Taada v.

Angara
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership
thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations
amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic
globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words,
are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the
heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies,
import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and
becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are
replacing age-old beggar-thy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic
producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru,
Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and
prosperity.

Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations -were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to
address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the
International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to
minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However,
for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and
WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT
was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no
institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the
Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the World
Trade Organization -- with the signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the
WTO Agreement by its members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the
goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving
Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs
on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the
opening of new opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty
associated with exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more investments into the country. Although the
Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of special interest to
the legal profession - - will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication
through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate
Tribunal.Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived
at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped
countries were at a disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or
impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this

Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy
that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the
nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the
release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the
use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned
therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.

The Facts
On
April
15,
1994,
Respondent
Rizalino
Navarro,
then
Secretary
of
the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities,
with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994
from the President of the Philippines, [3] stating among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the
President of the Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that the
Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization.[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. [6] The text of the WTO
Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volumeUruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the
said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade
Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed [7] the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after
having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement
which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the
same and every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three
(3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated
May 13, 1996,[8] the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows:

The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters,
such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations
and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and
definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents
comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to
the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the
Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva,
Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper, [9] for brevity, (1) providing a
historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of
proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the
Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the
multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of
the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, he listed the various bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments
involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance
dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.

The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the
concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the
provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and
impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines;
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise
of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the

World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act,
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the several issues
raised by petitioners into the following:[10]
1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements
and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by
petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and
12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court
in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor
General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is
otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna
Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the
Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO
Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very
jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case -- was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled
upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively
waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents favor, will
not cause the petitions dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the
defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an
integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus
standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They
probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international
commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the
substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE
STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR
IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF
JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?

(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE
THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. [12] Once a controversy
as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters [14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in the
1987 Constitution,[15] as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike down grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an
innovation in our political law.[16] As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, [17] the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, [18] it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be
given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this,
we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass
upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule
on the propriety of the governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies,
quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty
to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
xx xx xx xx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum:[19]
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no Member shall apply any TRIM
that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of
Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:

(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source,
whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in
terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the
volume or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided
for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under
domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its
access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value
of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents,
p.22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article
XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).
b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432 (emphasis
supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein,
each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all
measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own
like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords
to its own like services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it
modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement
on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610 emphasis supplied).

It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more
manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to
ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements.[20] Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such
Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic
portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to
other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited
WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient
provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution [21] is called the basic political creed of the nation by
Dean Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise
of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
cause of action in the courts.They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines
for legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles need legislative
enactments to implement them, thus:
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth)
of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they
are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and
the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade
into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his
concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.,[26] explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that

the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.One is that unless the
legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may
well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions
to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and
executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced
Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles
relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other
sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth;
a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an
expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian
reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;

2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of
the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony[27] and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive;
[28]
and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.[29] In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the
outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; [30] and speaks of industries
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et
al.,[31] this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is
enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the
rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the
Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. [32] In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to
protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the
UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of
any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver
of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in
general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any
member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of
withdrawals.[33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is
not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines
to share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development. These basic principles are found in the preamble[34] of the WTO Agreement as follows:

The Parties to this Agreement,

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal
use of the worlds resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs
and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with
the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to theelimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading
system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in
general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff
reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an
average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6)
years while developing countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to effect an average tariff
reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to
agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be
effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce
their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21%
within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of
that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such
reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import
surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of
these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local
industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the
economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been
taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have
gravely abused their discretion.True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet
uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other
economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the
advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its
constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy [35] does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on
external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means
avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources
and public utilities.[36]
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to
all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity,[37] the
fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of
the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to
compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under
a policy of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise,
nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make
available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the
most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the
general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it will -- as promised by
its promoters -- expand the countrys exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto
are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its
framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the
United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that
necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the
absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is

to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the
same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent
political law writer and respected jurist [38] explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time
develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution
cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure
by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from
becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.
[39]
Petitioners maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty,
specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is
vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and
general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the
trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of investments and money x x x as well as to a whole slew of
agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x. [40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress.[41] And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such
authority is subject to specified limits and x x x such limitations and restrictions as Congress may provide,
[42]
as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their
arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed
to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." [43] By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound
by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws.[44] One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda -international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. [45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and
in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise
of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States
concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the
regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in
peace and the establishment of international organizations. [46] The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot

in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of selfsufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.[47]

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented
to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation. 47-A Under Article 2 of the
UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which
the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peacekeeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of
Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the
Congo were expenses of the United Nations under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all
its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine
Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees
with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its
representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of
sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example: although sovereign equality and
domestic jurisdiction of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under
Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation
under the present charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the
sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both
bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the
Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed,
among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal
Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar
remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and personal services performed by them
as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with
respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs
duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare
parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties,
excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts,
regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same
privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.

(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted
Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines
not exceeding 59 days.
(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and
visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special
Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the
Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related
charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the
interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of international obligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes
the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or
trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in
international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal
obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that
structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution
procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by
subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain
disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a
larger set of potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the
smaller countrys market.[48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation
and amity with all nations.

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) [49]intrudes on the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. [50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, [51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as
follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in
paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial

authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical
product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the
following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of
the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the
alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words in the
absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with
the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said
patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is
substantial likelihood that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented process but
the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty
of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually
refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or
fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the
existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that
the identical product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law
on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or
product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility
model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying.
(underscoring supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption
applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able
through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not
obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue -derogation of legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity
clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks
and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. [52]

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in
the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in
the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it
is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in
representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the
President to the Senate[53] which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject
of concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of
the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending
the conference.[54] It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted
conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one page [55] in Vol. I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They
were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of
the members can meet to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and
generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement. [56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not
apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which have indicated in their respective
schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing
financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and
national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the
normal course of business.[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed
included as its integral parts,[58] as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this
Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to as
Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as Plurilateral
Trade Agreements) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are
binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for
Members that have not accepted them.

4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as GATT
1994) is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to
the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter
referred to as GATT 1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the
members deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11,
1994,[59] the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this
Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the
agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the
same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization?And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a
point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative
solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the
nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making a new submission which
improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his
intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this
question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate
for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization
as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial
Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali
Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft
of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The
Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being
submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or
acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization

Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final
Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been
adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays session and I dont see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of
question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to
make.

Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ ofcertiorari grounded on grave
abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply
shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. [61] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must begrave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [62] Failure on the part
of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. [63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one
of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a
constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in
good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such
presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition
of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot
find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. [64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino
labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles
-- while serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of
action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate
which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So
too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal
hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members,

may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that isnot a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own
judicial power and duty.Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a
matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the
worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership,
should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance[65] where the East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and
culturally in the next century. He refers to the free market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming
Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia
negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on
national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation,
stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the
advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of
the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected
officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

AGABON v NLRC
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review seeks to reverse the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63017, modifying the decision of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR Case No.
023442-00.
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental
and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice
installers on January 2, 1992[2] until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims [3] and on December 28,
1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay
the monetary claims. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the termination of the complainants illegal.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to pay them their backwages up to November 29, 1999
in the sum of:
1. Jenny M. Agabon - P56, 231.93
2. Virgilio C. Agabon - 56, 231.93
and, in lieu of reinstatement to pay them their separation pay of one (1) month for every year of
service from date of hiring up to November 29, 1999.
Respondent is further ordered to pay the complainants their holiday pay and service incentive
leave pay for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 as well as their premium pay for holidays and rest
days and Virgilio Agabons 13 th month pay differential amounting to TWO THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY (P2,150.00) Pesos, or the aggregate amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY
ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT & 93/100 (P121,678.93) Pesos for Jenny
Agabon, and ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY
EIGHT & 93/100 (P123,828.93) Pesos for Virgilio Agabon, as per attached computation of Julieta
C. Nicolas, OIC, Research and Computation Unit, NCR.
SO ORDERED.[4]

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and
were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also
denied for lack of evidence.[5]
Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned
their employment but ordered the payment of money claims. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSED only
insofar as it dismissed petitioners money claims. Private respondents are ordered to pay petitioners
holiday pay for four (4) regular holidays in 1996, 1997, and 1998, as well as their service
incentive leave pay for said years, and to pay the balance of petitioner Virgilio Agabons 13 th month
pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this petition for review on the sole issue of whether petitioners were illegally dismissed. [7]

Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the private respondent refused to give them assignments
unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis when they reported for duty on February 23, 1999. They did not agree
on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits as Social Security System (SSS) members. Petitioners
also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. [8]
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.
[9]

In fact, private respondent sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report

for work. Private respondents manager even talked to petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone sometime in June
1999 to tell him about the new assignment at Pacific Plaza Towers involving 40,000 square meters of cornice
installation work. However, petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to perform
installation work for another company. Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per day.
When this was not granted, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case. [10]
It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even
finality if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. This is especially so when such findings were affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.[11] However, if the factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are conflicting, as in
this case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings. [12]
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of the facts, ruled that petitioners dismissal was
for a just cause. They had abandoned their employment and were already working for another employer.
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. [13] Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latters representative in connection with the employees work;
(b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. [14] It is a form of
neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. [15] For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no
more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified.[16]
In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent having subcontracted for an installation work for another
company. Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship with private respondent. This was not the first time they did this. In January 1996, they did not report
for work because they were working for another company. Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that

they would be dismissed if this happened again. Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention
to sever their employer-employee relationship. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining
the penalty that should be meted out to him.[17]
In Sandoval Shipyard v. Clave,[18] we held that an employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or
permission from his employer, for the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his
job. We should apply that rule with more reason here where petitioners were absent because they were already
working in another company.
The law imposes many obligations on the employer such as providing just compensation to workers, observance of
the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of employment. On the other hand, the law also
recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and
diligence, but also good conduct[19] and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such
persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his interests. [20]
After establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid cause, we now determine if the procedures for
dismissal were observed.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code:
Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of termination of
employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last known address.
Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while
dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate
employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of
employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full backwages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is
no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the
employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before

terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if
the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and
the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article
282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due
process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the
dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or
authorized cause but due process was not observed.
In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid and the employer will not suffer any liability.
In the second and third situations where the dismissals are illegal, Article 279 mandates that the employee
is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid
up to the time of actual reinstatement.
In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not
invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established
that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow
the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless
because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse
because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. [21] Thus, it should be
held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
A review and re-examination of the relevant legal principles is appropriate and timely to clarify the various rulings
on employment termination in the light of Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission.[22]
Prior to 1989, the rule was that a dismissal or termination is illegal if the employee was not given any notice. In the
1989 case of Wenphil Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[23] we reversed this long-standing rule and
held that the dismissed employee, although not given any notice and hearing, was not entitled to reinstatement and
backwages because the dismissal was for grave misconduct and insubordination, a just ground for termination under
Article 282. The employee had a violent temper and caused trouble during office hours, defying superiors who tried
to pacify him. We concluded that reinstating the employee and awarding backwages may encourage him to do even

worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. [24] We further held
that:
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be
maintained. He has no right to return to his former employment.
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to
private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as
above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due
process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a
sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law
before dismissing petitioner from employment. Considering the circumstances of this case
petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this
award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the
employer.[25]
The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the
due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the
employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule.
On January 27, 2000, in Serrano, the rule on the extent of the sanction was changed. We held that the
violation by the employer of the notice requirement in termination for just or authorized causes was not a denial of
due process that will nullify the termination. However, the dismissal is ineffectual and the employer must pay full
backwages from the time of termination until it is judicially declared that the dismissal was for a just or authorized
cause.
The rationale for the re-examination of the Wenphil doctrine in Serrano was the significant number of cases
involving dismissals without requisite notices. We concluded that the imposition of penalty by way of damages for
violation of the notice requirement was not serving as a deterrent. Hence, we now required payment of full
backwages from the time of dismissal until the time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.
Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to dismiss now and pay later by imposing full
backwages.
We believe, however, that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the
Labor Code which states:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or authorized causes
provided by law. Payment of backwages and other benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only if the employee
was unjustly dismissed.
The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and injustice which elicited strong dissent has
prompted us to revisit the doctrine.

To be sure, the Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on
moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a
civilized society as conceived by our entire history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of
what is fair and right and just. [26] It is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and
judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the
valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of
dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by
Department Order Nos. 9 and 10.[27] Breaches of these due processrequirements violate the Labor Code.
Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process.
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and
Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
In Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28] the dismissal was for a just and valid cause but
the employee was not accorded due process. The dismissal was upheld by the Court but the employer was
sanctioned. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty, and depends on the facts of each case
and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.
In Nath v. National Labor Relations Commission,[29] it was ruled that even if the employee was not given
due process, the failure did not operate to eradicate the just causes for dismissal. The dismissal being for just
cause, albeit without due process, did not entitle the employee to reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorneys
fees.
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in his separate opinion in MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[30] which opinion he reiterated in Serrano, stated:
C. Where there is just cause for dismissal but due process has not been properly observed
by an employer, it would not be right to order either the reinstatement of the dismissed employee
or the payment of backwages to him. In failing, however, to comply with the procedure prescribed
by law in terminating the services of the employee, the employer must be deemed to have opted
or, in any case, should be made liable, for the payment of separation pay. It might be pointed out
that the notice to be given and the hearing to be conducted generally constitute the two-part due
process requirement of law to be accorded to the employee by the employer. Nevertheless,
peculiar circumstances might obtain in certain situations where to undertake the above steps would
be no more than a useless formality and where, accordingly, it would not be imprudent to apply
the res ipsa loquitur rule and award, in lieu of separation pay, nominal damages to the employee. x
x x.[31]
After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment
termination, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements
of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that the
dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than

that imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just
to employees, but to employers as well.
The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals for valid or authorized causes but not complying with
statutory due process may have far-reaching consequences.
This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the most notorious violators of company policy are rewarded by
invoking due process. This also creates absurd situations where there is a just or authorized cause for dismissal but a
procedural infirmity invalidates the termination. Let us take for example a case where the employee is caught
stealing or threatens the lives of his co-employees or has become a criminal, who has fled and cannot be found, or
where serious business losses demand that operations be ceased in less than a month. Invalidating the dismissal
would not serve public interest. It could also discourage investments that can generate employment in the local
economy.
The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress
employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer
when it is in the right, as in this case. [32] Certainly, an employer should not be compelled to pay employees for work
not actually performed and in fact abandoned.
The employer should not be compelled to continue employing a person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently inimical to the employer. The law protecting the rights of
the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[33]
It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if
the requirements of due process were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal.
An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the Social Justice
Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. As the
eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.[34]
This is not to say that the Court was wrong when it ruled the way it did in Wenphil, Serrano and related cases.
Social justice is not based on rigid formulas set in stone. It has to allow for changing times and circumstances.
Justice Isagani Cruz strongly asserts the need to apply a balanced approach to labor-management relations
and dispense justice with an even hand in every case:
We have repeatedly stressed that social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of
reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly
extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor
simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must
always be served for the poor and the rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.[35]

Justice in every case should only be for the deserving party. It should not be presumed that every case of illegal
dismissal would automatically be decided in favor of labor, as management has rights that should be fully respected
and enforced by this Court. As interdependent and indispensable partners in nation-building, labor and management
need each other to foster productivity and economic growth; hence, the need to weigh and balance the rights and
welfare of both the employee and employer.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for
the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission.[36] The indemnity to be
imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to deter in
the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the
facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated
or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.[37]
As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions,[38] an employer is liable to pay
indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal,
the employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process. The Court, after considering the circumstances
therein, fixed the indemnity at P2,590.50, which was equivalent to the employees one month salary. This indemnity
is intended not to penalize the employer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right to statutory due process
which was violated by the employer.[39]
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. [40] Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at
bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers
from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
Private respondent claims that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it failed to pay petitioners holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.
We are not persuaded.
We affirm the ruling of the appellate court on petitioners money claims. Private respondent is liable for
petitioners holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without deductions.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the employee must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to
prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and
other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of
workers have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the
employer.[41]

In the case at bar, if private respondent indeed paid petitioners holiday pay and service incentive leave pay, it could
have easily presented documentary proofs of such monetary benefits to disprove the claims of the petitioners. But it
did not, except with respect to the 13th month pay wherein it presented cash vouchers showing payments of the
benefit in the years disputed.[42] Allegations by private respondent that it does not operate during holidays and that it
allows its employees 10 days leave with pay, other than being self-serving, do not constitute proof of payment.
Consequently, it failed to discharge the onus probandi thereby making it liable for such claims to the petitioners.
Anent the deduction of SSS loan and the value of the shoes from petitioner Virgilio Agabons 13 th month pay, we find
the same to be unauthorized. The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional
income in the form of the 13 th month pay to employees not already receiving the same [43] so as to further protect the
level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide inflation. [44] Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay is
included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code, to wit:
(f) Wage paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated,
capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece ,
or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to
an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or
for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined
by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the
employer to the employee
from which an employer is prohibited under Article 113 [45] of the same Code from making any deductions without
the employees knowledge and consent. In the instant case, private respondent failed to show that the deduction of
the SSS loan and the value of the shoes from petitioner Virgilio Agabons 13 th month pay was authorized by the latter.
The lack of authority to deduct is further bolstered by the fact that petitioner Virgilio Agabon included the same as
one of his money claims against private respondent.
The Court of Appeals properly reinstated the monetary claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter ordering the
private respondent to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the
amount of P6,520.00, service incentive leave pay for the same period in the amount of P3,255.00 and the balance of
Virgilio Agabons thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 23, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63017, finding that petitioners Jenny and Virgilio Agabon abandoned their
work, and ordering private respondent to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996
to 1998, in the amount of P6,520.00, service incentive leave pay for the same period in the amount of P3,255.00 and
the balance of Virgilio Agabons thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each
of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED

Gutierrez v. House of Representative Committee on Justice

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the
Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint [1] against
petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.[2]
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. [3] who,
by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.[4]
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre
Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint [5] against
petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio,
Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus. [6] On even date, the House of
Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By
letter still of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who,
by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,[8] also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,
[9]

instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja,

Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business,
[10]

which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred
both complaints to public respondent.[11]
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient
in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September
2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public
respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner

to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to
each of the 55 members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of
the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their
allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was
served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days. [13]
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court
the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the
Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to
comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public
respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30,
2010.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by
Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by
petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the
given 15-day period.
The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public
respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two
impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, [16] and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.[17]
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. [18] The argument that
impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to
the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution,
is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the

power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call
upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the
Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well
the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the abovementioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to
leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
xxxx
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is
well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of
whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House
of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject
to judicial review. InTaada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such memberelect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances.Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[21]
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine
whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise
of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective
measures from the Court.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.[22]
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they
only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues
that when petitioner filed the present petition [23] on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of
the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.
An

aspect

of

the

case-or-controversy

requirement

is

the

requisite

of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by
the challenged conduct.[25] In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the
simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which
call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a
novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she
took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue whether public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically
anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar
provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the
subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been

charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner,
the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public
respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of
form and substance of the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any
indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR,
Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out
of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote
of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to
legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a
three-man body x x x. [28]

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over
the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.[29]
Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the
inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a
respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed . In addition to that[,] his
father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be expected to act with
impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only
human we grant him that benefit.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then
(interrupted)
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be deprived of due process of
law?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:

No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with
the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due process is the lack of
impartiality that may be expected of him.
JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of
the committee as in this case there were objections relative to the existence of the
implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman Golez to the
effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.
JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite
which makes it mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he
had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the
situation whereby with that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that
there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the
effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an impartial adjudicator.
[30]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two
complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public
respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So SantosConcio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per
se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt
dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the
paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to
each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all
phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to
present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical
calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating
Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the
presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.[32] (italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and
substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by
petitioners counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an answer.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is
sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to file her answer
(interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the
regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that
statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a determination that the
complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed,
Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how is not your action
premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations
involved and that is (interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15 th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the
Committee-level, particularly Section 5[34] which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment
proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in
form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its finding of
sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of
the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. [35]
The claim fails.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the
express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such
determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the
House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential
considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the
constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in
determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, [36] and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the committee.[37]

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary.This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic
law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. [38] In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the
Impeachment Rules.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its
judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised,
upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately,
delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent
provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010
its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of
general circulation.[40]
Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules
was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the
complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
Congress shallpromulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium
of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]
Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations [43] which
held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public
respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the
purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.

Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or
obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order
that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.[44] (emphasis
supplied)

While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times. [45] A number of those instances involves the
promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and publish, the case of the
Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for
their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.[46]
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to promulgate its
rules for the canvassing of the certificates in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress
approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25, 2010, [47] it did not require the
publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on different meanings as
they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of
implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally
understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was
clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.[49]
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution
itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.

Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to
make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this
Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts
may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano,
this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
[50]
(italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as
categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate,
there is no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it
being published.
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a
set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court
anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case
of Taada v. Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a
tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general
sense of making known the issuances.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate
Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the
impeachment process.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional
section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified
complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or
grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of
court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a
citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4
which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON
IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think
all these other proceduralrequirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.
[52]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section
3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional
Commission took pains in designing even its details.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to

operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[53] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior
to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of
the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the
expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House
would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the
publication requirement.
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed
at effectively carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion
when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet
the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the effective implementation of the purpose of the
impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is
within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or
supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for
this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. [54] In the present
case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are
involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of
the offender.[55]
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in
its entirety. Rather,

x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be

considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect
the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such
violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.[56] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and
invoked certain provisions[57] of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for
reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July
22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from
July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation
starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee,
following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion
of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel
group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its
impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take
initial action on it.[59] The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action
to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking
initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the
complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action [60] which contemplates a situation where a first
impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici
curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least onethird[61] of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period.[62] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings Sections 16[63] and 17[64] of Rule V thereof clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article
XI since they g[a]ve the term initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.[65]

Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional
Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambongs statements [66]that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint.
Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress
that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee
report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.
Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this, [67] for certain exchanges in the Constitutional
Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment
proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate
proceedings.
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the
membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is
required.
xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a
report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the
members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary
Member.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very
liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where
we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is
we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report,

whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the
questions we would like to be discussed.
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be
overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and
that such overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON. One-third.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to
convict. To impeach means to file the case before the Senate.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are
charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding. [69] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two
occasions:
[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval
of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The
procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the
Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that
the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it
was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging the words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with
me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with
me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but
the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3
(3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the
exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment
proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH
THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in impeachment and replace the word by with OF,
so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the

House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF
the committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of
the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified
complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President,
that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly
explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is
the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
onJune 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant
in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that
had already been done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion.
The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee report initiates the
impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be
done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of
the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary

to

petitioners

emphasis

on

impeachment complaint,

what

the

Constitution

impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint

[74]

mentions

is

to denote the limit

prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its
enlarged and plural sense.[75]
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that
kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a

matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick
reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the
candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a
year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment
complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism
wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions,
can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out
of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after
diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an
impeachment complaint.
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a
laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the
process is precisely intended to effectively weed out worms in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by
other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or
principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment
complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign,
endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating
the Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same
year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed
impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the
House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the
time of committing their endorsement.
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also
on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas
disquisition[76] in Francisco, a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in the House[77] precedes the
bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives. [78] Conscious of the legal import
of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment

proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress
alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.
The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House Secretary General who would
otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to
the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it
in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the
power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the
initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but
any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. [79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice
that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only
as to the propriety of the referral. [80] With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to
refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate
show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said
committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally
prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which
to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with
deadlines. The Constitution states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral
of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group.For while the said complaint was filed on July 22,
2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the
15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August
2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was
well within the said 10-day session period.[81]
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving
the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable
access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry

whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to
remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment
proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on
Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint
by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House. [82] To the Reyes group, initiation means the
act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. [83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the
Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.[84]
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed
provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12 th Congress.The present case involving an impeachment proceeding
against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that
dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on
no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of
law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine,
which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way,
then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The
Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants
and the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same
point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to
decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me
yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I
am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong
in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if
litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the
courts.[85]

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of
the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.[86]
Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of
successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse,
the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends
with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding [87] of a contrary resolution (as espoused by
public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), [88] or the

Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by
respondent-intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally
imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under
one proceeding.
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a
year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.
[89]

Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too

frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to
the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials
who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative
body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we
allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do
nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the
number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that
he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one
impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine
laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing andreferral remains congruent to the rationale of the
constitutional provision.
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple
impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the
filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral.
As pointed out during the oral arguments [91] by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege
and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound.The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a
single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form
and substance all these must be met before bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an
impeachable officer.
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed
on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered
or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if
only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary
requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are
enough oppression.
Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly
proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur.What the Constitution assures an impeachable
officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the
charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the
impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges
entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media
tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of
performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable
officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is
called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is
the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules

on Criminal Procedure
On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own
Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules
of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings
before the House.
Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress
may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.
First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules,
petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a]
complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since
each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that
public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose
her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard

of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public
respondent from completing its report within the deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must
charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on
Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It
adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue
respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a
political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or
information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name
of the People of the Philippines.
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions [92] outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more
relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to
apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from
office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that
petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying
out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving
into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which
must be made by the House [93] which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of
that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment
for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set
known as the Articles of Impeachment.[94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only
one impeachable offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner
maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep.
Tupas stated that [c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today
or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes of
consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate.
[95]
Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely contemplated. [96]
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court
will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]

Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that

the two impeachment complaints

were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails.Petitioners theory obviously
springs from her proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already brushed aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7,
2010

of

public

respondent,

the

House

of

Representatives

Committee

on

Justice,

are NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, 1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether

the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the
Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC
the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than
October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on
Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained. 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by
the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a governmentowned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the
shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay
down conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs
of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who
have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimonyof the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the
shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege
of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition
giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no
clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of
a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an
outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing
certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by
an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions
has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not selfexecuting, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the
Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE"
is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference
to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do
we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it
to remove the word "QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the
word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will
always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For

example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et

cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it
is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe
a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a selfexecuting constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and
make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require
any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements
of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as
moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights are simply not in point. Basco
v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal
dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social
justice, 24 and the values of education.25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional
provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the
vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development.33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own

inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

34

explains

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to
out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our
people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as
the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House
of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and
1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention.
In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failedcoup d'
etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that theFilipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo
amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is

agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation
that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual
Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say
that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities
or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.

39

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be
read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos"
here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual
Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by
Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner
Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL THE
STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the socalled "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the
grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision
was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic
concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be
made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen
over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel
company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision
is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a
clear constitutional provision by the government itself is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of
reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the
provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own
and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises
out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for
an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command.
That is not how constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
"state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes
under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although

entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after
it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
"Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.
Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason
for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the
bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.
For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional
fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities
is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad
since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid
tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS
to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing

to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the
Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy
the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.
This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained
by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they
are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A
commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state,
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no
higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important
events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and

continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel and all that it stands for is sold to a nonFilipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will
continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other
acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit more
on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions such as the
Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qualified
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos. 1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony" consists
of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I) consisting of land,
sea, and air. 2study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would
show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the
Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their natural resources of the

country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well
as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers
did not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this
may be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony). 3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. 4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as
such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This
institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a historical
event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel L.
Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do so with. an eye
to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the trustees of the
patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the
distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nationalization
of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not
make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of
constitutional enactment" 6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in their
own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and
encumbrances". 7
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must refer not
only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the
existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national
patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid
of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the nonFilipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The
Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid
of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our country,
stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While government
agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and
even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from
reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the
hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in the
Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of
the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with
the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural
heritage in the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos" 1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or
regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel
has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which derives
its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State
subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to take
the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the
only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign
bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to
the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could
trigger the right of preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown that
it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the peculiar
constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at time is seen,
to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it even takes on
non-justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional
mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the
bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila
Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it over
a foreign national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the
Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking the
larger ownership interest in MHC," 2 so that petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the
Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is
only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential
treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. 3That, to me, is what
"preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case by favoring Filipinos whenever they
are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to Filipino
citizens in the lease of public market stalls." 5 This Court upheld the cancellation of existing leases
covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter of the stalls
to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De
la Fuente, 6 this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute (R.A.
No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino citizens in
the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo, 7the preference
granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls
occupied by alien vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as good as those
occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest between
Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to preference
immediately arises." 8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s in
America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination programs

designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as employment, contracting
and licensing. 9Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are situations in which the only way to
place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to give them
preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive the
country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common trades of
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with the sale of government
property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and concessions covering the national
economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens. That
at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the
Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the relinquishment of the business in
favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be trading
competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are qualified, having
hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding that is sought to be
modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of
an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would be not to make a
bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid,
make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bidding of
the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to 15
million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity,
after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the
highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly
submitted bids." 14 The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in the case at
bar with legal and constitutional issues and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of history. The
reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of
history is worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural
aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the nation".
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national goals and priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution pertaining
to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively by
Filipinos. (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the 1987
Constitution Commission proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN THE
GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS". And
the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents,
will include not only individual Filipinos but also FilipinoControlled entities fully controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III,
Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as
Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this
body already approved what is known as the Filipino
First policy which was suggested by Commissioner de
Castro. So that it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV,
Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a
foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise
is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given
a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some
aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still
be preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p. 616,
Records of the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no reneged on this
nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . . It
cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional
(Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the product of
events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the
collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to
historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal
largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively discussed in
the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the
auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical values of
our people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the words
of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps flowing, and
one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If you look towards the hill from
which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the river or people
towards the future, and if you look the other way, you progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says "He is always right who suspects that he makes
mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding the belief that
the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic
corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph
of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila
Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was included in
the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to
51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel Corporation. After
the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was increased from a
maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was
required to "provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel" 1 The proposal was
approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules were
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong Berhad,
Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified. 2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First Pass the prequalification process;

Second Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;
Third Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than
October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to
the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of the
following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel industry;
or
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board
representation) in another hotel company; or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to
successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide access to
the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE
The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration Office
between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period
specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the following:
a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification
and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila
Hotel Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and Bidding
Conference
xxx xxx xxx

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila
Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the Applicant to seek
clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines and
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification documents
will be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this conference is
strongly advised, although the Applicant will not be penalized if it does
not attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents (1
original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:00 AM to
4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the
assistance of the TEC based on the Information
Package and other information available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the
evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of the
group, taking into account the contribution of each
member to the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results
of the PBAC evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the
criteria set forth below:
a. Business management expertise,
track record, and experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the
proposed strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem
appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding ITT
Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels International
Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton may participate in the
Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification process
again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of Qualified
Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the date specified in
Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by member

whose qualification was a material consideration for being included in the
shortlist is ground for disqualification of the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to participate
in the Public Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred
Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing Thirty Percent to
Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of
MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified
Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of shares within
the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract bidders with different
preferences and objectives for the operation and management of The
Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum bid
required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is Thirty-Six
Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the minimum
required will not considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy of
which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be properly
accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may be a sufficient
basis for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the Official
Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a sealed
envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be submitted
along with the bid in a separate envelop marked "SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS":
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the Qualified

Bidder should submit a Board resolution which adequately authorizes
such representative to bid for and in behalf of the corporation with full
authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified
Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of the
Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board resolution authorizing
one of its members and such member's representative to make the bid
on behalf of the group with full authority to perform such acts necessary
or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos
(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:
i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft
payable to the "Government Service Insurance System"
and issued by a reputable banking institution duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable
banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than
the required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or unconditional
demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security will be for the
account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic Partner,
the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on the Qualified
Bidder's offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned immediately
after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not declared the Highest
Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest
Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of GSIS
if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract specified
by the Highest Bidder or other types of contract in its strategic plan for
The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with

GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not
later than October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any
other reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the following
location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building
Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding to
accept any and all bids and supporting requirements. Representatives
from the Commission on Audit and COP will be invited to witness the
proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid Form.
The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a sealed
envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents
in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS"
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted simultaneously
to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard
Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after
the closing time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of the
two sealed envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be
indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the
corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes will be in
full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding, the
PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those who
submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which is/are
not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The
envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately returned
to the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at 3:00

PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will be read
publicly as the envelopes are opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will formally
announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis. In the
event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same equivalent price
per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger ownership
interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed
period; or
b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and
acceptable to the PBAC.
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by
October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the
Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is
intending to provide only financial support to The Manila
Hotel, a separate institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase
and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which will be
distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management Contract
for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the management fee
structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in the Management
Contract are as follows:
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross
revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating
profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead
expenses and the basic management fee.
c. Fixed component of the international
marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of
gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should indicate
in its Information Package if it is wishes to charge this
fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for the
hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the Highest
Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The Manila
Hotel should determine whether or not the management fee structure
above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification documents to
GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be in
accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their respective bids in
their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority will be given to the
Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bids on
the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner
after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC
not later than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and
COP/OGCC are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the
Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than October
23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares after
deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Check or
unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Service
Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution licensed to
do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all
applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such application as
maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly
reserves the right to require the submission of any additional information
from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding prior
to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under

amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the
Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the
prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submission of
the prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or other
pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the respective
deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it has
on the Block of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders,
except the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public Bidding is
final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public Bidding, are
deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, suit or
allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders who
have participated in the Public Bidding. 3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The GSIS
declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid
price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph of
Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three million pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions of the
contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain petitioner's request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution 4 on the
"National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement section
10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner, a
qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in
the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government. 5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further
legislative action. 6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws
enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The
key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language. A
searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete
in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement. 7 The inquiry
demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question. 8
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, 9 rather than as requiring
future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated
as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily
ignored and nullified by Congress. 11Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that
legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in action should not suffocate
them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures, 13the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an accused, 15 and the
privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection
of property. 17 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or
damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which
the policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our
Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as mere
statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social
Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end
Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the
discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy
content. 24
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country 25 to
Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws
that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical
command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments
in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises.
The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right
by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution. 27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark
case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez, 28 where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to
Filipinize certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of
section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of
Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not to
Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also
broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the]
national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read
as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qualified
Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their
language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to
refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is
now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino First policy in our
fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its enforcement by the whole State
without any pause or a half- pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves
the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that
the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo,
"patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 30 By
this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The
unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value
of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened
on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or
passing through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino craftsmanship
were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively used by American and Caucasian
travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign
dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the
Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers
from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the
Liberation of Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents
and kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports celebrities were
housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local scene,
it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped
and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and travel award-giving
bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts
which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No.
4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846, "The Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural
property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property. 32 Approved on
June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as the
exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not
equate cultural treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look
at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that administers
funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the government. 33 The
funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be
used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the
administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS, 35 Excess funds, however, are allowed to be
invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees. 36 It is thus contended that the
GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the
contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to
the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on Audit. 38 As state-owned and
controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the general welfare of the
people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional
command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their "preferential
right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for a Constitution
only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet today's manifest needs and
tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living
constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to define the
phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that present
and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of
Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against
aliens over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is
understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the
existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay
down conditions under which business map be done, for
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as giving

preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who

are not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the
intention of the proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is
addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and
regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rulemaking power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the standards to
measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed
that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it a second
chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the second
paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino for
it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. Indeed, in
the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our
State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata first, the need to develop
our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our
economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define the degree of the
right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the general
welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing
needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as
time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree
of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at any
given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right primarily
belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of government,
and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state policy. Within the limits
of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the degree of this right of
preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national economy and judicial duty. On
the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we
must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS to determine
the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless
look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be
accorded qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that they
do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the
Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand
that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and
bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the rules
inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the
highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of shares . . ." No
reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complied with the
procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and
the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not
give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules
did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no
power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The
parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose determination belongs
to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect
that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little
but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State
action amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as
unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner
was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not
provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot
be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it
wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on he essence of
bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the
government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that must
be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully
written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial capability.
The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This objective will be
undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it. For
plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first
bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M. Recto
has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own land. The
Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the Filipino First policy requires
that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy makers can write laws
and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after
writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and
foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution protects all against unfairness. We can be
pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

Orceo v COMELEC

PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] questioning the validity of Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it provides that
the term firearm includes airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations, which results in their coverage by the gun ban
during the election period this year.
Resolution No. 8714 is entitled Rules and Regulations on the: (1) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting of
Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and (2) Employment, Availment or Engagement of the Services of Security
Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. The
Resolution was promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on December 16, 2009, and took effect
on December 25, 2009.
Resolution No. 8714 contains the implementing rules and regulations of Sec. 32 (Who May Bear Firearms)
and Section 33 (Security Personnel and Bodyguards) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166, entitled An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.
Section 1 of Resolution No. 8714 prohibits an unauthorized person from bearing, carrying or transporting
firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including all public buildings, streets, parks, and private vehicles
or public conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, during the election period.
Under Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714, the term firearm includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their
replica/imitation in whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real. Hence, airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations are included in the gun ban during the election period from January 10, 2010 to June 9,
2010.
Petitioner claims that he is a real party-in-interest, because he has been playing airsoft since the year
2000. The continuing implementation of Resolution No. 8714 will put him in danger of sustaining direct injury or
make him liable for an election offense[2] if caught in possession of an airsoft gun and its replica/imitation in going
to and from the game site and playing the sport during the election period.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the definition of firearm in Resolution No. 8714,
since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations. He asserts that the
intendment of R.A. No. 7166 is that the term firearm refers to real firearm in its common and ordinary usage. In
support of this assertion, he cites the Senate deliberation on the bill, [3] which later became R.A. No. 7166, where it
was clarified that an unauthorized person caught carrying a firearm during the election period is guilty of an election
offense under Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Further, petitioner alleges that there is no law that covers airsoft guns. By including airsoft guns in the
definition of firearm, Resolution No. 8714, in effect, criminalizes the sport, since the possession of an airsoft gun or
its replica/imitation is now an election offense, although there is still no law that governs the use thereof.

Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as follows: (1) Annulling Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it
includes airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations within the meaning of firearm, and declaring the Resolution as
invalid; (2) ordering the COMELEC to desist from further implementing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations are concerned; (3) ordering the COMELEC to amend Resolution No. 8714 by removing
airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations within the meaning of firearm; and (4) ordering the COMELEC to issue a
Resolution directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police and other law enforcement
agencies deputized by the COMELEC to desist from further enforcing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations are concerned.
The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations in the term firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
The Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in this case.
R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes)[4] provides:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. During the election period, no person shall bear, carry
or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park,
private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized
in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearms licenses shall be suspended during the
election period.
Only regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and other law enforcement agencies of the Government who are duly deputized in
writing by the Commission for election duty may be authorized to carry and possess firearms during
the election period: Provided, That, when in the possession of firearms, the deputized law
enforcement officer must be: (a) in full uniform showing clearly and legibly his name, rank and serial
number, which shall remain visible at all times; and (b) in the actual performance of his election duty
in the specific area designated by the Commission.
xxxx
SEC. 35. Rules and Regulations. The Commission shall issue rules and regulations to
implement this Act. Said rules shall be published in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.

Pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8714,
which contains the implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. The pertinent
portion of the Resolution states:

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), Republic Acts Nos. 6646,
7166, 8189, 8436, 9189, 9369 and other elections laws, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to promulgate the following rules and regulations to implement Sections 32 and 33
of Republic Act No. 7166 in connection with the conduct of the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections:

SECTION 1. General Guiding Principles. During the election period: (a) no person
shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including
all public buildings, streets, parks, and private vehicles or public conveyances, even if
licensed to possess or carry the same; and (b) no candidate for public office, including
incumbent public officers seeking election to any public office, shall employ, avail himself of or
engage the services of security personnel or bodyguards, whether or not such bodyguards are
regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) or other law enforcement agency of the Government.
The transport of firearms of those who are engaged in the manufacture, importation,
exportation, purchase, sale of firearms, explosives and their spare parts or those involving the
transportation of firearms, explosives and their spare parts, may, with prior notice to the
Commission, be authorized by the Director General of the PNP provided that the firearms,
explosives and their spare parts are immediately transported to the Firearms and Explosives
Division, CSG, PNP.
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Resolution:
(a)
Election Period refers to the election period prescribed in Comelec
Resolution No. 8646 dated 14 July 2009 which is from 10 January 2010 to 09 June 2010;
(b)
Firearm shall refer to the "firearm" as defined in existing laws, rules and
regulations. The term also includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in
whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real;
(c)
Deadly weapon includes bladed instrument, handgrenades or other
explosives, except pyrotechnics.
xxxx
SEC. 4. Who May Bear Firearms. Only the following persons who are in the regular
plantilla of the PNP or AFP or other law enforcement agencies are authorized to bear, carry or
transport firearms or other deadly weapons during the election period:
(a) Regular member or officer of the PNP, the AFP and other law enforcement agencies
of the Government, provided that when in the possession of firearm, he is: (1) in the
regular plantilla of the said agencies and is receiving regular compensation for the
services rendered in said agencies; and (2) in the agency-prescribed uniform showing
clearly and legibly his name, rank and serial number or, in case rank and serial
number are inapplicable, his agency-issued identification card showing clearly his
name and position, which identification card shall remain visible at all times; (3)
duly licensed to possess firearm and to carry the same outside of residence by means
of a valid mission order or letter order; and (4) in the actual performance of official
law enforcement duty, or in going to or returning from his residence/barracks or
official station.
xxxx
(b) Member of privately owned or operated security, investigative, protective or
intelligence agencies duly authorized by the PNP, provided that when in the
possession of firearm, he is: (1) in the agency-prescribed uniform with his agencyissued identification card prominently displayed and visible at all times, showing
clearly his name and position; and (2) in the actual performance of duty at his
specified place/area of duty.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Enforcement. Any person who, not wearing the authorized uniform mentioned
herein, bears, carries or transports firearm or other deadly weapon, shall be presumed
unauthorized to carry firearms and subject to arrest.[5]

Petitioner contends that under R.A. No. 7166, the term firearm connotes real firearm. Moreover, R.A. No.
7166 does not mention airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations. Hence, its implementing rules and regulations
contained in Resolution No. 8714 should not include airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the definition of the
term firearm.
The Court is not persuaded.
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor[6] held:
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute
being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is
in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing
the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by the law.[7]

Evidently, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to Section 35 of
R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to issue the implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of
R.A. No. 7166. Under this broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry
or transport firearms or other deadly weapons, as well as the definition of firearms, among others. These details are
left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and
expertise on election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
In its Comment,[8] the COMELEC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, states that the
COMELECs intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term firearm and their resultant coverage by the election
gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election
period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting
the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun, which is sought to be
averted. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections this
year.
Contrary to petitioners allegation, there is a regulation that governs the possession and carriage of airsoft
rifles/pistols, namely, Philippine National Police (PNP) Circular No. 11 dated December 4, 2007, entitled Revised
Rules and Regulations Governing the Manufacture, Importation, Exportation, Sale, Possession, Carrying of Airsoft
Rifles/Pistols and Operation of Airsoft Game Sites and Airsoft Teams. The Circular defines an airsoft gun as follows:
Airsoft Rifle/Pistol x x x includes battery operated, spring and gas type powered
rifles/pistols which discharge plastic or rubber pellets only as bullets or ammunition. This differs
from replica as the latter does not fire plastic or rubber pellet.

PNP Circular No. 11 classifies the airsoft rifle/pistol as a special type of air gun, which is restricted in its
use only to sporting activities, such as war game simulation. [9]Any person who desires to possess an airsoft
rifle/pistol needs a license from the PNP, and he shall file his application in accordance with PNP Standard
Operating Procedure No. 13, which prescribes the procedure to be followed in the licensing of firearms. [10] The

minimum age limit of the applicant is 18 years old. [11] The Circular also requires a Permit to Transport an airsoft
rifle/pistol from the place of residence to any game or exhibition site. [12]
A license to possess an airsoft gun, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be
reasonably imposed.[13]
The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the
gun ban during the election period is a reasonable restriction, the objective of which is to ensure the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
However, the Court excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns from the term firearm
under Resolution No. 8714, because they are not subject to any regulation, unlike airsoft guns.
Petitioner further contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies in these
constitutional provisions:
Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Art. II, Sec. 17. The State shall give priority to x x x sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members. Families are
entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to
choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the
COMELEC.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, states that it adheres to the aforementioned
state policies, but even constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to some extent to serve
appropriate and important interests.
As a long-time player of the airsoft sport, it is presumed that petitioner has a license to possess an airsoft
gun. As a lawyer, petitioner is aware that
a licensee of an airsoft gun is subject to the restrictions imposed upon him by PNP Circular No. 11 and other valid
restrictions, such as Resolution No. 8714. These restrictions exist in spite of the aforementioned State policies,
which do not directly uphold a licensees absolute right to possess or carry an airsoft gun under any circumstance.
Petitioners allegation of grave abuse of discretion by respondent COMELEC implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount

to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[14]
The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns
and airguns in the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period, with
the apparent objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible elections this year. However, the replicas and
imitations ofairsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicas and imitations
of airsoft guns from the term firearm is concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are hereby
declared excluded from the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714. The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the
exclusion ofairsoft guns from the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft guns and airguns are covered by the
gun ban during the election period.
No costs.
SO ORDERED

Lambino v COMELEC

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) 2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article
XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that
after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite
for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. 7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC
invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to
set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course
to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively,
the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification
of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners,
urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the
Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of
initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the
contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering
and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance
with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the
parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion
is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to
be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before
they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and
they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also
"envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare
that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one
of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of
the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States 15 which allow
initiative petitions,the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on
an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts.
Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has
not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the
signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example,
omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to
the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person
giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in

seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are
described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide
sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign
the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required
because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to
or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid,
requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties
who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments
against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum
on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature
sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete
Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province:

City/Municipality:

No. of
Verified

Legislative District:

Barangay:

Signatures:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING

AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM
TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall
form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Precinct
Number

Name
Last Name, First
Name, M.I.

Address

Birthdate

Signature

Verification

MM/DD/YY

10

_________________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)

_________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

__________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes
in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before
this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August
2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino
Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his
group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty.
Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated
that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the
25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering
signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as
well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a
registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as
shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass
of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines" 22 has posted the full
text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a
common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative
Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for
Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the
House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her
Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report
sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates
against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to
amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the
constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to
other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBERLEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP)
SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)

COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND

REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at
the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006
petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
"support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through
people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the
Consultative Commission24 arevastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the
25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound
impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that
the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to
affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory
Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing
of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However,
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation
of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC.
On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim
that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged
in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the
Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition
was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead,
the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly
reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court
that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who
did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature
on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State
v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC
below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature
sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group
alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the
draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's
citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August
2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later
with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that
they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assumingthe Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during
the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies
of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added
that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state
with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only
assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of
these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed
changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy
each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company
attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people
signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people
who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority
of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The
inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the
full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before
they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes,
either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of
such attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this
admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in
the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that

the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full
text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the
proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost
all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus,
the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred
or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature
sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people
during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during
the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However,
the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all
local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with
the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be
held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This
allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year
term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the
6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3
million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on

the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in
2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets.
The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and
the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino
Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when
the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in
a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a
petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the
unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our
judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting
on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x
The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x
The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes
it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court
of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule
was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less
appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically
use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there
is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties
clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or
before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has
the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the

initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so
soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the
proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the
people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no
counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office
will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all
the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of
Representatives to theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used
to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of
the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.
That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in
a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney
to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full
text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not
after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with
the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only
to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was
suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line
1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x
applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to
the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is
thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the
people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined
hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed
'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision
of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be
submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention,
and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or
revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through
the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference
between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure
here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used
in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the
constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in
the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and
hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs
is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the
people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section
2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided
in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can
be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor,
even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed
in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the
manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in
a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as
extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people
are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at
will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of
constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method
by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation
of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its
solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One
of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and
the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance
of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in
our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly
the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." 38 A change in
the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances." 39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that
are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications
for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance
a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was
defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions
of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of
the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been
in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since
the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept
of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry
on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people
at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further
amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result,
or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple
chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would obtain from an
amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and

Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point
unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many
sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and upto-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here. 43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino
Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be
affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative
seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when
proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary
people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for
both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while
the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It
would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on
one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on
the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work fulltime on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or
procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same
proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a
revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the
present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of
changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45 Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory
wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such
a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only

exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change
involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves
rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected
this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed
by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which
the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed
revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the
constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction
between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the
proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines
of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical
restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon
constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions
instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of
the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII,
section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a
means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a
means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an
individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the
other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at
the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of
the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring farreaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any
other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years 47 is an amendment and not a
revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to
60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. 49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution
other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of

government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example,
the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II 50 of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis
of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on
how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article
VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless
they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law,
the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating
that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with
a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions
until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded
during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty.
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The
inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the
traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German,
Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people
who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or
New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only
for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system

requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiagowill not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the wellsettled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved
on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives
to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30
August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty.
Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with"
the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's
initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's
Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's
ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should
reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed
to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing
that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325,
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all
the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution
itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be
tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast 53
approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval
included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can
change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the
Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of
the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the
specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through
false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's"
initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution.
This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present
initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution,
which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and
protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To
allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
____________________

EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.

Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada

After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective arguments
-- both oral and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed
colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my previous Opinions
and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken together and interpreted properly
and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 provide more than sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve
him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not
thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The
fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper
use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,
the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly concedes intended
by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate
an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on
initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution.
Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this
Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on

Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their
purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby";
and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A.
6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec
issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was
promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum
on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then
composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."
__________________
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao.
All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and
thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary
effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local
legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such
differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses
Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as
against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the
Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help them
gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising
their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of
the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to
stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the
eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your
right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes
wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All
three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and
plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic
rights of our people to be used as
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. Comelec,3 I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no
grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed by

__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago,
nonetheless the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin
petition which was the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed,
and still do, that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I
cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said
decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest
Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the
Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have
been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's
supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the
Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law
are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution
2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec
the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise
empowers the electoral body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of
this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x." Finally
and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."
"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right
time and for the right reason." Let me explain further.
The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may avail
themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament when it
implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to
provide for implementation of the right (of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in the en
banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26,
1996], this Court unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum are powerful
and valuable modes of expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise."
The Right Way
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and interpreted properly
and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's
power to amend the Constitution." Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by
outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be taken the right way to amend the Constitution
through a people's initiative.

"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition which
shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the
petition shall state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a formal
designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to
the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission
shall motu proprioreject the petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may thence
file the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification
cards. In deciding whether the petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the
proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the
Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution
2300 will notipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its sufficiency,
the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite
should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety (90) days after certification by
the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and
the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and
automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA
must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change the lifting of the term limits of elective officials -- constitute a mere
amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This question is
relevant considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995 national
elections was voided after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may be
used starting only in the elections of May 1998.

3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the people
who signed the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact
orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified warm
bodies comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and
2 above, while important, are basically legal in character and can be determined by
argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues but
gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a
people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just
alleging -- that six million voters of this country indeed want to amend the Constitution, what
power on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the President or
Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far
from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very rafters and
foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand, PIRMA
and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by
many, these six million signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all
history in a signature-verification process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a citizen of this
country, would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new
doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA 6735 and
the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the
proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the petition for
initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to
advance their own political self-interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to
initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted
exercise legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum, as the
'ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic
Bay, we specified that 'initiative is entirely the work of the electorate x x x a process of lawmaking
by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives.' As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle: The right to
amend through initiative belongs only to the people not to the government and its
minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances of many constitutional commissioners
like those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied with the
National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in the event that they are
dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if the legislature
is not as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon

(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere amendment
and not a revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the people [which]
should not be frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it, our Charter
itself provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or
constituting Congress into a constituent assembly. These are officialdom's weapons. But initiative
belongs to the people.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's organizations or are
they merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a factual question
which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore, because the Supreme Court
majority ruled that the law that implements it, RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as
initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated
a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed
that such precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and
to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is
no need to "burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can
be exposed as such in the ways I have discussed short of abrogating the right itself. On the
other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate if it hurdles the four issues I outlined
earlier by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory
inadequacy has pre-empted unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view any judicial determination
of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the
PIRMA petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be proposed. Section
2 of Article XVII precludes amendments "within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has
never been amended. Hence, the five-year prohibition is now inoperative and amendments may
theoretically be proposed at any time.
"Be that as it may, I believe given the present circumstances that there is no more time to lift
term limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and
the next national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified warm
bodies comprising at
__________________
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the sufficiency of
RA 6735 was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide
the motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same issue is also raised by the
petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible motion for reconsideration. These time
spans could not be abbreviated any further, because due process requires that all parties be
given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 as I believe it
should and allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be
enough to tackle the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve
tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to
this Court for review, and reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may again
be sought.

"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is enormously
time-consuming, considering that any person may question the authenticity of each and every
signature, initially before the election registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally,
before this Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite itself assuming such stage
can be reached may be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90) days, from
the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or coalitions
may start selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on
November 27, 1997; the period for filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February
9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while
the campaign period for other elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time
PIRMA's proposition is ready if ever for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have
been overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term
limits in time for the 1998 elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's initiative does
not detract one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to
implement this constitutional right and, more important, (2) my faith in the power of the people to
initiate changes in local and national laws and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can
deliberate on these two items even more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free
from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the
here and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of
epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our people's right to initiative.
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein."
__________________
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people to express
their will and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and
civil strife. It is an inherent right of the people as basic as the right to elect, the right to selfdetermination and the right to individual liberties. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the
capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose
what is best for themselves and their posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular official or
group of officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm
conviction that there is an adequate law implementing the constitutional right of initiative does
not ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change.
There are, after all, sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right
and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution,
only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be validated against an existing list of
voters and/or voters' identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of and by the people,
not of incumbent officials and their machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures
must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to
do this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification process as
mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears stressing, is subject to
review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at EDSA in
1986, and yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not
just from the National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this claim through the
invention of its novel theory of statutory insufficiency, the Court's majority has stifled the only legal

method of determining whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to
lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six million voters want to initiate amendments to
their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court may have
unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In its
misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously
divested the people of a basic constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right way at the
right time and for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against
them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately,
the right thingis being rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After all,
the Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail. This
mission is undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to build the
pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial litigation is the verity of
facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in this mission of discovery, our
country and our people have been deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier
noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.4 Neither can
whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it
prudently followed this Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that
Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action. 6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The differences
pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the
present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not
make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the verification issue is
"contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino
Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment:
DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that the
Commission had "only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by
Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even
remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because the signatures were
unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the number of
signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. 7 Without those
signatures, the Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."

So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise
of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this
Court's pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any guise, to refuse
enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8 The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino
Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also
contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down
as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final
arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my Opinions in
Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the
Constitution, still, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following
prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling in question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an initiative to change
the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's reading of the basic law. 9
I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the form of the
legislature from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government.
The ponencia has amply demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive branches
under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction," will "radically
alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have
an overall implication on the entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic
provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic
generosity, as "amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or amendments)
may be proposed only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the third
mode -- people's initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions have cited the
historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their respective positions. I will not add to the woes of
the reader by reiterating them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is found in the
Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change can be drafted, defined,
articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative
body like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their
adoption or non-adoption must result from an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to spend
many months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting before they could
agree on the wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of government
of our Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take several
weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can approve them. How much
more when it comes to constitutional changes?
A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to parliamentaryunicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So, why should a revision be
rammed down our people's throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly prohibiting
petitions for initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter." 10 The present initiative covers at
least two subjects: (1) the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2) the

change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.11 Thus, even under Republic Act 6735 -- the law that
Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds
Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional requirement that
it be supported by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of
the registered voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors One
Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a failure to meet the minimum percentages
required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements involve
"contentious facts," which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to
the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself mandates the
said requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not show the required
percentages is fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and unconstitutional.
It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that an initiative
must be directly proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply established that petitioners
were unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of
the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the Commission, the
Petition must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an amendment, in gross violation of
the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.
Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of Justice Puno
who supports them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is
a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe
that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely
and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the Constitution,
because the present Petition violates the following:
The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and requires
definite percentages of verified signatures)
The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one subject)
Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under consideration
on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More tellingly, it is
a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe
we must confront the issues head on, because the people expect no less from this august and venerable
institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue

At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a
treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our world-admired and oftenimitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy must be
cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people, between
each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly expressed their will that
all of them shall be governed by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the
common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully
abide by the processes the Constitution has ordained in order to bring about a peaceful, just and
humane society. Assuming arguendothat six million people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed
changes in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social covenant -- the present
Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost twenty years ago. 14 I do not denigrate
the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest perch, because our
government must remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold the
Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest expression of the sovereign will,
they must subject to the strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded
by the assaults of the mob and of ill-conceived designs. The Court must single-mindedly defend the
Constitution from bogus effortsfalsely attributed to the sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against incessant
voices from the more powerful branches of government, it should never cower in submission. On the
other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it speaks
independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule
of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to perform
its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about alleged carrots
offered and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case. 16 There being no judicial proof of
these allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which says,
"There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known and come to
light."17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and each of its
members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand years
-- from now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about,
either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred
Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the nation and
the world for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Remnan Enterprises v Professional Regulatory Board

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29
and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law
on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate service
sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service
practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country.
Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in
the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service
(PRBRES) created under the new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the
PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of
R.A. No. 9646:
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. The provisions of
this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:

(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in
Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;
xxxx
SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. No person shall practice
or offer to practice real estate service in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as real estate service
practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or any sign tending to convey the impression that one is a
real estate service practitioner, or advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to
practice the profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or assessor in any national
government entity or local government unit, unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure
examination given by the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid certificate of
registration, and professional identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly issued to him/her
by the Board and the Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers, they
have paid the required bond as hereto provided.
xxxx
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. (a) No partnership or corporation shall engage
in the business of real estate service unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the persons authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all duly
registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants, as the case may be. The
partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate service practitioners to the
Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial requirements. There shall at least be one (1)
licensed real estate broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real
estate development project in the regular course of business must be headed by full-time registered and
licensed real estate brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by a duly licensed
real estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service practitioner, the same shall
be reported by the employer to the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of
effectivity of the resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the services of
registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis to perform
real estate services and the latter shall be deemed independent contractors and not employees of such
corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section 26
(1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission,
now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of
license to sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it
violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers most basic ownership rights,
the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section
28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between

real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with
their own property.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a "corps of technically
competent, reasonable and respected professional real estate service practitioners" is not served by
curtailing the right of real estate developers to conduct their business of selling properties. On the
contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects on the real estate industry as the additional cost
of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of real estate packages. When that happens,
petitioners claimed that the millions of jobs and billions in revenues that the real estate industry generates
for the government will be a thing of the past.
After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision 2 denying the petition. The trial court held that the
assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate the practice of real
estate service in the country by ensuring that those who engage in it shall either be a licensed real estate
broker, or under the latters supervision. It likewise found no real discord between E.O. No. 648 and R.A.
No. 9646 as the latter does not render nugatory the license to sell granted by the HLURB to real estate
developers, which license would still subsist. The only difference is that by virtue of the new law, real
estate developers will now be compelled to hire the services of one licensed real estate broker for every
twenty salespersons to guide and supervise the coterie of salespersons under the employ of the real
estate developers.
On the issue of due process, the trial court said that the questioned provisions do not preclude property
owners from using, enjoying, or disposing of their own property because they can still develop and sell
their properties except that they have to secure the services of a licensed real estate broker who shall
oversee the actions of the unlicensed real estate practitioners under their employ. Since the subject
provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation of the practice of real estate services,
these are consistent with a valid exercise of the States police power. The trial court further ruled that
Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection clause because the exemption of real estate
developers was anchored on reasonable classification aimed at protecting the buying public from the
rampant misrepresentations often committed by unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent
unscrupulous and unethical real estate practices from flourishing considering the large number of
consumers in the regular course of business compared to isolated sale transactions made by private
individuals selling their own property.
Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law:
1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;
2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under
Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;
4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of real
estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and
5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or
juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own
property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. 3

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.
Justiciable Controversy
The Constitution4 requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power the existence of an
actual controversy between litigants. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution. 5 The controversy must be justiciable
definite and concrete touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which
may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.6 In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other;
that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 7 An
actual case is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.8
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly affected by
the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without first complying with
the registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of
criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is likewise real. Asserting that the
prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose of their properties, petitioners challenged on
constitutional grounds the implementation of R.A. No. 9646 which the respondents defended as a valid
legislation pursuant to the States police power. The Court thus finds a justiciable controversy that calls for
immediate resolution.
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
In Farias v. The Executive Secretary,9 the Court explained the provision as follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well
as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating
to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall
be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the
Act.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all
the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as

long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 11 An act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general object.12
It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect. 13 Indeed, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." 14
R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines,
Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes." Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system for the
professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate
developers with respect to their own properties. Henceforth, real estate developers are prohibited from
performing acts or transactions constituting real estate service practice without first complying with
registration and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and
salespersons.
Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real
estate development project in the regular course of business are now required to be headed by full-time,
registered and licensed real estate brokers, this requirement constitutes limitations on the property rights
and business prerogatives of real estate developers which are not all reflected in the title of R.A. No.
9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are already regulated under a different law, P.D. No. 957,
included in the definition of real estate service practitioners.
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service practitioners in
the social, political, economic development and progress of the country by promoting the real estate
market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing government income from real property-based
transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture through proper and effective regulation and supervision
a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners
whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the
real estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the laws primary goal of developing "a
corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners
whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the
real estate industry." Since the marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails the
performance of those acts and transactions defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate
service sector.
No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646
and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648
Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they conflict with P.D. No.
957 which decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and

business." Such jurisdiction includes the authority to issue a license to sell to real estate developers and
to register real estate dealers, brokers or salesmen upon their fulfillment of certain requirements under the
law. By imposing limitations on real estate developers property rights, petitioners contend that R.A. No.
9646 undermines the licenses to sell issued by the NHA (now the HLURB) to real estate developers
allowing them to sell subdivision lots or condominium units directly to the public. Because the HLURB has
been divested of its exclusive jurisdiction over real estate developers, the result is an implied repeal of
P.D. No. 957 as amended by E.O. No. 648, which is not favored in law.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to
effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with
the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible
must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed.
There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later
statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency
that falls short of that standard does not suffice.15 Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 16
There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No.
648. P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree,"17 vested the NHA with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA to register, approve and monitor real estate
development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate owners and developers. It further granted
the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke licenses of brokers, dealers and salesmen engaged in
the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units.
E.O. No. 648, issued on February 7, 1981, reorganized the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) and transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA under P.D. 957 to the HSRC. Among these
regulatory functions were the (1) regulation of the real estate trade and business; (2) registration of
subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and
condominium units in the registered units; (4) approval of performance bond and the suspension of
license to sell; (5) registration of dealers, brokers and salesman engaged in the business of selling
subdivision lots or condominium units; and (6) revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and
salesmen.18
E.O. No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986, renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and was designated as the regulatory body for housing and land development
under the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). To date, HLURB continues
to carry out its mandate to register real estate brokers and salesmen dealing in condominium, memorial
parks and subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. No. 957, which reads:
SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and Salesmen. No real estate dealer, broker or
salesman shall engage in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units unless he has
registered himself with the Authority in accordance with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied with the applicable rules of
the Authority, including the payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer,
broker or salesman upon filing a bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be fixed by
the Authority conditioned upon his faithful compliance with the provisions of this Decree: Provided, that
the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the termination of his employment with a dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of December of each year. Renewal
of registration for the succeeding year shall be granted upon written application therefore made not less

than thirty nor more than sixty days before the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment of the
prescribed fee, without the necessity of filing further statements or information, unless specifically
required by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said period shall be treated as original applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or salesmen shall be recorded in
a Register of Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be open to public
inspection.
On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent for all persons who will
engage in acts constituting real estate service, including advertising in any manner ones qualifications as
a real estate service practitioner, compliance with licensure examination and other registration
requirements including the filing of a bond for real estate brokers and private appraisers. While Section 11
of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration requirements for dealers, brokers and salespersons engaged in the
selling of subdivision lots and condominium units, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 regulates all real estate
service practitioners whether private or government. While P.D. No. 957 seeks to supervise brokers and
dealers who are engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No. 9646 aims to
regulate the real estate service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and raising the level of
ethical standards for licensed real estate professionals.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real estate service
practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically for violations
of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and not the entire real estate service sector which is now under the
regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURBs supervision of brokers and dealers to effectively implement
the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose regulation of the real estate service as a profession.
Real estate developers already regulated by the HLURB are now further required to comply with the
professional licensure requirements under R.A. No. 9646, as provided in Sections 28, 29 and 32. Plainly,
there is no inconsistency or contradiction in the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as
amended.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that will
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws.19 Congress, therefore, could not be presumed to have
intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to run counter to P.D. No. 957.
No Violation of Due Process
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and infringe the
constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law. They stress that real estate
developers are now burdened by law to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of
their properties. Despite having invested a lot of money, time and resources in their projects, petitioners
aver that real estate developers will still have less control in managing their business and will be
burdened with additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and
enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners
feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals
in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable
regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State particularly
when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, public health and welfare and public morals.20 In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at

most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To
pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore the settled
practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions.21
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners
by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as real property transactions are
"susceptible to manipulation and corruption, especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons
working under an ineffective regulatory system." The new regulatory regime aimed to fully tap the vast
potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to our gross domestic income, and real estate
practitioners "serve a vital role in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor
confidence, and in promoting overall national progress." 22
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the States police power. As we said in another case
challenging the constitutionality of a law granting discounts to senior citizens:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in
its favor.23 (Emphasis supplied.)
No Violation of Equal Protection Clause
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons dealing with their
own property, and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy
proceedings. However, real estate developers are specifically mentioned as an exception from those
enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this provision violates the equal protection clause because it
unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from those exempted persons who also own
properties and desire to sell them. They insist that no substantial distinctions exist between ordinary
property owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into real
estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed real estate brokers.1wphi1 They assail the
RTC decision in citing the reported fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate
developers from the exempted group of persons under Section 28(a).
We sustain the trial courts ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause.
In Ichong v. Hernandez,24 the concept of equal protection was explained as follows:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825). 25
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that
the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation.26 If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all
members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not
violate the equal protection guarantee.27
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development of "a
corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners,
knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and practice of the profession." 28 Real estate
developers at present constitute a sector that hires or employs the largest number of brokers,
salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number of products (lots, houses and
condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. As early as in the 70s, there has been a
proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation and
obligations to comply with government regulations such as the provision and maintenance of subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water system and other basic requirements. To protect the interest of home
and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate
development projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the
necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including and
more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike
individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots,
houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated
by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted
under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A.
No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is
valid and constitutional.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion
is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot
escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. 29
Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the
statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of
the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted." 30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10-124776 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Jadewell Parking System v Hon. Lidua

LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August
15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and
prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate
and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized
under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a
clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the
facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe
dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure
with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was
allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal isP26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and
the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo
Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City,
herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the
clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was
then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier
rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents
took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00. According
to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the
respondents.2

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three
(3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint
was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary
investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging
Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave
Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents,
respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the
clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the
vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the
vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he
had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed
against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City
Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against
the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The
elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases,
thereby negating the existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the
wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of
Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the
provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey
Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was
still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in
both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in Court. 6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City
dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted
design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp
then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging
to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation
of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell
Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other
consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,

San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel
Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2, 2004. The
Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following
grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state
facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003.
5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this
Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the
offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already
extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed. 9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the
cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004
Order11to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription
of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the
Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period. 12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting
respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for
the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City
Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R.
No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act
No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED
BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION
SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that
the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged
against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not
when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner
cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed
with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof
states that "the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of
the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws." 17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the
criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the
criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses
charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary
Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot
be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not
apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the
complaint should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city
ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information." 18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not
prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the
Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive
period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two
months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October
2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge
Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since
cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the twomonth prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City
Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7,
ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and
the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged
against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a
municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months,
filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This
is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the
Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases
based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their
Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were
charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents
argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the
civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v.
Judge Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal
offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February
10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner
also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the
preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons
aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as
amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not
provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the
same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be
either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered

Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however,
that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing
cities. Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component
cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as
United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act
No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts
and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The
Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is
for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129,
vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants
to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the

Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then
files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent
People v. Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws
are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine
of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the
Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to
run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance
did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the
petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed
within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had
already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal
of the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service
Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by
the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that
the crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential
element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which

punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense
charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office
of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices Prosecution Staff and established
Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for
particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of
the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur,
La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the
Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the
dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable
to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in
order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the
applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem
here sought to be corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

TAADA VS. TUVERA (1985)

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 18421847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,11491178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 16061609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 17371742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it
is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell
vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that
it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the
rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may
well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty
of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of

any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be

published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall
have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

TAADA VS. TUVERA (1986)

CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for
an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not

always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and
that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the
Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule
3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the
internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published;
that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision
under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at
all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as anultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as
a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication
in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need
for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present
membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as
we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not
pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory
opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of
their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression
and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED