1 Abakada V Purisima

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G.R.No.166715
TodayisFriday,August12,2016
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.166715August14,2008
ABAKADAGUROPARTYLIST(formerlyAASJS)1OFFICERS/MEMBERSSAMSONS.
ALCANTARA,EDVINCENTS.ALBANO,ROMEOR.ROBISO,RENEB.GOROSPEandEDWIN
R.SANDOVAL,petitioners,
vs.
HON.CESARV.PURISIMA,inhiscapacityasSecretaryofFinance,HON.GUILLERMOL.
PARAYNO,JR.,inhiscapacityasCommissioneroftheBureauofInternalRevenue,andHON.
ALBERTOD.LINA,inhisCapacityasCommissionerofBureauofCustoms,respondents.
DECISION
CORONA,J.:
Thispetitionforprohibition1seekstopreventrespondentsfromimplementingandenforcingRepublic
Act(RA)93352(AttritionActof2005).
RA9335wasenactedtooptimizetherevenuegenerationcapabilityandcollectionoftheBureauof
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOCofficialsandemployeestoexceedtheirrevenuetargetsbyprovidingasystemofrewardsand
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
PerformanceEvaluationBoard(Board).3ItcoversallofficialsandemployeesoftheBIRandtheBOC
withatleastsixmonthsofservice,regardlessofemploymentstatus.4
TheFundissourcedfromthecollectionoftheBIRandtheBOCinexcessoftheirrevenuetargetsfor
the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_166715_2008.html
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incentiveorrewardistakenfromthefundandallocatedtotheBIRandtheBOCinproportiontotheir
contributionintheexcesscollectionofthetargetedamountoftaxrevenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance
(DOF)orhis/herUndersecretary,theSecretaryoftheDepartmentofBudgetandManagement(DBM)
or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their
Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rankandfile employees and a representative
fromtheofficialsnominatedbytheirrecognizedorganization.6
EachBoardhasthedutyto(1)prescribetherulesandguidelinesfortheallocation,distributionand
release of the Fund (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
employeeswhoserevenuecollectionfallsshortofthetarget(3)terminatepersonnelinaccordance
withthecriteriaadoptedbytheBoard(4)prescribeasystemforperformanceevaluation(5)perform
other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to
promulgateandissuetheimplementingrulesandregulationsofRA9335,8tobeapprovedbyaJoint
CongressionalOversightCommitteecreatedforsuchpurpose.9
Petitioners,invokingtheirrightastaxpayersfiledthispetitionchallengingtheconstitutionalityofRA
9335,ataxreformlegislation.Theycontendthat,byestablishingasystemofrewardsandincentives,
the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bountyhunters"astheywilldotheirbestonlyinconsiderationofsuchrewards.Thus,thesystemof
rewardsandincentivesinvitescorruptionandunderminestheconstitutionallymandateddutyofthese
officialsandemployeestoservethepeoplewithutmostresponsibility,integrity,loyaltyandefficiency.
Petitionersalsoclaimthatlimitingthescopeofthesystemofrewardsandincentivesonlytoofficials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to
officialsandemployeesofallothergovernmentagencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
providesthatBIRandBOCofficialsmaybedismissedfromtheserviceiftheirrevenuecollectionsfall
shortofthetargetbyatleast7.5%,thelawdoesnot,however,fixtherevenuetargetstobeachieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient
standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in
ordertodismissBIRorBOCpersonnel.
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Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violatesthedoctrineofseparationofpowers.Whilethelegislativefunctionisdeemedaccomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for
beingprematureasthereisnoactualcaseorcontroversyyet.Petitionershavenotassertedanyright
or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents
acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this
case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere
speculationanddoesnotsufficetoinvalidatethelaw.Seeninconjunctionwiththedeclaredobjective
ofRA9335,thelawvalidlyclassifiestheBIRandtheBOCbecausethefunctionstheyperformare
distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law
provides a sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions.
Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates,separationofpowers.Itensuresthefulfillmentofthelegislativepolicyandservesasacheck
toanyoveraccumulationofpoweronthepartoftheexecutiveandtheimplementingagencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that
petitionershavefailedtoovercomethepresumptionofconstitutionalityinfavorofRA9335,exceptas
shallhereafterbediscussed.
ActualCaseAndRipeness
Anactualcaseorcontroversyinvolvesaconflictoflegalrights,anassertionofoppositelegalclaims
susceptibleofjudicialadjudication.10 A closelyrelated requirementisripeness, that is,thequestion
must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the
governmentalactbeingchallengedhasadirectadverseeffectontheindividualchallengingit.11Thus,
to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the
caseoraninjurytohimselfthatcanberedressedbyafavorabledecisionoftheCourt.12
Inthiscase,asidefromthegeneralclaimthatthedisputehasripenedintoajudicialcontroversyby
themereenactmentofthelawevenwithoutanyfurtherovertact,13petitionersfaileithertoassertany
specificandconcretelegalclaimortodemonstrateanydirectadverseeffectofthelawonthem.They
areunabletoshowapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthiscaseoraninjurytothemselves.Onthis
account,theirpetitionisprocedurallyinfirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
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constitutionalityinfavorofthelaw.Andwhereanactionofthelegislativebranchisallegedtohave
infringedtheConstitution,itbecomesnotonlytherightbutinfactthedutyofthejudiciarytosettlethe
dispute.14
Accountabilityof
PublicOfficers
Section1,Article11oftheConstitutionstates:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountabletothepeople,servethemwithutmostresponsibility,integrity,loyalty,andefficiency,
actwithpatriotism,andjustice,andleadmodestlives.
Publicofficeisapublictrust.Itmustbedischargedbyitsholdernotforhisownpersonalgainbutfor
thebenefitofthepublicforwhomheholdsitintrust.Bydemandingaccountabilityandservicewith
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and
employeeshavethedutytoberesponsivetotheneedsofthepeopletheyarecalledupontoserve.
Publicofficersenjoythepresumptionofregularityintheperformanceoftheirduties.Thispresumption
necessarilyobtainsinfavorofBIRandBOCofficialsandemployees.RA9335operatesonthebasis
thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of
encouragingtheofficialsandemployeesoftheBIRandtheBOCtoexceedtheirrevenuetargetsand
optimizetheirrevenuegenerationcapabilityandcollection.15
Thepresumptionisdisputablebutprooftothecontraryisrequiredtorebutit.Itcannotbeoverturned
by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this
casewhereitisanunderlyingprincipletoadvanceadeclaredpublicpolicy.
PetitionersclaimthattheimplementationofRA9335willturnBIRandBOCofficialsandemployees
into"bountyhuntersandmercenaries"isnotonlywithoutanyfactualandlegalbasisitisalsopurely
speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocalone.16ToinvalidateRA9335basedonpetitionersbaselesssuppositionisanaffronttothe
wisdomnotonlyofthelegislaturethatpasseditbutalsooftheexecutivewhichapprovedit.
Publicserviceisitsownreward.Nevertheless,publicofficersmaybylawberewardedforexemplary
andexceptionalperformance.Asystemofincentivesforexceedingthesetexpectationsofapublic
office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
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dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government
personnel.
InUnitedStatesv.Matthews,17theU.S.SupremeCourtvalidatedalawwhichawardstoofficersof
the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding onehalf of the net proceeds of
forfeituresinviolationofthelawsagainstsmuggling.CitingDorsheimerv.UnitedStates,18theU.S.
SupremeCourtsaid:
Theofferofaportionofsuchpenaltiestothecollectorsistostimulateandrewardtheirzealand
industryindetectingfraudulentattemptstoevadepaymentofdutiesandtaxes.
Inthesamevein,employeesoftheBIRandtheBOCmaybylawbeentitledtoarewardwhen,asa
consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue
targets.Inaddition,RA9335establishessafeguardstoensurethattherewardwillnotbeclaimedifit
will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular
performanceofofficialduties.OneoftheseprecautionarymeasuresisembodiedinSection8ofthe
law:
SEC.8.LiabilityofOfficials,ExaminersandEmployeesoftheBIRandtheBOC.Theofficials,
examiners,andemployeesofthe[BIR]andthe[BOC]whoviolatethisActorwhoareguiltyof
negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligenceintheperformanceoftheirdutiesshallbeheldliableforanylossorinjurysufferedby
any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance,misfeasanceorfailuretoexerciseextraordinarydiligence.
EqualProtection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and
amongpersonssimilarlysituateditisequalityamongequals,notsimilarityoftreatmentofpersons
who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.19
Whenthingsorpersonsaredifferentinfactorcircumstance,theymaybetreatedinlawdifferently.In
Victorianov.ElizaldeRopeWorkersUnion,20thisCourtdeclared:
Theguarantyofequalprotectionofthelawsisnotaguarantyofequalityintheapplicationof
thelawsuponallcitizensofthe[S]tate.Itisnot,therefore,arequirement,inordertoavoidthe
constitutionalprohibitionagainstinequality,thateveryman,womanandchildshouldbeaffected
alikebyastatute.Equalityofoperationofstatutesdoesnotmeanindiscriminateoperationon
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
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protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does
notprohibitlegislationwhichislimitedeitherintheobjecttowhichitisdirectedorbythe
territorywithinwhichitistooperate.
TheequalprotectionofthelawsclauseoftheConstitutionallowsclassification.Classificationin
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculationorpracticebecausetheyagreewithoneanotherincertainparticulars.Alawisnot
invalidbecauseofsimpleinequality.Theveryideaofclassificationisthatofinequality,sothatit
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.Allthatisrequiredofavalidclassificationisthatitbereasonable,which
meansthattheclassificationshouldbebasedonsubstantialdistinctionswhichmakefor
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law that it must not be
limitedtoexistingconditionsonlyandthatitmustapplyequallytoeachmemberofthe
class.ThisCourthasheldthatthestandardissatisfiediftheclassificationordistinctionis
basedonareasonablefoundationorrationalbasisandisnotpalpablyarbitrary.
Intheexerciseofitspowertomakeclassificationsforthepurposeofenactinglawsovermatters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessarythattheclassificationbebasedonscientificormarkeddifferencesofthingsorintheir
relation.Neitherisitnecessarythattheclassificationbemadewithmathematicalnicety.Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protectionguarantydoesnotprecludethelegislaturefromrecognizingdegreesofevilorharm,
andlegislationisaddressedtoevilsastheymayappear.21(emphasissupplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
publicpolicyistheoptimizationoftherevenuegenerationcapabilityandcollectionoftheBIRandthe
BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR
andtheBOC,theincentivesand/orsanctionsprovidedinthelawshouldlogicallypertaintothesaid
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinctprimaryfunctionofgeneratingrevenuesforthenationalgovernmentthroughthecollectionof
taxes,customsduties,feesandcharges.
TheBIRperformsthefollowingfunctions:
Sec.18.The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be
headedbyandsubjecttothesupervisionandcontroloftheCommissionerofInternalRevenue,
who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the
DOF],shallhavethefollowingfunctions:
(1)Assessandcollectalltaxes,feesandchargesandaccountforallrevenuescollected
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(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and
duties
(3)Preventandprosecutetaxevasionsandallotherillegaleconomicactivities
(4)Exercisesupervisionandcontroloveritsconstituentandsubordinateunitsand
(5)Performsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.24
xxxxxxxxx(emphasissupplied)
Ontheotherhand,theBOChasthefollowingfunctions:
Sec.23.TheBureauofCustoms.TheBureauofCustomswhichshallbeheadedandsubject
tothemanagementandcontroloftheCommissionerofCustoms,whoshallbeappointedbythe
PresidentupontherecommendationoftheSecretary[oftheDOF]andhereinafterreferredtoas
Commissioner,shallhavethefollowingfunctions:
(1)Collectcustomduties,taxesandthecorrespondingfees,chargesandpenalties
(2)Accountforallcustomsrevenuescollected
(3)Exercisepoliceauthorityfortheenforcementoftariffandcustomslaws
(4)Preventandsuppresssmuggling,pilferageandallothereconomicfraudswithinallportsof
entry
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and
aircraftsinallportsofentry
(6)Administeralllegalrequirementsthatareappropriate
(7)Preventandprosecutesmugglingandotherillegalactivitiesinallportsunderitsjurisdiction
(8)Exercisesupervisionandcontroloveritsconstituentunits
(9)Performsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.25
BoththeBIRandtheBOCarebureausundertheDOF.Theyprincipallyperformthespecialfunction
ofbeingtheinstrumentalitiesthroughwhichtheStateexercisesoneofitsgreatinherentfunctions
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taxation.Indubitably,suchsubstantialdistinctionisgermaneandintimatelyrelatedtothepurposeof
the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335
fullysatisfythedemandsofequalprotection.
UndueDelegation
Twotestsdeterminethevalidityofdelegationoflegislativepower:(1)thecompletenesstestand(2)
the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequateguidelinesorlimitationsinthelawtomapouttheboundariesofthedelegatesauthorityand
preventthedelegationfromrunningriot.27Tobesufficient,thestandardmustspecifythelimitsofthe
delegatesauthority,announcethelegislativepolicyandidentifytheconditionsunderwhichitistobe
implemented.28
RA9335adequatelystatesthepolicyandstandardstoguidethePresidentinfixingrevenuetargets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the
policyofthelaw:
SEC.2.DeclarationofPolicy.ItisthepolicyoftheStatetooptimizetherevenuegeneration
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) byprovidingfor asystem ofrewards andsanctionsthrough thecreationofaRewards
andIncentivesFundandaRevenuePerformanceEvaluationBoardintheaboveagenciesfor
thepurposeofencouragingtheirofficialsandemployeestoexceedtheirrevenuetargets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated power to the
Presidenttofixrevenuetargets:
SEC.4.RewardsandIncentivesFund.ARewardsandIncentivesFund,hereinafterreferred
toastheFund,isherebycreated,tobesourcedfromthecollectionoftheBIRandtheBOCin
excessoftheirrespectiverevenuetargetsoftheyear,asdeterminedbytheDevelopment
BudgetandCoordinatingCommittee(DBCC),inthefollowingpercentages:
Excess of Collection of the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection
Excess
the
Revenue toAccruetotheFund
Targets
30%orbelow
15%
Morethan30%
15%ofthefirst30%plus20%ofthe
remainingexcess
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TheFundshallbedeemedautomaticallyappropriatedtheyearimmediatelyfollowingtheyear
whentherevenuecollectiontargetwasexceededandshallbereleasedonthesamefiscalyear.
Revenuetargetsshallrefertotheoriginalestimatedrevenuecollectionexpectedofthe
BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the
BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies revenue targets as allocated
amongitsrevenuedistrictsinthecaseoftheBIR,andthecollectiondistrictsinthecaseofthe
BOC.
Revenuetargetsarebasedontheoriginalestimatedrevenuecollectionexpectedrespectivelyofthe
BIRandtheBOCforagivenfiscalyearasapprovedbytheDBCCandstatedintheBESFsubmitted
bythePresidenttoCongress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on
thePresidentasitalsoundergoesthescrutinyoftheDBCC.
Ontheotherhand,Section7specifiesthelimitsoftheBoardsauthorityandidentifiestheconditions
under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least
7.5%mayberemovedfromtheservice:
SEC.7.PowersandFunctionsoftheBoard.TheBoardintheagencyshallhavethefollowing
powersandfunctions:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent
(7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as
providedintherulesandregulationspromulgatedunderthisAct,subjecttocivilservicelaws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided,Thatthefollowingexemptionsshallapply:
1.Wherethedistrictorareaofresponsibilityisnewlycreated,notexceedingtwoyearsin
operation,ashasnohistoricalrecordofcollectionperformancethatcanbeusedasbasis
forevaluationand
2.Wheretherevenueorcustomsofficialoremployeeisarecenttransfereeinthemiddle
of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of
revenuetargetsorpotentialnonperformanceofrevenuetargets:Provided,however,That
when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or
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employeeshassufferedfromeconomicdifficultiesbroughtaboutbynaturalcalamitiesor
forcemajeureoreconomiccausesasmaybedeterminedbytheBoard,terminationshall
beconsideredonlyaftercarefulandproperreviewbytheBoard.
(c)Toterminatepersonnelinaccordancewiththecriteriaadoptedintheprecedingparagraph:
Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the
applicationofthecriteriafortheseparationofanofficialoremployeefromserviceunder
this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on
accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the AntiGraft and Corrupt
PracticesAct
Clearly,RA9335innowayviolatesthesecurityoftenureofofficialsandemployeesoftheBIRand
theBOC.Theguaranteeofsecurityoftenureonlymeansthatanemployeecannotbedismissedfrom
theserviceforcausesotherthanthoseprovidedbylawandonlyafterdueprocessisaccordedthe
employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant
factorsaffectingthelevelofcollection.Thisstandardisanalogoustoinefficiencyandincompetencein
the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.32 The
action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantiveandproceduraldueprocess.
Atanyrate,thisCourthasrecognizedthefollowingassufficientstandards:"publicinterest,""justice
andequity,""publicconvenienceandwelfare"and"simplicity,economyandwelfare."33Inthiscase,
thedeclaredpolicyofoptimizationoftherevenuegenerationcapabilityandcollectionoftheBIRand
theBOCisinfusedwithpublicinterest.
SeparationOfPowers
Section12ofRA9335provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
CongressionalOversightCommitteecomposedofsevenMembersfromtheSenateandseven
MembersfromtheHouseofRepresentatives.TheMembersfromtheSenateshallbeappointed
by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members
from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementingrulesandregulations(IRR)itshallthereafterbecomefunctusofficioandtherefore
ceasetoexist.
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TheJointCongressionalOversightCommitteeinRA9335wascreatedforthepurposeofapproving
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and
CSC.OnMay22,2006,itapprovedthesaidIRR.Fromthenon,itbecamefunctusofficioandceased
toexist.Hence,theissueofitsallegedencroachmentontheexecutivefunctionofimplementingand
enforcingthelawmaybeconsideredmootandacademic.
Thisnotwithstanding,thismightbeasgoodatimeasanyfortheCourttoconfronttheissueofthe
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other
similarlawsforthatmatter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversightinMacalintalv.CommissiononElections34isilluminating:
Conceptandbasesofcongressionaloversight
Broadlydefined,thepowerofoversightembracesallactivitiesundertakenbyCongressto
enhanceitsunderstandingofandinfluenceovertheimplementationoflegislationithas
enacted.Clearly,oversightconcernspostenactmentmeasuresundertakenbyCongress:
(a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty,(d)topreventexecutiveusurpationoflegislativeauthority,and(d)toassess
executiveconformitywiththecongressionalperceptionofpublicinterest.
Thepowerofoversighthasbeenheldtobeintrinsicinthegrantoflegislativepoweritselfand
integraltothechecksandbalancesinherentinademocraticsystemofgovernment.xxxxxxx
xx
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check
theperceived"exponentialaccumulationofpower"bytheexecutivebranch.Bythebeginningof
the 20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the
executivebranchandtheadministrativeagencies.Congress,thus,usesitsoversightpowerto
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority
delegatedtothem.xxxxxxxxx
Categoriesofcongressionaloversightfunctions
TheactsdonebyCongresspurportedlyintheexerciseofitsoversightpowersmaybedivided
intothreecategories,namely:scrutiny,investigationandsupervision.
a.Scrutiny
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Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

administrativeoperations.Itsprimarypurposeistodetermineeconomyandefficiencyof
the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress
may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendationsorpassresolutionsforconsiderationoftheagencyinvolved.
xxxxxxxxx
b.Congressionalinvestigation
Whilecongressionalscrutinyisregardedasapassiveprocessoflookingatthefactsthat
arereadilyavailable,congressionalinvestigationinvolvesamoreintensediggingoffacts.
The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution
undersection21,ArticleVI,xxxxxxxxx
c.Legislativesupervision
ThethirdandmostencompassingformbywhichCongressexercisesitsoversightpoweristhru
legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the
part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative
area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive
branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional
supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority, and
permitsCongresstoretainpartofthatdelegatedauthority.
Congressexercisessupervisionovertheexecutiveagenciesthroughitsvetopower.Ittypically
utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an
agencytopresenttheproposedregulationstoCongress,whichretainsa"right"toapproveor
disapproveanyregulationbeforeittakeseffect.Suchlegislativevetoprovisionsusuallyprovide
thataproposedregulationwillbecomealawaftertheexpirationofacertainperiodoftime,only
ifCongressdoesnotaffirmativelydisapproveoftheregulationinthemeantime.Lessfrequently,
the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approvesit.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power
betweenthelegislativeandtheexecutivebranchesofgovernmentasitofferslawmakersaway
todelegatevastpowertotheexecutivebranchortoindependentagencieswhileretainingthe
optiontocancelparticularexerciseofsuchpowerwithouthavingtopassnewlegislationorto
repealexistinglaw.Theycontendthatthisarrangementpromotesdemocraticaccountabilityas
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it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One

proponentthusexplains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern
government have often led Congresswhether by actual or perceived necessity to
legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the
choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or
maynothaveparticipatedinoragreedwiththedevelopmentofthoseaims.Consequently,
absentsafeguards,inmanyinstancesthereverseofourconstitutionalschemecouldbe
effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the
legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some
means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would
be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with
legislativeintentandthuswhetherlegislativeinterventionisappropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the
executiveprerogatives. They urge that any postenactment measures undertaken by the
legislativebranchshouldbelimitedtoscrutinyandinvestigationanymeasurebeyond
that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They
contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto
authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of
government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it
preventstheexecutivebranchandindependentagenciesfromaccumulatingtoomuchpower.
They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow
Congresstoscrutinizeonlytheexerciseofdelegatedlawmakingauthority.Theydonotallow
Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the
opportunityforongoingandbindingexpressionsofcongressionalintent.Incontrast,legislative
vetopermitsCongresstoparticipateprospectivelyintheapprovalordisapprovalof"subordinate
law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by
Congress.Theyfurtherarguethatlegislativeveto"isanecessaryresponsebyCongresstothe
accretionofpolicycontrolbyforcesoutsideitschambers."Inaneraofdelegatedauthority,they
point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain
controlovertheevolutionandimplementationofitspolicyasdeclaredbystatute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the
validityoflegislativevetoprovisions.Thecasearosefromtheorderoftheimmigrationjudge
suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the
suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to
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invalidatethedecisionoftheexecutivebranchtoallowaparticulardeportablealientoremainin
the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement
the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals
dismissedthealiensappeal,holdingthatithadnopowertodeclareunconstitutionalanactof
Congress.TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsforNinthCircuitheldthattheHousewaswithout
constitutional authority to order the aliens deportation and that 244(c)(2) violated the
constitutionaldoctrineonseparationofpowers.
Onappeal,theU.S.SupremeCourtdeclared244(c)(2)unconstitutional.ButtheCourtshied
awayfromtheissueofseparationofpowersandinsteadheldthattheprovisionviolatesthe
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the onehouse veto was essentially
legislativeinpurposeandeffect.Assuch,itissubjecttotheproceduressetoutinArticleIofthe
Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President.xxxxxxxxx
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower
courtdecisionsinvalidatingthelegislativevetoprovisionsintheNaturalGasPolicyActof1978
andtheFederalTradeCommissionImprovementActof1980.Followingthisprecedence,lower
courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these
provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism
requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised.35
(emphasissupplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and
considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the
CourtstruckdowntheprovisioninRA9189(TheOverseasAbsenteeVotingActof2003)creatinga
Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the
implementationofthesaidlawbutalsotoreview,revise,amendandapprovetheIRRpromulgatedby
the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independenceoftheCommissiononElections.36
Withthisbackdrop,itisclearthatcongressionaloversightisnotunconstitutionalperse,meaning,it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
underminestheconstitutionalseparationofpowers.Rather,itisintegraltothechecksandbalances
inherentinademocraticsystemofgovernment.Itmayinfactevenenhancetheseparationofpowers
asitpreventstheoveraccumulationofpowerintheexecutivebranch.
However,toforestallthedangerofcongressionalencroachment"beyondthelegislativesphere,"the
ConstitutionimposestwobasicandrelatedconstraintsonCongress.37Itmaynotvestitself,anyofits
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its
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legislativepower,itmustfollowthe"single,finelywroughtandexhaustivelyconsidered,procedures"
specifiedundertheConstitution,39includingtheprocedureforenactmentoflawsandpresentment.
Thus, any postenactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.Inparticular,congressionaloversightmustbeconfinedtothefollowing:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conductedinconnectionwithit,itspowertoaskheadsofdepartmentstoappearbeforeandbe
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation40and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congresstoconductinquiriesinaidoflegislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution.Legislativevetoesfallinthisclass.
LegislativevetoisastatutoryprovisionrequiringthePresidentoranadministrativeagencytopresent
theproposedimplementingrulesandregulationsofalawtoCongresswhich,byitselforthrougha
committeeformedbyit,retainsa"right"or"power"toapproveordisapprovesuchregulationsbefore
theytakeeffect.Assuch,alegislativevetointheformofacongressionaloversightcommitteeisin
theformofaninwardturningdelegationdesignedtoattachacongressionalleash(otherthanthrough
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitutions diagram of power as it
entruststoCongressadirectroleinenforcing,applyingorimplementingitsownlaws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad
horizons of its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the
executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with
those standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditionswhenitleavesthehandsofthelegislature.47Thus,whatisleftfortheexecutivebranchor
theconcernedadministrativeagencywhenitformulatesrulesandregulationsimplementingthelawis
tofillupdetails(supplementaryrulemaking)orascertainfactsnecessarytobringthelawintoactual
operation(contingentrulemaking).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules
and regulations partake of the nature of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been
writteninthestatuteitself.Assuch,theyhavetheforceandeffectoflawandenjoythepresumption
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of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a
competentcourt.51Congress,intheguiseofassumingtheroleofanoverseer,maynotpassupon
theirlegalitybysubjectingthemtoitsstampofapprovalwithoutdisturbingthecalculatedbalanceof
powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR
basedonadeterminationofwhetherornottheyconformedwiththeprovisionsofRA9335,Congress
arrogatedjudicialpoweruntoitself,apowerexclusivelyvestedinthisCourtbytheConstitution.
ConsideredOpinionof
Mr.JusticeDanteO.Tinga
Moreover,therequirementthattheimplementingrulesofalawbesubjectedtoapprovalbyCongress
asaconditionfortheireffectivityviolatesthecardinalconstitutionalprinciplesofbicameralismandthe
ruleonpresentment.52
Section1,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionstates:
Section1.ThelegislativepowershallbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippineswhich
shallconsistofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives,excepttotheextentreservedto
thepeoplebytheprovisiononinitiativeandreferendum.(emphasissupplied)
Legislativepower(orthepowertopropose,enact,amendandrepeallaws)53isvestedinCongress
whichconsistsoftwochambers,theSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives.Avalidexerciseof
legislativepowerrequirestheactofbothchambers.Corrollarily,itcanbeexercisedneithersolelyby
oneofthetwochambersnorbyacommitteeofeitherorbothchambers.Thus,assumingthevalidity
ofalegislativeveto,bothasinglechamberlegislativevetoandacongressionalcommitteelegislative
vetoareinvalid.
Additionally,Section27(1),ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presentedtothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesame,heshallsignit,otherwise,heshallveto
itandreturnthesamewithhisobjectionstotheHousewhereitoriginated,whichshallenterthe
objectionsatlargeinitsJournalandproceedtoreconsiderit.If,aftersuchreconsideration,two
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by twothirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
membersvotingfororagainstshallbeenteredinitsJournal.ThePresidentshallcommunicate
his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereofotherwise,itshallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit.(emphasissupplied)
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Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this
sense, lawmaking under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive.
Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect
withoutsuchpresentmentevenifapprovedbybothchambersofCongress.
Insum,twostepsarerequiredbeforeabillbecomesalaw.First,itmustbeapprovedbybothHouses
ofCongress.54Second,itmustbepresentedtoandapprovedbythePresident.55Assummarizedby
Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the
approvalofbills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
somemeasuresthatmustoriginateonlyintheformerchamber.
Thefirstreadinginvolvesonlyareadingofthenumberandtitleofthemeasureanditsreferral
bytheSenatePresidentortheSpeakertothepropercommitteeforstudy.
Thebillmaybe"killed"inthecommitteeoritmayberecommendedforapproval,withorwithout
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of
the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorshiporasacommitteebill.
Oncereportedout,thebillshallbecalendaredforsecondreading.Itisatthisstagethatthebill
is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second
readingisthemostimportantstageinthepassageofabill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members
merelyregistertheirvotesandexplainthemiftheyareallowedbytherules.Nofurtherdebate
isallowed.
Oncethebillpassesthirdreading,itissenttotheotherchamber,whereitwillalsoundergothe
threereadings.Iftherearedifferencesbetweentheversionsapprovedbythetwochambers,a
conference committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if
ratifiedbytheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativeswillthenbesubmittedtothePresident
forhisconsideration.
ThebillisenrolledwhenprintedasfinallyapprovedbytheCongress,thereafterauthenticated
withthesignaturesoftheSenatePresident,theSpeaker,andtheSecretariesoftheirrespective
chambers59
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ThePresidentsroleinlawmaking.
ThefinalstepissubmissiontothePresidentforapproval.Onceapproved,ittakeseffectaslaw
aftertherequiredpublication.60
WhereCongressdelegatestheformulationofrulestoimplementthelawithasenactedpursuantto
sufficientstandardsestablishedinthesaidlaw,thelawmustbecompleteinallitsessentialtermsand
conditionswhenitleavesthehandsofthelegislature.Anditmaybedeemedtohaveleftthehandsof
the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal
rightsandobligationsbecomeavailabletothoseentitledbythelanguageofthestatute.Subjecttothe
indispensablerequisiteofpublicationunderthedueprocessclause,61thedeterminationastowhena
lawtakeseffectiswhollytheprerogativeofCongress.62Assuch,itisonlyuponitseffectivitythata
lawmaybeexecutedandtheexecutivebranchacquiresthedutiesandpowerstoexecutethesaid
law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to
approvingorvetoingthelaw.63
Fromthemomentthelawbecomeseffective,anyprovisionoflawthatempowersCongressoranyof
itsmemberstoplayanyroleintheimplementationorenforcementofthelawviolatestheprincipleof
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congressoritsmemberstoapprovetheimplementingrulesofalawafterithasalreadytakeneffect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any
directiveorrulingmadebythemembersoftheexecutivebranchchargedwiththeimplementationof
thelaw.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While
theremaybesimilarprovisionsofotherlawsthatmaybeinvalidatedforfailuretopassthisstandard,
the Court refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an
appropriatecaseassailingthoseprovisionsisbroughtbeforeus.64
Thenextquestiontoberesolvedis:whatistheeffectoftheunconstitutionalityofSection12ofRA
9335ontheotherprovisionsofthelaw?Willitrendertheentirelawunconstitutional?No.
Section13ofRA9335provides:
SEC.13.SeparabilityClause.IfanyprovisionofthisActisdeclaredinvalidbyacompetent
court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity
shallremaininforceandeffect.
InTatadv.SecretaryoftheDepartmentofEnergy,65theCourtlaiddownthefollowingrules:
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Thegeneralrule is thatwhere part of a statute isvoidas repugnant totheConstitution,while

anotherpartisvalid,thevalidportion,ifseparablefromtheinvalid,maystandandbeenforced.
Thepresenceofaseparabilityclauseinastatutecreatesthepresumptionthatthelegislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally
enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which
carriesoutthelegislativeintent.xxx
Theexceptiontothegeneralruleisthatwhenthepartsofastatutearesomutuallydependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other,
astowarrantabeliefthatthelegislatureintendedthemasawhole,thenullityofonepartwill
vitiatetherest.Inmakingthepartsofthestatutedependent,conditional,orconnectedwithone
another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have
enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other
provisionsthusdependent,conditional,orconnectedmustfallwiththem.
TheseparabilityclauseofRA9335revealstheintentionofthelegislaturetoisolateanddetachany
invalidprovisionfromtheotherprovisionssothatthelattermaycontinueinforceandeffect.Thevalid
portionscanstandindependentlyoftheinvalidsection.WithoutSection12,theremainingprovisions
stillconstituteacomplete,intelligibleandvalidlawwhichcarriesoutthelegislativeintenttooptimize
therevenuegenerationcapabilityandcollectionoftheBIRandtheBOCbyprovidingforasystemof
rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
EvaluationBoard.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to
enforceorimplementexistinglawpursuanttoavaliddelegation.TheIRRofRA9335werepublished
on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days
thereafter.67Untilandunlessthecontraryisshown,theIRRarepresumedvalidandeffectiveeven
withouttheapprovaloftheJointCongressionalOversightCommittee.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyPARTIALLYGRANTED.Section12ofRA9335creatingaJoint
CongressionalOversightCommitteetoapprovetheimplementingrulesandregulationsofthelawis
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the
remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the
provisionsremaininforceandeffect.
SOORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, CarpioMorales,
Azcuna,Tinga,ChicoNazario,Velasco,Jr.,Nachura,Reyes,LeonardodeCastro,Brion,JJ.,concur.
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Footnotes
*AdvocatesandAdherentsofSocialJusticeforSchoolTeachersandAlliedWorkers.
1UnderRule65oftheRulesofCourt.
2AnActtoImproveRevenueCollectionPerformanceoftheBureauofInternalRevenue(BIR)
andtheBureauofCustoms(BOC)ThroughtheCreationofaRewardsandIncentivesFundand
ofaRevenuePerformanceEvaluationBoardandforOtherPurposes.
3Section2,RA9335.
4Section3,id.
5Section4,id.
6Section6,id.
7Section7,id.
8Section11,id.
9Section12,id.
10Cruz,Isagani,PhilippineConstitutionalLaw,1995edition,p.23.
11Bernas,Joaquin,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,
1996edition,pp.848849.
12Cruzv.SecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResources,400Phil.904(2000).(Vitug,J.,
separateopinion)
13SeeLaBugalBLaanTribalAssociation,Inc.v.Ramos,G.R.No.127882,01December
2004,445SCRA1.
14Taadav.Angara,338Phil.546(1997).
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15Section2,id.
16CentralBankEmployeesAssociation,Inc.v.BangkoSentralngPilipinas,G.R.No.148208,
15December2004,446SCRA299.
17173U.S.381(1899).
1874U.S.166(1868).
19BlacksLawDictionary,SpecialDeLuxe5thEdition,West,p.481.
20158Phil.60(1974).
21Id.Citationsomitted.
22Ambrosv.CommissiononAudit,G.R.No.159700,30June2005,462SCRA572.
23Section2,RA9335.
24Section18,Chapter4,TitleII,BookIV,AdministrativeCodeof1987.
25Section23,id.
26Pelaezv.AuditorGeneral,122Phil.965(1965).
27EasternShippingLines,Inc.v.POEA,G.R.No.L76633,18October1988,166SCRA533.
28Cruz,Isagani,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1991edition,p.97.
29PanamaRefiningCo.v.Ryan,293U.S.388(1935),(Cardozo,J.,dissenting).
30Section5,RuleII,ImplementingRulesandRegulationsofRA9335.
31DeGuzman,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,391Phil.70(2000).
32SeeSection46(b)(8),Chapter6,TitleI,SubtitleA,BookV,AdministrativeCodeof1987.
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33EquiAsiaPlacement,Inc.v.DepartmentofForeignAffairs,G.R.No.152214,19September
2006,502SCRA295.
34453Phil.586(2003).Mr.Justice(nowChiefJustice)Punosseparateopinionwasadopted
aspartoftheponenciainthiscaseinsofarasitrelatedtothecreationofandthepowersgiven
totheJointCongressionalOversightCommittee.
35Id.(italicsintheoriginal)
36Id.
37MetropolitanWashingtonAirportsAuthorityv.CitizensfortheAbatementofAircraftNoise,
501U.S.252(1991).
38Id.
39Id.
40SeeMr.Justice(nowChiefJustice)PunosseparateopinioninMacalintal.
41E.g.,byrequiringtheregularsubmissionofreports.
42SeeMr.Justice(nowChiefJustice)PunosseparateopinioninMacalintal.
43SeeTribe,Lawrence,IAmericanConstitutionalLaw131(2000).
44Id.
45Id.at141.
46MetropolitanWashingtonAirportsAuthorityv.CitizensfortheAbatementofAirportNoise,
supra.
47Eduv.Ericta,146Phil.469(1970).
48Bernas,Joaquin,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,
2003edition,p.664citingWaymanv.Southward,10Wheat1(1852)andTheBrigAurora,7Cr.
382(1813)).
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49Eslaov.CommissiononAudit,G.R.No.108310,01September1994,236SCRA161Sierra
MadreTrustv.SecretaryofAgricultureandNaturalResources,206Phil.310(1983).
50Peoplev.Maceren,169Phil.437(1977).
51SeeEslaov.CommissiononAudit,supra.
52ItisalsoforthesereasonsthattheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtstruckdownlegislative
vetoesasunconstitutionalinImmigrationandNaturalizationServicev.Chadha(462U.S.919
[1983]).
53Nachura,AntonioB.,OutlineReviewerinPoliticalLaw,2006edition,p.236.
54Section26,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionprovides:
Section26.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhich
shallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof.
(2)NobillpassedbyeitherHouseshallbecomealawunlessithaspassedthreereadings
onseparatedays,andprintedcopiesthereofinitsfinalformhavebeendistributedtoits
Membersthreedaysbeforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresidentcertifiestothe
necessityofitsimmediateenactmenttomeetapubliccalamityoremergency.Uponthe
lastreadingofabill,noamendmenttheretoshallbeallowed,andthevotethereonshall
betakenimmediatelythereafter,andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal.
55SeeBernas,supranote48,p.762.
56PhilippinePoliticalLaw,2002edition,CentralLawbookPublishingCo.,Inc.,pp.152153.
57ThePhilippineConstitutionforLadies,GentlemenAndOthers,2007edition,RexBookstore,
Inc.,pp.118119.
58TheconferencecommitteeconsistsofmembersnominatedbybothHouses.Thetaskofthe
conferencecommittee,however,isnotstrictlylimitedtoreconcilingdifferences.Jurisprudence
alsoallowsthecommitteetoinsertnewprovision[s]notfoundineitheroriginalprovidedthese
aregermanetothesubjectofthebill.Next,thereconciledversionmustbepresentedtoboth
Housesforratification.(Id.)
59Supranote56.
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60Supranote57.
61SeeSection1,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution.InTaadav.Tuvera(230Phil.528),theCourt
alsocitedSection6,ArticleIIIwhichrecognizes"therightofthepeopletoinformationon
mattersofpublicconcern."
62AsmuchisrecognizedinArticle2oftheCivilCodewhichstatesthat"Lawsshalltakeeffect
afterfifteendaysfollowingthecompletionoftheirpublicationeitherintheOfficialGazette,orin
anewspaperofgeneralcirculationinthePhilippines,unlessitisotherwiseprovided."Taada
recognizedthat"unlessitisotherwiseprovided"referredtothedateofeffectivity.Simplyput,a
lawwhichissilentastoitseffectivitydatetakeseffectfifteendaysfollowingpublication,though
thereisnoimpedimentforCongresstoprovideforadifferenteffectivitydate.
63IthasbeensuggestedbyMr.JusticeAntonioT.CarpiothatSection12ofRA9335islikewise
unconstitutionalbecauseitviolatestheprincipleofseparationofpowers,particularlywith
respecttotheexecutiveandthelegislativebranches.Implicitinthisclaimisthepropositionthat
theabilityofthePresidenttopromulgateimplementingrulestolegislationisinherentinthe
executivebranch.
Therehaslongbeenatrendtowardsthedelegationofpowers,especiallyoflegislativepowers,
evenifnotexpresslypermittedbytheConstitution.(I.Cortes,AdministrativeLaw,at1213.)
Delegationoflegislativepowersispermissibleunlessthedelegationamountstoasurrenderor
abdicationofpowers.(Id.)RecentinstancesofdelegatedlegislativepowersupheldbytheCourt
includethepoweroftheDepartmentsofJusticeandHealthtopromulgaterulesandregulations
onlethalinjection(Echegarayv.SecretaryofJustice,358Phil.410[1998])thepowerofthe
SecretaryofHealthtophaseoutbloodbanks(Beltranv.SecretaryofHealth,G.R.No.133640,
133661,&139147,25November2005,476SCRA168)andthepoweroftheDepartmentsof
FinanceandLabortopromulgateImplementingRulestotheMigrantWorkersandOverseas
FilipinosAct.(EquiAsiaPlacementv.DFA,G.R.No.152214,19September2006,502SCRA
295.)
Thedelegationtotheexecutivebranchofthepowertoformulateandenactimplementingrules
fallswithintheclassofpermissibledelegationoflegislativepowers.Mostrecently,inExecutive
Secretaryv.SouthwingHeavyIndustries(G.R.Nos.164171,164172&168741,20February
2006,482SCRA673),wecharacterizedsuchdelegationas"confer[ring]uponthePresident
quasilegislativepowerwhichmaybedefinedastheauthoritydelegatedbythelawmaking
bodytotheadministrativebodytoadoptrulesandregulationsintendedtocarryoutthe
provisionsofthelawandimplementlegislativepolicy."(Id.,at686,citingCruz,Philippine
AdministrativeLaw,2003Edition,at24.)Lawbookauthorsarelikewisevirtuallyunanimousthat
thepoweroftheexecutivebranchtopromulgateimplementingrulesarisesfromlegislative
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delegation.JusticeNachuradefinesthenatureoftherulemakingpowerofadministrative
bodiesintheexecutivebranchas"theexerciseofdelegatedlegislativepower,involvingno
discretionastowhatthelawshallbe,butmerelytheauthoritytofixthedetailsintheexecution
orenforcementofapolicysetoutinthelawitself."(A.E.Nachura,OutlineReviewerinPolitical
Law[2000ed.],at272.)Hefurtherexplainsthatrulesandregulationsthat"fixthedetailsinthe
executionandenforcementofapolicysetoutinthelaw"arecalled"supplementaryordetailed
legislation".(Id.,at273.)OthercommentatorssuchasFr.Bernas(Bernas,supranote48,at
611),DeLeonandDeLeon(H.DeLeon&H.DeLeon,Jr.,AdministrativeLaw:TextandCases
(1998ed),at7980citing1Am.Jur.2d891)andCarlosCruz(C.Cruz,Philippine
AdministrativeLaw(1998ed),at1920,22,23)havesimilarviews.
TheCongressmaydelegatethepowertocraftimplementingrulestothePresidentinhis
capacityastheheadoftheexecutivebranch,whichistaskedundertheConstitutiontoexecute
thelaw.Ineffectingthisdelegation,andaswithanyotherdelegationoflegislativepowers,
Congressmayimposeconditionsorlimitationswhichtheexecutivebranchisboundtoobserve.
AusualexampleisthedesignationbyCongressofwhichparticularmembersoftheexecutive
branchshouldparticipateinthedraftingoftheimplementingrules.Thissetupdoesnotoffend
theseparationofpowersbetweenthebranchesasitissanctionedbythedelegationprinciple.
ApartfromwhateverrulemakingpowerthatCongressmaydelegatetothePresident,thelatter
hasinherentordinancepowerscoveringtheexecutivebranchaspartofthepowerofexecutive
control("ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutivedepartments,bureausand
offices"Section17,ArticleVII,Constitution.).Byitsnature,thisordinancepowerdoesnot
requireorentaildelegationfromCongress.Suchfacultymustbedistinguishedfromthe
authoritytoissueimplementingrulestolegislationwhichdoesnotinhereinthepresidencybut
instead,asexplainedearlier,isdelegatedbyCongress.
ThemarkeddistinctionbetweenthePresidentspowertoissueintrabranchordersand
instructionsorinternalrulesfortheexecutivebranch,ononehand,andthePresidents
authoritybyvirtueoflegislativedelegationtoissueimplementingrulestolegislation,onthe
other,isembodiedintherulesonpublication,asexplainedinTaadav.Tuvera(G.R.No.L
63915,29December1986,146SCRA446).TheCourtheldthereinthatinternalregulations
applicabletomembersoftheexecutivebranch,"thatis,regulatingonlythepersonnelofthe
administrativeagencyandnotthepublic,neednotbepublished.Neitherispublicationrequired
ofthesocalledlettersofinstructionsissuedbyadministrativesuperiorsconcerningtherulesor
guidelinestobefollowedbytheirsubordinatesintheperformanceoftheirduties."(Id.,at454)
Thedispensationwithpublicationinsuchinstancesisrootedintheverynatureofthe
issuances,i.e.,theyarenotbindingonthepublic.Theyneithercreaterightsnorimpose
obligationswhichareenforceableincourt.Sincetheyareissuedpursuanttothepowerof
executivecontrol,andaredirectedonlyatmembersoftheexecutivebranch,thereisno
constitutionalneedfortheirpublication.
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However,whenthepresidentialissuancedoescreaterightsandobligationsaffectingthepublic
atlarge,asimplementingrulescertainlydo,thenpublicationismandatory.Inexplainingwhy
thisisso,theCourtwentasfarastonotethatsuchrulesandregulationsaredesigned"to
enforceorimplementexistinglawpursuanttoavaliddelegation."(Id.,at254.)TheCourt
wouldnothavespokenof"validdelegation"ifindeedthepowertoissuesuchruleswas
inherentinthepresidency.Moreover,thecreationoflegalrightsandobligationsislegislative
incharacter,andthePresidentinwhomlegislativepowerdoesnotresidecannotconferlegal
rightsorimposeobligationsonthepeopleabsenttheproperempoweringstatute.Thus,any
presidentialissuancewhichpurportstobearsuchlegaleffectonthepublic,suchas
implementingrulestolegislation,canonlyemanatefromalegislativedelegationtothe
President.
TheprevalentpracticeintheOfficeofthePresidentistoissueordersorinstructionstoofficials
oftheexecutivebranchregardingtheenforcementorcarryingoutofthelaw.Thispracticeis
validconformablywiththePresidentspowerofexecutivecontrol.Thefacultytoissuesuch
ordersorinstructionsisdistinctfromthepowertopromulgateimplementingrulestolegislation.
Thelatteroriginatesfromadifferentlegalfoundationthedelegationoflegislativepowertothe
President.
JusticeCarpiocitesanunconventionalinterpretationoftheordinancepowerofthePresident,
particularlythepowertoissueexecutiveorders,assetforthintheAdministrativeCodeof1987.
Yet,bypractice,implementingrulesarenevercontainedinexecutiveorders.Theyare,instead,
containedinasegregatepromulgation,usuallyentitled"ImplementingRulesandRegulations,"
whichderivesnotfromtheAdministrativeCode,butratherfromthespecificgrantsinthe
legislationitselfsoughttobeimplemented.
HispositiondoesnotfindtextualsupportintheAdministrativeCodeitself.Section2,Chapter2,
Title1,BookIIIoftheCode,whichdefines"Executiveorders"as"[a]ctsofthePresident
providingforrulesofageneralorpermanentcharacterintheimplementationorexecutionof
constitutionalorstatutorypowers".Executiveordersarenotthevehiclesforrulesofa
generalorpermanentcharacterintheimplementationorexecutionoflaws.Theyarethe
vehicleforrulesofageneralorpermanentcharacterintheimplementationorexecutionof
theconstitutionalorstatutorypowersofthePresidenthimself.Sincebydefinition,the
statutorypowersofthePresidentconsistofaspecificdelegationbyCongress,itnecessarily
followsthatthefacultytoissueexecutiveorderstoimplementsuchdelegatedauthority
emanatesnotfromanyinherentexecutivepowerbutfromtheauthoritydelegatedbyCongress.
Itisnotcorrect,asJusticeCarpioposits,thatwithoutimplementingrules,legislationcannotbe
faithfullyexecutedbytheexecutivebranch.Manyofourkeylaws,includingtheCivilCode,the
RevisedPenalCode,theCorporationCode,theLandRegistrationActandtheProperty
RegistrationDecree,donothaveImplementingRules.Ithasneverbeensuggestedthatthe
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G.R.No.166715
enforcementoftheselawsisunavailing,orthattheabsenceofimplementingrulestotheselaws
indicatesinsufficientstatutorydetailsthatshouldprecludetheirenforcement.(SeeDBM
v.KolonwelTrading,G.R.Nos.175608,175616&175659,8June2007,524SCRA591,603.)
Inrejectingthetheorythatthepowertocraftimplementingrulesisexecutiveincharacterand
reaffirminginsteadthatsuchpowerarisesfromalegislativegrant,theCourtassertsthat
Congressretainsthepowertoimposestatutoryconditionsinthedraftingofimplementingrules,
providedthatsuchconditionsdonottakeonthecharacterofalegislativeveto.Congresscan
designatewhichofficersorentitiesshouldparticipateinthedraftingofimplementingrules.It
mayimposestatutoryrestraintsontheparticipantsinthedraftingofimplementingrules,andthe
Presidentisobligedtoobservesuchrestraintsontheexecutiveofficials,evenifhethinksthey
areunnecessaryorfoolhardy.Theunconstitutionalnatureofthelegislativevetodoesnot
howeverbarCongressfromimposingconditionswhichthePresidentmustcomplywithinthe
executionofthelaw.Afterall,thePresidenthastheconstitutionaldutytofaithfullyexecutethe
laws.
64Thisstanceiscalledforbyjudicialrestraintaswellasthepresumptionofconstitutionality
accordedtolawsenactedbyCongress,acoequalbranch.ItisalsofindssupportinPelaezv.
AuditorGeneral(122Phil.965[1965]).
65346Phil.321(1997).Emphasisintheoriginal.
66Inparticular,thePhilippineStarandtheManilaStandard.
67Section36,IRRofRA9335.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
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Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One

Thegeneralrule is thatwhere part of a statute isvoidas repugnant totheConstitution,while

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