In seeking his acquittal, appellant raises the defenses of denial and alibi. However, such
defenses, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received
with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are
easily fabricated and concocted.
Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were
not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants. Between the categorical
statements of the prosecution eyewitnesses Java and Delos Reyes, on one hand, and the bare
denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must prevail. After all, an affirmative testimony
is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it conies from the mouth of a credible
witness. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be shown
that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
In contrast to the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Delos Reyes and Java
who positively identified appellant as the gunman, the testimonies of the defense witnesses in
support of appellant's denial and alibi, are tainted with material inconsistencies.
Page | 47
Meanwhile, the use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the
crime or to facilitate escape, but not when the use thereof was merely incidental and was not
purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the
offender easier and his apprehension difficult.
The prosecution has proven through the testimonies of Java and Delos Reyes that
appellant was riding a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he twice shot Atty. Segundo
who thus lost control of his owner-type jeep and crashed into the interlink wire fence beside the
road. The motorcycle then stopped near the jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice,
before leaving the crime scene aboard the motorcycle. Clearly, the trial court correctly
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of
the crime.
AMADO I. SARAUM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205472
January 25, 2016
Facts:
Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article I I (Possession of Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3
Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A
buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta.
Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Anion against a certain Pata. PO2 Sta. Ana was
designated as the poseur-buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up of
PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team as the perimeter security. PO1 Anion coordinated with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation. After preparing all
the necessary documents, such as the pre-operation report and submitting the same to the PDEA,
the team proceeded to the subject area.
During the operation, Pata eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the
house, which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and
Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a
shabu pot session. They recovered from Saraums possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and
aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of
misua wrapper, and made initial markings.
At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as AIS-08-17-2006 the paraphernalia
recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed, the subject items were turned over to the
property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor. By way of defense, Saraum denied the
commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in question, he was
passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by
men with firearms. They were already with Antik and Pata, both of whom were his
neighbors. Believing that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He
learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court. The accused was
convicted in the RTC. The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Page | 48
Ruling:
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or
capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great
weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. Besides, a review of the records reveals that the
CA did not err in affirming his conviction.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession
of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which
were offered and admitted in evidence. Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime,
which instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in
the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Here, the Court is
unconvinced with Saraums statement that he was not committing a crime at the time of his
arrest.
VINSON D. YOUNG a.k.a. BENZON ONG and BENNY ' YOUNG a.k.a. BENNY ONG v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL
G.R. No. 213910
February 3, 2016
Facts:
Members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), namely P02 Arsua and P02 Talingting, Jr., among others,
conducted surveillance operations on separate dates at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jagar) in Cebu City,
and observed that its customers paid P6,000.00 in exchange for sexual intercourse with guest
relations officers (GROs), or Pl0,000.00 as "bar fine" if they were taken out of the establishment.
In the course of an entrapment operation, P02 Arsua, P02 Talingting, Jr., and POl
Nemenzo, acting as poseur customers, handed P15,000.00 worth of marked money to the
"mamasang"/manager of Jaguar in exchange for sexual service. At the prearranged signal, the
rest of the RAHTTF members raided Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual
paraphernalia, recovery of the marked money from one Jocelyn Balili (Balili), and the rescue of
146 women and minor children. Later, six (6) of these women -who all worked at Jaguar as
GROs, executed affidavits identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as Jaguar's owners.
In defense, petitioner denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights
and interests therein to one Charles Theodore Rivera. Not being the manager nor owner of
Jaguar, therefore, he had no control and supervision over the victims, with whom he denied
acquaintance. Similarly, Benny claimed that he was neither the owner nor manager of Jaguar and
was not even present during the raid.
Issue:
Page | 49
Whether or not there is probable cause to indict petitioners for violation of Sections 4 (a)
and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, otherwise known as
the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature.
The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation for
the purpose of filing information in court. On the other hand, judicial determination of probable
cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in
clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause -that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate
the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
The evidence on record herein does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of
probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the
prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4
(a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. It appears from the records that
petitioners recruited and hired the victims and, consequently, maintained them under their
employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution.
In view of this, probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest. The Court further
notes that the defenses raised by petitioners, particularly their disclaimer that they are no longer
the owners of the establishment where the sex workers were rescued, are evidentiary in nature matters which are best threshed out in a full-blown trial.
ROBERTO PALO y DE GULA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192075, February, 10, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner and his co-accused Jesus Daguman y Ramos (Daguman) were charged with
violation of Section 11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Officer 3Miguel Capangyarihan.
During trial, the testimonies of all other prosecution witnesses namely: Police Officer 1 Ernesto
Santos, Senior Police Officer 1 Reynaldo Tapar, Police Officer 2 Miguel Isla, and Police
Inspector Juanita Sioson were dispensed with upon stipulation by the parties.
P03 Capangyarihan, a member of the Valenzuela City Police, testified that at around 6:30
in the evening of July 24, 2002, he was walking along a dark alley at Mercado Street, Gen. T. De
Leon in Valenzuela City. With him at that time was a boy who was a victim of a stabbing
incident and right behind them, was PO1 Santos. While they were walking toward the petitioner's
direction, at a distance of about five to seven meters, P03 Capangyarihan saw the petitioner and
Daguman talking to each other. P03 Capangyarihan also noticed the petitioner holding a plastic
sachet in his hand who was then showing it to Daguman. Believing that the plastic sachet
contained shabu, from the manner by which the petitioner was holding the sachet, P03
Capangyarihan immediately approached the petitioner, held and recovered from his hand the said
plastic sachet. Right there and then, the petitioner was arrested by P03 Capangyarihan. Daguman
was also arrested by PO1 Santos. P03 Capangyarihan further testified that the petitioner and
Page | 50
Daguman were informed of their constitutional rights and that the two accused, together with the
item seized, were brought to the police station where the confiscated item was marked by P03
Capangyarihan with petitioner's initials "RPD." During his cross-examination, P03
Capangyarihan disclosed that there is a rampant selling of shabu at the place where the two
accused were apprehended and that his suspicion was aroused by the petitioner's delicate way of
handling the plastic sachet. P03 Capangyarihan turned over the petitioner Daguman, and the
confiscated item to SPO 1 Tapar, the investigator of the case. The parties stipulated that SPOl
Tapar received one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with "RPD" marking from P03
Capangyarihan, which item was marked in evidence as Exhibit "B". SPOl Tapar prepared the
letter-request for the examination of the substance found inside the plastic sachet. Also stipulated
was the fact that after SPOl Tapar's investigation, the seized item and the said letter-request were
transmitted by him to P02 Isla for delivery to the Philippine National Police Crime LaboratoryNorthern Police District Crime Laboratory Office (PNPCL-NPDCLO).
The defense, on the other hand, presented the petitioner and Dagumans witnesses.
According to the petitioner, he can no longer recall the date and time of his arrest. All the same,
the petitioner testified that he and Daguman were just sitting along the road, in front of a house
that was raided by P03 Capangyarihan and POI Santos. One or two persons were arrested from
the raid. The petitioner averred that when the police officers passed by him and Daguman, they
were arrested and frisked but nothing was found in their persons. Nevertheless, the two accused
were made to board the police vehicle, brought to the police station and detained thereat. The
petitioner insisted that he had never been involved in any drug-related incident prior to his arrest.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the RTC convicting the petitioner of the offense
charged.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the prior ruling of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the dearth of evidence supporting
the prosecution's contention; and
(2) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court notwithstanding the arresting officers' patent non-compliance with the
proper chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs.ch
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
To secure a conviction for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the concurrence of the
following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The Court finds that these elements were proven by the prosecution in the present case.
P03 Capangyarihan testified in a clear and straightforward manner that when he chanced upon
petitioner, the latter was caught red handed in the illegal possession of shabu and was arrested in
flagrante delicto. On direct examination, the police officer positively identified the petitioner as
the person holding, scrutinizing and from whom the plastic sachet was confiscated. After
conducting a chemical analysis, the forensic chemical officer certified that the plastic sachet
recovered from the petitioner was found to contain 0.03 gram of shabu. Nowhere in the records
was it shown that the petitioner is lawfully authorized to possess the dangerous drug.
Page | 51
Furthermore, Daguman admitted that the petitioner intentionally sought and succeeded in getting
hold of shabu. Clearly, the petitioner knowingly possessed the dangerous drug, without any legal
authority to do so, in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
In seeking acquittal, the petitioner insists that the failure of the arresting officers to
comply with the directives outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165
particularly on the requirements of markings, physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items translates to their failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
item. The Court disagreed with the argument of the petitioner. The fact that the apprehending
officer marked the plastic sachet at the police station, and not at the place of seizure, did not
compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon
immediate confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory nor the lack of
photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible. What is of utmost importance
is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these would be
used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of shabu seized from the
petitioner had been preserved under the chain custody rule even though the prescribed procedure
under Section 21 ( 1 ), Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of
the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, was not strictly complied with.
Page | 52

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