Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
No. 15-1889
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.
Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:13-cv-00173-FPS)
Submitted:
Decided:
June 6, 2016
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Travis Pegg and Kristina Pegg appeal the district
courts
grant
of
Defendants-Appellees
Herrnberger
on
the
summary
Nathan
basis
judgment
Tyler
of
Klempa
qualified
in
and
immunity.
favor
of
Grant
The
P.
Peggs
The amended
Mr.
existed
Pegg
to
refused
arrest
him
to
exit
for
his
vehicle,
obstruction.
probable
The
court
cause
also
determined that, because the arrest of Mr. Pegg was lawful, the
force applied by the officers was not excessive.
that
dangerous
and
Herrnberger
was
reasonably
therefore
justified
believed
in
that
frisking
she
her.
was
The
Klempas
justified
by
searches
officer
of
safety
her
purse
and
concerns. 1
the
vehicle
Finally,
the
were
court
concluded that Mrs. Pegg had not been the victim of a battery as
a result of the frisk, and that the remainder of the Peggs
state law claims were also barred by qualified immunity.
On appeal, the Peggs assert three errors in the district
courts
decision.
First,
they
argue
that
the
officers
was
unlawful.
Second,
they
argue
that
no
facts
The court noted that Mrs. Pegg had consented to the search
of her purse, but concluded that it was unclear whether Mrs.
Peggs consent was voluntarily given.
Because the court
determined that the search was valid regardless of consent, it
did not reach a determination as to whether consent was
voluntary.
Amendment.
Summary judgment is
Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Qualified
constitutional
established
(en
protects
violations
law,
were lawful.
2011)
immunity
could
but
who,
reasonably
officers
in
who
commit
of
clearly
light
believe
that
their
actions
banc).
Thus,
to
successfully
avail
themselves
of
established
at
the
time it
was
violated. 2
Id.
In
official
that
situation he confronted.
(4th
Cir.)
(quoting
his
conduct
was
unlawful
in
the
Saucier v.
Katz,
533
U.S.
194,
20102
regard
to
Mr.
Peggs
claim
of
unlawful
arrest,
we
conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the
officers
are
entitled
constitutionality
of
to
qualified
traffic
stop
immunity.
is
analyzed
The
under
for
the
traffic
stop
was
legitimate
and,
if
so,
we
duration
of
police
inquiries
in
the
traffic-stop
stop.
2011).
As to the first prong, Mr. Pegg concedes that his vehicle
had an inoperative license plate light and therefore the initial
justification for the traffic stop was valid.
Regarding the
stopping
conversation
with
conversation
that
recalcitrance.
the
Mr.
was
Mr.
Peggs
Pegg
vehicle,
regarding
extended
Pegg
Klempa
the
by
eventually
had
traffic
Mr.
stop,
Peggs
turned
brief
a
initial
over
his
minutes
the
elapsed
by
time
Klempa
returned
to
Only five
Mr.
Peggs
vehicle.
Klempa wanted Mr. Pegg to exit the vehicle for two reasons:
(1) because of concerns for officer safety; and (2) to show Mr.
Pegg the burned-out light and issue a verbal warning.
This
an
initial
matter,
the
traffic
stop
itself
had
not
concluded as Klempa had not yet issued the warning to Mr. Pegg.
See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008)
6
From the moment the stop began, Mr. Pegg was agitated and
expressed
incredulity
traffic stop.
Klempa
to
notified
of
the
reason
for
the
order
reasonably
when
Mr.
directed
Pegg
toward
from
the
the
proper
vehicle,
purpose
it
of
was
the
also
stop
that, at the time he was asked to exit his vehicle, the officers
were standing in or near the lane of traffic.
testified,
drunk driving.
there
is
higher-than-usual
likelihood
of
not
unreasonably
detention.
extend
duration
of
Mr.
Peggs
the
the officers, they had probable cause to believe that Mr. Pegg
was
obstructing
Botkins,
719
an
officer.
S.E.2d
863,
872
refused
to
comply
[with
officer
may
have
believed
See
City
(W.
the
Va.
of
2011)
officers
the
refusal
Saint
(Once
order],
to
be
Albans
a
an
v.
Appellee
reasonable
attempt
to
to
warrantless
the
search
searches
unreasonable,
several
of
of
the
vehicle
exceptions
Peggs
vehicle,
are
exist.
presumptively
United
although
States
v.
Of relevance to
this case,
the search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police
officer
possesses a
reasonable
belief
based
on
specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with
the
rational
inferences
from
those
facts,
reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
immediate control of weapons.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
such
safety
belief
of
concerns,
both
(1)
an
the
officer
suspects
must
possess
dangerousness
reasonable
and
(2)
the
circumstances
whether
in
determining
suspicion existed.
the
requisite
reasonable
The
that
Mrs.
Pegg
was
dangerous
because:
(1) it
was
evening on New Years Eve; (2) prior to being arrested, Mr. Pegg
had been agitated and failed to follow officer commands; (3) it
would be reasonable . . . to believe that . . . Mrs. Pegg[] was
also agitated and a risk to officer safety; and (4) Mrs. Pegg
had opened her car door and asked why her husband was being
arrested.
Certainly, the fact that the stop occurred at nighttime on
New Years Eve supports reasonable suspicion.
Even assuming
is
circumstances
relevant
fall
to
well
Mrs.
short
Peggs
of
the
dangerousness,
requisite
reasonable
these
irritated. 3
To
the
contrary,
she
was
cooperative
and
identification; (2) closed her door and stayed quiet; (3) exited
the vehicle to be searched; and (4) lifted her shirt and coat to
expose
her
torso
to
Herrnberger.
During
his
deposition,
10
The
evidence
establishes
that
Mrs.
Pegg
had
no
known
We therefore conclude
person
subjected
to
the
frisk
is
armed
and
dangerous.
F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 27 (1968)).
detailed
supports
believed
that
above,
conclusion
Mrs.
the
that
Pegg
evidence
no
was
in
this
reasonable
dangerous.
case
officer
Although
strongly
would
have
the
stop
occurred after dark, and Mr. Pegg was somewhat uncooperative but
not threatening during the stop, there is simply no evidence
that Mrs. Pegg presented any threat.
Furthermore, at the time of the search, a number of our
cases
made
clear
that
something
more
than
the
circumstances
information
was
insufficient
to
create
reasonable
12
thus
conclude
that,
at
the
summary
judgment
stage,
contact
with
the
person
of
the
other
or
third
contact
with
indirectly results.
the
person
of
the
other
directly
or
conclude
that
an
unauthorized
battery.
annoying,
clothing
for
frightening,
and
satisfy
weapons
perhaps
the
requirements
an
contact
the
to
constitutes
offensive
of
sufficient
frisk
must
humiliating
surely
be
for
an
experience).
13
courts
we
affirm
order,
in
and
part
remand
and
for
reverse
further
in
part
the
proceedings
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART
14