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Nietzsche is dead?
A P O R I A
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy
Fall 2006/Winter 2007: Volume XXIV, Issue 1
Editor-In-Chief
Kevin Decker
Publisher/Executive Editor
Kelley Meck
Managing Editor
AnnMary Mathew
Layout Editor
Norton Zhang
Editorial Board
Lizzy Asher
Nathan Clarke
Tatyana Liskovich
David Ong
Katie McIntyre
Jared Westheim
Contributing Authors
Kevin Decker
Lizzy Asher
Andrew K. Fletcher
Ann Mary Mathew
Yan Shurin
Jessica Spradling
Jenny Strakovsky
Faculty Advisor
Julia Driver
The publication of this journal is made possible by the financial support of the Philosophy Department
and Dartmouth Council on Student Organizations.
Copyright 2007 by the Trustees of Dartmouth College.
Volume 24 Issue 1 Fall 2006/Winter 2007
Table of Contents
A Note From The Editors
Kevin Decker
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
To Froese one of the most egregiously wrong tendencies in Western Philosophy has been
to reject the world of change for the true world of form. It is a tendency that is almost nonexistent in Eastern philosophy. In her book, Froese draws compelling connections between
Nietzsches Eternal Return, Heideggers Being, and the Daoist Dao-which Froese sees as
fluid alternatives to more the more static metaphysics of mainstream Western Philosophy
........................................
11
Scholars of Nietzsche often disagree over what kind of political system he supported. The strong
position is that Nietzsche proposed and advocated for a specific kind of structure. The weaker position
is that Nietzsche expressed his views through the criticism of existing political systems and so from a
process of elimination we can determine which he would have actually supported. This paper examines
Nietzsches views on democracies, oligarchies, and dictatorships and demonstrates why they fail to
meet his standards of an ideal society. In the end, the author proposes that Nietzsches ideal political
state is the state of nature and shows how he overcomes Hobbes criticism of such an existence.
Table of Contents
The Human Condition and the 21st Century
Jessica Spradling .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Nearly 50 years after Hannah Arendt wrote The Human Condition, this study considers
Arendts major work in light of the substantial changes the human condition has undergone
in the half-century since 1957. In particular, the study focuses on many of the most-talked
about developments in the past half-century such as mass communication, brain sciences,
globalization, and medical innovation in so far as they relate to Arendts vita activa and the
possibilities of authenticity, privacy, and action at the beginning of the 21st century. The
writings of later social theorists such as Seyla Benhabib, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, and Dana
Villa will provide support for this reconsideration of Arendts work in the contemporary world.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
In his Meditations, Descartes attempts to establish a stable and lasting foundation for human
knowledge by eliminating all preconceived thoughts and using logic to discover basic indubitable
truths. In the Third Meditation, he argues that, because God himself is an idea, his origin must
come from somewhere within ourselves (given that the existence of an outside world has not
yet been determined). Because the concept of God contains infinity, while people are distinctly
finite creatures, He must originate from outside us. However, in his proof, Descartes ignores the
human quality of creative and inventive thinking, which allows us to extrapolate from simple
ideas and fabricate extravagant thoughts, and in addition, allows us to invent the idea of God.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
This paper discusses the problems Hume foresaw with inductive reasoning as it relates to the
work of Nelson Goodman. Hume holds inductive knowledge to standards of certainty that not
even deductive knowledge can attain. Goodman improves on Humes hypothesis by proposing
that the problem of induction stems from not having an adequate system of rules with which
we can judge an inductive arguments validity. Although we cannot ever be certain about
inductive conclusions, experimentation and abstraction can help us refine our ideal sample set.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Is it possible to act against ones better judgment? In philosophy, this concept is known as akrasia and
there is debate among philosophers about whether or not it exists. This paper explains the possibility
of human akrasia and the case for the weakness of will, the condition that leads an individual
to act in a manner contrary to his best interests. Utilizing examples of addiction and conflicting
motivations, this essay aims to carefully define the philosophical lexis involved, and concludes
that weakness of will, when understood as improper intent revision, is both plausible and common.
Volume 24 Issue 1 Fall 2006/Winter 2007
Friedrich Nietzsche
is a name that often provokes strong reactions in both the general
and philosophical communities. Different interpretations of his works abound. This plurality of
interpretations is perhaps fitting considering his perspectivism. Regardless of ones attitude toward
Nietzsche, however, it is hard to deny his profound and pervasive influence on philosophy over
the course of the past century.
Nietzsches somewhat obscure and tragic life as a sickly recluse seems surprising with
regard to the number of (in)famous appropriations of his philosophy in the twentieth-century.
Acquaintance with these appropriations is far more common than the intricate understanding
Nietzsches thought demands. While this may seem to be a regrettable state of affairs, familiarity
with the positive use of a philosophers concepts proves that these concepts deserve study. In
light of this observation, this issue features reviews of two quite different uses of Nietzsches
philosophy.
Two of our editors offer our readers reviews of books that explore Nietzsches relation
to different areas of philosophy. Ann Mary Mathew reviews Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Daoist
Thought: Crossing Paths In-between by Katrin Froese. This book offers an interesting perspective
on Nietzsche in relation to Eastern Philosophy as well as Heidegger. Kevin Decker reviews
Nietzsches French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism by Alan Schrift. Schrift offers a
clear exploration of the untimeliness of Nietzsches philosophy and its influence on twentiethcentury French thought.
Our readers will also find four articles in this issue. Jessica Spradling offers a detailed
exposition of Arendts The Human Condition, which is arguably one of the most important works
in recent social and political philosophy. Jenny Strakovsky offers an argument against one of
Descartes proofs for the existence of God in Meditations. Lizzy Asher criticizes the infamous
problem of induction posed by Hume in his Enquiry. In the final article, Drew Fletcher offers an
interesting examination of the possibility of weakness of the will.
As always, we hope that our readers will find some philosophical inspiration and unfamiliar
thoughts contained within these pages.
A Book Review
Kevin Decker
Schrift, many people fail to recognize the ambivalence these two philosophers had towards power.
Many critics incorrectly conflate Nietzsches affirmation of the will to power with an affirmation
of all manifestations of it. Similarly, many critics
overlook Foucaults claim that power also produces in his criticism of the repressive hypothesis.
Schrift also claims that Foucault seeks to
replace a Sartrean subject with a Nietzschean creatively constructed self. He continues to suggest
that Foucaults later philosophy is not a rupture
with his earlier work and signals a return to the
philosophy of the subject. He is simply adding a
supplement, in the Derridean sense, which is not
a correction.
Schrifts section on Deleuze is Putting Nietzsche to Work: Genealogy, Will to Power, and
Other Desiring Machines. He acknowledges that
navigating Deleuzes thought can be difficult,
even terrifying, and offers Nietzsche as a way to
orientate ourselves within the Deleuzian matrix.
His aim is to show where their ideas connect and
also how Nietzsche does work for Deleuze. First,
however, Schrift uses Nietzsche to illustrate two
primary differences between Derrida and Deleuze.
Whereas Derrida is concerned with the text and
interpretation, Deleuze shies away from hermeneutic matters and instead treats the text as an
assemblage of parts that are interconnected and
able to be used. Another difference is the attitude
toward binary concepts. Derrida deconstructs hierarchical oppositions; Deleuze uses many binary
pairs strategically. While Derridas concern is dissolution, Deleuzes is with multiplication. Schrift
claims that Deleuze finds inspiration for this tactic
in Nietzsche. He does not clarify, however, how
Derrida and Deleuze can differ so widely in their
attitudes towards binary oppositions if they both
derive these attitudes from Nietzsches thought.
Schrift then explains the rejection of Nietzsche by the French Anti-Nietzscheans Luc Ferry,
Alain Renault, and Vincent Descombes. These
thinkers took issue with what they saw as seeking
paradox, avoiding clarity, and excessive rhetoric
in the French Nietzscheans. While Ferry, Renault,
and Descombes may agree with some of the issues
raised by their predecessors, their generally hold
that they went beyond Nietzsche to the point of
obscurity and absurdity in either exaggerating the
problems or attempting to provide solutions.
In Cixous, he claims there is a masculine economy grounded in the law of return and in which
gift-giving is not possible. A feminine economy,
on the other hand, allows the possibility of giftgiving. It diverges from Nietzsches noble eco-
Notes
Schrift, Alan. Nietzsches French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism. Great Britain: Routledge,
1995.
10
gest that the hyper-mechanized state of the current world is due to the success of such a notion
of metaphysics. Its an interesting and unique
argument:
the danger is that the line between philosophy and praxis has become dangerously narrow.
Abstractions have become our reality, as we continue to be mesmerized by the truth of numbers and
logic. Nietzsche makes the bold suggestion that
philosophys excessive theoretical bent may have
undermined the activity of philosophizing. Once
our concepts have achieved a stranglehold on our
existence, there is no longer any need to philosophize. We deliberately limit our experience to ways
in which it can be categorized, and then we argue
that praxis is important and philosophy is irrelevant.
The hubris of philosophy has therefore led to its
extirpation
Notes
Froese, Katrin. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths In-Between. New York: State
University Press of New York Press, 2006.
Volume 24 Issue 1 Fall 2006/Winter 2007
13
Yan Shurin
possible values to be freely chosen under it. Falling under his general hatred of institutions, Nietzsche holds particular scorn for the nation state.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is full of ridicule
of the state. Where there is still a people, there the
state is not understood, but hated as the evil eye,
and as sin against laws and customs, says Zarathustra.16 The state, which he described as the
coldest of all cold monsters,
...lieth in all languages of good and evil; and whatever it saith it lieth; and whatever it hath it hath
stolen. False is everything in it; with stolen teeth it
biteth, the bitingone. False are even its bowels.
It seems worth noting that Nietzsches antagonism to the state extended in his actual life as
well, as he renounced his German citizenship in
1880 and was technically state-less until 1889.18
Nietzsches hatred for the state was surpassed only
by his hatred for nationalism, for those who loved the state. He took special delight in mocking
Deutschland, Deutschland ber Alles because
this sort of nationalism was the combination of all
of his concerns; it was a strong nation-state imposing its value system while destroying the values
and culture of all.
Nietzsches hatred of political systems and
the nation-state has led many to believe that Nietzsche was simply disinterested, and disgusted, with
politics. His various statements on politics itself
have furthered this view. In the Untimely Meditations he pointed out that every philosophy which
believes that the problem of existence is touched
on, not to say solved, by a political event is a joke17
This Nietzschean freedom is neither the metaphysical free will nor classical freedom from
outside forces of liberal political philosophy.
Instead, freedom is the condition that allows the
full manifestation of self-overcoming and the
will to power. The statement that best represents
Nietzsches somewhat unusual views on freedom
is that the free man is a warrior.26 This free man
fights against himself and against others, trying to
overcome all. With this sort of freedom identified
as Nietzsches primary political and social good,
we can now examine the condition of society that
would be most conducive to the existence of this
good: the state of nature.
The state of nature, that mythical land
from which the social contract evolved, is the natural home of Nietzsches proposed free men. The
view that the state of nature is Nietzsches preferred situation receives a significant amount of
support from the Nietzschean arguments against
democracy, oligarchy, dictatorship, institutions,
and the state. The common theme of all of these
arguments has been that institutions, by their very
nature, oppress individual freedom. It does not
matter what type of institution it is because any
institution must suppress the will to power and
freedom of all those under it in order to stand. The
state of nature lacks these oppressive institutions
and, because of this, is the ideal home of the true
Nietzschean.
The Overman, the man who has overcome both himself and others, is Nietzsches dream.
He will create new values and destroy old ones,
18
This shows that the focus of Nietzsches concern with leaving the state of nature to form institutions truly is his view of equality as unjust. Were
Hobbes to be correct about man essentially being
equal, then Nietzsche might concede the need for
institutions. However, since there are both sheep
and birds of prey, there is no room for powerful
systems and institutions.
The analogy of the birds of prey and the
sheep is a significant theme in Nietzsches work.
While it may be the case that it is a simple analogy about the two types of people there are in the
world, it may, on the other hand, give significant
clues to Nietzsches political philosophy. Nietzsche specifically states that the Overman refuses to
20
be either the shepherd or the herding dog and instead is clearly a bird of prey. This shows that what
the Overman wants from politics is freedom and
not power (responsibility) over others. There is no
condition that would give him more freedom, and
less institutional connections to the sheep, than the
state of nature.
The hope is that the arguments against the
views that Nietzsches preferred political system
was either democracy or oligarchy/dictatorship,
combined with the examination of what kind of
social situation Nietzsche would want to exist, provide good evidence for believing the Nietzsches
preferred political condition was the state of nature. There are several potential objections to this
view and they deserve careful consideration. The
first major concern is the question of why, if he
really did believe the state of nature was optimal,
Nietzsche did not explicitly call for it.
Nietzsche is not one to avoid saying something because it sounds too outrageous, neither is
he one who restricts himself to only certain topics.
So why then does he never devote a few words
to explicitly arguing for the state of nature? This
question may not, however, be a fair one. This is
because the argument is for the weaker view, that
a political philosophy can easily be constructed
from Nietzsches other views. There is no need for
Nietzsche to have been aware that he was actually
arguing for the state of nature. This would in turn
explain why he never directly addressed it. There
is also, however, a good argument in favor of the
stronger position.
Nietzsche hated systems. He believed them
to be inherently flawed because their desire for
universality necessarily sacrificed justice in many
cases. Holding this position made it impossible for
him to explicitly propose his own political system.
He was left to simply attempt to destroy all the
ones he saw around him. Were he to be successful
in the destruction, he would also be successful in
creating his state of nature. That is because the state of nature is arguably the default state of human
existence. Nietzsche has no need to explain how to
Dartmouth Philosophy Journal
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
22
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Ecce Homo, Why I am a Destiny, #1. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 2000.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, Part 5, #199. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 2000.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part 4, #9. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 1995.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of The Idols, Maxims and Arrows, #48. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale.
London: Penguin Books, 2003.
Ibid.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Antichrist, #57. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books,
2003.
Dartmouth Philosophy Journal
7
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, Part 5, #203. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 2000.
8
See, among others, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Poli
tics by Lawrence J. Hatab, Nietzsche and Political Thought by Mark Warner, Identity/Differ
ence: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox by William E. Connolly, and Nietzsche,
Politics, and Modernity by David Owen.
9
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Antichrist, #56. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books,
2003.
10
Ibid.
11
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Antichrist, #57. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books,
2003.
12
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue, #9. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Modern Library, 1995.
13
Brobjer, Thomas. The Absence of Political Ideals in Nietzsches Writings: The Case of the Laws
of Manu and the Associated Caste-Society, Nietzsche-Studien 27 (1998): 300-318 and Ni
etzsches Reading About Eastern Philosophy The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 28 (2004) 3-35.
14
Brobjer, Thomas. Nietzsches Reading About Eastern Philosophy The Journal of Nietzsche
Studies 28 (2004) 3-35.
15
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, #38. Trans. R. J. Hol
lingdale. London: Penguin Books, 2003.
16
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, The New Idol, #11. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Modern Library, 1995.
17
Ibid.
18
Friedrich Nietzsche, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#1>
19
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Untimely Meditations, Schopenhauer as Educator, Part 4
20
Bergmann, Peter. Nietzsche: The Last Anti-Political German, Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1987, p.183
21
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Ecce Homo, Why I am So Wise, #3. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 2000.
22 The very nature of my origin allowed me an outlook transcending merely local, merely national
and limited horizons, it cost me no effort to be a good European. On the other hand, I am
perhaps more German than modern Germans, mere citizens of the German Reich could possibly
be,-I, the last anti-political German. And yet my ancestors were Polish noblemen: it is owing to
them that I have so much race instinct in my blood, who knows? This seems to suggest that by
anti-political Nietzsche meant that he was against the politics of the German Reich.
23
Golomb, Jacob and Robert S. Wistrich. Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and
Abuses of a Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp.1-17
24
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, #38. Trans. R. J.
Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books, 2003.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, #126. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 2000.
28
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Untimely Meditations, Schopenhauer as Educator, Part 6
29
Ibid.
30
Conway, Daniel. Nietzsche and the Political, New York: Routledge, 1997, p.8.
31
Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan, Chapter XIII
Volume 24 Issue 1 Fall 2006/Winter 2007
23
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
24
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols, #38. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin
Books, 2003.
bid.
Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan, Chapter XIII
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols, #38. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale.
London: Penguin Books, 2003.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, Part 9, #259. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 2000.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Dawn, Preface, #3
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, Part 6, #208. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Modern Library, 2000.
In the Untimely Meditations (Schopenhauer as Educator, Part 4) Nietzsche wrote, Here,
however, we are experiencing the consequences of the doctrine, lately preached from all the roof
tops, that the state is the highest goal of mankind and that a man has no higher duty than to serve
the state: in which doctrine I recognize a relapse not into paganism but into stupidity. It may be
that a man who sees his highest duty in serving the state really knows no higher duties; but there
are men and duties existing beyond this-and one of the duties that seems, at least to me, to be
higher than serving the state demands that one destroy stupidity in every form, and therefore in t
his form too.
men were the same. Friendship became the public relationship whereas love became the private
relationship.5
The Human Condition Parts I & II
The modern social realm arose as a sphere
of existence that was, strictly speaking, neither
public nor private. Within the social, housekeeping and household chores were brought out of
the private sphere to what was once the public
sphere. Thus, in the modern age, the public and
the social are often confused. Arendt also relates
the rise of the social sphere to the decline of the
family unit. She argues that the dominance of the
social stems from an increase in population: the
larger a population becomes, the more it tends toward behavior.6 Society is born when public life
constitutes only those things which testify to the
mutual dependence of social existence and where
the activities connected to the preservation of life
(labor) become public.7 Therefore, while at once
demolishing the public sphere, the modern age has
greatly infringed on the private sphere. By eroding
the public and pushing the private into the public,
modern man is left with no choice but the conformity of the social realm. Wealth and property have
also shifted from association with the public realm
to association with the private realm;8 though as is
the nature of the modern, the private care of this
private property became a public concern.9
Parts III & IV: Labor and Work
Though they are actually two parts of a threepart paradigm, Arendt draws a more direct comparison between work and labor. For the most
part, she describes work and labor as two sides of
the same coin, beginning with the Greek distinction between ponein and ergazestha.10 Both labor
and work are modes of existence in which man
is drawn away from the world and into isolation.
25
gaged in world-building, and the degree of worldliness of produced things, which all together form
the human artifice, depends upon their greater or
lesser permanence in the world itself.19 As far as
classifying things by their worldliness, Arendt defines the durability of objects by their resemblance
or non-resemblance to the cycle of human life
(i.e. their non-resemblance to that created through
labor). The least durable objects are those needed for the life process themselves. Like humans,
these objects come and go quickly, their worldliness is brief, and these objects provide humans no
evidence for the continuity of world.
Homo faber, however, is not the positive alternative to animal laborans. In his work of fabrication homo faber possesses a tendency towards the
end justifies the means thinking. Animal laboran
is reduced to a bodily experience of the world, but
homo faber is obsessed with use and value, it is
for the sake of usefulness in general that homo
faber judges and does everything in terms of in
order to.20 In fabricating his objects, homo faber
not only isolates himself from the world, but also
creates objects for further privation.21 Similar to
labors affect on the division between wealth and
property, work has created the idea of value as
opposed to worth. Arendt argues, value is the
quality a thing can never possess in privacy but
acquires automatically the moment it appears in
public.22 Value is also relatively unstable. Arendt
suggests that this creates in homo faber a tendency
toward assigning values in a relativistic sense. At
the very least, the birth of value comes with the
loss of intrinsic worth.23
Part V: Action
Action is the third mode of the human condition, and for Arendt, action is the ideal mode of
existence. Action, together with its partner speech,
is the activity of humans in the political sphere.
Action need not entail movement; Arendt singles
out passive resistance as one of the most effective forms of action. Together, action and speech
are what reveal the basic plurality of the human
condition.24 Action has no corresponding prototype such as homo faber or animal laborans. AcVolume 24 Issue 1 Fall 2006/Winter 2007
is both informed by and informs the loss of worldliness and the shrinking of the world caused by the
first two great events. After the invention of the
telescope, the viewpoint of the sciences changed
greatly. Not only was Galileo able to confirm Copernicuss theory of a heliocentric universe, but
his improvements in the telescope eventually led
to a system without a fixed center,43 and allowed
for general relativism to emerge in the sciences
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Coupled
with his philosophical counterpart, Descartes, Galileo led the shift in the modern era toward doubt.
Doubt coupled with the macroscopic viewpoint is
what Arendt calls remoteness. Both characteristics
of remoteness were strong factors contributing to
modern world alienation:
Cartesian doubt did not simply doubt that human
understanding may not be open to every truth or that
human vision may not be able to see everything, but
that intelligibility to human understanding does not
at all constitute a demonstration of truth, just as visibility did not at all constitute proof of reality.44
Mentality/Icon
Ancients
Action
Polis
PreModern
Work
Modern
Labor
30
Worldview
Mind
Political/private (property)
Geocentric
Homo Faber
Public/private
Heliocentric/
Christianity
Animal Laborans
Social (wealth)
No Fixed Center/Doubt
Arendts thought has no ability to assert an authentic self in isolation from others.
But what could be the way out of all
of this? Arendt clearly believes that we are not
doomed to be laborers (whether or not the world
is trapped into being a society dominated by the
mentality of labor is less clear). She seems to suggest that man retains an ability and responsibility to think, act, and speak together with others;
to be more concerned with the world instead of
production or consumption of worldly things. Arendt seems to believe that switching mentalities
is easier than people believe, one merely needs to
take up the possibilities of the alternative to switch
mentalities.
The Structure of The Human Condition
Perhaps fittingly to her foremost concernwith man in the world, Arendt devotes little
space in The Human Condition to a discussion of
her methodology. Arendt conceives of action and
speech as events that happen in a momentany
attempt to capture them afterwards is necessarily
flawed. The history Arendt gives in The Human
Condition seems to be one she constructs from intellectual texts and historical institutions. Figures
such as Plato, Socrates, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rene
Descartes, and Karl Marx dominate the historical
landscape of her work. Instead of empirical evidence that the world has changed from one of action to one of labor, Arendt draws out the mentality
of a certain time period through the texts it left behind. She aims her historical argument, however,
at an analysis of the present. How important, then,
is historical analysis in The Human Condition to
the overall thrust of the text?
Seyla Benhabib argues that Arents historiographic methodology in The Origins of Totalitarianism is opposed to the idea that what happened had to happen.54 According to Benhabib,
Arendt views history as a somewhat dangerous
pursuit which sets a deterministic trap, robs the
current situation of its unique being, and denies
that the future is radically underdetermined. Benhabib cites areas in Totalitarianism where Arendt
Volume 24 Issue 1 Fall 2006/Winter 2007
is thrown and the possibilities of that thrown situation that Da-sein takes up and chooses to project. Within its realm of possibilities, Da-sein can
choose to project authentically or not. In Arendts
writing, action and speech are modes of existence
that seem equivalent to Heideggers concept of
authenticity, whereas work and labor seem linked
to Heideggers inauthenticity. Da-sein in Being
and Time experiences the moment of Angst without choice or warning; it is only a choice to take
up the possibilities of that moment of Angst and
become authentic or inauthentic. Arendts philosophy is different. There is no moment of Angst. She
seems to suggest that the possibility of non-passivity, of action, is always present and waiting to
be seized upon.
However, history in Arendt seems to dictate how readily man chooses to seize upon the
possibility of action. The ancients took up the possibility of individuality much more readily than
we do now in the modern age. Arendt never says it
was easier to be an individual in the ancient world,
but more people chose to be so. Each historical
epoch had a mode of existence that appeared the
most obvious way of being at that time. The importance of history to her argument appears, then,
to be that history reveals to us the possibilities of
existence that are not obvious to us in our current
situation. This conclusion leads us to our next series of questions, what if her historical analysis is
incorrect? What if, for example, the ancient world
contained roughly the same proportion of slaves
as modern age contains laborers?
I maintain that it would not matter if her
historical argument could be proved wrong by
some empirical means. The historical basis of her
description of the human condition grounds her
project firmly in the lives of men, but the phenomenal distinctions of the human condition she outlines hold without her historical analysis. Arendts
historical analysis provides a suggestion for why
in a certain era in history a certain mode of existence dominated, and explores why that situation
may have seemed normal at the time.
32
thought that such communications were threatening to the real of human affairs and potentialities of
human power. Furthermore, our collective acceptance of the Internet as our form of public sphere speaks
to Arendts prediction that we were entering an age of great passivity. Perhaps our willing acceptance of
cyberspace communications is a sign that we have already accepted the passivity Arendt warned of ordinary and everyday.
Jessica Spradling graduated in 2006 with a major in English and a minor in German Studies. She lives
in New York and works as a literary agent.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition, Second Edition. Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1958, 7.
Ibid, 73.
Ibid, 24.
Ibid, 49.
Ibid, 50.
Ibid, 43..
Ibid, 46.
Ibid, 61.
Ibid, 69.
Ibid, 80.
Ibid, 94
Ibid, 83.
Ibid, 85.
Ibid, 130.
Ibid, 115.
Ibid, 120
Ibid, 117.
Ibid, 94.
Ibid, 96.
Ibid, 154
Ibid, 163.
Ibid, 164.
Ibid, 165.
Ibid, 176.
Ibid, 192.
Ibid, 179.
Ibid, 181.
Ibid, 181.
Ibid, 201.
Ibid, 209.
Ibid, 199.
Ibid, 220.
Ibid, 221.
35
34
Ibid, 215.
35
Ibid, 232.
36
Ibid, 241.
37
Ibid, 248.
38
Ibid, 251.
39
Ibid, 248.
40
Ibid, 253.
41
Ibid, 256.
42
Ibid, 258.
43
Ibid, 263.
44
Ibid, 275.
45
Ibid, 280.
46
Ibid, 280.
47
Ibid, 288.
48
Ibid, 289.
49
Ibid, 294.
50
Ibid, 307.
51
Ibid, 320.
52
Ibid, 322.
53
Ibid, 322.
54
Benhabib, Seyla. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Lanham, MD: Rowan &
Littlefield, 2003, 64.
55
Benhabib, 88.
56
Arendt, 322
57 He found the Archimedean point, but he used it against himself; it seems that he was
permitted to find it only under this conditionFranz Kafka.
58
SamuelChambers, Democracy and (the) Public(s). Political Theory Volume X, Issue
2005,135.
59
Frazer, 255
60
See Mind Over Machine, On the Internet, and What Computers Still Cant Do.
61
Hubert Dreyfus, On the Internet. New York, Routledge, 2001, 26.
62
Ibid, 61.
63
Ibid, 55.
64
Ibid,81.
65
Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition, Second Edition. Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1958,, 183.
66
Ibid, 234
67
Ibid, 237.
68
Ibid, 241.
36
look like, because the human eye cannot see frequencies higher or lower than the range in which
the rainbow is contained, and consequently, cannot perceive the colors. However, although the
mind can never see the colors, it can still have
the concept of the potential existence of such
colors. Using inference, the mind can reason that
although it cannot perceive any colors outside the
rainbow, frequencies of light above and below the
given range exist, and more acute perceptive abilities would logically allow a visual representation
of these frequencies to appear to the mind. Thus,
the mind can have an idea of a color of ultraviolet
light, without ever being able to perceive the light
itself. Again, it must be noted that the concept of
ultraviolet color is not causeless, but, rather, has
its roots in the concepts of existing colors, and that
the idea formed by the mind of a more advanced
color is done by extrapolating the existing ideas;
it is a combination of the ideas of color and the
continuity of possible frequencies of light.
Furthermore, even if physics told us that no
light frequencies continued beyond our scope of
vision, we may still be able to have an idea of
ultraviolet color. Descartes, though accepting of
the minds ability to invent ideas such as winged
horses, does not account for the breadth of the
faculty involved in this process: mental creativity.
This faculty allows the mind to take elements from
different ideas and infer the result of their combination. While it is possible that we would simply
accept as true that light cannot have a higher frequency than we can see, it is much more likely that
we would have the mental creativity to think about
the possibility of a higher-frequency light, as one
might imagine flying without a machine. Conceiving of a higher frequency of light in congruence
with our existing concept of light, the mind would
probably infer that this hypothetical light would
also have a color. Thus, it is enough for us to have
a concept of light and of color in order to have
an idea of the color of ultraviolet light. We can
therefore see that it is only necessary for the basic
elements of an idea to be individually grounded in
something objectively true in order for the mind to
use its creativity to generate a distinct but possibly
Dartmouth Philosophy Journal
untrue idea.
Thus, Descartes second premise, that the
cause of an idea must formally or objectively contain the properties exhibited in the idea, is weakened. All of the elements of the properties of an
idea must have a cause containing equal or greater
degrees of the same elements, but the properties
themselves can be arranged, extrapolated, and
organized within the mind. Now, in order to determine the cause of the idea of God, it is necessary to
examine the elements of Gods properties. Every
element must be shown to either originate within
the mind itself, as does arithmetic, or within the
material world, which we are currently assuming
also resides within the mind. If any element can
be found in neither cause, we will know that the
mind cannot be its cause, it will necessarily follow that [the mind is] not alone in the world, but
that some other thing which is the cause of the idea
also exists.7 This may still not necessarily mean
that God exists, but it will show that not all parts
of the idea of God come from within the mind.
As Descartes defines God, He is a substance
that is infinite, <eternal, immutable,> independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful,
and which created both myself and everything
elsethat exists.8 First, let us consider the simplest property, that God is the creator. It is easy to
see that our concept of one independent substance
creating another comes from the constant acts of
creation that we perceive in our interactions with
the material world. We clearly and distinctly understand how materials can be used to build a house
or a clock, and, similarly, know how reproduction
occurs to generate more independent living things.
It is logical for us to believe that a perfect being
should have the capacity to do these things at a
level of advancement that is beyond our capacity.
Similarly, the property of independence is easy to
understand because the mind, conceiving of itself
as distinct and requiring no other substance in
order to exist, is itself independent. Likewise, the
idea of eternity stems from the idea of time, which
is, simply put, the continuation of general existence. Because the mind has never experienced the
Volume 24 Issue 1 Fall 2006/Winter 2007
transition from existence to non-existence, it cannot conceive of the end of time. Because one can
conceive of life as temporary independent existence in time, it is logical for the idea of a perfect
being to contain the idea of life during the entirety
of time. The analogous property of immutability
is also simply the negation of the idea of change,
which is fundamental to our concepts about the
material world.
The properties of supreme intelligence and
supreme power can likewise be found within the
mind. The idea of intelligence, of the ability to
process and think about information, is, like mental creativity, a defining faculty of the mind. However, it must be admitted that in this human life
we are often liable to make mistakes about particular things,9 demonstrating the imperfection of
our intelligence. Similarly, in the case of power,
our ideas of dependence and independence allow
us to imagine the idea of one substance exerting
a force on a dependent object to cause a certain
change. We can also imagine the dependent object
having some faculty of power to resist, giving us
the idea of partial or ordinary power. The idea of
the supreme level of both intelligence and power is
simply created from the extrapolation of ordinary
versions of these properties, giving us a perception of a being that has perfect mental and physical
faculties.
At this point, all the properties that were
assigned to God have been shown to come from
within the mind, except for infinity. We know that
the infinite is the opposite of the finite, but it is not
clear which idea is prior to the other, and thus we
cannot simply explain the infinite by negating the
finite. In understanding the finite, one understands
a substance that has a defined and limited size, such
as a book with distinct dimensions. However, it is
one thing to have the idea of distinct objects, but
quite another to assign them the property of being
limited. In order to have the idea of a limit, one
must have the idea of being limitless, as a limit
is simply an obstacle which prevents continuity,
making the idea of continuity prior to that of an
obstacle.
39
Jenny Strakovsky is a sophomore at Dartmouth College pursuing a major in German Studies. She is
interested in ethics, the history of philosophy, as well as the specific philosophies of Kant and Leibniz.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
40
Ren Descartes. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, Translated from the French
by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1984, 26.
Ibid., 28.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 30.
Ibid.
Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 31.
Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 30.
Ibid., 47.
Ibid.
Hume makes an important point. Experience is limited to the past. Thus, knowledge about
the future cannot be deductively valid because we
must assume that the past will resemble the future.
Yet it seems we can acquire limited factual knowledge without appealing to induction. In thinking,
I exist I can prove my existence without even
41
Lizzy Asher is a sophomore at Dartmouth College and recently decided to become a philosophy major.
She enjoys writing, rock-climbing, skiing, and traveling.
44
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford:
Oxford UP Inc., 1999. 108.
Ibid, 108.
Ibid, 114.
Ibid, 111.
Ibid, 109.
Carroll, Lewis. What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind ns 4, 1985, 278.
Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. 3rd ed. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1973, 65.
Ibid, 67.
Ibid, 94.
45
Intentionally Weak:
The Case for Weakness of Will
Andrew K. Fletcher
espite its common usage, both colloquially and in philosophical writing, there is
great debate over whether or not weakness of will even exists. Some authors contend
that akrasia, the Greek term referring to what we
might now consider incontinence or the ability to
act against ones better judgment, is impossible.
Such scholars maintain that our decisions are forever guided by our best judgment. Others seek to
describe weak willed actions not as freely chosen
options, but as compulsive acts of an alien motivation. However, it seems to me that neither of
these accounts sufficiently describes weakness of
will, nor hold weight as a skeptical response to its
presence as an aspect of human nature. Because
akratic action is a realistic possibility, and compulsive action is, in all relevant cases, actually controlled by the agent, I argue that weakness of will
is a certain possibility. Furthermore, I will provide
a plausible account of the defining characteristics
of weakness of will, and practical guidelines with
which one can correctly use the term.
Because weakness of will seems closely
related to the possibility that an agent can act
against her better judgment, it is necessary to first
explore the concept of akrasia. While often used
as a linguistic synonym for weak will, I do not
see the terms as equivalent. If akrasia is regarded
as a strict impossibility, however, the argument
supporting the weakness of will loses force and
credibility. Therefore, it is important to provide an
argument for the existence of akrasia in order to
establish the foundation for weakness of will.
Skepticism regarding akrasia is certainly
not a novel position. One of the famous rebuttals to
the belief that an agent could knowing act against
his best judgment was provided by Socrates in
Meno and Protagoras. In what is now referred to
46
reasons to revise an intention, namely: if the circumstances have changed, if they can no longer be
accomplished, if they would now lead to greater
suffering, and not to reconsider in situations that
prevent clear thought or when the original intention was designed to avoid such indecisiveness.20
While this is not exhaustive list, it is designed only
to provide basic rules of thumb, which apply to
nearly all the realistic cases an agent faces. There
are certain clarifications that Holton believes
should be considered. For example, if I revise
risky decision, this may or may not be an example
of weak will. If I plan to bungee jump, but knowing my rope will break, revise my intention and
go purchase and new rope, this does not seem to
exhibit weak will.21 However, if I am sure the jump
will be as safe as it can be, and I simply lose my
nerve at the last moment, it seems I am experiencing a weakness of will.
Andrew K. Fletcher is a senior at Dartmouth College, seeking a major in Philosophy and a minor in
Native American Studies. He is interested in moral philosophy, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind. Next
year he will attend the University of Oregon School of Law as a meritorious scholarship recipient.
50
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Watson, Gary. Skepticism about Weakness of Will., Philosophical Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, July
1977, 319.
Watson, 320.
Walker, Arthur F. The Problem of Weakness of Will., Nos, Vol. 23, No. 5, December 1989,
654.
Pugmire, as quoted in, Walker, 654.
Ibid, 324.
Ibid, 325.
Ibid, 325.
Ibid, 325.
Ibid, 327.
Holton, Richard. Intention and Weakness of Will., Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96, No. 5, May
1999, 241.
Ibid, 241.
Ibid, 241-242.
Ibid, 243.
Velleman, David. Review of: Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason by Michael Bratman,
Philosophical Review 100, No. 2, April 1991, 278.
Velleman, 278.
Ibid, 278.
Bratman, Michael. Two Faces of Intention, Philosophical Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, July 1984,
376.
Velleman, 278.
Holton, Richard. Intention and Weakness of Will., Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96, No. 5, May
1999, 247.
Ibid, 249.
Ibid, 249.
Ibid, 250.
Ibid, 250.
Ibid, 251.
51