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slammed into his car. The accident killed one person and left
two others with severe brain injuries. McCutchen himself
was grievously injured and survived only after emergency
surgery. He spent several months in physical therapy and
ultimately underwent a complete hip replacement. Since the
accident, McCutchen, who had a history of back surgeries and
associated chronic pain, has also become unable to effectively
treat that pain with medication. The accident has rendered
him functionally disabled. McCutchens Health Benefit Plan
(the Plan), administered and self-financed by US Airways,
paid medical expenses in the amount of $66,866 on his
behalf.
After the accident, McCutchen, through his attorneys
at Rosen Louik & Perry, P.C., filed an action against the
driver of the car that caused the accident. Because she had
limited insurance coverage, and because three other people
were seriously injured or killed, McCutchen settled with the
other driver for only $10,000. However, with his lawyers
assistance, he and his wife received another $100,000 in
underinsured motorist coverage for a total third-party
recovery of $110,000. After paying a 40% contingency
attorneys fee and expenses, his net recovery was less than
$66,000. US Airways demanded reimbursement for the
entire $66,866 that it had paid for McCutchens medical bills.
Soon after, Rosen Louik & Perry placed $41,500 in a trust
account, reasoning that any lien found to be valid would have
to be reduced by a proportional amount of legal costs. The
record on appeal does not establish what amount was
disbursed to McCutchen.
When McCutchen did not pay, US Airways, in its
capacity as administrator of the ERISA benefits plan, filed
II.
A.
Congress designed ERISA to protect employee
pensions and benefits by providing pension insurance,
enumerating certain specific characteristics of pension and
benefit plans, and setting forth fiduciary duties for the
managers of both pension and nonpension plans. Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly observed that ERISA is a
comprehensive and reticulated statute, the product of a decade
of congressional study of the Nations private employee
benefit system. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Courts have therefore been reluctant to
tamper with its carefully crafted and detailed enforcement
scheme. Id. Under this scheme, Congress gave plan
beneficiaries greater rights than plan fiduciaries to enforce the
terms of a benefit plan. A beneficiary has a general right of
action to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan.
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 221 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
1132(a)(1)(B)). By contrast, a fiduciarys right to enforce
plan terms is governed by ERISAs 502(a)(3), which limits
the available relief to an injunction or other appropriate
2010)). Summary judgment is appropriate only where,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id. (quoting Melrose Inc., 613 F.3d at 387)).
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C.
Against this conclusion, US Airways cites to prior
decisions of this Court in which we declined to fashion a
federal common law rule limiting an ERISA plan
administrators right to reimbursement under the plans terms.
See Ryan ex rel. Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express, 78 F.3d 123
(3d Cir. 1996); Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113 (3d
Cir. 1997); see also Bill Gray Enterprise v. Gourley, 248 F.3d
206, 220 n.13 (3d Cir. 2001). While we recognize that the
District Court may have considered itself bound by these
cases, each came before the Supreme Courts decisions in
Knudson and Sereboff, which clarified the meaning of
appropriate equitable relief in 502(a)(3), specified its
central importance to fiduciaries reimbursement suits under
ERISA, and thereby undermined the reasoning and holdings
of our prior decisions. Our prior opinions in Ryan, Bollman
Hat, and Gourley did not consider whether the phrase
appropriate equitable relief in 502(a)(3) limits a
fiduciarys right to relief. In fact, none of these cases even
referenced 502(a)(3). These cases are therefore inapposite
in light of the Supreme Courts intervening decisions. See In
re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (A panel of this
Court may reevaluate the holding of a prior panel which
conflicts with intervening Supreme Court precedent.); see
also Gately v. Mass., 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st Cir. 1993)
(noting that under [t]he essential principles of stare
decisis . . . if an issue is not argued, or though argued is
ignored by the court . . . the decision does not constitute a
precedent to be followed). 3
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Shank and OHara courts depart from the text of ERISA. See
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently
demonstrated in Cigna, the importance of the written benefit
plan is not inviolable, but is subjectbased upon equitable
doctrines and principlesto modification and, indeed, even
equitable reformation under 502(a)(3). 131 S. Ct. at 1879
(finding that the District Courts reformation of the terms of
the plan, in order to remedy the false or misleading
information CIGNA provided . . . . [was within] a traditional
power of an equity court). While the basis for the
reformation in Cigna was intentional misrepresentations by
the employer and fiduciary, the broader and more relevant
point is that when courts were sitting in equity in the days of
the divided bench (or even when they apply equitable
principles today) contractual language was not as sacrosanct
as it is normally considered to be when applying breach of
contract principles at common law. We do not suggest that
US Airways conduct was fraudulent or dishonest in the way
that Cignas was, but equitable principles can apply even
where no one has committed a wrong.
Thus, we agree that one of Congresss purposes in
enacting ERISA was to ensure the integrity of written,
bargained-for benefit plans. OHara, 604 F.3d at 1236.
But, as demonstrated by the language of 502(a)(3) and now
Cigna, Congress expressly tempered that purpose by limiting
fiduciaries to appropriate equitable relief, thus invoking
principles that it surely knew are sometimes less deferential to
absolute freedom of contract. In other words, vague notions
of a statutes basic purpose are . . . inadequate to overcome
the words of its text regarding the specific issue under
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