Documenti di Didattica
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 24, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and
compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party. Id. at 836-37.
First, we find no merit to Roxbury-Smellies claim that the district court
abused its discretion when it refused to apply the public records hearsay exception
exception to the hearsay rule can be considered by a district court when it rules on
a motion for summary judgment. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th
Cir. 1999). The Federal Rules of Evidence create an exception to the hearsay rule
for [r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth . . . factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C).
The statements made by Roxbury-Smellies co-workers, Kerlande Aboite
and Silvia Escobar, did not fall into the public records exception because they were
not a factual finding made by the EEOC investigator, but rather a record of the
interviews conducted by the EEOC investigator.
Id.
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the interview notes did not
fall within the hearsay exception for public records.
1323. If the employer is able to meet its burden, the plaintiff must then show that
the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dept of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff may
show that [her] employer treated similarly situated employees outside [her]
classification more favorably. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing Coutu v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commissioners, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073
(11th Cir. 1995)). In evaluating whether employees accused of misconduct are
similarly situated, we look to whether the employees are involved in or accused of
the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways. Burke-Fowler,
447 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.
1999)). We require that the quantity and quality of the comparators misconduct
be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers reasonable
decisions and confusing apples with oranges. Id. (quotations omitted).
Where evidence of similarly situated employees is unavailable, the plaintiff
is required to produce other circumstantial evidence of discrimination to establish
her prima facie case of disparate treatment.
(holding that [i]f a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly situated
identified as being similarly situated to her -- Phyllis Gainer, Adam Thomas, and
Marvin Williams -- did not engage in misconduct that was nearly identical to the
threatening comments she was terminated for making to her supervisor. Gainer,
who was only reprimanded, merely hung up the phone on her supervisor during a
heated conversation. Thomass misconduct -- an arrest for domestic violence -took place outside of the office and did not involve a superior or fellow co-worker,
and furthermore, Roxbury-Smellie did not offer any evidence of the FDOCs
disposition of Thomass case.
indicated that there was some racial disharmony in the office where she and
Roxbury-Smellie worked, it did not provide any evidence that the FDOC made any
employment decisions based on race or national origin.
Moreover, the statements made by Aboite and Escobar to the EEOC would
not have established a prima facie case of discrimination if they had been admitted
into evidence. Aboite said in her interview that Tift had a problem with Spanish
employees, but that she had never heard Tift say anything negative about RoxburySmellie or Bahamians specifically. Similarly, Escobar said in her interview that
she had heard rumors that Tift did not like Hispanics, but like Aboite, she made no
statements regarding the treatment of Roxbury-Smellie specifically or Bahamians
in general. As a result, these two statements, if admitted into evidence and viewed
in the light most favorable to Roxbury-Smellie, still do not establish a prima facie
case of discrimination against the FDOC.
Finally, although the district court was not required to make a ruling as to
pretext, it did not err when it determined, in the alternative, that the FDOCs
explanation for its termination of Roxbury-Smellies employment was not
pretextual.
comparators, she did not demonstrate that the FDOC treated other employees
outside of her protected class who engaged in similar conduct more favorably.
Second, even though Roxbury-Smellie denied that she had conducted herself in a
manner unbecoming to a public official, she did not claim that the FDOCs version
of the incident at issue was a fabrication nor did she argue that her supervisors did
not have a good faith belief that her statements were threatening. See Jones v.
Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding even if a Title VII
claimant did not in fact commit the violation . . . an employer successfully rebuts
any prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that it honestly believed the
employee committed the violation).
For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Roxbury-Smellies Title VII disparate treatment claim.
AFFIRMED.