NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-4360
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHANNON R. HAMILTON,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 10-cr-00038)
District Judge: Hon. Edwin M. Kosik
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 24, 2011
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 28, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Shannon R. Hamilton appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 151 months imprisonment, three
years supervised release, and assessments and restitution of $14,224 for committing

bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). His attorney has moved to withdraw
under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons that follow, we will
grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the District Courts judgment.
I.

Background
Between December 9, 2009, and January 6, 2010, Hamilton committed five bank

robberies. He was arrested in January 2010 and, after waiving his Miranda rights,
admitted to the crimes. He was initially indicted on four counts of bank robbery, and
then, in June 2010, he was charged with all five in a Superseding Information.
During plea negotiations with the government, Hamilton became disappointed
with his counsel. He insisted on a 120-month sentence, which his counsel proposed to
the government. The government rejected the proposal and agreed only to recommend a
sentence for Hamilton at the bottom of the Guidelines range, which was correctly
anticipated to be 151 to 188 months imprisonment. Hamilton filed a Motion for
Termination of Counsel because he felt his counsel was working against him.
The District Court addressed that motion at a plea hearing in June 2010, during
which Hamiltons counsel explained his efforts and interactions with the government.
The Court denied the motion, explaining to Hamilton that whats transpired between
you and your counsel is what transpires between defendants and their counsel when
theres a plea agreement offered. You cant always get what you want. I can tell that
[your attorney] is experienced. (App. at 43.) Ultimately, Hamilton stated that he
wanted to [s]ign the plea now and get sentenced so he could go about [his] business.
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(App. at 46.) Hamilton answered all of the Courts questions indicating that he
understood and agreed to the terms of the offered plea agreement, which recommended
his sentence be 151 months, and also agreed that the Courts recitation of the facts
concerning the robberies was accurate. After the required colloquy, the Court accepted
Hamiltons guilty plea.
The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) which
recommended that Hamilton be sentenced as a career offender. The PSR calculated a
Guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 181 months imprisonment based on a total offense
level of 29 and criminal history category VI. Hamilton objected to his career offender
designation and to being assessed two criminal history points for matters in which he had
not been represented by counsel.
At his sentencing hearing, Hamilton withdrew the career offender objection, and
the District Court sustained the objection to the assessment of two criminal history points.
Recognizing that the two-point assessment did not affect the Guidelines calculation
because Hamilton was a career offender, the Court imposed a sentence of 151 months
imprisonment. The Court also sentenced Hamilton to three years supervised release and
imposed assessments and restitution totaling $14,224. Hamilton filed a timely notice of
appeal, and his counsel has moved to withdraw. Pursuant to Anders, and as required by
Local Appellate Rule 109.2, counsel has filed a brief in support of that motion. Hamilton
has not filed a brief in opposition.

II.

Discussion1
Under Anders, counsel may seek to withdraw from representing an indigent

criminal defendant on appeal if there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal. United States
v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000). We exercise plenary review to determine
whether there are any such issues. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) ([T]he
appellate court must itself decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Whether an issue is frivolous is
informed by the standard of review for each potential claim raised. See United States v.
Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 2002).
We implement Anders through our Local Appellate Rule (L.A.R.) 109.2(a),
which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that
the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the
United States. The United States must file a brief in response. Appellant
may also file a brief in response pro se. If the panel agrees that the
appeal is without merit, it will grant counsels Anders motion, and dispose
of the appeal without appointing new counsel.
3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2010). We ask two principal questions when Anders is invoked:
whether defense counsel has adequately fulfilled the requirements of L.A.R. 109.2(a),
and whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3231. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
4

With respect to the first question, the fulfillment of the requirements of L.A.R.
109.2(a) often turns, as it does here, on the adequacy of counsels supporting brief. To be
adequate under L.A.R. 109.2(a), an Anders brief must (1) satisfy the court that counsel
has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, Youla, 241 F.3d at
300; (2) identify issues that might arguably support appeal, see Smith v. Robbins, 528
U.S. 259, 285 (2000); and (3) explain why th[ose] issues are frivolous[,] Marvin, 211
F.3d at 780. Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim[,] but he or she
must still conscientiously examine the record. Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.
With respect to the second question, we review the record to determine whether
the appeal lacks any basis in law or fact. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486
U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988). When the Anders brief is adequate, we confine our review to
portions of the record implicated by the Anders brief. Youla, 241 F.3d at 301. When the
Anders brief is inadequate, we may expand our review to portions of the record
implicated in the defendants pro se brief or other filings that provide guidance
concerning the issues [the defendant] wishes to raise on appeal. Id. Regardless of the
adequacy of the Anders brief, we may affirm the District Court without appointing new
counsel if we find, after reviewing the record, that the frivolousness [of the appeal] is
patent. United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In his Anders brief, Hamiltons counsel identifies four potential issues for appeal,
and describes why each is frivolous. Counsel explains that: (1) the District Court had
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jurisdiction to sentence Hamilton under 18 U.S.C. 3231; (2) Hamiltons guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary; (3) the sentence was reasonable and legal; (4) and there was no
valid basis to argue that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint
new counsel.
The Anders brief is adequate in identifying the potential issues and explaining why
they are frivolous. Our independent review of the record confirms counsels assessment
that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal. The District Court had jurisdiction to
sentence Hamilton; the District Court properly questioned Hamilton to ensure the plea
was knowing and voluntary; the District Court accepted a binding plea agreement under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which was reasonable; and the District
Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint new counsel because there was
no evidence that counsel was not adequately representing Hamilton.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the

judgment of conviction.