Equality, Luck and Hierarchy

Author(s): Ronald Dworkin

Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Spring, 2003), pp. 190-198
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557937 .
Accessed: 04/06/2013 19:22
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Princeton University Press and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Philosophy &Public Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

RONALD DWORKIN

Luckand Hierarchy
Equality,

In a recentarticlein thisjournal,ProfessorSamuelScheffier
criticizes
whathe takesto be an importantnew movementin politicalphilosoHe identifies
me as a luckegalitarian,
and I
phy:"luckegalitarianism."'
I
here.
have
a
But
moregeneralworry
challengethatcharacterization
abouthisthesis.He complainsthatluckegalitarianssubordinatesocial
and politicalequalityto economicequality: he says thatmyown acforexample,is "administrative"
and presupcountofeconomicequality,
the
a
on
takes
social
and politiposes hierarchical
society.He,
contrary,
and supposesthateconomicinequality
cal equalityto be fundamental,
is objectionableonlyifand to theextentthatitunderminesthatsocial
The impulseto see one or anotherdimensionof
and politicalequality.2
is misconceived,
however.A genuinesocietyof
equalityas fundamental
equals mustaim at equal stakeas wellas equal voice and equal status
foritscitizens.Wemustbuildconceptionsofthesedifferent
dimensions
of equalitythatfitwithand drawupon one another,not suppose that
than
eithereconomicorpoliticalor socialequalityis morefundamental
theothers.
I
his definition
of
identifies
me as a luckegalitarian,
AlthoughScheffler
thatmovementin factexcludesme. I do believethatluckshouldplay
1. SamuelScheffler,
"Whatis Egalitarianism?"
& PublicAffairs
Philosophy
31(2003):5-39.
Scheffler's
articleappearedtoolateforme tobe able to respondtoitin a generalresponse
I recently
ofcommentson mybookSovereign
Virtue.
See "Sovereign
publishedto a variety
VirtueRevisited,"Ethics113(2002): 106-43. That articletreatsin more detail some of the is-

takestheterm"luckegalitarian"
fromProfessor
ElizsuesI mentionbriefly
here.Scheffler

abeth Anderson. See Anderson's"What is the Point of Equality?"Ethicslog (1999):287-337.

I discussAnderson's
inmy "Sovereign
Virtue
Revisited."
arguments
2. See Scheffler,
p. 23.

2003 by PrincetonUniversityPress. Philosophy& Public Affairs31,no. 2

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

191

Equality,Luckand Hierarchy

less ofa rolein fixing

thedistribution
ofwealththanit nowdoes in,for
I
But
the
United
States.
do
not
hold the much moreextreme
example,
viewhe attributes
to themovement.He saysthat"[Luckegalitarianism]
has different
butthecentralidea is commonto all ofthesevarivariants,
ants.The coreidea is that... inequalitiesderivingfromunchosenfeaI did notdefendthat"core
turesofpeople'scircumstances
are unjust."P
Virtue.4
"Thegeneralambitionofequalityof
idea" in mybook,Sovereign
resources,..." I said,"is to makecircumstances
equal undersome apI
version
of
the
then
test."'
propriate
envy
argued,overmanypages,that
theappropriate
versionofthattestrequiresnot,as Scheffler's
"coreidea"
suggests,thatpeople be fullycompensatedforanybad luckafterithas
occurred,butratherthatpeoplebe made equal, so faras thisis possible,
in theiropportunity
to insureor provideagainstbad luckbeforeit has
if
that
is
notpossible,thatpeople be awardedthecompenoccurred,or,
sationit is likelytheywouldhave insuredto have iftheyhad had that
Thatlattergoal is not a compromiseor second-bestsoluopportunity.6
tionthatacceptssomeinjusticeoutofnecessity.
Itis whatequality,
propitself
requires.7
erlyunderstood,
Scheffler
denies thata person'snatural
saysthat"luckegalitarianism
innovativeskill,or entrepreneurial
talent,creativity,
intelligence,
ability
can be thebasisforlegitimate
I
that
such
inequalities.""argued
inequalitiesare perfectly
ifa schemeof redistributive
taxationis in
legitimate
thoseinequalitiesbyindemnifying
place thatmitigates
people who lack
suchskillsintheamountmostofthemwouldhaveinsuredto receivehad
insurancebeen availableon fairterms."
He saysthatluckegalitarianism
holds "thatanyextraincomederivingfrompeople'schoicesshould,in
be exemptfromredistributive
principle,
taxation."'I arguefora progressiveincometaxthatis modeledon hypothetical
insuranceand therefore

3. Scheffler,
p. 5.
and PracticeofEquality(Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
4. Sovereign
Virtue:The Theory
Press,2000),hereinafter
University
SV.
5. SV,p. 140.
6. See particularly
SV,chap.2,8,and 9.
7. See thediscussioninSV,pp.340-46.
8. Scheffler,
p. 6.
9. SV,chap.2 and 9.
to. Ibid.

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

& PublicAffairs
Philosophy

192

fallson totalincomewithno exemptionofthatkind.Luckegalitarians,

he says,insistthat"thefactthata person'surgentmedicalneeds can be
behavior"makes
ofhigh-risk
tracedto his ownnegligenceorfoolishness
it"legitimate
to denyhimthecarehe needs,"and that"peopleautomatianyclaimto assistanceifitturnsoutthattheirurgentneeds
callyforfeit
choicesthatsimplyturned
are theresultofprudentor well-considered
outbadly.""I arguedthatequal concernrequiresthateveryonebe given
the benefitof a hypothetical
insuranceregimethatwould meet the
in
has
mind.12
He says thatluckegalitarianism
"enneeds"
he
"urgent
to
scrutinize
the
fellow
citizens
both
of
...
deepestaspects her
courages
selfand to arriveat heavilymoralizedjudgmentsaboutthedegreeofreButtheinsurancescheme
shebearsforherownmisfortune."'1
sponsibility
no
more
invites
citizenstoscrutinize
has
such
effect:
it
no
mentioned
just
their"deepestaspects,"and demandsno morebywayofpersonalmoralizing,thananyotherinsuranceschemethataskspeoplenottolie.So I am
listshold
not a luckegalitarian,
thoughperhapsotherswhomScheffler
moreoftheviewshe takestodefinethatgeneralposition.
I do hold one positionthatScheffler
takesto be characteristic
ofluck
I believethatthe distinctionbetweenpeople's choices
egalitarianism:
and theircircumstancesis of centralimportanceto justice. Scheffler
is notmorallycompelling,
thatthisdistinction
argues,on thecontrary,
In myview,people
and thatmyownwayofdrawingitfaces"difficulties."
areentitledtoreceivesomeformofcompensationwhentheyarehandicapped or lack marketabletalent,but not whenand just because their
isjustified,
I
The distinction
tastesorambitionsareexpensiveto satisfy.14
to
their
can
choose
whether
claim,because people
satisfy
expensive
ambitions.Criticshaveobjectedthatpeople no morechoose tohaveexpensiveambitionsthantheychoose to have handicaps.I agree,butreply(withcommonsense,I think,butagainsttheopinionofmanytheorists)thatthepertinent
questionis notwhetherpeople have chosento
makesthemunbutwhetherhavingthatproperty
have some property,
able to choose among combinationsof occupationand income that
peoplewithoutitarefreeto choose among.'"
11. Scheffler,
pp. 18-19.

12. SV,chap. 2 and 9. See also "SovereignVirtueRevisited,"p. 113.

13. Scheffler,
p. 21.
14. See SV,chap. 2 and 7.

discussionoftheissueis in SV,chap.7.
15. Thefullest

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Equality,Luck and Hierarchy

193

Someonewho is seriouslyhandicappedor withoutmuch marketable

talentis forthatreasonunabletochoosemanyoccupationsthatareopen
to others.Someoneblindfrombirthcannotmakearthistory
his profession,and thatis nottheconsequenceofanychoicehe made. Butsomeone who yearnsfora lifeof leisure,or thinkssuch a lifeparticularly
freeto choose amongotheroccupaappropriateforhim,is nevertheless
tionsand therewardstheybring.He maycomb beaches and giveup a
chance forwealth.Or he may become a lawyerand leave combing
beaches to others.He mayregretthathe cannothave bothleisureand
wealth,but his choice betweenthe two prospectsis in no way less
a choice. Nor is it less a choice because he did not choose to value
leisuremorethanotherpeople do, butjust findshe does. Whateverhe
becomes-poor beachcomberor rich lawyer-he chooses to become
one and could have chosento become theother.His careeris therefore
Itis notlesshischoiceifhis dehischoice,notpartofhiscircumstances.
cisionisinfluenced
ofcharacter.
Mostlazypeoplehavenotchosen
bytraits
to be lazy,buttheyarefreeto overcometheirlaziness,eventhoughthey
mustsometimesmakeextraeffort
at thecostof"welfare"
todo so.
Thisdistinction
betweenchoice and circumstance
is, as I said,familiar in everyday
life.It is subject,however,to well-known
complications
and borderline
cases.Certainstrongformsofdeterminism
denythatthe
is everreal:theysay thatno one is everfreeto choose other
distinction
than as he does choose. My argumentrejectsthat position.Even if
is false,some ambitionsare actuallyobsessions,
strongdeterminism
traitsof characterare actuallycases of mental
and some unfortunate
disease. I conceded thatspecial account mustbe takenof these,and
that the distinctionmightbe hard to draw in certaincases, though
I added thatthe hypothetical
insurancedevicemightmake drawinga
linein some ofthosecases unnecessary.
accountofthe"difficulties"
facesdoes not
Scheffler's
mydistinction
I
takeup the argument havejust summarized,butis ratherbased on a
fewindependentremarksI made. He pointsto mycomment,forexamhis pursuitofhisambitions,"''
traits"affect
ple,thatsomeone'scharacter
and he objectsthatso do his talentsor lack ofthem."But I used that
phrasein a discussionoftherelationbetweencharacterand ambition.
16. SV,p. 322.
17. Scheffler,
p. 20.

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

& PublicAffairs
Philosophy

194

I did notintendto distinguish

in thatwaycharacterfromlackoftalent,
bothofwhichofcourseaffect
how successfulone is. He also notesthatI
withtheirambitionsand take"consesaythatpeople usually"identify"
fortheirown personalities."'"
He objects that
quentialresponsibility
take
also
for
consequentialresponsibility theirexceptionmanypeople
because
talents
allygreat
theythinktheydeserveto keep all theincome
theseproduce.'"Mypointin thepassage he refersto,however,
was only
thatordinarypeople do notthinkthemselvesabsolvedfrommoralrebecause theyhavenotchosenthemotivesoutofwhichthey
sponsibility
of
and
thatalso appliesto thechoicestheymakein deploycourse
act,
withtheirexceptionaltalingtheirtalents.He saysthatpeople identify
ents.20Yes,theydo, in the sense thattheythinkoftheseas advantages
and central
theywanttokeep,and thathelpto definewhatis important
to theirlives.Butit does notfollowthattheyidentify
withtheirhandicaps orlackoftalent,whichis theissuenowin point.Surelyallbuta few
in thosewayswouldprefer
ofthosewhosuffer
thattheirhandicapswere
curedand thattheirtalentswereimproved.2'
II
mainchargeis thatluckegalitarianism
ignoresthetraditional
Scheffler's
heartofegalitariantheory.Luckegalitarians,
he says,argueoverscholasticdifferences
butmakeno effort
to defendtheir
amongthemselves,
generalviewagainstcriticsof theirwhole approach,or to locate their
opinionsin any deeper and more embracingaccount of equalityas a
18. SV,p. 290.

19. Scheffler,
p. 20.
20. Ibid.

21. Scheffler
alsoendorsesProfessor
remark
thatitis difficult
toreconAnthony
Appiah's
cilemyviewthathandicapsaregroundsforcompensation
witha claimI makein a differVirtue(see SV,chap.6) whichis thatpeopleshouldtaketheirgeneral
entpartofSovereign
circumstances
intoaccountas "parameters"
in decidinghowto live.(See Scheffler,
n. 40,
toK.Anthony
ofWhat?"TheNewYorkReviewofBooks,
26April
Appiah,"Equality
referring
he saw;andneitherdoes Scheffler.
There
2001, 63-68.)Appiahdidnotexplainthedifficulty
is no obviousinconsistency:
I emphasized,in mydiscussionofethicalparameters,
that
"[w]ecannotdescribethechallengeoflivingwell,thatis,withoutmakingsomeassumptionsabouttheresourcesa good lifeshouldhave availableto it.We musttherefore
find
some suitableaccountof thewayin whichresourcesenterethicsas parameters
of the
no alternative
buttobringjusticeintothatstorybystipulatgoodlife,andwe have,I think,
thatjusticerequires"(SV,p. 264).
ingthata goodlifeis a lifesuitedtothecircumstances

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Equality,Luckand Hierarchy

195

He generouslysaysthatI am "one
generalsocial and politicalvirtue.22
writerwho can be interpreted
as attempting
to anchorluck-egalitarian
principles in an ideal of equality . . . the ideal of treatingpeople as
that"[Dworkin's]
ideal ofequalityis
equals."23Buthe adds immediately
not the same as the social and politicalideal I have described."24My

administrative
ideal.Myclaimthat"equal
ideal,he says,is a hierarchical
shows a preoccupation
concern"is a sovereignvirtueof government
withthe questionofhow powerfulofficialsshoulddistribute
the comwealth
to
their
and
the
more
basic
social
and
ignores
munity's
subjects
of
dimensions
political
equality.
Scheffler's
Virtueis explicable,I believe,onlyon
readingof Sovereign
thedangerousassumptionI describedearlier,whichis thatthedimensionsofequalityaresomehowcompetitive,
so thatmyemphasison economicequalityin twoearlychaptersofthatbook signalsan indifference
in
to social and politicalequalityand therefore
a toleranceofhierarchy,
spiteoftherestofmybook.In facthe supportshis claimwithonlytwo
I think,thatwhen,in his
He says,first,
that"itis noteworthy,
arguments.
famoustwo-partarticle,'Whatis Equality?,'Dworkinfirstbroachesthe
questionofhowtheideal oftreating
people as equals mightbestbe aphe does so withreference
to theexample
pliedto issuesofdistribution,
ofa wealthyman who is decidinghow,in drawingup hiswill,to divide
hiswealthamonghischildren,
each ofwhomhas different
needs,ambideconstructive
tions,and tastes."25
Although
literary
theorymakesmuch
use of criticalmaneuversofthiskind-callingattentionto an author's
imagesand examplesand arguingthatthesebetraya hiddenagenda-I
In anycase,
thoughtphilosophyhappilyfreeofthatparticularstrategy.
thetestatorexampleis hardlyan important
one. The chaptersofSoverhas inmindaredominatedbya verydifferent
Scheffler
image:
eignVirtue
thatofa groupofsettlersagreeingamongthemselveshowbestto divide
withno hintofautocracy.
commonresources,
second argumentnotesthatI rejectwhatI call equalityof
Scheffler's
as a goal,and thenadds,"Theupshotis thatDworkin's
politicalinfluence
idealofequalitydoes notrequireorevenpermitan equal distribution
of
22.

Scheffler,
pp. 13-15.

23. Scheffler,
p. 34.

24. Ibid.
25. Scheffler,
p. 35.

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

& PublicAffairs
Philosophy

196

of resourcesthatit does
power; and the kind of equal distribution
with
is
not
social
or even,as he himself
require
incompatible
hierarchy
ButI define"influence"
as a technical
says,with'benevolenttyranny."'26
is hispowertoaffect
howotherpeople
term:someone'spoliticalinfluence
vote.27Bill Gates and KennethLay both have had much greaterthan
Butso didThomasJefferson,
WalterLippmann
averagepoliticalinfluence.
tothedegreewe can,extra
and MartinLutherKing.Wewanttoeliminate,
influencethatcomes frommoney.28But we certainlydo not want to
mindorinfectious
eliminateextrainfluencethatcomesfroma powerful
and
that
is
I
influence
as a goal.29Itcould
of
idealism,
why rejectequality
be realized,in anycase,onlythrough
an extravagant
totalitarianism
that
forbidsany politicaldiscussionat all. In fact,I emphasizeratherthan
denigratetheimportanceofpoliticalequalityunderstoodin a moresattwicerefersto my statementthatdistributive
isfactory
way.Scheffler
butthenacknowlequalitymightbe producedbya "benevolenttyrant,"
"forother
edges in a footnotethatI wouldrejecta benevolenttyranny
reasons."30In fact,myreasonsare exactlythosehe denies I have: I say
that"no tyranny
could advance theparticipatory
goals anyegalitarian
wouldalso aim to secure."31
community
Scheffler
citesJohnRawlsas a theoristwho differs
fromme because
Rawls's"questionis whichprinciplesofjusticeare most consistent,
in
withthefreedom
and equalityofpersons."32Scheffler
modernconditions,
that
saysthatmyownproject"contrasts
sharplywithan egalitarianism
beginsfromthe questionof whatrelationships
among equals are like
and goes on fromthereto considerwhatkindsof social and political
are appropriateto a societyof equals.""33I musttherefore
institutions
to saythatI did mean to addressthosequestions,
takethisopportunity
one political
valueas fundamental
so thatothers
not,itis true,byselecting
are subordinate-notby designating
a particularvalue as the one with
an interpretive
whichone "begins"-butthrough
methodthatemphasizes
26. Scheffler,
pp.36-37.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

SV,chap. 4.

See SV,chap.4 andio.

pp. 194-98.
SV,
Scheffler,
p. 37,n. 76.
SV,p. 187.

32. Scheffler,
p. 31.
33. Scheffler,
p. 37.

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

197

Equality,Luckand Hierarchy

and interdependencies
interrelations
among all the politicalvalues,
in
an
overallaccountof a societyof
to
come
them
together
supposing
Virtuedoes tryto developegalitariantheoryin some
equals." Sovereign
does suggest
and institutional
concretelegislative
detail,and ittherefore
shouldand shouldnotbehave.Butit steadilyophowpoliticalofficials
poses hierarchy.
deScheffler
emphasizestheimportanceofthecontemporary
rightly
bate about racial,genderand otherformsof discrimination?.3But he
I think,thedegreeto whicheconomicinequalityboth
underestimates,
flowsfromand exacerbatestheseotherchallengesto equal citizenship.
In anycase,itis unclearwhyeconomicequalityshouldnotbe supposed
thathe seems to denyit.The distrito have the independentauthority
ofitslawsand policies,not
butionthatanysocietyachievesis a function
ambition:itdeclares,
definesthatinterpretive
to Sovereign
Virtue
34. TheIntroduction
as a fundamental
p. 5) and it
principle,thathumanlivesare of "equal importance"(SV,
lookstoward"a plausibletheoryofall thecentralpoliticalvalues-of democracy,
liberty
and civilsocietyas wellas ofequality-thatshowseach ofthesegrowingout ofand reaboutthevalueofa huflectedinall theothers... and [in]evenmorebasiccommitments
to realizethatvalue in his own life"(SV,
man lifeand about each person'sresponsibility
equalityandtherestofthebooktries
p. 4).Chapters
1and2 setoutan accountofdistributive
to showhowthisaccountis supportedbyand supportsotherdimensionsofequalityand
othervalues.Chapter3 exploreshow"thefreedomand equalityofpersons"is bestunderone another:thatchapterargues"thatlibertyand equalityare not
stoodas supporting
independentvirtues,but aspectsofthe same ideal of politicalassociation"(SV,p. 182).
defendsa conceptionofdemocracythat"blursthedisChapter4,on "PoliticalEquality,"
tinctionbetweeninputand output,betweenpoliticalequalityand the otheraspectsof
justice(SV,p. 188);thatchapterarguesthatfree
theory"includingdistributive
egalitarian
mandarinsand insiston inand equal citizensmustrejectgovernment
byadministrative
dependentmoralagencyone byone:"Wedo notengagein politicsas moralagentsunless
and an adequatepoliticalprocessmust
we sensethatwhatwe do can makea difference,
obstacles,to preservethatpotentialpowerforeveryone"(SV,
strive,againstformidable
according
conceptionofdemocracy,
p. 202).Chapterto definesanddefendsa "partnership"
towhich"government
byall thepeople,actingtogether
by'thepeople'meansgovernment
ofself-government"
in a collectiveenterprise
as fulland equal partners
(SV,p. 358).Chaptersii and 12defendraciallysensitiveadmissionsand hiringpoliciesnot on traditional
theconditionsofgenuinesocialequality
justice,butbyidentifying
groundsofrestorative
actionplansbe judgedon theirpracticalpowerto helprealthataffirmative
and insisting
ize thoseconditions.Chapter5, on "LiberalCommunity,"
arguesthat"politicalcommucommunallifeis
nitieshavea communallife,and thesuccessorfailureofa community's
whetherits members'livesare good or bad" (SV,p. 223),and
partofwhatdetermines
is an appropriate
Chapter6, on "Equalityand theGood Life,"that"ethicalindividualism"
formembersofa genuinely
community.
egalitarian
personalphilosophy
35. Scheffler,
p. 38.

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

198

& PublicAffairs
Philosophy

and taxlaws,but thefull,complexlegalstructure

that
onlyitsproperty
in
itscitizensand officialsenactand enforce.Ifthelaws weredifferent
ofwealthwouldin consequence
even minorrespects,thedistribution
oflawsthatwe can imagine,some citibe different.
Underanystructure
zens facebleakerprospectsfortheirentirelives-or at leastless glowing
ofequals themaprospects-thanothers,and in a genuinecommunity
joritymustexplainto thosewhose prospectsare worsewhyit has not
underwhichtheirprospectswould be
chosen a different
arrangement
better.
It is hardlyenoughto say (althoughmanypoliticalphilosophersapparentlythinkit is enough)thatsocietyowes everyonecare fortheir
mostbasic needs,but noteconomicequality.It is nota questionofdisbasic needswere
cretepriorobligation,butofequal status.Ifeveryone's
had
an
to
theirlivesmuch
still
make
but
some
citizens
met,
opportunity
variedor interesting
thanotherscould,the
moreexciting,
productive,
resourceswiththat
questionwouldremainwhetherlaws thatdistribute
Nor
is
it
are
to
consequence
justified.
enough say thatifwhat Rawls
essentials"are satisfied,
thenproceduralfairness
called "constitutional
the play of ordinarypoliticsproduces.
justifieswhateverdistribution
Ordinary
politicsis a matterofpeople and theirrepresentatives
voting
in one wayratherthananother,and theissue persists,at everylevelof
politicaldecision,whethertheyshouldvoteto changetheirlaws so as
moreperfectly
to recognizetheequal importanceofeverycitizen'slife.It
is an inescapablepartofthatquestionin whatwaysand towhatdegree
people'sresourcesshouldbe permittedto varywiththeirluck.My anis complex,and it is of coursecontroversial.
swer,in SovereignVirtue,
ButthechallengeI describemustbe metin someway.

This content downloaded from 143.107.8.10 on Tue, 4 Jun 2013 19:22:55 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions