Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
1
War is dead. We are now left with an international
order of deterrence, ushered in by US-Sino
Engagement
Baudrillard 81 (Jean, Simulacra and Simulation: The Orbital and the
Nuclear, 1981, ML)
The simultaneity of two events in the month of July 1975 illustrated this in a striking
manner: the linkup in space of the two American and Soviet supersatellites, apotheosis of
peaceful coexistence - the suppression by the Chinese of ideogrammatic writing and conversion to
the Roman alphabet. The latter signifies the "orbital" instantiation of an abstract and
modelized system of signs, into whose orbit all the once unique forms of style
and writing will be reabsorbed. The satellization of language: the means for
the Chinese to enter the system of peaceful coexistence , which is inscribed in
their heavens at precisely the same time by the linkup of the two satellites. Orbital flight of the Big
Two, neutralization and homogenization of everyone else on earth. Yet, despite this
deterrence by the orbital power - the nuclear or molecular code - events continue at ground
level, misfortunes are even more numerous, given the global process of the
contiguity and simultaneity of data. But, subtly, they no longer have any
meaning, they are no longer anything but the duplex effect of simulation at the
summit. The best example can only be that of the war in Vietnam, because it took place at
the intersection of a maximum historical and "revolutionary" stake, and of the
installation of this deterrent authority. What meaning did this war have, and wasn't its
unfolding a means of sealing the end of history in the decisive and culminating historic event of our era?
Why did this war, so hard, so long, so ferocious, vanish from one day to the
next as if by magic? Why did this American defeat (the largest reversal in the
history of the USA) have no internal repercussions in America? If it had really
signified the failure of the planetary strategy of the United States, it would
necessarily have completely disrupted its internal balance and the American
political system. Nothing of the sort occurred. Something else, then, took
place. This war, at bottom, was nothing but a crucial episode of peaceful
coexistence. It marked the arrival of China to peaceful coexistence . The
nonintervention of China obtained and secured after many years, Chinas
apprenticeship to a global modus vivendi , the shift from a global strategy of
revolution to one of shared forces and empires, the transition from a radical alternative to
political alternation in a system now essentially regulated (the normalization of Peking - Washington
reduction of forces can be seen on the field. The war lasted as long as elements irreducible to a healthy
politics and discipline of power, even a Communist one, remained unliquidated. When at last the war had
passed into the hands of regular troops in the North and escaped that of the resistance, the war could
stop: it had attained its objective. The stake is thus that of a political relay. As soon as the Vietnamese had
proved that they were no longer the carriers of an unpredictable subversion, one could let them take over.
That theirs is a Communist order is not serious in the end: it had proved itself, it could be trusted. It is even
more effective than capitalism in the liquidation of "savage" and archaic precapitalist structures. Same
scenario in the Algerian war.
behind
the armed violence, the murderous antagonism of the adversaries - which seems a matter of life
and death, which is played out as such (or else one could never send people to get themselves killed in
this kind of thing), behind
verisimilitude of the final montage. The moralists of war, the holders of high wartime values should not be
too discouraged:
the war is no less atrocious for being only a simulacrum - the flesh
This
objective is always fulfilled, just like that of the charting of territories and of disciplinary sociality.
What no longer exists is the adversity of the adversaries , the reality of antagonistic
suffers just the same, and the dead and former combatants are worth the same as in other wars.
causes, the ideological seriousness of war. And also the reality of victory or defeat, war being a process
etc.) never started, never existed, except as artificial occurrences - abstract, ersatz, and as artifacts of
The
media and the official news service are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality,
history, catastrophes and crises destined to maintain a historical investment under hypnosis.
of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of facts. All the events are to be read backward, or one
becomes aware (as
was still an attempt to create a dramaturgy of life, the last gasp of an ideality of the body, of blood, of
violence in a system that was already taking it away, toward a reabsorption of all the stakes without a
the trick has been played. All dramaturgy, and even all real writing of
Simulation is the master, and we only have a right to the
retro, to the phantom, parodic rehabilitation of all lost referentials . Everything
still unfolds around us, in the cold light of deterrence (including Artaud, who has the
trace of blood. For us
right like everything else to his revival, to a second existence as the referential of cruelty).
only now unconstrained by any nomos and resistant to the forms what
would be imposed upon it by any single decision or decider. It is, put
simply, the mode of polemicity that corresponds the generalized anomie that
has washed over the Earth with the emergence of the sea of globalization.
ironically may lead to an intensification of the biopolitical predicament in which the sovereign exception has become the
philosophy.
Nonetheless, China has been an actively involved party in Operation Enduring Freedom. It has provided police training for
Afghanistans security forces, as well as mine-clearance. Though it was opposed to the US invasion of Iraq without UN mandate,
China has emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the occupation, as it is one of the biggest winners of oil contracts in Iraq.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, China has been accused of free-riding on American efforts, but China has nonetheless been clearly
and the US with regards to Afghanistan: We both hope Afghanistan will continue to maintain stability We both hope to see the
China
and the USA have jointly engaged in what is termed advisory and capacitybuilding for Afghans, for example in training Afghan diplomats, and their cooperation continues around shared goals in the region. Much could be said
here about Chinas participation in the American-led globalization project and
war on terror. My point here is simply to note that whatever we read America as doing through its war on terror, China is a
supporting and benefiting actor in this process. It is clearly positioned as part of this global idea
of self. At the same time, however, China is also portrayed, from within
and without, as a challenger, an alternative, or an other to that global,
American or Western order.
reconstruction of Afghanistan and we both dont want to see the resurgence of terrorism (cited in Chen Weihua, 2013).
We therefore turn next to the Chinese scholarly and governmental rhetoric that claims to offer such an alternative or challenge to
the Western way of war that Baudrillard criticized and that we can see China joining in the war on terror. (ii). Contemporary PRC rhetoric on pre-modern Chinese thought on war In contemporary China, the official
rhetoric on war focuses on pre-emption and the claim that China will never be a hegemonic or warmongering power unlike the US. In this rhetoric, the Chinese war is by nature a non-war. Official documents
emerging in the last decade repeatedly stress that China is by nature peaceful, which is why nobody needs to worry about its rise. In the 2005 government whitepaper Chinas Peaceful Development Road, for
example, we are told that: [i]t is an inevitable choice based on Chinas historical and cultural tradition that China persists unswervingly in taking the road of peaceful development. The Chinese nation has always
been a peace-loving one. Chinese culture is a pacific culture. The spirit of the Chinese people has always featured their longing for peace and pursuit of harmony (State Council of the PRC 2005b). The whitepaper
(and numerous other official and unofficial publications) posit an essentialised Chinese culture of peacefulness as prior to any Chinese relations with the world. This rhetoric of an inherently non-bellicose Chinese
way has also echoed in Chinese academic debates, where Chinese pre-modern philosophy has come back in fashion as a (selectively sampled) source of inspiration. The claims and logics that have come out of
these debates are varied. One significant grouping of Chinese academics directly follow the government line and claim that choosing peaceful rise is on the one hand Chinas voluntary action, on the other hand it
is an inevitable choice (Liu Jianfei 2006: 38). That peacefulness and harmony is something that Chinese people have always valued is an implication, and often explicitly stated fact in these literatures. Zhan
Yunling, for example, claims that from ancient times until today, China has possessed traditional thought and a culture of seeking harmony (Zhang Yunling 2008: 4). This claim to natural harmony is mutually
A related set of
commentators further stress the significance of militarily non-violent means
to China getting its (naturally peaceful) way in international relations
This line of
argument typically sees what some would call soft power tools as a way of
getting others to become more like yourself without any need for outright
war or other forms of physical violence
supportive of the claim that the Chinese nation has always been a peaceful nation, to authors such as Liu Jianfei (2006), or Yu Xiaofeng and Wang Jiangli (2006).
Sheng draws on the Sunzi quote mentioned above: to subjugate the enemys army without doing battle is the highest of excellence (Ding Sheng 2008: 197).
. In a discussion of the official government rhetoric of harmonious world under former president Hu
Jintao, Shi Zhongwen accordingly stresses that the doctrine opposes going to extremes, and therefore contradicts what Shi calls the philosophy of struggle (Shi Zhongwen 2008: 40, where struggle implies Marxist
ideology). Qin Zhiyong similarly argues that China needs to steer away from collisions and embrace the aim of merging different cultures (Qin Zhiyong 2008: 73). At the same time, few Chinese academics question
the direction of the merging of cultures discussed above clearly it is other cultures that should merge into Chinas peaceful one. In a common line of thought that draws on the historical concept of Tianxia, or Allunder-heaven, it is argued that the Chinese leadership can thus bring about a harmonious world through voluntary submission [by others] rather than force simply through its superior morality and exemplary
behaviour (Yan Xuetong 2008: 159). On this logic, the leadership will never need to use violence, because everybody will see its magnanimity and will want to emulate its behaviour (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 34. See
Callahan 2008: 755 for a discussion). Much of these debates have come to pivot around this concept of Tianxia, an imaginary of the world that builds on a holistic notion of space, without radical self-other
distinction or bordered difference. To some thinkers, this imagination is based on a notion of globalisation (for example Yu Xiaofeng and Wang Jiangli 2006: 59) or networked space (Ni Shixiong and Qian Xuming
2008: 124) where everything is always already connected to everything else in a borderless world. In these accounts, Tianxia thinking is completely different from Western civilisation, since Chinese civilisation
insists on its own subjectivity, and possesses inclusivity (Zhou Jianming and Jiao Shixin 2008: 28). Despite this apparent binary, it is claimed that Tianxiaism involves an identification with all of humankind, where
there is no differentiation or distinction between people (Li Baojun and Li Zhiyong 2008: 82). A thinker whose deployment of the Tianxia concept has been particularly influential is Zhao Tingyang, who proposes the
concept as a Chinese and better way of imagining world order (Zhao Tingyang 2005; 2006), where better means better than the Western inter-state system to which Tianxia is portrayed as the good opposite. In
opposition to this Western system, he argues that Tianxia can offer a view from nowhere or a view from the world, where [w]orld-ness cannot be reduced to internationality, for it is of the wholeness or totality
rather than the between-ness (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 39). However, as a consequence of a prioritisation of order over the preservation of alterity, any inconsistency or contradiction in the system will be a disaster
(Zhao Tingyang 2006: 33). As a corollary of this prioritisation, Zhao comes to insist on the homogeneity of his all-inclusive space, which aims at the uniformity of society (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 33, emphasis in
original) where all political levels should be essentially homogenous or homological so as to create a harmonious system (2006: 33). The aim of the Tianxia system is thus to achieve one single homogeneous
and uniform space. Clearly, for such homogeneity to be born from a heterogeneous world, someone must change. Zhao argues that: one of the principles of Chinese political philosophy is said to turn the enemy
this
conversion to a single good homogeneity should happen
through volontariness rather than through
expansive colonialism: an empire of All-under-Heaven could only
into a friend, and it would lose its meaning if it were not to remove conflicts and pacify social problems in a word, to transform () the bad into the good (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 34). Moreover,
This
complete and perfect understanding is hence attainable only to an elite,
who will achieve homogeneity (convert others into self) through example.
Eventually, then, there will be no other, the many will have been
problems are domestic, Zhao says that this model guarantees the a prioricompleteness of the world (Callahan 2007: 7).
transformed into the one (Zhao Tingyang 2005: 13, see also 2006). It is through this
transformation and submission to the ruling elite that the prevention
of war is imagined. If Baudrillard had engaged with these contemporary Chinese redeployments
of pre-modern thought on war (which, to my knowledge, he never did), I think he would have
recognised many of the themes that interested him in Western approaches to the first Gulf
war. Most strikingly, this is a way of talking about war that writes out war from its story. Like deterrence, it is an
imagination of war that approaches it via prevention and pre-emption . What
is more, we recognise an obsession with the self-image of the self to itself in
this case, a Chinese, undemocratic self rather than a Western, democratic
one. In this Chinese war, like in the Persian Gulf of which Baudrillard wrote, there is
no space for an Other that is Other. In the Tianxia imaginary, Others can only be imagined as something
that will eventually assimilate into The System and become part of the Self, as the Self strives for all-inclusive perfection. There is
certainly not to say that there are not those who fear a Chinese war or that we have no reason to fear it. In various guises, the war
that is imagined through a Clausewitzean ontology of agonistic and reciprocal exchange returns and is reified also in China. It is not
uncommon for authors discussing the Chinese traditions of thinking war that I describe above to begin their discussion by explicitly
drawing on Clausewitz and take his war as their point of departure (for example Liu Tiewa 2014). For several Chinese writers, it is
clear that this building of a harmonious world is directed against others whose influence should be smashed (Fang Xiaojiao 2008:
68). From this line of thinkers, the call to build a harmonious world has also been used to argue for increased Chinese military
capacity, including its naval power (Deng Li 2009). Although Chinese policy documents stress that violence or threat of violence
should be avoided, they similarly appear to leave room for means that would traditionally be understood as both hard and soft in
Joseph Nyes dichotomisation (See for example State Council of the PRC 2005a). Indeed, many of Chinas neighbours have voiced
The arguments and assumptions underpinning this strategy are laid out most clearly in a 2008 Foreign Affairs
article by Princeton professor John Ikenberry entitled The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Ikenberry
takes it as axiomatic that Chinas power will continue to grow while, at least
in relative terms, that of the United States inevitably declines. According to him, what
political scientists refer to as a power transition, in which a previously dominant state
is eventually displaced by a rising one, is thus under way. Although the
history of such transitions has often been violent, Ikenberry believes that,
properly handled, this one need not be. As he explains, the current USled Western order is hard to overturn and easy to join. Even if China wanted
to overthrow it, the existence of nuclear weapons has made war among great powers unlikely eliminating the
major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemons.1
Thankfully, war-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.2 More to the point, if its leaders see
their interests as Ikenberry believes they must, China should have no reason to risk such drastic and dangerous
massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system.4 In the security
domain, the norms of state sovereignty and the rule of law have provided China with a measure of protection
and reassurance, even when it was relatively weak, and they continue to serve its interests.5 At the highest
the existing global system provides new entrants with ways of gaining
status and authority and opportunities to play a role in its governance . Small
wonder, then, that, as Ikenberry sees it, China is increasingly working within , rather
than outside of, the Western order.6 The prescriptions that follow from this analysis are
straightforward and reassuring. Basically, Washington needs to stay the course ,
demonstrating renewed faith in the resilience and attractive power of the
system it built after the Second World War. The United States must invest
in bolstering the existing order, reinforcing the rules and institutions
that comprise it, and avoiding actions that might undermine them in
pursuit of short-term advantage. Properly managed, the current system
can continue to function, and to serve Americas interests, even as its
power declines relative to Chinas. In short, the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic
struggle The Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift
into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States.7 Regarding
levels,
the balancing part of US strategy, Ikenberry advocates the preservation of existing alliances, which he describes
as having primarily political value as part of a wider Western institutional structure.8 On the question of
the United States should try to ease Beijing down the road
toward liberalising domestic political reform, he appears to favour a longwhether and, if so, how
term, indirect approach. Even though the rules and institutions of the existing system are rooted in
the evolving forces of democracy and capitalism, it is apparently unnecessary for a nation to be democratic to
Hegel defines the life of the Spirit. The life of the Spirit, he says, is not that life which is frightened of
death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its
is that the others have died of their singularity and that is a noble death whereas we are dying from the
loss of all singularity, from the extermination of our values, and that is not a noble death. We think that the
destiny of any single value is its elevation to the universal without taking heed of the mortal danger that
this promotion represents. Rather than an elevation, it is a reduction or shall we say an elevation to a
degree zero of value. At the time of the Enlightenment, universalisation was a top down affair, in a process
of continuous advancement. Today, it is bottom up and involves a neutralisation of values as a result of
globalisation. When the dynamic of the universal as transcendence, as ideal, and as utopia becomes a
reality, it ceases to exist as transcendence, as ideal, as utopia. The gobalisation of exchange puts an end
to the universality of values. It is the triumph of monothought over universal thought. What is globalised is
first of all the market, the promiscuity of exchange of anything and everything, the perpetual movement of
money. Culturally speaking, this is the anything goes promiscuity of the signifier and of values; in other
words, pornography. The endless stream flooding the net with anything and everything, this is
pornography. No need for sexual indecency, the simple existence of this interactive copulation is all it
takes. At theend of this process, there is no longer any difference between the global and the universal.
Marginalisation and exclusion, are no accident: they are in the very logic of
globalisation which, unlike the universal, breaks apart the existing structures,
all the better to assimilate them. On every level the gaps grow wider, become irreversible. A
little like the universe where the galaxies are moving away from one another at such prodigious speeds. If
this is the case, one might well ask whether the universal hasn't already succumbed under the weight of
its own critical mass, whether it ever had any real existence other than in official discourse and moral
codes. In any event, for us, the mirror of the universal is shattered (one could even see it as a kind of
threatened are surviving; those we believed had disappeared are coming back to life. Japan, once again, is
a remarkable case in point. Japan, better than any other country, has made a success of globalisation
(technical, economic, financial) without going through the phase of the universal (the succession of middleclass ideologies and forms of political organisation) and without losing anything of its singularity, despite
what is said to the contrary. One could even say that it is precisely because Japan was never lumbered with
the concept of the universal that it succeeded so well technically and globally, by bringing together the
singular (the power of tradition) and the global (the power of the virtual, that is, the internet revolution ).
Behind the increasingly fierce resistance to globalisation, social and political resistance which can seem
like an archaic refusal of modernity at all costs, one cannot but read a reaction against the domination of
the universal, a kind of painful revisionism in respect to the achievements of modernity, and in respect to
the idea of progress and of History, a rejection not only of the (in)famous global techno-structure, but of
the underlying monoculturalism, the mental structure that places all cultures, from every continent under
the one sign of the universal. This resurgence, or, one might even say, this "insurrection" of singularity can
take on violent, anomalous, irrational forms from the perspective of (so-called) "enlightened" thought;
ethnic, religious, linguistic, but also on an individual level, forms of neurosis and personality disorder. But it
would be a monumental error (the same error which can be seen in the moralistic orchestration of political
correctness common to all power structures and the majority of "intellectuals") to write off these
movements of revolt as populist, archaic, or even terrorist. Every event that makes its mark in the world
today, does so in reaction to this abstract universality (including the antagonism of Islam towards Western
values - it is because Islam is the most violent critic of this Western globalisation that Islam is public enemy
number one today). If we refuse to understand this, we will exhaust ourselves in an endless contest
between a universal thought sure of its power and sure of its rightness, and an ever increasing number of
irreducible singularities. Even in our societies, which are thoroughly acculturated to the universal, it is clear
that nothing that has been sacrificed to this concept has truly disappeared. It has simply gone
underground. And what is being played out in reverse today is an entire history supposedly progressivist,
an entire evolutionism cristallised around its ultimate end, which, moreover, has been completely lost sight
of in the meantime. Today this utopia is dislocated, and its dislocation at the deepest levels is proceeding
even faster than its imposition by force. What we are dealing with here is a complex three level process:
the globalisation of exchange, the universality of values and the singularity of forms (languages, cultures,
individuals, character types, but also chance, accident etc.- everything the universal is bound to reject as
exception or anomaly). But, the situation is changing and is becoming more and more extreme as universal
values lose their authority and legitimacy. As long as they were accepted as mediating values, they
succeeded (more or less) in integrating singularities as differences within a universal culture of difference.
But the die has not yet been cast, even if for universal values, all bets are definitely off The stakes have
risen and globalisation is by no means a sure winner. Everywhere its dissolving and homogenising force is
being challenged by emerging forces heterogeneous in nature, which are not only different but
antagonistic and irreducible. What may emerge, out of the shattering of the global system, are
singularities. Now, these singularities are neither negative nor positive. They are not an alternative to
global order, they are on a different scale. They are not subject to value judgements; so they can be either
the best or the worst. Their one absolute saving grace is to allow us to break out of the straitjacket of
totality. They cannot be federated in a single historical move. They are the despair of every would-be
dominant monothought. But they are not a monocounterthought. They invent their own rules of the game,
This is what
the Fourth World War will be about, and it will be the only truly world war, since its
stakes are globalisation itself. Culture itself started off as a singularity. That is, an incomparable,
and their most likely fate is the fate of heresies: to be eradicated by global orthodoxy.
irreducible, inexchangeable form. Then came the concept of universal culture. Then the current
globalisation of a culture which had become a global product. I would like to talk a little more about this
"fate of culture" which poses for each of us, within the context of the global, the problem of cultural
identity.
being fought out in the courts. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in
its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated
is being indicted for, above all, is its commission of lawfare: the use of its own
penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its
charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of
violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word . Also, to commit its own
ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in
the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) is equally marked in
to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, Drive Out Trash, which has forced
political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of slum clearance has recently taken this
practice to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the
that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts
to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the
Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the
play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in
this respect from other nation-states? The answer to the first question looks obvious. The
turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about
lawlessness. But this does not explain the displacement of the political into
the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs .
The fetishism, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It has to do with the
very constitution of the postcolonial polity. Late modernist nationhood, it appears, is
undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity : a
nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity (Anderson 1983). The rise of
key questions:
neoliberalism with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on geographies
of production and accumulation has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected
with growing
heterodoxy, legal instruments appear to offer a means of
commensuration (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): a repertoire of standardised terms
and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and
interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage . Hence the flight into
a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces heterogeneity in highly
individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less
and less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more
global, ever more authoritative discourse. But there is something else at work too. A wellfrom the first on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because,
recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the outsourcing by states of many of the
conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the conduct of
of the weak, the strong and everyone in between . Which, in turn, exacerbates
the resort to lawfare. The court has become a utopic site to which
human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends .
This, once again, is particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not
elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this
it unsurprising that a culture of legality should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal
undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime appropriates, re-commissions
and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in
Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the
national economy (Standing 2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions
of government, not least security provision. Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world
often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders against the persons, property
and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either has
stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even
structured as franchises and, significantly, are said to offer alternative citizenship to their members.35
Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that modern states operate much like organised crime.
the counterfeiting of
a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and
disorder. After all, once government outsources its policing services and
franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by
providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself becomes
like a hall of mirrors. What is more, this dialectic has its own geography. A
geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties . We said a moment ago that
communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their
affairs; it is often in the process of so doing , in fact, that they become
communities at all, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. Herein lies
their will to sovereignty, which we take to connote the exercise of
autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of
those who fall within its purview and the extension over them of the
jurisdiction of some kind of law. Lawmaking, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet
again, is power making. But power is the principal of all lawmaking . In sum, to
transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture
of legalities. Or their simulacra
These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently,
One of the most important aspects of your work has been to argue why
the original sentiment which provoked Deleuze and Guattaris Nomadology
narrative needed to be challenged. With the onset of a global war machine
which showed absolutely no respect for state boundaries, matched by the rise
of many local fires of resistance which had no interest in capturing state power, the
Evans:
sentiment that History is always written from the victory of States could now be brought firmly into
question. On a theoretical level alone, the need to bring the Nomadology Treatise up to date was an
important move. However, there was something clearly more at stake for you than simply attempting to
One gets the impression from your works that you were
deeply troubled by what was taking place with this new found
humanitarianism. Indeed, as you suggest, if we accept that this changing political
terrain demanded a rewriting of war itselfaway from geo-political territorial
struggles which once monopolised the strategic field, towards bio-political life struggles
whose unrelenting wars were now to be consciously fought for the politics of all life
itself, then it could be argued that the political stakes could not be higher.
canonise Deleuze and Guattari.
For not only does a bio-political ascendency force a re-conceptualisation of the war effortto include those
forces which are less militaristic and more developmental (one can see this best reflected today in the now
familiar security mantra War by Other Means), but through this process a new paradigm appears which
makes it possible to envisage for the first time in human history a Global State of War or a Civil War on a
everybody within, some have argued that the picture became more clouded with the invasion of Iraq which
going back to the original War on Terrors life-centric remit is once again calling for the need to step up the
humanitarian war effort in order to secure the global peace. Indeed, perhaps more worrying still, given that
the return of the Kantian inspired humanitarian sensibility can now be presented in an altogether more
globally enlightened fashion, offering a marked and much needed departure from the destructive but
ultimately powerless (in the positive sense of the word) self-serving neo-con, then it is possible to detect a
more intellectually vociferous shift taking place which is rendering all forms of political difference to be
truly dangerous on a planetary scale. With this in mind, I would like your thoughts on the Global State of
War today. What for instance do you feel have been the most important changes in the paradigm since you
first proposed the idea? And would you argue that war is still the permanent social relation of global rule?
designates conflict within a single territory in which one or both of the parties is not sovereign. War
designates, in other words, a conflict in some sense external to the structures of sovereignty and civil war
a conflict internal to them. It is clear that few if any of the instances of armed conflict around the world
today fit the classic model of war between sovereign states. And perhaps even the great conflicts of the
cold war, from Korea and Vietnam to countries throughout Latin America, already undermined the
distinction, draping the conflict between sovereign states in the guise of local civil wars. Toni Negri and I
thus claimed that in our era there is no more war but only civil wars or, really, a global civil war. It is
probably more precise to say instead that the distinction between war and civil war has been undermined,
in the same way that one might say, in more metaphorical terms, not that there is no more outside but
rather that the division between inside and outside has been eroded. This claim is also widely recognized,
it seems to me, among military and security theorists. The change from the framework of war to that of
civil war, for instance, corresponds closely to thinking of armed conflicts as not military campaigns but
police actions, and thus a shift from the external to the internal use of force. The general rhetorical move
from war to security marks in more general terms a similar shift. The security mantra that you cite war
by other means also indicates how the confusion between inside and outside implies the mixture of a
series of fields that are traditionally separate: war and politics, for example, but also killing and generating
forms of social life. This opens a complicated question about the ways in which contemporary military
actions have become biopolitical and what that conception helps us understand about them. Rather than
pursuing that biopolitical question directly, though, I want first to understand better how the shift in the
relationship between war and sovereignty that Toni and I propose relates to your notion of liberal and
interest as long as they remain within the confines of international law. Whereas those inside , in other
words, are at least in principle privilege to the liberal framework of rights and representation, those outside
division declines between the inside and outside of sovereignty, on the one hand, the liberal logic must be
deployed (however inadequately) to justify the use of violence over what was the outside while, on the
other, liberal logics are increasingly diluted or suppressed in what was the inside. Evans: What I am
proposing with the Liberal War Thesis borrows from some pioneering works which have already started to
cover the main theoretical ground2 . Central to this approach is an attempt to critically evaluate global
Liberal governance (which includes both productive and non-productive elements) by questioning its will to
Liberal Peace is thus challenged, not on the basis of its abstract claims to universality
otherwise, but precisely because its global imaginary shows a
remarkable capacity to wage warby whatever meansin order to
govern all species life. This is not, then, to be confused with some militaristic appropriation of
rule.
juridical or
the democratic body politica situation in which Liberal value systems have been completely undermined
by the onslaught of the military mind. More revealing, it exposes the intricate workings of a Liberal
rationality whose ultimate pursuit is global political dominance. Traces of this account can no doubt be
found in Michael Ignatieffs (completely sympathetic) book Empire Lite, which notes how the gradual
confluence between the humanitarian and the military has resulted in the onset of an ostensibly
humanitarian empire that is less concerned with territory (although the State no doubt still figures) than it
Liberalism as such is
considered here ( la Foucault) to be a technology of government or a means
for strategising power which taking life to be its object feels compelled to wager the
destiny of humanity against its own political strategy. Liberalism can therefore be said to
betray a particularly novel strategic field in which the writing of threat assumes
both planetary (macro-specific) and human (micro-specific) ascriptions. Although it should
be noted that it is only through giving the utmost priority to life itself
working to secure life from each and every threats posed to an otherwise
progressive existence, that its global imaginary could ever hold sway. No coincidence
is with governing life itself for its own protection and betterment.
then that the dominant strategic paradigm for Liberals is Global Human Security. What could therefore be
the Liberal problematic of security of course registers as a Liberal biopolitics of security, which in the process of promoting certain forms of life
equally demands a re-conceptualisation of war in the sense that not every life
lives up to productive expectations, let alone shows its compliance . In a number
of crucial ways, this approach offers both a theoretical and empirical challenge to
termed
the familiar IR scripts which have tended to either valorise Liberalisms visionary potential or simply
castigate its misguided idealism. Perhaps the most important of these is to insist upon a rewriting of the
history of Liberalism from the perspective of war. Admittedly, there is much work to be done here. Not
least, there is a need to show with greater historical depth, critical purpose, and intellectual rigour how
Liberal war (both externally and internally) has subsequently informed its juridical commitments and not
vice versa. Here I am invariably provoking the well rehearsed Laws of War sermon, which I believe more
accurately should be rephrased to be the Wars of Law. Nevertheless, despite this pressing need to
rewrite the Liberal encounter in language whose familiarity would be capable of penetrating the rather
conservative but equally esoteric/specialist field of International Relations, sufficient contemporary
grounds already exist which enable us to provide a challenging account of global civil war from the
perspective of Liberal bio-political rule. Michael Dillon and Julian Reids The Liberal Way of War
A bio-political
discourse of species existence is also a bio-political discourse of species
endangerment. As a form of rule whose referent object is that of species existence, the liberal way
of rule is simultaneously also a problematisation of fear and danger involving threats to the
peace and prosperity of the species. Hence its allied need, in the pursuing the peace and
prosperity of the species, to make war on whatever threatens it. That is the
reason why liberal peacemaking is lethal. Its violence a necessary corollary of the
encapsulates these sentiments, with the following abridged passage worth quoting:
aporetic character of its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species... There is, then, a
martial face to liberal peace. The liberal way of rule is contoured by the liberal way of war ...
Liberalism
is therefore obliged to exercise a strategic calculus of necessary killing, in the
course of which calculus ought to be able to say how much killing is enough...
[However] it has no better way of saying how much killing is enough, once it starts killing to make life live,
than does the geopolitical strategic calculus of necessary killing3 . This brings me to the problem of the
carve out any meaningful distinctions between inside/outside, peace/war, friend/enemy, good/evil,
truth/falsehood and so forth. However, whilst this approach would no doubt either re-enforce the
militaristic paradigm or raise further critical doubts about the post-modern/post-structural turn in political
how Foucaults bio-politics was inadequate to our complex, adaptive and emergent times. To rectify this,
Deleuzes notion of Control Societies was introduced which is more in line with
How can the relationship between global risk and the creation of a global public be understood?, Beck
discusses a globalization
Greenpeace enjoy a high level of legitimacy in the public sphere and are increasingly entrusted with the
task of globally monitoring issues of human rights and ecology. Although Nussbaum and Beck
enthusiastically endorse cosmopolitanism as a solution for past injustices and a promise of better
the same boat, and that makes all the difference. For Beck, the tsunamis resulted in the
globalization of compassion; but, as an instructive contrast, I would like to consider a moment in
Spivaks narrative of a major cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991 and the
subsequent intervention by Mdecins sans frontire s. The MSF workers, none of whom
spoke the local language, were obliged to work through interpreters. When Spivak later arrived at one of
authentic victims who truly deserve our benevolence. What do we do with our will to empower the
disenfranchised and the vulnerable, and how do we deal with those who refuse to be interpellated as
appropriate objects of our solidarity?
declined only because its form and strategies have changed. If we take Manichaean divisions and rigid
exclusionary practices (in South Africa, in the colonial city, in the southeastern United States, or in
Palestine) as the paradigm of modern racisms, we must now ask what is the postmodern form of racism
and what are its strategies in today's imperial society. Many analysts describe this passage as a shift in the
dominant theoretical form of racism, from a racist theory based on biology to one based on culture. The
dominant modern racist theory and the concomitant practices of segregation are centered on essential
biological differences among races. Blood and genes stand behind the differences in skin color as the real
substance of racial difference. Subordinated peoples are thus conceived (at least implicitly) as other than
human, as a different order of being. These modern racist theories grounded in biology imply or tend
toward an ontological difference-a necessary, eternal, and immutable rift in the order of being. In response
to this theoretical position, then, modern antiracism positions itself against the notion of biological
essentialism, and insists that differences among the races are constituted instead by social and cultural
forces. These modern anti-racist theorists operate on the belief that social constructivism will free us from
the straitjacket of biological determinism: if our differences are socially and culturally determined, then all
humans are in principle equal, of one ontological order, one nature .
hatred and fear. In this way imperial racist theory attacks modern anti-racism from the rear,
and actually coopts and enlists its arguments. Imperial racist theory agrees that
races do not constitute isolable biological units and that nature
cannot be divided into different human races. It also agrees that the
behavior of individuals and their abilities or aptitudes are not the
result of their blood or their genes, but are due to their belonging to
different historically determined cultures.[14] Differences are thus not fixed and
immutable but contingent effects of social history. Imperial racist theory and modern anti-racist theory are
really saying very much the same thing, and it is difficult in this regard to tell them apart. In fact, it is
precisely because this relativist and culturalist argument is assumed to be necessarily antiracist that the
dominant ideology of our entire society can appear to be against racism, and that imperial racist theory
accustomed to thinking that nature and biology are fixed and immutable but that culture is plastic and
is a
clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings."33 With such risks in
mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these
In pondering the
modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body
machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the
organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but
both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that
obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Selfannihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as
self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the
"highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of
political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life ."
representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter.
the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the
bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon.
bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the
when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept
the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological
the Irreverent, distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of
counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the
distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking it out, of the turbaned
Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?)
as a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully
modern, animated through technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or
even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body.
CASE
Solvency
China says no multiple warrants
Lundestad and Tunsj 14 professor of international contemporary
history and has a doctorate in history from the University of Oslo AND
Associate Professor at the Center for Asia Security Studies [Ingrid Lundestad
and ystein Tunsj, 2014, The United States and China in the Arctic, Polar
Record 51 (259): 392403 (2015), Cambridge University Press 2014,
doi:10.1017/S0032247414000291] AMarb
There are substantial and obvious differences between the United States and
China in the Arctic. The US is an Arctic coastal state, with a more longstanding
interest in the region. It has a population, territory, EEZ and continental shelf in the
Arctic. The US has also for decades had a significant presence in the broader circumpolar region. It is a
member of Arctic cooperative forums such as the AC. The US has strong influence and
maintains broad interests in the Arctic, including significant strategic and political interests, due
to its regional and global responsibilities. The freedom of the seas, facilitating US
presence and activity, remains a top priority for the US, in the Arctic, as
elsewhere. Compared to the US, China is a relative newcomer and first showed its interest
in the region when it started Arctic scientific research in the 1990s. China is not an Arctic state,
has no Arctic coastline and has no sovereign rights in the area. Thus, Chinas
access to the Arctic is more constrained and the US and China are unequal
powers in Arctic affairs. Also the types and broadness of interests the two countries have in
the region are significantly different. On the one hand, the United States has interests in most
if not all issues pertaining to the Arctic region, related to diplomacy, defence, economy,
including energy, the environment, research, and the indigenous population.
China on the other hand, has more limited interests in the region,
primarily pertaining to economic development and research . Thus the
roles of the two countries in the Arctic are quite different. Even with such an uneven
foundation for their current engagement in the north, there are some similarities in how the two countries
view the region. On a general basis,
in
approaches to the Arctic, which may be more similar than the case between, for instance, China
and other Arctic states. As great powers with more or less a global outlook, the Arctic is viewed as
just one region among many in their respective foreign policies. For many of the
other Arctic countries, perhaps most notably Canada and Norway, the north has a much more prominent
terror focused on the broader middle east, the Obama administration has put explicit emphasis on the
China is currently
preoccupied with the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the western
Pacific. Thus, while the US has more longstanding and broader interests in the
Arctic than China does, the intensity of these interests, when seen next to
other priorities, make them less different from those of China. Even if the
Arctic Ocean becomes navigable and strategically more important in the
future, China may continue to focus diplomatically and militarily on its
sovereignty claims and territorial disputes in the Yellow Sea and the South
and East China Sea. The Arctic is not mentioned in the 2013 white paper on
Asia-Pacific (US Department of Defense 2012a; Clinton 2011). Also
Chinas armed forces (Chinese White Paper 2013). China has no territorial claims in
the Arctic and cannot be expected to have a significant military presence
here. For China it is more relevant to continue to emphasise sea control in coastal waters and access
denial capabilities in the near seas and the western Pacific. Growing power projection capabilities and the
China will
deploy its naval vessels to other oceans and seas, such as the Indian Ocean
and South China Sea, rather than the Arctic. This implies that the United
States and China have less focus on and activity in the Arctic than what their
statuses as great powers may indicate. As noted, the US Department of Defense wants to
developments of a blue water navy facilitate missions in the high seas, but it is likely that
balance its Arctic engagement, ensuring that the US neither invests too much nor too little. Thus, it seems
as if the US wants to be as active in the region as deemed necessary to protect its interests (Lundestad
While the Chinese government has not published any official Arctic
strategy, their priorities are likely to resemble the balancing act of the US,
although China has so far been more ambiguous about what role it will play in
the Arctic. Both countries have become more active in the region as the Arctic is opening up to more
2013).
activity and other Arctic and nonArctic states are paying more attention to it. There also exist certain
common interests in the Arctic, especially related to the freedom of the seas. US and Chinese foreign
affairs and maritime agencies have met to talk about issues related to oceans, the law of the sea and the
polar regions (US Department of State 2014). The US as a global maritime power has an interest in the
Arctic in terms of navigation and overflight, and we have seen that China sees the potential for benefiting
from Arctic transport routes. Thus, both countries seem to argue in favour of the freedom of the seas and
nations, of balancing expanding jurisdictional waters and of developing the natural resources in those
waters on the one hand, and the desire of major maritime powers to uphold the principle of the freedom of
the seas throughout the world, on the other (Wu and Zhang 2012). In other words ,
China is facing a
dilemma and needs to juggle between global norms and national interests . So
far, China has supported coastal states claims to jurisdiction, partly in conflict with its own, and US,
maritime interests in the Arctic. China and the US have no conflicting maritime claims in the Arctic or the
South and East China Sea. Overall, a few disputes remain over delineating maritime jurisdiction in the
Arctic, but in comparison to some of the disputes in the South and the East China Sea they have been
resolved peacefully or have been alleviated through joint development. Those still being debated are
seeking settlement in cooperative ways and within the existing legal framework.
Warming
Even if China complies, the central government cant
enforce it
Economy, 7 Elizabeth C. Economy, C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director
for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2007
(The Great Leap Backward, Foreign Affairs)
enthusiasm stems from the widespread but misguided
belief that what Beijing says goes. The central government sets the country's
agenda, but it does not control all aspects of its implementation . In fact, local
officials rarely heed Beijing's environmental mandates, preferring to
concentrate their energies and resources on further advancing economic
growth. The truth is that turning the environmental situation in China around will
require something far more difficult than setting targets and spending money; it will require revolutionary
bottom-up political and economic reforms.
Unfortunately, much of this
Overfishing
No impact to food security, c/a Nordin 14, and Baudrillard
81
Double bind either overfishing is rapid and you cant
create a global model in time or its slow and the k
accesses a faster internal link to its impacts
They cant stop illegal overfishing and thats way worse
Pegg 3 (J.R., FL Museum of Natural History,
http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/InNews/overfish2003.htm)
Fish that are illegally caught by rogue nations or by EU fishers in excess of
ICCAT quotas are frequently sold in the United States, Ruais said, and the
"U.S. government has not been sufficiently aggressive with its current
authority or with its fiscal resources to stop this black market." Addressing
the problem of illegal fishing at the market is only one part of the solution the challenge of stopping illegal fishing before it happens could prove
equally, if not more, difficult. "It is a huge challenge given the vastness
and far reach of some of these major fishing nations, many of which have not
signed international agreements," said Admiral Thomas Collins, who is the
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Catch and stock status are two distinct measurement tools for evaluating a
fishery, and suggesting inconsistent catch data is a definitive gauge of fishery
health is an unreasonable indictment of the stock assessment process.
Pauly and Zeller surmise that declining catches since 1996 could be a sign of
fishery collapse. While they do acknowledge management changes as another possible factor, the
context is misleading and important management efforts are not represented .
The moratorium on cod landings is a good example zero cod landings in the Northwest
Atlantic does not mean there are zero cod in the water. Such distinctions are not
apparent in the analysis. Another key consideration missing from this paper is varying management
capacity. European fisheries are managed more effectively and provide more complete data than Indian
Ocean fisheries, for example. A study that aggregates global landings data is suspect because indeed
accurate, but rather a proportionate depiction of global trends. Paulys trend line
is almost identical, just shifted up the y axis, and thus fails to significantly alter our perception of
global fisheries.
The paper does not go into much detail on these reasons for the
observed declines in catches and discards, except to attribute it to both
reductions in fishing mortality attendant on management action to reduce
mortality and generate sustainability, and some reference to declines in areas that are not
managed. It is noteworthy that the peak of the industrial catches in the late 1990s/early
2000s coincidentally aligns with the start of the recovery of many well
managed stocks. This point of recovery has been documented previously (Costello et al 2012;
Rosenberg et al 2006; Gutierrez et al 2012) and particularly relates to the recovery of large numbers of
stocks in the north Pacific, the north Atlantic and around Australia and New Zealand, and mostly to stocks
that are assessed by analytical models. For stocks that need to begin recovery plans to achieve
sustainability, this most often entails an overall reduction in fishing effort, which would be reflected in the
reductions in catches seen here. So, one could attribute some of the decline in industrial catch in these
regions to a correct management response to rebuild stocks to a sustainable status, although I have not
The
above-reported inflection point is also coincident with the launch of the MSCs
sustainability standard. These standards have now been used to assess almost
300 fisheries, and have generated environmental improvements in most of them
(MSC 2015). Stock sustainability is part of the requirements of the standard, and
previous analyses (Gutierrez et al 2012, Agnew et al 2012) have shown that certified fisheries
have improved their stock status and achieved sustainability at a higher
rate than uncertified fisheries. The MSC program does not claim responsibility for the turn-around in
directly analyzed the evidence for this. This is therefore a positive outcome worth reporting.
global stocks, but along with other actions such as those taken by global bodies such as FAO, by national
administrations, and by industry and non-Governmental Organisations it can claim to have provided a
significant incentive for fisheries to become, and then remain, certified.
catch are scientifically assessed using a mixture of data sources including data on the
trends in abundance of the fish stocks, size and age data of the fish caught and other information as available . This paper really
adds nothing to our understanding of these major fish stocks . Another group of stocks,
constituting about 20% of global catch, are assessed using expert knowledge by the FAO. These experts use their personal knowledge of these
fish stocks to provide an assessment of their status. Estimating the historical unreported catch for these stocks adds nothing to our
For many of the most important stocks that are not assessed by scientific
organizations or by expert opinion, we often know a lot about their status . For example; abundance of fish
understanding of these stocks.
throughout almost all of South and Southeast Asia has declined significantly. This is based on the catch per unit of fishing effort and the size of
the individuals being caught. Estimating the amount of other unreported catches does not change our perspective on the status of these
In the remaining fisheries where we know little about their status , does the
fact that catches have declined at a faster rate than reported in the FAO catch
data tell us that global fisheries are in worse shape than we thought? The answer is not
really. We would have to believe that the catch is a good index of the
abundance. Looking at Figure 1 of the Pauly and Zeller paper we see that a number
of major fishing regions have not seen declines in catch in the last 10 years .
stocks.
These areas include the Mediterranean and Black Sea, the Eastern Central Atlantic, the Eastern Indian Ocean, the Northwest Pacific and the
Western Indian Ocean. Does this mean that the stocks in these areas are in good shape, while areas that have seen significant declines in
scientific assessments
that stocks in the Mediterranean and Eastern Central Atlantic are often
heavily overfished yet catches have not declined . We know that stocks in the
Northeast Pacific are abundant, stable and not overfished, and in the
Northeast Atlantic are increasing in abundance . Yet their catch has declined.
Total catch, and declines in catch, are not a good index of the trends in fish
stock abundance. Pauly and Zeller have attempted to estimate the extent of unreported catch for all the fish stocks of the world.
catch like the Northeast Atlantic, and the Northeast Pacific are in worse shape? We know from
For any individual stock in the U.S. the hardest part of doing the stock assessment is often estimating the total catch. Historical discards are
often unreported, species were often lumped in the historical catch data, recreational catch was poorly estimated, and illegal catch totally
unreported. Scientists can spend months trying to reconstruct these data for an individual stock and it is recognized that these estimates may
historical fish catches, and instead concentrate on understanding the status of fish stocks at present. If all the effort that had been spent in
trying to estimate historical catches by Pauly and Zeller had instead been devoted to analysis of what we know about the status of a sample of
fish stocks in different places, we would know much more about the status of world fisheries.
, and six of the top 10 producers of marine products are in Asia. [graph omitted] [graph omitted] In South
Korea and Japan, seafood makes up about 20 percent of the protein supply and contributes more than 15 percent in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
10 percent of protein supply in Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, and while it was at around 8.5 percent in China, between 2008 and 2011 there was a
increase
By comparison,
seafood provides a little over 5 percent of protein consumption in the United Kingdom, a little less than 5 percent in the United States and less than 4.5 percent in Germany. [graph omitted] [graph omitted]
million fishing vessels plying the waters of the South China Sea alone,
employing some 5.4 million people. Asia's fleets are growing faster than
those of the rest of the world
Asia contributed a third of global seafood exports,
with China alone accounting for 12.5 percent of total global exports
with the value of China's exports growing nearly 200 percent over the
same period
And
. Since the late 1980s, the overall size of the world's fishing fleets has stabilized, but the Asian fleet has nearly doubled, comprising
2007,
. In Indonesia, fisheries contribute more than 3 percent to total national gross domestic product. In other countries, the numbers are harder to come by, as fisheries are often
included with agriculture and forestry in statistics. Many countries in Asia have sizable local fishing communities, and as with agricultural concerns, these often have a greater political impact than their economic
economic opening and reform program, Beijing actively sought to expand its fishing fleet and activities.
, with fish now its top agricultural export. There were nearly 10,000 fish processing
companies in China in 2013, employing 400,000 workers, predominately in Shandong, Liaoning and Fujian. Overall, the
rise from the 52,225 in 1979. Chinese fishermen earn almost 50 percent more than their farming counterparts, and as of 2010, China was spending $4 billion a year in subsidies to the industry. Dwindling Resources
The marine fishing industry has long been important in Asia, and in the 20th century, it saw several boom and bust cycles with the expansion of mechanized fishing fleets and increased consumption and export
patterns.
protein.
A healthy human body regenerates cells in this way constantly. Protein is also especially important for growth during childhood and pregnancy
. It is mostly found in children and infants in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America. A
limited supply or lack of food is common in these countries during times of famine caused by natural disasters such as droughts or floods or political unrest. A lack of nutritional knowledge and regional
dependence on low-protein diets, such the maize-based diets of many South American countries, can also cause people to develop this condition. This condition is rare in countries where most people have access to
enough food and are able to eat adequate amounts of protein. If kwashiorkor does occur in the United States, it can be a sign of abuse, neglect, fad diets, or a perceived milk allergy, found mostly in children or older
adults. It can also be a sign of an underlying condition, such as HIV. What Are the Symptoms of Kwashiorkor? The symptoms of kwashiorkor include: change in skin and hair color (to a rust color) and texture fatigue
diarrhea loss of muscle mass failure to grow or gain weight edema (swelling) of ankles, feet, and belly damaged immune system, which can lead to more frequent and severe infections irritability flaky rash shock
How Is Kwashiorkor Diagnosed? If kwashiorkor is suspected, your doctor will first examine you to check for an enlarged liver (hepatomegaly) and swelling. Next, blood and urine tests may be ordered to measure the
level of protein and sugar in your blood. Other tests may be performed on your blood and urine to measure signs of malnutrition and lack of protein. These tests may look for muscle breakdown and assess kidney
function, overall health, and growth. These tests include: arterial blood gas blood urea nitrogen (BUN) blood levels of creatinine blood levels of potassium urinalysis complete blood count (CBC) How Is Kwashiorkor
Treated? Kwashiorkor can be corrected by eating more protein and more calories overall, especially if treatment is started early. You may first be given more calories in the form of carbohydrates, sugars, and fats.
Once these calories provide energy, you will be given foods with proteins. Foods must be introduced and calories should be increased slowly because you have been without proper nutrition for a long period. Your
Block
1
The Politics of Globality is an inversion of Clausewitz, in
which political substitutes for war are merely way by
other means. China and the U.S. unite to wage a war of
the political on citizens of both countries. The logics,
languages, and effects of militarism have become so
normalized that any attempt to distinguish between
military and civic presence militarizes life itself, producing
a perverse investment in normalized violence that
maintains the global war machine
unpack and then extend these categories in ways that allow us to understand a bit better one of the most
significant fronts in the war on youth? BE: I think we need to start here by looking at the title of the
Summer Institute, that is The War on Youth. How do we look at the discursive provocation of saying
there is a war on youth taking place? Weve had some discussion around whether the term war itself is a
metaphor or whether it is a diagnostic tool for really analyzing the conditions of the present. The question
how does the term war function politically ? One thing we can
say is that within military establishments, and certainly within the political environment on
that is instantly raised is
popular media, the proliferation of the use of the term war has not been anything unique. Throughout
the 1990s every form of social ill seemed to have a war waged on it the war on
poverty, the war on drugs. This goes into the war on terror, which becomes an openly declared war on all
This
language is emotive and functions in a certain political way . But also, it does
reveal the way that people will diagnose the operation of power . First, an important
start point here is that the proliferation of the use of war doesnt open up into popular
vocabulary within critical discoursesits actually touted by regimes of power . A
regime of power will say a war needs to take place upon this particular social
problem. The proliferation around the meaning of war has been made into a
fronts. I was watching Fox News yesterday and they were talking about a war on Wal-Mart.
moral and ethical imperative, such that action needs to be taken because the
stakes are so high there will be casualties, and of course all wars produce
casualties. You then have to go into the question of saying : What is the use
value and function of appropriating the terminology of war and turning the
logic of war back against itself? One of the earlier and really sophisticated mediations on this
appeared in Michel Foucaults (2003) Society Must be Defended, where he really appreciates the idea that
power has always taken life as its object, particularly since the
beginning of modernity, and indeed, that war has always taken life to be
its object. This resonates with the Nietzschean idea that war is the mode of
modern societies, such that nihilism is also the motive of modern
societies. Situating this in the context of whats happening to youth today, if we take power at its
word, then youth are quite literally inserted within a war paradigm . If we just take the
post 9=11 moment, it was certainly a war paradigm insomuch as youth overseas were deemed to be the
troubling demographic which could become radicalized and which could become insurgents. Youth at home
monitor studentsattendance, performance, whether someone speaks in a way that might raise
whats happening to young people today, but its also to misunderstand the changing shape of war in the
military providing security for the London Olympics, we have the military parading on talent shows as if it's
part of everyday entertainment, military personal are being openly recruited into education systems
1nr Perm
Politics of harmonization eradicates political
alternatives. The formulation of politics in this
manner pits the insiders versus the outsiders
promoting perpetual antagonism within the populous,
thus the perm links
Nordin 16 (Astrid, Futures beyond the West? Autoimmunity in Chinas harmonious
world, Review of International Studies, 42, pp 156-177, January 2016) DP
provide an ultimate ground for any given choice in Derridean terms, such grounds will
always be indefinitely deferred. Therefore, the ultimate decision will have to rely on a skillful combination
politics and harmony is dangerous because its denial of antagonism will tend to alienate those excluded
negotiable values would be the opposite of the cooperative harmony sought. To both Rockman and Torfing,
then, complete or perfect harmony will defeat harmony and create disharmony. In this way, the excessive
We can
see this happening in contemporary China, where the harmonising policies
enforced under the harmonious society slogan have produced a range of
oppositional movements, from Chinese youth mocking harmony online to the
increasing number of selfimolations we currently witness in and around Tibet .
Numerous scholars argue that in order to imagine harmony, we need to imagine
heterogeneity and multiplicity. We can now add that the problematic organisation of
difference that remains in imaginations of harmonious world eliminates the
multiplicity in the here-now that is a prerequisite for harmony . What these
production of harmony is what produces the disharmonious elements that come to threaten it.
renditions of harmony show, I believe, is that the tensions in and logics of harmony are very similar to the
ones that are described by Derrida and others in terms of the autoimmune.