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No. 14-2415
DELTEK, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Administrative Review Board,
Respondent,
DINAH R. GUNTHER,
Intervenor.
Argued:
December 8, 2015
Decided:
ON BRIEF:
M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor, Jennifer S.
Brand, Associate Solicitor, William C. Lesser, Deputy Associate
Solicitor,
Megan
E.
Guenther,
Counsel
for
Whistleblower
Programs, Office of the Solicitor, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
R.
Gunther,
former
employee
of
Deltek,
Inc.,
hearing
testimony
on
from
Gunthers
multiple
complaint,
witnesses
during
which
presenting
two
she
very
explanation
for
liable
retaliation.
for
briefing
Deltek,
were
the
presented,
including
Gunther.
firing
an
pretextual,
And
after
the
ALJ
award
of
four
the
ALJ
found
additional
assessed
years
evidence
damages
of
Deltek
front
and
against
pay
to
But we owe
deference to the findings of the ALJ and the Board and must
uphold
them
so
long
as
they
are
supported
by
substantial
I.
A.
Deltek, a Virginia-based software provider, hired Gunther
in
October
Technology
2008
(IT)
as
financial
Department. 1
analyst
in
Gunther,
its
Information
former
executive
degree.
advantage
of
the
Once
hired
companys
by
Deltek,
tuition
she
planned
reimbursement
to
program
take
and
technology
services.
Delteks
IT
Department
Almost from
deliberately
disputes
in
an
subjecting
effort
to
Verizon
hide
invoices
to
telecommunications
baseless
budget
between
the
companies,
task
with
which
Gunther
five
were
baseless.
Reynolds
shared
Reynolds opined
his
views
with
uncovered
massive
fraud
and
pattern
of
abusing
the
J.A. 31.
and
submitted
the
same
letter
to
Delteks
audit
committee,
Gunthers letter
with
conceal
Verizon
large
to
avoid
budget
timely
variance
payment
from
of
Deltek
fees
and
management,
Gunther also
alleged that she had been ignored or punished for raising these
issues
with
her
supervisors.
Reynolds
filed
similar
immediate
action,
and
then
meeting
his
meeting
complaint.
Schwiesow,
informing
Delteks
separately
Gunther
the
with
on
complaints
information.
CEO
Gunther
April
would
General
be
And
21,
of
Counsel,
the
and
complaints
Reynolds.
Schwiesow
taken
did
In
assured
seriously
Deltek
took
and
conduct
Gunther
asked
an
her
that
to
with
her
gather
investigation,
She also
became
increasingly
upset
about
what
she
viewed
as
her
On May
issues
that
were
affecting
her
work,
and
Kortright
for
that
Gunther
would
and
result
Deltek
in
began
Gunthers
negotiating
separation
from
And in
Things
Gunther,
came
after
negotiations,
to
head
directing
on
Saturday,
her
counsel
October
to
end
24,
when
settlement
that
because
she
was
represented
by
counsel,
Deltek
reading
Gunther
Schwiesows
who
testified
midnight
that
before
she
did
not
leaving
for
accompanying
her
in
separate
arrived
at
wait
for
Kortrights
arrival.
After
15
or
20
minutes,
In
her
Kortright
husband,
and
who
Ahmad
Kortrights office.
was
holding
watched
the
scene
video
from
camera,
the
while
window
of
According to
intimidated
Kortrights
assistant
by
standing
and
no
intention
of
actually
returning
to
work.
But
after
the
ALJ
rejected
that
characterization,
finding
no
According to the
very
concerning
behavior
at
Deltek
the
prior
day,
and
brought
Gunther
and
to
an
Deltek,
end
the
and
employment
Gunther
J.A. 4142.
relationship
promptly
amended
between
her
OSHA
after
the
termination,
continued to deteriorate.
husband
each
sent
respectively,
which
aggressive.
J.A.
71.
parties
relationship
letters
Deltek
the
to
Kortright
characterized
And
in
the
and
as
Delteks
CEO,
threatening
course
of
its
and
post-
recordings
of
certain
Deltek
meetings
and
exchanged
cause
Sarbanes-Oxley
retaliation
to
Act,
believe
18
that
U.S.C.
whistleblowers
who
Deltek
1514A,
report
had
which
certain
violated
protects
kinds
of
the
from
fraud
See
and
factor
in
(4)
the
her
protected
unfavorable
activity
action.
was
See
Jones
contributing
v.
Southpeak
Interactive Corp. of Del., 777 F.3d 658, 668 (4th Cir. 2015); 29
C.F.R. 1980.104(e) (2012).
adverse
activity.
action
even
in
the
absence
of
the
protected
engaged
in
two
forms
of
protected
whistleblowing
the SEC in April 2009, and the original OSHA complaint of May
2009.
Deltek
did
not
dispute
that
the
filing
of
formal
protected
reports
be
would
to
need
illegal,
protected,
both
reasonable
whistleblowing
belief
and
as
the
ALJ
subjective
that
Deltek
the
activity.
argued
explained,
belief
conduct
that
But
and
she
Gunther
an
had
Gunther
fraud,
finding
had
and
that
it
subjective
that
as
was
clear
from
that
Deltek
belief
result
of
her
the
was
also
of
was
insufficient
her
objectively
complained
Gunther
for
The ALJ
record
that
engaged
collaboration
with
in
and
ALJ
had
no
difficulty
determining
that
Gunther
had
contributing
recognized
that
factor
proximity
in
in
her
time
is
termination,
sufficient
to
the
raise
ALJ
an
almost
immediately
after
the
breakdown
of
the
settlement
J.A. 52.
Gunthers
the
audio
recording
of
After listening to
events
of
that
day
and
reviewing the record, the ALJ found that Gunther was not in fact
confrontational or rude, and that there was no evidence that
Gunther ever took any actions in the workplace toward other
employees
that
were
inappropriate
or
threatening
or
that
J.A. 52-53.
Deltek
Gunthers
for
termination
were
contradicted
Gunther
satisfied
the
final
by
J.A. 53.
element
of
her
Delteks
explanation
proffered
for
Gunthers
termination
as
her
protected
activity.
Deltek
therefore
was
liable
for
retaliation.
After considering additional evidence and briefing by the
parties,
the
ALJ
issued
supplemental
13
decision
and
order
(Dept
of
Labor
June
5,
Act
that
an
2013)
(ALJ
Supplemental
employee
who
prevails
on
the
employee
whole,
J.A.
64
(quoting
18
U.S.C.
that
Gunther
could
obtain
combined
with
restoration
job
comparable
to
her
tuition
reimbursement
brief
discovery
time
of
period
misconduct
between
for
Gunthers
which
it
firing
would
and
have
Delteks
terminated
husband,
Gunthers
recording
of
Deltek
meetings
and
both
supported
the
by
liability
finding
substantial
and
evidence
and
the
damages
that
the
award
ALJs
were
legal
Gunther v. Deltek,
2014)
(ARB
Final
Order),
J.A.
1418.
Deltek
timely
II.
A.
Our review of the Boards decision is limited.
Administrative
Procedure
Act,
which
governs
Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley
is
arbitrary,
capricious,
an
abuse
of
discretion,
or
The whistleblower retaliation provision of the SarbanesOxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1514A, incorporates the rules and
procedures of 49 U.S.C. 42121(b), which in turn incorporates
the Administrative Procedure Acts standard of review in cases
like this, 5 U.S.C. 706.
15
v. U.S. Dept of Labor, 548 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 2008).
We
2008); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84344 (1984).
affirmed
by
evidence.
the
Board,
if
they
are
supported
substantial
evidence,
our
role
is
by
substantial
not
to
substitute
our
re-weigh
conflicting
determinations.
Craig,
evidence
76
F.3d
[or]
at
make
589.
credibility
Rather,
the
challenges
the
Boards
liability
finding
on
two
grounds, arguing that the ALJ and the ARB erred first in holding
16
discussed
2009
constituted
above
letter
and
explained
complaint
protected
and
activity
May
under
by
the
2009
the
ALJ,
Gunthers
OSHA
complaint
Sarbanes-Oxley
Act
of
the
See
18
conduct
U.S.C.
reasonable
she
was
1514A(a)(1).
belief
objective component:
reporting
And
standard
as
has
was
the
both
in
violation
ALJ
a
recognized,
subjective
that
and
an
The ALJ
is
ample
record
evidence
to
support
the
ALJs
finding that Gunther, who raised her concerns early and often,
both informally and formally, and even in the face of what she
perceived as adverse treatment, genuinely believed Deltek to be
17
violating
the
subjective
law.
belief
Delteks
Gunther
may
principal
have
had
argument
was
not
is
that
any
objectively
Gunther
judgment.
that in
forming
lacked
her
belief
sufficient
Gunther
knowledge
reasonably
to
make
relied
that
on
her
Reynolds
was
consistent
with
governing
law,
which,
in
circumstances
of
the
putative
whistleblower,
see
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1132
(10th Cir. 2013), which may include what he or she learns from
coworkers, see, e.g., Mahony v. KeySpan Corp., No. 04 CV 554 SJ,
2007 WL 805813, at *1-2, 6 (E.D.N.Y. March 12, 2007) (reasonable
for employee, who had taken only a few accounting classes, to
rely on judgment and expertise of more experienced employee in
forming belief that unlawful conduct was occurring).
And there
18
2.
Delteks more sustained argument is that the ALJ and the
Board erred when they found the necessary causal link between
Gunthers 2009 letter complaint and 2009 OSHA complaint, on the
one
hand,
and
disagree.
her
termination,
on
the
other.
Again,
we
that
termination.
her
protected
activity
contributed
49 U.S.C. 42121(b)(2)(B)(i).
to
her
The contributing
rather
light
burden
by
showing
her
protected
this
case,
turns
application
critically
on
of
the
contributing
one
key
finding
19
by
factor
the
ALJ,
Gunthers
termination
was
pretextual
or,
more
J.A. 52.
hearing,
contradicted
J.A.
5253
by
&
the
the
tape
n.29.
ALJ
rejected
and
Gunther
that
unsupported
was
not,
as
contention
by
the
Deltek
as
evidence.
alleged,
J.A. 52.
There was no evidence that Gunther ever took any actions in the
workplace
toward
threatening.
other
J.A.
employees
53.
And
that
even
were
the
inappropriate
alleged
or
parking-lot
J.A. 52-53. 4
That
finding,
affirmed
by
the
Board,
is
supported
by
of
opportunity
twelve-day
hearing,
the
ALJ
had
ample
to
it
should
be
accepted
by
the
N.L.R.B. v. CWI
of
1997)
Md.,
Inc.,
127
F.3d
319,
326
(4th
Cir.
(internal
legitimate
confrontational
and
intervening
disruptive
event
conduct
on
here,
October
Gunthers
26
can
But the ALJ and the Board had no occasion to apply that
doctrine,
given
their
finding
that
there
was
no
legitimate
Board did not, as Deltek would have it, impermissibly secondguess an employers judgment as to the wisdom of terminating
employees who threaten workplace safety or comfort.
and
entirely
appropriately
they
evaluated
the
Rather
truth
of
See Bechtel v.
the
inferences
evidentiary
standard
drawn
of
from
proving
such
by
pretext,
meet
preponderance
the
of
the
of
intentional
persuasive).
Moreover,
explained,
is
protected
Feldman,
Gunthers
also
activity
752
F.3d
discrimination
proximity
sufficient
contributes
at
348.
whistleblowing
to
to
And
that
in
time,
raise
an
while
complaints
may
an
in
as
quite
the
inference
adverse
six
be
action.
months
April
ALJ
that
See
separated
from
her
apparent
that
Deltek
could
not
otherwise
settle
its
& n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (even extended period of time between
protected activity and adverse action may demonstrate causation
where adverse action occurred at the natural decision point). 5
conclusion
that
Gunthers
whistleblowing
activity
F.3d
at
589
(where
evidence
allows
reasonable
minds
to
C.
Deltek separately challenges the damages award to Gunther.
First, Deltek argues that the ALJ and the Board erred by failing
to apply the after-acquired evidence doctrine, limiting Delteks
liability
Gunthers
for
damages
termination
because
would
have
evidence
led
to
discovered
her
firing
after
had
the
award
pay
of
four
years
of
front
as
of
the
ALJ
and
the
unduly
speculative
and
are
supported
by
is
of
an
that
discovered
it
the
would
have
misconduct
terminated
in
the
question.
employee
49
when
it
U.S.C.
Deltek cannot
points
first
to
its
discovery,
post-termination,
In connection with
that
understanding
claim,
the
ALJ
recognized
Gunthers
that
account
only
whistleblowing
reasonable
Deltek
reports;
concern
employees
motivation
documents
for
[Sarbanes-Oxley]
or
that
that
that
the
when
the
she
documents
otherwise
forwarding
were
did
so,
might
be
destroyed;
documents
allegations.
J.A.
relevant
and
was
68-69.
she
had
shredded
that
to
to
her
a
by
Gunthers
support
her
Distinguishing
when
they
indiscriminately
misappropriated
On
this
record
and
in
light
of
the
specific
factual
selected
relevant
documents
from
what
she
reasonably
from
Delteks
General
Counsel,
would
not
have
led
self-serving
to
circumstances
testimony
termination,
under
which
that
their
violation
without
any
evidence
Deltek
had
fired
of
would
similar
employees
or
Accordingly, we
defer to the determination of the ALJ and the Board that Deltek
has
not
made
the
requisite
showing
under
the
after-acquired
evidence doctrine.
We
also
find
that
substantial
evidence
supports
the
As to
J.A. 66.
J.A. 70.
retraction
of
termination letter.
the
mischaracterizations
J.A. 71.
in
Kortrights
harassing his wife and that it had been sent without Gunthers
participation.
J.A. 71.
reimbursement
benefits
of
$30,000.
recognized,
reinstatement
rather
than
front
presumptive
and
remedy
for
unlawful
preferred
whistleblower cases.
As
the
ALJ
pay
is
the
discharge
in
Co., Nos. 98-166 & 98-169, 2001 WL 168898 (Dept of Labor Feb.
9, 2001)).
pay
may
be
an
appropriate
substitute,
as
the
ALJ
concluded.
Neither party has appealed the threshold determination that
front pay and not reinstatement was the proper remedy in this
case, and so the only issue before us is the calculation of the
front pay award.
occupied
Bryant
v.
1542547,
had
she
Mendenhall
at
*6
remained
employed
or
Acquisition
Corp.,
No.
04-014,
June
30,
2005)
(Dept
of
Labor
been
reinstated.
2005
WL
(internal
calculate
reasonably
certain
front
pay
award.
Id.
(quoting McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
in
front
pay
awards
rest
shaping
the
appropriate
in
the
remedy.
discretion
Duke
v.
of
the
Uniroyal
Deltek
devotes
only
single,
largely
conclusory
But reading
We disagree.
of damages that included her annual salary and benefits, and the
ALJ used that data to calculate the value of four years of front
pay, essentially multiplying by four.
some
speculation
Barbour
(emphasis
v.
in
about
Merrill,
48
original),
future
F.3d
but
earnings
1270,
the
ALJ
1280
and
[was]
necessary,
(D.C.
Cir.
the
Board
1995)
made
the
J.A.
83. 9
choice
perhaps
of
the
four
years
inclusion
as
of
the
tuition
period
for
front
reimbursement
pay
(and
benefits
for
Gunther
sought ten years of front pay, arguing that it would take her at
least that long to regain the professional status she lost when
Deltek fired her.
college
degree.
We
think
that
determination,
as
to
obtain
finance
position
again
had
been
unable
to
from
her
prior
employer
position
as
cannot
agree
with
Deltek
that
the
ALJ
provided
no
by
substantial
evidence.
Deltek
insists
that,
decision
to
hire
Gunther.
But
the
ALJ
considered
and
been
willing
to
give
J.A. 81.
employment
[Gunther]
chance
that
other
prospects
necessarily
involved
some
future
as
financial
analyst
without
college
necessary,
or
some
speculation
because
parties
about
have
future
introduced
earnings
is
conflicting
Gunther
was
entitled
to
be
returned
to
the
identical
financial position that she would have occupied had she not
been
terminated
activities.
unlawfully
See
Bryant,
for
2005
protected
WL
1542547,
at
whistleblowing
*6;
18
U.S.C.
The
ALJs
rationale
is
fully
explained
and
its
pay
awards
rest
in
equitable
discretion
of
court);
Traxler, 596 F.3d at 1014 (holding that district court did not
abuse discretion in setting front pay award).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Administrative Review Board.
AFFIRMED
35
determine
conclusions.
are
to
whether
that
rubber-stamping
agency
majority
in
(ALJs)
record
supports
the
agencys
undertake
review.
the
fails
review
it
fallacious
assure
factfinding.
that
Instead,
to
obligation
permits
post
the
hoc
to
we
Id.
are
In
engage
not
my
in
administrative
ergo
propter
simply
view,
the
meaningful
law
hoc
We
judges
basis
for
unreasonable
and
bears
no
relation
to
Gunthers
I. Causation
The
ALJ
found
that
Gunther
met
her
burden
to
prove
Review
Board
(the
36
Board)
J.A. 52.
affirmed
the
The
ALJs
see
why
the
J.A. 15.
ALJs
causation
finding
is
not
simply
an
agencys
abuse
conclusions
of
that
discretion,
or
are
arbitrary,
otherwise
not
in
where
the
ALJs
finding
was
supported
by
substantial
law).
reviewing
Court
is
obliged
to
take
into
487-88 (1951).
matters within its special competence, the Court must set aside
the agencys findings.
Id. at 490.
burden
protected
of
establishing
activity
termination.
was
causation
by
contributing
29 C.F.R. 1980.109(a).
showing
that
her
in
her
factor
Under this
Id.
filing
looked
of
only
at
SOX
the
complaint
sequence
of
and
her
the
termination,
events
that
led
the
ALJ
to
the
tied
the
chain
of
events
to
causation
other
But
than
happenstance.
The
ALJs
only
discussion
of
proof
of
causation
is,
38
in
termination
activities.
J.A. 52.
was
causally
related
to
the
protected
fallacy
assumption
because
inference
that
relationship.
it
makes
temporal
McClain
an
v.
based
relationship
Metabolife
on
the
proves
Intl,
Inc.,
false
causal
401
F.3d
1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d
442, 459 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the post hoc ergo propter hoc
fallacy assumes causality from temporal sequence).
The mere
occurrence
of
protected
activity
followed
by
adverse
employment action, but that is all that the ALJ found to satisfy
Gunthers
burden
of
proving
the
element
of
causation.
The
statute cannot be read to mean, as the ALJ and Board found, that
whenever an employee engages in protected activity prior to an
adverse employment action like termination, the plaintiff has
met her burden as to causation.
204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that a retaliation
claim
cannot
rest
on
the
logical
39
fallacy
of
post
hoc
ergo
177,
182
(4th
Cir.
1998)
(accord);
Bermudez
v.
TRC
Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998) (Timing may
be an important clue to causation, but does not eliminate the
need to show causation -- and [the plaintiff] really has nothing
but the post hoc ergo propter hoc argument to stand on.).
Proof of causation requires an evidentiary link between the
protected
act
and
an
adverse
event.
That
evidentiary
nexus
error and relies on a new basis for causation that neither the
ALJ nor Board found: that the explanation proffered by Deltek
for
Gunthers
termination
Delteks
pretextual
satisfied
causation.
proffered
came
the
only
pretextual
after
elements
was
of
for
ALJ
her
prima
determined
facie
more
terminating
the
or,
Gunther
that
case,
were
Gunther
including
40
which came only after the burden had shifted to Deltek to show
an affirmative defense. 2
Congress has imposed on this Court the responsibility to
ensure that an agency keeps within reasonable grounds.
responsibility
is
not
less
real
because
it
is
limited
That
to
II. Damages
The ALJ awarded Gunther four years of front pay in the
amount
of
$300,352
in
addition
to
tuition
reimbursement
of
$30,000 for the same period, although the ALJ recognized that
Gunther
field.
college
was
essentially
J.A. 81.
degree
when
an
entry
level
employee
in
new
hired
her
approximately
one
year
before her termination, but the ALJ opined that Gunther would be
unlikely to obtain employment in her chosen field without the
degree, as she did not work for [Deltek] for a sufficient period
of time to obtain on-the-job qualifications. 3
J.A. 82.
For
reasons not apparent in the record, the ALJ then awarded Gunther
four years of front pay and tuition reimbursement so that she
could attend a university full-time, without working, if she so
chooses in order to obtain a bachelors degree in accounting or
finance.
Id.
of
the
majoritys
approval
of
an
award
that
is
rankly
point.
42
See
Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 300 (4th Cir. 2009).
It is again helpful to consider the standard by which we
review the ALJs findings.
Substantial
evidence
is
more
5 U.S.C.
than
mere
accept
as
adequate
to
support
conclusion.
Consol.
Even
See also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981)
([I]t is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no
reason or for the wrong reason.).
SOX entitles a prevailing employee only to such relief
necessary to make the employee whole, including reinstatement,
back pay with interest, and various other fees and costs.
U.S.C. 1514A(c).
18
remedy
in
cases
under
the
Sarbanes-Oxley
and
other
for
the
Handling
of
43
Department of Labor,
Retaliation
Complaints
Under
Front
pay,
however,
is
disfavored.
Sellers
v.
As such, we have
Duke v. Uniroyal
A plaintiff bears
the
burden
of
providing
the
essential
data
necessary
to
McKnight v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1992).
We will
not
unduly
give
deference
speculative.
The
to
front
pay
amount
of
that
are
front
pay
awarded
awards
four
years
front
in
this
case
lacks
with
full
time
tuition
from
vocational
expert,
job
counselor,
or
any
unable
degree.
to
secure
comparable
employment
absent
college
necessary
to
calculate
reasonable
front
pay
award.
See
college
degree
would
be
prerequisite
for
obtaining
just
one
year
college
education
and
prior
to
without
her
termination
relevant
without
on-the-job
any
training.
J.A. 1281-
certificate
in
financial
forensics).
simply,
the
ALJ
did
not
temper
Her
J.A. 1282.
the
front
only
pay
See Duke,
was
she
discontinued
requires
Gunthers
attending
taking
Deltek
full
to
school
classes
bear
time,
full
after
the
time.
her
onerous
four-year
Further,
termination.
burden
college
of
Gunther
No
law
subsidizing
education,
supporting
this
award,
which
actually
puts
Gunther
in
far
J.A. 2224.
Even
at
4-Year
Institutions,
at
iii
(1999)
(noting
that
Gunther
under
she
would
the
never
only
Deltek
bachelors degree.
missed
one
accumulate
plan
--
and
72
barely
performed
satisfactorily,
credit
hours
in
four
half
those
needed
years
for
her in a far better position than she could have been in while
employed at Deltek.
Nothing in the record shows Gunther had a specific plan,
much less a plan approved by Deltek, to obtain any level of
46
degree
is
fundamentally
divorced
from
what
is
See
also Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir.
1985) (The cost of obtaining a college degree, cited by the
plaintiff
as
basis
for
the
front
pay
award,
cannot
be
Inc.,
of
29
F.
Supp.
college
2d
1003
education
(N.D.
should
Iowa
not
be
1998)
borne
([T]he
by
[the
patently
speculative.
evidence
Moreover,
justifying
lengthy
failed
to
any
award.
47
has
present
such
Gunther
prospective
only had the foresight to demand twenty years of front pay, she
would have received an eight-year pay award.
But rejection of
for
if
Gunther
could
obtain
sufficient
on-the-job
is
not
circumstance
where
longtime
employee
is
terminated from a post she held for years and years and faces a
vastly
different
requirements.
termination
job
market
with
expanded
job-credential
without
college
degree,
48
and
nothing
precludes
and
capricious
agency
act.
The
Court
owes
no
in
the
record
and
shows
no
discretion,
restraint
and
III. Conclusion
For
all
the
foregoing
reasons,
believe
the
majority
we
engage
in
meaningful
review
of
agency
decisions.
reasoning
and
front
pay
award
that
is
unduly
49