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FRANCISCO v BOISER - 332 SCRA 792 - May 31, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Adalia Francisco sold the 1/5 share of parcel land of Adela Bias, her
mother to respondent Zenaida Boiser. Respondent Boiser filed a complaint to the
petitioner for demanding her share in the rentals being collected by petitioners from
the tenants of the building. Adela Bias and other owners never informed about the
sale of the respondents, which they only came to know when Adelia received the
summons. Respondent contends that Adalia knew about the sale because she wrote
petitioner a letter informing the latter about the sale.
Statcon:
There was thus a return to the doctrine laid down in Butte. That ruling is sound. In
the first place, reversion to the ruling in Butte is proper. Art. 1623 of the Civil Code
is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the vendor or
prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is, therefore, no room for
construction. Indeed, the principal difference between Art. 1524 of the former Civil
Code and Art. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who must
give the notice, whereas the present one expressly says the notice must be given
by the vendor. Effect must be given to this change in statutory language.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the right of legal redemption is Adalia Francisco.
In Re: Valenzuela and Vallarta 298 SCRA 408 November 9, 1998
Facts:
This case all about the appointment of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
Vallarta as judges of RTC Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively, during the
banning period by the President.
Statcon:
The Courts view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his termthe President is neither required to make appointments
to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is
noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every
six years.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not
unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight appointmentsthose
made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their
makingbut also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of the Presidential election. On the other hand, the exception in the same
Section 15 of Article VIIallowing appointments to be made during the period of the
ban therein providedis much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The
exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during
the period of the ban.
Held:
Appointments of Respondent Judges declared void without prejudice to their
renomination.
LLDA v Court of Appeals - 251 SCRA 42 December 7, 1995
Facts:

This case is all about the Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development
Authority where exercise jurisdiction over the lake with regard the issuance of permits.
However, it was repealed by the R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
Statcon:
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled
rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of
cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general
law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special
statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the
general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the legislature.
A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication.
Held:
This Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.

LAND BANK v CA - 249 SCRA 19 - October 6, 1995


Facts:
Private respondents are landowners (Pedro L. Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, AMADCOR)
whose holdings were acquired by Department of Agrarian Reform and subjected to transfer
schemes to qualified beneficiaries under RA 6657. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses by
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines with respect to the
valuation and payment of compensation for their land; private respondents filed a petition
questioning the validity of DAR AO Nos. 6 and 9. They sought to compel DAR to deposit in
cash and bonds the amounts respectively, earmarked, reserved and deposited in trust
accounts for private respondents and allow them to withdraw the same. Land Bank
(petitioner) assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994,
which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
Statcon:
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other

form. If it were the intention to include a trust account among the valid modes of deposit,
that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared
from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
deposit.
Held:
The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it
issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29,
29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Melendres vs. COMELEC - 319 SCRA 262 - November 25, 1999
Facts:
Miguel Melendres filed a case against Ruperto Concepcion contesting the result of the
election. During the preliminary hearing it was shown that no filing fee was paid by the
Melendres, in which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6.
Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to comply with the said
requirements, but the Metropolitan Trial Court, denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is merely an administrative
procedure and not jurisdictional.
Statcon:
Nothing extant in the COMELEC Rules either expressly or by implication requires the
payment of the filing fee for purposes of conferment upon or acquisition by the Court of
jurisdiction over the case. The Rule speaks only of giving due course to the protest upon the
payment of the filing fee. Therefore, the payment of the filing fee is an administrative
procedural matter, proceeding as it does from an administrative body.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the petition of Melendes is dismissed for lack of merit.

KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO - 246 SCRA 540 - November 16, 1995

Facts:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leasedonline lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross
amount of ticket or atleast P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted
to charity. Term of lease is for 8years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible
for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25
million.
Statcon:
It was held that the PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which would
involve it in any form of collaboration, association or joint venture for the holding of
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities. This interpretation must be
reexamined especially in determining whether petitioners have a cause of action.

Held:
The SC held:
1. That the ELA is a valid as a lease Contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to
the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
2. That under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether
alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it
itself holds or conducts such lottery; and
3. That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted
to public bidding as a condition for its validity.

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