RA 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF

FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURALBORN
FILIPINOS
EO 227 - AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"
Family Code
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the
Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license
and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer
with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said
consular official. (75a)
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of
a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage
license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular
officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of
the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit
stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract
marriage. (66a)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6),
3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
E.O. 292 Sec 6
SECTION 6. Omission of Some Rules.(1) The University of the
Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification

any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or

otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available
on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall
contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule
and new copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which,
pursuant to law is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall
in all cases be published in full text.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIARECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other
facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and
the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between

Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and
both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable
laws to any and/or both parties."3

at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed

that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson
only in November, 1997.

The Facts

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,

he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage andits
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage
to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australian in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,

an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's

wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage
ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen,

as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by
the Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual
Help
Church
in
Cabanatuan
City.7 In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be

dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted
their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.17

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived

separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and

Order.

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the abovequoted Decision.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground

that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in

the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the

basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage;
that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.
Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage;
thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with
the petitioner.

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding

Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as
the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained
by
the
respondent
in
Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling

"2
The Petition is partly meritorious.
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha
Samson

"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of
the Family Code in this case.
"4

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce

between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in
this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the

foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged

divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
failed to establish these elements.

demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing

it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26

of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated
(the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the
marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles
1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted

in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.
These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each
of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the

previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx

xxx

xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has

been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or
her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in

the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;

otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
divorce decree is a public document a written official act of
an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further
proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign
country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree

of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact
that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends
that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations
in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must
be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal

sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for
a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The
first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the
case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree
a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect
the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted
on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of
good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the

trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian

divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to
his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented
on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under
Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required
by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.

Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan

City, Nueva Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d)
Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit
"1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi
of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of the
Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is

determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for
a marriage license.50

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that

respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring
him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves

respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her

marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the
divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive

evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to

marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively
show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and
failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes
Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15,
1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case,
and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of

the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973
and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the

ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines

so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety
of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower
Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves
upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which,
in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition
would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to
go ahead with the proceedings. 2 We consider the petition filed
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due
course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties
and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim
on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he
made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was
not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's
claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by
the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine

whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had

obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as
No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to
the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of
Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons,
to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be

adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada

divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are
to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party

shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is

still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge
is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case
No. 1075-P of his Court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where

one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court
to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing

along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently
live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to

remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry
filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

REMARRY

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family

Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are

also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its

duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in
the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern
the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the

Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original

Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code.
A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
it now provides:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those

whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while
the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of

divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to
be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that
this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship
by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita
v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became
a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter

dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign

spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must

prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the

proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition
for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment
would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other
hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized
alien spouse.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph

2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended
by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare,
based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent

evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.13

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines

is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.

CORPUZ VS STO TOMAS STAT CON CASE

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a

pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31

January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She
left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition
in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the
case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court
of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent
has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he
may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition
was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court
based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the

preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate

dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara
or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife
and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11on bigamy
and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a)
in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a
bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in

the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest

and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the
Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local
registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides
that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted
that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which
allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held
that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately
dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners

motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The
trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as
a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized,
x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this
case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the
petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and
not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as
required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence,

this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition

under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents,
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through
the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that
the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply
with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that
the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to
declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void.
The
Solicitor
General
cited Juliano-Llave
v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action
if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage
void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as

the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all,
it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity
of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court
judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no

jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the
fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara also
denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On
the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence
for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
persons legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity

of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification
or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country
such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service
in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form

and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the

investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pretrial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation
of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects
the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen,
over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.

They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition

and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the
rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize
a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to

remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce

decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove
as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof
of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of
a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the
Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the
State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is

precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a

particular fact."67

the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the

marriage.71

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the

Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights
and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in

any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a

spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in

the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77If anyone can file a

criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that
the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all,
it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order
to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can
petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established,
there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition

of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage

between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry
in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate
a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution
of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of
a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of

marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family

Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A.
No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized
the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage

between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a

foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines
the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this
Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains
a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is
not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where
the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26
of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction
to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of
a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a

bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity

of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the
only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution
for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states

that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of

a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the nullification of the Orders dated 14 January
and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R
TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45,1 City of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the
Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as
follows:
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro
Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil wedding

solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their

Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A' and
made an integral part hereof.

issued to her until she can prove by competent court

decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi
Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in

Japan, and was validly granted under Japanese laws, a
divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of
the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General
of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex B and made an
integral part hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A
copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto
attached as Annex C and made an integral part hereof.

xxxx

6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to

remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status,
petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005
in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy
of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex
D and made an integral part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken
on 27 December 2005. A copy of the JapaneseFamily
Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he
obtained and his remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly
authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as
Annex E and made an integral part hereof.
8. Recently, petitioner
Philippine passport to
husband Masatomi Y.
Department of Foreign

applied for the renewal of her

indicate her surname with her
Ando but she was told at the
Affairs that the same cannot be

12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioners marriage with

her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando musttherefore be
honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise
declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then,
petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the
issuance of a Philippine passport under the name Edelina
Ando y Tungol. Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court.2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, which was later raffled off to Branch 46.
She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as
respondent and prayed for the following reliefs before the
lower court:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this
Honorable Court that after proper proceedings, judgment be
rendered, as follows:
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between
petitioner Edelina T. Ando and her husband Masatomi Y.
Ando until otherwise declared by a competent court;
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a
Philippine Passport under the name "Edelina Ando y
Tungol"; and

(c) directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to honor

petitioners marriage to her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and
to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner under the name
"Edelina Ando y Tungol".
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for
want of cause and action, as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held
thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioners
marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein petitioner was married
to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba,
Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce
was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the their
(sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein
complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the
Family Code that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that
herein petitioner does not have any cause of action and/or is
entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. In the same vein, though there is other adequate
remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is however
beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act upon
and grant, as it is only the family court which is vested with
such authority and jurisdiction.4
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated 15 November 2010. In an
Order dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion
in this wise:

WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs

prayed for by the petitioner in her petition and the instant
Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the
Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the interest of
substantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15,
2010 is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the
Office of the Clerk of Court for proper endorsement to the
Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriate action and/or
disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of
the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court dismissed the
Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no cause of
action. The Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to
be declared as valid is already her second marriage, a
bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Code
considering that the first one, though allegedly terminated by
virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never
recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is
considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the
second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered
as valid at this time.
Petitioners allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
misplaced. The fact that no judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same
valid because such declaration under Article 40 of the Family
Code is applicable only in case of re-marriage. More
importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage is not even a requisite to make a marriage valid.

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is

imperative.6
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated 14 January 2011. The
motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8
February2011, considering that neither the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with
copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Review, raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC erred
in ruling that she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or
the husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not
even allowed to file a direct petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a void marriage, with even more reason can
it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a
petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that
under the law, a marriage even one that is void or voidable
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.

Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment

recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is required under
Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a
mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license. Any
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with
respect to the marriage license, shall not affect the legality of
the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for
a petition for declaratory relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex Parte
Motion for Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA, petitioner
avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a
summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction
over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the
Petition. The latter raised the following arguments: (1) the
Petition was improperly verified, as the jurat in the Verification
thereof only stated that the affiant had exhibited "her current
and valid proof of identity," which proof was not properly
indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a Philippine
court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is
required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled
to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show
that she had first exhausted all available administrative
remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA
under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport
Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of
declaratory relief; and (4) petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper
and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the
RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.

On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the

Comment, addressing the issues raised therein.
THE COURTS RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her
passport, petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory
relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty
was to question the DFAs refusal to issue a passport to her
under her second husbands name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
8239, which was adopted on 25 February 1997, the following
are the additional documentary requirements before a married
woman may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or
widowed women shall be made in accordance with the
following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides
to adopt the surname of her husband pursuant to Art.
370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the
original or certified true copy of her marriage contract,
and one photocopy thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in
the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be required to
present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and
Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when
applying for a passport for the first time.

b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must

present a certified true copy of her annotated Marriage
Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court
Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien
husband, she must present a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine
Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over
the place where the divorce is obtained or by the
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the
Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a
certified true copy of the Divorce Decree or a certified true
copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shariah Court or
the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband, the applicant must present the original
or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or
the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shariah
Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to
use her husbands surname or resume the use of her maiden
surname. From the above provisions, it is clear that for
petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married
name, all she needed to present were the following: (1) the
original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and one
photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a
Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a
certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by
the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction
over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the
Philippines.

In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be
issued a Philippine passport under her second husbands
name.1wphi1 Should her application for a passport be
denied, the remedies available to her are provided in Section 9
of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. Any person who feels aggrieved as a result
of the application of this Act of the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to
appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision
judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
ARTICLE
Appeal

10

In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an

existing one cancelled or restricted, the applicant or holder
thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the Secretary
within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or
restriction.
Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of
the DFA in the event of the denial of her application for a
passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A.
8239. Petitioners argument that her application "cannot be
said to have been either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the
DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to
appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told"8 that her passport
cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a
direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her
application.

Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her

second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead,
a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from
her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient;
both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven and like any other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to
remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition
for declaratory relief,11 we are still unable to grant the prayer of
petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient
proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law
of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the
divorce decree under that national law.12 Hence, any
declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made
upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce
decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action
instituted in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without
prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the proper remedies
available.