Advanced Placement United States History

Primary Source Inquiry Assignment

By Sophie Koontz
 UNITED STATES HISTORY
SECTION II
Part A

(Suggested writing time—45 minutes)

Directions: The following question requires you to construct a coherent essay that
integrates your interpretation of Documents A-H and your knowledge of the period
referred to in the question. High scores will be earned only by essays that both cite key
pieces of evidence from the documents and draw on outside knowledge of the period.

1. How did the priorities of the Cold War influence America’s changing
relationship with China? Discuss with respect to the period 1945 to 1974.

Document A

Source: Nixon, Richard M. “Speech on Vietnamization,” November 3, 1969.

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the
Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South
Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower
sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their
efforts to prevent a Communist takeover….
In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from
Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for
the cause of peace….
“In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of
South Viet-Nam but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there.”
 Document B

Source: Korean War Map.

 Document C

Source: Kissinger, Henry A. “My Visit to China,” a memorandum for President Nixon.
November 19, 1973.

The Sino-Soviet Split. We have been in probably the ideal situation with regard to the
two communist giants: they both want and need to deal with us because they cannot deal
with one another. We are walking a delicate tightrope of public détente with Moscow and
tacit alliance with Peking. This will continue to require the most careful handling. The
meticulous care and feeding of the Chinese on our Soviet policy has paid off, but Peking
sees our détente pursuit as at least objectively threatening its security, whatever our
motives. And even if we don’t make mistakes, events beyond our control could turn one
or the other against us or propel them toward each other.
 Document D

Source: Le Pelley, Guernsey. “China’s Okay, but Don’t You and I Have More in
Common?” Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 1972.
 Document E

Source: Secretary Dulles’ Policy Speech to the Far East-America Council of Commerce,
September 26, 1958.

And the expansionist aims of that regime [the Chinese Communists] have been shown in
Tibet, in Korea, in Indochina, and now in the Formosa area….
Now were the United States to extend general diplomatic recognition to the Chinese
Communist regime, this would be of immense help to them in carrying out that Asian
policy.
Such recognition would, for example, gravely jeopardize the authority of the Republic of
China on Formosa and its good relations with us. It would, in other Asian countries, mean
that the influential Chinese communities would increasingly take political guidance from
the Communist authorities and become a tool for the overthrowing of now friendly
governments….
The stakes involved are not just some square miles of real estate. What is involved is a
Communist challenge to the basic principles of peace that armed force should not be used
for aggression….
And if this challenge is to world order in general, it is particularly a challenge to the
United States. If we, the strongest of the Free World powers, were to show indecision or
weakness in the face of this challenge, we would merely confirm the rules of the Sino-
Soviet bloc, the rulers of international communism, in their hope that by threatening
anywhere and everywhere around their circumference they could compel submission or
surrender.
 Document F

Source: Folliard, Edward T. “What Are the Facts About the Furore Over China?” The
Washington Post, December 2, 1945.

The historic, long-range policy of the United States is to establish a strong and
independent China. Every American Secretary of State from the days of John Hay and
the Open Door has nurtured that policy.

A strong and independent China, with some 450 million people, would mean a valuable
ally and an enormous market for American manufacturers. Above all, it would mean—so
it is hoped, at any rate—peace in the Far East, that area of the world that brought
America into the shooting war and the area where American and Russian interests come
closest together.
 Document G

Source: Kerry, John. “Vietnam Veterans against the War Statement by John Kerry to the
Senate Committee of Foreign Relations,” April 23, 1971.

In our opinion, and from our experience, there is nothing in South Vietnam which could
happen that realistically threatens the United States of America. And to attempt to justify
the loss of one American life in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos by linking such loss to the
preservation of freedom, which those misfits supposedly abuse, is to us the height of
criminal hypocrisy, and it is that kind of hypocrisy which we feel has torn this country
apart….

We found that not only was it a civil war, an effort by a people who had for years been
seeking their liberation from any colonial influence whatsoever, but also we found that
the Vietnamese whom we had enthusiastically molded after our own image were hard put
to take up the fight against the threat we were supposedly saving them from.

We found most people didn’t even know the difference between communism and
democracy.
 Document H

Source: Childs, Marquis. “Our Two Policies On Two Chinas.” The Washington Post,
May 20, 1963.

With disaster looming, Chiang would send up a cry for American help. And it is here that
a recurring nightmare haunts sober officials. To refuse such help would be to invite the
charge for the China lobby and the Republican opposition that the Democrats are the only
party that lost China twice.

But to go to Chiang’s rescue would touch off a chain reaction so far-reaching no one
would venture to predict its end. At the very least it would heal the breach between
Russia and China and put a period to all hope of a permanent split in the Communist
bloc. At the worst it would mean nuclear war. That is a measure of what is at stake in the
old recurring dilemma of China.
 Analysis of Documents

Document A

In this excerpt from his speech, Nixon explains that the main reason why the United
States became involved in the Vietnam War was the attempt by Communist China and
the Soviet Union to spread Communism to South Vietnam. This statement emphasizes
that America’s Cold War policy of containment led the United States to go to war against
North Vietnam, a country that was supported by China. The student might also note that
Nixon references the Domino Theory, another Cold War policy, when he says that “for us
to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam but
Southeast Asia.” This document suggests that the reason behind the United States going
to war against a country that was strongly backed by China was because of America’s
Cold War objective of stopping the spread of communism.

Document B

This map of Korean War offensives shows how Chinese forces joined the North Koreans
in forcing U.N. troops out of North Korea and back below the 38th parallel. The student
could give background on how the United States applied the foreign policy ideas
expressed in NSC-68 and became involved in the Korean War after Communist North
Korea invaded the more democratic, pro-American South Korea. The Cold War policy of
containment and the need to prevent a communist take-over of South Korea led to the
Korean War and direct fighting against the Chinese. Also, the green arrows show how
U.N. forces invaded North Korea, going beyond the policy of containment to the policies
of liberation and rolling back communism. It was because China felt endangered by this
attack near their border that they joined forces with the North Korean army. This map
shows that China became the United States’ enemy in the Korean War because its
Communist government felt threatened by America’s Cold War policy of rolling back
communism. Additionally, the student could mention that one of the main reasons behind
America’s intervention in Korea was that after “losing” China to communism, the United
States didn’t want to lose Korea too.

Document C

This document shows the shift in America’s relationship with China that occurred during
Nixon’s presidency. The student could discuss how by the early 1970s the US
government no longer refused to recognize Communist China as it had before, but instead
started to form a “tacit alliance with Peking.” Also, this excerpt shows how one of
America’s main objectives at this point in the Cold War was to prevent the “two
communist giants” from becoming allies, something that could be accomplished by
cultivating a closer relationship with the mainland Chinese government. The student
could use this document to argue that the main reason why the United States reopened
diplomatic relations with China was to split up China and the Soviet Union.

Document D

This 1972 cartoon depicts the Soviet leader Brezhnev suggesting to Nixon that the United
States has more “in common” with the U.S.S.R. than it does with China. The cartoon
suggests that the Soviet Union wants to have a close relationship with the United States,
illustrating how important and powerful an alliance between two world superpowers
would be. If two out of the three major countries formed an alliance, the third country
would see its power and influence greatly decrease. The student could reference this
cartoon to help explain why the United States policy towards China changed under
Nixon. By starting to build a relationship with Communist China, the United States was
trying to gain power and accomplish its Cold War goal of weakening the Soviet Union.

Document E

This document shows America’s relationship with Communist China earlier in the Cold
War. The student could contrast Dulles’ point of view to Kissinger’s and explain how this
difference results from the shift in the United States’ Cold War policies. At this point in
the Cold War, the United States’ main objective was containment. As this excerpt from
Dulles’ speech explains, recognizing the People’s Republic of China would aid its
“expansionist aims” and would mean that Communist authorities would have more power
to turn “influential Chinese communities” into “a tool for the overthrowing of now
friendly governments.” Recognizing the communist government would increase its
influence and prestige, thereby giving it more power to carry out its imperialistic goals.
Another important point made in this document is that the United States couldn’t back
down from the challenge of Communist China by recognizing it because America saw
itself as the leader in the fight against communism and the “strongest of the Free World
powers.” The United States needed to set an example and prove that it would fight to stop
communist expansion all over the world. Finally, the student could use this document to
discuss how the US viewed Communist China as a threat to the capitalist “world order”
that America envisioned, and that if American leaders extended diplomatic recognition to
the Communist government they would validate its beliefs and “confirm the rules of the
Sino-Soviet bloc.”

Document F
This document, published at the beginning of the time frame for the question, sets the
stage for the large role China will play in the Cold War struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union. While Mao ZeDong and the Communist Party hadn’t taken
over mainland China at this time, the “Far East” was already proving to be an area of
conflict and the place “where American and Russian interests come closest together.”
The student could also add that with a population of 450 million people, China would be
a strategic ally to have and whichever of the two world super powers had a closer
relationship with it would have an advantage. However, the student could also use this
document as evidence that the United States’ relationship with Communist China later
changed not only because of Cold War objectives, but also for economic reasons. With
such a large population, China would be an “enormous market for American
manufacturers.”

Document G

This document presents a viewpoint on the Vietnam War that contradicts the one
presented in the other documents and held by many of the American leaders during the
Cold War. Unlike the other documents, especially Nixon’s “Speech on Vietnamization,”
which allude to the Domino Theory and use containment as the reason for intervening in
other countries, this excerpt suggests that nothing could happen in Vietnam that
“realistically threatens the United States of America.” John Kerry believes that US
actions in Vietnam are not helping America stand up to China and the Soviet Union, but
that the conflict there is a civil war that the United States should not have intervened in.
He thinks that US actions there are not a moral obligation or necessary to prove
America’s unyielding stand against communism, but “the height of criminal hypocrisy.”
In her response to the question, the student will need to consider the fact that some people
did not believe that intervention in Vietnam was a necessary part of the broader Cold War
struggle or justified by the Cold War policy, articulated in the Truman Doctrine, to
“support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressure.”

Document H

First of all, the student could use this document to talk about how important an alliance
with China was during the Cold War, exemplified by the fact that losing China was a
political disaster for the Democratic Party. The United States’ intervention in Korea and
Vietnam, as well as its protection of Formosa, not only resulted from Cold War goals, but
also from political motivations of not wanting to lose another Asian country. The student
could also use this document to talk about how America’s complex relationship with
Communist China was intertwined with the Cold War. The United States needed to stay
true to its promises and protect Chiang Kai-shek from the People’s Republic of China,
but American leaders also didn’t want to end the possibility of achieving another Cold
War goal of splitting up the two main communist superpowers by forming an alliance
with China.

Likely Outside Information

Mao ZeDong and Communist Party take over mainland China in 1949
U.S. “Lost” China
Pro-American Chiang Kai-Shek and Nationalist Party retreat to Formosa
Only recognize Republic of China government on Taiwan for thirty years
U.S. works to prevent People’s Republic of China from taking China’s seat in the United
Nations
Truman Doctrine
Containment
Rolling-back communism
NSC-68
Domino Theory
North Korea’s attack on South Korea in 1950 as the start of the Korean War
China’s role in Korean War
China’s support of North Vietnam in Vietnam War
Communist imperialism
Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China in 1972
U.S. didn’t officially recognize the People’s Republic of China until 1979
World Superpowers
Sino-Soviet bloc
Weaken Soviet Union
United States as leader of Free World
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