SILVERIO vs REPUBLIC (GR No. 174689, Oct.

22,2007)
FACTS:

RULING:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change

of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he
was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name
was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. An order setting the case for initial
hearing. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision
in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner
essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil
Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex

and first name through the intervention of sex reassignment
surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same
Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed
by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are
involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a persons first name be change because of
sex reassignment?

Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public

policy consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
Second, there will be major changes in statutes that
underscore the public policy in relation to women.

TUASON vs CA (GR No. 116607, April 10,1996)

FACTS:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez
Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati
a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint,
private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were
married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two
children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was
already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward
and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that
in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on

private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case

for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used
prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and
sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been
rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984,
he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in
succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his
wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave
minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the
tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to
accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends;
that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some
of their assets and incurring large obligations with banks,
credit card companies and other financial institutions, without
private respondent's consent; that attempts at reconciliation
were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage,
private respondent prayed for powers of administration to
save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against
him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he and private
respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten
years of their marriage and actually begot two children during
this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have
serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the
respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like
a persona non grata; that due to the "extreme animosities"
between them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a
"cooling-off period" in 1984; that it is private respondent who
had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with
another man; that petitioner's work as owner and operator of
a radio and television station exposed him to malicious gossip
linking him to various women in media and the entertainment

world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses

in his business and was compelled, with the knowledge of his
wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive
golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow
him to return to the conjugal home and continue his
administration of the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE:
WON the State failed to intervene and inquire the reason of
his non-apperance

RULING:
No
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the
adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is
negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of
record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of
counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the
loss of this right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face. 16
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by
default is fraught with the danger of collusion. 22 Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and
legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered
to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing
any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare
him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting

attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties.

23 The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated. 24 Our Constitution is
committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution. 25 Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and,
hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application
of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner
was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and
contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent.
He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private
respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation
was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by
collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates
the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of
a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the

contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the

proceedings in the trial court.

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs NLRC

( 272 SCRA 596)
FACTS:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever,
specically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a xed
period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one
C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. 1 Under the
Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company,
her employment was to be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10,
1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991, private respondent' s services as reliever were again
engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda
F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. 2 After
August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her
services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more
asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee,
the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job
application form that was furnished her to be lled up for the
purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein
that she was single although she had contracted marriage a
few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. It now appears
that private respondent had made the same representation in
the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on

June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly

learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio
City,Delia M. Ocial, sent to private respondent a
memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain
the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded
about the company's policy of not accepting married women
for employment. In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992,
private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's
policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along
she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. 5
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her
explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992, 6 which she readily
contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled
with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances
(COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.

ISSUE:
WON THE PT&T Companys policy on marriage was against
the fundamental policy of the state/Constitution

RULING:
Yes
The Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs
afoul of the constitutional provision on equal protection but
also on the fundamental policy of the State toward marriage.
The Supreme Court relevantly said:

In the final reckoning, the danger of such a policy

against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes
at the very essence, ideals, and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted
here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is
not only in order but imperatively required.

DUNCAN (TECSON) vs GLAXO Wellcome Philippines

Inc. ( GR no. 162994, Sept. 17, 2004)

FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by
respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation. Thereafter, Tecson signed
a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that
he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and should management find that
such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos
products in the Camarines Sur- Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship
with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals 3 (Astra), a

competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in

Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area. Even before they got married,
Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager
regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with
Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson
married Bettsy in September 1998. In January 1999, Tecsons
superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to
a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he
and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign
from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to
retain him as much as possible because he was performing his
job well. Tecson requested for time to comply with the
company policy against entering into a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra,
Bettsys employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca,
another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of
the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With Bettsys
separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest
would be eliminated. At the same time, they would be able to
avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time
resolve the problem. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a
transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did
not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would
be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos
least-movementpossible policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan
City-Surigao City- Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked
Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.

ISSUE:
WON the Glaxos policy against its
employees from competitor is valid

employees marrying

RULING:
YES
An employment contract requiring an employee to disclose to
management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and requiring such employee to
resign should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest was not held to be in violation of
the equal protection clause of the constitution considering that
the said stipulation is reasonable under the circumstances
because such relationship might compromise the interest of
the company and the requirement was shown to be aimed
against the possibility that a competitor company will gain
access to its secrets and procedures. The Supreme Court said
that the provision does not impose an absolute prohibition
against relationships between the companys employees and
those of Competitor Company.

STAR PAPER CORP. vs SIMBOL

(GR no 164774, April 12, 2006)
FACTS:
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a
corporation engaged in trading principally of paper

products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel

and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its
Managing Director The evidence for the petitioners show that
respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia
(Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular
employees of the company.
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27,
1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company,
whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage,
Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get
married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company
policy promulgated in 1995, 2 viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case
he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship,
already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic ], one
male and another female) developed a friendly relationship
during the course of their employment and then decided to
get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above.
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company
policy.
Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She
met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on
June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant
to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get
married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga
(Zuiga), also a coworker. Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a

married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly

could have terminated her services due to immorality but she
opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice,
constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorney's fees.
They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal
and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also
contended that they were dismissed due to their union
membership.

ISSUE:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from
working in the same company violates the rights of the
employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a
valid exercise of management prerogative.
RULING:
Yes.
Where a company policy provided that, in case two of their
employees decide to get married to each other , one of them
should resign from the company, the Supreme Court held that
the act of the company in enforcing such policy is illegal as it
failed to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy especially so when the asserted policy is
premised on the mere fear that employees married to each
other will be less efficient. Thus, it was not shown how the
marriage between sheeting machine operators of the company
married to an employee in the repacking section in the same
company, or a production helper to a cutter machine helper,
can be detrimental to the business operations of the
company.

GR No. 112019
January 4, 1995
Leouel Santos vs.The Honorable Court of Appeals and
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
Facts:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in
Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial
court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The
couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was
named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will
quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of
Julias parents into their family affairs.

Ruling:
No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication
with him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the
marriage
is
celebrated.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability. The incapacity must be
grave such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required.

18 May 1988, Julia left for the United States to work as a

nurse, but never came back. When Leouel got a chance to
visit US where he underwent training, he desperately tried to
locate or to somehow get in touch with Julia but in all his
efforts where of no avail.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his

petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual
settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to
to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

Having failed to know the whereabouts of his wife, Leouel filed

with the RTC of Negros Occidental a complaints voiding of
marriage under art 36 of the Family Code. Julia, in her answer,
opposed the complaint and denied all allegations that it was
the petitioner who had been irresponsible and incompetent.

GR No. 166676
September 12, 2008
Republic of the Philippines vs. Jennifer B. Cagandahan

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home or at the

very least to communicate with him are circumstances that
clearly shows her being psychologically incapacitated to enter
into marriage.
Issue: WON such marriage be void under article 36 of the
Family Code.

Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her
Certificate of Live Birth. Growing up, she developed secondary
male characteristics and was diagnosed to have CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA (CAH). During her childhood years,
she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on
diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She
likewise has no breast or menstruation. According to her, for
all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,

she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC

Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such
that her gender or sex is changed to male and her first name
is changed to Jeff.
Issue: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should
be granted.
Ruling:
Yes. RTC granted respondents petition, however the OSG
contends that such petition is fatally defective for noncompliance with rules 103 and 108 of rules of court because
while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in the
petition but the respondent did not implead the local civil
registrar. The local civil registrar is required to be made a
party.
The determination of a persons gender appearing in his birth
certificate is legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. Under Rep. Act 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent undisputedly ha CAH, a condition that causes the
early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristic. A
person with this condition produces too much androgen, a
male hormone. CAH is one of the conditions that involve se
anatomy.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a
female, then there is no basis for changing in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing

respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
In so ruling, we do no more than give respect to the diversity
of nature and how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondents
congenital conditional and his mature decision to be a male.
AM No. 99-1211
January 28, 2000
Zenaida S. Beso vs. Judge Juan Daguman
Facts:
On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainants
fiance, Bernardito A. Yman, got married under the
solemnization of Judge Juan Gaduman in his residence in
Calbayog City, Samar. However after the wedding, Yman
abandoned Zenaida. When he left, the she inquired to the City
Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract. The
complainant found out that her marriage was not registered.
She wrote to the respondent Judge to inquire and the former
found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy
was retained by the respondent.
Respondent Judge in hi comment averred that he solemnized
the marriage because of the urgent request of the
complainant and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino
overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government policy;
that he was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so
that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens
to get married; the failure to file the marriage contract was
beyond his control because Yman absconded with the missing
copies of the marriage certificate. However, he tried to recover
custody of the missing documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation

report dated, August 11, 1998 found the respondent Judge
committed non-feasance in office and recommended that
he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5, 000).
Issue: WON Judge Daguman solemnized a marriage outside of
his jurisdiction.
Rulling:
Yes. The authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to
those municipalities under his jurisdiction and clearly,
Calbayog City is no longer his area of jurisdiction.
As provided by Art 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage
may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber or at place
other than his sala are:
1. When either both of the contracting parties is at
point of death;
2. When the residence of either party is located in a
remote place;
3. Where both of the parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated in a
sworn statement to that effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso
or fiance Yman was at the point of death or in a remote area.
Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent judge that the marriage be
solemnized outside his chamber or at a place other than his
sala. In fact, the respondent judge was promted more by
urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because
complainant was an overseas worker, who, respondent

realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under

present Government policy.
Considering that Judge Dagumans jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Margarita, Tarangan and Pagsanjan,
Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize
marriages in Calbayog City.
The respondent judge is fined five thousand pesos and sternly
warned that a repetition of the same infractions will be dealt
with more severely
GR No. 105540
July 5, 1993
Ireneo G. Geronimo vs. Court of Appeals and Antonio
Esma
Facts:
Graciana Geronimo died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving
no descendants or ascendants. She was survived by her two
brothers Tomas and Ireneo, petitioner, her nephew Salvador
and husband, private respondent, Antonio Esman. However,
the husbands capacity to inherit and administer the property
of the decedent is now being questioned in view of the
discovery by the petitioner, Ireneo, that the marriage between
private respondent and decedent was celebrated without a
marriage license.
Issue: WON the marriage between Graciana Gernimo and
Antonio Esma was valid.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals ruled that there the marriage of Graciana
and Antonio are valid. The oppositore-respondent contends
that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere concoctions.

He presented two copies of the marriage contract issued by

the civil registrar of Pateros, Rizal and the Parish Church of
San Roque were the same certified copy of the marriage
contract which was attached to the original petition which
named the oppositor as husband of the deceased. Oppositorrespondent presented various witnesses to prove that indeed
the deceased and oppositor were married.
The non inidication of the license number in the certified
copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be
deemed as fatal to the issue of validity of the marriage
because there is no law that requires the marriage license
number would be indicated in the marriage contract itself.
At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only
serve to prove the non-recording of the marriage license
number but certainly not the non-issuance of marriage license.
G.R. No. 167746
August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.

FACTS:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by
petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that
on December 8, 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage
for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their

wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of

the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. They got married on the
same day, December 8, 1982. Petitioner and respondent went
through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983. The
marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing
a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they
never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local
civil registrar of the said place. On October 14, 1985,
respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In
1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Petitioners Argument:
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void. Stating that there was no
marriage license because he and respondent just went to the
Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them.
Respondents Argument:
Respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage license is void.

RULING:
The Supreme Court decided that the marriage license was
valid.
The law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number.
A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in
fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of
Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage
filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in
favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on
December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs.
Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy

between the marriage license number in the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which
states that the marriage license issued to the parties is

No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that

the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same
is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of
the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the
numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may
read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does
not detract from our conclusion regarding the
existence and issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.
G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997
NANCY
GO
AND
ALEX
GO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES
ONG and JANE C. ONG, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane
Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The
video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at
a contract price of P1, 650.00. Three times thereafter, the
newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding,
which they planned to show to their relatives in the United
States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice
they failed because the tape was apparently not yet
processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be
ready upon private respondents' return.
When private respondents came home from their honeymoon,
however, they found out that the tape had been erased by
petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the

only record of their wedding, private respondents filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages against
petitioners. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a
decision,
-

Recission of the Contract

Making Petitioners Jointly and Severally liable
P450 down payment
P75, 000, moral damages
P20, 000, exemplary damages
P5, 000, attorneys fees
P2, 000, litigation expenses

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to

the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993, dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision.

Petitioners Argument:
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
not appreciating the evidence they presented to prove that
they acted only as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and, as such,
should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that
there is no evidence to show that the erasure of the tape was
done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages.
Respondents Argument:
Respondents contend that for not abiding on the
contract and erasing the footage of their wedding, petitioners
should be liable for damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners should be liable.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are jointly
and severally liable.
Clearly, petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for
having failed to process the video tape. Considering that
private respondents were about to leave for the United States,
they took care to inform petitioners that they would just claim
the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the erasure
of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.
In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that
"those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages."
In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents
entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former
undertook to cover the latter's wedding and deliver to them a
video copy of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners
failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly,
petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said
private respondents and are thus liable for damages.

Considering the sentimental value of the tapes

and the fact that the event therein recorded a
wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone
to be cherished and remembered could no longer be
reenacted and was lost forever.

G.R. No. 145226

February 06, 2004
LUCIO
MORIGO
y
CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for

judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seek
among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.

FACTS:

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with

Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor
of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were

boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four
(4) years (from 1974-1978). Lucia was working abroad
but still became sweethearts.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her
work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court
(General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married
Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

Petitioners Argument:
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing.
Respondents Argument:
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a previous marriage.
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.
RULING:

The previous marriage was void ab intitio for lacking

the requisites of a valid marriage which is a marriage
ceremony, therefore, petitioner is not guilty of bigamy.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
322 and 423 of the Family Code. This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of
the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the
date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that
the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking
this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage
to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the
instant charge.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was

performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer .

Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage

contract on their own. The mere private act of signing
a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before
he contracts a subsequent marriage.

G.R. No. 84464

June 21, 1991
SPOUSES
JAIME
AND
TEODORA
VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I.
SANCHEZ, respondents.

FACTS:
Herein private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming
to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez, averred that her
husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land
located at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her
knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners on the
strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by
her late husband on February 7, 1968. Involving the report of
a handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, who found that the signature on the
document was written by another person, she prayed that the

deed of sale be annulled, that the registration of the lot in the

name of the petitioners be cancelled, and that the lot be
reconveyed to her.
In their answer, the petitioners questioned the
personality of the private respondent to file the complaint,
contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was never married
but had a common-law wife by whom he had two children. On
the merits, they claimed that Roberto Sanchez had deeded
over the lot to them in 1968 for the sum of P500.00 in partial
settlement of a judgment they had obtained against him. They
had sued him after he had failed to pay a P1, 300.00 loan they
had secured for him and which they had been forced to settle
themselves to prevent foreclosure of the mortgage on their
property.

Petitioners Argument:
Petitioners contend that Catalina Sanchez was not the
widow of Roberto Sanchez; and that she had no capacity to
institute the complaint.

Respondents Argument:
Respondent submitted the marriage contract between
her and the late Roberto Sanchez.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Catalina Sanchez can validly file the

complaint for the recovery of her late husbands property.
RULING:
The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez
has proved her status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez with
her submission of the marriage contract denominated as
Exhibit "A." That evidence rendered unnecessary the
presumption that "a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage" and may also explain why Roberto Sanchez could
not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had two
illegitimate children, assuming these persons did exist. It is
strange that the trial court should reject Exhibit "A" in favor of
the Transfer Certificate of Title describing Roberto Sanchez as
"single," disregarding the elementary principle that the best
documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract
itself. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership
of registered land, not of the civil status of the owner.
As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, the
private respondent could validly file the complaint for the
recovery of her late husband's property, without prejudice to
the succession rights of his other heirs.

G.R. No. L-9005

June 20, 1958
ARSENIO
DE
LORIA
and
RICARDA
LORIA, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.

DE

deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are

grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim
to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe
Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of
first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and
dismissed the complaint.

FACTS:
Petitioners Argument:
It appears that long before, and during the War of the
Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and husband
at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but
had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila
and surrounding territory, Matea became seriously ill. Knowing
her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated
to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They
fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of
Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been
living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage,
asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites
of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the
confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy
Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in
articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as
sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but
death was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she was
interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial
ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed
this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to

Petitioners contend that there was no "marriage contract"

signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as
required by section 3 of the Marriage Law and the priest filed
no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil
registry.
Respondents Argument:
Respondent contend that the marriage was valid because it
was a marriage in articulo mortis
ISSUE:
mortis

Whether or not the marriage is valid in articulo

RULING:
The SC ruled that the marriage was valid.
There is no question about the officiating priest's
authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that
the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that
both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and

Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and

wife."
Cosca vs Palaypayon
The factual basis of the first proposition no signing
may seriously be doubted. The Court of Appeals made no
finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held
such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said
"the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact".
The "essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section
1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the
parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife" which in this case actually
occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract or
certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose
of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling
has been cited making it an essential requisite not
the formal requirement of evidentiary value.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without
marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the
affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually
required for the issuance of a marriage license. The
first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage
celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act
3613), this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of
such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of
the union of men and women who have lived publicly in a
state of concubinage, (section 22), we must hold this marriage
to be valid.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249
FACTS:

The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca

(Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon
C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the
presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court
II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages

even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the
following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias &
Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater
& Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples
did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted
by the parties which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano &

Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted
from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the
couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with
the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to
solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil
registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage
contracts and the date and place of marriage are not
included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage
contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The
alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer,
Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him
since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a
marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte
was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the
guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the

respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were
valid.

HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license along with the other couples.
The
testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the
photographs taken showed that it was really Judge
Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after
the solemnization and bring with them their marriage
license. They already started living together as husband and
wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the
photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However,
considering that there were pictures from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to
believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he
solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed
it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting
parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost 6 years
already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that
Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before
they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit,
Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they
started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon
should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have
executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage
license requirement.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the

absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in
the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the
declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?

HELD:
Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and
Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to
Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children
under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8
months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that
they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from
securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.

ISSUES:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the

marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma
had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and
cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even
after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage.

Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000

FACTS:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November
15, 1973 in Quezon City. They had two children. On
September 15, 1983, Fernando left the conjugal dwelling.
Since then, they lived separately with the children in the
custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a
petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga which was later amended to a petition for
separation of property. In 1988, she filed a case of attempted
parricide against Fernando. However, the case was lowered to
slight physical injuries. Petitioner filed for a declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It was denied. On appeal, she raised the issue of
their marriage being void ab initio for the lack of marriage
license. Their marriage license was obtained on September 17,
1972 while their marriage was celebrated on November 15,
1973. Hence, the marriage license was expired already.

Issue:
W/N the marriage is valid

Held:
No. Evidence shows that there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders
the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
shows that the marriage license, was issued in Carmona,

Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever

resided in Carmona. Marriage is void ab initio for lack of
marriage license. Issue on psychological incapacity is hereby
mooted.

Aranes vs. Judge Occiano

AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge
Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the
presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However,
he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia
on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and
without the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their
application of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was
stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither
of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with
the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged
marriage.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully

examined the documents and first refused to conduct the
marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the
absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest
pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the

postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical

condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he
solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that
they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano
denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount
to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano,

Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
CARDENAS, respondent.

Facts:

vs.CARMELITA

N.

In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he

claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress
and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas
and the latters father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the
Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the
City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him
and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied
for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita
and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and
claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May
1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695
at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both
marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila
and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.
Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they failed to locate the book wherein

marriage license no. 2770792 is registered, for the

reason that the employee handling is already retired.
With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that
the marriage license specified in the parties marriage contract
was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the
local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
marriage license was issued but rather, because it failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is

registered. Simply put, if the pertinent book were available

for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have
contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
Issue:
WON there was a marriage license issued.

Held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia,
of maintaining a register book where they are required to
enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

records of his office contain no such record or entry.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot
locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of
the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook
was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the
logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof
of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also
mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept
that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity
of entries therein.

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar

must categorically state that the document does not exist in
his office or the particular entry could not be found in the
register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be
sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or

fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.24

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed

by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x

x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent

matrimony

are

presumed,

in

the

absence

of

any

counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in

fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage.30

In Pugeda vs. Trias,

The defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs
produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of Jaunary 1916,
to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage.
Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of
witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed,
although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence
of marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no marriage
took place.
Other evidence may be presented it to proof marriage.

DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF

LUIS
DELGADO,
petitioners,
v.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN,
respondents.
G.R. No. 155733.
January 27, 2006.

Facts:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a
Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate of deceased
spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and
1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by Marciana
Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the
beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed
Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene
in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of an
acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she should be
the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the
spouses were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado
died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this
case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the
estates of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of
the
estate
noting
that
Josefa
and
Guillermo did not contract marriage.
Ruling:
The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses, that
marriage between Josefa and Guillermo never occurred.
Although it is presumed that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail. Since, no
marriage had occurred between the two, the estate must be
settled in different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot
be appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of the
deceased.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 103047,

September 2, 1994236 SCRA 257FACTS
Facts :
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a
civil ceremony without the knowledge of the formers parents.
All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage
which includes procurement of marriage license, was attended
by Cardenas. It was stated in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued. The cohabitation of
Castro and Cardenas lasted only for four (4) months after
which they parted ways .Castro sought the advice of a lawyer
for a possible annulment of her marriage with Cardenas before
leaving for the States to follow her daughter who was adopted
by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The Civil
Registrar of Pasig issued a certification stating that Castro and
Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court
on June 21, 1970 under an alleged marriage license
no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970 but
such cannot be located since it does not appear in their
records. It was then that she found out that there was no
marriage license issued prior to the celebration of her
marriage with Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her petition. It
ruled that inability of the certifying official to locate the
marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued.
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending
that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently

established the absence of a marriage license. The respondent

appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court declaring
that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and
void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the
marriage contract. However, the Republic of the Philippines,
the petitioner herein, brought a petition for review on
certiorari which challeged that the certification and the
uncorroborated testimony of Castro are not sufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.
ISSUE
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that
no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of
marriage.

RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and
inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license
no.3196182 to the contracting parties. The fact that private
respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not aground to deny her petition. The
failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony
is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case .The
finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the

contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage

license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar
of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the
solemnizing officer. It was held that under the circumstances
of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established
the absence of the subject marriage license. Therefore, the
petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible
error committed by respondent appellate court

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

FACTS:

The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca

(Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon
C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the
presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court
II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages

even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the
following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias &

Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater

& Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples
did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted
by the parties which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano &

Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted
from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the
couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with
the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to
solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil
registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage
contracts and the date and place of marriage are not
included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage
contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The
alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer,
Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him
since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a
marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte
was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the
guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the

respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the

Palaypayon were valid.

marriage

solemnized

by

Judge

Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before

they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit,
Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they
started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon
should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have
executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage
license requirement.

HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license along with the other couples.
The
testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the
photographs taken showed that it was really Judge
Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after
the solemnization and bring with them their marriage
license. They already started living together as husband and
wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the
photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However,
considering that there were pictures from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to
believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he
solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed
it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting
parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost 6 years
already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that
Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the

absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in
the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

MARTINEZ V. TAN 12 PHIL. 237

Facts
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the
justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for
the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal
marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant
Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25,
1907. Evidence supporting this were: document signed by
plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and plaintiff appeared
before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by
Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the
defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the justice of
peace and signed the document, the testimony of Ballori who
also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the
bailiff of court that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and

two witnesses were all present during the ceremony.

Issue
Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married
on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the
peace
Held
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of
the
complaint
is
affirmed.
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a
positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be
married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize
the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they
ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the
petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice
of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which
certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer
authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the
justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as
husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such
presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission
of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the
marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which
admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite
in marriage when they appeared and signed the said
document which so states before the justice of the peace who
authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and
the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish
language, and that they knew the contents of the document

which they signed; and under the circumstances in this

particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took
place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.