Attorney General v.

Adolf Eichmann
The crimes perpetrated by the Nazis during Hitlers reign against Jewish citizens were some of the worst
recorded in history. Although accurate figures may never be known, it is estimated that some 6 million
Jewish individuals died men, women, and children from all over Europe. They were deported from their
homes in large freight trains in appalling conditions, others starved or froze to death, others still were
taken away to concentration camps where the fit were forced to perform manual labor whilst the weak
were shot to death or later, gassed to death in their thousands.
The Appellant, Adolf Eichmann, was an Austrian by birth who volunteered to work for the Security Service
(SD) in Berlin. He rose through the ranks and eventually occupied the position of Head of Section
(Referant) for Jewish Affairs charged with all matters related to the implementation of the Final Solution to
the Jewish Question. In this capacity, he oversaw the transport and deportation of Jewish persons, set up
and personally ran an operations center in Hungary in order to implement the Final Solution there,
organized the transfer of money from evacuated Jews to the State and was responsible for the
administration of the camps at Terezin and Bergen-Belsen.
He was captured by Israeli Security Forces in Argentina and handed over to the District Court of
Jerusalem to stand trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people.
He was convicted of all 15 counts and sentenced to death by the District Court of Jerusalem. His appeal
was rejected by the Supreme Court of Israel and he was executed by hanging a few minutes before
midnight on 31 May 1962.
In May 1960, the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, abducted Eichmann from his hiding place in
Argentina and transferred him to Jerusalem to face an Israeli court.
The trial commenced on 11 April 1961 with the indictment charging Eichmann with 15 counts of crimes
against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes and membership in an organization
declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 15 years earlier. On 11 December
1961, Eichmann was convicted on all 15 counts and sentenced to death.
He appealed on both legal and factual grounds against his conviction and sentence. On 31 January 1962
and 15 February 1962, his Counsel submitted written pleadings to the Supreme Court.
Eichmann was executed by hanging on 31 May 1962.
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Appellant was a member of the Austrian SS and later
volunteered for a position with the Head Office of the Security Service (SD) in Berlin (para. 59 of trial
judgment). When the SD merged with the State Secret Police (Gestapo) to form the Head Office for Reich
Security (RSHA), the Accused occupied the role of Special Officer of Zionist Affairs (para. 61 of trial
judgment). He was transferred to Vienna in 1938 to administer the Central Office for the Emigration of
Austrian Jews (para. 64). His success was such that approximately 150,000 Austrian Jews were forced to
emigrate and he was appointed head of the new Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration in October
1939 (para. 65 of trial judgment).
From the outbreak of the War to mid-1941, the Accused devised and carried out the mass deportation of
Jewish persons from his role as the Special Referent for Emigration and Evacuation within the RSHA
(paras. 71-75 of trial judgment) and explored the possibility of setting up a slave Jewish state in
Madagascar (para. 76 of trial judgment).
In early 1942, the Accused was appointed the Referant of the RSHA in matters connected to the Final
Solution (para. 88 of trial judgment). In implementing the Final Solution, the Accused received information
as to the number of persons to be expelled (para. 90 of Trial Judgement), organized the transfer of money
from evacuated Jews for the disposal of the SS (para. 91 of trial judgment), and oversaw the handling of
the transport of Jews (para. 93 of trial judgment), not only in the Reich but also in other countries (para.
98 of trial judgment). In particular, he headed the Eichmann Special Operations Unit in Hungary and did
his utmost to carry out the Final Solution (para. 111 of trial judgment). These "Transport Jews" were taken

to concentration camps and those who were unfit for hard labor were exterminated immediately (para.
145 of trial judgment).
In autumn 1942, a cover up effort was begun as bodies in mass graves were burned in an effort to hide
the slaughter (para. 148 of trial judgment). The concentration camps were evacuated (para. 149 of trial
judgment) the Accused in particular was responsible for all administrative matters connected with the
Terezin Ghetto (para. 152 of trial judgment) and the camp at Bergen-Belsen (para. 153 of trial judgment).

Core issues
1. Is the Law of 1950 contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law or to the principle of
territorial sovereignty?
2. Does the Law of 1950 conflict with the principle of territorial sovereignty?
3. Can the Appellant rely on the Act of State doctrine to excuse his criminal responsibility?

Specific legal rules and provisions

Sections 1(a)(1),(2),(3), 1(b) and 8 of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law.
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A person who has committed one of the following offenses--1. Did, during the period of the Nazi regime, in hostile country, an act constituting a
crime agaist the Jewish people;
2. Did, during the period of the Nazi regime, in a hostile country, an act constituting
a crime against humanity;
3. Did, during the period of the Second World War, in a hostile country, an act
constituting a war crime;
is liable to death penalty.

Court's holding and analysis

1. There is no rule of general customary international law, which prohibits the enactment of retroactive
penal legislation. Furthermore, the argument that to punish an individual for conduct which was not yet
criminal at the time of its commission would be unethical loses its force in face of the odious crimes
committed by the Appellant. The Appellants contention that the Law of 1950 is therefore contrary to the
principle of non-retroactivity and cannot therefore apply to the Appellant is rejected (para. 8).
2. There is no rule of general customary international law that the principle of territorial sovereignty
prohibits the enactment of a criminal law applicable to extra-territorial crimes committed by a foreign
national. The Appellants second ground of appeal must also be rejected (para. 9).
These findings are reinforced by positive international law: the crimes for which the Appellant was
convicted were international crimes under international law entailing individual criminal responsibility at
the time that they were committed (para. 11), and their universal character is such that each State is
vested with the power to try and punish anyone who assisted in their commission (para. 12).
3.Finally, the Appellant contends that his crimes were Acts of the State, the responsibility for which rests
with the State alone and another State has no right to punish the person who committed the act, save
with the consent of the state whose mission he carried out. This ground of appeal was rejected by the
Supreme Court as there is no basis for applying the doctrine to acts prohibited by international law,
particularly in cases of such heinous international crimes. This was affirmed by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg (para. 14)