Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
No. 15-6382
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief
District Judge. (3:14-cv-00042-GMG-JSK)
Argued:
Decided:
June 7, 2016
ARGUED:
Tennille Jo Checkovich, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Natalie C. Schaefer, SHUMAN, MCCUSKEY
personnel,
violations
surgery
to
conclude
Eighth,
of
and
his
and
administrators
constitutional
remove
that
prison
penile
Kings
implants
complaint
Fourteenth
rights
while
properly
Amendment
after
Equal
for
he
alleged
underwent
incarcerated.
stated
his
Protection
We
Fourth,
and
Due
Process claims.
Marvin Plumley.
those
bases,
vacate
further proceedings.
the
dismissal,
and
remand
the
case
for
I.
In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.
as
they
are
integral
to
the
3
complaint
and
authentic.
Philips v. Pitt Cty. Meml Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.
2009).
Here,
we
look
to
Kings
complaint,
including
his
is
an
inmate
at
Huttonsville
Correctional
Center
In fall
now deceased, decided to have the implants done during the body
modification
craze,
as
they
had
heard
about
the
J.A. 16.
an
inmate
Id. at 25.
reported
seeing
and
another
inmate
King verified that the marbles were not recently implanted and
that there was no sign of infection.
King was escorted to the segregation unit, where an officer
told him that the implants were not noted in his file.
King
The
was
Id.
subsequently
325.00-1.26,
which
found
in
prohibits
violation
exposing
of
Policy
body
fluids,
1.26Exposing
Body
Fluids/Tattooing/Piercing:
No
inmate shall intentionally expose to any person body
fluids such as urine, feces, spit, blood, or any other
body fluid. No inmate shall give oneself or others a
tattoo/piercing or allow another inmate to give
him/her a tattoo/piercing.
No inmate shall possess
any
tattooing/piercing
equipment,
to
include,
tattooing ink, tattooing patterns, tattooing needles,
etc.
King Br. 24. Due to this violation, King was sentenced to sixty
days of punitive segregation, sixty days loss of privileges, and
ninety days of loss of good time.
While
King
was
in
segregation,
Sherri
Davis,
the
unit
examine
his
implants
and,
if
necessary,
remove
them.
J.A. 26.
King
responded that Rosencrance could not punish him twice for the
same violation.
want.
King
Id.
segregation.
was
then
returned
to
administrative
at
Ruby
practically
Memorial.
against
[his]
Id.
will
The
as
[he]
surgery
was
was
coerced
by
done
the
Id. at 31.
area
the
marbles
were
removed;
an
uncomfortable,
stretching feeling where the cut was made; pain in his penis
when it rains, snows, or gets cold; and stabbing pain [that]
shoots into [his] stomach if he bumps into something or the
scar on his penis is touched.
experienced
these
symptoms
until
removed.
after
his
King never
implants
were
Id. at 15.
He worries about
the possibilities that [his] penis will still be numb when [he]
. . . is with another woman and about how he will explain what
happened if in the future someone is sickened by the scarring.
Id. at 16.
his five roommates are in the cell with him, a problem he did
not previously experience.
they
refer to him as Marble Man and when they search him, they ask
where his marbles are.
Id. at 15.
Id.
gay inmates approach him, because of the way the staff have
gossiped about him.
him
feel
situation,
uncomfortable
where
it
is
and
a
place
strong
[him]
in
possibility
compromising
that
physical
Id. at 17.
b.
His complaint
Deputy
Warden
Rosencrance,
Segregation),
Sherri
Lester
Davis,
Thompson
Stacy
(Unit
Manager
Scott
E-1
(Supervised
Id. at 33.
The defendants
removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia and moved to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
sides
responses.
filed
objections;
only
the
defendants
filed
II.
This
dismiss.
Court
reviews
de
novo
the
grant
of
motion
to
sufficiency
of
complaint;
it
does
not,
however,
resolve
231,
243
(4th
Cir.
(quoting
dismiss,
the
complaints
[f]actual
Republican
Party
v.
To survive a motion
allegations
must
be
Bell Atl.
Bare legal
construed,
and
pro
se
complaint,
however
Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)).
III.
King appeals the dismissal of his substantive claims, as
well as the dismissal of Scott, Plumley, Rubenstein, and Goodin.
a.
King
dismissed
protects
first
his
claims
Fourth
[t]he
right
that
the
Amendment
of
the
district
claim.
people
court
improperly
The
Fourth
Amendment
be
secure
in
to
their
U.S.
Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that an inmate has no
reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no Fourth Amendment
protection, in his prison cell, given the paramount interest in
institutional
security.
Id.
at
528.
While
imprisonment
Id. at 523-24.
the
the
Supreme
Court
developed
reasonableness
invasive searches . . . .
of
broad
flexible
range
of
test
to
sexually
877, 883 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
the
Court
has
continues
weighing
to
the
apply
assum[ed]
to
competing
reasonableness of a search.
302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992).
lawfully
interests
that
the
confined
to
Fourth
prisoners
determine
the
we
agree
with
our
sister
circuits
that,
J.A. 171.
under
Wolfish,
900 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (Even in prison, case law
indicates that the Fourth Amendment protects, to some degree,
prisoners bodily integrity against unreasonable intrusions into
their bodies.); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 42 &
n.5 (1st Cir. 2009) (We have recognized that a limited right to
bodily
privacy
against
searches
is
not
incompatible
with
unreasonable
searches
11
and
seizures
extends
to
prisoner
maintains
some
reasonable
expectations
of
hold
that
the
Wolfish
factors
weigh
against
body
partit
was
certainly
not
commonplace.
See
[and]
pain:
King
alleged
scarring
and
at
771;
see
also
Winston
v.
Lee,
470
U.S.
753
botched
See 384
(1985)
because
of
the
risk,
trauma,
and
pain
involved
in
the
plaintiff
alleged
that
he
was
slashed
and
mutilated
during surgery, that his life and health were jeopardized, and
that he experienced severe physical and emotional pain as a
result).
insertion
instance.
of
J.A. 177.
marbles
into
his
penis
in
the
first
v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 963 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding the scope
suggested unreasonability where officers physically extracted a
plastic
making
bag
no
himself);
1991)
containing
mention
that
Rodriques
v.
(finding
extreme,
again
a
not
contraband
defendant
Furtado,
from
had
950
considering
13
presumably
F.2d
warrant-authorized
that
defendants
805,
inserted
811
(1st
vaginal-cavity
plaintiff
rectum,
it
Cir.
search
inserted
the
contraband
herself).
We
find
the
scope
of
the
intrusion
objectively extreme.
The
second
factor,
the
manner
in
which
the
search
was
[O]nce
unnecessary
risk
of
harm
to
the
person
being
searched.
We agree
with the district court that the surgery posed a risk to Kings
health and caused him trauma and pain.
Turning
to
the
third
factor,
J.A. 176.
the
defendants
correctly
alike.
Hudson,
468
U.S.
at
527.
Indeed,
prison
judgments
concerning
institutional
operations.
Union,
433
U.S.
119,
128
(1977))
(alterations
in
original).
courts
defer
must
to
the
judgment
of
correctional
officials
searches
. . . cannot be condoned.
citation omitted).
conducted
in
an
abusive
fashion
Williams v.
475
U.S.
claim);
312,
see
322
(1986))
also
(considering
Hudson,
468
an
U.S.
Eighth
at
528
provided
facts
that
support
this
contention.
First,
he
allegation
supported
by
the
findings
with
the
policy
directive
of
the
two
medical
This, he argues, is
that
he
was
found
violation of:
1.26Exposing
Body
Fluids/Tattooing/Piercing:
No
inmate shall intentionally expose to any person body
fluids such as urine, feces, spit, blood, or any other
body fluid. No inmate shall give oneself or others a
tattoo/piercing or allow another inmate to give
15
in
him/her a tattoo/piercing.
No inmate shall possess
any
tattooing/piercing
equipment,
to
include,
tattooing ink, tattooing patterns, tattooing needles,
etc.
Id. at 24.
E.I. du Pont de
the implants and was not exposing blood by inserting the marbles
at the time of the violation.
King also alleged that other prisoners implanted foreign
objects into their penises, but unlike King, they have been
permitted to keep them.
J.A. 27.
Id. at 17.
The
inmates
defendants
proof
that
point
this
to
Kings
practice
is
examples
of
not
isolated
an
other
as
occurrence,
conceal
contraband:
beneath
their
skin.
but
implants.
did
J.A.
not
require
17.
them
These
to
surgically
allegations
remove
contradict
their
the
16
Appellees Br.
As in Sanchez, King
E.g.,
(describing
under
what
conditions
he
was
placed
in
done.);
that
is
the
see
Sanchez,
product
of
590
official
F.3d
at
46-47.
intimidation
or
or
coercion,
express
or
implied.
Schneckloth
v.
security
threats,
the
pleadings
raise
sufficient
This
Thus, at this
the
overwhelming
unreasonable.
evidence
Accordingly,
we
that
reverse
the
the
search
district
was
courts
Wilson
F.2d
objective
820,
and
824
(4th
requires
Cir.
that
1991)).
the
18
The
deprivation
first
be
prong
is
sufficiently
serious;
the
second
requires
us
to
determine
whether
F.3d at 1379.
We
hold
that
Kings
complaint
plausibly
satisfies
both
J.A. 27.
These include
tingling and numbness in his penis; pain in the area where the
marbles
were
removed;
an
uncomfortable,
stretching
feeling
where the cut was made; pain in his penis when it rains, snows,
or
gets
cold;
and
stabbing
pain
[that]
shoots
into
[his]
the
scar
is.
Id.
at
15,
27.
King
also
gets
very
the
scarring
and
is
reminded
of
the
marbles
Id. at 15.
that
his
He worries about
the possibilities that [his] penis will still be numb when [he]
. . . is with another woman and about how he will explain what
happened if someone is sickened by the scarring.
Id. at 16.
the
cell
with
him,
problem
19
he
did
not
previously
experience.
Id. at 15.
sees
the
any
of
defendants.
Id.
King
claims
that
he
is
Id.
Id.
He
now has [g]ay inmates approaching [him] because the staff that
was
involved
in
forcing
[him]
to
have
the
Id. at 16.
surgery,
have
Id. at 17.
dismissing
the
claim,
the
district
court
read
too
the
proposition
unconstitutional.
that
segregated
confinement
is
not
King resulted only from the surgery, not from his segregation.
This reliance on Allgood is misplaced.
[S]egregated
confinement
is
not
per
se
Indeed, we stated,
unconstitutional.
to
the
district
courts
conclusion.
Segregation,
by
Cf.
absent
other
illegitimate
deprivations.
(emphasis added)).
In his complaint, King provides that his Eighth Amendment
claim was based on more than the confinement itself:
The Staff
sentence
and
loss
of
Parole
Eligibility
in
order
to
to
have
(describing
discharge
performed.
threats
of
segregation,
of
sentence,
loss
of
J.A.
16;
see
id.
administrative
as
well
privileges,
as
and
at
15,
segregation
sentence
loss
of
of
good
25-27
until
punitive
time
for
into
physical
coerced
consenting
and
mental
surgery,
of
to
surgery,
injuries.
which
which
This
the
in
harm
turn
resulted
resulting
segregation
was
in
from
the
part,
is
Wilson,
The
requisite
state
of
mind
is
thus
one
of
Odom v.
S.C. Dept of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
While
deliberate
that
unnecessary
are
and
totally
wanton
without
inflictions
penological
of
pain
are
justification.
see
also
Hope
v.
Pelzer,
536
U.S.
730,
738
(2002)
(quoting
Trop
v.
Dulles,
22
356
U.S.
86,
100
(1958)
(alterations
in
original));
(underscoring
that
the
Hudson,
Eighth
468
Amendment
U.S.
at
protects
530
against
of
transparent
an
inmates
jumpsuit
Amendment.
781
claim
during
F.3d
at
that
his
being
transfer
896.
The
forced
violated
court
to
wear
the
pointed
Eighth
to
the
transported
in
exposed . . . .
see-through
Id. at 898.
jumpsuit
that
left
him
Id.
Even
able
to
where
prison
authorities
are
identify
valid
humiliate
and
cause
psychological
pain.
Id.
at
897
to
consent
contention
with
to
factual
medically necessary:
the
surgery.),
allegations.
The
and
supports
removal
was
this
not
that the marbles were not recently implanted and there was no
sign of infection, and the doctor he saw confirmed this.
25-26.
Further,
King
alleges
that
other
Id. at
prisoners
have
some
of
these
incarcerated.
Id.
at
17.
tend
to
suggest
[t]hese
facts
inmates
have
Like
Id. at 27.
even
had
those
that
it
King notes
done
presented
there
was
no
in
while
King,
security
We
agree that these risks were compounded by the fact that the
marbles
were
not
recently
medically necessary.
not
change
this.
Id.
A
implanted
and
their
removal
not
prisoner
does
not
absolve
correctional
the
States
jurisdiction
arbitrary discrimination.
against
intentional
and
was
the
discrimination.
Cir.
2001).
treatment
can
scrutiny.
result
of
intentional
or
purposeful
then
be
justified
Id.
consider
[T]he
whether
under
Supreme
the
the
disparity
requisite
Court
has
level
recognized
in
of
the
alleges
that
she
has
been
intentionally
treated
Of
Marshall,
N.C.,
426
F.3d
25
251,
263
(4th
Willis v.
Cir.
2005)
We hold
regard
to
the
first
prong,
we
find
that
Kings
least
two
other
inmates
with
in
their
penises.
J.A. at 17.
King further
alleges that the defendants single[d him] out from these other
inmates.
Id. at 27.
In
general,
disparate
treatment
sustained
if
disparity
of
purpose.
there
unless
is
is
treatment
suspect
presumed
a
to
rational
and
some
be
class
is
valid
and
relationship
legitimate
involved,
will
between
be
the
governmental
(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993)); see also
Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (applying rational basis review to classof-one claims).
prison
however,
context,
scrutiny
to
ensure
courts
that
prison
must
adjust
officials
the
are
level
afforded
of
the
impinges
on
inmates
constitutional
rights,
the
valid,
the
rational
penological
connection
interest;
(2)
between
whether
there
policy
is
an
and
the
alternative
(4)
the
absence
of
ready
alternatives
that
fully
interests.
Morrison,
239
F.3d
at
655
(citing
have
held
that
[p]romoting
the
inmates
safety
and
169, 178 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing McRae v. Johnson, 261 F. Appx
27
554,
558
(4th
Cir.
discussed
above,
arguments
that
2008)
we
are
Kings
(unpublished)).
not
persuaded
marbles
posed
Nonetheless,
by
a
the
as
defendants
security
threat.
the
would
defendants
scenario,
other
inmates
be
implanting
that
fourth
surgery
factor,
was
the
reasonable.
absence
of
ready
We
acknowledge
alternatives,
that
is
the
not
also
suggested
other
alternatives
to
surgery,
including
The
we
exaggerated
conclude
that
response
to
surgery
was
defendants
an
On this
unreasonable
concerns.
See
id.
raises
Nevertheless,
this
King
claim
was
for
not
the
required
Md.,
743
F.3d
411,
first
418
to
time
use
any
on
appeal.
precise
or
Cir.
2014);
see
also
Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1995) (Legal labels
characterizing a claim cannot, standing alone, determine whether
it fails to meet [the standard for notice pleading under Federal
29
competent
interest
person
in
has
refusing
constitutionally
unwanted
medical
protected
treatment.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
This
liberty
interest
survives
conviction
and
incarceration.
administration
of
specific
form
of
medical
officials
reasonably
may
related
override
to
this
legitimate
right
In this context,
when
penological
treatment
is
interests.
This
is
circumstances
fundamental,
would
have
and
been
the
required
State
to
under
satisfy
other
a
more
As the
district court did not consider this potential claim, and given
30
the
facts
alleged
in
Kings
complaint,
we
remand
for
in
magistrate
finding
or
judges
report,
recommendation
on
party
that
must
issue
object
with
to
the
sufficient
ground
for
the
objection.
Makdessi,
789
F.3d
at
131
(quoting United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir.
2007)) (alteration in original).
on
multiple
other
grounds
to
Id.
Here, despite
the
report
and
that
Scott
be
dismissed
without
prejudice.
Alternatively,
personal
capacity,
his
official
capacity,
or
in
in
more
The
district
courts
conclusion
appears
to
have
accidentally dismissed the complaint in its entirety with
prejudice, and the judgment entered by the clerk indicates that
Kings complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
Nevertheless,
the district courts order dismissed Scott without prejudice,
and both parties understand that the dismissal was without
prejudice. J.A. 163; Kings Reply Br. 29; Defs. Br. 47.
32
Kentucky
In an official-capacity
the
deprivation,
id.
(third
quotation
quoting
Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)); thus, the entitys
policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of
federal law, id. (quoting Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Meanwhile, a
of
constitutional
deliberate
alleged
indifference
offensive
affirmative
injury;
to
or
practices;
causal
link
constitutional injury.
(2)
tacit
and
between
his
response
authorization
(3)
his
that
there
inaction
showed
of
the
was
an
and
the
population.
King
claims
that
Plumley
so
decided
because I had not had the marbles surgically removed. J.A. 31;
33
see
also
id.
(I
wrote
an
appeal
to
Warden
Plumley
seeking
sent
to
the
Correctional
Quality
Complex
of
Life
. . . .).
Program
The
at
Mount
defendants
Olive
point
to
which
recommendation
sending
him
shows
to
to
that
keep
King
Plumley
in
rejected
punitive
administrative
the
committees
segregation,
segregation.
instead
Nevertheless,
chosen
Id. at 27.
to
single
me
out
for
some
unknown
district
that
court
Plumley
concluded
played
that
part
in
these
facts
Kings
only
housing
in
at
165.
As
the
district
court
found
that
segregated
was not the segregation standing alone that may have constituted
the Eighth Amendment violation.
That King [did] not contend that Plumley [was] liable in
his official or supervisory capacity, id. at 166, is belied by
34
their
official
personal
allegations
liberally,
and
contained
attempt
to
in
capacities.
the
make
Moreover,
the
complaint
itself,
construed
connection
between
Plumleys
at
26
(The
Warden
few
overturned
their
E.g.,
recommendation
and
was
told
by
the
Unit
Manager
of
E-Unit
Shortly
Lester
35
Kings
admittedly
allegations
significantly
as
to
less
Rubenstein
robust,
and
and
the
Goodin
district
are
court
his
complaint.
allegations
as
to
King
these
did
make
defendants
slightly
in
his
more
specific
objections
to
the
Even a pro se
standard.
Nevertheless, we find that the dismissal against these two
defendants should have been without prejudice.
742, 756 (7th Cir. 2011); Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604
(4th
Cir.
1965)
(per
curiam)
(holding
that,
if
pro
se
be
given
an
opportunity
36
to
particularize
his
allegations).
Accordingly,
Rubenstein
Goodin
and
but
we
affirm
modify
it
the
to
dismissal
reflect
that
as
to
it
is
without prejudice.
IV.
Based
stated
his
Protection
on
the
foregoing,
Fourth,
and
Due
we
Eighth,
Process
and
conclude
Fourteenth
claims.
We
decision
the
case
on
for
those
bases,
further
that
also
King
properly
Amendment
hold
Equal
that
King
vacate
the
proceedings.
dismissal,
and
We
the
affirm
37