Conde v.

Abaya
Facts: Casiano Abaya died on April 16, 1899, unmarried. Paula Conde,
mother of natural children Jose and Teofista Conde, whom she states
she had by Casiano Abaya, moved for the settlement of the intestate
succession. The deceaseds brother, Roman Abaya, opposed said
appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of
the deceased. Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the
court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the
exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be
therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate,
and that it be adjudicated to him; Paula Conde asserts that the her
right was superior to that of Ramon and prayed that she be declared to
have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano and that the
same be adjudicated to her. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Conde
stating that: That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya
should recognizeTeopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of
Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the
hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their
deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby
declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate
estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya. Ramon
Abaya appealed the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary
rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased
natural father Casiano Abaya
Held: No. The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his
legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the
acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his
presumed parents. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the
child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he may exercise
it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of
action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does
not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed
parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
personal character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may
exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three
cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he
died during his minority, or while insane, or after action had been
already instituted. (ART. 118) So that, in order that it may constitute a
portion of the child's inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and
the terms contained in article 118 shall be present, since without them,
the right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal and
exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible
of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his
death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118
exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural
child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his
death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance
of the deceased child.

G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980

CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and
APOLONIA
ONTE, petitioners,

vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO,

MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO,
MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA,
LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO,
LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents
FACTS: Spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega acquired
adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021
square meters respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in
the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega." Herein
respondents are the heirs of Monica Maniega and children of the
Moreto spouses. More than six (6) years after the death of Monica,
Flaviano, without the consent of the heirs of his deceased wife, and
before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and
Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of petitioner Geminiano
Pamplona, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for
P900.00.
After the execution of the sale in 1952, the vendees constructed their
house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor pointed out to
them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son
of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a
cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of
their house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary
of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed all the time that the
area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which
according to its title contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the
deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold
as Lot 1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon
agreement of the parties during the proceedings of the case below, the
area sold was within Lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the
plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where
they had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano had no
right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same
belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife
and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed without
the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses
Pamplano refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and
hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking
for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale.
The Regional Trial Court decided that the sale between Flaviano and
Geminiano that the contract of sale was valid but only with respect to
the 390 sq meter or portion of the land because there is coownership between Flaviano and his children, but the consent of the
latter was not obtained. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the whole portion
(781 sq. meters) of the lot in question.
HELD: The Petitioners are entitled to the whole portion of the lot. The
Court rejected the ruling of the lower courts that the sale was valid only
as to portion of the lot. Flaviano, the vendor, had the legal right to
more than 781 sq.meters of the communal estate, a title which he can
dispose or alienate in favor of the vendee-petitioners, as provided for
under ART. 493 of the Civil Code. Being lawfully entered into when the

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vendor is still alive, the Contract of sale is binding; and such obligation
to transfer the title to the vendee was not extinguished upon Flavianos
death. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private
respondents received from their deceased parents and/or
predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations
which were not extinguished by their parents' death. Accordingly, to the
private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full
ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which
was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and
not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said
obligation.

PEOPLE vs. UMALI

193 SCRA 493
FACTS: On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by
Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of
robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen discovered
that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime against property,
only if under the influence of drug (sic). As Pierre Pangan is a minor,
the police investigators sought the presence of his parents. Leopoldo
Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police headquarters and
was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the
police investigators if something could be done to determine the
source of the marijuana which has not only socially affected his son,
but other minors in the community. Previous to the case of Pierre
Pangan was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise
investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department
and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed
against him, covered by Criminal Case No. 85-516 before Branch 60 of
the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said case, accused
Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as
concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against property. Pat.
Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help
of Francisco Manalo and told him the social and pernicious effect of
prohibited drugs like marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong,
Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by the
appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to help in the
identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the
policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He did not
negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he has
entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of Judge
Eriberto Rosario.
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the
Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy
marijuana from sources known to him. The serial numbers of the
money was entered in the police blotter. The instruction was (sic) for
Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the
police headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic), Manalo returned
with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the
accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police
investigators to give a statement on the manner and circumstances of
how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from accused
Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the
two (2) foils of marijuana. the Chief of the Investigation Division
petitioned the Court for the issuance of a search warrant as a
justification for them to search the house of Gloria Umali located at

Rector (sic) Street. Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing the

same, the police operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali and
served the search warrant on her. Confiscated from the person of
Gloria Umali were the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers BA26943,
DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively as reflected in the
police blotter. Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00 bills were the
letters T which were placed by the police investigators to further
identify the marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic) in the house
was made in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan. The search
resulted in the confiscation of a can of milo, containing sixteen (16)
foils of dried marijuana leaves which were placed in a tupperware and
kept in the kitchen where rice was being stored.
The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and
insisted that said court committed reversible errors in convicting her.
She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its
face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several
charges in court and because of his desire to have some of his cases
dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.
However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that
even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal charges
when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a
witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more
so, it was also corroborated in its material respect by the other
prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers."
ISSUE: WON the court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and
credence to the biased testimony of Francisco Manalo
RULING: Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from
casually modifying or rejecting the trial court's factual findings. Such
factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded with great
respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly
and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial and other
proofs as they are presented at the trial and is therefore better situated
to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof
(See People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, 29 December, 1989,180 SCRA
694,699). The findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight, and
should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court
had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being
acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the
witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their
testimonies (People v. Alverez y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July
1988, 163 SCRA 745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708,
December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the absence of any
showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial facts,
said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed are
binding even on this Court.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can
make known their perception to others may be
witnesses.

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Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome

of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground
for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which
states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from
being witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF COURT
ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the
above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case
does not involve the probate of a will, we rule that the fact that said
witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in
any way disqualify him as a witness.

signature of Diancin. He declared positively that the thumb marks

appearing on the will were those of Diancin and that he saw Diancin
make these impressions.
Where thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic
marks far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features
enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack of identity of the
impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of
alleged experts and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct
similarity in some respects between the admittedly genuine thumbmark
and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident
The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied
not only the customary written signature but also by the testator's or
testatrix' thumbmark. The method of identification of fingerprints is a
science requiring close study.
Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu
GR No. 6845 / 27 Phil. Rep. 579 / 1 September 1914

G.R. No. L-33365

December 20, 1930

Estate of the deceased Paulino Diancin. TEOPISTA DOLAR,

proponent-appellant, vs. FIDEL DIANCIN, ET AL., oppositorsappellees.
FACTS: The will in question is alleged to have been executed by
Paulino Diancin at Dumangas, Iloilo, on November 13, 1927.
The will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was denied probate in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo on the sole ground that the thumb
marks appearing thereon were not the thumb marks of the testator. A
document of sale containing an admittedly genuine thumbmark of
Paulino Diancin was presented and offered as evidence to compare
the thumb mark in the will.
A thumbmark appears at the end of the will and on the left hand margin
of each of its pages in the following manner: "Paulino Diancin, Su
Signo, Por Pedro Diamante." The witnesses to the will were the same
Pedro Diamante, Inocentes Deocampo, and Juan Dominado. The will
is detailed in nature, and disposes of an estate amounting
approximately to P50,000.
The trial judge ruled that great differences existed between the
questioned marks and the genuine mark.
ISSUE: W/N there was an error denying probate.
HELD: Yes. The court ruled giving credit to the testimony of Diosdado
Dominado who was present and the one who prepared the will for the

FACTS: A certain PERFECTO GABRIEL, representing herein

petitioner YAP TUA instituted a probate proceeding involving the last
will and testament dated 11 August 1909 (presented as EXHIBIT A) of
TOMASA ELIZAGA YAP CAONG. Two witnesses were presented
before the court establishing the fact that the decedent died on 11
August 1909 in Manila; that before her death, the decedent executed
her last will and testament; and that these witnesses were present
when the will was voluntarily signed by the decedent.
The lower court probated the last will and testament of the
decedent and appointed herein petitioner as executor of the will, upon
the giving of a bond.
Thereafter, herein respondents YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA
LLU filed a petition a new trial, as they were interested in the matters of
the said will, and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to
represent them in the cause. The herein respondents, represented by
GABRIAL LA O, assailed the probated will, the latter being null and
void. Herein respondents alleged that the signature of the decedent
was obtained through fraud and illegal influence because at the time
the will was executed, the decedent was mentally incapacitated due to
her sickness; and that there was another will dated 6 August 1909
(presented as EXHIBIT 1) that was previously executed (even before
the execution of the assailed will) in accordance with all the formalities
required by law.
The lower court granted the motion of herein respondents.
One of the witnesses presented was a certain TOMAS
PUZON, a professor and an expert in handwriting. He testified that the
first name and surname, pertaining to the signature of the decedent, on
Exhibit A were written by two different hands. The writing Tomasa on
Exhibit A was identical to Exhibit 1. However, with regard to the
surname Yap Caong, found on Exhibit A, it was thoroughly
distinguished and different from the one found on Exhibit 1. Hence, an
inference that the decedent had not signed the second will (Exhibit A)
was deduced.
After the rehearing, the lower court concluded that the last
will and testament dated 11 August 1909 was admitted to probate, and
ordered the previously appointed administrator to continue as such
administrator.

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Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the will dated 11 August 1909 (presented as Exhibit A)
was not signed by the decedent, on account that the signature of the
decedent is not identical to the will that she previously executed on 6
August 1909 (presented as Exhibit 1).
HELD: NO, Exhibit A was signed by the decedent. One who makes a
will may sign the same by the use of a mark, the name having been
written by others. If the writing of a mark simply upon a will is sufficient
indication of the person to make and execute it, then certainly the
writing of a portion or all of the same ought to be accepted as a clear
indication of an intention to execute it.
The man, who cannot write and who is obliged to make his
mark simply therefor upon the will, is held to sign as effectually as if
he had written his initials or his full name. It would seem to be
sufficient, under the law requiring a signature by the person making a
will to make his mark, to place his initials, or all or any part of his name
thereon.
In the present case, the court thinks that the proof shows
that the decedent, if she did not sign her full name, did at least sign her
given name Tomasa, and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.
Signatures by the first name only and by initials only are applicable in
the present case and are considered signatures that are binding to a
contract.
AVERA vs. GARCIA
Facts: In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera
for probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by
Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of
guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date
appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of
the three attesting witnesses who testified with details not
necessary to be here specified that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in
full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness
was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the
testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was
their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
When the proponent rested, the attorney for the opposition introduced
a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and
indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was
so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about.
After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof
thus presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the
making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that
the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to
probate.
From this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf of the persons
contesting the will.
ISSUES: Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of
the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting
witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will
instead of the left margin.

HELD: The will in question is valid.Under section 618 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is essential to the
validity of a will in this jurisdiction that the names of the testator
and the instrumental witnesses should be written on the left
margin of each page, as required in said Act, and not upon the right
margin. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the
instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of
each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is
to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills
must be fully complied with
So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part
thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear
on the left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or the other.
The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on
every page, and the only point of deviation from the requirement of the
statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of
the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of
the will is authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly
the same degree that it would have been protected by being signed in
the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted
without discovering the slightest difference between the consequences
of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other.
The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well
stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, in a case where the
signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the
margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
So when an interpretation already given assures such ends,
any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible
prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from
the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to
invalidate the instrument.
G.R. No. L-21755

December 29, 1924

In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased.

FILOMENA
NAYVE, petitioner-appellee,
vs. LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR, opponents-appellants.
FACTS: This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the
deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena
Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar,

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sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased. The will in question,

Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side
of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or
pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3,"
"Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was
issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the
margin, left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the
signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side
of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but
about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the
attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses
do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation
clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the margin, left
side of the reader.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defects attributed to the last will and
testament of the deceased will render the will invalid.
HELD: No, the will is not invalid. As to the location of the signatures,
applying that doctrine in Avera v. Garcia to the instant case, we hold
that, as each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of
the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all
appear on the left margin of each page does not detract from the
validity of the will.
As to the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with
letters, suffice it to cite the case of Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil., 494),
where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals and not with
letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just
as valid as paging with letters.
As to the unstated number of sheets last paragraph of the will, it is true
that in the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), it was
held that the attestation clause must state the number of sheets or
pages composing the will; but when, as in the case before us, such
fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end
of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number
of the sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it complies
with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will
is composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number
of the sheets of the will from being unduly increased or decreased.
With regard to the last defect pointed out, namely, that the testator
does not appear to have signed on all the sheets of the will in the
presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and
signed on all the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each
other, it must be noted that in the attestation clause above set out it is
said that the testator signed the will "in the presence of each of the
witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of
the testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting
witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement was clearly
and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is
whether the testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the
signing of the will is one which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition
of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly
stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the
testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may
be proven by the mere examination of the document, although it does

not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant
case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to
avoid, does not exist.
[G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005]
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA
CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner, vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL
ABELLAR, respondents.
FACTS: Abada died in May 1940 and his widow Paula Toray died
sometime in September 1943 without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio Abaja (Alipio) filed with CFI of Negros
Occidental a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of
Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural
children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of
Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left
no will when he died in 1940. Caponong averred that it should be
disallowed for it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2)
it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
the beneficiaries.
the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada, and
Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco also
opposed the petition. They are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren
of Abada and Toray.
Alipio filed another petition for the probate of the last will and testament
of Toray which was opposed by Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and
Levi Tronco, et al. on the same grounds they cited.
Caponong filed a petition praying for the issuance in his name of letters
of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray.
The court admitted the probate of the intestate of Toray. The court
likewise ruled designating Belinda Caponong-Noble Special
Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.
Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of
the will of Abada but was denied by court.
Judge Layumas discovered that in an Order dated 16 March 1992,
former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the case
for decision granting executing of the LWT and allowing the probate.
Noel Abbellar is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula Toray.
The decision was affirmed by CA. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary
public;

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3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language

or dialect known to the testator;

employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause

fulfills what the law expects of it.

4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so,

whether the attestation clause complies with the requirements of the
applicable laws;

Caneda vs. Court of Appeals

5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of

whether the will of Abada is written in a language known to Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the
will of Abada.
HELD: CA did not err in affirming the decision of RTC.
The Applicable Law
Since Abada executed his will on 1932 the in force at that time are the
CC 1889 and Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) which governed
the execution of wills before the enactment of the NCC.
Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the OCC. Under the
CCP, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of
any will. Therefore, Abadas will does not require acknowledgment
before a notary public.
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the
testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter
that a party may establish by proof .
The Attestation Clause of Abadas Will
A scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. On
the other hand, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the
attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On this
point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on
substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While
the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close
inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in
permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the
will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved.
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will.
Abadas will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three
witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is
answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is
desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the
words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language

GR No. 103554 / 222 SCRA 781 / 28 May 1993

FACTS: The decedent MATEO CABALLERO, a widower without any
children, executed a last will and testament before 3 attesting
witnesses: Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando, and Flaviano
Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer and a
notary public, in the preparation of the last will. It was declared therein,
among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies
and devises his real and personal properties to certain persons, all of
whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, the testator filed a petition seeking the
probate of his last will and testament. The probate court set the petition
for hearing but the scheduled hearings were postponed. The testator
passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate
court.
A certain BENONI CABRERA, one of the legatees named in
the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the
testators estate. The probate court ordered his appointment as such.
Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and
nieces of the testator, filed a petition opposing the probate of the
testators will and the appointment of a special administrator of his
estate.
Herein private respondent was consequently appointed by
the probate court as special administrator by reason of the death of
BENONI CABRERA.
Herein petitioners object to the approval of the will on the
ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was
already in a poor state of health, such that he could not have possibly
executed the same, thus, the issue as to the genuineness of the
testators signature therein.
The lower court declared the will in question as the last will
and testament of the decedent, finding that it was executed in
accordance with all the requisites of the law. The fact that the testator
who initiated the probate of his will during his lifetime when he caused
the filing of the original petition, clearly underscores the fact that the
will in controversy was indeed his last will.
On appeal, herein petitioners asserted that the will was null and void
for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails
to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they
also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The subject attestation clause: and he
(testator) has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence
of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us
(witnesses).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court, ruling that the attestation clause in the last will of the testator
substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the attestation clause contained in the last will and
testament of the decedent complies with the requirements of Article
805 in relation to Article 809 of the Civil Code.

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HELD: NO, contested attestation clause does not comply with the
requirements of prescribed by the law. An examination of the last will
and testament of the testator shows that it is comprised of 3 sheets all
of which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of
each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the testator and
the 3 attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the
testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect
and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause
in question, on the other hand, is recited in the English language and is
likewise signed at the end thereof by the 3 attesting witnesses thereto.
Article 805 requires that the witnesses should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one
another. Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is
the act of the senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The
former is mental, the latter is mechanical, and to attest a will is to know
that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to
constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper
published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the
witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.

CODOY vs. CALUGAY

Facts: On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay and two other devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the will who died on January
16, 1990. On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy filed an
opposition to the petition alleging that the holographic will was a
forgery. Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various
documentary evidence. Herein petitioners filed a demurrer to evidence.
The lower Court granted the Demurrer to Evidence. Respondents filed
a notice of appeal and in support they reiterated the testimony of the
following witnesses, namely:
1. Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, where the probate of the holographic
will was filed.
2. Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was
presented to produce the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However,
the voters' affidavit was already destroyed.

Upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein

assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed
the will and all its pages in the presence of the 3 attesting witnesses,
and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does
not expressly states therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator an of each other.

3. Matilde Binanay, testified that the deceased was her aunt, and that
she lived with her for eleven (11) years. During those years she
acquired familiarity with her signature as she used to accompany her in
collecting rentals from her tenants and the deceased always issued
receipts. Moreover, she assisted in posting the records of the
accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.

The phrase in the contested attestation clause and he has

signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for
his signature and on the left hand margin, obviously refers to the
testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words as his Last Will and Testament. On the other
hand, although the words in the contested clause in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each and all of us may, at first
blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must,
however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the
presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the
words he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin. What is then
clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

4. Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that he handled all the pleadings and
documents signed by the deceased in connection with the intestate
proceedings of her late husband. He testified that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased
but he can not be sure.

The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal

defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
The aforementioned defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot
be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the
language used therein which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil
Code.
The substantial compliance rule under Article 809 must be
limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: (1) whether all the page are consecutively
numbered; (2) whether the signatures appear in each and every page;
(3) whether the subscribing witnesses are three; or (4) whether the will
was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether
all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other, must
substantially appear in the attestation clause.

5. Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the DENR who testified that

she processed the application of the deceased for pasture permit and
was familiar with the signature of the deceased.
6. Evangeline Calugay testified that she had lived with the deceased
since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. She testified that the
signature appearing in the holographic will is true and genuine.
The Court of Appeals held that even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code in
requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. Thus,
the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will
and allowed the will to probate.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are
permissive or mandatory
Held: The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a
contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly
declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the
testator. We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article
811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a
mandatory order.
In the case at bar, the goal is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to
defeat the wishes of the testator. It will be noted that not all the

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witnesses were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case
of Augusto Neri, he merely identified the record of the Special
Proceedings. Generosa E. Senon, did not even produce the voters'
affidavit d as it was no longer available. The will was found not in the
personal belongings of the deceased but with Ms. Binanay, she
revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985. There
was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents. Even the former
lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
signature. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that
the strokes are different; there were uneven strokes, retracing and
erasures on the will. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the
strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of
the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased. IN VIEW
WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin.

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES
ROBERTO
AND
THELMA
AJERO, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents
FACTS: Herein petitioners and respondents are named in the will of
the deceased, Anne Sand, as devisees.
Petitioners instituted a Special proceeding for the allowance of the
deceaseds holographic will. Respondent Clemente Sand opposed the
petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure
and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose
Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said
property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was
not its sole owner.
Despite the oppositions, the RTC admitted the will to probate on the
basis of the showed pieces of evidence that the Testatrix was to be of
sound mind when she made the will. To be of sound mind, it is
sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew
the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. All of these
requisites were present in the case at bar.
However, the CA reversed the decision It held that the decedent did
not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which
read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions
appearing in a holographic will are signed without
being dated, and the last disposition has a
signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of
prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure

or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Anne Sand was valid and in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
HELD: Yes, the will is valid. The formalities required by law in a will
depend on whether it is holographic or not. For non-holographic wills,
the formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation and
acknowledgment requirements under Article 805 and 806 of the New
Civil Code. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what
assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic
or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of
the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not
result in the disallowance of a holographic will that
is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In
the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court
held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures,
corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will have not been noted
under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary
when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula
el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
1985." (Citations omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.

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It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of

changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the
Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering
holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the
testator writes it himself in the form and with the
requisites required in Article 688.

ISSUE: WON three witnesses are necessary to establish the

handwriting/ signature contained in a will.
RULING: NO. The decision appealed from is set aside, and the
records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to
hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion.
RATIO:

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only

by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on

stamped paper corresponding to the year of its
execution, written in its entirety by the testator and
signed by him, and must contain a statement of
the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or

interlined words, the testator must identify them
over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their

own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that

only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not
those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential
to the probate of a holographic will.
AZAOLA v. SINGSON
G.R. No. L-14003
FACTS: An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. This case involves the determination of the quantity of evidence
required for the probate of a holographic will. September 9, 1957:
Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died; Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein
for probate, submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria
Alilagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the
deceased Cesario Singson (respondent). Francisco Azaola testified
that he saw the holographic will a month, more or less, before the
death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his wife; he
also testified that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the
holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix. Additional evidence:
residence certificates to show the signatures of the testatrix for
comparison purposes. Azaola testified that the penmanship appearing
in the said documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix
as well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the
testatrix (as contained in the stenographic notes). The probate was
denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will
and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being
contested. The lone witness presented by the proponent "did not prove
sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the
testatrix.

Where the will is holographic, no witnesses need to be

present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three
witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are
to be avoided. The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the
Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Art. 811, Civil Code: In the probate of a holographic will, it
shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the
will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to.
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the
proponent was not required to produce more than one witness.
Even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, the
Court is of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code
cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of
a holographic will (none being required by law) the existence of
witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question
of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be
witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator"
and who can declare truthfully "that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator."
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may
even be impossible. This is evidently the reason for the second
paragraph of Art. 811. The law foresees the possibility that no
qualified witness may be found (or may refuse to testify), and
provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
The requirement can be considered mandatory only in
the case ofordinary testaments, precisely because the
presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of
ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity.
The resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if
the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law
deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will
is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert
evidence. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide
if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn
from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the
court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay
witnesses.

[G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000]

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NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR.,

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A.
NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO,
respondents.
FACTS: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband
and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on
December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad,
Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr.
are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr.,
Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.
During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete
acquired properties in Quezon City and in the Province of Cavite.
It appears that after the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an
intestate case. Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers
estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his
parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of
real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds
involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by
Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad. By virtue of the
sales, TCT were issued to Natividad.
Among the lots subject of the sale is the one(Lot 3-B) occupied by
Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969. Nevertheless,
unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to
Maximino, Jr.

Natividad P. Nazareno had long been the exclusive owner of the

property in question. There was no way therefore that the aforesaid
property could belong to the estate of the spouses Maximino
Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete. The mere fact that Romeo P.
Nazareno included the same property in an inventory of the properties
of the deceased Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. will not adversely affect
the ownership of the said realty.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a
personality of its own. Though Romeo represented at one time the
estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct
personality from the former.
Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale.
The question, however, is whether these sales were made for a
consideration. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the
Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by
fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. It
was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals that
Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the Deed of
Sale. Court is convinced that the questioned Deed of Sale is simulated
for lack of consideration, and therefore ineffective and void. The
Supreme Court held that badges of simulation make a deed of sale null
and void since parties thereto enter into a transaction to which they did
not intend to be legally bound. Natividad never acquired ownership
over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for
being without consideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her
name.
Rivera vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR Nos. 75005-06 / 182 SCRA 322 / 15 February 1990

When Romeo found out about it, they filed an action for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction
and mandatory injunction. The court ruled in favor to Maximo Jr which
was affirmed by CA.
Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino, Sr., the
present case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad
and Maximino, Jr. Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale
made on January 29, 1970 to Natividad and that made on July 31,
1982 to Maximino, Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack
of consideration. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party
complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza
Romeo presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28,
1962 executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of
their children, except Jose, who was then abroad and was represented
by their mother, Aurea
The court ruled dismissing the DOS but was reversed by CA with
modification such that title to the subject lot reverted back to Maximo
Sr. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: W/N subject land belongs to the estate of their parents.
HELD: NO. Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property in dispute by
purchase in 1970. She was issued TCT. Even since her parents died,

Cruz, J.
FACTS: A certain JOSE RIVERA, herein petitioner, filed a petition
(docketed as SP No. 1076) for the issuance of letters of administration
over the estate of the decedent VENANCIO RIVERA. This petition was
opposed by herein private respondent ADELAIDO RIVERA, who
denied that herein petitioner was the son of the decedent. Herein
private respondent averred that he is the son of the decedent, and that
the decedent did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.
Herein private respondent filed a petition (docketed as SP
No. 1091) for the probate of the holographic wills, which was opposed
by herein petitioner, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of the
decedents intestate estate. Herein petitioner denied the existence of
the holographic wills submitted by herein private respondent and
claimed that they were spurious.
The lower court appointed herein private respondent as
special administrator and found that herein petitioner was not the son
of the decedent but of a different VENANCIO RIVERA who was
married to MARIA VITAL. The decedent VENANCIO RIVERA whose
estate was in question, was married to MARIA JOCSON. The
holographic wills were also admitted to probate.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed the lower courts decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the IAC erred in considering the holographic wills in
controversy as valid because it found them to have been written,
dated, and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article

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810 of the Civil Code, and in finding that there was no necessity of
presenting the 3 witnesses required under Article 811 because the
authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the

fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

HELD: NO, respondent court did not err. The existence and
authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by herein
petitioner. In his own petition, he declared that the decedent died
intestate. In the petition of herein private respondent, herein petitioner
denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by herein
respondent for probate. In both proceedings, herein petitioner opposed
the holographic wills submitted by herein respondent, and claimed that
they were spurious.

After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence,
the trial court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985,
allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and void
the Deed of Absolute sale. The court a quo had also directed the
respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to reimburse to
the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the redemption price
for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal
interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to
vendee a retro.

It may argued that the respondent court should have applied

Article 811:
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary
that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will
is contested, at least 3 of such witnesses shall be required.
However, such argument is flawed. It has already been
determined that herein petitioner is not the son of the deceased whose
estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have
the legal effect of requiring 3 witnesses. The testimony of 2 witnesses
(siblings of herein respondent) who authenticated the wills as having
been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
LABRADOR vs. CA
Facts: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of
Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a
parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of
Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all
surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by
his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a
quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922I of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now
deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed
an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on
September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the
consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying
in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a
matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of
land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers,
Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of
Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had
already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a
holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for

Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals,

which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the court a
quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being
undated and reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by the Court
of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio

Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 810 2 of the New Civil Code
HELD: The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is
really dated, although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed
with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect
compliance with Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first
paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are
making the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignment of the said fishpond, and
this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the
year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of
mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other than MELECIO
LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p.
46,Rollo)
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will
itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are
present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when
the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among
themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution
of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement"
between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of
other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to
comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to

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a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death."

ISSUE:
1.

Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the

date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the
succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will
was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who
plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of
partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's
instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was
fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of
the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the
disposition of his estate.

2.

Whether or not the Kasalutan ng Pag-aalis ng Mana is

considered as a holographic will that would result to a testate
proceeding.
Whether or not there was preterition

HELD:

Yes, there was a valid holographic will. The RTC should

have allowed for the probate of the will. A holographic will,
as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or
out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and
Segundos document, although it may initially come across
ALLOWED probate.
as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make
an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results
in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
DY
YIENG
SEANGIO, BARBARA
D.
SEANGIO
and
VIRGINIA
D. favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
versus
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS anddisinheritance cannot be given effect.
JM ES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondents Alfred Seangio filed a petition for the settlement
of the INTESTATE estate of his late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners are
the wife of the Segundo and Alfreds siblings, who opposed the petition
of respondent in the special proceeding. Petitioners alleged that
Segundo has left a holographic will which disinherit respondent Alfredo
for a cause. Such cause was evidenced by the deceaseds letter
(Kasulatan ng Pag-aalis ng Mana) dated September 20, 1995 stating
that Alfredo caused disgrace to the name of the deceased by loaning
to a bank and not paying the same after using his relation to Segundo
as security for the loan; and that he said many bad things about
Segundo. Petitioners filed for a petition to probate the holographic will
made by the deceased.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
the alleged will of the deceased did not comply with the provisions of
Article 783 of the Civil Code and that there was preterition which would
result to intestacy.
The RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings made by the
petitioners on the ground that there was a preterition that would cause
to intestacy. However, it does not apply to the widow, Dy Yieng, as she
was not a compulsory heir by direct line. The RTC also decided that
there was no valid disinheritance made by Segundo against Alfred
because the cause did not fall within the enumeration provided for
under Article 919. Hence, the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari
with application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or TRO.

1.

2.

There was no preterition because Segundos last expression

to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the
sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir]to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere
mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal
heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

SPOUSES ILUMINADA and CIRILO CAPITLE vs. FORTUNATA

ELBAMBUENA
509 SCRA 444 (2006)
FACTS : Petition for review on certiorari-A Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar covering a
parcelof agricultural land situated inNueva Ecija. Consequently, a
Transfer Certificate of Title in his name wasissued. When Olar died,
respondents FortunataElbambuena and Rosalinda Olar, spouse and
daughter-in-law, respectively, claim that Olar relinquished one-half of
the lot in favour of Rosalinda by a Kasanduan dated July 17, 1992
the execution of which was witnessed by petitioner Cirilo Capitle; a
ndthat theremaining portion of the lot was surrendered to Fortunata by
an undated document.-Responden ts alleged tha t on petitioners
request, petitioner were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a means of
livelihood.

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Since 1980, the petitioners have failed to pay the rentals despite
demand. And they failed to heed to the demand to return
thepossession of lot, drawing respondents to file a petition for recovery
of possession and payment of back rentals before DARAB- Spouses
Iluminada and Cirilo Capitle, on theother hand, claim that they have
been in possession of the lot since 1960 andpresented a "Waiver of
Rights" executed by Olar, wherein he acknowledged that he copossessed the lot with petitioners Capitle. A Pinagsamang Patunay
certifying that they are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot was
likewise presented. -Petitioners further claim that since 1959,
respondent Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she
evenremarried thus giving her no right to inherent from Olar - While
Elbambuena and Olars petition was pending before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), petitionersCapitle filed before
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO),Nueva Ecija a petition
for cancellation of the CLOA issued toOlar, on the ground that they are
the new farmer-beneficiaries as shown by, among other things, the
"Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar.PARAD ruled in favor of
petitioners Capitle. Elbambuena and Olar appealed the decision to the
DARAB. The DARAB set aside PARADs decision. The case was then
elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for review. The appellate
court affirmed in toto the DARAB decision. (DARAB decision in relation
to wills and succession: Cristobal Olars death substantially passed all
his rights and interest in and over the subject property to his legal heirs
by operation of law.This is as it should, considereing that rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
And since Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda Olars relationship
with Cristobal Olar was in this case, never put in issue, their being
legal heirs of the deceased gave them unqualified right to participated
in all proceedings affecting the subject property).

(c) seasonal farmworkers;

Petitioners concede that although Olars death passed all his rights
and interest over the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing
them to his estranged wife but to a relative (petitoners), who helped
him in tilling and who took care of him , should be accorded respect
over the intent of the law on hereditary succession.

Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife

and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased
spouse.16 Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of
Olars son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be
injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA
issued in Olars name.

ISSUE: Who has better rights? Heirs or tenants?

RULING: Petitioners Capitle, argument that "it would be absurd for
Olar to bequeath his property to his estranged wife not to a relative
who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and took good care of
his needs is a virtual admission that their possession was not in the
concept of owners, they having merely "helped" in tilling the lot,
thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and tiller.
Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public
officers who issued the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties,
including adhering to the provisions of Section 22 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which provides:
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the
CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of
the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of
the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(d) other farmworkers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified
under Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution
of the land of their parents; And provided further, That actual tenanttillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably
sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become
beneficiaries under this Program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude
and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible.
The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record of performance
of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or
misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right
to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit reports on the
performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers
of the lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor
of Olar would not bind respondents as they were not impleaded.

Guerrero v. Bihis 521 SCRA 394

FACTS: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A.
Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed
for probate in the RTC QC. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder
sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment
did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the
testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children
procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence.
Petitioner Guerrero was appointed special administratrix. Respondent
opposed petitioner's appointment but subsequently withdrew her
opposition. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that
Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will
was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's
residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario
O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan
City.
ISSUE: Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place

(b) regular farmworkers;

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of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil
Code?
HELD: No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with
the execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a
will. In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and
cannot be accepted for probate.
The Notarial law provides:
SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary
public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive
with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act
beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not
complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law
was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and
Atty. Directo were all completely void.
Samaniego-Celada vs. Abena
GR No. 145545 / 556 SCRA 569 / 30 June 2008
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: The decedent MARGARITA MAYORES died single and
without any ascending nor descending heirs. She was survived by her
first cousins, among them is herein petitioner PAZ. Before her death,
the decedent executed a last will and testament, where she
bequeathed of her undivided share of a real property to certain
persons unrelated (by blood) to the testator, among them is herein
respondent LUCIA ABENA who was the decedents lifelong
companion. The decedent also left all her personal properties to herein
respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.

Herein respondent argues that the petition for review raises

questions of fact, not of law.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will
invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law.
HELD: No, CA did not err. Herein petitioner failed to establish the
allegation that the testator was not mentally capable of making a will at
the time of the execution thereof. Not one of the witnesses of herein
petitioner has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the
testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation
of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically
weak but it does not follow that she was not of sound mind. Hindi yata
ito kasama sa subject ng wills.
The will is not fatally defective by sole reason that its
attestation clause states that the will is composed of 3 pages while in
truth and in fact, the will consists of 2 pages only because the
attestation is not part of the notarial will. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not part of the will, the court, after examining the
totality of the will, opined that error in the number of pages of the will
as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the
subject will. It must be noted that the subject will is consecutively
lettered with pages A, B, and C, which is a sufficient safeguard from
the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must
have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole
instrument consisting of 3 pages inclusive of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgement.
In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue and
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form
of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with the requirements of Article 805.
Hence, there is a substantial compliance with all the formal
requirements of the law (Article 805) in the execution of the subject
notarial will.

Herein petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of

the estate of the decedent before the RTC.
Herein respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of
the decedent before the RTC, which was later on consolidated with the
case instituted by herein petitioner.
RTC declared the last will and testament of the decedent
probated, and declared herein respondent as the executor of the will.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Herein petitioner argues that the decedents will failed to
comply with the formalities required under Article 805 because:
(1)
(2)

(3)

The will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another;
The signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the
will are not the same or similar, indicating that they were not
signed on the same day;
The will was procured through undue influence and pressure
because at the time of the execution of the will, the decedent
was weak, sickly, jobless, and entirely dependent upon
herein respondent for support, hence, these circumstances
compelled the decedent to sign the will

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