Professional Psychology: Research and Practice

2015, Vol. 46, No. 4, 270 276

2015 American Psychological Association

0735-7028/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pro0000021

Beliefs About Therapist Suggestiveness and Memory Veracity in

Recovered-Memory Therapy: An Analogue Study
Bryan Myers, Jennifer Myers, Phillip Herndon, Nastassia Broszkiewicz, and Maria Tar

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

University of North Carolina Wilmington

Recovered-memory therapy (RMT) is controversial, largely because the practice is regarded by many
memory experts as highly suggestible. However, we know little about how the public regards these
practices. A sample of college students (N 118) was randomly assigned to watch 1 of 4 videotaped
enactments of a series of therapy sessions in which the client eventually reported a recovered memory
of childhood sexual abuse. The therapy conditions were identical except for the level of suggestiveness
employed by the therapist (i.e., control, expectation, guided imagery, hypnosis). The results indicated that
participants in the expectation, guided-imagery, and hypnosis groups saw the therapist as significantly
more suggestive than those in the control condition. However, participants judged the competency of the
therapist and the veracity of the memory reports equally high across all 4 conditions. These findings
suggest that the lay public may recognize the suggestive practices of therapists engaged in RMT, but they
fail to see their relation to the accuracy of the memories reported by clients, or question the competence
of the therapist.
Keywords: recovered memories of abuse, false memories, suggestive memory practices

Evidence-based practice in psychology (EBPP) reflects recognition that psychologists are scientists, and the techniques used in
patient care should be evaluated based on their efficacy as well as
their clinical utility (APA Presidential Task Force, 2006). Although much of the focus has been on getting clinicians to adopt
practices that are empirically supported (Gallo & Barlow, 2012),
an equally legitimate concern may be getting practitioners to
discontinue unsupported treatments, as the reliance on both supported and unsupported treatments is common (Pignotti & Thyer,
2009). Whereas the number of supported treatments has expanded
considerably with the enhanced emphasis on EBPP (Kazdin,
2014), the discontinued use of less supported techniques remains a
challenge. As Lilienfeld, Ritschel, Lynn, Cautin, and Latzman
(2014) have noted, a variety of inferential errors conspire to
promote unsupported beliefs about the treatment efficacy of psychotherapy practices that are ineffective or even risky. Indeed,

once a practice gains a following, it may be difficult to convince

practitioners that the efficacy is not well-established, and/or that
inherent risks associated with the practice may outweigh any
benefits.
The use of recovered-memory therapy (RMT) to help retrieve
early memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been criticized extensively on the grounds that these suggestive techniques
carry risks for false-memory reports (Lindsay & Read, 1994;
Lynn, Krackow, Loftus, & Lock, 2013; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003;
Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, &
Milling, 2002). RMT involves a number of techniques designed to
help clients recall previously unrecalled events (Shobe & Kihlstrom, 2002). Two techniques often used in RMT are hypnosis and
guided imagery (Lindsay & Read, 1994). Both these methods
involve assisting clients to relax and engage in imagined experiences with the assistance of the therapist, who suggests what is to

This article was published Online First June 8, 2015.

BRYAN MYERS received his PhD in Experimental Psychology from Ohio
University in Athens, Ohio in 1998. He is currently professor of psychology at the University of North Carolina Wilmington. His research interests
include forensic psychology, jury decision making, and false memories.
JENNIFER MYERS received her MA in Clinical Psychology at Western
Carolina University in Cullowhee, North Carolina in 1997. She is currently
a lecturer and clinical Training coordinator in the Department of Psychology at the University of North Carolina Wilmington. She is a licensed
psychological associate in North Carolina and has a part-time clinical
practice. Her professional interests include clinical treatment of children
and adolescents and marital therapy.
PHILLIP HERNDON received his MA in General Psychology at the University of North Carolina Wilmington in 2006. He is currently a private
business owner in Wilmington NC. His professional interests include the
treatment of severe and persistent mental illness, and his research interests
include false memories of CSA.

NASTASSIA BROSZKIEWICZ received her MA in Psychology with a

concentration in substance abuse treatment psychology at the University of North Carolina Wilmington in 2014. She is currently a licensed
psychological associate working in Charlotte, North Carolina. Her
research and professional interests involve the suggestibility and malleability of memory, forensic psychology, substance abuse, and health
psychology.
MARIA TAR received her MSW at the University of North Carolina
Wilmington in 2012. She is a licensed clinical social worker employed at
Coastal Horizons Behavioral Health Center in Wilmington, North Carolina, and has a private practice. Her professional interests include mental
health treatment of children, adolescents, and adults in the areas of depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant disorder,
and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to
Bryan Myers, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina Wilmington, Wilmington, NC 28403. E-mail: myersb@uncw.edu
270

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BELIEFS ABOUT RMT

be imagined (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Lynn & Kirsch, 2005;

Thayer & Lynn, 2006).
For proponents of RMT, these techniques aid clients in remembering previously forgotten memories for events that, once remembered, can lead to a reduction in symptomatology as they begin to
understand these memories with the help of the therapist (Cannell,
Hudson, & Pope, 2001). Supporters of this approach note that
traumatic experiences are remembered and stored differently than
other experiences (e.g., Alpert, Brown, & Courtois, 1998; Brown,
Scheflin, & Hammond, 1998; Spiegel, 1997). They further contend
that there is ample documentation to support the notion that
delayed recall of traumatic memories can emerge after a period of
amnesia (Harvey & Herman, 1994). In addition, they regard the
recovery of these memories as necessary to the clients recovery
(Gorman, 2008), and this is a position endorsed by a great number
of psychotherapists (see Palm & Gibson, 1998). Because of the
traumatic nature of the abuse and the early age at which it occurred, recovery of memories surrounding these events are judged
to require specific techniques (e.g., hypnosis and guided imagery)
that assist in retrieval (Courtois, 1992). Further, advocates of RMT
regard the evidence that these recovery methods generate false
memories as unfounded, as it is based primarily on laboratory
studies that bear little resemblance to the techniques used in
psychotherapy (Alpert et al., 1998).
Critics of RMT contend that evidence for the efficacy of these
techniques is not empirically supported. For example, Lief and
Fetkewitz (1995) reported that clients undergoing RMT showed
marked deterioration, including an increase in suicidal thoughts
and self-mutilation. Thayer and Lynn (2006) and Littrell (1998)
have noted that re-experiencing traumatic events is not cathartic,
but rather, can have negative consequences. Stocks (1998) reviewed a number of studies in which RMT was used to uncover
early memories of abuse, and in each instance, clients showed an
increase in both the frequency and severity of symptoms after
undergoing RMT. More frequently, however, critics of RMT have
noted that these recovery methods risk the production of falsememory reports, and so these researchers have warned against
their use (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Lynn et al., 2013; Ornstein et al.,
1998; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999; Stocks, 1998; Thayer &
Lynn, 2006).
Although much has been written about the risks of false memories arising from RMT, the practice is not rare. Numerous surveys
have shown that RMT has been frequently used by therapists
(Poole, Lindsay, Memon, & Bull, 1995) and taught in graduate
programs (Maki & Syman, 1997), and they have continued to be
advocated in the published literature (e.g., Colangelo, 2007;
Degun-Mather, 2006). Indeed, more recent studies have suggested
that therapists continue to engage in RMT or endorse questionable
beliefs about memory recovery, such as the belief that repressed
memories can be accurately recalled in therapy (Legault & Laurence, 2007; Magnussen & Melinder, 2012; Ost, Wright, Easton,
Hope, & French, 2013; Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus,
2014).
Although hypnosis and guided imagery are two common methods in RMT that could lead to an increased tendency for falsememory reports, the act of establishing an expectation that early
abuse is likely may alone be sufficient to promote false memories.
Consequently, informing clients, in and of itself, that their symptoms indicate they were likely abused, despite their inability to

271

recall abuse, may increase the potential for false memories. Davis,
Loftus, and Follette (2001) refer to this as the power of belief (p.
150), and note that client expectations arise as a consequence of
the therapists conviction that CSA is the source of the clients
current problems.
The role of expectations in memory-reporting errors has been
empirically supported. For example, Chan and Lapaglia (2011)
noted that suggestibility is increased with repeated questioning.
Lynn, Malinoski, and Green (1999) demonstrated that subtle wording differences that varied the expectation that an earlier memory
was retrievable (e.g., Tell me when you get an earlier memory)
versus (e.g., If you do not remember, its alright) produced
statistically significant differences in memory reporting (cited in
Lynn et al., 2013). Consequently, therapists operating from the
stance that abuse is presumed to be true may also create expectations in clients conducive to generating false-memory reports.
Despite the widespread coverage of the recovered-memory debate in psychology journals, the public remains generally unaware
of the debate concerning RMT (Nachson et al., 2007). What clients
do know about psychotherapy and the benefits and dangers of the
techniques used is likely to come from the therapists themselves,
as education/indoctrination is a common element in therapy (Price
& Hescheles, 1999). Many therapists regard the recovery of early
memories of abuse as critical to treatment success (Palm & Gibson, 1998), and clients are typically deferential to therapists and
unlikely to challenge their perspectives (Rennie, 1994). Consequently, for those clients introduced to RMT, there is reason to
believe they are unlikely to take a skeptical stance toward this
treatment approach, and therefore information about the risks of
false memories arising from these practices would need to come
from the therapists.
In addition, how the public regards RMT is generally not well
understood. In one of the few studies to assess how the public
regards memory-recovery practices, Coleman, Stevens, and
Reeder (2001) presented participants with a malpractice suit
against a therapist who engaged in RMT, leading the client to
recover a memory of CSA that turned out to be false. Participants
rated the hypnosis as a causal contributor to the false memory, and
judged the therapists competence as poor when the techniques
described were highly suggestive. However, this was in the context
of a trial, in which the memory was first identified as false and the
techniques used to recover the memory were only briefly described. Fusco and Platania (2011) found that public perceptions of
hypnosis impacted liability in a civil sexual abuse case. These
results suggest that jurors may be more skeptical of hypnotically
derived memories, lending support to the findings of Coleman et
al. (2001). Wilson, Greene, and Loftus (1986) found that as much
as 70% of their participants had a generally favorable opinion of
hypnosis for memory enhancement, but they remained more likely
to trust the testimony of a witness who had not been hypnotized
over one who had undergone hypnosis to aid recall. Furthermore,
Knight (2005) examined general perceptions of hypnosis outside
of the legal context, and the findings indicated that undergraduate
students who were presented with an informational presentation on
hypnosis were less likely to accept inaccurate information regarding hypnosis. The results of the study indicate that public perceptions of hypnosis are generally favorable for facilitating repressed
memories. But, in each of these instances, those surveyed about
their attitudes had little opportunity to witness the techniques they

MYERS, MYERS, HERNDON, BROSZKIEWICZ, AND TAR

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272

were asked about. The question remains how individuals would

come to regard these techniques if they had the opportunity to
watch them in practice. In addition, if these methods do risk
false-memory creation, would clients identify the risks of false
memories if they witnessed these recovery practices in detail, but
were never told the memories turned out to be false?
The purpose of the present study was not to revisit the
recovered-memory debate. Rather, the goal was to examine how
the public regards recovered-memory practices, and whether they
perceive these methods as suggestive and potentially leading to
false memories. In past studies that have examined attitudes about
memory-recovery practices (e.g., Coleman et al., 2001), the methods were only identified, or only briefly described, and so participants would have little opportunity to understand what these
methods involve. According to a number of memory researchers,
suggestive memory-recovery practices risk generating false memories (see Lindsay & Read, 1994). We investigated whether the
public recognizes the risks associated with these recovery methods
in the present study.

Method
Participants and Procedure
Recruited from an introductory psychology class participant
pool, a total of 78 women ranging in age from 17 to 48 (M 19.2;
SD 3.6) and 40 men ranging in age from 18 to 38 (M 20.0;
SD 3.2) participated. The study was advertised as Lay Perceptions of Therapy, and participants were told they would be watching a series of psychotherapy-session enactments. A priori we
established 30 participants per condition as a sufficient number to
achieve adequate power for our measures based on a moderate
effect size. We arranged for three participants to arrive at each
session, but because some participants did not show up as scheduled, our sample sizes across conditions were not equal. Three
participants who could not correctly answer four basic questions
about what took place during the videos were removed from the
final sample reported here.
Participants watched videotaped portrayals of a series of psychotherapy sessions that took place over 4 weeks, and were randomly assigned in groups of up to three participants to one of four
video conditions that were identical except for the manner in
which the therapist attempted to elicit memories of early childhood
abuse. Privacy dividers ensured that participants could not see one
another. The conditions were (a) no highly suggestive practices
(i.e., control), (b) suggestion of suspected abuse only (i.e., therapist
expectation), (c) suggestion of suspected abuse followed by guided
imagery techniques, and (d) suggestion of suspected abuse followed by hypnosis. The tape lasted approximately 40 46 min,
depending on the condition. After the tape was finished, participants were given a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of the
therapy sessions.

Materials
Mock-therapy videotape. Each videotape depicted four simulated psychotherapy sessions taking place over the course of 4
weeks, and each videotape was identical across conditions except
for the third session, which varied according to the level and

manner of suggestion used by the therapist to encourage the client

to recall memories of CSA. Sessions depicted the conversations
between the therapist and the client, and the camera was situated
so both actors could be easily seen. Participants were informed that
they were watching portions of four separate sessions that took
place over 4 weeks, and the length of the sessions ranged from 5
min (Session 4) to 17 min (Session 3).
The therapy sessions were written by a licensed psychotherapist
with over 7 years of experience in the field, and she also played the
role of the therapist in the videos. The client (Sarah) was a
university student who entered the counseling center complaining
of depression and sleep disturbances. During the initial session, in
the course of a standard intake, Sarah responded that she had no
prior history of sexual abuse when directly asked about it by the
therapist. In the second session, Sarah revealed her history of an
eating disorder, specifically caloric restriction, and indicated that
those tendencies were re-emerging of late. The third session involved the presence/absence of suggestive methods used to recover an early memory of abuse (detailed below). In the fourth
session, Sarah asked to see the therapist prior to their scheduled
session, in which she revealed that since the last session, she had
recovered a memory of being sexually abused as a child by her
father.
Control. In the third session, Sarah described her attempts to
punish herself with caloric restriction on days she felt anxious. She
was again asked if she was ever sexually abused, and again she
reported that she was never abused. The therapist made no additional attempts to recover memories of the abuse.
Expectation. The expectation condition was identical to the
control condition with the exception that the therapist informed
Sarah that (a) she exhibited symptoms consistent with early sexual
abuse, (b) many clients repress their early traumatic experiences
such as sexual abuse, (c) memory recovery is critical to her
treatment success, and (d) as many as 33% of adult women were
sexually abused as a child and many had no memories of this abuse
years later.
Guided imagery. This condition was identical to the expectation condition except that, after learning that she may be repressing memories of abuse, Sarah agrees to undergo a guided-imagery
procedure she is told will help her recover the abuse memory. The
procedure involved relaxation techniques followed by imagining a
series of events, such as her father putting her to bed as a child
while she described the feelings and sensations (e.g., sounds,
smells) associated with that event.
Hypnosis. This condition is identical to the guided-imagery
condition except that the procedure was labeled hypnosis, and
Sarah underwent a hypnotic induction whereby she was asked to
imagine herself descending a staircase as she fell deeper into
hypnosis. Sarah was told the hypnotic induction would help her
recover the abuse memory.
Questionnaires. Participants were asked to make ratings on
four items, and each item was on a 6-point scale. They were first
asked: Sarah told the therapist that she recalled that her father
sexually molested her when she was a little girl. How accurate was
Sarahs memory of the incident? The options they were given
ranged from not at all accurate (1) to extremely accurate (6).
Participants then responded to the question: Do you believe the
sexual molestation actually occurred? Here, the options ranged
from definitely did not occur (1) to definitely did occur (6). Next,

BELIEFS ABOUT RMT

participants rated whether the therapist was competent, with options ranging from not at all competent (1) to extremely competent
(6). Participants rated whether the therapist was suggestive, with
options ranging from not at all (1) to very much (6). Participants
were also asked whether they had a previous experience seeing a
mental health therapist, and to indicate if they would terminate
therapy (no or yes) if they had been the client depicted in the
video.1

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Results
A one-way ANOVA conducted on ratings of therapist suggestiveness revealed significant differences across the four conditions,
F(3, 114) 8.88, p .001, 2 .19. Post hoc analyses (Tukeys
HSD) revealed that participants in the control group rated suggestiveness as significantly lower than those in the remaining three
groups, which failed to differ from one another.
The veracity of the abuse allegation was scored with a composite measure that averaged ratings on whether the molestation
occurred, and whether the memory report by Sarah was accurate
( .78). When items are correlated, creating composite scores
and conducting ANOVAs on the composite scores are considered
a more appropriate and powerful approach than conducting multivariate analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). A one-way
ANOVA revealed no significant differences across the four conditions for veracity scores, F(3, 114) .36, p .78, 2 .009.
A separate one-way ANOVA on competency ratings across the
four conditions also revealed no significant differences, F(3,
114) .64, p .59, 2 .017, as all four groups rated the
therapist as highly competent. See Table 1 for means and standard
deviations for ratings of therapist suggestiveness, memory-report
veracity, and therapist competency across the four conditions.
For brevity, factorial ANOVAs including gender have not been
reported. For all three measures of veracity, competency, and
suggestiveness, no main effects or interactions involving gender
were significant. In addition, ANCOVAS were conducted for all
analyses concerning condition and the three dependent variables
using gender as a covariate, and no changes were observed with
our findings, suggesting that differences in the proportion of females across the four conditions did not mask significant differences.
Pearson correlations revealed that therapist suggestiveness was
unrelated to beliefs in the veracity of the memory report or perceived competence of the therapist (see Table 2). No prior expe-

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Suggestiveness, Veracity,
and Competency Ratings Across the Four Conditions
Suggestiveness

Veracity

Competence

Condition

SD

SD

SD

Control
Expectation
Guided imagery
Hypnosis

28
24
32
34

3.79a
5.00b
4.94b
5.12b

1.42
1.14
.91
.98

28
24
32
34

4.05
3.96
4.14
4.21

.92
.95
.89
1.04

28
24
32
34

4.82
4.63
4.97
4.97

1.22
.97
1.00
1.03

Note. Judgments were made on a 6-point scale. Means in the same

column that do not share subscripts differ at p .05 based on Tukey HSD
post hoc analysis.

273

Table 2
Correlations for Suggestiveness, Veracity, Competency, and
Intent to Terminate
Variable

Veracity

Competency

Terminate

Suggestiveness
Veracity
Competency

.02

.09
.50

.26
.12
.35

Note. N 118. Correlations involving intent to terminate are point

biserial correlations, where not-terminate therapy was scored 0 and
terminate was scored 1. All other correlation coefficients reported are
Pearson product-moment.

p .01.

rience with psychotherapy was reported by 75% of the sample, and

the remaining participants reported a little or a lot of experience. These latter two categories were collapsed so that experience
was a dichotomous variable (no or yes). Competence ratings did
not differ according to prior experience with psychotherapy, as
those with prior experience (M 4.71, SD 1.18) did not regard
the therapist as significantly less competent than those without
prior experience in psychotherapy (M 4.93, SD 1.00),
t(115) .97, p .34, d .21.
Participants were asked if they would terminate therapy if they
were the client depicted in the video, and their response options
were dichotomous (0 no, 1 yes). Suggestiveness was significantly related to their indicated belief that they had cause to
terminate therapy, r .26, p .006, so that the more suggestive
they judged the therapist, the more likely they were to indicate they
would terminate therapy. Overall, only 27% of the sample reported
they would terminate therapy, but intent to terminate did not differ
significantly across the four suggestiveness conditions 2 (3, N
119) 7.45, p .06, v .25. Participants in the hypnosis
condition were most likely (i.e., 44%) to report they would stop
seeing the therapist. In comparison, 16%, 25%, and 22% of participants in the guided-imagery, expectation, and control groups
respectively reported that they would stop seeing the therapist if
they had been the client. When we examined the correlation
between suggestiveness and therapy termination and excluded the
hypnosis group, the relation between suggestiveness and intent to
terminate was no longer significant, r .11, p .30.

Discussion
One goal of the present study was to examine the extent to
which clients recognize the dangers associated with RMT. Although participants were cognizant of the greater suggestibility of
the therapist in the three suggestive conditions, this observation did
not translate to greater mistrust in the veracity of the memories
uncovered. Participants expressed similar beliefs in the veracity of
the memory reports across the four conditions. For those who
witnessed one of the three suggestive conditions, nearly 76%
indicated that they believed the client had been abused.
1
The questions asked were part of a larger series of questions addressing
forensic implications (e.g., whether the participant would file a lawsuit
against the therapist) and beliefs regarding repressed memories of abuse.
These questions have not been presented here because they are not relevant
to the issues addressed in the current paper.

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274

MYERS, MYERS, HERNDON, BROSZKIEWICZ, AND TAR

One interpretation for this finding is that participants may have

failed to adequately link the suggestive nature of the therapy with
the accuracy of the memory. This attributional error occurs in other
contexts, as well, as individuals generally fail to account for
situational factors when judging behavior (Ross & Nisbett, 1991).
Alternatively, belief in the veracity of the memory may say more
about how participants judged Sarahs credibility than anything
else. In the enactments, her interactions with the therapist may
have led participants to see her as particularly trustworthy. Regardless of which interpretation is most appropriate here, beliefs in
the veracity of the memories were unrelated to the suggestive
practices on the part of the therapist, and so the risks for false
memories arising from suggestive practices do not appear to be
easily recognized when individuals get an opportunity to witness
the techniques.
Participants also failed to equate the suggestive practices of the
therapists with their competence. The therapists who used guided
imagery or hypnosis to retrieve memories of early abuse, despite
the clients assertion that no abuse occurred when she were first
asked, were judged as no less competent than the therapist who
refrained from suggestive practices. Moreover, although nearly
44% of those who witnessed hypnosis in the therapy session
indicated they would terminate therapy, only 16% in the guided
imagery indicated they would terminate. The difference between
the two conditions suggests that hypnosis may carry a unique
reputation among the public, despite the fact that guided imagery
and hypnosis are highly similar, and show similar propensities to
elicit false memories (Lynn et al., 2013). Although intent to
terminate therapy was significantly related to the suggestiveness of
the therapist, this relation may be spurious and attributable to
individual attitudes regarding hypnosis rather than a recognition
that suggestive practices may be risky and a reason to discontinue
seeing the therapist. This theory represents conjecture on our part,
but hypnosis carries a stigma that other equally suggestive methods do not carry (e.g., see Coleman et al., 2001). When the
hypnosis condition was removed from the analysis, the relation
between termination intent and suggestiveness was reduced substantially and was no longer significant.
The present findings may have important implications for instances in which clients bring lawsuits against therapists when the
memories recovered as a result of RMT turn out to be false.
Cannell et al. (2001) and Brown, Scheflin, and Hammond (1998)
reported a number of these cases, and the suggestiveness of the
practices and the clients awareness of their relation to false
memories was one of the central features of the cases. The data
here suggest that clients may fail to see the risks for false memories, despite the fact that they recognize that the methods are
suggestive.

Limitations
There are a number of important limitations to the present
investigation that warrant consideration when evaluating the implications of the findings. First, as an analogue study, the characteristics of the sample as well as the materials used served only as
an approximation of the kinds of experiences one encounters in
therapy. These are not insignificant differences, and so one must
be cautious when generalizing these findings to the population of
interest. Still, although our sample was required to witness therapy

sessions rather than participate as clients, there remains the potential to extrapolate these findings to client populations. Studies
across a wide array of contexts have shown that confidence in
memory reports (both when evaluating our own memory reports
and those of others) is only modestly related to accuracy, and lay
individuals are poor judges of how factors such as suggestiveness
are related to memory accuracy (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).
Moreover, studies have demonstrated that suggestive practices can
elicit memory reports for emotional early childhood experiences
that are false, but remain confidently held (Herndon, Myers,
Mitchell, Kehn, & Henry, 2014; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999).
Another limitation with the present study is that the measures
used were brief, single-item ratings for such constructs as suggestiveness and competence, and only two items were used to measure
veracity. These measures were not accompanied by additional
questions that further probed the rationale contributing to these
beliefs. For example, we know that participants judged the competency of the therapists similarly across conditions, but we do not
know what factors played a role in their judgments of the competency of the therapists. A therapist that is warm, engaged, and
sensitive to the clients needs may be factors that override any
concerns about the use of suggestive memory practices. Consequently, for future research in this area, it would be beneficial to
obtain more open-ended and detailed information about the constructs assessed here (e.g., suggestiveness, competency).
In addition, our sample consisted of first-year college undergraduates. Examining whether the findings here extend to more
heterogeneous populations, as well as groups with different training (e.g., mental health professionals, graduate students) would be
an important next step. Furthermore, it would be useful to examine
the possible interaction between the gender of the therapist and
that of the client. Given that the goal is to identify when clients
regard practices as suggestive, understanding whether male therapists are regarded as more suggestive than female therapists when
the client is female would merit investigation.

Conclusion
Memory-recovery practices are suggestive, and clients may not
adequately link the veridicality of their remembrances with the
techniques used to generate them. This is problematic if the accuracy of these memories is important, and if therapists assume that
clients take the suggestiveness of the practices into account when
deciding whether to believe the memories arising from RMT.
Substantial research exists to indicate that repeatedly imagining
events can increase the difficulty in distinguishing what are real
experiences and what experiences were only imagineda phenomenon known as imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus,
& Sherman, 1996). As the present findings illustrate, clients may
need therapists to more clearly explain that suggestive practices
increase the possibility that the memory reports generated from
these practices may be false.
One method to better ensure that clients are aware of the
possible risks associated with RMT is to make it part of the
informed consent process. A number of researchers have made this
suggestion (e.g., Brown et al., 1998; Cannell, Hudson, & Pope,
2001; Pope & Brown, 1996). As Cannell et al. (2001) noted,
psychotherapists have frequently experienced lawsuits from former clients who claimed they experienced false memories of CSA

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BELIEFS ABOUT RMT

as a result of RMT. In the vast majority of these cases, the chief

claim against the defendant was that he or she failed to obtain
informed consent from the client, and that the risks of false
memories associated with RMT were never revealed. Although
informed consent does appear to be a reasonable approach to better
educating clients about the risks associated with RMT, Davis et al.
(2001) noted that there are likely to be compliance problems with
which to contend. Many therapists who continue to regard the
benefits of RMT as significant and regard the risks as exaggerated
may fail to give the informed consent process any more than
cursory coverage. These authors further noted that to properly
inform clients, therapists must do so in a way that the client is
convinced of his or her own vulnerability to false memories and
fully appreciate that these risks apply to them and not just other
clients.
In conclusion, in keeping with the goals of EBPP, promoting
effective psychological practices that enhance public health necessitates that the risks associated with practices be effectively communicated to clients. The findings here suggest that suggestive
practice on the part of psychotherapists engaged in memory recovery may not be easily recognized by clients as a potential risk
for false memories. Effectively communicating these potential
risks should be a practice all psychotherapists can support, regardless of their position on the recovered-memory debate.

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Received September 4, 2014

Revision received December 19, 2014
Accepted April 17, 2015