Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Machinery, etc.
x x x x [Star Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Paper City Corporation of the Philippines, 692 SCRA 438(2013)]
Movable Property
Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the object of appropriation
are considered either real property or personal property.Business is likewise not enumerated as
personal property under the Civil Code.Just like interest in business, however, it may be
appropriated.Following the ruling in Stochecker v. Ramirez, Business should also be classified as
personal property.Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article
415, it is therefore personal property. (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13,2009,
576 SCRA 41)
Property of the public domain
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony, a doctrine consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required for the registration of lands
under the Torrens system. Section 8 of CA 141 limits alienable or disposable lands ony to those lands
which have been officially delimited and classified.
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. Yap 568 SCRA 164.
Disposition of lands of the public domain
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the
public domain, namely:
(1)s a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed
to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2)he following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a)gricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the
exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land
by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public
use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and
are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated
or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription. [Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 704 SCRA 561(2013)]
Classification of public lands
It cannot be overemphasized that the prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to administrative
agencies which have been specially tasked by statutes to do so, namely DANR now DENR and its two
bureaus, the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry. (Republic vs. Mendoza, Sr., 519 SCRA 203)
Alienable and Disposable Land
The certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr. , as annotated on the
subdivision plan, constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates
that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,
1925. (Republic vs. Serrano, 612 SCRA 537)
Property held by public corporations
PRA was created essentially to perform a public service considering that it was primarily responsible
for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of lands
belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their
development consistent with the public interest.
x
Article498.hen the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Under this provision, the sale in favor of Pante would have to be upheld since the contract executed
between the Church and Pante was duly notarized, converting the deed into a public instrument.
[The Roman Catholic Chruch vs. Pante, 669 SCRA 234(2012)]
Ownership and Certificate of Title
Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should
not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the
latter only serving as the best proof of ownership [Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677(2011)]
Accession (Alluvium)
But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.Thus, it is not enough to
be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.One who claims the right of accretion
must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner
has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the
foregoing requisites. (New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., G.R.No. 168800, April 16,
2009, 585 SCA 1329)
Builder in good faith
Introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give the lessee the right of
retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith the doctrine is that a
lessee a neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code since his rights are governed by Article 1678. (Sulo sa Nayon, Inc.
vs. Nayong Filipino Foundation, 576 SCRA 655)
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option
lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. (Briones
vs. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 150666, August 3, 2010)
Respondents argument does not hold water. Since respondents occupation of the subject property
was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
She is aware that her tolerated possession may be terminated any time and she cannot be
considered as builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New
Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance
of its owners are not possessors in good faith. At the time respondent built the improvements on the
premises in 1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the
petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief that she is
the owner thereof. [Esmaquel vs. Coprada, 638 SCRA 428(2010)]
The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the improvements on the leased
subject property. However, tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith
as they have no pretension to be owners of the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not
apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always
be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property. [Mores vs. Yu-Go, 625
SCRA 291(2010)]
In fine, the Court applied Article 448 by construing good faith beyond its limited definition. We find no
reason not to apply the Courts ruling in Spouses Macasaet vs. Spouses Macasaet In the instant case.
First, good faith is presumed on the part of the respondent-spouses. Second, petitioner failed rebut
this presumption. Third, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner opposed or objected to
the improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses. Consequently, we can validly presume
that petitioner consented to the improvements being constructed. (Communities Cagayan, Inc.
vs. Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 [2012])
With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had
built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations
of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the
land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of
the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder
to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists
between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the
Civil Code. [Angeles vs. Pascual, 658 SCRA 23(2011)]
Accretion
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs
ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains
in effect in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits
along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART.4.ccretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes,
by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art.57.o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek
do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of
the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner
of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the
possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against
the State. [Offices of the City Mayor of Paraaque City vs. Ebio, 621 SCRA 555(2010)]
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot
3998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up riverbed of the
Paraaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was the land
which was previously part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up.
(Republic vs. Santos III, 685 SCRA 41 [2012]).
Dried-up Creek
Assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek, under Art. 420 and Art. 502 of the Civil Code,
rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion (Fernando vs. Acuna, 657 SCRZ 499)
Co-ownership
We have ruled that the words married to preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of
the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of
the Family Code. [Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702(2013)]
Co-ownership: rights of a co-owner
A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which
is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use. Cruz vs. Catapang, 544
SCRA 512.
Co-ownership; Partition
The right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches; The only exception to
the imprescriptibility of an action for partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the
co-ownership. Monteroso vs. Court of Appeals, 553 SCRA 66.
In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co-ownership amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other coowners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. [Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. vs. Reyes, 626
SCRA 758(2010)]
Not having been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal in
nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, we find that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over
criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957. [Dazon vs. Yap, 610 SCRA 79(2010)]
As earlier stated, both the law and the Master Deed refer to utility installations as forming part of the
common areas, which reference is justified by practical considerations. Repairs to correct any defects
in the electrical wiring should be under the control and supervision of respondent to ensure safety
and compliance with the Philippine Electrical Code, not to mention security and peace of mind of the
unit owners. (Limson vs. Wack-Wack Condominium Corp., G.R. No. 188802, February 14,
2011)
The case before the RTC involved an intra-corporate disputethe Moreno spouses were asking for an
accounting of the association dues and were questioning the manner the petitioner calculated the
dues assessed against them. These issues are alien to the first case that was initiated by Salvacion
a third party to the petitioner-Moreno relationshipto stop the extrajudicial sale on the basis of the
lack of the requirements for a valid foreclosure sale. [Chateau de Banie Condominium
Corporation vs. Moreno, 644 SCRA 288(2011)]
Among the obligations of FDC and FSCC to the unit owners or purchasers of FSBs units was the duty
to provide a centralized air-conditioning unit, lighting, electricity, and water; and to maintain
adequate fire exit, elevators, and cleanliness in each floor of the common areas of FSB. But FDC and
FSCC failed to repair the centralized air-conditioning unit of the fourth floor of FSB despite repeated
demands from Agcaoili. To alleviate the physical discomfort and adverse effects on his work as a
practicing attorney brought about by the breakdown of the air-conditioning unit, he installed two
window-type air-conditioners at his own expense.Also, FDC and FSCC failed to provide water supply to
the comfort room and to clean the corridors. The fire exit and elevator were also defective.
These defects, among other circumstances, rightly compelled Agcaoili to suspend the payment of his
monthly amortizations and condominium dues. Instead of addressing his valid complaints, FDC
disconnected the electric supply of his Unit 411 and unilaterally increased the interest rate without
justification.
Clearly, FDC was liable for damages. Article 1171 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. [Fedman Development Corporation
vs. Agcaoili, (2011)]
Action to Quiet Title
If the person claiming to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe, the
reason being that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right. Alio vs. Heirs of Angelica A. Lorenzo, 556 SCRA 139.
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
[Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation vs. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA 327(2011)]
Possession
Two elements are paramount in possession there must be occupancy or taking and there must be
intent to possess. (So vs. Food Fest Land, Inc., 617 SCRA 5410)
Acquisition of Possession
Execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. It is negated
by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. (Beatingco vs. Gasis, 642
SCRA 539)
Actual and constructive possession
A person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive
possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument. [Villamar vs. Mangaoil, 669
SCRA 426(2012)]
Possession and Occupation
Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the publicdomain because the
law requires possession and occupation.Ong vs. Republic, 548 SCRA 160.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is broader than occupation be cause it
includes constructive possession. Unless, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Republic vs. Enriquez, 501 SCRA
436.
Possession alone is not sufficientto acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the
law requires possession and occupation-since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other; Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession-when the law adds the word occupation,
it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Mistica vs. Republic, 599
SCRA 401.
Possession by Tolerance
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon
demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such
demand; The absence of demand to vacate precludes the Court from treating this case, originally
instituted as one for forcible entry, as one of the unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is
jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer. Acaylar, Jr. vs. Harayo, 560 SCRA 624.
Right of Possessor
The purchasers right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his
successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter
Where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession
from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and who entered into
possession before the suit was begun, the court has no power to deprive him of possession by
enforcing the decree. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Prime Neighborhood
Association, 587 SCRA 582.
Usufruct
While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of Mendoza, his title is only
limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the clubs facilities and privileges while employed
with the company. In Thomson v. Court of Appeals,20 we held that a trust arises in favor of one who
pays the purchase price of a property in the name of another, because of the presumption that he
who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest for himself. [Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. vs.
Mendoza, 699 SCRA 290(2013)]
The complicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredos possession; he was holding
the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputed before his
death, hand in hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case. Without need,
however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the
death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This
development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of
the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution. [Rivera-Calingasan vs. Rivera,
696 SCRA 613(2013)]
Easement on riparian bank
Thus, the above proves that petitioners right of ownership and possession has been limited by law
with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the
Court cannot agree with the trial courts opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that
respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are
occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no
right or title over it precisely because it is public land.
Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon.
The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to
have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have
retained the same character throughout their occupancy.
As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone, We find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the
local government of Las Pias City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be
achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the
latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise
known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).
Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of
squatting in the metropolis, all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish
persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds. [Pilar Development Corporation vs. Dumadag, 693 SCRA 96(2013)]
owner of the dominant estate.Unicourse Development and Marketing Corp. Vs. Joseph Chung,
et al., G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA 382.
Easement; restrictions on rights of owner of dominant estate.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its
rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the
easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation
of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the
servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it
should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient estate.Goldcrest Realty Corporation vs.Cypress
Gardens Condominium Corporation, 584 SCRA 435.
Easement of right of way
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to pass through
other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners
concept of what is adequate outlet a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in
order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or
artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.20 [Dichoso, Jr. vs. Marcos,
647 SCRA 495(2011)]
Nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition
or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes
with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs
the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law
of necessity.
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the
city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of
persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing
the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the
power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. [Gancayo vs. City Government of Quezon
City, et al., (2011)]
Donation
It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the
obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a
donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed by the rules on
contract.
It has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of donation. Petitioner DECS failed to use the
property for the purpose specified in the deed of donation. In fine, petitioner DECS has no use for the
property, hence, the same shall be reverted to the respondents. Secretary of Education, The vs.
Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr., 480 SCRA 452.
Post-mortem dispositions typically:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive.
(2) That before the [donors] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed.
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Further
(4) [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates
that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa.
(5) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that
the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria; such statements
are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent
of the transferor, (and)
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather that mortis
causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation
inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not
be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez, signalling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguezs estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This
transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguezs acceptance of the
disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965.
Rodrigos acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as
only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full
title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that the
donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity x x x or words to that effect.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his
cause (e.g. the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise and devise).
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are interpreted holistically, to give effect to the donors
intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as mortis causa dispositions,
the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter vivos, consistent with
the principle that the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the
effect that the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria [but] x
x x are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor. Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos
transfers to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. (Villanueva
vs. Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011, 640 SCRA 308)