MMDA v.

Bel-Air Village Association,

328 SCRA 836,
GR 135962 (2000)
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMDA) is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila, while Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is the registered owner
of Neptune Street, a road inside a private residential subdivision, the Bel-Air Village. On
December 30, 1995, the president of the respondent received from the chairman of MMDA a
notice requesting the respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996. On that same day, the president of the respondent was apprised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished. On January 2, 1996, the respondent instituted an action for injunction against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order.
However, after due hearing, the court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street being a private subdivision road and to cause the demolition of its perimeter
walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by an ordinance.
Issue/s:
1. WON MMDA has the right to order the opening of Neptune and to cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls.

Held: The Court ruled that the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils,
that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlunsod
of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals
did not err in so ruling.
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with
powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality]
and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGUs
corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows
the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit of
government since it is neither an LGU nor a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and
police power.
Moreover, the MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system,
but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify
the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant.
The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

G.R. No. 79956

January 29, 1990

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Executive Order no 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate
economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local
government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the
supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and
activities in the region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a
policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR
and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional
government is established and organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by
issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive no. 220 is Valid
Whether or not CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
Whether or not the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province)
and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

RULING OF THE COURT:

1) Yes. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region
as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we
shall show later. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean
that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region
in the Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the
autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that
E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region,
covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. To determine
policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular
session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development
programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board.
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental
structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the
agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and nongovernmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

2) No. we have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E.O.
No. 220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political
subdivision. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did
not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political
subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public
corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of
property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR
was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of
expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of
1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established
11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional centers and required departments
and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices
therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the
Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical,
efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional
offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with
local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be
provided by law. CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under

the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires
the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and nongovernmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
3) No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in
more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy
is not unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973
Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the
Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act
(R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of
local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to
these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a
legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction
in each of the autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory
coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into
an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SARMIENTO, J.:p
Facts of the Case:
Furthermore, we may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local Government
Code of 1991 (recently signed into law by the President) 18 which provides (as to imposition of
preventive suspensions) as follows:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension
xxx xxx xxx
b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond
sixty (60) days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed
against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.(emphasis supplied)

The main decision refers to the three (3) suspension orders the first, the second and the
third. As shown earlier, the first and the third orders have already been served. It is only the

second order which seems to have been unserved. If we follow the decision which states that
the three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there appears to be no reason why the second order
should not be served for another 60-day period. However, there is no cogent reason why, under
the bizarre circumstances of this case where the respondent Secretary has chosen to impose
preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead of consolidating the several administrative cases of
similar nature and close vintage we cannot allow the concept of simultaneous service to
apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). It would follow then that the second
order is also fully served to this date for the service of said second order would have started on
5 August 1991 (when the main decision was rendered as this was the time when this Court
found and affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspension orders, including the second order).
The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4 October 1991.
It appears that as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there is still
an existing preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil
Action No. 18312, entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et al. 20
One may ask as to the status of the case pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 33 insofar as
the said case involves the issue on the validity of the second preventive suspension order.
Under the main decision of this Court, dated 5 August 1991, second preventive suspension has
been affirmed; under the present resolution, said second preventive suspension has been
served. Consequently, Special Civil Action No. 18312 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City has been rendered moot and academic, insofar as the second preventive suspension order
is concerned.

Issue:
When will petitioner Ganzon may be allowed to re-assume his position and duties as mayor of
Iloilo City? The answer to this question would depend on how petitioner has served the
preventive suspension orders issued against him.

Decision:
As to the petition (docketed CA-G. R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court of Appeals, which
involves the question of the validity of the fourth order, and which has clearly been served,
petitioner admitted that he filed it, on the belief that it was the proper remedy for his
reinstatement to office; thinking that his suspensions have been served and ended. As we have
ruled that petitioner has served the suspension orders decreed in the main decision and in the
light of the finding of this Court that the fourth preventive suspension order has been served, the
issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840; have also become moot and academic, warranting
dismissal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is hereby GRANTED.
The temporary restraining order dated 5 September 1991 is hereby LIFTED. Respondents are
ordered to allow petitioner to re-assume his office as elected Mayor of Iloilo City effective
immediately.
The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 for having become moot and
academic. The Region Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 before which petitioner's action for
prohibition (Special Civil Action No. 18312) is pending is also ordered to dismiss the said case

for having become moot and academic insofar as petitioner prays therein to enjoin his (second)
preventive suspension.
This resolution is without prejudice to the administrative cases (where the first, second, third and
fourth preventive suspension orders were issued) proceeding on the merits thereof. Also, as
decreed in the main decision of 5 August 1991.
. . . petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account
of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to
August 11, 1988. . . .

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN respondent
SARMIENTO, J.:
GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of
Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall
be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the
Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which
the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its
resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions.
What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held:

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X,
Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on
the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it
comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant
to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first
place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in
the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal
as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of
local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is
true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,
since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he
could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called
his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves
behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his
side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

Province of Batangas vs. Romulo

GR 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the
functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No.
OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October
6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify
the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals
and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the
DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and
void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and
2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion
for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund
(LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy
of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, theConstitution
confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Limdistinguishes supervision from
control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to
order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees
to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the just share shall beautomatically
released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any
act to receive the just share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To
subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would
violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the
national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections
of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991
not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the
LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate lawand not
through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations
bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein
which is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general &
substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs
would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy
they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.