Third World Quarterly, 2015

Vol. 36, No. 4, 691704, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024433

Sectarianism and the prevalence of

othering in Islamic thought
Naser Ghobadzdeha* and Shahram Akbarzadehb
a
Institute for Social Justice, Australian Catholic University, Sydney, Australia; bAlfred Deakin Research
Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia

The current sectarian conicts in the Middle East did not arise solely
from renewed geopolitical rivalries between regional powers. They
are also rooted in a solid, theological articulation proposed by classic
Islamic political theology. The exclusivist approach, which is a decisive part of the political, social and religious reality of todays Middle
East, benets from a formidable theological legacy. Coining the
notion of othering theology, this paper not only explores the ideas
of leading classical theologians who have articulated a puritanical
understanding of faith, but also explicates the politico-historical context in which these theologians rationalised their quarrels. Given the
pervasive presence of these theologies in the contemporary sectarian
polemics, the study of classical othering theology is highly relevant
and, indeed, crucial to any attempt to overcome sectarianism in the
region.
Keywords: sectarianism; Ibn Taymiyyah; Wahhabism; othering;
Islamic State; Khawarij
Introduction
Islamism has utilised the rhetoric of othering to justify itself. Dening who
falls within the category of true believers and who remains outside has proven
to be a key concern for advocates of Islamism. It is common for Islamists, such
as the Islamic State (IS), formerly Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), to
present the world in a binary mode, as a core of true believers surrounded by
disbelief. The rise of modern Islamism in the 1970s and 1980s was marked by
the perpetuation of violence, not only towards non-Muslims but also targeting
Muslim rulers regarded as betraying the faith and joining the camp of disbelief. Sayyid Qutb (190666) was a signicant thinker in this respect, laying the
conceptual framework which labelled Muslim rulers unbelievers for their lack of
interest in Islamising society and the state. Qutbs comparison of contemporary
governments with pre-Islamic rulers of the jihalliya period (known as the era of
ignorance) justied the notion of jihad in Muslim majority states and paved the
way for violence directed at Muslim political leaders. The assassination of
*Corresponding author. Email: naser.ghobadzadeh@acu.edu.au
2015 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com

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N. Ghobadzdeh and S. Akbarzadeh

President Anwar Sadat (1981) by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad was a turning point
in the modern era as Islamist violence targeted Muslim leaders for their alleged
betrayal of the faith.
As the Arab world struggles to cope with sectarian differences at a time of
political tumult, Islamist groups such as IS have launched a concerted campaign
against Muslim Shia. The Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has been targeted for
its Alawite lineage, which is deemed by Islamists to be a branch of Shiism and
heretical, in a conict that has spread over the border and engulfed neighbouring
Iraq with its Shia majority population. The rapid spread of sectarianism, advocated as jihad by Islamists, rests on the dubious foundation of an othering tradition in Sunni Islamic scholarship. This paper investigates the use of the
othering discourse in classical Islam and explores the ways in which classical
Islamic scholarship has been evoked to justify violence against the Shia sect in
the Muslim world. This is distinctly different from the calls for jihad against
non-Muslim actors, be it in Afghanistan against the USSR or against Israel or
the USA.
It is important to note also that Sunni Islamists are not the only groups with
an exclusive claim to the truth. Shia groups have also utilised the othering discourse, which in revolutionary Iran took on a distinct political colouring as
Sunni governments were depicted as tyrannical and illegitimate. The Shia discourse, however, deserves an extended study of its own and falls beyond the
purview of the present paper.
From global jihad to sectarianism
The terminology used in this paper has been widely adopted in the literature on
the political manifestations of Islam. The term Islamist refers to individuals,
groups and organisations which take a selective reading of the Quran and prophetic traditions (Hadith) to advance the very modern preoccupation with the
capture of the state. Islamists aim to Islamise society, according to their reading
of the religion, by gaining control over the levers of power. This is a vertical
approach, making Islamisation a top-down process. Islamism and its xation
with the capture of political power is not inherently violent. However, some
Islamists have made a conceptual leap to argue that the objective of capturing
political power and establishing the ideal Islamic state puts them in direct conict with the ruling regimes. In other words, the only thing that stands between
Islamists and their idealised divine rule are the incumbent governments. For the
Islamists this is a battle between good and evil a Manichean perspective
which opens the door to the evocation of the concept of jihad to defeat evil.
Holy war is the jihadists answer to the above challenge, which presents the
good vs evil (Islam vs Kufr) duel as a matter of existential urgency. While not
all Islamists are jihadists, jihadism draws on the Islamist world-view and is sustained by practices and traditions of othering in Islamic scholarship.1
The most ardent proponent of sectarian violence in the Arab world, IS, had its
origins in the jihadist movement that targeted non-Muslims. IS, initially known as
the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), was an offshoot of al-Qaeda, which
emerged in the wake of the 2003 US toppling of Saddam Hussein. Under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (19662006), ISIL proved a serious threat to

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stability in Iraq as it targeted the Shia population and mosques and advocated open
hostility with what al-Zarqawi called the near enemy, as opposed to the far
enemy, ie the USA.
Zarqawi articulated his position in a letter to Osama Bin Laden and Ayman
al-Zawahiri in 2004, urging al-Qaeda to deal with the imminent Shia threat. He
described Shia as the most evil of mankind and the lurking snake, the crafty
and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom, a people
who have been party to a sect of treachery and betrayal throughout history.2
Zarqawi urged al-Qaeda to shift its attention to the Shia.3
The radha4 have declared a secret war against the people of Islam and they constitute the near and dangerous enemy to the Sunnis even though the Americans
are also a major foe, but the danger of the radha is greater and their damage
more lethal to the umma than the Americans.5

In Zarqawis view Shias did not practise true Islam and their sole purpose was
to destroy Islam by subverting its tenets. A shift in al-Qaedas mission in the
region occurred just two months before Zarqawis death in June 2006. He
recorded a long tirade against Shias, mapping out the next phase of jihad, in
which he said: The Muslims will have no victory or superiority over the
aggressive indels such as the Jews and the Christians until there is a total annihilation of those under them such as the apostate agents headed by the radha.
Immediately after his death Zarqawis successor to the leadership of Tawhid wal
Jihad, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, published his anti-Shia diatribe, conrming the
groups sectarian mission:
You [Shias] who have taken gods in addition to Allah, and slandered the honor of
the Prophet, and cursed his blessed companions, and were ardent in the service of
the Crusaderswe shall do unto you as Abu Baker al-Siddiq saw t to do against
the apostates, and we will continue what Abu Musaab God bless his soul
started with you, and we will ght you until the word of monotheism is supreme
and the word of your tyrants is brought low.6

By 2011, according to Khaled Ahmed, al-Qaeda afliates had killed more Shia
than Americans in Iraq.7 The Syrian crisis deepened tensions and offered Islamists an ideal theatre of war to pursue their sectarian agenda. The Assad regime,
with its strong afliation with the Alawite community and strong links with Shia
Iran, offered an easy target for Islamists. The reality of the Assad regime, however, is much more complex than the Islamist depiction. While drawing its leadership core from the Alawite minority, the regime has advanced a secular
social policy which does not sit with the Shia version of Islam in power in Iran.
Indeed, the Alawite version of Islam is viewed suspiciously as a form of heresy
in the Twelver Shia Iran.8, 9 The SyriaIran alliance represents a shared strategic
agenda which has prompted Tehran to support the Assad regime during the crisis. Irans backing of the Assad regime, however, is further proof of a Shia conspiracy in the eyes of the Islamists and even of some Sunni observers.
The growing prevalence of the sectarian lens for viewing the Syrian crisis is
aided by public statements by the established clerics (scholarly elite). Even
some of the widely respected and otherwise cautious Islamic scholars have

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N. Ghobadzdeh and S. Akbarzadeh

tended to give credence to the interpretation of events in sectarian terms.10 One

example of this is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian Islamic theologian
now based in Qatar with a large following, who seek his advice on Al Jazeera.
In his warnings to Muslims about the threat of Shia invading Sunni societies,
Qaradawi described Shia as heretics.11 For Qaradawi the Syrian crisis is a
SunniShia conict pure and simple. In 2013 Qardawi urged his followers to
stand against them [Shias]. Every Muslim trained to ght and capable of
doing that [must] make himself available and join the battle in Syria.12 There is
no doubt that such proclamations by religious authorities lend legitimacy to the
anti-Shia discourse.13
It is ironic that Qaradawis 2013 appeal to his Sunni followers to resist the
Shia invasion of Sunni societies echoes Zarqawis 2004 letter, in which he
warned bin Laden of the Shia secret war against the people of Islam. While
Zarqawi and Qaradawi were miles apart, one representing a violent backlash
against the USA and its allies and the other a voice of stability and the status
quo, both drew on a well-established tradition among Sunni scholars of
othering the Shia. Two Islamic scholars in particular stand out for their views
on the Shia and have been widely consulted by modern-day Islamists to justify
their sectarian violence: Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (12631328) and
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (17031792). The following sections explore
the writings and edicts of these two to make sense of the contemporary crisis in
the Middle East and of the conceptual framework which allows for the adoption
of an othering discourse against the Shia in the twenty-rst century.
Islamism and others
Islamism is an exclusivist reading of Islam which dismisses all other manifestations of the faith as false and illegitimate. This exclusivist mindset is also
dominant in essentialist movements such as Wahhabism and Salasm, which
seek to purify Islam by calling upon believers to return to the true origins of
the religion, ie the Quran and the Sunnah. This purication includes protecting
Islam and Muslims from the corruption of modernity, and from innovations
that could distract Muslims attention from the faith. These are puritanical
movements with a pronounced commitment to preserve the pristine form of
Islam practised at the time of the Prophet Muhammad before it was allegedly
diluted, distorted and corrupted through the ages. Puritanical movements seek
to rescue Islam from false pretenders by exposing the latter and discrediting
their divergence from the true path of Islam. The othering discourse is an integral aspect of puritanical movements, now championed most violently by IS in
Iraq.
The exclusivist claim to the truth is not new. One of the most controversial
topics debated among Muslim scholars throughout history has been the demarcation between faith (Iman) and disbelief (Kufr) and, by extension, between
believer and unbeliever. Who is a believer? And under what circumstances will
one lose his/her faith? Muslim scholars who have engaged in the above demarcation and labelled individuals and groups as belonging to the community of
faith or to disbelief championed othering discourse, which has become the staple
of current Islamists literature.

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Early othering discourses

The rst identiable sect of Islam, ie the Khawarij (those who exit the community)
emerged in response to an internal conict among Muslims.14 The Khawarijis,
being a puritanical movement and utilising the slogan there is no rule but the rule
of God (La Hukma Illa Lillah), turned on both contestants for the leadership position: Ali ibn Abi Talib (599661) and Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan (602680). In
the Khawarijs view the majority of Muslims were deviating from the straight
path. The Khawarij felt that they alone had been entrusted with the true version of
Islam and that it was their religious duty to disseminate it.15 The Khawarij
declared those who disagreed with their position apostates, and therefore deemed
them deserving of death.16
The Khawarij was a short-lived sect in Islamic history. Their extreme perspectives, and the actions that set them apart from the mainstream Islamic discourses, saw them eliminated in the initial period of the Abbasid era. However,
their impact on the Islamic community was profound, since they introduced the
tradition of the generous use of Takr (the charge of unbelief levelled against
Muslims). The Khawarij othering rhetoric has survived throughout Islams politico-religious history, which is why Khawarij ideology is relevant to contemporary radical movements.17
Among the four mainstream schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam scholars from the Hanbali School have relied most on the othering discourse.18 The
distinguished medieval Hanbali theologian and jurist Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn
Taymiyyah (12631328) is of especial importance for his expansion of the circle
of Kufr. The legacy of ibn Taymiyyah, who made a major contribution to exclusivist rhetoric in mediaeval times, continues to the present day. Not only did he
maintain a deeply hostile attitude towards the other Abrahamic religions, ie
Christianity and Judaism,19 he also articulated extremely antagonistic sentiment
vis--vis sectarian divisions within the Islamic faith. Indeed, he went so far as to
argue that renegades who claimed to be Muslim were in greater error than
Christians and Jews.
A leading mission of ibn Taymiyyahs intellectual project was to contest sectarian divisions and reunite Muslims.20 His prescription for reunication was to
return to the beliefs and practices of the Salaf us-Saalih, that is, the rst three
generations of Muslims. Similarly to other Muslim scholars, ibn Taymiyyah
noted the basic principle of Islam to be Tawhid (Oneness of God, monotheism).
However, he argued for the importance of the testimony of faith (Shahada21) and
the practice of monotheism. He considered the simple declaration of faith to be
insufcient and emphasised the signicance of practice.22 In other words, failure
to act according to Islamic precepts constituted grounds for takr, being considered an apostate. What, in particular, differentiated ibn Taymiyyah from other
Muslim scholars was the fact that he outlined a broad range of practices that supposedly caused believers to deviate from Tawhid. For ibn Taymiyyah the denial
of certain practical issues, such as rejecting the obligation of the ve daily
prayers, alms and fasting during the month of Ramadan, would result in a charge
of unbelief against the perpetrator. In addition, denying the prohibition of adultery, usury, injustice and other comparable matters would result in a similar ruling, despite the fact that they are deemed practical issues within the sharia.23
Sirriyeh asserts that ibn Taymiyyah ercely denounced many sects and cults in

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the Muslim world as apostates, especially many aspects of Susm, popular cults
of saints, Shiite heterodoxy, mingling of Jewish and Christian observances with
those of Islam.24 In other words, the unbridled use of takr (designating other
Muslims as kar), has been a lasting legacy of Ibn Taymiyyah.25 As the following excerpt demonstrates, there could be no leniency for apostates in his view:
It is a well-established rule of Islamic Law that the punishment of an apostate will
be heavier than the punishment of someone who has never been a Muslim... [and]
any group of people that rebels against any single prescript of the clear and reliably transmitted prescripts of Islam has to be fought, according to the leading
scholars of Islam, even if the members of this group make a public formal
confession of their [Islamic] Faith by pronouncing the Shahada.26

Ibn Taymiyyah was writing at the time of the Mongol rule in Baghdad (1258
1335). It may well be argued that this political backdrop inuenced his thinking,
as the Mongol rulers converted to Islam and proclaimed the Shahada. Yet Ibn
Taymiyyah remained unconvinced and issued three controversial fatwas to justify revolt against Mongol rule. Ibn Taymiyyah adopted a distinct othering discourse to discredit Mongol rule, in general, and Ghazan Khan (12711304), in
particular.27
This was a turning point in the history of Islamic political theology. Classical
Islamic scholars in all four schools of jurisprudence had steered clear of supporting revolt against the incumbent ruler. Throughout Islamic history jurists had
proven extremely reluctant to provide believers with religious justication to
revolt against a ruler.28 For example, al-Ghazali (10581111), one of the most
inuential Muslim thinkers, did not see revolt against a ruler as a religiously
sanctioned option: Enforcing change by the use of force by any subject against
his ruler is not an option because this only serves to stir up turmoil and arouse
evil, leading to greater danger.29 Al-Ghazali did, however, allow for the articulation of criticism as long as it did not lead to general upheaval. Similarly the
founder of the Hanbali School, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (died 855) declared revolt
against a ruler a sin: You should obey the government and not rebel against it.
If the ruler orders something that implies sin against God (masiya), you should
neither obey nor rebel. Do not supporttna (strife), neither by your hand nor
by your tongue.30 Among Muslim scholars, reluctance to permit revolt against
a ruler reached such a stage that some legal scholars came to regard perseverance in the face of the rulers injustice as an article of faith.
In this sense Ibn Taymiyyahs writings were highly signicant. Not only did
he sanction revolt against a Muslim ruler for his alleged deviation from the true
path, he even presented such revolt to be a religious duty. This theological foundation offers modern day Islamists a point of reference and a conceptual framework to deal with incumbent governments. For example, Juhayman al-Otaybi
(193680) denounced the blasphemous practices of Saudi rulers in order to justify the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Similarly Muhammad abdal-Salam Faraj (195482) declared Anwar Sadat an apostate, an accusation
which led to the latters assassination. A more recent example can be found in
the works of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who points out the indel nature of
the Saudi state. Notably al-Maqdisi makes repeated references to Ibn Taymiyyah
and his legacy of denouncing Mongol rulers.31

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Ibn Taymiyyahs legacy

Ibn Taymiyyahs rulings proved inuential for subsequent Islamic jurists, especially in the Hanbali school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. Muhammad ibn
Abd al-Wahhab (170392) was among the later scholars who subscribed to a
puritan version of Islam and denounced any innovation to be diverting from,
and distorting, Islam (bida).32 During his studies in Medina and Iraq Abd
al-Wahhab became heavily inuenced by the jurisprudential works of Ibn
Taymiyyah and his student ibn-Qayyim-al-Jawziyya (12921350).33 One could
argue that Abd al-Wahhab found a way to practise what these two mediaeval
scholars had conceptualised.34 Montgomery Watt argues that:
[Abd al-Wahhabs] clearest dependence on Ibn-Taymiyya[h] is in its attack on the
cult of the saints and in its general insistence on a return to the purity of original
Islam. For the most part it is concerned largely with externals, like much of Islamic religious thought. It shows no interest in the methodology of Ibn-Taymiyya
[h], which he devised in order to escape from the rigidity of the scholastic
methods and to make possible an adaptation of Islamic truth to contemporary
conditions.35, 36

Abd al-Wahhab expanded the theological framework for the othering discourse
and articulated the grounds for the excommunication of Muslims who did not
subscribe to his puritanical version of Islam.37 Abd al-Wahhabs success in forming an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud, the tribal chief of Diriyah in 1744,
brought together religious and politicalmilitary authority and offered Abd
al-Wahhab a rare opportunity to put his ideas into practice and enforce his
puritanical interpretation of Islam. The rst Saudi state, however, was short-lived
as the Ottoman Empire reconquered the lost territories in the Arabian Peninsula
in 1818.38 Antagonism towards the Ottomans and other competing tribal chiefs
was the underlying current in Abd al-Wahhabs theological perspective. While
access to political power was lost as the Saud family were driven out of the
peninsula in the 19th century by the rival Al-Rashid tribe, the alliance between
the Saud and Wahhab families survived. The political fortunes of the Wahhab
family turned around as Abdul Aziz ibn Saudi staged a military comeback at the
turn of the 20th century to defeat rival tribes and, aided by the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, eventually form the modern-day Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
1933. The discovery of oil in 1938 gave the new state immeasurable wealth and
the tools to project itself as the custodian of Mecca and Medina. The adoption
of Abd al-Wahhabs teachings as the ofcial version of Islam in Saudi Arabia
gave rise to a codied interpretation, otherwise known as Wahhabism.
Othering has been a key component of Wahhabism, best exemplied in its
quest to purify Islam from any form of so-called deviation. This is evident in
the number of books and epistles written on the denition of shirk (the sin of
idolatry) by Abd al-Wahhab and his descendants, known as Shaykhs.39 Like ibn
Taymiyyahs, Abd al-Wahhabs othering discourse was rooted in his narrow
conceptualisation of Tawhid. For Abd al-Wahhab true Tawhid must not only
be expressed by the tongue, but also in the heart and in ones deeds. Abd
al-Wahhab considered the declaration of faith (the Shahada or Kalima)
insufcient. He emphasised that this should be accompanied by an understanding
of the true meaning of Tawhid, which requires consistent demonstration in

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practice.40 According to Abd al-Wahhab, even if a believer refrained from shirk

and did everything in accordance with correct Islamic teachings, he could still be
considered an apostate if he committed the sin of loving anyone or anything as
much as or more than God. Abd al-Wahhab asserted that a true believers
thoughts and actions should be governed by her/his love of God. Even minor
distractions had the potential to ultimately lure a believer away from Tawhid.
This notion of absolute Tawhid as the distinctive feature of Islam could
prompt one to argue that there are many and varied ways to fall into the category of apostate. These range from denying the oneness of God and worshipping others alongside Allah at one end of spectrum, to not taking a stand
against unbelievers, or nding pleasure in sorcery.41 Abd al-Wahhab denounced
a wide range of shirk manifested in the practices of many Muslims. His unique
understanding of Tawhid may have been such that most of the professed
Muslims of his day could have been considered apostates. Thus, a Wahhabi
Muslim ought to ght all others until they accept Islam.42 This discourse created
a deeply rooted dichotomy between the Saudi Wahhabi politico-religious
entity and others, including not only Christians, Jews and Shias, but also
Sunnis even Wahhabis who, for example, accepted military assistance from
indels or lived under the rule of enemies.43
While it may be argued that Abd al-Wahhab was primarily concerned with the
purication of the Arabian Peninsula, the political aspirations of the Saud family
brought the WahhabSaud alliance into direct confrontation with the Ottoman
Empire.44 This confrontation gained signicant prominence in the theological
thinking of Wahhabi scholars. As hostility with competing powers was an ongoing
issue in the Arabian Peninsula, othering the external world became a central pillar
of Wahhabism. Conict with the Ottoman Empire for over a century had a lasting
impact on the Wahhabis othering discourse. These conicts not only led Abd
al-Wahhabs descendants to excommunicate the Ottomans as apostates; those who
supported the Ottomans, or even consented to live under their rule, were also
denounced as apostates. The case of Abd al-Wahhabs grandson, Sulayman Ibn
Abdullah Al al-Shaykh (17851818) is one noteworthy example in this regard.
Sulayman was the rst Wahhabi scholar to further elaborate his grandfathers
othering discourse. He laid out both practical and theological guidelines not only
for excommunicating Shias and Sus, but also for tagging all non-Wahhabi Sunnis
as apostates.45 Abd al-Wahhabs tendency was to criticise specic sets of
behaviours and practices, rather than groups of people or specic sects. He
avoided naming specic groups of people in his writings.46 Sulaymans
contribution to the othering discourse was signicant for two reasons: (1) he
expanded the circle of Kufr to include all Muslims except the Wahhabis; and (2)
he explicitly labelled specic groups of Muslims apostates.
The capture of Medina, Mecca and Taif in 180203 offered the Wahhabis an
opportunity to apply the pursuit of purifying Islam on a larger scale. This led to
the intensication of the othering discourse. As the leading scholar of Wahhabism
at the time, Sulayman asked the ulama of Mecca to pledge their allegiance to the
Wahhabi school. In response to their resistance, Sulayman denounced all those
who did not subscribe to the Wahhabi creed as heretics. Yes, we excommunicate
all the people of our timeexcept those who belong to us.47 Eventually
Sulayman found himself branding most Muslims apostates. Facing increasingly

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difcult political frontiers, he stated that whoever assisted idolaters (Ottomans) or

pretended to agree with them was an apostate, even if they did so out of fear:
Know, may God bless you, that when a person shows approval of the polytheists
religion, for fear of, or in appeasement or attery to them to avoid their evil, that
he is an unbeliever like them, even if he dislikes their religion and hates them and
loves Islam and Muslims, if that were the only [error] committed. However, if he
is in a protected realm, and he invites them, obeys them and shows approval of
their false religion and assists them with help and money, becomes loyal to them
and terminates loyalty between himself and the Muslims, and becomes a soldier
of polytheism and tombs and their people...no Muslim should doubt he is an
unbeliever.48

Seemingly alarmed by the number of defections from Wahhabism, Sulayman

wrote an inuential treatise, which consisted of a general discussion and 21
Quranic-based texts as evidence. He denounced many Muslims of his time as
unbelievers.49 Another important text by Sulayman, in which he opposed travelling to the land of the Ottomans, was entitled On the Rule Governing Travel to
the Land of Idolatry and Residence there for Trade and Showing Signs of
Hypocrisy and Friendship with the.50

Conclusion
Contemporary jihadi ideology uses an identical argument not only to tag Shias
as apostates, but also to exclude other Sunni groups from the community of
belief for not being sufciently strict to meet jihadi standards. For example, Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian Palestinian scholar, has argued that those
who submit to idolatry become idolaters themselves.51 As Kazemi suggests, this
line of thinking has led to the denunciation of Sala groups such as the Muslim
Clerics Association and the Iraqi Islamic Party.52 Zarqawi employed a similar
argument to label the Shias in Iraq apostates in order to justify targeting not
only Shiite leaders, but also Shia lay people. From his viewpoint everyone
would realise that Shias had become soldiers of the unbelieving occupiers and
thus were no longer lay people. In listing other religious leaders who had spoken of lay Shias as unbelievers, Zarqawi accused Shias of spying on Muslim
ghters. For example, Zarqawi referred to Sheikh Ali Al-Khudhair, an inuential
Saudi Arabian scholar who explicitly categorises all Shias as unbelievers.
Al-Khudhair states: They [Shias] are all Kufr Mushrikn and they are not
Muslims and there is no difference between their scholars, followers, ignorants
[sic], because they are all Mushrikn and they are not Muslims and they will
not be excused for their worship of others besides Allah.53 For Zarqawi, Shias
could not simply be innocent bystanders, because their votes would grant power
to reprobates.
These are just some gures among many contemporary scholars and ideologues actively cultivating an exclusivist discourse that relies heavily on classical articulations of othering rhetoric in Islamic political discourse. These
historical othering trends are also being played out in physical conicts, such as
the ongoing internal conict that persists among radical groups in Iraq and

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Syria, and which resembles the Ikhwan and SaudiWahhabi conicts of the
early 20th century. In addition, the usage of labels such as Mushrikeen and
Murtadeen is rapidly increasing among jihadi groups in order to justify their
attacks on various sects and groups of Muslims as unbelievers. Ibn Taymiyyah
and Abd al-Wahhab, as has been argued in this paper, were two leading scholars
whose theological articulations of the other represent powerful sources of
credibility for the contemporary othering discourse among Sunni radical
Islamists. This is why these two classical scholars take pride of place in the
contemporary literature.54
Once othering becomes part of politico-religious discourse, it moves to all
levels of society, transforming itself into as much a bottom-up as a top-down
process. Over the course of time othering rhetoric has expanded beyond theology to become a decisive part of political, social, religious and economic reality,
spreading hatred at the societal level and producing potential new recruits for
jihadi groups. Indeed, othering discourse has become deeply entrenched in Saudi
Arabias educational curriculum, which denigrates all except those who subscribe to Wahhabism. A report by the Center for Religious Freedom at Freedom
House, compiled in 2006, argues that for several decades Saudi textbooks have
been indoctrinating students with an ideology of religious hatred, not only
against non-Muslims, but also against Muslims who do not subscribe to the
strict Wahhabi brand of Islam.55 The othering discourse has now become dominant in the Middle East. IS relies on the long tradition of othering theology to
propagate its message of hatred and drag the region to the depths of barbarity.
Acknowledgment
The authors are also grateful to Dara Conduit for her valuable support and assistance in preparing this
manuscript.

Funding
Research on this topic was funded by the Qatar National Research Fund [NPRP grant 6-028-5-006].
The statements made in this article are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Notes on contributors
Naser Ghobadzdeh is a research fellow at the Institute for Social Justice,
Australian Catholic University, Sydney. His interests lie in the study of Islamic
political theology, secularism, statereligionsociety relations and Middle
Eastern and Iranian politics. His current research project involves conceptualising the possibility not only of the coexistence of religions and secularity, but
also the need to recognise the religious roots of an emerging model of secularity
in the Muslim world.
Shahram Akbarzadeh is ARC Future Fellow and Professor of Middle East and
Central Asian Politics at the Alfred Deakin Research Institute for Citizenship
and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne. He maintains a research interest in Political Islam and is currently researching the role of Islam in Iran foreign policy. Among his latest publications is the Routledge Handbook of

Third World Quarterly

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Political Islam (2012). He is the founding editor of the Islamic Studies series
published by Melbourne University Press.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

Akbarzadeh, The Paradox of Political Islam.

Zarqawi quoted in Raphaeli, The Sheikh of the Slaughterers: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and the
Al-Qaeda Connection.
There was an internal debate within al-Qaeda over the prioritising of Shia as its primary target. See
Kazimi, A Virulent Ideology; and Karmon, Irans Role, 279280.
Radha is a collective noun, which means those who refuse. It is a derogatory term historically
applied by the Sunnis to describe the Shia, who refused the legitimacy of the rst three caliphates, ie
those of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman. The term had a connotation of militancy and struggle engaged in
by the Shia against the Sunni rulers who oppressed them. In modern times the term is still used in Sunni
polemics against the Shia but also by some Shia themselves in places such as Lebanon and Iraq as a
source of pride, signifying revolt against all tyranny. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 262.
Zarqawi, quoted in Ahmed, Sectarian War, 55.
Muhajir, quoted in Kazimi, Zarqawis Anti-Shia Legacy, 67.
Ahmed, Sectarian War, 76.
Kramer, Syrias Alawis and Shiism, 237254.
The IR of Iran has proven its monopolising tendency particularly when it comes to religious beliefs.
Not only are peoples of other faiths discriminated against, but also Shia who do not subscribe to the ruling clergys interpretation of Shiism are subjected to government brutality. A demonstrative example is
the Islamic states persecution of the Gonabadi Dervishes, who have been labelled non-traditional Shia
Muslims.
Helfont, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Islam and Modernity; Baker, Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists, Graf, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi in Cyberspace; Esposito Rethinking Islam and Secularism.
Shiites are invading Sunni Societies.
Saudi Scholars were Right.
Howeidy, The Politics of Sects.
Sonn, Kharijites.
Salem, Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij, 83.
Al-Misri, The Khawaarij and Jihad; Salem, Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij; Kenney,
Heterodoxy and Culture: The Legacy of the Khawarij in Islamic History; Kenney, Kharijites and the
Politics of Extremism in Egypt; Sonn, Kharijites.
Khawarij thought has attracted renewed interest with the rise of extremist movements in the 20th
century, as indicated by the term neo-Khawarijis, which was conceptualised to describe contemporary
radicalism. Among the rst scholars to use the term were Shepard, Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawi;
Kenney, Muslim Rebels; Euben, Killing (for) Politics; Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Sala
Movement; and Martin, Unbelief in the Western Sudan.
Ahmad ibn Hanbals teachings offered a conducive context for othering discourse, given their call for
traditionalism and rejection of reasoning in Islamic theology and jurisprudence. For ibn Hanbal it was a
sin to think that truth could be reached through reason. He discarded altogether the principle of analogical deduction, opting to consider only the Quran and the Sunna to be the truth. For more discussion
about the Hanbali School, see Al-Matroudi, The Hanbali School of Law.
The Correct Response (Al-Jawb al-a) is the longest refutation of Christianity in the Islamic tradition. For an English translation of this treaty, see Ibn Taymiyah, A Muslim Theologians Response. See
also Swanson, Ibn Taymiyya; Thomas, Apologetic and Polemic; and Abdullah, Tawd and
Trinity.
Fazul Rahman argues that, for ibn Taymiyyah, the unity of the worlds Muslim community was far more
fundamental than unity of government. Rahman, Islam & Modernity, 29.
I testify that there is no God except Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger. For more discussion
about Shahada, see Shaykh, The Five Pillars of Islam, 1721.
At the other end of the spectrum in the debate about faith was the idea of Murjia, an appellation
derived from the Quranic use of the verb arja, meaning to defer judgment. There are verses in the
Quran that command Muslims to defer judgment of individual belief to the judgement day and to God,
who will decide whether to condemn or forgive sinners. According to Murjia these verses of the Quran
meant that takr was not possible in this world. While a Muslim could become a sinner through his or
her actions, it was God alone who would decide this. Moreover, the Murjia dened faith as belief alone,
de-linking it from practice. As long as Muslims proclaimed the Shahada and their belief in Islam, they
had faith. Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Sala Movement, 229.
Al-Matroudi, The Hanbali School of Law, 70.
Sirriyeh, Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism, 125.

702
25.

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

N. Ghobadzdeh and S. Akbarzadeh

There are many different understandings and readings of ibn Taymiyyah and his theology. Fazlur
Rahman notes that ibn Taymiyyah was a hero of both progressive and conservative Muslims. Similarly
Mona Hassan notes that ibn Taymiyyas political thought and social activismhas not been recalled
and reconstituted in a monolithic fashion, and his precedent has been subject to multiple, and even conicting interpretations. Hassan, Modern Interpretations and Misinterpretations, 351. See also Malkawi
and Sonn, Ibn Taymiyya.
Ibn Taymiyyah, quoted in Jansen, Ibn Taymiyyah and the Thirteenth Century, 395.
Ibn Taymiyyahs activism against the Mongols was indeed one of the most celebrated aspects of his personality. He issued three controversial fatwas against Mongols, which continue to be used by jihadi
groups in the contemporary era. For a detailed explanation of ibn Taymiyyahs campaign against the
Mongols and his fatwas against them, see Jackson, Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial; Michot, Ibin Taymiyyas
New Mardin Fatwa; Michot, Muslims under Non-Muslim Rule; Aigle, The Mongol Invasions; Little,
The Historical and Historiographical Signicance; and Did Ibn Taymiyya Have a Screw Loose?
Soroush, Ghiam Alaihe Hokumat-E Dini [Revolt against Religious State].
Al-Ghazali quoted in Ghazali and Farouk-Alli, Within the Boundaries of Islam: A Study on Bid Ah, 34.
Ibn Hanbal quoted in Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, 91.
Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Inuence of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, 5972;
Hegghammer and Lacroix, Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman Al-Utaybi
Revisited; Goldberg, Smashing Idols and the State: The Protestant Ethic and Egyptian Sunni
Radicalism; Lahoud In Search of Philosopher Jihadis: Abu Muhammad Almaqdisis Jihadi Philosophy.
From a theological point of view both scholars focused much of their attention on rejecting innovation
in the religion (bida), partnership with God (shirk), the oneness of God (Tawhid), and the declaration of
apostasy (takr), all of which are specically related to the issue of othering.
For a detailed discussion of al-Jawziyyas theology and his relations with ibn Taymiyyah, see Allen and
Lowry, Essays in Arabic Literary Biography: Studien und Texte zur Literatur des Orients; and Bori, A
Scholar in the Shadow.
Haj, Reordering Islamic Orthodoxy, 333; and Na, A Teacher of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab.
Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 146.
See also Na, A Teacher of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab.
Zarabozo, The Life, Teachings and Inuence of Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhaab, 3137.
Facey, Dir Iyyah and the First Saudi State; Bowen, The History of Saudi Arabia, 6975, Wynbrandt,
A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, 117142.
Sirriyeh, Modern Muslim Interpretations of Shirk, 143.
Firro, The Political Context, 771.
Dallal, The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 17501850, 350351, Qadhi, An
Explanation of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhabs Four Principles of Shirk.
Cook, On the Origins of Wahhabism, 191.
Firro, The Political Context, 784.
Al-Fahad, From Exclusivism to Accommodation, 494.
Firro, The Political Context, 776.
Al-Fahad, From Exclusivism to Accommodation, 491492; and DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 61.
Shaykh Sulayman, quoted in Firro, The Political Context, 777.
Shaykh Sulayman, quoted in Al-Fahad, From Exclusivism to Accommodation, 496.
Shaykh Sulayman, The Evidence for the Ruling.
Sirriyeh, Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism, 129131.
Maqdisi, Imtaa Al-Nadher.
Kazimi, A Virulent Ideology, 64.
Al-Khudhair, Regarding the Reality.
McCants and Brachman, Militant Ideology.
Center for Religious Freedom, Saudi Arabias Curriculum, 22.

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