Case 2:16-mc-00049-EGS Document 32 Filed 08/03/16 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE: STANLEY JOSEPH CATERBONE,
Appellant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-mc-49

BANKRUPTCY NO. 16-10517

ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2016, the pro se appellant, Stanley Joseph
Caterbone, having filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (Doc. No. 28); 1
and the court having determined that the application was defective because it did not contain an
affidavit complying with Rule 24(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Order,
Doc. No. 30; 2 and the court having therefore denied the application without prejudice to the
appellant to submit an affidavit that fully complies with Rule 24(a)(1); and the appellant having
filed an Affidavit that Complies with Rule 24(a)(1) on this date (Doc. No. 31); and
THE COURT HAVING thoroughly reviewed the newly-filed affidavit, which includes
a statement of issues to be raised on appeal and which seemingly claims an entitlement to
redress, see Aff. that Complies with Rule 24(a)(1) at ECF pp. 5-14; and the court finding that all
of the issues the appellant seeks to raise are frivolous; accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that
the application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 28) is DENIED and the court
CERTIFIES that, based on the purported issues to be raised on appeal, that the appeal in this
matter is not taken in good faith. 3

The appellant also includes a copy of his application to proceed in forma pauperis with his notice of appeal. See
Doc. No. 27.
2
The court noted that the affidavit did not comply with subsections (B) and (C) of Rule 24(a)(1) insofar as it did not
(1) claim an entitlement to redress, and (2) state the issues that the appellant intended to present on appeal. See
Order, Doc. No. 30.
3
28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3) provides that [a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith. In this matter, all of the appellants issues on appeal are frivolous. Just by
way of example, the appellant includes the following in his statement of issues: (1) he asserts some sort of

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conspiracy claim with respect to the denials of his IFP application by judges in this district and in the Lancaster
County Court of Common Pleas; (2) he references his apparent need to provide the court with evidence and
insight into how he is entitled to $50 million dollars (due to United States sponsored mind control); (3) he appears
to attempt to argue that the case involves a RICO violation insofar as there is a conspiracy to cover-up [his]
International Signal & Control, Plc., whistle blowing activities[;] (4) he briefly mentions due process, but as it
relates to other cases that he is somehow involved in (such as cases involving Lisa Michelle Lambert) or other cases
that are no longer active cases in this court; and (5) he discusses that he has been falsely arrested 29 times, which
demonstrates a civil conspiracy. See Affidavit that Complies with Rule 24(a)(1) (Rule 24(a)(1) Aff.) at ECF pp.
5-8. Almost all of these topics are not issues having anything to do with this case. The only tangential topic that
possibly touched on an issue is his claim relating to a conspiracy among various courts to deny his IFP
applications, but this conspiracy has only materialized in his most recent submission and has no factual basis. Thus,
all of these topics are either irrelevant or frivolous.
The appellant then goes on to itemize his list of issues to be raised on appeal and includes the following:
1. Judicial Misconduct[;] 2. Selective and Retaliatory Discrimination under the 1990 Disabilities Act[;] 3.
Collusion to Commit Assault and Battery in Easton, Pennsylvania[;] 4. Using the Courts for Political Vendettas[;] 5.
Attempted Extortion of Real Monies[;] 6. Libel and Slander[;] Collusion of COINTELPRO-LIKE Tactics with Law
Enforcement. Id. at 9. The court notes that none of those claims were raised before the undersigned and the claims
raised from his second through seventh listed issues have nothing to do with this case and appear to be the result of
the appellants apparently paranoid and delusional views.
Nonetheless, upon looking at the remaining portion of his narrative below the aforementioned list, the
appellant appears to disagree with the matter being transferred from the Honorable Anita B. Brody to the
undersigned. This is a frivolous argument as the appellant has no power to dictate which judge hears one of his
cases. Then, he appears to disagree with the undersigneds decision not to grant his motion for a change of venue
from Easton to Philadelphia. This is also a frivolous argument as the appellants conclusory references to
inconvenience and undo [sic] hardship are unsubstantiated and, most importantly, the appellant indicated that he
would readily travel to Philadelphia for a proceeding despite the federal courthouse in Philadelphia being almost the
same distance away from his home as the Easton federal courtroom. See Order at 2, n.2, Doc. No. 10.
Additionally, the court granted the appellant electronic filing privileges in this case, so he would receive electronic
notification of all filings in this case and have the ability to see the filings from his computer. See id. at 1. The
fact that he must go to Philadelphia to copy documents in his other court cases (due to whatever problems he has
with his PACER access, apparently caused by computer hackers) does not in any way whatsoever warrant
transferring the case to Philadelphia.
For the next portion of his narrative, the appellant discusses why he failed to appear at the scheduled July
19, 2016 hearing on his application to proceed in forma pauperis. He first indicates that computer hackers
prohibited him from locating the Easton courtroom on Mapquest. Rule 24(a)(1) Aff. at ECF p. 9. The court notes
that the appellant discreetly omits reference to his phone call to chambers just prior to the date of the hearing where
he informed the undersigneds civil deputy that he would not appear for this hearing unless it was transferred to
Philadelphia. The appellant then poses as an excuse that he had to travel to Norristown, Pennsylvania to visit the
Montgomery County Courthouse to file an amicus brief in the criminal prosecution of the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Kathleen Kane. Id. at ECF p. 10. Once again, a computer hacker caused a
problem with the appellants GPS resulting in him driving around in circles for nearly 2 hours. Id. Somehow, he
blames an unidentified Clerk of Court for maliciously and purposefully inconveniencing him and causing him to
miss the hearing on July 19th. Id. He then mentions an additional traveling time of one hour. Presumably, he is
referring to his trip to Easton from his home in Lancaster and, if so, the notion that he would have to travel an
additional hour to Easton is not true as explained earlier. Admittedly, the appellant references Easton as being
unfamiliar territory, which might be true but ultimately immaterial.
There are at least two issues with this purported excuse. First, the appellant states that he contacted the
undersigneds chambers to tell one of my staff members about his excuse for failing to appear. As the court stated
on the record on July 28, 2016, when reciting the history of this case and the reasons for dismissing it with
prejudice, the appellant contacted chambers on July 19, 2016, but only did so to confirm that the court received his
document (where he blamed not being able to find the courthouse on computer hackers affecting his Mapquest) filed
earlier that morning. Not once did the appellant, who apparently had the phone number for the courts chambers,
contact the court to indicate that he could not find the chambers or request a continuance of the hearing. Second, the
document that he filed containing his excuse (which was 280 pages long) was time-stamped by this courts interim
clerk of court on July 19, 2016, and was entered on the docket by 9:37 a.m. that morning, meaning that the appellant

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court shall immediately notify the parties
and the court of appeals that the court certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith as
required by Rule 24(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Edward G. Smith

EDWARD G. SMITH, J.

found a way to the federal courthouse in Philadelphia to personally file that document at the same time he was
apparently driving around in Norristown for two hours being unable to find the courthouse there to file his amicus
brief and thus, causing him to be unable to get to Easton by 9:30 a.m. for the hearing. The appellant could not have
been filing a document in Philadelphia and at the same time driving in circles in Norristown for two hours.
Thus, once again, the appellants arguments are frivolous.
For the final portion of the narrative, the appellant contends that this courts July 20, 2016 order was
somehow unclear as to whether he had to appear before the undersigned for a hearing on July 28, 2016. Id. The
appellant points out that the July 20, 2016 order to show cause required him to submit a written response by no later
than July 27, 2016, and if he failed to do so, the court would deem him to be in favor of dismissing the bankruptcy
appeal. Id. Thus, his argument is because he submitted a timely written response, the order did not require him to
appear at the hearing. Id.
Once again, this argument is undeniably frivolous. In the first place, the July 28, 2016 order scheduled a
hearing for July 28, 2016. The appellant is the only litigant in the case. There is no reason to schedule a hearing if
the court did not intend for the litigant to appear. Secondly, the July 20, 2016 order stated that [i]f the appellant
fails to appear for the hearing, the court will dismiss this appeal with prejudice. Order at 2, 4, Doc. No. 17. If the
court did not intend for the appellant to appear for the hearing, the court would not have threatened a sanction in the
nature of a dismissal with prejudice for his failure to appear. Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, even if the
appellant was somehow confused as to his obligations in this case, he admits that he contacted the undersigneds
chambers in the late afternoon on the day prior to the scheduled hearing and one of my chambers staff confirmed to
him that he had to appear for the following days hearing. The appellant did not like it when he received this
information, as he ever so not politely informed my staff member that he was not coming to Allentown as it was
unfair, and he then colorfully informed the staffmember that the undersigned could take it and stuff it up my God
Damned Fucking Ass. At bottom, the appellant knew he had to appear for the hearing and willfully failed to
appear.
The court notes that in his narrative the appellant has interpreted the courts requirement to have him
appear in Easton as being malicious. Rule 24(a)(1) Aff. at ECF p. 11. He also claims that somehow the court
WISH[ES] TO PUT THE COMPLAINTAINT[sic] IN HARMS WAY AND HIS LIFE AT RISK! As the
court is unaware of any outstanding threats to the appellants well-being by traveling to Easton and he has not
identified any malicious acts by this court, these arguments are also frivolous.
The court further notes that the final portion of the appellants affidavit contains references to a study by
Dr. Richard Cordero, Esquire, seeking to [e]xpos[e] [j]udges [u]naccountability and [c]onsequent [r]iskless
[w]rongdoing. Id. at ECF pp. 12-14. As the hyperlinked document and the summary thereto have nothing to do
with this litigation (other than to possibly support the appellants fanciful and baseless views about judicial
misconduct and conspiratorial activity), it does not militate against the courts conclusion that the appellants issues
raised are frivolous and that this appeal is not being taken in good faith.