Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

FACTS:The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia,
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters.
ISSUE:Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing
privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.
The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a
later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991
on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
Masangcay vs COMELEC
Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged withseveral others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC
when it opened 3 boxeswithout the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution.After appearing and showing
cause why they should not be punished forcontempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposinga fine.
Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercisethe power to punish for contempt because such
power is inherently judicial innature.In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it didnot exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise thepower to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power
isinherently judicial in nature. The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer alllaws relative to the
conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear anddecide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with
theelections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classifiedas a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, ArticleVIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi- judicial functions insofar
as controversies that by express provision of law comeunder its jurisdiction.The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts;
its existence isessential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to theenforcement of judgments, orders and mandates
of courts, and, consequently, inthe, administration of justice.The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident andattribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariablylimited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony. And the exercise of thatpower by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been invalid
Radio Communications v NTC

Facts: RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under legislative franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036
(1957). The petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon (1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and
Catarman, Samar (1983).Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the NTC to operate radio networks in the
same areas.RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the same areas. The NTC ruled
against the RTCs favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the operation of radio telegraphs in the three areas.
RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied. In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had sections that was still in
effect even if the Public Service Commission was abolished and the NTC was established.These were S13- the Commission shall have
jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchisesS 14- Radio companies are exempt from the
commissions authority except with respect to the fixing of ratesAnd S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines without
possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience,"
Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a
certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in the
aforementioned areas

Held: Yes.Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to Board of
Transportation, the Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the
Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were transferred to the
National Telecommunications Commission
Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service communications; and
determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where
charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies
recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;c. Grant permits for the use of radio
frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio
and television broadcasting systems;The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission and the Board of Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and
implementing executive orders.The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground
that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.
Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is
subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police power, are applicable not only to
those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation .
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as
amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio communications system
anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the grantee until the Secretary of Public
works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a
license for such case.
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a precondition
before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it desires to operate.
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications before the
petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio
telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity
appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable public
utility regulations.
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject
to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when the common good so requires.
CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRER
v.
EMELITA BERNARDO,
FACTS:Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment
and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square meters
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned bytheir predecessorininterest, Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on
acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo.The parcel of land was later oncovered by Tax Declaration No. CD0060828 under the name of the
respondents.Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the subject property consisting of about 700 square meters was
bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's father, from a certain Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo
inherited the700squaremeter lot.The COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject property.ggrieved,
petitioner Celia S.Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorariwith the CA. The CA ruled that the
COSLAP has exclusivejurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land
dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the
issue of lack ofjurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively participated in theproceedings before the said body.Petitioner averred
that theCOSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle and decide thequestion of ownership over the subject land. Further, the present
case cannot be classified as explosive in nature as the parties neverresorted to violence in resolving the controversy. Petitionersubmits
that it is the Regional Trial Court which hasjurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of the subject property.
ISSUEWhether COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership between theparties.
HELD:YESJurisdiction of COSLAPThe COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21,
1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.It is an administrative body established as a means of providing amechanism for the
expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers,landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid
socialunrest.Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals oflimited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling
statute.Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit:
(a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is
one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the

large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate
action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP
has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need
for immediate and
urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on
the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint.The present case does not fall
under any of the cases .O. No. 561.The dispute between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large
number of parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a
critical situation that requires immediate action.Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim ofownership
over thesubject property, which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, the jurisdiction of
which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courtsdepending on the assessed value of the
subjectpropertySincethe COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action,all the proceedings therein, including the decision ren
dered, are null and void. A judgment issued by a quasijudicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right or
create any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no
judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the proceedings.Respondents' allegation that petitioner is
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction ofthe COSLAP by reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from
raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging
its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties
secretary of justice vs lantion
FACTS:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the United States for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who
have committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample time to comment
on said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Issue: Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal
cases
Ruling: The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the executive authority to
conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not
a criminal investigation but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. The process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5.
PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to prosecution. The power of investigation
consists in gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its
rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative
body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate
extradition documents. If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial finding of whether or not
the extradition petition can be filed in court. The court has the power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected.
The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and
to the deprivation of his liberty. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition
against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing. In this case, the
extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the following day the Department of Justice
received the request). Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents.
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in computing premiums to
include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon

receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect
protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay
and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further questioned
the validity of the circular for lack of autho
rity on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in
the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation
that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to
Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the
Social Security Commission.
Held:There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation
of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations,
it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction
provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon
which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in
the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

CIR vs. CA, CTA and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.

Facts: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco"), engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, registered
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. BIR classified them as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco
Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortun changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium
More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category.
A 45% Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands. Then Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654 was enacted 55% for locally
manufactured foreign brand while 45% for locally manufactured brands. 2 days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR saying since there is no showing who the real owner/s are of
Champion, Hope and More, it follows that the same shall be considered locally manufactured foreign brand for purposes of
determining the ad valorem tax - 55%. BIR sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco addressed to no one in
particular. Then Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for
ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00
Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. 8 CTA upheld the position of Fortune. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON it was necessary for BIR to follow the legal requirements when it issued its RMC
Held. YES. CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers which publication, filing, and
prior hearing.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives
no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. BUT when, upon the other hand, the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must accord, at least to those directly affected, a chance to be heard,
before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
RMC 37-93 cannot be viewed simply as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly,
been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654 which subjects mentioned brands to 55% the BIR not
simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice,
of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

ANTIPOLO REALTY v NHA

FACTS
Jose Fernando executed a Contract to Sell with petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation over a lot at Ponderosa HeightsSubdivision in
Antipolo Rizal. He transferred his rights over the lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. Thereafter, Yusonassumed the obligations of
the vendee under the original contract, including payment of Fernandos installments in arrears.However, due to the failure of ARC to
develop the subdivision project as stipulated under Clause 17 of the contract, Yusonpaid only the arrears for the month of August 1972
and stopped paying thereafter.
Despite the notice sent by ARC and its citing of an NHA decision both claiming that it had complied with its obligation tocomplete the
improvements, Yuson refused to pay the Sept 1972-Oct 1976 monthly installments, but agreed as to the postOct 1976 installments.
ARC reacted by rescinding the contract, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments madeby Yuson.Aggrieved, Yuson
brought the matter to the NHA. The latter ordered the reinstatement of the contract. Motion forreconsideration was denied. On
certiorari before the SC, petitioner cries lack of jurisdiction on the part of NHA and likewise,notice as to the schedule of the hearing. A
minute resolution was issued, affirming NHA, but without prejudice to pursuing anadministrative remedy. ARC then appealed the case
to the Office of the Presiden. Again, the contract was upheld. Back tothe SC, ARC now claims that the NHA had not only acted on
matter outside its competence/jurisdiction, but had also,ineffect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which
it wasnt authorized to perform.
ISSUEW/N the NHA has quasi-judicial functions.
HELD
YES, it has. As a matter of fact, Sec3 of PD No. 957, or The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Decree vests the NHAwith
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate real estate trade and business. In its 2nd and 3rd preambular paragraphs, the statutediscussed the need
and scope for NHAs regulatory authority, that is, the rise of cases where subdivisionowners/developers/sellers renege on their
obligations to lot buyers, and other fraudulent means employed by the former tothe detriment of the latter. Most importantly, PD No.
1344 provides that the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decidecases of the following nature: (a) unsound real estate
business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any otherclaims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesma,and (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lotsor condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.NHAs
ruling which reinstated the contract is justified under the provisions of Sec 23 of PD No. 957, which provides that noinstallment
payment shall be forfeited in favor of the owner/developer WHEN the buyer desists from paying DUE TO thefailure of
owner/developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within thetime limit for
complying with the same.Having failed its obligation to complete certain specified improvements within the period of 2 years,
petitioner is NOT entitiledto exercise its options under Clause 7 of the contract (rescind and treat payments as forfeited in its favor).
Instead, in thelight of ARCs breach with Yuson, it is the latter who has the option either to rescind and receive reimbursement OR to
suspend payment until petitioner has complied. Thus, NHA was correct in its ruling.
GUERZON V CA
FACTSPetitioner executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corp (later acquired by Shell) a Service Station Lease and Dealers
SalesContract. Respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the latter contract and issued a Certificate of Authorityin
Petitioners favor. After the contract, respondent Shell wrote Guerzon informing him that they are not renewing thecontract. A copy of
said letter was furnished to BEU. Thereafter, BEU issued an order directing petitioner to vacate thepremises and to show cause in
writing why no administrative order and/or criminalproceedings shall be instituted for hisviolations.Shell was able to secure the
possession of the gas station. Guerzon then filed with the RTC a complaint but such wasdismissed for lack of jurisdiction to annuk the
order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the RTC.
ISSUES
W/N the BEU has the authority to order petitioner to vacate the premises.
RULING
NO. The power of an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted (here PD 1206) to it by law andthose that
are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Said PD states that after notice and hearing, it can impose andcollect a fine and failure
to pay the fine or to cease and discontinue the violation of the law (i.e. illegal trading in petroleumproducts) shall be sufficient reason
for suspension, closure or stoppage of operations.
Nowhere in the order is it stated that petitioner engaged inillegal trading or any other violation of BP 33. It merely made avague
reference to violation of BEU laws, rules and regulation. The BEU (like its predecessor, the Oil IndustryCommission) has no power
to decide contractual disputes between gasonline dealers and oil companies. It cannot orderpetitioner to vacate the premises as this is
an appropriate case in the vicil courts for unlawful detainer. Assuming arguendothat it did had the authority, it still failed to comply
with the requirement of notice and hearing.
NOTE: Nevertheless,petitioner could not require that possession be given to him as the contract was not renewed .