1) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILFREDO FELOTEO, accusedappellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused WILFREDO FELOTEO was charged with and convicted of the crimes of Murder, as defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and Illegal Possession of Firearm, a violation
of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The Informations against accused read:
In Criminal Case No. 11109
"That on or about the 6th day of May, 1993, in the evening, at Sitio Nagbaril, Barangay Bintuan,
Municipality of Coron, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, while armed with a firearm and with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with his firearm, to wit: an
armalite rifle, one SONNY SOTTO, hitting him on the vital part of his body and inflicting upon him a
gunshot wound on the left side of his chest, thru and thru, which injury was the direct and immediate
cause of his instantaneous death. (emphasis ours)
"CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating circumstance of treachery."
In Criminal Case No. 11644
"That on or about the 6th day of May, 1993, and prior thereto, at Sitio Nagbaril, Barangay Bintuan,
Municipality of Coron, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control, one armalite rifle with Serial No. 9035914 and ammunitions, without
any license or permit to possess the same and that this firearm was used in shooting to death one
SONNY SOTTO in a case of Murder filed with the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 11109 and that this crime have no relation or in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
or subversion. (emphasis ours)
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned, accused pled not guilty. Trial ensued.
The records show that in the evening of May 6, 1993, the victim, SONNY SOTTO, and his friends,
ARNEL ABELEDA and JOHNNY ABREA, were walking along the highway in Barangay Bintuan, Coron,
Province of Palawan. They had a few drinks earlier that day and were on their way home to Sitio
Nagbaril. Abrea walked ahead of the group, about thirteen meters away from Sotto, followed by
Abeleda. They were in a lively mood as Abeleda playfully walked backwards, facing Sotto. [1]
The accused, WILFREDO FELOTEO, appeared on the opposite side of the road and walked past Abrea
and Abeleda. He was armed with an armalite rifle. Abeleda and Abrea recognized the accused, their
barriomate, as the moon was shining brightly. They did not pay much attention to the accused as
Abeleda was playing "habulan" with Sotto. Without uttering a word, the accused aimed the armalite at
Sotto and pressed its trigger. Sotto was hit above the left chest and fell on the ground, face down.
Abeleda and Abrea scampered away to find help, while the accused fled from the crime scene. [2] Ten (10)
minutes later, Abeleda and Abrea, accompanied by Barangay Tanod Tito Abrina and a certain Inyong
Adion, returned to the locus criminis. They found Sotto dead.
Sotto was brought to the hospital for autopsy. The Autopsy Report showed that he sustained a
gunshot wound, with the bullet entering the left side of his collarbone and exiting at the spinal cord. The
bullet came from an M-16 armalite rifle. He also had abrasions on the knees and face. Dr. Hew G.

Curameng of the Palawan Provincial Hospital opined that Sotto fell on his knees before he slumped on
the ground, face down. There were no powder burns on his body, indicating that the victim was shot
from a distance. The cause of death was massive blood loss secondary to gunshot wound. [3]
The firearm used in the shooting incident belongs to SPO2 Roman Adion. On May 6, 1993, SPO2
Adion went to the house of Teofisto Alaquin in Sitio Nagbaril. He brought with him his official service
firearm, an M-16 armalite rifle,[4] as he has been ordered to go to Jandanao the next day to investigate a
land dispute. He slept early. At around 6:30 p.m., Alaquin woke him up and informed him that the
accused stole his armalite. SPO2 Adion, together with Nazario Adion and Frank Adion, immediately
looked for the accused. They heard a gunshot coming from a distance of about four hundred (400)
meters and rushed to the place where it emanated. They saw Sotto lying prostrate on the road, shot on
the chest. SPO2 Adion suspected that his armalite was used in the shooting incident and he continued
his hunt for the accused. The next day, May 7, 1993, at 5:00 a.m., he nabbed the accused in Sitio
Cabugao, five (5) kilometers away from the crime scene. The accused surrendered the armalite to him.
Upon inspection, SPO2 Adion found nineteen (19) bullets left in the armalite. There were twenty (20)
bullets inside the armalite chamber and magazine before it was stolen. [5]
SPO4 Jose Ansay, Chief of the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in
Tiniguiban, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, affirmed that the accused was not duly licensed to carry a
firearm.[6]
The accused denied that he stole SPO2 Adion's armalite and alleged that the shooting of Sotto was
an accident. He averred that on May 6, 1993, he was in his sister's house in Barangay Bintuan, Coron,
when SPO2 Adion passed by and invited him over to the place of Teofisto Alaquin in Nagbaril. They
boarded SPO2 Adion's tricycle and arrived at Nagbaril at about 3:00 p.m. Frank Adion dropped by the
house of Alaquin and borrowed the tricycle of SPO2 Adion. Frank Adion later returned on foot and told
SPO2 Adion that the tricycle's engine broke down so he left it along the road. SPO2 Adion checked on his
tricycle and left behind his armalite rifle. Before leaving, he instructed the accused to wait for him at
Alaquin's house.[7]
After thirty minutes, the accused decided to follow SPO2 Adion. He took the armalite and walked
the road leading to Bintuan. At about 7:00 p.m., he met Sonny Sotto's group. They zigzagged as they
walked. In jest, the accused said to Sotto, "Boots, don't get near me, I'll shoot you." He pointed the
armalite to Sotto and pressed its trigger, allegedly unaware that it was loaded. It fired and hit Sotto. The
accused fled but was apprehended by SPO2 Adion the following day. He told SPO2 Adion that he
accidentally shot Sotto.[8]
After trial, the accused was found guilty as charged. [9] He was sentenced to suffer the penalties
of reclusion perpetua, for murder, and imprisonment of twenty (20) years, for illegal possession of
firearm. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of Sotto the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), as civil indemnity.
In this appeal, appellant contends:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AS
ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME ALLEGED AND IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF MURDER IN THE KILLING OF SONNY SOTTO."
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
We reject the argument of the appellant that he should not have been convicted for murder as
treachery was not duly established by the prosecution. Allegedly, Sotto knew of the impending
attack for it was frontal. Moreover, Sotto was warned, albeit jokingly, that he was going to be shot.
Under par. 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is
present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make. [10] The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the
attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend

himself. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from a
victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. [11]
In the case at bar, treachery is present for there was a sudden attack against the unarmed
Sotto. When Sotto and his friends encountered appellant on the road, they were in a "jovial mood" as
they just came from a drinking spree. Although they saw appellant carrying an armalite, they did not
suspect anything untoward to happen. However, without any provocation, appellant shot Sotto. The
fact that the attack was frontal cannot negate treachery. The shooting was unexpected. There is no
showing that the alleged warning given by appellant to Sotto afforded the latter sufficient time to defend
himself. Indeed, Sotto could not defend himself as he was unarmed and a bit drunk-- as observed by the
appellant himself, the victim was walking in a zigzag manner. There was no way for Sotto to avoid the
armalite bullets.
We now come to the penalty imposed on appellant for the illegal possession of firearm in view of the
recent amendments to P.D. No. 1866 by R.A. No. 8294.
Appellant was convicted under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, the governing law at the time the crime
was committed. It provides:
"SEC. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.- The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition of machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed." (emphasis ours)
The penalty for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866 is
death. Since at that time, the death penalty cannot be enforced in view of Article III (19) (1) of the
1987 Constitution, appellant should have been sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
[12]
not twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
Nonetheless, Republic Act No. 8294, amended P.D. No. 1866, by reducing the penalties for simple
and aggravated forms of illegal possession of firearms.[13] The law now provides:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores
bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .45 and also lesser caliber
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (emphasis ours)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. - The term unlicensed firearm shall include:

1) firearms with expired license, or

2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime."
Clearly, the penalty for illegal possession of high powered firearm is prision mayor in its minimum period
and a fine of P30,000.00. In case homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm,
such use of unlicensed firearm shall be merely considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The enactment of R.A. No. 8294 can be given retroactive effect as it favors the appellant. [14] So we
held in People vs. Simon,[15] viz:
"Since obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act 7659 could neither have been involved or
invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage,
can sua sponte apply the provisions of Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That
issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
`x x x. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal
laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the
courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused
has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the
penalty.'
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act
No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then
practice, procedure and pragmatic consideration would warrant and necessitate the matter being
brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus." (footnote omitted)
As mentioned above, the penalty for simple illegal possession of high powered firearm is prision
mayor in its minimum period.[16] This penalty was taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence, although
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA 8294, is a special law, the rules in said Code for graduating penalties
by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. [17]
In the case at bar, an unlicensed firearm was used in committing murder, thus, aggravating the
crime and increasing the imposable penalty to the maximum period of prision mayor minimum, the
duration of which ranges from seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eight (8) years. [18]
We determine the minimum and maximum sentence pursuant to the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law[19] which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum of which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
Accordingly, the minimum range of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from any of the
periods of prision correccional maximum, the penalty next lower in degree to the penalty of prision
mayor minimum. Prision correccional maximum has a duration of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years. On the other hand, the maximum penalty to be imposed, taking into
consideration the aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, shall be taken from
the maximum period of prision mayor minimum which ranges from seven (7) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to eight (8) years.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment against appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 11109 (for Murder) and
Criminal Case No. 11644 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that, in
Criminal Case No. 11644, appellant should be sentenced, as he is hereby sentenced, to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as the minimum term, and eight (8) years
of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term. No costs.

4.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Gervasio
Diaz
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

for

appellant.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding
the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:
A eso de las once de la maana del dia 5 de junio de 1934, mientras se celebrahan las elecciones
generales en el precinto electoral numero 4, situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del Municipio de
Pilar, Provincia de Capiz, el aqui acusado fue sorprendido por Jose E. Desiderio, que era entonces
el representante del Departamento del Interior para inspecionar las elecciones generales en la
Provincia de Capiz, y por el comandante de la Constabularia F.B. Agdamag que iba en aquella
ocasion con el citado Jose E. Desiderio, portando en su cinto el revolver Colt de calibre 32, No.
195382, Exhibit A, dentro del cerco que rodeaba el edificio destinado para el citado colegio
electoral numero 4 y a una distancia de 22 metros del referido colegio electoral. Inmediatament
Jose E. Desiderio se incauto del revolver en cuestion.
La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D. Benliro y de Dioscoro Buenvenida, trato de
establecer que el aqui acusado paro en la calle que daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a
invitacion de dicho Jose D. Benliro y con el objeto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado para
llevar a su casa a los electores del citado Jose D. Benliro que ya habian terminado de votar, y que
cuando llegaron Jose E. Desidierio y el comadante F.B. Agdamag, el aqui acusado estaba en la
calle. Desde el colegio electoral hasta el sitio en que, segun dichos testigos, estaba el acusado
cuando se le quito el revolver Exhibit a, hay una distancia de 27 metros.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el apelante fue sorprendido con su revolver dentro del
cerco de la casa escuela del Barrio de Aranguel, Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado como
colegio electoral.
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpable de la infraccion de la Ley Electoral
querrellada y, por consiguiente, al condenarle a prision y multa.
As to the question of fact raised by the first assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that the record
shows that both Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major
Agdamag of the Philippine Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the elections in the
Province of Capiz, testified positively that the defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling
place when Desiderio took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This also disposes of
that part of the argument under the second assignment of error based on the theory that the defendant
was in a public road, where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument
under the second assignment of error is that if it be conceded that the defendant went inside of the
fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election Law, because he was called by a friend
and merely approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; that there
were many people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his
revolver in his automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and thereby
incurring in a violation of the law.
As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile without the risk of
losing it because he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary

for the defendant to leave his automobile merely because somebody standing near the polling place had
called him, nor does the record show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that
occasion.
The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially construct buildings for
electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever building there may be available, and all election
precincts are within fifty meters from some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd,
because members of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that
prohibition and could not use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; that people living in the
vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within their
own residences on registration and election days;
That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to
influence in any way the free and voluntary exercise of suffrage;
That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in
question should only be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for
the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the
decision of this court in the case of Peoplevs. Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20,
1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the
request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar there
is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the
candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to
go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the
election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of
the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him.
We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The
law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate
the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the
fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully.
The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to
interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an
offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that he intended to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is
sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go
Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)
While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be
held criminally responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or
at least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized
the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great
master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128;
U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in
the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and
Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)
The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the
enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day,
within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he
had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in
pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling
place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they
would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case
of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p.

169,ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of election
inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms.
If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not
proved that he tried to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell
intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.
As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the provision in question,
that is a matter for the Chief Executive or the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
7.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO, defendant-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio Sugay for defendant-appellant.

CUEVAS, J.:
In an amended Information 1 filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, VALENTINA
MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and
deliberated to kill her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, with whom she was united in lawful
wedlock, enter (sic) the NAWASA building situated at Pasay City, where said Elias Day y
Pablo was working as a security guard; and the said accused, having in her possession a
bottle containing gasoline suddenly and without warning, poured the contents on the
person of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said
Elias Day y Pablo suffered burns and injuries which subsequently caused his death.
Contrary to law

Tried after pleading "NOT GUILTY" upon arraignment, accused was convicted and thereafter sentenced
to reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay
costs.
From the aforesaid judgment, she ventilated an appeal to the then Court of Appeals (which referred the
appeal to us considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, assailing her aforesaid
conviction and contending that the trial court erred: 1) in convicting her solely on the basis of the
alleged extrajudicial confession; 2) in finding that Pneumonia was a complication of the burns sustained
by the victim; 3) in not finding her not to have cause the death of the deceased; and 4) in not acquitting
her at least on ground of reasonable doubt.
The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is as follows:
On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA
Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had
just purchased ten (10) centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft
Avenue which she placed in a coffee bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry
of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was
maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching
the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened,

Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p. 14, Id). The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle
of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id).
Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame. (Exhs. "A" and "A1", p. 197, Rec.)
The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a
written statement (Exh. "A", p. 197, Rec.) where she admitted having burned the victim.
Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and
then to the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965.
(Exh. "C", p. 208, rec.) due to pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary. 3
Appellant's story on the other hand runs, thus:
It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m. when appellant returned from Olongapo City. She fed her
grandson and put him to bed. After filing the tank with water, she remembered that the
next day was a Sunday and she had to go to church. Her shoes were dirty but there was
no gasoline with which to clean them. Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left
for a nearby gasoline station and bought ten centavos worth of gasoline. Then she
remembered that her husband needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped by his place
of work. (p. 13, Ibid.)
Appellant saw her husband inside a bonding of the NAWASA standing by the window. As
the iron grille was open, she entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the
door, but when he saw his wife he shouted at her. Appellant said that she had brought the
gasoline which he needed for his lighter, but Elias, who was under the influence of liquor,
cursed her thus: "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON". Elias continued shouting and cursing
even as appellant told him that she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted.
Appellant trembled and became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not know that she
was sprinkling the gasoline on her husband's face. She was tired and dizzy and had to sit
down for a while. Then she remembered her grandson who was alone in the house so she
went home leaving her husband who was walking to and fro and not paying attention to
her. (pp. 13-14, Ibid., p. 2, March 20, 1969)
She went to bed but could not sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to
apologize to her husband. Upon reaching the NAWASA, however, she found that police
officers were present. Her husband was walking all around still fuming mad, and when he
saw her he chased her. A policeman pulled appellant aside and asked if she was the wife
of Elias. When she replied in the affirmative, the police officer accused her of burning her
husband. She denied the accusation. But the police took her to the headquarters, and
prepared a written statement, Exhibits A, A-1. Appellant was made to sign said statement
upon a promise that she would be released if she signed it. Although she did not know the
contents, she signed it because of the promise. (pp. 14-16. Id.; p. 5, March 20,1969) 4
Appellant's assigned errors boil down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial
confession was voluntarily given; and (2) whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed
to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death.
Right after the burning incident, appellant was picked up by the police operatives of Pasay City. She was
thereafter investigated by Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the Pasay City Police who took her statement in
Tagalog and in Question and Answer form which was reduced into writing. 5 After Sgt. Garcia was
through taking her statement, she was brought to Fiscal Paredes who asked her questions regarding the
said statement and its execution and before whom said statement was subscribed and sworn to by her.
In that investigation, appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband and
thereafter set him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statementT Ano ang nangyari at iyong binuksan ng gasolina ang iyong asawa na si
Elias Day?

S Dahil may sala siya, at sinunog niya ang aking mga damit, at may babae
pa, at saka lahat ng aming pagkain sa bahay ay hinahakot.
T Ng dahil dito sa mga binanggit mong ito ay ano ang ginawa mo sa iyong
asawa?
S Ako po ay nagdilim ang aking isipan at ang ginawa ko ay naisip kong
buhusan ng gasolina, kaya ang aking ginawa ay bumili ako ng halagang 10
sentimos sa Esso Gasoline Station sa Tall Avenue at inilagay ko sa isang
boti.
T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay makabili ng gasolina sa station ng Esso sa Taft
Avenue dito sa Pasay City, ay ano ang ginawa mo?
S Ako po ay nagpunta sa kanya na pinaggoguardiahan sa Nawasa at
pagdating ko nuon ay kumatok ako sa pintuan ng Nawasa, at nang marinig
niya ang aking katok sa pinto ay binuksan niya ang pintuan, at pagkabukas
ng pintuan ay nakita niya ako, at nagalit siya at ako ay minura ng puta
putan Ina mo, lalakad ka ng gabi, at namumuta raw ako, at pagkatapos na
ako ay mamura ay hinahabol pa ako ng suntok, kayat ang ginawa ko po
kinuha ko ang aking dalang bote na may gasolina at aking ibinuhos sa
kanyang katawan at aking kinuha ang posporo at aking sinindihang at
hangang magliyab ang suot niyang polo shirt, na may guhit na itim at puti.
T Alam mo ba na kung ano ang iyong ginawa sa iyong asawa kanginang
humigit kumulang na mag-iika alas 11:00 ng gabi Marzo 6, 1965?
S Opo, aking sinunog ang aking asawa. (Exhs. A & A-1 Emphasis supplied)
She would now like her aforesaid extrajudicial confession discredited by asserting that she did not
understand its contents because she is not a Tagala aside from having reached only the primary grades;
and furthermore, that said statement was signed by her merely upon the promise of the policemen that
she will later be released.
We find appellant's aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as true. For the truth
is that appellant knew and understood Tagalog despite her not being a Tagala, having stayed in Manila
since 1951, continuously up to the time of the burning incident in question for which she was
investigated. During this period of almost fourteen years, she was in daily association with Tagalogs
communicating with them in Pilipino. This is clear from her admission on cross-examination which runs
thusQ But you can understand Tagalog because of the length of time that you
litem been living here in Manila?
A Yes.
Q And as a matter of fact, when you buy something from the store, you
speak Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q And when you ride in a jeep or bus, you speak Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q And you were well understood by these Tagalog people?
A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, you can understand Tagalog?

A Yes,
Q And you can also read Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q You can read?
A Yes, but I do not litem interest to read. TSN, March 29, 1969, pp. 11-12).
All through shout the entire investigation and even at the time appellant A as before Fiscal Paredes,
before whom she subscribed and swore to the truth of an what appeared in her statement, 6 no
denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police investigators. Neither was
there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures thereto because of
the promise by the police that she will be released later. We therefore find her aforesaid claim highly
incredible and a mere concoction. For why will the police still resort to such trickery when the very sworn
statement given by her proved by its contents that appellant was indeed very cooperative. In fact,
almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her
on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations contained therein.
Moreover, We find said statement replete with details which could not litem been possibly supplied by
the police investigators who litem no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance with her and the victim,
especially with respect to the circumstances and incidents which preceded the fatal incident that
brought about the death of the latter. We therefore find no error in the trial court's pronouncement that
appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily given by her; that she fully understood its contents; and
that she willingly affixed her signatures thereto.
Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt when
taken without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as a basis of the declarant's conviction. 8 It
is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The burden of proof is upon the person who
gave the confession. 9 That presumption has not been overcome in the instant case.
Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn statement in
assessing her guhit since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By then, she had yet no time
to concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the aftermath consequences of her criminal design
she must litem been motivated by no other purpose except to admit the undeniable. On the other hand,
when she took the witness stand, disclaiming any responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was
already January 13, 1969 . . . more than five years after the incident and decidedly after she had the
benefit of too many consultations.
That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her husband when she went to the
latter's place of work on that fatal night and intended an the consequences of her nefarious act finds
clearer manifestation and added support in her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed concern
over the fate that had befallen the victim . . . her husband . . . especially at times when he needed her
most. Being the wife, she must be the closest to him and the hardest hit by the mishap if she has not
authored the same nor voluntarily participated therein. She was then reasonably expected to come to
his succor and alleviate him from his sufferings. And yet, the records do not show her having seen her
husband even once while the latter lay seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and death.
Neither did she attend his funeral nor was she ever present during the wake while the victim's remains
lay in state. That she was under detention does not excuse nor justify those glaring and significant
omissions. For she could litem asked the court's permission for any of the enumerated undertakings
which we believe would not litem been denied. But she did not even attempt.
Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and explanation, we become more convinced of the
falsity and incredibility of her assertions. For instance, her claim that her purpose in buying gasoline at
so an unholy hour of the night, past ten o clock in the evening, solely for the purpose of cleaning her
shoes which she would wear in going to church the following Sunday, hardly recommend acceptance.
That she dropped at her husband's place of work also at the middle of the night for no other purpose
except to deliver to him gasoline for his cigarette lighter, is likewise too taxing upon one's credulity . . .

more so if we litem to consider the previous spat she had with the deceased in the morning of that fatal
day.
In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would like Us to believe that her husband died of
pneumonia because the latter drank liquor as shown by the toxicology report indicating presence of
alcohol in the victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband on fire, she is not criminally liable for
her husband's death.
We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid ratiocination
The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to exculpate the
appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused by taking alcohol. In fact,
alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to produce an almost comatose
condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a diminution of the oxygen content of the body. 10 In
fine, as correctly pointed out by the Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an
efficient supervening cause of his death which took place on March 10, 1965, just four days after the
burning.
The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary.
There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-mortem findings
immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere
complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the
court a quo held on to state that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second
degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as
to the cause of death, merely contributory. We agree.
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred.
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.
the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
committed by the offender. 11
The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4; and PP vs.
Quianzon,62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL 748, 751 is as follows
One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes
contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable
"even if the deceased might litem recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or
submitted to surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the
wound and contributed to the death, or that death was men." caused by a surgical
operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The principle on which this
rule is founded is one of universal application. It lies at the foundation of criminal
jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the
natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in
a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious
and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other
causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the wound or its unskilled and
improper treatment which are themselves consequences of the criminal act, must in law
be deemed to litem been among those which are in contemplation of the guilty party and
for which he must be responsible The rule has its foundation on a wise and practical
policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting theories of medical
men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries it
would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of

death, and thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might
escape conviction and punishment.
In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be increased to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against appellant.
It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court recommends
her for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, be
furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon. Minister of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman)

9.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA, defendant-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Felixberto
B.
Viray
for
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.

appellant.

OZAETA, J.:
Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the following information filed
against him in the Court of First Instance of Manila:
The undersigned accuses Rafael Balmores y Caya of attempted estafa through falsification of a
security, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the
crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly by overt acts, to wit; by then and there
tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and
substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number
074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning
number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29, 1947, and presenting the said
ticket so falsified on said date, September 22, 1947, in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
for the purpose of exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said number has won,
fraudulently pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said
ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on said date, June 29, 1947, but the said
accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the crime of estafa
through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some causes other than this
spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused
presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket
as presented by the said accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a
policeman who apprehended and arrested the said accused right then and there.
Contrary to law.
(Sgd.)
LORENZO
Assistant City Fiscal

RELOVA

and was sentenced by Judge Emilio Pena to suffer not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and
not more than 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, and to pay a fine of P100 and the costs.
From that sentence he appealed to this court, contending (1) that the facts and (2) that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of guilty because, being illiterate, he was not assisted by
counsel.
In support of the first contention, counsel for the appellant argues that there could be so could be no
genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket for the June 29, 1947, draw; that this court has

judicial notice that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office issued only four 1/4 units for each ticket for
the said draw of June 29, 1947; that the information does not show that the true and real unidentified
number of the ticket alleged to have been torn was not and could not be 074000; that the substitution
and writing in ink of the said number 074000 was not falsification where the true and real number of the
ticket so torn was 074000.
This contention is based on assumption not borne out by the record. The ticket alleged to have been
falsified is before us and it appears to be a 1/8 unit. We cannot take judicial notice of what is not of
common knowledge. If relevant, should have been proved. But if it is true that the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office did not issue 1/8 but only 1/4 units of tickets for the June 29, 1947, draw, that would
only strengthen the theory of the prosecution that the 1/8 unit of a ticket which appellant presented to
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office was spurious. The assumption that the true and real
unidentified number of the ticket alleged to have been torn was the winning number 074000, is likewise
not supported by the record. The information to which appellant pleaded guilty alleged that the
appellant removed the true and real unidentified number of the ticket and substituted and wrote in ink
at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000. It is obvious that there would
have been no need of removal and substitution if the original number on the ticket was the same as that
which appellant wrote in ink in lieu thereof.
The second contention appears to be based on a correct premises but wrong conclusion. The fact that
appellant was illiterate did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction assisted by counsel. The decision
expressly states that appellant waived the right to be assisted by counsel, and we know of no law
against such waiver.
It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as that
which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the
falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to
article 59, of the Revised Penal Code. Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly was not
punishable but is now under article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following: (1) When one tries
to kill another by putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is
common salt; and (2) when one tries to murder a corpse. (Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code, 4th ed., page 15; decision, Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1879; 12 Jur. Crim., 343.)
Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would
have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket
if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not exercised due care.
The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or falsification of "treasury or bank notes or
certificates or other obligations and securities" is reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine
not to exceed P10,000, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an
obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. This being a complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or security of the Philippines, the penalty should
be imposed in its maximum period in accordance with article 48. Taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot
be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. It results,
therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.
The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone and
would not constitute a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-winning
number. So in the ultimate analysis appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit estafa
(punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but technically and legally he has to suffer for the
serious crime of falsification of a government obligation. We realize that the penalty is too severe,
considering all the circumstances of the case, but we have no discretion to impose a lower penalty than
authorized by law. The exercise of clemency and not in this court.
We are constrained to affirm the sentence appealed from, with costs against the appellant.
Moran, C.J.

10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO MENDOZA y BUTONES, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
THIS IS ANOTHER DISGUSTING INCIDENT OF INCESTUOUS RAPE OF A MINOR.

his

Antonio Butones Mendoza, appellant, was indicted for two (2) counts of incestuous rape, i.e., rape of
minor
daughter
on
18
March
1998
and
10
September
1999,
both

in Lakip, Atimonan, Quezon Province, under two separate Informations docketed as Crim. Cases Nos.
6636-G and 6637-G, respectively, before the RTC-Br. 61 of Gumaca, Quezon.[1] The charges are specified
in the affidavit-complaint of his daughter Maricar T. Mendoza who on 18 March 1998 was only fourteen
(14) years old and on 10 September 1999 was fifteen (15).[2]
The cases were consolidated and joint trial was subsequently conducted as they involved the same
parties.
At the trial, the birth certificate of Maricar was offered in evidence where her date of birth is
indicated as 23 December 1983 and her father as Mendoza, Antonio, thus corroborating her
personal circumstances alleged in the Informations as a minor and daughter of appellant.
[3]
Maricarsmother Leonida Mendoza affirmed the date of birth of Maricar and her affiliation to appellant
as her father,[4] which appellant himself admitted.[5] He also testified that he and Leonida, mother
of Maricar, were common-law spouses.[6]
On 18 March 1998 victim Maricar was left in her familys rickety hut together with her father, herein
appellant, and her six (6)-year old sister. [7] On that day, Maricars mother was in San Narciso, Quezon, to
visit a relative.[8] As nighttime fell, Maricar retired to her space in the hut while her younger sister stayed
outside.[9] While Maricar was alone, appellant who was already naked, and taking advantage of the
darkness and the sleepy condition of his daughter, moved over to Maricar and removed her clothes.
[10]
He placed himself on top of her, both of them being already undressed, kissed his daughter and
touched her breasts, at the same time threatening to kill her if she would shout or tell anybody
afterwards what he was doing to her. [11]He boxed her on the stomach that sent her unconscious; she did
not know what transpired after that.[12]
Maricar could only describe her physical appearance when she woke up the following day. Her
relevant testimony was Q: After boxing you on your stomach, what else did he do?
A:

I do not know already, Maam.

Q: Why did you not know?.

A:

Because I lost consciousness.

Q: You lost consciousness and when you regained consciousness, what did you notice about
your body?
A:

I saw blood, Maam.

Q: Where did you see blood?

A:

On my thigh, Maam.

Q: And where was the blood coming?

A:

From my vagina, Maam.

Q: And what did you feel in your vagina?

A:

It was painful, Maam.

Q: Was that your first sexual experience?

A:

Yes, Maam.

Q: And who caused your vagina to bleed?

A:

My father, Ma am.[13]

Maricar further testified that after 18 March 1998 her father still abused her sexually many times.
She remembered the date 10 September 1999because it was then when her mother was in
the poblacion to set up her stall for selling vegetables.[15] Maricar was left in the hut with her younger
sister and herein appellant.[16] It was nighttime and she was sleeping beside her sister when her father
suddenly placed himself on top of Maricar.[17]Awakened by the startling occurrence, Maricar found herself
bare as was appellant whose exposed body was rubbing against hers. [18] He kissed her on the cheeks
and breasts[19] and for thirty (30) minutes his penis was inside her vagina.[20]
[14]

On 22 September 1999 Maricars school principal discovered that Maricar was on the family way.
The principal called for Maricars mother so she could confer with her. During the meeting, she told
the mother that it was the father of Maricar who raped her.[22] On the same day, they
hadMaricar examined by government doctor who found her already four (4) months pregnant. [23] To
account for her pregnancy, Maricar explained that she was sexually abused by her father repeatedly
between their first encounter on 18 March 1998 and the apparently last instance on 10 September 1999.
[24]
On 23 September 1999, mother and daughter filed the complaint for incestuous rape against
appellant.[25]
[21]

Significantly, when Maricar testified before the trial court on 29 March 2001 she admitted being
again pregnant.[26] She said that the common-law spouse of an older sister forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him, hence her unwanted condition all over again. [27]
In his defense, appellant denied any sexual union with his daughter Maricar.[28] He claimed that he
had been a good provider for his family,Maricar included, and that there was no reason for Maricar or
her mother to file the charges against him which he claimed to be trumped-up. [29] He ventured though
that the probable motive could be because Maricar wanted to be left alone so she could be with her
many boyfriends.[30] He however admitted that he had no personal knowledge of this allegation, and that
this theory was peddled to him by a certain Erlinda Rivera who, curiously, is the mother of the live-in
partner of Maricars older sister whom Maricar incriminated as the author of her second unwelcome
pregnancy.[31]
On 13 December 2001 the trial court found appellant guilty of rape of his minor daughter Maricar on
two (2) counts[32] and sentenced him to two (2) death penalties. It also ordered appellant to
pay Maricar for each count of rape P50,000.00 as indemnity, P10,000.00 as moral damages, and
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In this automatic review, appellant argues that Maricar and her testimony lack credibility to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Firstly, he posits that the pregnancy of Maricar on 22 September
1999 could not have been due to the rape alleged in the Informations considering that the first rape
happened way back on 18 March 1998 and that the second instance on 10 September 1999 was too
recent to cause the bulge in her stomach. Secondly, she wavered and gave inconsistent answers when
asked about the whereabouts of her mother on 18 March 1998. Thirdly, it was contrary to normal
human experience for his penis to wallow in Maricars vagina for thirty (30) minutes when a rapist would
ordinarily not dilly-dally. And, lastly,Maricar had the bad habit of accusing her relatives for her
unexpected pregnancies just as she did when she was heavy with her second child.
After a careful assessment of the facts, we find that the prosecution in Crim. Case No. 6636-G failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that incestuous rape was consummated. The testimony
of Maricar does not establish carnal knowledge considering that she did not know what happened while
she was unconscious. The blood had already dried up when she was awakened, and the traces thereof
were on her thighs, not in her vagina. For us to conclude sexual intercourse from her conjecture that the
blood might have come from her private part would be engaging in too much speculation. This is not to
mention that we do not even have corroborative evidence to confirm that the blood splattered on her
thighs was indeed hers.
Neither could we associate the pain in her vagina with consummated carnal knowledge. Several
alternative explanations for the pain, such as disease or exertion of varied forms of manipulation, [33] can
be reasonably imagined and propounded, besides the essential fact of sexual congress. Pain is
subjective and so easy to feign unless the specific cause is pinpointed which, in this case, should be an

insertion of the penis into the vagina.[34] To insist on this inference of carnal knowledge on the strength
solely of pain in the vagina effectively emasculates the critical distinction between consummated and
attempted rape that we laid down in People v. Campuhan,[35] i.e., the touching of the female organ to
constitute consummated rape should be construed in relation to the entry by the penis, however slight,
into the labia majora.
Indeed, the defense has no duty to justify why we should take the side of such probable
explanations as would exculpate appellant, much less are we obliged to find more severe culpability
under otherwise less grave circumstances; rather, it is the business of the prosecution to prove why the
incriminatory interpretation of the evidence should be preferable. The prosecution has
the onus probandi of establishing the precise degree of culpability of the appellant; it must demonstrate
in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Where the evidence gives rise to
two possibilities, one consistent with the innocence and the other indicative of the guilt of the accused,
that which favors the accused should be properly considered. [36] Thus, absent any compelling reason to
agree with the prosecutions assessment of the evidence, we cannot affirm the conviction in Crim. Case
No. 6636-G.
This of course does not mean that no crime was perpetrated in Crim. Case No. 6636-G. The criminal
acts ascertained by the prosecution are that appellant went on top of Maricar while both were naked and
then kissed his daughter and touched her breasts, at the same time threatening to kill her if she would
shout or thereafter tell anybody of what he was then doing. Under these circumstances, while
incestuous rape can be rationally ruled out since there is no evidence of the introduction of the penis of
appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant, [37]accusedappellant is positive for having an intent to lie with his victim. He is guilty of attempted rape.
Rape is merely attempted when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by
overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.[38] Appellants unclothed being which he rubbed against the torso of his
daughter whom he had also stripped of clothing, his acts of kissing and touching the victims breasts
while the latter was flat on the bed and rendered purposely unconscious by appellant, evidently
demonstrate the intent of appellant to have carnal knowledge of her against her will. [39]
Clearly, the acts of appellant are of such nature that they themselves, by the facts to which they are
related, by the circumstances of the person performing the same, and by the things connected
therewith, obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended by appellant. [40] They are overt
acts of rape which have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. [41] It is simply unfortunate
that the court record is barren of evidence beyond reasonable doubt that his acts ended up with the
consummation of his criminal objective, and so, we cannot convict him of consummated incestuous
rape.
However, the conviction of appellant for incestuous rape [42] in Crim. Case No. 6637-G must be
affirmed. The factual findings of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and to assess their credibility are entitled to the highest degree of respect. [43] Upon our own
review, the testimony of Maricar is clear, straightforward and convincing; the circumstances of the
crimes discovery unmistakably show that the harrowing events of which Maricar testified were not
rehearsed, invented or contrived.
Time and again we have held that not all kinds of discrepancies and inconsistencies in testimonies
have the effect of discrediting a witness. On The contrary, some variances may actually strengthen the
witness credibility as they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. The alleged incongruities in the
testimony of Maricar, as pointed out by appellant, are of this nature. They reinforce the credibility
of Maricar and her testimony as they manifest her innocence and spontaneity in relating her story in
court amidst the petrifying experience of a trial proceeding. She never faltered in her narration of the
essential elements of the subject felony whether before the investigating judge or prosecutor, or the
trial judge.[44]
Furthermore, the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimony of Maricar refer to
minor details outside the essential elements of the crime charged. In the case at bar, the attack is upon
the period or time that private complainants mother was away from their residence; her unwanted
pregnancy when she was medically examined for purposes of filing the rape cases under consideration

did not jibe with the incidents of rape that were charged in the Informations; the sexual intercourse for
thirty (30) minutes which was contrary to the normal human experience of a rapist;
and, Maricars supposedly bad habit of implicating her relatives for her unexpected pregnancies.
These allegations are mere collateral matters inconsequential in the determination of the criminal
liability of appellant. Or, they can easily be debunked by reference to Maricars testimony. Her first
pregnancy is explained in her testimony that between 18 March 1998 and 10 September 1999she was
raped several times more. There was no need for appellant to hurry with the rape on 10 September
1999 because Maricars mother was in the poblacion selling vegetables. Finally, who can say for sure
that the victim was not raped by her sisters live-in partner as she otherwise sincerely and voluntarily
narrated? Certainly, not appellant nor his counsel de oficio since they have no personal knowledge of
the facts of this supposed crime, and thus have no basis for saying that Maricar was lying.
The defense of denial peddled by appellant is not only weak but obviously manufactured. He
blamed his daughter for his misfortune by stating that she merely wanted to gallivant with her many
boyfriends. The value of this argument is belittled by the fact that it was not of his personal knowledge
but only derived from one Erlinda Rivera who intriguingly was the mother of the man who allegedly
raped Maricar after the latters ordeal with her father.
In addition, if Maricar were yearning to be freed from the purported watchful eyes of her father, she
could have easily eloped with her alleged boyfriends as her other sisters had done previously. In
implying evil motive to Maricars charges, appellant appears to contradict that part of his testimony
where he claimed that he had always been a caring father to his family. If he were indeed a good
provider and counselor to his children, why would Maricar then accuse him of such grave criminal act
that may cost him his life? The pictures he paints of himself are truly contrary to human family
experience as we have known it to be.
As to the proper penalties, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G, appellant is liable for attempted rape.
Nighttime is alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance and proved beyond doubt by the
prosecution to have been exploited by him in the execution of the felony. The penalty for attempted
rape is two (2) degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of death for consummated incestuous rape of
a minor.[45] Two (2) degrees lower from death is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking account of nighttime, the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed upon accused-appellant shall be taken from the maximum period of reclusion
temporal, the range of which is seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its
periods.[46]
As to the amount of damages in Crim. Case No. 6636-G, prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of
the civil indemnity in attempted rape at P30,000.00.[47] Thus, the victim Maricar T. Mendoza must be
awarded civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00.
Moral damages may be adjudged in recognition of her injury as being inherently concomitant with
and necessarily resulting from the attempted rape, especially since the victim is the offenders own
daughter who shall forever be haunted by a most unpleasant memory of a beastly father. [48] We allot to
her moral damages of P25,000.00, [49] and in addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00
must be imposed in the hope of deterring other fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual
behavior from preying upon and sexually abusing their young daughters. [50]
In Crim. Case No. 6637-G, we hold that appellant is guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art.
266-B of The Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 where the imposable penalty is death x x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim x x x x

The civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000.00 since the rape was committed with the
attending qualifying circumstances of minority and affinity that require the imposition of the death
penalty.[51]
Again, moral damages are awarded without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is
assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award [52] which is
P75,000.00 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape. [53] Lastly, exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 is also called for by way of public example and to protect the young from sexual
abuse.[54]
Three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Majority that the law
is constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo in Crim. Cases Nos. 6636-G and 6637-G
is MODIFIED:
In Crim. Case No. 6636-G appellant ANTONIO MENDOZA y BUTONES is found guilty
of ATTEMPTED RAPE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, four (4) months and ten
(10) days of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum; to indemnify the victim Maricar T. Mendoza the
sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
In Crim. Case No. 6637-G we find appellant ANTONIO MENDOZA y BUTONES guilty
of INCESTUOUS RAPE OF A MINOR as charged under Art. 266-B of The Revised Penal Code as amended
by RA 8353 and is sentenced to the supreme penalty of death. He is also ordered to pay the
victim Maricar T. Mendoza P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659 amending Sec. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this Decision let the records of this case be forwarded forthwith, to the President of the Philippines for
the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Finally, as the circumstances demand immediate counseling and other remedial measures, let copy
of this Decision be served upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development so the
victim Maricar T. Mendoza may be extended such vital assistance for her healing, recovery and
reintegration to society as a rape survivor under RA 8505, The Rape Victim Assistance and Protection
Act of 1998.
Costs de oficio.

15.
THE
PEOPLE
vs.
TEODORO SABIO, defendant-appellant.

OF

Antonio
T.
de
Jesus
for
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellee.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

defendant

and

appellant.

BENGZON, J.P. J.:

At about six p.m. of April 12, 1963, Teodoro Sabio was squatting with a friend, Irving Jurilla, in the plaza
of Central Manapla, Manapla, Negros Occidental. Romeo Bacobo and two others Ruben Miosa and
Leonardo Garcia approached them. All of them were close and old friends.
Romeo Bacobo then asked Sabio where he spent the holy week. At the same time, he gave Sabio a
"footkick greeting", touching Sabio's foot with his own left foot. Sabio thereupon stood up and dealt

Romeo Bacobo a fist blow, inflicting upon him a lacerated wound, inch long, at the upper lid of the left
eye. It took from 11 to 12 days to heal and prevented Romeo Bacobo from working during said period as
employee of Victorias Milling Co., Inc.
Sabio was thereafter prosecuted for less serious physical injuries. In the municipal court he was found
guilty and sentenced to imprisonment of 5 months and 10 days plus costs. In the Court of First Instance,
however, to which he appealed, he was found guilty but with the mitigating circumstance of
provocation, so that the penalty imposed was one (1) month and five (5) days of arresto mayor plus
indemnity of P100 and costs.1wph1.t
Defendant appealed from this judgment to Us to raise as a pure question of law the sole issue of
whether, under the facts is determined below, a fist blow delivered in retaliation to a "foot-kick greeting"
is an act of self-defense and/or justifying circumstance entitling the accused to acquittal and relief from
all liabilities, civil and criminal.
A primordial requisite for self-defense is unlawful aggression (Art. 11, Rev. Penal Code). And for unlawful,
aggression to be present, there must be real danger to life or personal safety (People vs. Beatriz Yuman,
61 Phil. 786). For this reason, a mere push or a shove, not followed by other acts, has been held
insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (People vs. Yuman, supra). A playful kick the lower court
rejected defendant's claim that it was a "vicious kick" at the foot my way of greeting between friends
may be a practical joke, and may even hurt; but it is not a serious or real attack on a person's safety.
Appellant's submission that it amounts to unlawful aggression cannot therefore be sustained. As rightly
found by the Court of First Instance, such kick was only a mere slight provocation.
Reference is made to a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain (prom. Jan. 20, 1904, 72 Jur. Crim. 123125), considering a slap on the face an unlawful aggression. No parity lies between said case and the
present. Since the face represents a person and his dignity, slapping, it is a serious personal attack. It is
a physical assault coupled with a willful disregard, nay, a defiance, of in individual's personality. It may
therefore be frequently regarded as placing in real danger a person's dignity, rights and safety. A
friendly kick delivered on a person's foot obviously falls short of such personal aggression.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J.,
16.
RENATO
B.
TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated December 12,
1983, convicting petitioner Renato B. Torres of homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Patrolman Renato B. Torres y Barcena is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and the victim's sufficient provocation or threat immediately
preceeding the act sued upon and without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the penalty of reclusion temporal prescribed by law is reduced by one degree
to prision mayor, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty, ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
maximum; to pay the legal heirs of the deceased, Danilo Rivera y Pumicpic, the amount of
P2,920.00 as actual damages; P24,000.00 for the unrealized net income or lost earning

capacity of said deceased for a period of ten (10) years; and P15,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of the latter.
The statement of facts summarized by the Solicitor General in his Comment, which was later considered
as his Memorandum, is not disputed by petitioner.
Petitioner Renato Torres became a member of the Metropolitan Police Force, Southern Police District on
March 16, 1980. In the afternoon of April 5, 1982, he and another policeman, Corporal Ruben Onelia,
were assigned to direct traffic at the corner of C. Jose Street and Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in
Pasay City.
At about 5:30 p.m., petitioner saw the victim Danilo Rivera his motorcycle in a zigzag manner along C.
Jose Street and then along EDSA. Shortly after the victim came out of C. Jose Street, petitioner called his
attention and commanded him to pull over to the side. The victim questioned his apprehension.
Petitioner approached him and pointed out that he was driving in a zigzag fashion. He observed that the
victim was either drunk or high on drugs because of his red eyes. The victim replied that he was not
violating any traffic regulation. At this juncture, the discussion between the two became more heated.
Petitioner required the victim to produce his driver's license. The victim refused to hand it over.
Petitioner threatened to take him to the police station. He went closer to the victim who then
dismounted from his motorcycle. Petitioner insisted that the victim go with him to the police station but
the victim refused to budge. When petitioner reiterated his command, the victim retorted that he was
delaying him in his work. Nevertheless, petitioner disregarded his remark and continued trying to force
the victim to go with him to the police station.
At this point, the victim defied the petitioner by pulling out from his pants pocket a bladed knife
commonly known as "tusok", which is six inches in length, including the two-inch handle. The victim
lunged at petitioner who was two meters away. Petitioner moved back, drew his gun and warned the
victim that he will shoot if he (the victim) attacked again. Petitioner noticed that the victim was not
standing steady. When he attempted a second thrust, the victim lost his balance. At that instant,
petitioner shot him at the back. When the victim fell, petitioner immediately hailed a taxi and took the
victim to the Pasay City General Hospital. He then left for the police headquarters to surrender. He
placed himself under the custody of Colonel Alfredo Angeles, chief of the Investigation Division. He
turned over to him his service revolver and the knife carried by the victim. In the meantime, the victim
died and was duly autopsied by Dr. Renato C. Bautista. He noted the cause of death in his report (Exh.
A): Hemorrhage, profuse, secondary to gunshot wound; Back, left side. After due investigation, petitioner
was charged with homicide two days later, or on April 7, 1982 (tsn, pp. 4-7, July 28, 1982; pp. 4-20, 2429, 31-32; May 9, 1983; pp. 9-10, July 19, 1983; Rec. p. 1).
On April 7, 1982, petitioner was charged with homicide to which he pleaded not guilty. On December 12,
1983, respondent Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner. It ruled that the shooting and killing of the
deceased was not attended by any justifying circumstance; that the true happenings preceding the
shooting belie and militate against self-defense or fulfillment of duty; that at most, petitioner was
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat, apart from voluntary
surrender, but not to total absolution of liability.
Petitioner did not file any motion for reconsideration with respondent Sandiganbayan. Instead, he filed
with this Court a petition for review on certiorari on January 30, 1984 alleging that the Sandiganbayan
erred (a) when it failed to consider in favor of petitioner the elements of unlawful aggression and
reasonable necessity of the means used to repel it; (b) when it dismissed outright petitioner's theory of
self-defense just because he did not suffer any scratch; and (c) when it convicted petitioner despite the
fact that there was doubt as to his guilt, hence no civil damages should be awarded.
The Solicitor General submits that the facts prove the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased, since it is undisputed that the deceased attacked petitioner twice with a four-inch bladed
knife; that unlawful aggression is clearly manifest since the physical assaults against petitioner placed
his life in actual peril (People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 647); that in determining the existence of unlawful
aggression, it does not matter if the attacks have no predictable success; that, moreover, it is not
necessary for petitioner to be wounded first to prove the existence of unlawful aggression, it being
sufficient that the aggression be attempted so as to give rise to the right to prevent it (People vs.
Batungbacal, 37 Phil. 382; People vs. Hitosis, 55 Phil. 298).

We agree with petitioner and the Solicitor General that the first requisite of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense unlawful aggression - is present in the case at bar (Article 11 [l] of the Revised Penal
Code). There is no question that the third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself - is also present. Petitioner was merely acting in the performance of his duty
as a traffic policeman when he tried to arrest the deceased for violating a traffic regulation. In fact,
respondent Sandiganbayan appreciated the victim's sufficient provocation or threat immediately
preceding the act sued upon as a mitigating circumstance together with petitioner's voluntary surrender.
The principal issue is whether or not the second requisite reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression - is present. On this point the Solicitor General agrees with
respondent Sandiganbayan that petitioner did not use reasonable means to repel the attack of the
deceased. When the deceased lunged at petitioner the second time, he stumbled and even went past
petitioner. At that instant, petitioner could have just struck at the deceased with his gun, or at worse,
aimed his gun at a non-vital part of his body to overcome his resistance to arrest. However, petitioner
chose to fire at the back of the deceased, thus killing him almost instantly. The Solicitor General invokes
the ruling in People vs. Oanis (74 Phil. 257, 262), to the effect that a peace officer is never justified in
using unnecessary force in effecting arrests or in treating with wanton violence the arrested person or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. This doctrine was restated in
the Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and
the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. "
(Sec. 2 of Rule 109, subsequently Rule 113). It is worthwhile noting that the rule was made stricter in
Sec. 2, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure thus: "No violence or unnecessary force shall
be used in making an arrest . . . "
We agree with the Solicitor General. In the case of People vs. De Jesus, this Court ruled that:
With the deceased shown to be the aggressor as against Yalong, the reasonableness of
the means used by Yalong to repel the aggression may however, not be assessed in his
favor. The deceased was in a state of drunkenness, so he was not as dangerous as he
would if he had been sober. His aim proved faulty and easily evaded as shown by the fact
that Yalong was not hit by the stab attempts blows directed against him. At best, We can
grant incomplete self-defense in his favor, the necessity of the means he used to repel the
aggression not appearing to Us clearly reasonable.11 (People vs. De Jesus, November 19,
1982, 118 SCRA 616, 627)
In the case at bar, petitioner testified as follows:
Q What happened after he stabbed you?
A I moved back and then I drew my gun. I shouted at him, 'don't continue
doing that., I will shoot you.'
Q Then what did he do?
A But he did not heed my warning and he continued lunging at me. And
maybe because he was somewhat drunk or somewhat high in drugs, he was
not steady and he was - outbalanced and so, when he made that thrust, he
lost his balance in which time I simultaneously shot him." (TSN, pp. 13-14,
May 9, 1983)
Under such circumstances, there was no need for petitioner to fire his gun at the deceased.
The penalty prescribed by law for homicide is reclusion temporal Considering the fact that two out of the
three requisites for the justifying circumstance of self-defense are present, Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code is applicable and a penalty lower by two degrees may be imposed. The mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the deceased may no longer be considered
because it is deemed absorbed by his unlawful aggression. But the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender may still be considered. Two degrees lower than reclusion temporal is prison correccional

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in accordance with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, petitioner is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a minimum period of six months of arresto
mayor and a maximum period of two years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty as above provided, the decision appealed from is
affirmed,
18.
THE
UNITED
STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO RIVERA, ANTONIO RIVERA, and CANUTO BATOON, defendants-appellants.
Julio
Borbon
Villamor,
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

for

appellants.

CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Sur, convicting
the three defendants and appellants of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to fourteen years
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law.
The information charging the commission of the crime is as follows: "That the said Domingo Rivera,
Antonio Rivera, and Canuto Botoon, the defendants above named, on December 27, 1912, in the
municipality of Vigan Province of Ilocos Sur, P. I., did willfully, criminally, and unlawfully, and with abuse
of superior strength, wound and beat Cayetano Peralta, inflicting upon him various injuries as the result
of which the said Cayetano Peralta died on December 31 of the same year; a deed committed in
violation of the law."
The evidence of record discloses that on the morning of December 27, 1912, a dispute arose between
the wife of the deceased and the wife of the defendants Domingo Rivera, over some question as to the
loan of a pair of scissors and the failure to return them. Heated and insulting language passed between
the women from the windows of their houses, which were located quite close together. The deceased
appears to have been drawn into the wordy dispute, and as result of an offensive remark made by him
to Rivera and his wife, Rivera went down from his house into the street, and standing in front of the
house of the deceased with two stones in his hands, challenged him to come down and prove which was
the better man. The deceased when he heard his challenge from the street became greatly enraged,
picked up a large bolo, rushed out of his house and advanced on Rivera, who being a much smaller man
and seeing his adversary approaching him with wih a large bolo in his hand, took to flight. The deceased
pursued him and inflicted upon him two wounds, one in the back and one in the side. Rivera ran into the
lot of one of the neighbors and finding himself stopped by a fence, turned and endeavored to defend
himself from the onslaught of the deceased with a small knife or bolo. At that moment the father of
Rivera (his coaccused Antonio Rivera) and Canuto Botoon (the other coaccused) rushed to his
assistance. The father with a blow of a heavy piece of cane succeeded in disarming the deceased and at
the same moment Botoon leaped upon him from behind and caught him around the waist. In the melee,
which only lasted a second or two, the accused Domingo Rivera inflicted three wounds upon the
deceased, two in the arms and one in the abdomen. The parties were separated almost immediately and
the wounded man was carried to the municipal building, where he died four days thereafter. Domingo
Rivera, who inflicted the fatal wounds gave himself up to the local authorities, claiming that what he had
done had been done in self-defense. The deceased, in his ante-mortem statement, charged Domingo
Rivera with having inflicted the fatal blow, and Antonio Rivera and Botoon with having joined in the
assault by disarming and holding him while the fight was in progress.
There is considerable conflict in the testimony of the witnesses called at the trial. The story told by the
widow of the deceased, who claimed to have seen all that occured from the window of her house, was
substantially as above related, except that she asserted that when her husband went down-stairs with a
bolo in his hand Domingo Rivera met him in the street and with his bolo inflicted two wounds in his
arms; that her husband then took to flight and ran away from Rivera until he was stopped by the fence

in the neighbor's yard, where the fatal blow was struck, all three of the accused there joining in the
attack.
For an examination of all the evidence of record as well as from a consideration of the inherent
improbability of this story, we are well satisfied that the window of the deceased deliberately inverted
the facts with the intention of increasing the criminal liability of the accused.
It is fully and conclusively established that when Domingo Rivera stood in the street challenging her
husband to come down and prove which was the better man, he had two stones in his hands, and it may
fairly be inferred from this fact that at that moment he was not armed with a bolo. The bolo with which
the fatal wound was inflicted was produced at the trial in the court below and was shown to be, by
comparison with the bolo used by the deceased, a relatively small weapon, referred to indifferently by
the witnesses as a knife or a bolo (cuchillo o bolo). It does not appear clearly from the record just where
or when Domingo Rivera secured this bolo, but it seems clear that it must either have been handed to
him by some person after the accused had rushed upon him and put him to flight, or that he drew it
from its sheath while he was endeavoring to make his escape. The deceased was shown to be a much
larger and more powerful man than his adversary, and it would seem to be contrary to the inherent
probabilities of the situation to hold that the smaller man, unarmed or at most armed with a very short
small bolo, would succeed in putting to flight his adversary, who by the window's own statement rushed
down from the house to the attack with a large and dangerous bolo in his hand. Moreover the wounds in
the back of Domingo Rivera almost conclusively corroborate his story and the story of various witnesses
who testified that they saw him endeavoring to make his escape from the deceased.
The accused themselves undertook at the trial to relieve themselves of all criminal responsibility:
Domingo Rivera insisting that he struck the fatal blow in self-defense at the moment when the deceased
had left himself open to attack by a slip as he approached the fenced place where he (Rivera) turned to
await him; and the other two accused insisting that they did not come up to the party until a few
moments after the fight took place, and that they intervened only to help to carry away the wounded
man. Their account of the fight at the fence is in our opinion completely disaproven by the testimony of
the witnesses called for both the prosecution and the defense, and we are satisfied that in declining to
tell the truth as to all that occured, Rivera and Batoon were actuated by the fear that if they had taken
an active part in the fight they might be punished on the charge of unlawfully killing the deceased.
The trial judge accepted the story as told by the window and, erroneously as we are convinced,
convicted all three defendants of the crime of homicide. As to the accused Antonio Rivera (the father of
Domingo, who inflicted the fatal wound) and Canuto Batoon, we think that they were clearly entitled to
acquittal on the ground that their intervention if the affray was actuated solely by a desire to save their
kinsman and friend from imminent danger of death at the hands of his much stronger and better-armed
adversary. It seems quite clear that in striking the bolo from the hands of the deceased and grasping
him around the waist, they did no more than the manifest necessities of the occasion demanded, and
that under all the circumstances they cannot be held criminally liable for their intervention on his behalf.
It is not contended that they took any part in the original dispute which resulted in the fatal affray, nor
that they were actuated by revenge, resentment or any other evil motive. Article 8 of the Penal Code
provides that:
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. lawph!1.net

5. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, or legitimate,
natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and
those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second
circumstances prescribed in the next preceding paragraph are present, and the further
circumstance, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making
defense had no part therein.
6. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second circumstances mentioned in paragraph four are present, and the further circumstance
that the person defending be not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
As to the accused Domingo Rivera, we are of the opinion that in view of the provocation given by
him to the deceased he cannot be said to have established his claim of absolute exemption from
criminal liability on the ground that the killing of the deceased was done in lawful self-defense.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he provoked the quarrel which resulted in
the death of his adversary.
Article 86 of the Penal Code provides as follows: "A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed were not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of
some of the conditions required for exemption from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in article 8, provided that the majority thereof be present. The courts shall impose the
penalty in the degree which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and weight of the
conditions of exemption present or lacking."
Under all the circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the appellant Domingo Rivera,
although guilty of the crime of homicide, should be given the benefit of the provisions of this
article, it appearing that but for the fact that he himself provoked the fatal quarrel, he would be
exempt from all criminal liability, on the ground that he struck the fatal blow in self-defense. The
penalty which should have been imposed upon him is, therefore, the penalty lower by one degree
than that prescribed for the crime of homicide.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court upon all the defendants
and appellants should be and is reversed. The appellants Antonio Rivera and Canuto Batoon
should be and are acquitted of the crime with which they are charged, with their proportionate
share of the costs in both instances de oficio, and they will be set at liberty forthwith. But the
defendant Domingo Rivera is hereby declared to be guilty of the crime of homicide with which he
was charged, modified nevertheless by the fact that the fatal blow would have been struck in
lawful self-defense but for the fact that he himself provoked the assault of his adversary. He
should therefore be, and he is hereby, sentenced to six years and one day of prision correccional,
together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to the payment of his proportionate
share of the cost in both instances.

21.
THE
PEOPLE
vs.
MANUEL
BERONILLA,
FILIPINO
ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.

OF
VELASCO,

THE
POLICARPIO

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
PACULDO,

and

JACINTO

Agripino
A.
Brillantes,
Valera,
Eufemio
and
Bernardez
for
appellants.
Prospero
C.
Sanidad
and
Claro
M.
Recto
for
defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo
for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of
murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz ,
Province of Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as
Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an
attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was

appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry,
Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his
appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all
Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons
accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received
from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of
Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all
Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of the
municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in
progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued.
Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to
file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority
were filed against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as
chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella,
Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as
members; while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk
of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily
appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the proceedings for several
days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the
jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor
Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said
records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions:
HEADQUARTERS
15TH
In the Field

3RD

MILITARY

INFANTRY,

DISTRICT
USAFIP

16 April 1945
Msg.
Subject:
Arsenio
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.

No.
Borjal,

337
Against

Charges

1.
Returned
herewith
are
the
papers
on
the
case
of
Arsenio
Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the
case is hereby approved.
(Sgd.)
R.
Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding

H.
15th

Inf.,

ARNOLD
PA

Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.

(Sgd.)
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

MANUEL

BERONILLA

(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto
Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic
Church was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the
Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution,
Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following
message:
HEADQUARTERS
15TH
In the Field

3RD

MILITARY

DISTRICT
USAFIP

INFANTRY,

22 April 1945
Msg.
Subject:
Report
To: Military Mayor Beronilla

and

No.
information

Re

Borjal

398
case

1.
Received
your
letter
dated
18
April
1945,
subject,
above.
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from
Higher Headquarters regarding same. Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable

acts of the accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely impartial and fair.
Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent way of handling the
whole case.
(Sgd.)
R.
Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding

H.
15th

Inf.,

ARNOLD
PA

Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.

(Sgd.)
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

MANUEL

BERONILLA

(Exhibit 21, 21-a)

Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix
Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen,
Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix
Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner,
Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the
Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of
Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8,
granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was granted
amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of
the defendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who
denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal motives, and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted
amnesty by the Amnesty Commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally
dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he might be utilized
as state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants
Antonio Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered
judgment, acquitting the members of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that
they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix
Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in
the crime; but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto
Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer
imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal toreclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the costs. In convicting said
defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of
the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was
committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the
deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico
appealed to this Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the
late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9
and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet
officials and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two
thirds vote. It is to be noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be
prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in
accordance with instructions of superior military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due
more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however,
predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall
area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction
and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as
follows:
"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED
JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF

PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION
ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED
TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in
San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning
of April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to
and received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the
Volckmann message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18,
1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that
Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied
it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package
he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who
claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was
Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at
the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can
not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal
Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of
the message. In the affidavit, he stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz,
Abra? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the
Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio Borjal is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came
to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on orders of Mayor
Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet
learned of the decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla,
asking the reason for his being ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to
Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I should tie
Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and
Mayor Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the
message arrived, otherwise Beronilla would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified
later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of the contents of the Volckmann
message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family,
considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another
prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that
the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that
the agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's
petition to be allowed to hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed
Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on
the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is
even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on
April 21, 1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but
independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial
for disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to
transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do
away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who
was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already
decided that the concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a
liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by
appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal
motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of
the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and
trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to
be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted
nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality, and it was not resumed until
headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban
Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed; and when
the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's

headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later
with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved"
(Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after
finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians
to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that
"the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill
Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon
orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good
faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say
that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48;
Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25
March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi
mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person performing the act complained of
be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).
But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below
should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off.
Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area
from enemy control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz,
Abra, is contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original
accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records;
and this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on
March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the
case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948,
setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was slain. The
two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the
Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to
whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused"
(42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done inPeople vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Paras, C. J
23.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEA, defendant-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Primicias,
Abad,
Mencias
and
Castillo
for
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.

appellant.

DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19,
1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the accused
acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the
provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered
him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority.
From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had
acted with discernment and in not having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The
incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed
order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos
and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard,
intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this

act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped
him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening
attitude, for which the reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning
immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The
accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller
and more robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now
deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal,
to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the accused had
been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife because he might attack
Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which
was in a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doquea
approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist, to
which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was
bigger that the accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued
playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands,
the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter,
not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by section
138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed the crime in
question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual,
Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a
company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always
obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in committing the crime,
acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so
also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial
of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken
from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means
resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine
whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time
the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on
the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear
that the attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the
Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating
circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not
only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial
(U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is
correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J.

24.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
BIENVENIDO NOCUM, defendant-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Severino
P.
Izon
for
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Umali for appellee.

appellant.

BENGZON, J.:
For having discharged a gun and accidentally killed Eugenio Francisco, the defendant Bienvenido
Nocum, aliasBembe, was tried in the Court of First Instance Manila, before the Honorable Alfonso Felix,
judge. Found guilty of homicide through reckless negligence, he appealed in due course.
According to the evidence, about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight
between Federico Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Streets,
City of Manila. Desiring to stop the encounter, defendant shouted at the combatants. As these paid him
no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice at the air. The bout continued, however; so he
fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an
innocent by-stander, resident of the place. The wounded man was promptly carried to the St. Luke's
Hospital where he expired soon after.
The above paragraph is a composite and abridged statement of the declarations of several witnesses
(Jesus Santos, Vicente and Juan Aurencio and Ramon Gagui) in connection with defendant's confession
Exhibit F.1 But his attorney, assailing the validity of said confession in the ground of involuntariness,
contends in this Court that in asmuch as the corpus delicti had not been demonstrated by evidence
dehors that document, his client should be absolved, pursuant to several pertinent decisions. (United
States vs. De la Cruz, 2 Phil., 148; and People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil., 834.) Particular attention has been
given to these points. Yet there is competent proof establishing the fact that, during the affray, pistol
detonations were heard, and that one of the bullets produced the tragic death of Eugenio Francisco,
whose photograph is Exhibit B. That is proof of the corpus delicti, i. e., proof of violent death, whether or
not feloniously caused. (See Moran, Law of Evidence, Revised Edition, pp. 108, 109; People vs. Mones,
58 Phil., 46.) The confession Exhibit F served to identify the person who fired those shots and committed
the offense.
We feel no inclination to reject such confession, because the uncorroborated and implausible testimony
of the accused, alleging he had been manhandled before signing this document, about which he knew
nothing, could not definitely overcome the positive assertions of Pablo Montilla of the Manila Police
Department (before whom Exhibit F had been executed) that no force or intimidation had been
employed on Nocum, who willingly signed it "after propounding to him all the questions and explaining
to him the contents" thereof. The impartiality of that officer of the law has not been shaken by the lone
testimony of herein appellant, which, as explained in the People's brief, deserves no credence. Nocum
said in court that he signed Exhibit F when Montilla told him "it was simply a proof that they arrested
me" (p. 27, t.s.n.). This is inconsistent with the alleged third-degree methods. If he was forced, deceit
was unneccessary. And yet, he could not be deceived thusly, because he was no illiterate, being seventh
grader.
Anyway, the trial judge had the chance to see the opposing witnesses, and to observe their demeanor
on the stand; and in the conflict of their statements we will not interfere with his judgment, unless the
record discloses some important circumstance which was overlooked, (United States vs. Remigio, 37
Phil., 599; United States vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155), it being the peculiar province of trial courts to resolve
questions relating to the credibility of witnesses. (United States vs. Pico, 15 Phil., 549.)
The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence, the slaying having been
unintentional (cf. People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939; and United States vs. Reodique, 32 Phil., 458). It is
apparent the defendant wilfully discharged his gun for which he exhibited no license, by the way
without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated, and the
likehood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
A landowner surprise a youngster in the act of stealing some fruit in his orchard. To scare the intruder he
fired a shotgun aiming at the foliage of a cherry tree. The shot scattered and a pellet injured the boy,
who was standing under the tree. That was reckless negligence, the Spanish Supreme Court decided.
(Sent. June 20, 1900, Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 7, p. 14.)

The penalty imposed on the appellant is 2 months and 1 day to 1 year and 1 day, indemnity of P2,000
with subsidiary imprisonment, and costs. It is within the limits authorized by law. (Article 365, Rev. Penal
Code, and Act No. 4103.) (Act No. 284.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Moran, C.J.,

25.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS FERNANDO alias COMMANDER "BOB," defendant-appellant.
Maximo V. Cuesta, J and Cipriano Manansala for defendant appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Teodulo R. Dino for plaintiff-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant for
the crime of murder.
The accused was charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac under the
following information:
That on or about March 30, 1961, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Bamban, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Carlos Fernando alias "Bob," together with Francisco Ronquillo alias Commander
"Manly," (Deceased) and Mario Salonga (at large), confederating, conspiring and helping
one another, with malice aforethought and the deliberate intent to take the life of
Bienvenido Laxamana, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treacherously attack the latter with pistols caliber 45, thereby inflicting upon the said
Bienvenido Laxamana, mortal wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused
his instantaneous death.
After trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged, on the strength of his two confessions,
consisting of his 4-page written sworn statement taken on June 16, 1961 by Capt. Pedro Acierto of the
First Philippine Constabulary Zone, 1 soon after his capture on June 12, 1961 in an encounter in Barrio
Balibago between Dau and Mabalacat, Pampanga, between PC troops and Huks led by HMB Commander
Francisco Ronquillo alias Commander Manly who was killed, and his 3-page testimony at the preliminary
examination of the criminal complaint for murder conducted on July 19, 1961 by Judge Pompeyo S.
Tiglao of the Municipal Court of Bamban, Tarlac, 2 as well as of his own testimony at the hearing of March
11, 1965 as the lone defense witness on his own behalf, at which he, freely admitted his participation in
the murder. 3
The trial court found the facts as follows: "(O) n the evening of March 30, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock,
Bienvenido Laxamana was inside a store of one Honoria Atienza next to his house on the same side of
the street in the poblacion of Bamban, Tarlac. He was then, sitting and eating peanuts. While in that
position, Mario Salonga alias 'Manding,' who is still at large, and the accused Carlos Fernando alias 'Bob,'
without any warning, suddenly and unexpectedly fired shots with their .45 caliber pistols at Laxamana.
The duo then departed, leaving their victim sprawled outside the store.
Salonga and Fernando were members of the Hukbalahap Organization. Before going to
Bamban, Tarlac, on the evening of the incident, they were somewhere within the
jurisdiction of Angeles City where they received instruction from one of their commanders,

Francisco Ronquillo alias Commander Manly,' to liquidate Laxamana. The motive was that
the latter, while an officer of the civilian guards, had ordered the killing of a relative of
Commander "Manly" and the beating up of the father of Salonga. Fernando and Salonga
went to Bamban from Angeles City by walking all along between sugar cane field. After
the killing of Laxamana, they also decamped together the same route.
The victim, Bienvenido Laxamana, was married to Remedios L. Laxamana. Two daughters
were born out of their wedlock, the elder of whom is 13 years old. Before his death,
Laxamana was a member of the Central Azucareras de Tarlac Planters' Association of that
province. When his brother-in-law, the late Sinforoso Lomboy, was the Municipal Mayor of
Bamban sometime in 1950, he became a member of the civilian guards or the Civilian
Commando Unit (CCU) in that town with the rank of captain.
That evening of March 30, 1961, Mrs. Laxamana came from the Catholic church of
Bamban with her elder daughter, Bernadette. While on her way home and when the
distance from her house was about thirty meters, she heard the firing of shots. She took
cover in one stores; and after the firing had ceased, she went out and hurriedly proceeded
to her home. In front of the store of Honoria Atienza she saw her husband sprawled on the
ground full of blood. She was not able to come close to him because somebody held her
back. A jeep arrived where her husband was placed but not long thereafter he was
brought back already dead.
Dr. Honorato Navarro, municipal health officer of Bamban Tarlac, made the autopsy of the victim's
cadaver or the same night of the murder, and per his necropsy report, 4 the victim cited of "hemorrhage,
massive, secondary to GUNSHOT WOUNDS, multiple (23) in neck, chest, and back, lumbar region, and
upper and lower extremities," many of which were mortal wounds hitting vital organs in the neck such
as the carotid artery and the vagus nerve, both lungs and the liver, kidneys and intestines in the lumber
region.
The trial court rejected the accused's testimony at the trial that he did not fire any shot at the victim but
merely stood guard outside the store, and that his role, after Salonga had ceased firing at the victim was
to fire three shots in the air as a signal for them to depart, thus: "(T)he Court entertains a very serious
doubt on the veracity of the above-mentioned statement of the accused because the same is contrary to
what he stated when he was first investigated by the P.C. after his apprehension. Portion of his written
statement (Exh. F-1) reads as follows:
12. T Natupad ba naman ninyo ang iniutos ni Comdr. FRANCISCO
RONQUILLO na patayin si BIENVENIDO LAXAMANA?
S Opo napatay namin sa pamamagitan ng pagbaril sa kanya nuong
gabing iyon ng ika-30 ng Marzo, 1961.
13. T Anong clase ng baril ang inyong ginamit sa pagpatay kay
LAXAMANA?
S Pareho po kaming gumamit ng Pistola calibre 45. Si MARIO SALONGA
alias MANDING na aking kasama ay nakapagpaputok ng humigit kumulang
sa labing-dalawa at ako naman ay tatlong putok.
14. T Sinabi mong natupad ninyo ang utos ni Comdr. FRANCISCO
RONQUILLO alias Commander MANLY, na patayin si Bienvenido Laxamana,
natatandaan mo ba kung saan lugar ninyo binaril at pinatay ang taong
naturan?
S Duon po sa loob ng isang tindahan sa Poblacion, Bamban, Tarlac, na
ang may-ari sa naturang tindahan ay hindi ko kilala.
The answer of the accused to the above-quoted question No. 13 to the effect that he and
Salonga both used .45 caliber pistols in killing Laxamana, with Salonga firing twelve shots

and he, three shots, conveys no other idea, than that the three shots he fired were
directed at the victim and not upwards into the air. The Court is inclined to believe that
this statement is the one in keeping with the truth, taking into consideration the
determination of the accused to participate in the killing of Laxamana and the number of
gunshot wounds found on the latter's body.
At any rate, the trial court further held, there was no doubt as to the existence of conspiracy between
the accused and Salonga, as the accused actively participated in the criminal design of Salonga and
acted in concert with him, granting arguendo that the accused merely stood guard for Salonga and that
Salonga alone inflicted the 23 gunshot wounds on the victim.
The trial court likewise rejected the accused's contention that he should be punished only for the crime
of rebellion as the murder was in pursuance of the Huks rebellion movement, since the motive for the
killing of the victim was personal, to avenge the alleged killing of a relative of Commander Manly and
the alleged maltreatment of the father of Salonga, supposedly ordered by the victim. The trial court
further pointed out that while the victim had been an officer of the civilian guards in Bamban, that was
more than ten years ago in 1950, and the victim was an ordinary civilian when he was shot in cold
blood.
The trial court found that "(F)rom the testimony of the accused himself on the witness stand, it clearly
appears that the firing of the shots which snuffed out the life of Laxamana was sudden and unexpected,
without any risk to the assailant which might have proceeded from the defense of the victim. The crime,
therefore, committed by the accused is murder, qualified by treachery," and therefore rendered the
following verdict:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused CARLOS FERNANDO alias
COMMANDER "BOB" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of Bienvenido Laxamana in the sum of
P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the nature of
the principal penalty imposed, and to pay the costs.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant assigns as error the trial court's rejection of his contentions that his
participation in the murder was in furtherance of the Huk movement and that he should have been held
by virtue of his Huk membership to have acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. He further assigns as error the
trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the case filed on November 4, 1963, after the prosecution
had rested its case, on the ground of double jeopardy, on the ground of his previous conviction on
August 31, 1961 by the Pampanga Court in another case 5 of the crime of simple rebellion, on his
entering of plea of guilty.
We find the trial court's rulings to be in accordance with the evidence and the law.
1. Appellant's contention that because he and Salonga as members of the Hukbalahap organization had
received from Commander Manly the order to liquidate the victim, the murder committed by them
should have been held in furtherance of and absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that they should
have been instead charged for rebellion, is untenable. The record is bereft of any evidence that the
murder was committed as a necessary means to commit rebellion or in furtherance thereof. The victim
had no established connection with the government at the time. 6 As emphasized in People vs.
Paz 7 besides, "(T)hat the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or
defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily." Far from discharging the
burden, appellant himself revealed in his unrepudiated written confessions that the killing was inspired
by personal motives of avenging the alleged killing of a relative of Commander Manly and the alleged
maltreatment of Salonga's father, as ordered by the victim Laxamana, and cannot be deemed absorbed
by the rebellion and should be separately prosecuted. 8 As held in Hernandez,supra, 9 the mere fact that
the accused is a member of the Hukbalahap organization "is no reason why all his acts and misdeeds
should be considered in furtherance of or absorbed by rebellion." Appellant's contention that
Commander Manly's personal motive did not apply to him and that he merely obeyed as "a mere

'soldier' of the HMB is of no avail either in the face of his awareness of an acquiescence to the personal
motivation and the void of any evidence that the murder was necessary to the rebellion or in
furtherance thereof.
Accused next asks the Court to "take judicial notice of the fact that the Hukbalahap or HMB organization
deal with its members who disobey or refuse to carry out its orders in the most severe manner. A
member who disobeys or refuses to carry out its order may be liquidated or given another form of
severe punishment." On this tenuous premise, he claims that by virtue of his Huk membership, his
participation in the murder of the victim should have been deemed to be an act under the compulsion of
an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury as to
exempt, him from criminal liability. 10
Justice Moreland long set the norm for the application of these exempting circumstances: "...before a
force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce, such an effect upon the individual
that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable of committing
a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his
members to act and his mind to obey. He must act not only without will but against his will. Such a force
can never consist in anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be a force which act
upon him from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take advantage of
subdivision 10 of article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury, it must appear that the threat that which caused the uncontrollable
fear related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it must safely be said that the ordinary run
of men would have been governed by it. And the evil threatened must be greater than, or at least equal
to, that which he is compelled to cause." 11
2. Accused dismally failed to show that he acted "not only without will but against will." On the contrary,
he testified that he joined the Hukbalahap organization since, December 28, 1950 "because it is a good
organization." 12 The record is devoid even of any claim of the accused that any threats were made upon
him or that he acted under uncontrollable fear. He was not under any physical or moral compulsion
when according to his own version at the trial, he freely stood on guard outside the store while his
companion Salonga went inside and shot the victim. At his preliminary examination before Judge Tiglao,
he further testified that his role as guard was to fight off any persons who might come to the aid of the
victim Laxamana. 13 And without any physical or moral compulsion, after the killing, he and Salonga,
according to his own testimony at the same preliminary examination, returned to report the same to
Commander Manly at Barrio Kutid, Angeles, Pampanga and accept his congratulations and thanks. 14
3. The last principal error assigned by accused that the trial court should have dismissed the present
case by virtue of his previous conviction for rebellion on August 31, 1961 is without merit.
The accused, even before his apprehension in the encounter with the PC troops on June 12, 1961,
already faced the criminal charge of rebellion in an information filed on October 17, 1960 against him
and several others before the Pampanga Court of First Instance. 15 After his apprehension, he entered a
plea of guilty to the charge and was sentenced to six years, eight months and one day of prision
mayor per the decision handed down by the Pampanga court on August 31, 1961.
The murder of Laxamana for which the accused stands charged in the present case was committed on
March 30, 1961. The criminal complaint therefor was filed with the municipal court of Bamban, Tarlac on
July 19, 1961 and after the records were forwarded on September 14, 1962 to the trial court, the murder
information was filed on November 29, 1962.
There clearly can be no double jeopardy, because the murder of Laxamana on March 30, 1961 could not
have been possibly included as one of the specific counts in the information for rebellion filed against
the accused on October 17, 1960, as the murder had not yet been committed then. Furthermore, the
acts constituting the crime of rebellion were committed in the province of Pampanga where the accused
was charged therefor, while the murder of Laxamana for which the accused is charged in the present
case was committed in the province of Tarlac over which the Pampanga court had no
jurisdiction. 16 Finally, as the murder here had been shown to have been committed furtherance of the
rebellion but for personal vengeance, it could not be deemed absorbed by the crime of rebellion but had
to be separately charged and punished. 17

In resume, even going upon the accused's own version at the trial that he merely stood guard while his
companion Salonga went inside the store and killed the victim, and that thereafter he fired three shots
in the air as a signal for them to part and return to their camp, the trial court correctly held this to
constitute more than adequate. Proof of his participation as conspirator and of his responsibility as coprincipal in the murder. 18 In the absence of evidence that, the killing, qualified by treachery, was
attended by any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P12,000.00. 19
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the indemnity
to the heirs of the deceased Bienvenido Laxamana is increased to P12,000.00. With costs against the
accused-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J.

26.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
TEODULO ROGSDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Solicitor
General
Edilberto
Barot
Alfredo
G.
Fernando
Angel C. Facundo for the appellants.

THE

and
Solicitor
Jorge
for
appellant

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

R.

Coquia
Teodoro

for

appellee.
Rogado.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On September 25, 1956, Teodulo Togado, alias Commander Sulit, Isaac Orenia, alias Commander Lawin,
Domingo Golfo, alias Eser, Cresencio Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro Merin, alias Abling, Francisco
Racoma, alias Maneng,
Pio
Mercurio, alias Abling,
Francisco
Racoma, alias Rolando,
Nemesio
Arsolacia, alias Noli, and Conrado Devesa, aliasDonato, were charged with murder before the Court of
First Instance of Laguna for killing of one Salvador Areza. They all pleaded not guilty.
During the trial and after several witnesses for the prosecution have testified, Francisco Racoma and
Conrado Devesa were excluded from the information upon motion of the fiscal to be utilized as
government witnesses. Later, upon motion also of the fiscal, the charge was dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence with respect to accused Nemesio Arsolacia, Maximo Cerebo and Pedro Merin. Then counsel
for the remaining accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the killing of the deceased was
accomplished by them in furtherance of the huk movement, but the motion was denied.
Upon resumption of the trial, counsel for Teodulo Rogado and Pio Mercurio moved for separate trial on
the ground that their defense is incompatible with the defense of their co-accused, which motion was
granted by the trial court. And when both parties have submitted the case for decision, the trial court
found the accused Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo and Arsenal guilty as principals of the crime charged and
sentenced them to suffer the supreme penalty of death, while it found Pio Mercurio guilty merely as
accomplice and sentenced him to the penalty of from 8 years and 21 days of prision mayor as minimum
to 14 years 19 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the corresponding
accessory penalties provided for by law. Each of the four principals was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.00 and the accomplice in the amount of P2,000.00, and all to
pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Pio Mercurio having failed to file his brief, this case is before this Court only for the review of the decision
rendered against the accused Rogado, Orenia, Golfeo and Arsenal which imposes upon them the penalty
of death.
On July 12, 1956, Salvador Areza, a farmer residing in Lilio, Laguna, left his house carrying with him a
bolo on lots scabbard to gather firewood in his farm in barrio Bubukal. When he failed to return home
that day, his wife Lydia Nudal went out to search for him. She was accompanied by some armed men,
the mayor, and a sanitary health officer, and after a brief search, they found the decapitated body of her

husband in an uninhabited place in Bubukal about half kilometer away from the road. The gruesome find
revealed that Areza's head was totally severed from his body with his hands tied together. The health
officer, Dr. Dominador L. Gomez, found the body to be in state of decomposition, which led him to
conclude that the deceased must have died three to five days prior to his discovery. Areza's bolo and his
scabbard were also found near his body.
It appears that on July 12, 1956, Teodulo Rogado, alias Commander Sulit, Isaac Orenia, alias Commander
Lawin, Domingo Golfeo, alias Eser Cresencio Arsenal, alias Sako, Pedro Merin, alias Nestor, Maximo
Cerebo, aliasManeng,
Pio
Mercurio, alias Abling,
Nemesio
Arsolacia, alias Noli,
Francisco
Racoma, alias Rolando, and Conrado Devesa, alias Donato, were on their way from barrio Sta. Lucia,
Nagcarlan, to the municipality of Lilio, Laguna. They lost their way, and as they were looking for
someone from whom they should get information as to their whereabouts they met Salvador Areza
whom Racoma and Deveza approached. Upon their inquiry, Areza informed them that they were in
barrio Bubukal, municipality of Lilio; that there was an army camp stationed nearby; and that the
soldiers occasionally go on patrol to the barrios.
The information was reported to commander Sulit (Rogado) who in turn ordered that Areza be brought to
him. After talking with him, Rogado asked Areza to lead the way for them, but Areza refused saying that
he had much work to do, and besides he had a carabao with him. after a brief talk with
Orenia, alias Commander Lawin, rogado told Racoma that they were taking along Areza and that if he
should refuse, he should be tied, which instruction Racoma relayed to his two companions, Merin and
arsenal, telling them to be prepared in case Areza would give them a fight. Thereupon, Racoma
approached Areza and asked if he could barrow from him his bolo. Areza obliged. When Areza refused to
go with them, Pio Mercurio dragged him along, and as he refused, Golfeo struck him with the butt of his
gun.
After walking a short distance, Mercurio tied Areza's hands behind him. Areza protested telling Mercurio
that he had not done anything wrong, whereupon Golfeo gave him a fist blow on his stomach. After
walking some distance, a command to stop was heard and so they stopped. Racoma then approached
Rogado and told him that they should release Areza at night but rogado told him that Areza should be
killed and when Racoma returned to the group he found that Areza was being assaulted by Orenia and
Golfeo. At this moment, Racoma heard Rogado saying, in the vernacular, "Kill him now so we can
proceed." Areza was then taken to a secluded place quite far from the road, which was thick forest about
20 or 30 meters away from the group, and there Golfeo ordered Areza to lie down. With Areza's bolo and
ignoring the plea for mercy of their victim, Golfeo gave him a blow on the neck as he lay face down and
with his hands still tied behind. With the same bolo, Arsenal also gave the victim another blow on the
neck which completely severed the head from the body.
On September 20, 1956, Pedro Merin, a member of the group who surrendered to the authorities, made
a sworn statement before the Justice of the Peace of Nagcarlan, Laguna, stating therein that Salvador
Areza was killed by Ezer and Sako upon order of Commander Sulit. Domingo Golfeo also made a sworn
statement before the justice of the Peace of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting his participation in the killing
of Areza upon order of Commander Sulit. On September 21, 1956, Cresencio Arsenal also made a
written statement before the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting that he was one of those who killed
Areza. Both Domingo Golfeo and Cresencio Arsenal, while admitting their participation in the killing of
the deceased, claimed in exculpation that they acted under the pressure of an irresistible force in that
they merely obeyed the order of their Commander, Rogado alias Commander Sulit, who would have
killed them if they disobeyed his order. The other appellants merely contended that the killing was done
in furtherance of the huk rebellion.lawphi1.net
Their is no doubt that the unfortunate victim met his death in the hands of the accused who decided to
take his life because of his stubborn refusal to obey their command that he lead their way to the place
they wanted to go in order that they may not be exposed and caught by the agents of the law who were
stationed in a nearby municipality. The only question to be determined is whether the defense they have
set up is sufficient to exonerate them from liability.
As regard accused Domingo Golfeo, The evidence is clear that it was he who first struck Areza with the
butt of his gun hitting him on the side of his body, then gave him a fist blow on his stomach, and after
he had been taken to a secluded place, it was he who ordered Areza to lie down in the fashion adopted
by the Kempetai during the gloomy days of Japanese occupation and in that position gave him a blow on

the back of the neck which almost severed his head from the body. His participation in the killing of
Areza cannot therefore be doubted. His only defense is that he did so in obedience to the order of his
commander, and because he acted under the influence of uncontrollable fear, he should be exempt from
criminal responsibility.
The defense of Golfeo is clearly untenable not only because of the well-settled rule that obedience to an
order of a superior will only justify an act which otherwise would be criminal when the order is for a
lawful purpose, but also because the circumstances under which Golfeo participated in the torture and
liquidation of Areza cannot in any way justify his claim that he acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being punished by his superiors if he disobeyed their order. In the first place, at the time of the killing,
Golfeo was armed with automatic carbine such that he could have protected himself from any retaliation
on the part of his superiors if they should threaten to punish him if he disobeyed their order to kill Areza.
In the second place, the evidence shows that Areza was brought to a secluded place quite far from that
where his superiors were at the time and in such a predicament, he and companion Arsenal could have
escaped with Areza to void the ire of their superiors. The fact that he carried out their order although his
superiors were at some distance from him and that without pity and compunction he struck his victim in
a Kempetai fashion show that he acted on the matter not involuntarily or under the pressure of fear of
force, as he claims, but out of his own free will and with the desire to collaborate with the criminal
design of his superiors. In the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in finding him
responsible for the death of Areza as co-principal by direct participation.
The same situation obtained with regard to Cresencio Arsenal. It appears that he was one of those
ordered by Rogado to kill Areza and in obedience to such order he had a direct participation in the
killing. It was he and Golfeo who brought Areza to a secluded place and once there he helped Golfeo in
killing him with the same bolo which was taken from the victim himself. Thus, it appears that after
Golfeo had given the first blow on the back of the neck of Areza as he lay face down on the ground,
Arsenal took the bolo himself and gave the fatal blow which completely severed the head of Areza from
his body. There is therefore no doubt that Arsenal directly cooperated with Golfeo in carrying out the
concerted plan of killing Areza because of the hostile attitude he adopted in denying them the help they
demanded from him. Since Arsenal to those existing in the case of Golfeo, his claim of obedience and
fear of retaliation if he disobeyed his superiors' order cannot also be entertained.
The other defense of appellants refers to their theory that they killed Areza not for personal motive but
in furtherance of the huk rebellion and so, if any liability they have, it is only for rebellion and for murder
as they are charged. And having already been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of rebellion in
Criminal Case No. SP-137 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, their prosecution in the instant case
would constitute double jeopardy.
to begin with, it should be stated that while this Court ruled in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil., 515, 52
Off. Gaz., No. 11, p. 5506, that there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder because the latter
offense is absorbed by the former, however, a distinction was made in the case of People vs. Geronimo,
100 Phil., 90, 53, Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 68, where we held that if the killing is inspired by personal motive
such killing is not absorbed by the rebellion but may be the subject of separate prosecution. In the
second place, we find that the acts with which appellants now charged do not appear included in the
information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. SP-137, for in the case they were merely accused of having
risen and taken up arms against the Philippine constabulary, Armed Forces of the Philippines, police
forces and other military detachments of the government, without specifying the particular acts
committed against private persons or civilians which may be said to have been undertaken in
furtherance of the huk rebellion. It is not, therefore, correct to say, as appellants now claim, that the act
in question is already included or absorbed in the rebellion charge filed against them in said criminal
case.
On the other hand, the pretense that the killing of Areza by appellants was done in furtherance of the
huk rebellion is preposterous considering the fact that Areza was a mere farmer who had no connection
whatsoever with any law-enforcement agency of the government. The pertinent question that arises is:
Why was he taken killed and brutally beheaded by appellant?
The answer is well given in the following interesting observation of the trial court:

According to the testimony of the prosecution witness, Francisco Racoma, Salvador Areza was
maltreated, tied and killed because the latter refused to lead and guide the group of Rogado to
the road when he was asked by the latter to do so, Rogado's men were lost in the mountains of
Lilio and they needed somebody to help them find the way out of the place. They came upon
Areza working in his farm. Rogado asked him to lead the way and Areza refused saying that he
had much work to do and he could not leave his carabao. Angered and irked by such stubborn
refusal, Rogado after conferring with his co-defendant Orenia gave the order to take Areza along
and to kill him. The killing of Areza was done solely to satisfy the anger of the leader, rogado,
who being used to the blind obedience of his men could not tolerate the refusal of Areza to carry
out his wishes and desires. The rebellious movement of the group had nothing to gain by
Atienza's death. On the contrary, Rogado and his group needed Areza alive in order that they
could utilize him as their guide while they were in the mountains of Lilio. There is no question
that they could have easily at the point of their thompsons, carbines and garands, forced Areza
to lead the way. But they did not do so, because at that time Rogado was not so much interested
in finding the path to the road; what concerned him most was to teach a lesson and a hard one at
that, to Salvador Areza for having the timerity of saying "no" to his wish and request. Surely, to
kill a person under those circumstances is obviously outside of the political intent of the
Hukbalahap movement. The huks rise up in arms because they mistakenly believe that by doing
so they can have desired changes in the political, social, and economic life of this country. But to
accomplish such a purpose, the death of innocent civilians like Salvador Areza is unquestionably
unnecessary. When the killing is done solely for the purpose of answering the lust to kill or of
satisfying angered feelings, thwarted desires of leaders and followers of the Hukbalahap
movement, such a killing must receive its due punishment at the hands of our courts which are
called upon to do justice not only to the living but just as well to the dead.
An attempt was made by appellants to show that Areza was killed because he threatened to inform the
Army of their presence in the neighborhood where he met them. Such attempt, however, is ridiculous,
for Areza, being then alone and confronted with a group of armed men, could not have hurled such a
threat without catering immediate death. As the trial court aptly observed: "This Court cannot believe
that Areza would have been such a fool to tell that band of armed Huks that he would give them away to
the Army. It is reasonable to presume that any sane person would have seen the danger of making such
statement under the circumstances, for that would have been sure death."
The trial court found that the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery,
aggravated by abuse of superior strength and the fact that it happened in an uninhabited place, for
which reason it imposed upon appellants to supreme penalty of death. While some members of the
Court agree to the existence of the above aggravating circumstances, others however doubt if they
could be entertained in the case of appellants who, as members of the Hukbalahap organization, rightly
or wrongly, were of the belief that they were justified in doing what they had done because Areza
committed something inimical to the purposes of their organization. At any rate, the requisite number of
votes for the application of the supreme penalty not having been obtained, the only alternative is to
impose upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
With this modification, we affirm the decision appealed from all other respects, with costs against
appellants.
Paras, C.J.,

27.
THE
vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
C.W.
Ney
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:

UNITED

STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

for

appellant.

The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary
detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful
authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the
complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence,
the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him
in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a
police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of
U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses
that having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause
the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought before the
proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far
as we can gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought
before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were expended in
doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice
of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of
the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence
discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then
to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being
due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the
prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same
municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the
officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as
appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more
commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him
exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is
nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the
subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and
there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the
trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was
no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no
certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to
hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local
authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make
an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if
only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in the
absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is
hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,

28. DANILO DANNY MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari seeking the modification of the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals, dated June 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. CR No. 21536, which affirmed the judgment of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 7190. In this case the trial court
convicted accused Danilo Mendoza, petitioner herein, for homicide wherein the victim was Alfonso
Nisperos. Petitioner does not seek an acquittal but merely prays that the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense be considered in his favor.
The Information charging petitioner with homicide is quoted as follows:
That on 23 November, 1994, in the evening at Brgy. 19, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab ALFONSO NISPEROS on the different parts of his body which caused
his death few moments thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on March 23, 1995, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty.
However, on July 11, 1995, petitioner manifested, through counsel, his desire to change his plea to that
of guilty and to prove the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Thus, on July 25, 1995, petitioner was re-arraigned and he entered a plea of guilty.
Evidence for the prosecution show that on November 23, 1994, one Willy Baluyot celebrated his
birthday at his residence in Barangay 19, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Among those invited were Danilo
Mendoza, petitioner, Alfonso Nisperos, Gervacio Pascua, William Kiskis, Manuel dela Cruz, Jr., Erwin Vergara,
and Nelson Romana.
During the party, Erwin Vergara got inebriated and had to be brought to a nearby hut by Alfonso
Nisperos and Willy Baluyot to shake off the effects of his intoxication.
When the duo returned, petitioner suddenly smashed a pitcher of water on the table and shouted,
Bullshit! You are always asking us to drink. The group was taken aback. Alfonso Nisperos asked
petitioner, Why, Mang Danny, why should we be the ones to quarrel?
Petitioner then went to his house about 40 to 45 meters away.
The group was still talking about petitioners outburst when Daniel Nisperos, a brother of Alfonso
Nisperos, joined them. Daniel noticed that petitioners mother was displeased since the group was
discussing her sons behavior. She feared that something untoward might happen. This caused the party
to break up and the Nisperos brothers headed for home. They were accompanied by their mother, Loreta
Nisperos.
After sometime, Alfonso Nisperos stepped out of his house to get some soup. When he returned, he
told his mother Loreta that he saw a person near their cow tied to a tamarind tree. Alfonso then went out
again to check on the person he saw.
After a short while, Loreta suddenly heard Alfonso screaming, Mother, help me!
Loreta rushed to her son. She found him lying, face down, with petitioner on top of him, stabbing him
with a knife.
Loreta then approached petitioner, pleading to him not to kill her son. But instead of heeding her plea,
he suddenly attacked her with his knife, hitting her right arm. Petitioner then dashed away from the scene.
Danilo brought his brother, Alfonso, to the Batac General Hospital in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Petitioner testified that the victim was the aggressor who attacked him with a knife. Thus, he was
forced to kill him with his own knife in order to defend himself.

On July 8, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting petitioner of homicide and sentencing
him to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as a minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, having taken into consideration his plea of guilty.
Petitioner was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as damages.
On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 21536, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial
court.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that when
petitioner committed the crime charged, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
was present.
Petitioner, in his petition, relies on Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code quoted as follows:
ART. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. A penalty lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability
in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be
present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that the witnesses for the prosecution who are
close relatives of the victim are credible.
Petitioner also contends that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part in stabbing the
victim.
Petitioner likewise faults the prosecution for its failure to present the knife used in attacking the victim.
In incomplete self-defense, unlawful aggression must be present, it being an indispensable requisite.
What is absent is either one or both of the last requisites, to wit: reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[2]
Just as in complete self-defense, the burden of proof is upon petitioner to prove the elements of
incomplete self-defense. It follows that he should have proved before the trial court that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. As found by the trial court, petitioner, to establish this element,
testified that during that drinking spree, he had an altercation with Willy Baluyot, the birthday celebrant.
Feeling bad, he (petitioner) slammed the table with a pitcher containing water. Then he left. At a distance,
he heard the victim calling him. When they were close to each other, the victim blamed him for his
conduct. He apologized but the victim started stabbing him with a knife. He tried to parry the attack as he
retreated. That moment, his back was against a wall. He then grappled for the knife which he was able to
wrench from the victim. They rolled over on the ground. At that point, he repeatedly stabbed the victim
with his own knife.
The prosecution, to prove that petitioner was the aggressor presented Loreta Nisperos, victims mother,
who testified as follows:
Q:

A:

And when you proceeded to that madre tree, what did you see?
A:

My son was already lying flat on the ground facing the ground and this Danilo was on top of
him and stabbing him.

Q:

You said that you saw Danilo stabbing your son, what instrument did he use in stabbing your
son?

Knife (immuko).

Q:

Can you approximate the time, what time was that?

A:

Between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 oclock.

Q:

It was already nighttime and it was dark?

A:

It was moonlight and there was also a light near the place where they were drinking.

Q:

From the place where you saw Danilo Mendoza stabbing your son and the location of the
bulb or the light, how far was it?

ATTY. BELLO:
There is no need of this question because the accused admitted that he stabbed the victim.
ASST. PROVL PROS. MOLINA:
x x x
Q:

When you saw Danilo Mendoza stabbing your son, what did you tell him?

A:

I pleaded to him saying, Danilo, Danilo, Danilo, please do not kill him.

Q:

Upon saying those words, what happened next?

A:

My son was able to move a little bit northward.

Q:

And where did the accused go?

A:

He still followed him.

Q:

And when the accused followed your son, what did the accused do?

A:

When I went near them, he also stabbed me.

Q:

And what portion of your body was stabbed?

A:

This one, sir. (Witness pointing to her right arm).

As stated by the Solicitor General in the appellees brief, petitioner was not defending himself from any
attack but was himself the aggressor against the victim and his mother.
The trial court did not believe petitioners testimony. Neither did the Court of Appeals. It bears
stressing that factual findings of trial courts are accorded respect by appellate courts unless certain facts
have been overlooked which, if considered, could affect the result of the case. [3] This exception is not
present here.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. This element being absent, petitioner cannot be accorded the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining the judgment of the trial
court, is AFFIRMED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman),

29.
DAISIE
T.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.

DAVID, petitioner,

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in
Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a
while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a
result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by
two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's
house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had
enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner
and against the respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural
mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the
subject minor Christopher J. T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect
upon the finality of this decision; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in a habeas
corpus case.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in
a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each
other but are separated. This is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother
have joint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the
parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not
hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a
relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by express provision of the law.
Hence, the question of custody and support should be brought in a case singularly filed for
the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee
and respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their support.

Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman;

whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he
financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for
the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of
respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined
in a proper case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in Special Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.
Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of
minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
For example, in the case ofSalvaa v. Gaela, 1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the
custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man
against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his
mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of
him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by
law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code,
"no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise." 3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her
children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they
were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC
decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System
Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so
that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up
for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the
three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member
of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it
what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the
child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to
support her children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the
amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private
respondent did not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of
P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for
his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging

that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of
the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He
prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and
education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this
case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child.
The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child.
Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even
now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld
because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the
Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of
her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for
him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to
deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give
him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an
appropriate action.

31.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFELINO ZAPATA and FERNANDICO TUBADEZA, defendants-appellants.
Ernesto
P.
Laurel
for
Office of the Solicitor General A. Padilla and Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo for appellee.

appellant.

ENDENCIA, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra convicting Rufelino Zapata and Fernandico
Tubadeza of the crime of murder, as principal and accomplice, respectively, and sentencing the former
to reclusion perpetua, and the latter to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years, 1 month and 11 days
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
both to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.
It appears from the evidence on record that on the evening of February 15, 1951, at about eight o'clock,
while Fausta Tubadeza, a sexagenarian, was cutting firewood near her house at the barrio of
Camcamiring, municipality of Dolores, Abra, appellants Rufelino Zapata and Fernandico Tubadeza
approached her, and Zapata, after telling her "You are the old woman who bewitched my wife,"
repeatedly beat her with a piece of wood about 2 feet long and 3 inches in diameter, on different part
of her body, while Fernandico Tubadeza dragged her by the arms. Her husband Mariano Bondame, also a
sexagenarian, attracted by the noise outside their house, looked out of the window and saw his wife
being dragged by Fernandico Tubadeza and clubbed by Rufelino Zapata. Mariano Bondame immediately
set to go down to help his wife, but Zapata met him at the stairs and threatened him bodily harm should
he intervene. Bondame helplessly saw his wife being beaten and dragged towards the direction of the
house of councilor Simeon Tubadeza, Bondame then went to the house of Estanislao Elvena to ask for
help and followed appellants to the house of councilor Tubadeza, where he saw his wife already
sprawled on the yard uttering, "I am going to die now," so he approached and embraced her. Fausta
then told her husband she had been maltreated and that some of her teeth were broken.
The evidence further shows that Fausta was taken to the house of councilor Tubadeza, who told
appellant Zapata and one Florencio Pilor to go to Fausta's house, and upon their return they brought a

bottle of wine and a bottle of oil and told the councilor, "Here are the ingredients for witchcraft that we
took from her house." The councilor then wrote on a piece of paper (Exhibit A) a statement that Fausta
practiced witchcraft on Zapata's wife and had the same thumbmarked by Fausta. Likewise Bondame was
forced to sign it. Fausta died that same evening at the house of councilor Tubadeza.
Dr. Paterno Millare who made a post-mortem examination of Fausta's body, found that the cause of her
death was:
Fracture, compound, complicating, Rib 5th, postero-lateral portion, right; Hemorrhage, internal,
acute; Wound, lacerated, lung, right; and Contusion, multiple and ecchymosis, abrasion evulsion,
teeth, upper incisor, canine, jaw, left, and etc.
Appellant Fernandico Tubadeza submitted a defense of alibi, attempting to show that on the night of
February 15, 1951, he was in Bantay, Ilocos Sur, in the house of the parents of his wife; while Rufelino
Zapata offered the following defense: That on the night in question, his wife Carolina Mercurio was
seriously ill; that in view of the barking of dogs and whining of pigs in his yard, he went down and saw
Fausta Tubadeza, who had a reputation in their barrio of being a witch, run away; that while he was
chasing her, she fell face down; that when he overtook her, she confessed that he had bewitched her
wife, whereupon Zapata took her to the house of councilor Simeon Tubadeza; that the latter, being a
near relative of Fausta and ashamed of her admission of having practiced witchcraft, kicked her a
number of times in her right side; that councilor Tubadeza then ordered appellant Zapata to fetch her
husband Mariano Bondame, and when Bondame arrived and knew of his wife's admission he became
angry and also kicked her a number of times on the right side, below the armpit; and that councilor
Tubadeza then wrote affidavit Exhibit A whereby Fausta assumed responsibility should Zapata's wife die.
By and large, the issue in this appeal is credibility of witnesses.
Referring to the alibi put up by Fernandico Tubadeza, we give it little or no evidence at all not only
because this kind of defense can be fittingly conceived and conveniently adjusted to suit any time and
place ad libitum but that his witnesses are all his relatives. On the other hand, prosecution witnesses
Salvador Turqueza, Relito Claro and Mariano Bondame positively identified and pointed him as the one
who dragged the deceased while his co-defendant Rufelino Zapata clubbed her.
Appellant Zapata's defense that the deceased died from the hands of Simeon Tubadeza, Florendo Pilor
and her own husband Mariano Bondame, who all kicked her, is likewise unworthy of belief. Although it is
true that, originally, Simeon Tubadeza and Florendo Pilor were included as defendants in the complaint
filed before the justice of the peace, upon reinvestigation of the case, however, the same was dismissed
as against them for lack of evidence and the fiscal had to exclude them from the information. Besides,
Mariano Bondame was not among those originally indicted. It is hard to believe that Mariano Bondame,
the aged husband of the deceased, would ever attempt to harm his wife, le alone kick her several times
in the presence of many people, just for the flimsy reason of having admitted that she was a witch. On
the contrary, Bondame positively testified that he tried in vain to rescue his wife from the hands of
appellants when he saw her beaten up, only to be confronted by Zapata at the stairs and threatened
with bodily harm.
Zapata further contends that prosecution witnesses Salvador Turqueza and Relito Claro who testified
having seen him beat the deceased on the back and on the nape, did not tell the truth because Dr.
Millare contradicted them by saying that he did not find any ecchymosis, discoloration or laceration at
the back and nape. We do not, however, find any inconsistency between the two versions, rather they
complement each other, for while these eyewitnesses said that they saw appellant Zapata beat the
deceased on the back, Dr. Millare, in his post-mortem examination found:
External: The body is cold and in rigor mortis. The height is about 4 ft. and 8 inches. The weight
is about 100 pounds more or less. There is presence of contusions and abrasions with ecchymosis
of the left face and with avulsion of the teeth, upper incisor and canine, left upper jaw. Presence
of a compound complicating fracture of the 5th rib at the right postero-lateral portion of the chest
wall. Presence of contusions on the anterior portions of the legs and thighs.
Internal: On opening the chest wall, there is a fracture, compound, complicating, of the 5th rib,
right, postero-lateral portion of the chest; with wound, lacerated on the right lung and internal

hemorrhage of the right lung. There is approximately 150 cc of unclotted blood on the right
chestcavity. Heart and left lung are apparently normal.
which evidently shows that the deceased was beaten mercilessly not only on the head but also on
different parts of the body as shown by the avulsion of the teeth, abrasions and ecchymosis on the left
face, the compound fracture of the 5th rib, on the postero-lateral portion. These two eyewitnesses could
not be expected to tell the exact spots where the blows had landed, considering that it was nighttime
and those fleeting moments cannot be recalled with exact precision. At all events, both witnesses are
agreed that it was appellant Zapata who clubbed the deceased.
The Solicitor-General points out that Fernandico Tubadeza should not be held merely as an accomplice
as found by the lower court but as co-principle, because.
It is to be observed that while it may be true as the trial court has stated, that "there is no
showing in what manner Fernandico too part in the torture, so much so that the evidence
discloses that only the accused Rufelino Zapata was provided with a club," yet the established
facts that (a) Fernandico accompanied Zapata in going to the house of the deceased; (b) he held
both hands of the deceased while Zapata was hitting her and (c) he pulled the deceased by the
hands while Zapata continued clubbing her clearly show the existence of concert of design
between the two. At any rate, even granting that there existed no previous understanding
between the two appellants, yet it may be implied from the acts of Fernandico, as stated above,
that they had the same unity of purpose in the execution of the act (People vs. Ging Sam, et al.,
94 Phil., 139; People vs. Binasing, et al., 98 Phil., 902).
We agree with the Solicitor-General.
We likewise agree with his observation that evident premeditation is not present in this case, but that
abuse of superior strength should be taken in its stead as the qualifying circumstance for murder,
considering that the deceased was a frail and undersized woman sexagenarian.
As to the aggravating circumstances of disregard of sex and age and nocturnity alleged in the
information, we find that while the evidence fails to show that nighttime was purposely sought by
appellants to commit the crime, it positively demonstrates that they disregarded the age and sex of the
deceased, it appearing that she was a frail woman of 65, weighing only around 100 pounds and only 4
feet and 8 inches in height, while Zapata and Tubadeza were 32 and 27 years of age, respectively, when
the crime was committed.
On the other hand, we believe that appellants are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, as it was evident that they merely wanted to
denounce her as a witch before councilor Tubadeza when she was beaten and dragged to the councilor's
house, but that she received a beating more than she could take, for which she died that same evening.
In addition, the mitigating circumstance of obfuscation should be appreciated in their favor, as we held
in U.S. vs. Makalintal, 2 Phil., 448, and People vs. Balneg, et al., 79 Phil., 805, for it clearly appears that
appellants committed the crime in the belief that the deceased had cast a spell of witchcraft upon the
wife of Zapata which caused her serious illness.
Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances as against one aggravating in the case,
appellants are entitled to the minimum penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code which
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that
should be imposed is 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, and 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
With the above modifications, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon,

32. PAT. RUDY ALMEDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is a case of homicide.
Petitioner Rudy Almeda was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tandag,
Surigao del Sur in an information which reads as follows:
"That on the 29th day of November 1988, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, inside
Bautista's Food and Snack Inn at Capitol Hills, Tandag, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot several times one,
CBL Leo Pilapil Selabao, PC Member, with the use of a caliber 45 nickled pistol, thereby inflicting upon
the latter the following wounds, to wit:
1. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry 1 cm. lateral to the 6th thoracic cavity,
penetrating lung thru and thru, with point of exit 2 cm. below the left nipple.
2. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry at midscapular area left at the level of 4th
thoracic vertebra, penetrating the thoracic cavity, penetrating the heart thru and thru, with point of exit
at level of ziphoid process.
3. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry 3 cm. left lateral to the 3rd thoracic vertebra,
posterior chest wall penetrating the thoracic cavity, penetrating the mediatinum thru and thru. Slug
lodged skin deep.
4. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with point of entry 4 cm. from midline right occipital area thru and
thru with point of exit preauricular area right.
5. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with gunpowder tatooing (sic) left infra auricular area thru and thru
with point of exit at the right side of the neck 2 cm. beside the oricoid cartilage.
6. Gunshot wound 1 cm. in diameter with gunpowder tatooing (sic) with point of entry at left side of
neck at level of 4th cervical vertebra, tangential with point of exit at left side of the neck at the level
of 5th cervical vertebra (about 4 cm. from point of entry), which wounds have caused the
instantaneous death of CBL Leo P. Salabao, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the following
amounts:
P50,000.00

as life indemnity of the victim;

10,000.00

as moral damages; and

10,000.00

as exemplary damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.)"[1]
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court [2] convicted petitioner
of homicide only and appreciated in his favor two mitigating circumstances. [3] The prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration with regard to the appreciation of the mitigating circumstances. On July 23,
1992, the lower court granted the motion and modified its earlier decision. The dispositive portion of the
modified judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Rudy Almeda GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and there
being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the offense,
but applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
to pay the heirs of the deceased victim PC Cbl. Leo Salabao the sum of Fifty Thousand (50,000) Pesos as
life indemnity and ten thousand (10, 000) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the cost.
The bail bond put up by the accused for his provisional liberty is ordered cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the modified judgment. [5] Hence this petition where
petitioner imputes error to the appellate court in (1) not finding that he acted in defense of strangers,
and (2) in failing to appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and
voluntary surrender.
The anterior facts ably supported by evidence on record are summarized by the CA as follows:
On November 29, 1988, at approximately 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Julian Herrera, Jr., together with
his two nephews Donato Salabao and PC Constable Leo Salabao arrived at the Bautista's Snack Inn to
fetch Susonte Montero who lived in the same town with Herrera. (TSN, January 22, 1992, p. 6) Herrera
asked Donato to enter the snack inn and inform Montero that they were ready to head home. However,
Montero was in the middle of a drinking spree with Vice Governor Acosta and the latter's companions,
one of whom was Almeda who was the Vice Governor's bodyguard. Upon the invitation of Vice Governor
Acosta, Herrera joined the drinking session and left his nephews in the service jeep. (TSN Jan. 23, 1992,
p. 5)
After about an hour, the Salabao brothers alighted and sought shelter in the covered porch of the
Bautista's Snack Inn. (TSN, Jan. 23, 1992, p. 6) Shortly thereafter, Felix Amora, who was among the
drinking companions of the Vice Governor and the then Community Development Officer and Civil
Defense Coordinator, stepped out of the inn and saw the Salabao brothers. Irked because Cbl. Leo
Salabao failed to salute him, Amora confronted the former and ordered Cbl. Salabao to salute him. Cbl.
Salabao countered that since Amora was not known to him as a PC officer and was in civilian clothes he
was not compelled to salute him.(Ibid.) Their argument got the attention of Herrera who went out to
pacify them. He then asked Amora and the Salabao brothers to get inside. (TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 10)
Once inside, Cbl. Salabao sat at the right side of Almeda while Amora sat opposite Almeda at the left
side of Herrera. (TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 12-14) Donato Salabao, on the other hand, sat near the counter.
(TSN, Jan. 23, 1992, p. 7)
Unknown to the Salabao brothers, during the past hour, Herrera had himself been arguing with Vice
Governor Acosta because of the latter's accusation that Herrera was involved in anomalous transactions.
(TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 7-9)
A short time after the Salabao brothers had seated themselves, Herrera's argument with Acosta
resumed. At this juncture Acosta stood up, presumably to pay for the beer he had ordered, and
whispered something to Almeda. Almeda promptly grabbed the barrel of the armalite rifle which Cbl.
Salabao carried with him and pushed it down. (TSN, Jan . 22, 1992, p. 16; TSN, Jan. 23, 1992, p. 8)
Simultaneously, Almeda pulled out his .45 caliber pistol pointed it at Cbl. Salabao's head and shot the
latter in the left temple. As Cbl. Salabao staggered Almeda fired five more shots felling (sic) the former.
(TSN, Jan. 22, 1992, p. 20-21; TSN, Jan. 23, 1992 p. 12) After which Almeda picked up Cbl. Salabao's
armalite, cocked it and than (sic) pointed it at Donato Salabao who immediately raised his hands. (TSN,
Jan. 23, 1992 p. 13) Almeda then left along with the Vice Governor and his companions. The following
day, at approximately 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Almeda was arrested by a group of PC Constables.
(TSN, Feb. 18, 1992 p. 3-4)[6]
The petition is not impressed with merit. A party who invokes the justifying circumstance of defense
of strangers has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory cause [7] that
would save him from conviction. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if the latter's evidence is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved[8] and will not exculpate the former from his categorical admission as the author of the

killing. The Court is convinced upon scrutiny of the evidence that petitioner failed to discharge this
burden.
Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Justifying Circumstance. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive "
This circumstance of defense of strangers has three requisites: [9]
(1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
The first and crucial requisite for defense of strangers to prosper is absent in this case. Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life or limb
of a person.[10] The mere cocking of the M- 14 rifle by the victim (Cbl. Salabao) without aiming the
firearm at any particular target, is not sufficient to conclude that the life of the Vice-Governor, Herrera or
even of Amora was in imminent danger. A threatening or intimidating attitude per se does not constitute
unlawful aggression.[11] Even a mysterious whisper poses no danger. There is nothing from the act of the
victim in trying to stand up, from which the Court may infer that the life of the person (the Vice
Governor) whom petitioner was allegedly protecting, was under actual threat or attack from the victim.
Besides, assuming that such act of the victim posed an imminent danger, petitioner was able to
check if not neutralize such danger, when with a lightning speed, he held and pointed downward the
rifle of the former and simultaneously poked his .45 caliber at the victim's head. Moreover, when the
victim fell down and staggered after petitioner shot him pointblank in the head, any supposed unlawful
aggression by the former, assuming that it has begun, had ceased. If so, the one making the defense
has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. [12] Accordingly, petitioner's contention that
"he was forced to fire five more shots to defend the life of the Vice-Governor belongs to the realm of
fantasy. "[13]
Moreover, the number, location and severity of the fatal wounds suffered by the victim belie the
claim of defense of stranger but is indicative of a determined effort to kill. [14] The victim was hit on the
vital parts of his body head, lungs, heart, chest and neck. [15]
With the absence of unlawful aggression that can be attributed to the victim, it becomes
unnecessary to determine the remaining requisites for they obviously have no leg to stand on. Thus, in
this case, the defense of stranger will not lie, complete or incomplete. [16]
On petitioner's claim that he voluntarily surrendered, the evidence on record disclosed otherwise.
Military men acting on order of their superior officer were tasked to look for and apprehend petitioner.
When they spotted him, they surrounded and captured petitioner. Moreover, before he was captured,
petitioner could have easily surrendered to the Vice Governor or to the police station which is a few
blocks from his house. Yet, the record is bereft of any evidence that he made any effort to do so.
The Court does not also agree with petitioner's claim that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of "sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the
act."[17] To avail of this benefit, it must be shown that the provocation originated from the offended party,
in this case, the victim. However, the records will attest that it was not the victim who provoked the
heated confrontation between the Vice-Governor and Herrera, as he has nothing to do with their
discussions. Neither was it shown that the victim provoked petitioner into committing the felonious act.
Petitioner and the victim do not know each other, they never met before that incident, and the
victim never aimed his rifle at petitioner. They merely sat beside each other which could hardly be

sustained as a provocative act. Moreover, any purported provocation by the victim on Amora, when the
former refused to salute the latter outside the restaurant, could not be considered as a provocation on
petitioner since the latter was not even aware of the saluting incident between the victim and Amora.
Thus, the benefit of the mitigating circumstances under Article 13 (4) of the Revised Penal Code is
unavailable to petitioner.
At any rate, the errors assigned by petitioner assail the factual findings and evaluation of witness's
credibility by the trial court. It is a settled tenet, however, that the findings of fact of the trial court is
accorded not only with great weight and respect on appeal but at times finality, especially when such
findings are affirmed by the CA and provided it is supported by substantial evidence on record. [18] Upon
examination of the evidence in this case, the Court is convinced that no significant facts or
circumstances were overlooked or disregarded by the courts below which if considered would warrant a
reversal of the findings and vary the outcome hereof. [19] With respect to the issue of credibility of
witnesses, the appreciation and assessment thereof is best left to the trial court judge [20] having the
unique opportunity of observing that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment
on the stand, a privilege denied to the appellate court.[21] Again, there is nothing in the record that would
indicate material inconsistencies or even improbabilities in the testimony of prosecution's witnesses.
Since no arbitrariness or any cogent reasons were cited that would call for the reversal of the lower
court's evaluation of credibility of witness, such evaluations bind this court. [22]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the trial court convicting Rudy Almeda of homicide and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one ( 1 ) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one ( 1 ) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the heirs of the victim Leo
Salabao, a total of P60, 000.00 as indemnity and damages is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,

33.
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
EFREN RIVERO, accused-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused-appellant Efren Rivero appeals from the decision of 31 August 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 32, at Pili, Camarines Sur, 1 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to:
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law, to indemnify
the heirs of Leon Gutierrez the sum of P50,000.00 and the further sum of P5,000.00, as
and for funeral expenses, with costs.
He was tried under an information 2 which was filed on 12 April 1983 and whose accusatory
portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March, 1982 at Barangay San Ramon, Municipality of
Lagonoy, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and hack with said bolo, one Leon Gutierrez, who as a result thereof
suffered several fatal hack wounds on his head and other vital parts of his body which
directly caused his death.

The facts of the case duly established by the evidence for the prosecution are correctly summarized by
the trial court in the challenged decision as follows:
Efren Rivero is the son-in-law of the deceased Leon Gutierrez; on March 18, 1982 at about
11:30 o'clock in the morning, in San Ramon, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, while Leon
Gutierrez was walking along a path, with Demetrio San Juan ahead of him, Efren Rivero,
from behind Leon Gutierrez, attacked the latter with a bolo, the first bolo attack hitting the
right shoulder of Leon, and the latter, on facing his assailant, received numerous hack
wounds from Efren, totalling 13 incised wounds in all, detailed in Exh. "A", the autopsy
report of Dr. Galan; Leon fell dead on the site there he was attacked by Efren Rivero; while
the attack on Leon was taking place, Demetrio San Juan moved back and for fear of being
attacked by Efren, fled from the scene of the incident, and immediately reported the
matter to Eufemia Gutierrez, the wife of Leon, who thereupon went to the place of the
incident, finding Leon dead on the path, some 30 meters away from the house of Efren
Rivero, and with the help of relatives and friends, brought the dead Leon to their house;
the next day, Leon was autopsied by Dr. Galan, whose findings are detailed in Exh. "A";
the first bolo wound administered by Efren on Leon's right shoulder immediately disabled
Leon, preventing him from offering any resistance at all. 3
The accused-appellant, on the other hand, claimed self-defense. According to him, at or about 8:00 a.m.
of 18 March 1982 he went to the house of the barangay captain of Lojo, Lagonoy, to settle his case with
his wife Myrna Gutierrez, a daughter of Leon Gutierrez, whom he caught in flagrante with her paramour,
Danilo Delfino, in their conjugal home. Myrna did not come, but Leon did. The accused-appellant told
Leon that he will not live anymore with his daughter because she committed adultery. Leon reacted by
warning him to be careful because he would kill him before the end of the day. The accused-appellant
was frightened, and he returned home, arriving at about 9:00 a.m. At about 11:00 a.m., while he was
inside his house, Leon Gutierrez, who was then armed with a bolo, challenged him to get out because he
was going to kill him; as a result, he was struck with fear. Then, Leon forced open the door and entered
his house. Due to his fear, the accused-appellant also got a bolo and told Leon not to come any nearer,
but the latter cornered him against the wall and hacked him. Leon was not able to hit him. He then
hacked Leon hitting the latter on the right shoulder thereby immediately disabling him. He could not
recall how many more times he hacked the victim because at that time he had already lost control of his
mental faculties. He thereafter surrendered to the police authorities. 4
The trial court accepted the version of the prosecution. It discredited the version of the accusedappellant thus:
Upon the other hand, this Court cannot believe the version of Efren Rivero that he killed
Leon Gutierrez in self defense, having been attacked first by Leon in his own house, which
is preposterous, first: because nothing could have been easier than to have established
this fact BY SHOWING TO THE POLICE at the time he surrendered, THE BLOOD STAINS
THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN VISIBLE INSIDE HIS HOUSE, were it true that the wounding of
Leon occurred inside Efren's house; second, Demetrio San Juan testified that the attack
occurred at the pathway, and the deceased was found near the pathway, and 30 meters
away from Efren's house.
1. . . . IN FINDING: THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT EFREN RIVERO GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
2. . . . IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CLAIM OF THE. ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT HE ACTED IN
SELF DEFENSE WHEN THE INCIDENT HAPPENED.
3. . . . IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE EYE WITNESS FOR THE
PROSECUTION. 5
and submits that the lone issue to be resolved is whether he acted in complete self-defense.
Having admitted that he killed his father-in-law, Leon Gutierrez, the burden of the evidence that he
acted in self-defense was shifted to the accused-appellant. It is hornbook doctrine that when selfdefense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified

and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. He must prove the essential
requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the accused. 6
The accused-appellant maintains that he was able to prove all these requisites. The victim, armed with a
bolo, came to his house and challenged him to a fight and, receiving no positive response from him, the
victim thereafter forced himself into his house. 7 The use of a bolo against a bolo-wielding aggressor was
a reasonable means to repel the aggression. Finally, he insists that there was absolutely no provocation
on his part; he was attacked inside his house and the killing took place therein.
We are not persuaded.
The accused-appellant has spun an incredible tale. The victim was found dead some thirty meters away
from the house of the accused-appellant. 8 This place corresponds to that indicated by prosecution
witness Demetrio San Juan as the spot where the victim was attacked by the accused-appellant. There is
no credible evidence that the victim was able to run away from the house; besides, with the thirteen
wounds inflicted on him, it was physically impossible for the victim to have done so. Then too, the
accused-appellant presented no evidence that bloodstains were found in his house although, as
correctly observed by the trial court, if indeed there were bloodstains, he could have pointed them out
to the police authorities immediately after he surrendered to them since they immediately came to the
scene of the incident and were even able to recover the fatal bolo. Moreover, the alleged bolo of the
victim was not recovered. It is indubitable to us that the victim was unarmed and was not killed inside
the accused-appellant's house.
Dr. Wilfredo Galan declared that the victim's wound at the back may have been inflicted without his
being forewarned of the attack. Thus:
Q So far, the wound that was directed at the back, can it be possible that
the deceased is about to face or backtrack?
A The first theory is that, the victim is already on his turning back of the
body and the victim does not know anything. That is why there was a
striking area at the back, and he had to face the assailant.
Q But the victim could have avoid or still defend the attack by running away
if he do it if he is not also intending to face the assailant?
A The victim is already out of his senses. That is why I have made that
theory. 9
This wound at the back strengthens the testimony of prosecution witness Demetrio San Juan that
the victim was hacked from behind with a sharp bladed long bolo called "ginogon" by the
accused-appellant who was following the victim while the latter was walking. 10 The victim
sustained thirteen hack wounds while the accused-appellant suffered no harm or injury despite
the fact that the former was bigger than him. 11 It is an oft-repeated rule that the presence of a
large number of wounds on the part of the victim negates self-defense; instead, it indicates a
determined effort to kill the victim. 12
On the basis of the evidence established by the prosecution and the nature of the injuries inflicted on
the victim and considering that the accused-appellant sustained no harm or injury, we are convinced
that the victim was attacked from behind; suddenly, unexpectedly, and without warning. There was,
therefore, treachery in the commission of the crime because the accused-appellant employed means,
method, or form in its execution which tended directly and especially to insure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make. 13

Treachery and evident premeditation are alleged in the information as qualifying circumstances;
however, only treachery, which is sufficient to qualify the killing to murder as defined and penalized in
Article 248; of the Revised Penal Code, has been duly established.
On the other hand, we appreciate in the accused-appellant's favor the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and of sufficient threat on the part of the victim which immediately preceded the
killing. 14 It was duly established that immediately after the incident the accused-appellant surrendered
to the police authorities at the Lagonoy Police Station. 15 And, as could be inferred from his testimony, he
killed his father-in-law because at the house of the barangay captain of Lojo at 8:00 a.m. of 18 March
1982 after he told the victim that he cannot live anymore with his adulterous wife whom he caught in
flagrante with her paramour in their conjugal home, the victim warned him to be careful because he
would kill the latter before the end of the day. The accused-appellant could have interpreted this
warning as a serious threat and may have prompted him to decide to eliminate his father-in-law before
he could carry out such threat.
Nonetheless, any of the two mitigating circumstances was offset by the alternative circumstance of
relationship. 16The remaining mitigating circumstance would then authorize the imposition of the
minimum period of the prescribed penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty which is comprised of three
distinct penalties, viz., a divisible penalty and two indivisible penalties, each of which, pursuant to Article
77 of the Revised Penal Code, shall form a period. Conformably with Article 64 of the said Code, the
proper imposable penalty in this case would thus be reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Since
the accused-appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he could be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
degree lower to that prescribed for the offense proved and whose maximum shall be within that so
prescribed, taking into account the modifying circumstances. This penalty next degree lower is prison
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. The accused-appellant could
thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prison mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the challenged decision of
Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur in Criminal Case No. P-2100 (formerly T-198)
subject to the modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced from reclusion perpetua to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prison
mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum as maximum.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo,

34.
THE
vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.

UNITED

Filemon
A.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

Cosio

STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

for

appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos, Province of Occidental
Negros. Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and ten,

proceeded to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was;
"There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on the accused as
explained by him in his confession was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the
provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the accused came up
behind him and struck him on the head with an ax, causing death the following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course not interfere with the
findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the court, naturally, took into consideration the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating
circumstance was that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony.
The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to whether this circumstance was
rightly applied. That there was immediate vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of Patobo
to the accused is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave offense" is more
uncertain. The Supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que araaba a todo el mundo,"
"landrones," and "era tonto, como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating
circumstance. (Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.) But the same court has held
the words "tan landron eres tu como tu padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision of October 22, 1894.) We
consider that these authorities hardly put the facts of the present case in the proper light. The offense
which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be considered as a
mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the butt of a
joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the lower court very properly gave
defendant the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum degree
of the penalty provided for the crime of murder. lawph!1.net
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen years four months and
one day ofcadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano,
C.J.,
Johnson,
J.,
Street, J., did not sign.

Torres,
concurs

and

Araullo,
in

JJ.,
the

concur.
result.

37. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARLON JUAN Y LESTE, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us for automatic review is the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 8, Second Judicial Region, finding the appellant, Marlon Juan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The information dated July 24, 2001 charged appellant with the crime of parricide as follows:
That on or about April 23, 2001, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife and a [sic] asador,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one
Yolanda Juan y Leste, his legitimate mother, inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds which caused her
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Upon arraignment on September 17, 2001, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
guilty to the crime charged.[3]
During the pre-trial conference on October 11, 2001, appellant admitted the following facts
presented by the prosecution:
1.

2.

identity of the accused that whenever the name Marlon Juan was mentioned, it referred
to the accused;
identity of the victim Yolanda Juan;

3.

that accused Marlon Juan was the son of the victim and that the victim was the
legitimate mother of the accused;

4.

that the accused killed the victim on April 23, 2001 inside the victims house at Barangay
Punta, Aparri, Cagayan with the use of a pointed iron bar; and

5.

that the victim died of multiple stab wounds as shown by the medical certificate and the
post mortem report issued and signed by Dr. Robert Ogalino. [4]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On January 9, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Marlon Juan y Leste GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Parricide for killing his mother and is hereby sentence [sic] to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The facts follow.
On April 23, 2001, around 10:00 p.m., Yolanda Juan opened the door of their house to let her son,
herein appellant Marlon Juan, in. Deogracias Juan (Yolandas husband and appellants father) who was
resting inside their bedroom could hear his wife and sons voice. Appellant who was high on drugs
demanded delicious food for dinner. Moments after, Deogracias heard the throwing and breaking of
plates. Then he heard Marvin (appellants brother) yelling Ni Nanang natayen (Mother is dead
already). Deogracias immediately proceeded to the porch where Marvins voice came from and saw
appellant in the act of stabbing Marvin. Deogracias grabbed the asador (pointed iron bar) from the
appellant and they wrestled for its possession. Eventually, Deogracias got control of
the asador. Appellant then drew a knife from his waist and tried to stab Deogracias but the latter was
able to wrest the knife away from the appellant. Appellant ran away. When Deogracias finally turned
his attention to his wife, only then did he realize that indeed she was already dead. Yolanda was lying
face down on the floor, no longer breathing. Deogracias nevertheless still brought her to the hospital
where she was pronounced dead on arrival.[6]
The statement of Marvin Juan to the effect that he was the brother of the accused and that he saw
the accused kill their mother was no longer heard by the trial court because the appellant admitted the
truth of such testimony.[7]
The prosecution formally offered the following documentary evidences: (1) death certificate (Exhibit
A) and postmortem examination report (Exhibit B) to prove the death of the victim and (2) birth
certificate of appellant Marlon Juan to prove that he was the legitimate son of the victim. [8]
The defense waived the presentation of appellants evidence. [9]
On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution which was not refuted by the defense,
the trial court ruled that it was clear as the snow of the Alps that appellant was guilty of the crime of
parricide and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. [10]

Appellant is before us, not to question his conviction for the crime of parricide by the trial court but
to question the death penalty imposed on him. Appellant contends that the proper penalty imposable on
him is reclusion perpetua, not death.[11]
The appeal is meritorious.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (hereafter the Code), the crime of parricide is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty for the crime of parricide is composed of
two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death), the imposition of the proper indivisible penalty on
appellant is governed by Article 63 of the Code which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
x x x

x x x

x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1.

When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2.

When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3.

When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance

and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4.

When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission

of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the
penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.

Based on the above provision, the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances must
first be determined for the imposition of the proper penalty.
In this case, no aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information. Thus, no aggravating
circumstances can be appreciated against the appellant. With regard to the presence of any mitigating
circumstances, we find that appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession
of guilt.
Article 13 (7) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an accused is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary confession of guilty if he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court
prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution. The following requisites must concur: (1) the
accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is,
before a competent court trying the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution.[12]
In this case, appellant made his confession of guilt before the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution since he pleaded guilty during the arraignment. The appellant also confessed voluntarily
and spontaneously despite knowing the serious nature of the charge against him. [13] Lastly, appellant
made his confession openly, that is, before the judge and the parties in a hearing. Clearly therefore, all
the requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession were present.
With one mitigating circumstance (voluntary confession of guilt) and no aggravating circumstance,
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties. . . [the lesser penalty shall be applied] when the [crime] is
attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstances. Thus, since the

crime of parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua should have been imposed by the trial court on appellant, not the penalty of death.
Other than the penalty imposed, we find no error in the ruling of the trial court that the appellant
was guilty of the crime of parricide since it was clear that appellant killed his mother. As discussed by
the trial court, all the elements of the crime of parricide were clearly and sufficiently proved by the
prosecution:
As to the first element which is, that a person is killed, there is an overwhelming evidence both
testimonial and documentary that absolutely show that Yolanda Juan was killed and died due to stab
wounds. The death certificate, Exhibit A (p. 6 rec.) lucidly and clearly show that Yolanda Juan died and
the cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to multiple stab wounds. Moreover, the accused
through his counsel de oficio during the pre-trial conference admitted that the victim died of multiple
stab wounds. . . . Finally, the proffered testimony of Marvin Juan, brother of the accused that he saw the
accused killed [sic] the victim was admitted by the accused through his counsel.
x x x

x x x

x x x

As to the existence of the second element, which is, that the deceased is the mother of the accused,
there is no iota of doubt on the part of the court to conclude that the victim is indeed the mother of the
accused. Exhibit C, the Birth Certificate of accused Marlon Juan (p. 39 rec) . . . indubitably show with
clarity that Yolanda Leste Juan is indeed the mother of . . . the herein accused. Further, the accused
through his counsel de oficio admitted during the pre-trial conference that, [he] is the son of the
deceased.
x x x

x x x

x x x

As to the presence of the third element [the last element] which is, the deceased is killed by the
accused, the court again is very certain that the accused is the author of the crime. . . not only because
he pleaded GUILTY to the crime of Parricide but because of the overwhelming evidence that
positively identify him as the perpetrator of the offense. Again, during the pre-trial of the case, the
accused admitted through his counsel that he killed the victim on April 23, 2001 at the victims
residence at Punta, Aparri, Cagayan with the use of a pointed iron bar (par. 4, Stipulation of Facts,
Order dated October 11, 2001; pp. 30-31 rec). Also, the proffered testimony of Marvin Juan, brother of
the accused, that he saw the accused killed the victim was admitted by the counsel for the accused
(Order dated November 21, 2001; pp. 36-37 rec). Finally, the open court testimony of accuseds father,
Deogracias Juan, that when his son Marvin shouted Mother is already dead, he immediately rose up
from where he was lying and proceeded to the place where Marlon was and saw the latter on motion to
stab Marvin and saw his wife Yolanda already sprawled on the floor speaks eloquently of the fact that
accused Marlon Juan was in the process of a stabbing frenzy. In fact, he was able to injure his brother
Marvin after stabbing successively to death his own mother. Thus, the accused having admitted his guilt
coupled by the overwhelming evidence positively showing and identifying him to be the killer of his
mother; the third element is therefore present.[14]
We affirm the above ruling of the trial court for being in accordance with the law and the evidence
on record. Consequently, although we uphold the conviction of appellant Marlon Juan of the crime of
parricide, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, not death.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8, in Criminal
Case No. 08-1318, finding the appellant, Marlon Juan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.

38.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
CELESTINO GARILLO Y ORJEL alias CELING (deceased) and
ARELLANO AliasPUTOL, accused.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
FEDERICO

FERNANDEZ

T.R. Dominguez for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Automatic review of the decision rendered by the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal in Case No. CCC-VII-55
(P.C. 8163), finding the accused Celestino Garillo y Orjel alias Celing and Federico Fernandez y Arellano
alias Putol guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of Death; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00, jointly and
severally, and to pay the costs. Celestino Garillo y Orjel alias Celing died in the National Penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal on August 16, 1970 and his appeal was dismissed by the Court December 9, 1970. 1
It is of record that Lim Tao Sing was the owner and operator of the Excel Ice Drop Factory located at No.
2504 Taft Avenue, Pasay City. His uncle, Lim Ping Suy assisted him in the management of said factory.
The factory was housed in a two-storey building, the upper floor of which was used by Lim Tao Sing as
his sleeping quarters. The ground floor contained the factory equipment and the sleeping quarters of
some of the factory workers. Lim Ping Suy resided elsewhere and went to the factory only in the
daytime.
In the early evening of October 31, 1968, Lim Tao Sing and Lim Ping Suy counted their money,
amounting to P3,200.00 which had been set aside for the operating expenses of the factory, such as
wages, house rentals, and light and water bills. They also examined the jewelry, consisting of a
necklace, a bracelet, a gold ring, a diamond ring, and other kinds of rings, all valued at P1,800.00, which
Lim Ping Suy bought for his nephew and which the latter had intended to send as gifts to his children in
China. Afterwards, they put the money and jewelry inside a trunk which Lim Tao Sing kept in his
bedroom. Lim Ping Suy then left for home.
In the evening of November 1, 1968, All Saints' Day, Henry Barillo and Alejandro Buco alias Tangkad,
workers in the factory slept, as usual, on the ground floor of the factory. The room was well lighted with
flourescent lamps because the generator of the factory operated for twenty four hours. At about 11:00
o'clock that night, Henry Barillo woke up because he felt that he was being tied up. True enough, Henry
Barillo saw his own co-workers at the plant, Tangkad, tying him up, while another person was pointing a
gun at him (Barillo). Barillo also saw three more persons, two of whom were armed with knives,
emerging from a hole which the culprits made on the plywood wall and then enter the factory. Barillo
was ordered to lie face downwards but he saw three men, including Tangkad, go upstairs to the room
occupied by Lim Tao Sing. A little later, he heard a shot, followed by the moans of Lim Tao Sing. Soon
thereafter, he saw the men coming downstairs. They left the place in a hurry, all of them running.
About an hour later, Barillo saw, through the hole in the wall, one Norberto, an ice drop vendor, whom
Barillo requested to call for the police. Two policemen arrived and Barillo was untied Then Barillo and a
policeman went upstairs. They found the room of Lim ransacked and Lim Tao Sing dead and covered
with a mosquito net soaked with his own blood. They saw the box, which had contained the money and
jewelry, destroyed and emptied of its contents.
The body of the deceased Lim Tao Sing was brought to the NBI morgue for autopsy and the medical
examiner reported that Lim Tao Sing died of multiple stab wounds in the body. 2
Three persons, Celestino Garillo y Orjel alias Celing, Alejandro Buco y Valdez alias Tangkad, and Federico
Fernandez alias Putol, were arrested and charged with the commission of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. Three other suspects remained at large. Garillo and Fernandez pleaded not guilty while
Alejandro Buco y Valdezalias Tangkad entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced by the court to suffer

the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 3Garillo and Fernandez were subsequently found guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Garillo died in prison and his appeal was
subsequently dismissed by this Court. Hence, We are concerned only with the case of Fernandez.
No doubt, there was a conspiracy to rob the Excel Ice Drop Factory. Alejandro Buco y
Baldez alias Tangkad admitted that the plan to rob the Chinaman who owns and operates the Excel Ice
Drop Factory was hatched up and proposed to him by Gaudencio Garillo alias Gauding, Celestino
Garillo alias Celing, Roberto Quinto alias Berto, and Guillermo alias Emot in the morning of November 1,
1968. 4 The deceased Celestino Garillo y Orjel alias Celing likewise admitted that the plan to rob the said
Chinaman was proposed to him by Gauden, Berto and Emot. 5 The accused Federico Fernandez y
Arellano alias Putol was also aware of the said plan. He denies, however, that he was a co-conspirator,
claiming that he was merely told of the plan to rob the ice drop factory; that he was further told by them
that if he did not want to go with them in robbing the Chinaman, he should merely keep quiet and they
will give him something, to which he answered that it was up to them that he was asked to accompany
them in order to act as look-out or guard outside (bantay sa labas) to which he added because he was
afraid of Alejandro Buco y Valdez alias Tangkad who has a tatoo "Simaron- Oxo" in his hands, but that he
left the place when the conspirators started to destroy a portion of the wall of the ice drop factory. 6
Counsel de oficio contends that it is obvious from the evidence that the accused Fernandez was not a
party to the plan to commit the robbery since he was merely told of the plan and that he never agreed
to participate in the commission thereof as shown by his leaving the place when the conspirators started
to break the factory's wall preparatory to their entering the premises; and that if Fernandez had made a
pretense, in the beginning, of joining the conspirators as a look-out or guard outside, it was because of
his fear of displeasing the mastermind, Alejandro Buco alias Tangkad, who was a member of the
notorious OXO gang and had a tattoo mark Simaron-Oxo " in his hands.
The disclaimer of participation in the conspiracy and desistance in the commission thereof is, however,
negated by the statement of Fernandez that he fled to Barrio Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal very early in the
morning of the next day and thence to Angeles, Pampanga where he stayed in a house together with
some of the conspirators. His statement reads, as follows:
t Iyo bang nalaman kung ano ang nangyari sa binalak o pinagusapan
ninyong holdap sa intsik sa loob ng pabrikang ice drop?
s Ang nalaman ko po ay pinatay nila ang intsik, dahil sa huli si Celing
(Celestino Garillo) na tumakbo at sinabi sa akin na huag akong maingay at
napatay namin ang intsik.
t Ng malaman mo ang nangyari, ano ang iyong ginawa?
s Kinabukasan ng umagang-umaga puminta ako kay Dado (Diosdado
Paraiso y Flores, 26, lab., add Bo. Bicutan, Tagig, Rizal), sa kanila sa
Bicutan Tagig, Rizal at akin ipinagtapat ang nangyari. Ang ginawa niya ay
isinama ako sa Angeles, Pampanga at iniwanan ako ruon para don na ako
magtabas ng tubo, dahil ngayon ng tabasan ng tubo.
t Magkano ang na parte mo sa holdap na isinagawa ninyo?
s Wala po, dahil ng magkita-kita kami ni Berto at Goding sa Angeles,
Pampanga at akin tinanong kung ano na ang nangyari ang sinabi po nila sa
akin ay walang nakuha dahil pumutok ang baril at napatay ang intsik dahil
sa lumaban.
xxx xxx xxx
t Sino naman ang nagsama kay Goding at Berto sa Angeles, Pampanga?

s Si Berto si Berto ang nagsama kay Goding, dahil bayaw no Dado

(Diosdado Paraiso) at meon o kapatid ni Berto ang amin tinuluyan. (See
Exh. M, pp. 78, Orig. Record).
If Fernandez were innocent as he claimed to be, there is no reason for him to run away and hide
together with some of the conspirators. "The wicked flee when no one is chasing them. But the godly are
bold as lions. 7
The evidence thus presented proves conspiracy and that the accused Federico Fernandez not only knew
of the plan to rob Lim Tao Sing, but also participated in its commission by previous and simultaneous
acts (by acting as look-out or guard outside) which lent to the accomplishment of the criminal intent.
Although the said accused may not have foreseen the killing of the victim and did not take part in its
execution, he is, nevertheless, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The rule is that when
homicide takes place as a consequence of or on occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the
robbery shag be guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless there is proof that
they have tried to prevent the killing. 8 Here, there is nothing in the record which would show that the
accused Fernandez ever attempted to prevent the homicide.
The said accused is, therefore, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, covered by Article 294, No.
1, of the Revised Penal Code. The trial Court found that the commission of the crime was attended by
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength, evident premeditation, and treachery.
Evident premeditation, however, if not considered. Is an aggravating circumstances in crimes Of robbery
because the same is inherent in the crime, especially where it is committed by various persons since
there must be an agreement and the plotters have to meditate and reflect on the manner of carrying out
the crime and they have to act coordinately in order to succeed. In the crime of robbery with homicide,
there should be evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, in order that it can be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. 9 In the instant case, it has not been proven that the accused, before
committing the crime, planned and decided, not only to steal, but also to kill Lim Tao Sing. Hence,
evident premeditation cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Abuse of superior strength cannot also be appreciated in the instant case in the absence of proof of the
relative physical strength of the aggressors and the victim and that the assailants took advantage of
their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. 10
Treachery is likewise absent in this case since the attack was made upon the impulse of the moment, as
a sequence of the unexpected turn of events. 11 It appears that while Tangkad, Celing, Gauden, and
Berto were in the second floor, used by Lim Tao Sing as his sleeping quarters, the gun held by Gauden
hit a table and misfired. As a result, Lim Tao Sing rose from his bed holding a bolo. So, some of the
accused stabbed him. 12
But, nocturnity is present since the accused purposely sought the cover of darkness of the night in
committing the crime. However, this aggravating circumstance is offset by the mitigating circumstance
that appellant suffers some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or
communication with his fellow beings, to wit: appellant's right hand is missing as a consequence of an
accident involving kuwitis" which occurred on New Year's eve of 1966. 13
Premises considered, the judgment imposed upon the accused Fernandez should be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, modified as thus indicated the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in an other respects.
SO ORDERED.

40.
THE
UNITED
vs.
MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

W.L.
Wright
Acting Attorney Harvey for appellee.

for

appellants.

MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal by Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez, Raymundo Revilla, Dorotea Rojas, Feliciano
Pantanilla, Roman Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella Sabino Raymundo, Geronimo Guijon,
Martin Sauler, Eusebio Bustamante, Victoriano Calipusan and Valentin Multialto from a judgment o the
Court of First Instance of the Moro Province, Hon Herbert D. Gale presiding, convicting them of the crime
of murder and sentencing them each to death.
From the proofs presented by the Government, it appears that the appellants, with nine other, being
members of the second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao, mutinied on the 6th day of
June, 1909, attempting, during the course of such mutiny, to kill one of their superior officers, Lieutenant
Goicuria; that immediately after such revolt the mutinees, having taken arms and ammunition from the
depositary, left the vicinity of Davao and marched toward the mountains of Lipada; that on the 8th day
of June, 1909, said mutineers returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the town; that the
inhabitants thereof, having received previous notice of the proposed attack, prepared themselves to
meet it; that J. L. Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, having been
detailed by those commanding the defense of the town, on the afternoon of the day referred to,
advanced to the cemetery within the limits of the town, forming an outpost for the purpose of awaiting
the coming of the mutineers; that about 4.15 o'clock they sighted the mutineers; that immediately
thereafter they heard a shot, followed by others, which came from near the cemetery, where the
mutineers had halted and dismounted; that after a few shots had been exchanged Roy Libby was struck
with a ball and killed; that the outpost retreated to the convent and took refuge therein; that the
mutineers advanced against the town, attacking it at various points and especially the convent, where a
portion of the residents of the town had gathered, including the women and children, or the purpose of
defending themselves; that no other person except Roy Libby was killed, although several others were
more or less severely wounded.
What with the confession of some of the accused, the testimony of others, and the evidence presented
by the witnesses for the prosecution, there remains so little a question of fact in this case that it is
substantially unworthy of discussion. That the appellants with others revolted against their superior
officers on the 6th of June; that they returned to Davao on the 8th and attacked it viciously and
persistently, killing one of its defenders and wounding several others; and that they all took a direct and
active part therein, is not only absolutely undoubted from the testimony of the prosecution but is
substantially admitted by all of the defendants in the case. Some of the appellants sought to defend
themselves upon the ground that they had been forced, by threats and intimidation, to take part in the
mutiny and the attack upon Davao by other members o the mutineer band. The evidence in no way
justifies this defense and it is utterly impossible under any construction of the evidence to sustain it. All
of the appellants, however, agree in presenting the defense that they entered the town of Davao on the
8th of June, not for the purpose of attacking it for the purpose of surrendering to their superior officers
and the governor of the district. Not only it is impossible from the testimony of the prosecution to arrive
at such a conclusion o fact, but it is almost as nearly impossible to arrive at such a conclusion from the
evidence presented by the appellants themselves. No defense upon the facts worthy of the name has
been presented.
As to whether or not there was present premeditacion conocida, qualifying the crime as murder, a
simple reading of the proofs presented by the Government is sufficient to demonstrate that beyond
question or doubt. It appears that all of the appellants, on or about the 8th day of June, at about 11
o'clock in the forenoon, went to the house of Cenon Rasay, some distance from Davao, in order to obtain
information as to whether or not reinforcements had been landed at Davao. On being informed that, to
the knowledge of the persons questioned, none had been landed, they asked the elder Rasay to permit
them to leave at his house the three woman that accompanied them, as they were going to march on
Davao and attack it. The appellant Rodriguez also requested that, in case he should be killed in the
attack, he, Rasay, should treat one of the women, who was the wife of Rodriguez, as his servant. Having
left the women in the house of Cenon, they took up the march to Davao. On arriving near the river
Bagoo, they were overtaken by Ignacio Rasay, a kinsman of Cenon Rasay, and suspecting that he was
going to Davao for the purpose of warning the town against the meditated attack, they halted him and
told him that, if he should give any warning of their approach, they would cause damage to his family.

He having assured them that such was not his purpose, they permitted him to proceed. The appellants
continued on their way and arriving at the cemetery near Davao heard a shot, which they claim came
from those who had seen sent out to watch for their approach. On seeing this advance guard, the
accused dismounted from their horses and began to fire forming in a skirmish line and advancing
steadily. Overwhelmed by the number of the attacking party, the outpost retreated toward the village,
pursued by the appellant. There followed an attack upon the town, more or less general, of the kind and
character generally to be expected from such a body of men. The attacks was, in a large measure,
unsuccessful and the mutineers withdrew when they saw the futility of further fighting.
The learned trial court found premeditacion conocida as the element qualifying the crime as murder. The
learned counsel for the appellants excepts to this finding and asserts that, inasmuch as the appellants
did not know even of the existence of the deceased, Roy Libby, at the time of his death, much less that
he was at the time in the village they attacked and one of the outpost of four, his death could not
possibly have been premeditated. He argues that, in order that the killing be premeditated, the accused
must have resolved to kill the premeditated person. We do not stop to discuss this question at length for
the reason that it has already been determined by this court adversely to the learned counsel's
contention. In the case of the United States vs. The Moro Manalinde, "the accused made up his mind to
kill two undetermined persons, the first whom he should meet on the way, in compliance with the
inducement of a third person." In its decision the court said:
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused upon accepting the order
and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully
and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under
orders received from the said Datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself
with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for
the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with
whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent,
might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the
tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the
consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature of the circumstances which
characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the
same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of
the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent,
the crime is considered a premeditated one, as the firm and persistent intention of the accused
from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed
upon the offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not
being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two,
premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer money,
reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being
independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was
agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a
persistently and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to
execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once
Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it. (U.S. vs The Moro Manalinde, 14
Phil. Rep., 77.)
The trial court found that the crime charged was committed with the aggravating circumstances
following:
8. When craft, fraud or disguise is employed.
9. When advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense.
10. When the act is committed with abuse of confidence.
11. When advantage is taken is taken by the culprit of his public position.
13. When the crime is committed on the occasion of a fire, shipwreck or other calamity or misfortune.
15. When it is committed at night, or in an uninhabited place, or by a gang.

16. When the crime is committed in contempt with insult to the public authorities.
As to number 8:
We do not believe that this circumstance was present.
This circumstance is characterized by the intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which
the criminal resorts to carry out his design. This paragraph was intended to cover, for example, the case
where a thief falsely represents that he is the lover of the servant of a house in order to gain entrance
and rob the owner (astucia); or where (fraude) A simulates the handwriting of B, who is a friend of C,
inviting the latter, without the knowledge of B, by means of a note written in such simulated hand, to
meet B at a designated place, in order to give A, who lies in wait at the place appointed, an opportunity
to kill C; or where (disfraz) one uses a disguise to prevent being recognized; and cases of that class and
nature.
We are unable to find from the facts proved any element which warrants the conclusions of the learned
trial court as to the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime of which the
appellants were found guilty. They boldly marched from the mountains of Lipada to Davao, partly, at
least, in the daytime, with the purpose of attacking the town, which purpose they communicated to at
least three person, one of whom was permitted to precede them to the town. they advanced against the
town at about 4.15 in the afternoon without any effort at concealment. They were in no way disguised,
but, on the contrary, each wore the greater portion of the Constabulary uniform in which he was clad at
the time of the mutiny. While it appears that some of them had cloths wrapped about their heads, it
does not appear that this was done as a disguise, but was following rather the custom of the country in
which they had been reared. We find in all the case nothing of craft, fraud or disguise.
As to number 9:
The circumstance depends upon the relative strength of the one attacking and the one attacked. It can
hardly be said that advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the
defense when twenty-three men, in the daytime, openly and without stratagem of any kind, attack a
town of the size of Davao. the results of the attack clearly show that the strength of the attacking party
was not sufficient to accomplish the purpose in view. They demonstrate, under the circumstance, that
no means were employed to weaken the defense, outside of such as are inherent in the situation when
one body of men attacks another with deadly weapons.
As to number 10:
For the existence of this circumstance it is necessary that there exist a relation of trust or confidence
between the person committing the crime and the one against whom it is committed and that the
former make use of such relation to commit the crime. For example, where one commits a robbery in a
house in which, as a friend of the owner, he is at the time a guest. No relation of this nature existed
between the appellants and the citizens of Davao or the deceased. The evidence fails to disclose a
single fact upon which the existence of this relation can be based.
As to number 11:
In order that this aggravating circumstance exist it is necessary that the person committing the crime be
a public official and that he use the influence, prestige or ascendency which such office gives him as the
means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry, "Did the
accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime?" We do not believe that the facts of this case
warrant the finding of the trial court in this particular. (Supreme court of Spain, decisions of 4th March,
1872; 18th December, 1871.)
As to number 13:
The reason for the existence of this circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one
who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by
taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them.

As is readily seen from the facts, no such condition as is described in this paragraph existed in Davao on
the occasion of the attack.
As to number 15:
The second paragraph of this subdivision reads:
The court shall take this circumstance into consideration according to the nature and
characteristics of the crime.
In this case, under all the circumstances, including those presented in the discussion relating to
paragraph 9, the fact that there were more than three armed persons in the attacking party is not
sufficient to call for the application of the provisions of this paragraph.
As to number 16:
The supreme court of Spain has held "that the circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority,
provided for in paragraph 16 of the Penal Code, can exist only when such authority is engaged in the
exercise of its functions and he who is thus engaged in the exercise of said functions is not the person
against whom the crime is committed in which that circumstance appears;" the court further saying that
such aggravating circumstance was not present in the case before it "because D. Jose Torres, although
he was municipal judge, was the object of the murder involved in that case."
In the case at bar, if the crime was committed with contempt of and insult to the public authorities,
those authorities must have been the public authorities of Davao. But the persons exercising that
authority were the very persons against whom, among others, the crime charged in this action was
being committed.
After diligent investigation and extended consideration, we have been unable to find that any
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of this crime.
There being present no aggravating circumstances and there existing no extenuating circumstances, the
penalty imposed must be in its medium degree.
The judgment of the court below is hereby modified and the appellants are each sentenced to cadena
perpetua, to the accessories provided by law, to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the deceased
Roy Libby the sun of P1,000 and to pay the costs of the trial.
So modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

42.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
BONIFACIO BALANSI alias "BAN-OS", defendant-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Balgos & Perez for defendant-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused-appellant stands charged with the murder of Elpidio Dalsen on January 30, 1982 at
Balinciagao, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao. The Information alleged that he, armed with a Garand rifle, went
inside the house of the victim, then allegedly fast asleep, where he shot him twice and killed him.

Treachery was held to be present, and so were evident premeditation and employment of means to
weaken the defense of the victim. 1
The accused-appellant was then the Barangay Captain of Balinciagao Norte, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, and a
member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), while the victim was the Provincial Development
Officer of Kalinga-Apayao. 2 The incident took place during a wedding celebration at Balinciagao Sur,
Pasil, at or about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The prosecution presented eight witnesses. The
defense placed two on the stand.
The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to die and to pay a total of
P590,000.00 in actual (P540,000.00 for loss of the victim's earning capacity) and moral damages, plus
costs. 3
It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was then sleeping at the house of his parents
located opposite the house where the wedding celebration was being held. At or about 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, Beatrice Canao, a Balinciagao resident, saw the accused, her uncle, standing at the door
of the house of the victim's parents, also her relatives, armed with a gun. She inquired what he was
doing there and he allegedly replied that he was waiting for the victim. She then entered the premises
to locate an old newspaper with which to wrap food, a rice cake, when she saw the victim asleep. When
she left, she saw the accused at the doorway. After disposing of her rice cake (which she gave to a
certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots, fired at an interval of two or three seconds, emanating
apparently from the house, to which she shortly rushed. She allegedly met the accused at the steps
leading to the second floor, brandishing his rifle. 4
She allegedly shouted "putok, putok!"

She then reported the matter to the police.

Yulo Asbok a fellow CHDF member of the accused and likewise a Balinciagao resident, also heard two
gunshots ring that afternoon. He said that he was three meters from the house where the gunshot
sounds seemed to have originated. He allegedly proceeded there but was met by the accused at the
steps. They allegedly grappled for possession of the rifle, which, he alleged, was still warm and reeked of
gunpowder. He was able to wrest possession, after which, the accused allegedly ran away and fled to
Pogon, also in Balinciagao. He later learned that the victim had been shot and that he died at Lubuagan
Hospital. 6
Rosalina Dalsen, the victim's wife was enjoying the wedding celebration when she heard two gunshots.
She made inquiries subsequently and was informed that the victim was her husband. She claimed that
she saw the accused standing at the entrance of her parents- in-law's house prior thereto. 7
Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by profession, was also at that celebration when he heard the shots. He then
went to the victim's parent's house where they, the shots, rang out from. He did not allegedly have in
mind that somebody had actually been fired upon but thought that may be there had been a burglary.
He ascended the steps of the house where the accused earlier met Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok, and
entered the second floor. He saw the victim lying in his room, whom he initially believed to be merely
sleeping, but who was, in fact, dead. 8
The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera, principal of Pasil Central School, and Artemio Dalsen the
victim's brother, who sought to establish a motive for the killing of the victim, a motive they imputed to
the accused. Valera testified that revenge was supposedly a tradition among Kalingas (of which both the
accused and victim were members), which, however, could be prevented by the dusa, meaning,
apparently, intervention and mediation by community elders. 9 Meanwhile, Dalsen claimed that the
accused had nursed along- standing grudge against the victim, whom he accused of delaying on alleged
award for the construction of a bridge in Balinciagao in 1979. 10
After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its evidence. It presented two witnesses, the
accused himself and Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana, Balinciagao.
The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding celebration on that fateful afternoon when he too
heard two gunshots break in the air. As a member of the CHDF, he allegedly took it upon himself to
investigate the matter. He said that he went to the direction where the shots came from and was on his
way to the entrance of the house when Yulo Asbok allegedly prevented him from doing so, who grabbed

the firearm he was carrying. He did not allegedly know at that time that the victim had been shot and
allegedly learned of it only on the following day. He admitted having ran away but allegedly because he
had been implicated. Four days later, he voluntarily turned himself in to the police. Masadao Jose
corroborated his statement. 11
In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed: "While there is no eye witness who testified to
having seen the accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet all the circumstances pointed to him as
the perpetrator of the crime." 12
The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily from the lips of Yulo Asbok and Beatrice Candao
as well as the accused himself, who admitted having been at the scene of the crime. Obviously, the
judge did not lend credence to the accused's defense.
The accused-appellant now contends that the judge erred, first, in appreciating circumstantial evidence,
second, in appreciating treachery, and third, in rejecting his defense of alibi.
We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.
While there was no eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial evidence points to no other
conclusion than that the accused was guilty of shooting the victim, Elpidio Dalsen to death in the
afternoon of January 30, 1982. These circumstances are as follows: (1) He was seen standing by the
entrance of the house where the victim had sojourned, armed with a long rifle, minutes before gunshots
were heard. Three witnesses saw him: Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen. (2) Moments
later, two shots rang out, one after the other. Four witnesses heard them: Canao, Asbok, Dalsen and
Nicolas Balais. (3) Thereafter, Canao saw him descending from the steps of the house. Asbok also saw
him there, whom he wrestled for the possession of the rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four days.
Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if.
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. 13
As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other than the accused-appellant, who could have
perpetrated the offense.
The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists that he was there, precisely, to investigate the
matter, and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo Asbok. His protests
notwithstanding, we too must reject this defense. Two reasons persuade us. First, he has not ascribed
any motive to Yulo Asbok as to why he, Asbok should testify falsely against him. Second, he admits
having fled immediately thereafter. If he were truly innocent, he would not have done so. We have held
time and again that flight is a silent admission of guilt. 14 As aptly put "The righteous is brave as a lion,
but the wicked man fleeth." 15
If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo Asbok who had something to do with the killing
and who had meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an inquiry, it would have been he, the
accused, to be the first to make a report to the authorities so that Asbok could be brought to the bar of
justice. If the latter did try to prevent him from performing his duties, as he claimed, 16 he should have
gone to lengths to implicate Asbok because that too was his duty.
We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecution's witnesses, notably Asbok who
stated that he was the first to be in the victim's house after the shooting (aside from the accused), in the

face of Canao's testimony that she also had been there. The Court is not convinced that an
inconsistency exists. For obviously, Asbok had been mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.
The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies attributing motive to the
accused-appellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that even without any successful showing of a motive,
the circumstantial evidence on hand nevertheless suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder arising from
treachery, evident premeditation, and means employed to weaken the defense of the victim. As to
treachery, jurisprudence is ample that the manner of attack must be shown. While there are testimonies
to the effect that the victim was "fast asleep", we can not safely presume that he was still in that
condition when the accused sprung his attack. And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can not
justifiably say that the victim was still actually still asleep at that time. 17
Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance. In appreciating evident premeditation, it is
necessary to show: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and execution. 18 The prior determination of the accused to do away with the
victim has not been sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.
That the accused also employed means to weaken the victim's defenses is likewise missing in this case.
As we said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence, we can not say for sure, based on
the evidence before us, that the appellant did employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.
We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling. Although the victim was not shot in
his house (his parents owned it) it has been held that the dwelling place need not be owned by the
victim. 19 In that case, it was held:
La circunstancia agravante de morada, aunque no fuese la casa propia de los occisos,
debe estimarse porque segun el Tribunal Supremo de Espaa " no solo por el respeto
que el domicilio ajeno merece, como especie de complements de la personalidad, y por el
que es debido al hogar de la familia, sino por el no menor de que es digna la residencia
privada de cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado de malicia que revela quien busca a
su victima alli en donde se encuentra con la confianza y abandono propios del lugar
elegido para el descanso y las intimidades de la vida: razon por la cual habla el Codigo
penal en el art. 10, no de domicillo en sentido legal, sino de morada en su acepcion real,
que no es otra que la del paraje en donde una persona hace estancia de asiento. ... a
titulo de nuesped, o por otro cualquiera.itc-asl (S. de 25 de Junio de 1886, 2 Viada., 5
ed., 329.) 20
In the Basa case, the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the house of another. Dwelling there
was held to be aggravating.
According to earlier cases, including U.S. v. Bredejo, 21 our ruling was that the dwelling place must be
owned by the offended party. In another decision, People v. Celespara, 22 dwelling was not appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof that the victim owned the dwelling place where
he was killed. In People v. Guhiting, 23 morada was not likewise considered for the same reasons.
However, more recent cases have
Galapia 24 and People v. Sto. Tomas. 25

since

followed

the

lead

of

Basa,

notably People

v.

"Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the
law accords to human abode. According to one commentator, one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary
worthy of respect" 26 and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than if he
who offends him elsewhere. However, one does not lose his right of privacy where he is offended in the
house of another because as his invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and
protected by the same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief
moment, "home" to him. He is entitled to respect even for that short moment.

It is with more reason in this case. The late Elpidio Dalsen died in the house of his very parents. who
raised him until he could be on his own.
Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only insofar as it held the accused-appellant
responsible for taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen. We hold him liable for simple homicide aggravated by
dwelling. Under the Revised Penal Code, he must suffer reclusion temporal in its maximum period, there
being no mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance. 27
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal. The grant of damages is affirmed.

44.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
vs.
CONRADO BAUTISTA and GERARDO ABUHIN, defendants and appellants.

and

appellee,

Natividad Maravilla Dato as Counsel de Oficio for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr., and
Celia Lipana-Reyes for appellee.

PER CURIAM:
Mandatory review of the death penalty imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in its
decision in case "CC-VII-847-Rizal" for Murder, entitled "People vs. Conrado Bautista and Gerardo
Abuhin", the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00;
to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages; and another P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
Prisoners George Daeng, No, 56088-P; Rolando Castillo, No. 31087-C (these two already sentenced
previously); Conrado Bautista, No. 71055-P; Gerardo Abuhin, No. 61409-P who are serving sentence by
virtue of final judgment, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, were accused of Murder, committed
as follows: .
That on or about December 13, 1970, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while
then confined at the said institution, conspiring, confederating and acting together and
each armed with improvised deadly weapons, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and would therewith one Basilio Beltran, No. 71495-P, another
convicted prisoner serving final sentence in the same institution, then in the process of
serving the accused breakfast, inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds while then
unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack launched by the accused, as a
result of which the said Basilio Beltran died instantly.
That the offense when committed by the accused was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and generic aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and obvious ungratefulness.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Both accused Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin were arraigned on March 10, 1973, and they
pleaded not guilty, after which the case went to trial on the merits. The evidence for the prosecution
established the following facts:
That on or about 6:15 in the morning of December 13, 1970, a stabbing incident took
place near the door of 8-C (cell house) at building 8; that the victim in said stabbing
incident was Basilio Beltran who was also a prisoner in the New Bilibid Prison with the rank
of IC (Inmate Cadet); that on said date and time, while prison guard Armando Miranda,
assigned keeper at Building 8 was then opening the door of 8-C, where members of the
Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang were confined, with him were IC Basilio Beltran and Domingo
Mallari, both confined at dormitory 8-A-2, who were then carrying bread ration for
breakfast of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang at 8-C, when all of a sudden, the four accused,
two of whom were already sentenced, and two of whom were Conrado Bautista and
Gerardo Abuhin, rushed out from their cell and attacked and stabbed to death prisoner
Basilio Beltran, while Domingo Mallari sneaked away from the attackers; that the victim,
Basilio Beltran, was facing the accused, standing, carrying the breakfast ration for the
occupants of 8-C when he was almost simultaneously stabbed by his attackers as a result
of which he sustained multiple stab wounds, numbering 12 in all, on the different parts of
his body; that the weapons used in stabbing the victim were matalas or improvised deadly
instruments; and an icepick which is improvised also; that the accused were investigated
by the investigators and they admitted having killed the victim because of an alleged
threat by the inmates cadets that they would kill any member of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik
Gang everytime that the IC delivered their ration, so that they moved ahead of the IC by
taking that opportunity.
Their defenses of denial and alibi based on testimonial evidence of the accused, and their claim that
their written statements admitting the crime were extracted from them by force and intimidation,
consisted of:
The accused Conrado Bautista was placed on the witness stand and he testified that he
was 28 years old, married and a woodcarver by Occupation and formerly residing at 2504
Cagayan St., Sta. Ana, Manila, but now an inmate of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa,
Rizal, after having been convicted by final judgment for the crane of Robbery. In the
course of the direct examination by counsel de oficio, Atty. Leonora M. Cabasal, accused
Bautista intimated to his counsel that he be allowed to withdraw his former plea of not
guilty and that he be allowed to substitute it with a plea of guilty. He was asked by his
counsel, if he realized the gravity of the offense that he has committed and he manifested
that he realized the same; that he realized the fact and he is aware that he would be
penalized in accordance with law; that he is determined to change his life because he
wanted to be free, after serving his sentence. However, during the cross examination of
the prosecution when he was asked if he helped the other accused, namely: Gerardo
Abuhin, Rolando Castillo and George Daeng, in stabbing the victim, Basilio Beltran, he
answered in the negative, alleging that he was inside the bartolina in that morning of
December 13, 1970, when the victim was stabbed to death, and he only admitted as a
participant in the killing of the victim because Boy Coro (a Alfredo Mariano poked him with
an improvised weapon; that this Boy Coro according to him was the leader of the Sputnik
Gang and he was very powerful because Boy Coro was the one giving orders and they
were mere followers; that the statement he allegedly signed was not really his own
statement but that of the investigator who forced him to sign the same through force and
intimidation and maltreatment, but he did not file any charge against said investigator
according because according him he does not know anything about filing charges. With
this manifestation of the accused Conrado Bautista, the counsel de oficio moved that the
former plea of not guilty of said accused be allowed to remain on record, which was
granted by the Court, there being no objection on the part of the prosecution. So also, the
defense of the accused Gerardo Abuhin that he was lying down on his cell when he
suddenly heard a commotion and he stook up and took his weapon, when he saw many
people coming out and he heard someone shouting, "everybody must come out"; that
what was stated in his statement was not the real happening, because it was only
his gawa-gawa, knowing that Sarmiento and Coro were very powerful in their cell and if he
would not follow, something might be done against him; that it was not true that his co-

accused Bautista was involved in the stabbing and his conscience would not forgive him
to implicate a man who was not really a participant in that riot; that he was not able to
add in his statement that Bautista was not guilty because he was not asked about it and it
did not occur to his mind to exculpate him in the course of his giving a statement to the
investigator; and that it would be against his conscience if he would let Bautista suffer for
anything that he did not commit; that he was intimidated by investigator de las Alas into
giving an extrajudicial confession and out of fear he signed the same.
We have gone to great lengths in closely scrutinizing the evidence presented in this case, and no
amount of deeper probing can convince Us that the trial court committed any reversible error in basing
its judgment of conviction "on the testimonies of the prosecution eye witnesses corroborating the
statements in the extrajudicial confessions of the accused" (Exh. "C-4"; Exh. "C-5").
An examination of the corroborated sworn statements of accused Rolando Castillo (already sentenced on
a plea of guilty, September 15, 1973) Exh. "C-1"; of Prison guard Armando Miranda, Exhibit "C-2"; of
accused George Daeng (already sentenced on a plea of guilty, September 1, 1973), Exh. "C-3"; of
accused Conrado Bautista, Exh. "C-4" of accused Gerardo Abuhin, Exh. "C-5"; and of prisoner (inmate
cadet) Domingo Mallari, Exh. "D", shows that on the morning of December 13, 1970, at around 6:15
A.M., while prison guard Armando Miranda accompanied by Inmate Cadets Basilio Beltran (victim) and
Domingo Mallari who carried bread and coffee, were about to give food to the prisoners in "Brigada 8-C"
under the stairs of "Brigada 8-A-2", located at New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, four prisoners,
accused Rolando Castillo, George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, and Gerardo Abuhin, all armed with
"matalas" (improvised deadly weapons) suddenly pushed the cell door and rushed out. While one of the
four (Rolando Castillo) suddenly pointed his weapon at prison guard Miranda, the other three
simultaneously attacked and stabbed inmate cadet Basilio Beltran; that accused Rolando Castillo joined
the three others in stabbing the already prostrate victim; and the attack happened so suddenly that it
did not take half a minute for the four accused to kill the victim. The other inmate cadet, Domingo
Mallari, was able to get away and give the alarm. Witness Domingo Mallari in his sworn statement Exh.
"D" was able to identify by their appearance, not by name, the four accused (Castillo, Abuhin, Bautista
and Daeng) out of ten prisoners in a line-up, as the prisoners who stabbed the victim. This same witness
stated that it was accused Conrado Bautista who first stabbed the victim.
We noticed from the sworn statements that they were all taken during the investigation immediately
conducted on the very day of the crime, December 13, 1970, except that of prison guard Armando
Miranda which was taken on December 15, 1970. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-1") of accused Castillo
given before PG Investigator, IS Ignacio J. Ferrer, was taken in the presence of prison guard-investigator
Jesus B. Tomagan, Chief Investigator Benedicto R. Planta and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos.
The sworn statement (Exh. "C-3") of accused George Daeng given before P.F. Jesus B. Tomagan was
taken in the presence of Security Officer B.R. Planta, P.G. Ignacio Ferrer and Administrative Officer
Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-4") of accused Conrado Bautista given before P.G.
Jesus B. Tomagan was taken in the presence of Chief Investigator Benedicto R. Planta, Investigator
Ignacio Ferrer and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-5") of
accused Gerardo Abuhin given before P. G. Abraham de las Alas was taken in the presence of P. G.
Ignacio J. Ferrer, P. G. Jesus B. Tomagan and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos.
The alleged threat and intimidation used in assailing the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confessions of
the four accused, being general in nature, becomes hardly credible in the face of the overwhelming
established facts and circumstances, as for instance (1) the judicial plea of guilty of accused Castillo and
Daeng (both of whom were already sentenced); (2) the very apparently disinterested and truthful
narrations of prison guard Miranda and inmate cadet Mallari who were eye-witnesses to the crime and
who positively identified the four accused as the persons who stabbed the victim, there being no other
prisoners who at that moment of the crime could have participated in it; (3) the manifestly spontaneous
narrations of the circumstances that happened during the crime appearing in the sworn statements that
were executed on the very day the crime was committed, when those who participated and who
witnessed the crime did not have sufficient time to fabricate evidence and distort the truth; (4) the fact
that it would be difficult to presume that those disinterested investigators who were present when the
accused gave their sworn statements would subvert the ends of justice and falsify the truth by utilizing
force and intimidation on the accused, there being no indication nor evidence that they have a motive or
grudge against the accused; (5) and the fact that those officials of the Bureau of Prisons were merely

doing their duties in the regular course of official business when they conducted the investigation to
shed light on the crime committed.
The narration of the crime contained in the sworn statement of prisoner Domingo Mallari (Exh. "D") who
was an eyewitness to the crime substantially coincides with his testimony in court in all material aspects
and he was able to identify the four accused (Castillo, Abuhin, Daeng, Bautista) when asked to do so
during the trial (pp. 7-25 t.s.n. Hearing on August 25, 1973). The four improvised deadly weapons used
by the accused in killing the victim were all recovered and identified (pp. 3-8; 14-15, t.s.n. Hearing of
September 1, 1973.).1wph1.t Prison guard Armando Miranda's testimony in court clearly
corroborated all his narrations contained in his sworn statement Exh. "C-2", pointing out without doubt
that the accused Bautista, Abuhin, Castillo and Daeng were the prisoners who rushed out of their cell
and stabbed the victim, Beltran, in the early morning of December 13, 1970 (t.s.n. pp. 2-11, Hearing of
April 28, 1973).
Accused Abuhin in his testimony in open court admitted that he participated in the killing and stabbed
twice, although he said he did so because he was hit and wounded by a knife thrown from above (p. 5
t.s.n. Hearing of November 29, 1973). He declared that he gave his sworn statement, Exh. "C-5",
voluntarily Cpp. 6-7 t.s.n. Hearing of November 29, 1973). Accused Bautista admitted in open court that
the signature appearing on Exhibit "C-4" (his sworn statement) is his (p. 7 t.s.n. Hearing of December
13, 1973). He claimed that he was maltreated by investigator Ferrer to extract from him the confession
contained in his sworn statement. Yet he could not explain why notwithstanding the supposed injuries
inflicted on him, he could sign the sworn statement calmly without signs of nervousness or trembling; he
was not treated for his supposed injuries, was never hospitalized for them, and never reported the
supposed maltreatment to Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos whom he treated like a father (pp.
7-9 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973).
Accused Bautista's very weak alibi was that on the morning of December 13, 1970, when the crime was
committed he was sleeping in his cell (pp. 9-10 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973). Witness Antonio
Juaningco, another prisoner, tried to substantiate Bautista's alibi by testifying that on the morning of
December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was with him sleeping in cell no. 9 and went out because they
were awakened by a commotion and then saw the victim Beltran already dead (p. 21 t.s.n. Hearing of
December 13, 1973).1wph1.t Accused Abuhin when recalled to the witness stand did a complete
somersault on his previous testimony implicating Bautista when he stated that on that occasion he did
not see Bautista (p. 28 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973). The trial court did not commit any mistake
in not giving credit to the alibi of accused Bautista, for aside from its inherent weakness as a defense,
unsupported as it is by credible evidence, his alibi cannot stand against the positive identification made
by prison guard Miranda, witness Mallari, and the very damaging sworn statements of his co-accused
Castillo and Daeng both of whom, by their plea of guilty, had been previously sentenced for the same
crime with which Bautista is charged. We consider of little significance the belated testimony of Castillo,
after he was convicted and sentenced, that Bautista was not a participant in the crime (pp. 2-6 t.s.n.
Hearing of January 21, 1974). We are more inclined to give more credence to his sworn statement (Exh.
"C-1") given on the very date of the crime, considering that Castillo had pleaded guilty to the crime of
murder and he has nothing more to lose in subsequently repudiating his previous narration of the crime
implicating his co-accused Bautista. It is likewise considered of no moment that another witness,
prisoner Benito Balagtas, testified that when the crime was committed in the early morning of
December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 13 (p. 4 t.s.n. Hearing of March 8,
1974).1wph1.t It is very significant that while defense witness Antonio Juaningco testified that on
the morning of December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was with him sleeping in cell no. 9, this defense
witness Balagtas in turn testified that accused Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 13 on the very same
occasion. What a tragedy for the accused and a significant victory for truth that even the very witnesses
presented to establish an alibi for accused Bautista contradicted themselves on a very material point.
Neither do We give credence to the testimony of witness Ricardo Felix, another prisoner, that on the
morning of December 13, 1970, immediately after the killing of victim Beltran, he saw prisoner Daeng,
Boy Coro and Rolando Castillo "poking a knife to Bautista" and threatening said Bautista to admit the
crime.
We consider it an exercise in futility to discuss further the alleged errors committed by the trial court in
considering as generic aggravating circumstances the presence of obvious ungratefulness and evident
premeditation so as to impose the maximum penalty of death, because Article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code succintly provides that "any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final

judgment, ..., or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony". In passing, however, it may be stated that the consideration of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances is for the purpose of fixing the proper penalty within the
minimum, medium or maximum as provided by law, but We have no choice here other than to impose
the maximum because by mandate of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code a person convicted of a
crime while serving sentence for a previous crime shall get the maximum of the penalty prescribed by
law for the new felony (murder), which is death, without further regard of the effect of mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, or the complete absence thereof.
The trial court correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the commission of the
crime of murder. It was conclusively proven that the accused in a sudden, concerted and unprovoked
act, all of them being armed with improvised deadly weapons, stabbed the victim to death after pushing
their cell door open, threatening and throwing off-guard Miranda when the victim who was holding in
both hands the bread and coffee intended for the breakfast of the assailants was not in a position to
defend himself from the unexpected assault.
As to the existence of evident premeditation, it was established by the following circumstances: (1) the
sudden concerted attack, perpetrated and calculated to throw off guard the intended victim as he was in
the act of giving food to the assailants, which attack necessarily must have been planned; (2) that all of
the accused were armed with improvised deadly weapons which they were not supposed to possess and
which they must have secretly prepared for a long time for committing the crime; and (3) the admission
on the part of the accused in their sworn statements that they killed the victim by "attacking first"
because they had heard that the members of the rival gang would liquidate them, leading to the
conclusion that the accused must have planned how to counteract the supposed attack of the rival gang
by literally beating the latter to the draw.
The aggravating circumstance of obvious ungratefulness was present as the victim was suddenly
attacked while in the act of giving the assailants their bread and coffee for breakfast. Instead of being
grateful to the victim, at least by doing him no harm, they took advantage of his helplessness when his
two arms were used for carrying their food, thus preventing him from defending himself from the sudden
attack.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the requirements of moral certainty in the
evaluation of evidence have been more than adequately met. We have no other alternative than to
affirm the penalty of death imposed by the trial court, and all other parts of the judgment.
Costs against the accused.

48.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
LEON, accused-appellant.

vs. ORLANDO

HERRERA

DE

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 136, convicting
Orlando Herrera de Leon of murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim, Michael Oris, in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On May 2, 1988, Assistant Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan of Rizal filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati an Information charging Orlando Herrera de Leon with homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of April, 1988, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, without
justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with a gun one Michael
Oris, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal shot wounds which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
After re-investigation, however, on March 27, 1989, the prosecution withdrew the Information for
homicide and filed an amended Information charging accused Orlando de Leon with murder, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of April, 1988, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, with
intent to kill, by means of treachery with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said gun one Michael Oris y Rodriguez, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused the death of said Michael
Oris y Rodriguez.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On September 19, 1989, upon arraignment, accused de Leon pleaded not guilty. [4] Trial ensued.
On April 28, 1988, at 11:00 p.m., Arthur Alfahora, Deo Vergara, Gilbert Castro, Jess Hernandez,
Archie Beticon and Michael Oris were walking along the ricefield near Don Jose Greencourt St.,
Gatchalian Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. [5] Suddenly, they heard gunshots fired in their
direction. The shots originated approximately 60 meters from them. Arthur Alfahora saw accused de
Leon standing outside the perimeter fence of the house of the mayor. Through the light of an electric
post, Arthur saw accused de Leon, in white shirt and maong pants, firing at them. [6] Archie Beticon, in
the moonlit night, saw accused de Leon holding a long firearm pointed at them. [7] Frightened, the boys
started running away from the gunfire but Michael Oris, who was a little overweight, lagged behind the
group. Moments later, Michael was hit. He fell to the ground. He cried out to his companions to help
him but the other boys continued running and left the scene. Later, the other boys returned with
Michaels father and they brought the injured Michael to the Olivares Hospital at Sucat Road. A few days
later, Michael died.
Dr. Danilo Gajardo of the PC Crime Laboratory conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the
deceased Michael Oris, and concluded that the deceased sustained two gunshot wounds and three
abrasions.[8] He opined that the deceased was shot from behind, based on the point of entry and
direction of the bullets.[9] The two gunshot wounds were fatal because vital organs were lacerated. He
did not find the point of exit of the bullets, and the slugs were not recovered.
Rodolfo Oris, father of the deceased, testified that he brought his son to the hospital and incurred
expenses for the medical treatment given to Michael.[10]Michael was confined for three days but died
nonetheless. Michael was buried at the Manila Memorial Park, with expenses that were duly
receipted. Rodolfo Oris presented receipts with amounts as follows: P30,483.00 for the hospital
expenses, P8,500.00 for the funeral and P3,190.00 for the burial. [11] He stated that the entire family was
shocked at the unexpected death of his son.
Accused Orlando de Leon denied committing the crime and invoked alibi.[12] He stated that he was a
member of the Civil Security Unit of the Paraaque Municipal Government since 1986 to guard the
Municipal Hall and the house of Municipal Mayor Wilfrido Ferrer, located at Don Jose Greencourt Road,
near the Gatchalian Subdivision. When he guarded the house of the mayor, his shift started at 3:00 in
the afternoon until 11:00 in the evening. He had two other companions in the shift: Rey de Leon and
another one whose name he could not remember.
On April 28, 1988, he was relieved at 10:50 in the evening by policeman Teddy Papa and two other
members of his security unit whose names he could not recall. After his shift, accused de Leon claimed
that he walked with Rey de Leon five hundred (500) meters to the corner of Don Arcadio Santos Avenue
and Gatchalian Avenue. Then, both of them took a passenger jeepney. Accused de Leon alighted at the
corner of Sto. Nino and Aquino Avenue, while Rey de Leon continued his ride. Thereafter, accused de
Leon took a tricycle to his residence at Col. de Leon St., Sto. Nio. He reached his house at 11:15 that
night. His wife and his children were not at home. He slept that night up to 10:00 in the morning of the
next day.

Accused-appellant denied shooting the victim with a long firearm. As a member of the security unit,
he carried only a batuta made of yantok. He denied knowing Michael Oris, but claimed that he knew
Michaels father, Rudy Oris. He never had any misunderstanding with Rudy Oris or any of the latters
family members.
Reynaldo de Leon, a rebuttal witness, alleged that he knew accused Orlando de Leon because they
were both security personnel detailed to guard the house of Mayor Wilfrido Ferrer. On April 28, 1988, his
shift was from 7 in the morning till 3 in the afternoon. He carried a firearm, an M16, which he turned
over to the reliever or to the next guard. He denied accused de Leons testimony that they left their
place of work together on the evening of April 28, 1988. He also denied riding in the same jeepney with
accused de Leon that day.[13]
Teddy Papa, a policeman, also testified that he knew accused de Leon because he was also part of
the civil security assigned to guard the house of the mayor. His shift lasted from 11 in the evening until
7 in the morning. On April 28, 1988, he saw accused de Leon before 11:00 in the evening armed with an
M16 rifle at the barracks located behind the house of the mayor. [14]
On January 31, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused, Orlando de Leon,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and it hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Michael Oris, the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Makati City, January 31, 1996.
(Sgd.)
JOSE R. BAUTISTA
Presiding Judge[15]
Hence, this appeal.[16]
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court, in convicting him of murder, merely considered the
weakness of his defense rather than the strength of the prosecution evidence.
We disagree. The trial court cited the testimony of the eyewitnesses to the crime as well as rebuttal
witnesses who established accused-appellants presence at the scene of the crime. Two eyewitnesses
saw accused-appellant holding a long firearm and shooting at them. Aside from the Meralco electric
light post that provided adequate lighting that night, there was moonlight illuminating the area where
accused-appellant stood, allowing the eyewitnesses to see his face. The two boys even noticed what
the accused-appellant wore on the night in question, which statements were not disputed by the
defense. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to notice the appearance of
their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. [17]
Moreover, the prosecution eyewitnesses did not have any motive to implicate accused-appellant in
a serious crime like murder. Where there is no evidence that the principal witnesses of the prosecution
were actuated by ill-motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony was
entitled to full faith and credit.[18]
Furthermore, the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were corroborated by the findings of the medical
expert that the victim was shot from behind.
Accused-appellant pointed out, however, that it was not possible for him to have shot anybody
because he was not issued a firearm in guarding the perimeter fence of the mayors house. He merely
used a nightstick made of yantok or rattan. However, this contention was belied by the testimony of

two witnesses who also worked with accused-appellant as part of the civil security of the mayor. They
stated that they carried an M16 rifle during their shift which they turned over to the guard of the next
shift.
On the other hand, accused-appellants defense consisted of alibi. For alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. [19] In this case, accused-appellant alleged that
he went home when the killing occurred. However, no other witness could support his alibi for his family
was not at home and the other person who could attest to the time he went home was his co-worker,
Rey de Leon. Unfortunately, Rey de Leon, whom accused-appellant claimed he rode with going home,
categorically denied doing so. Noteworthy too is the fact that accused-appellants house appeared to be
a few minutes ride from his place of work, thus rendering his presence at the scene of the crime
physically possible. An unsubstantiated alibi cannot overcome positive and credible evidence pointing
to accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[20]
From the foregoing evidence, it was clearly established beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant was responsible for the killing of Michael Oris on April 28, 1988.
The question is whether the crime committed by accused-appellant was murder or
homicide. Accused-appellant insists that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder, in the
absence of any qualifying circumstances. Indeed a look at the trial court decision reveals that the trial
court judge failed to explain why the offense was qualified to murder. Although the information
explicitly alleged that the crime was committed with treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court
in its decision was silent about the presence or absence of these qualifying circumstances. The trial
court failed to specifically discuss the qualifying circumstances or any other modifying circumstance in
the body or in the dispositive portion of the decision. Such a decision does not conform to the
requirement of the Rules of Court that a judgment of conviction shall state the legal qualifications of
the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any. [21]
Nevertheless, such lapse is not fatal to the validity of the decision. [22] An appeal
in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the
subject of assignment of errors or not.[23] Thus, we can review the evidence on record to evaluate if there
is sufficient basis for convicting accused-appellant of murder or of homicide.
The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. [24] Treachery is appreciated when the following conditions
are present: 1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate, and 2) the means of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted.
[25]
In this case, the victim was peacefully walking along the ricefield with his friends, when accusedappellant, with the use of a long firearm and without warning, fired upon the unarmed teenagers giving
the latter no opportunity to repel the aggression or defend themselves. Thus, the manner in which the
victim was killed showed the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.
With respect to evident premeditation, we find this circumstance lacking in this case. For evident
premeditation to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof, as clear as the
evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: 1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; 2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and 3) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.[26] Neither the record nor the appealed decision mentions the
existence of the foregoing essential elements for a positive finding of evident premeditation. When it is
not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was
carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.[27]
Considering that treachery qualified the crime, accused-appellant is guilty of murder.
At the time the crime was committed on April 28, 1988, the penalty prescribed for murder
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. [28] In the absence of any mitigating or

aggravating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, which is reclusion
perpetua.[29]
Regarding the award of damages, we note that the lower court only awarded fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages. We have uniformly awarded the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, without need of further proof other than the fact of death as a result of
the crime and proof of accused-appellants responsibility therefor. [30] The amount of forty two thousand
one hundred seventy three (P42,173.00) pesos shall be awarded as actual damages for the actual
expenses incurred by the family of the deceased as evidenced by receipts.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati, Branch 136, in Criminal Case No. 88-1631, convicting accused-appellant Orlando Herrera
de Leon of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The Court orders accused-appellant to
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and forty-two thousand one hundred seventy-three
(P42,173.00) pesos as actual damages.
Costs against accused-appellant.

50.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY AND JOSELITO PACOT y IBARRA (case provisionally
dismissed),accused,
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 31, in
Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 convicting appellant Francisco Dacillo y Timtim alias Dodoy of the crime
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot y Ibarra were indicted for murder in an information that
read:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about February 6, 2000, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and stabbed one Rosemarie B. Tallada with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her death.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The case against appellants co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence to identify him with certainty.
Appellant was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was
conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued thereafter.

To establish appellants guilt, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Charlita Tallada, the
victims mother; Patricia Turlao, the victims aunt; appellant Dacillos neighbors, Jovelyn Dagmil, Augusto
Cesar Arara, Roche Abregon, Resna Abregon, Allan Castanares, Jupiter Campaner; police officers SPO2
Rodolfo Taburda and SPO1 Avelino Alcobus, and medico-legal officer Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
The facts, as established by the prosecution witnesses collective testimonies, follow.
The victim, seventeen-year-old Rosemarie B. Tallada, was last seen alive at dusk on February 6,
2000, on the bridge near appellants house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
Around 7:45 p.m. that evening, witness Jovelyn Dagmil, who was living with her aunt in the house
adjacent to appellants, was looking for her cousin when she saw the victim Rosemarie on the
bridge. Because it was drizzling, she invited Rosemarie inside their house but the latter declined
and told her she was waiting for someone.3
After a while, Jovelyn heard a man inside appellants house calling "Psst, psst . . ." Thinking the call was
meant for her, she turned but instead saw Rosemarie walking towards and entering appellants house. 4
Not long after Rosemarie went inside the house, a struggle was heard therein. Witnesses Roche and
Resna Abregon, who were in the adjacent house singing with a karaoke machine, suddenly felt the floor
shaking as if a scuffle was going on at the other side of the wall. The houses were built on stilts above
the seashore, adjoining one another with mere wooden partitions in between. Roche Abregon peeped
through a hole on the wall and saw appellant and another man grappling with a woman who was gagged
with a handkerchief.5 When Roche saw appellant choking the woman, she informed her aunt about the
commotion in appellants house but the aunt brushed it aside as a simple family quarrel. 6 For a while
they heard the sound of a woman being beaten up. Then everything became quiet. Later that evening,
they saw appellant leaving his house.7
The following day, February 7, 2000, at around 8:00 a.m., appellant was seen entering his house
carrying lumber and screen.8 He was observed going in and out of his house several times, each time
carefully locking the gate as he left. 9 At around 9:00 a.m., appellant was seen with ready-mixed cement
in a plastic pail and, when asked what he was going to do with the cement, replied that it was for the
sink he was constructing.10
Later, appellant entrusted a bag of womans personal belongings to barangay tanod Allan Castaares
and told the latter that it belonged to his woman companion. He allegedly could not bring it home
because his wife might see them.11
By February 11, 2000, neighbors started smelling the rotten odor of Rosemaries already decomposing
body.12
At 5:00 p.m. the same day, witnesses Roche, Resna, and Rachel were gathering seashells under
appellants house when they saw droplets of blood and pus dripping from appellants comfort room.
They immediately reported it to their aunt who in turn instructed her husband to get a stick and poke
the sacks covering the comfort room. However, the husband instead climbed up the house and was
greeted by the stink emanating from the corner where he saw a tomb-like structure. They immediately
reported the matter to barangay officials who called the police.13
At about 10:00 p.m., policemen arrived at appellants house, accompanied by his wife, and forcibly
opened the lock. They proceeded to where the tomb was located.
When cracked open, the tomb revealed the decomposing body of a woman. 14
The corpse was brought to the Rivera Funeral Parlor where it was identified by the victims mother
Charlita Tallada and aunt Patricia Turlao as that of Rosemarie, through the keloid scar on her forearm.
Dr. Danilo Ledesma conducted an autopsy on Rosemaries remains. His necropsy report revealed that
Rosemarie died from a stab wound in the abdomen. The report further disclosed that she suffered
contusions in the anterior chest wall and her right hand; an incised wound on her left middle finger; a

stab wound on the left side of the face and fractures on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs on her
side.15
Dr. Ledesma testified that the wounds suffered by Rosemarie indicated that she put up a struggle and
the wounds were inflicted before her death.16
In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his participation. Appellant
alleged that he only held down Rosemaries legs to prevent her from struggling and, after the latter was
killed by another man he identified as Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.
He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation (DUCC), was looking for a house
where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could spend the night. He offered his brothers house which was
under his care. In the evening of February 6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the house
at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that evening, he returned to
the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had ordered. When he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were
already grappling with each other and Pacot was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of
heeding him, the latter ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he was going to be
implicated just the same so he closed the door as ordered and helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of the
woman" as "her feet kept hitting the walls."17
The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless. Pacot wanted to dump the body
into the sea but appellant told him it was low tide. Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body
in cement for which Pacot gave appellant P500.
Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought
the concrete mixture and cast the dead body in cement. After finishing the job in the afternoon of that
day, appellant reported for work at DUCC.
When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000, appellant immediately left for Cebu
City, arriving there the next day, February 12, 2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following
year.
On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder and imposed
upon him the supreme penalty of death:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby sentenced to the extreme
penalty of DEATH,
He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00,
plus the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
His immediate confinement to the national penitentiary is hereby ordered.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.18
Thus, this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE HEIRS OF THE OFFENDED PARTY THE
AMOUNT OF PHP50,000.00, WHICH APPEARS AS PAYMENT FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES. 19
Appellant admitted that he had a hand in the killing of Rosemarie but attempted to downgrade his
participation in the crime by claiming he only held Rosemaries legs as Pacot was strangulating her. The
rule is that any admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not
require proof to hold him liable therefor. Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never any such
disclaimer by appellant.
Moreover, despite appellants self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his involvement in the crime,
all circumstances pointed to his guilt. His declaration faltered in the face of the testimonies of
eyewitnesses positively identifying him as one of the two men who were with Rosemarie when she was
killed. Witness Roche Abregon pointed to appellant as the one who strangled Rosemarie. He was
established to be inside the house at the time the witnesses heard a woman being battered. Thus,
assuming for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellants admission that he
participated in its commission by holding Rosemaries legs made him a principal by direct participation.
Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct
participation if the following requisites are present:
1. they participated in the criminal resolution and
2. they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly
tended to the same end.20
Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal
resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the
crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. 21
The prosecution was able to prove appellants participation in the criminal resolve by his own admission
that, right after he was told by Pacot to close the door, he held down Rosemaries legs. He was
pinpointed as the one who throttled the victim. He admitted that they only stopped when they were sure
that Rosemarie was already dead. The two men planned how to dispose of the victims body; it was in
fact appellants idea to pour concrete on the body, prevailing over Pacots suggestion to just dump the
body into the sea. It was appellant himself who encased the body in cement and made sure that there
were no leaks from which foul odor could emanate. He was a conspirator in the killing and, whether or
not he himself did the strangling or the stabbing, he was also liable for the acts of the other accused.
It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them,
there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime
charged.22 Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of
the crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common
purpose or design.23
We are convinced beyond doubt of the joint and concerted effort between appellant and the man he
identified as Pacot in the killing of Rosemarie.
Appellant likewise contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder. He contends that the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not specifically alleged in the information.
Nothing can be farther from the truth. A cursory reading of the information reveals that appellant was

sufficiently informed of the charges against him, including the use of superior strength in killing the
hapless and defenseless female victim.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength necessitates a showing of the relative
disparity in the physical characteristics of the aggressor and the victim such as age, gender, physical
size and strength. We agree with the trial court that the killing of Rosemarie was committed with abuse
of superior strength. As found by the courta quo, two grown-up men against a young fragile woman
whose ability to defend herself had been effectively restrained revealed a shocking inequality of physical
strength. The victim was much weaker in constitution and could not have possibly defended herself from
her stronger assailants.24 Such disparity was manifest in the contusions in the chest and hands, wounds
on the fingers, a stab wound on the left side of the face and multiple fractures in the ribs of the
victim.25 The abuse of superior strength was obvious in the way Rosemarie was mercilessly beaten to a
pulp.
The killing of Rosemarie was thus correctly qualified to murder by the abuse of superior strength, a
circumstance specifically pleaded in the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the ground that
appellant admitted during re-cross examination that he had a prior conviction for the death of his former
live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic
aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the
information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences previously meted out to the
accused.26 This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
states:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be
appreciated against appellant. Hence the imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Regarding the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim, appellant claims that said
amount was awarded by the trial court as payment for actual damages. This claim is misleading. As
aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the amount was granted by the trial court by way of
indemnity ex delicto to compensate for the death of the victim which prevailing jurisprudence fixes
at P50,000.27 The award of such indemnity requires no proof other than the death of the victim and the
accuseds responsibility therefor.28
The award of P50,000 as moral damages is proper, supported as it was by the testimony of Charlita
Tallada, the victims mother, that Rosemaries death caused her immeasurable pain. 29
In addition, the Court awards P25,000 in temperate damages, said amount being awarded in homicide
or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. 30
With regard to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example of correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In People vs. Catubig,31 we explained that:

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of
the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Imposition of exemplary
damages is also justified under Art. 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for the public
good.32 For this purpose, we believe that the amount of P25,000 may be appropriately awarded.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 31, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Francisco Dacillo y
Timtim alias Dodoy is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is further ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Rosemarie Tallada the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity,P50,000 as moral
damages, P25,000 as temperate damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
52. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARSENIO SUNGA Y REYES
(alias) ARSENIO LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. QUALIFIED THEFT; UNLAWFUL ENTRY. The act of entering through the window, which is not the
proper entrance to the house, for the purpose of taking away certain valuable articles constitutes
unlawful entry, which if alleged in the complaint would make the crime robbery, but when, as in the
present case, no such allegation was made, said circumstance should be taken into account as an
aggravating circumstance (circumstance No. 21, article 10 of the Penal Code), with the result that, in the
absence of any extenuating circumstance, the penalty must be raised to the maximum degree.
2. SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT. The penalty of subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the accused is
not authorized by the law, as the principal penalty in this case is of an affective, and not correctional,
nature. (Art. 25 and 51 of the Penal Code.)
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J. :
The herein accused is Arsenio Sunga y Reyes (alias) Arsenio Lopez who was prosecuted for, and
convicted of, the crime of qualified theft in that with intent of gain he had taken away, without the
consent of the owner, certain pieces of jewelry and other valuables worth in all P3,277, equivalent to
16,385 pesetas. The penalty imposed upon the accused was ten years of presidio mayor, with the
accessories prescribed by law, to indemnify the offended party in the sum aforesaid, with subsidiary
imprisonment
in
case
of
insolvency,
and
to
pay
the
costs.
The theft was considered as qualified theft on account of the proven and undenied fact that the
appellant
is
fourteen
times
a
recidivist.
Counsel for defense in this instance does not assign any error to the judgment appealed from, which he
fields
in
accordance
with
the
facts
and
the
law
of
the
case.

However, the prosecution, maintaining that the defendant should be punished in accordance with
paragraph 1 of article 518 of the Penal Code in relation with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same
Code, recommends that in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the appellant should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed in article 520, in the medium degree, that is to say, seven
years,
four
months
and
one
day
of
presidio
mayor.
An examination of the record shows without a shadow of doubt the guilt of the accused. His alibi is
absolutely
worthless
as
a
defense.
The only matter that under the facts of the case concerns us is the determination of the penalty that
should be imposed. We are in accord with the prosecution as to the legal provisions applicable to the
case. However, we find that the accused entered the inhabited house through a window, which was not
the proper entrance to the house, and therefore, there is present in this case the circumstance of scaling
a house which, had it been alleged in the complaint, would have made the crime robbery (article 508 of
the Penal Code, second paragraph before the last), but as this circumstance was not alleged, it must be
considered as an aggravating circumstance (No. 21, article 10, Penal Code), with the result that, in the
absence of any extenuating circumstance, as in the present case, the penalty must be raised to the
maximum
degree.
On the other hand the subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the accused is not permitted by the law
because the principal penalty is not correctional, but affective, in nature. (Arts. 25 and 51 of the Penal
Code.)
The judgment appealed from is modified and the appellant is sentenced to undergo ten years of presidio
mayor, to return to the owner the articles stolen, described in the complaint, or their value of P3,277, to
the accessories prescribed in article 57 of the Penal Code, and to the payment of the costs of both
instances.

53.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLAVIANO PUDA Y GARAPEA alias "FLAVIO PUDA", accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:+.wph!1

This case is before us for the automatic review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II, sentencing the accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of death after finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery and premeditation with two
aggravating circumstances. The accused-appellant was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The original information for murder reads:t.hqw
That on or about the 19th day of December, 1959, in the municipality of Paraaque,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and wound with a dagger one Ching Tian
Un while he was sleeping, thereby upon him two mortal wounds which directly caused his
instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit:
1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim, Ching Tian Un, the latter
not having given provocation;
2. That the crime was committed in the night time, a circumstance deliberately sought by
the accused to facilitate the commission thereof;
3. That the crime was committed after an unlawful entry;and
4. That as a means to the commission of the crime a wall or window was broken.

At his arraignment, the appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, Atty. Norberto Inlayo,
voluntary and spontaneously pleaded guilty. In view however of the gravity of the offense charged and
because several aggravating circumstances were alleged, the lower court required the prosecution to
submit evidence.
From the evidence submitted, the following facts were established and were made the basis by the
court a quo for its decision:t.hqw
... it appears that in the early morning of December 19, 1959 defendant Flaviano Puda
climbed over the fence of the house of Luis Ching Kiat Biak located at 557 Tomas Claudia
Street, Paraaque, Rizal, then once over the fence he clambered to the awning (media
agua) of the back part of the ground floor of the house and from there, he went up to the
second story, removed the wooden mouldings which held in place the glass plates of the
transom located over one of the windows,and then removed the glass plates thereby
causing an opening to be made; that thereafter he removed his rubber shoes and went
thru the opening and gained entrance into the bedroom of Ching Tian Un, son of the
owner of the house who was then sleeping alone in said bedroom at the time; that after
having gained entry into the bedroom, defendant stabbed twice the sleeping Ching Tian
Un with a dagger causing the death of the latter (Confession of defendant marked exhibit
H). The method of entry into the house by the defendant as hereby outlined is
corroborated by the testimony of Purisima de Dumaual, a chemist of the National Bureau
of Investigation, who examined the rubber shoes used by the defendant, and who testified
that she had examined the same and had found on their soles paints Identical with the
paint of the awning where the defendant walked on in going up towards the window of the
house over which he gained entrance.
Demetrio de Leon, Chief of Police of Paraaque, Rizal, testified that in the morning of
December 19, 1959 he received a report that a Chinese boy was killed in his bedroom at
Tomas Claudio, Baclaran, Paraaque, and so he sent Lt. Peafiel, Sgt. Siga, and Pat.
Rosendo Cruz of his office to conduct an investigation. Pat Rosendo Cruz, one of the
policemen mentioned by the Chief of Police, testified that about 3:30 in the morning he
went to the house of the victim Ching Tian Un and found the room where he slept
splattered with blood; that all the windows of the room were closed and barred by iron
grills but he found that the glass plates of the transom over one of the windows had been
removed. According to him he found the pair of rubber shoes ( Exhibit C), the glass plates
of the transom as well as the moulding that had kept them in place on the awning below
the transom. He also found in the yard of the house the hunting knife, Exhibit B and a
handkerchief, Exhibit C; that the handkerchief, the knife or dagger and the pair of rubber
shoes which were used allegedly by the defendant were all sent to the Bureau of
Investigation for examination.
According to the examination conducted by the chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation, the aforementioned Purisima Dumaual, the stains which she found in the
handkerchief, Exhibit C and the dagger, Exhibit B, were human blood.
The evidence further established that after the defendant had been arrested and after he
had made the statement, Exhibit H, he was requested to reenact his movements and from
the reenactment it was shown that defendant may climbed over the fence and went over
the awning of the house wearing the pair of rubber shoes, Exhibit C-1; that after he had
removed the mouldings around the glass places of the transom he removed his shoes and
left them on the awning and then he entered the room.
Dr. Jesus Crisostomo of the National Bureau of Investigation who performed the autopsy
on the body of the deceased Ching Tian Un testified that he found two stab wounds on the
chest and upper abdomen of the deceased, the one on the chest having a width of 2-1/2
cm. and a depth of 12 cm. the right ventricle of the heart having been penetrated down to
the left ventricular chamber. The other wound was a gaping one 3.1 cm. in length and
extended down the upper abdominal cavity to a depth of 13 cm and involved the
supermedial aspect, left lobe of the liver. Dr. Crisostomo gave an opinion that the stab
wound on the chest was fatal and was the one which caused the death of the deceased.

The other testimonies established that the fingerprints found on the window under the
transom and in the room of the victim when developed were found to be Identical to those
of the defendant.
When it came to the turn of the appellant to testify, he at first stated that he was not guilty. Later on,
however, he reverted to his plea of guilty. Contrary to his previous confession, however, the appellant
testified that he gained entry into the house of the victim at around 3:00 o'clock that morning through
the main door which was open. Thereafter, he directly proceeded upstairs to the bedroom of the victim
the door of which was also open in order to steal some money although he did not know whose money
he, was looking for. According to the appellant, the victim who was out of the room when he entered,
immediately came and attempted to hit him three times with a piece of wood about two feet and one
and a half inches wide, but he managed to evade the attack and instead the victim hit the window. He
then stabbed the victim twice with something that he picked up from the drawer even before the victim
attempted to hit him again. After the stabbing, the appellant ran away by passing through the transom
of the window which had no glass or shade. (T.S.N., pp. 12-19, August 9, 1960). During the crossexamination, the appellant testified that he found the blade which he used in stabbing the victim inside
the drawer ransacking the same to look for money and he took the blade because he wanted it. (T.S.N.,
p. 21, August 9, 1960) Reminded that when he reenacted the crime, he showed that he reached the
bedroom by passing through the transom of the window, he stated that he made that re-enactment only
because he was beaten on the left part of his face between the left eye and the left ear. (T.S.N., p. 23,
August 9, 1960).
The trial court found the version of the prosecution more credible especially since it was supported by
the accused's confession, Exhibit H, which showed that the accused had been earlier convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for having stolen P100.00 from the father of the victim and for which
reason he was dismissed as houseboy and that because of this and of the fact that he had not been
treated well by the deceased he went to the victim's house in the night of December 19, 1959 with the
intention to kill the deceased; that the court also found that the shoes the accused used were stolen by
him from the said house; that he really passed through the transom of the window, removing however
the said shoes before entering the room; that once inside the room, he stabbed the deceased twice; that
after stabbing the deceased who was then sleeping, he escaped but left behind him the pair of shoes
and that he also lost on the way of the dagger he used in stabbing the deceased.
The trial court also found the following aggravating circumstances to be present, namely-treachery
which qualified the killing to murder; evident premeditation which was off-set by the appellant's plea of
guilty; unlawful entry and dwelling.
Thus, on November 21, 1960, the trial court found the accused guilty of murder with two aggravating
circumstances and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of death.
Unfortunately because of negligence of some court personnel the records of the case were not
forwarded by the court a quo to this Court for automatic review.
Eleven years after his conviction, the accused wrote a letter to this Court inquiring about the status of
his case. We inquired through a letter addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Rizal, about the veracity of the allegations of the letter of the accused and received a reply
informing us that due to the inadvertence of the then clerk in charge of criminal cases of Branch II, the
records of this case were placed in the archives sometime in 1960 instead of being forwarded to us.
Hence, it was only then that the entire records were elevated to this Court. The accused raises the
following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY FOR BEING
IMPROVIDENTLY GIVEN.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING AND GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ALLEGED
CONFESSION STATEMENT (EXH. H) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING AND IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO EVIDENCE TAKEN
FROM THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALLEGED RE-ENACTMENT WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED' RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY
INTERPOSING QUASI-SELF DEFENSE TENDING TO ESTABLISH HOMICIDE.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FULL OPPORTUNITY TO AN
EFFECTIVE DEFENSE TENDING TO ESTABLISH HOMICIDE.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION (1935 CONSTITUTION) AGAINST THE IMPOSITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT.
VIII
IN ANY EVENT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE METED WITH THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AS HE HAS FULLY PAID HIS DUE TO SOCIETY FOR HAVING
SUFFERED ENOUGH IN STAYING IN DEATH ROW FOR MORE THAN TWENTY (20) YEARS.
With respect to the first assignment of error, the accused contends that his plea of guilty was not
voluntarily and spontaneously made but was improvidently given because neither his counsel nor the
respondent judge informed him of the consequences of his plea.
This contention has no merit. The records show that after entering his plea of guilty, the accused
withdrew the same in open court on April 25, 1960 stating as the reason that he was not thinking at the
time he made the plea. Subsequently, however, on August 9, 1960, he reiterated his plea of guilty with
the assistance of his counsel who assured the court that the accused understood the purpose of trial
based on the plea of guilty and that they were only proving mitigating circumstances. Thus, it is clear
that aside from having been assisted by his counsel when he reiterated his plea, the accused also had
sufficient time to think about the consequences of the same. Furthermore, notwithstanding his plea, the
lower court continued with the trial and required the prosecution to present its evidence and also gave
the defense a chance to present its side. The contention, therefore, of the appellant that the case should
at least be remanded to the lower court for re-arraignment and further proceedings on the ground that
his plea was improvidently given cannot be sustained.
The ruling in the case of People v. Onavia (120 SCRA 232) is applicable: t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx

... Although it did not explain to the accused the fun import of his plea of guilty, neither
did it automatically accept that plea nor did it render judgment based exclusively thereon.
It accepted evidence for the purpose of determining the accused's guilt and the degree of
his culpability to the end that such evidence would dispel all doubt that the accused
misunderstood the nature and effects of his plea of guilty. (People v. Daeng, 49 SCRA 222
[1973]. Where the Trial Court received evidence on the crime, there is no improvident
acceptance of a plea of guilty. (People v. Nismal, 114 SCRA 487, 490 [1982] citing People
v. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]. The defense contention, therefore, that the plea of
guilty, having been improvidently accepted, the case should be remanded to the trial
court, is bereft of basis. The validity of the judgment under review is unassailable.
Similarly, in People v. Nismal, supra, we ruled: t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
... When, as in this case, the trial court in obedience to this Court's injunction in Apduhan
(People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798) and similar cases, receives evidence to determine
precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the
plea is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is, as in this
case, predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by the
accused of the offense charged.
Coming to the second and third assignments of errors, the accused maintains that the trial court erred in
appreciating and giving credence to the accused's confession and his alleged re-enactment of how he
gained entry into the house of the victim on the ground that both were executed by the accused without
the assistance of his counsel and therefore violated his right against self-incrimination.
It should be noted that the confession and re- enactment were executed by the accused long before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. The "Miranda-type" protection given to the accused during a
custodial investigation, cannot be invoked by herein appellant as said right was incorporated into the Bill
of Rights only in 197,3 and has no retroactive effects. In the case of Magtoto v. Manguera (63 SCRA 4)
we have settled this issue and ruled that. t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
... a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible
in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on
January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the
accused if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution,
even if presented after January l7,1973,and even if he had not been informed of his right
to counsel since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.
Hence, the trial court did not err in taking into account the confession and re- enactment of the accused
as part of the evidence against the latter.
With regard to the fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of errors, the accused contends that the trial court
erred in appreciating treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances and in not finding
that the crime committed was only homicide.
We are convinced that the crime committed was murder. Treachery and evident premeditation were both
present in the commission of the crime. The records of the case clearly establish the fact that the
accused after having served for eleven months as a houseboy of the victim's family was dismissed
because he stole money from his employers and for which he was convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Because of this and the fact that he was not treated well by the deceased, he decided
to seek revenge and did so in the early morning of December 19, 1959. While everyone in the house of
the deceased was still asleep, he forcibly removed the glass from the transom of the window of the room
of the deceased after he stealthily climbed up the same. After he succeeded in entering the room, he
stabbed the deceased twice while the latter was still asleep and thereafter, he hurriedly climbed up the

same window and made his exit through the same opening of the transom which he had created upon
his entry.
We cannot lend credence to the appellant's testimony that he gained entry into the house through the
main door which happened to be open at that time because aside from the testimony of Luis Ching Kiat
Biak the father of the deceased that he checked the doors of the house and the rooms of his children
and found them locked from the inside, it is also highly improbable that the main door of a house would
be left open at 3:00 o'clock in the morning while every member of the household was stiff sleeping. Lt.
Ismael de Leon also testified that he did not see any piece of wood in the bedroom of the deceased
which the accused claimed was used by the deceased when the latter tried to hit him. There were also
no signs of a struggle that may have ensued between the deceased and the accused tending to
establish the fact that the accused was really asleep when the deceased stabbed him
From the necropsy report, it was shown that the deceased weighed 78 kilograms or around 171.6
pounds and had a height of 168 centimeters or around 5' feet and 6 inches tall. The accused on the
contrary weighs only 110 pounds and stood at 5 feet. If there was really a struggle which ensued
between the two and if the deceased really attempted to hit the accused three times with a piece of
wood, the latter could not have stabbed the deceased twice; once on the chest and the other on the
abdomen with a depth of 12 and 13 centimeters respectively and in so short a time. According to the
accused, he was in the room of the deceased at 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of December 19, 1959
(T.S.N., p. 14, August 9, 1960) while according to Patrolman Rosendo Cruz, he arrived at the house of the
deceased at around 3:30 a.m. on the same day (T.S.N., p. 34, February 17, 1960). By that time, the
accused had already escaped through the transom of the window of the deceased's room and was
outside of the premises of the house. It is, therefore, highly improbable that between 3:00 o'clock and
3:30 a.m., or a span of less than 30 minutes, the accused was able to enter the room of the deceased,
evade the piece of wood which the deceased attempted to hit him with three times, pick up a bladed
instrument from the drawer and stab the latter twice one of which caused the mortal wound and finally
escape from the premises of the house by passing through a high window. The only way he could have
accomplished all of these in less than 30 minutes is if the deceased were asleep at that time so much so
that the accused did not have to exert extra effort to ensure his victim's death.
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the crime committed was murder qualified by treachery
and that evident premeditation dwelling and unlawful entry were also present.
The next assignment of error alleges that the death penalty is violative of the constitutional right against
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. In the case of People v. Camano, (115 SCRA 688), we
ruled that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. Citing the case of Harden v. Director of
Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 747, we further said that: t.hqw
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136
U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous something more than the mere extinguishment of life.'
The Court, however, agrees with the accused's contention that the penalty should not be imposed on
him since he has been detained and continues to be in the death row for about 24 years now since as
stated earlier, it took eleven years after his trial and conviction before the records of this case were
discovered and transmitted to this Court for automatic review. For lack of the needed votes, the penalty
of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua. (People v. Advincula, 96 SCRA 875; People v. Saravia, 127
SCRA 100)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of
death is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the indemnity for the heirs of the victim increased to THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.
In view of the long period of time during which the accused-appellant has been in Death Row this case is
referred to the Board of Pardons and Parole for a thorough study of all aspects of the case, including the
accused's conduct while in prison, with the end in view of recommending executive clemency if
warranted by the facts.

55.
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
SERGIO CURARATON y MONINIO, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for the accused.

MELO, J.:
Sergio Curaraton y Moninio was charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about December 12, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a bolo,
with treachery and cruelty and outraging the corpse of the victim, with intent to kill,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and hacked with said bolo one
Timoteo Cabagte, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Davao City, Philippines, December 20, 1989. (p. 13, Rollo.)
After trial on merits due to a plea of not guilty being entered, the court a quo rendered a decision on
December 4, 1990, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Sergio Curaraton guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder with the attendant circumstances of cruelty and disregard of
the age of his victim, Timoteo Cabagte, and hereby sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify his heirs in the amount of P30,000.00 for his death and
P3,000.00 for his burial.
Accused-appellant now seeks reversal on the basis of self-defense, or "on the assumption that his
conviction is in order", that he be credited the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The factual setting of the case, as depicted by the Solicitor General in his counter-statement of facts,
which, after a review of the record, we find to be fully supported by the evidence and which we,
therefore, hereby adopt, is as follows:
In the evening of December 12, 1989, Sergio Tonacao was at his house in Kutson, Biao,
Guianga, Tugbok, Davao City. At about 10:00 p.m., appellant appeared outside his house
armed with a bolo and a big stone and challenged Tonacao to come down and fight.
Tonacao advised appellant to go home and that they would just talk about the matter the
next day (pp, 3-5, TSN Aug. 28,1990). Appellant responded that he wanted to settle the
matter amicably with Tonacao that same night. Tonacao agreed and he came down from
his house. Appellant shook hands with him and also with Timoteo Cabagte, Tonacao's
brother-in-law, who joined them after coming from the house of Tonacao's neighbor about
40 meters away. Appellant told Tonacao: "Tocayo (name sake), you are not involved in
this." (p. 5). Appellant, who was 37 years old, addressed Cabagte, who was 54 [should be
65] years old, as "Manong" as they shook hands: "Manong, you have nothing to do with
this." (p. 5). After they shook hands, Cabagte went back to his neighbor Claudio Capricio's
house. Tonacao noticed that appellant followed Cabagte (pp. 4, 5, Id.) and hid behind a
coconut tree along the path leading to the house of Capricio about 10 armslength from
Tonacao's house (p. 6). Tonacao was curious why appellant was still holding the stone and
bolo so he surreptitiously went closer to observe (p. 6). When Tonacao was about two

armslength from appellant, Cabagte came walking back along the trail and as Cabagte
passed the coconut tree where appellant was hiding, Tonacao saw appellant, suddenly
strike Cabagte with the rock he was holding. Cabagte fell on the ground and appellant
immediately thrust his bolo into Cabagte's body several times. Not satisfied with felling
Cabagte, appellant chopped the victicm's body with the same bolo, hitting the victim on
the left forehead, left portion of the face, and at the back, even as the victim lay
motionless and dead (p, 7). Tonacao was afraid that appellant would turn on him, and so
he did not go to the victim's aid (p. 7).
Tonacao sought the assistance of Danilo Palad and together they went to the scene of the
crime and found only the mutilated corpse of Cabagte. Appellant was no longer at the
scene (p. 8).
The Necropsy Report (Exh. G) prepared and signed by Dr. Napoleon dela Pea, District
Health Officer at Calinan, Davao City, described the location and severity of the eleven
wounds suffered by the victim, to wit: (i) The first wound is a "hack wound, 13 cm. length,
4 cm. depth, occipital, left" located at the back portion of the head, running diagonally; (ii)
the second wound is a "hack wound, 4 cm. length, 2 cm. depth, mandibular, left" located
at the jaw; (iii) the third wound is a "hack wound, 5 cm. length, 4 cm. depth,
mandibulomaxilliary left", located at the left temple running down to the jaw; (iv) wound
no. 4 is an "incised wound, 2 cm. length, one cm. depth" located on the nose bridge; (v)
wound no. 5 is a "lacerated wound, 2 cm. length, scalp depth supraorbital right" located at
the eyebrow; (vi) wound no. 6 is a "hack wound, 7 cm. length, 5 cm. depth, lumbar right"
at the right side of the body below the ribs; (vii) wound no. 7 is "amputated forearm, distal
third right" the right hand was completely cut off, about 2 inches from the wrist; (viii)
wound no. 8 is "lacerated wound, one cm. length cm. depth, anterior axillary line, axilla
"from front of the right armpit going inside the armpit; (ix) wound no. 9 is a "hack wound,
15 cm. length, 5 cm. depth, scapular, left", at the back just below the left shoulder,
running down to the anterior axillary line, below armpit; (x) wound no. 10 is a "hack
wound, 13 cm. length, 6 cm. depth, suprascapular, right" from just below the right
shoulder at the back running horizontally towards the end of the shoulder; and (xi) wound
no. 11 is a "hack wound, 7 cm. length, 5 cm. depth, gluteal, left" at the left buttocks (pp.
42-47, TSN 8-30-90).
The cause of death was massive hemorrhage secondary to hack wounds. The wounds
could have been caused by a sharp-bladed instrument. The most serious and fatal wound
is wound no. 1 (hack wound, 13 cm. length, 4 cm. depth, occipital) because it involved the
brain that wound alone could already have caused the death (pp. 47-48, TSN 8-30-90).
At around 11:00 p.m. that same night, Epifanio Cabagte, brother of the victim reported
the killing of his brother at the hands of appellant to the Tugbok Patrol Station. Patrolman
Limbaco went to the scene of the crime to investigate and thereafter recorded the
incident in the blotter. The following morning he received information from the Calinan
Patrol Station that appellant had surrendered himself and the bolo (Exhibit "A") at said
station where the incident was also entered in the blotter (Exhibit "B"). At 7:30 in the
morning of December 13, Pat. Limbaco dispatched three policemen to Calinan to take
custody of appellant and the bolo.
Appellant denied that prior to the incident he had gone to the house of Tonacao and shook
hands with Tonacao and Cabagte but claimed that he was on his way home, after cleaning
his tuba container, when somebody struck him down with a nipa frond. He stood up and
hit back. (pp. 4-8, Appellee's Brief.)
Under his first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him
on the ground of self-defense. He must, however, understand that an accused who puts up self-defense
bears the burden of establishing the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of the court (Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 38 [1989]). Should he fail to do so, his
conviction follows as a matter of course. Said elements are the following:
1. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression, and
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Ortega vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 42.)
It is essential that the first element of self-defense, unlawful aggression initiated by the victim, must be
clearly shown for in its absence, self-defense cannot exist (Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan, supra). The
evidence shows that, after accused-appellant assured Cabagte, the victim, addressing and telling him,
"Manong, you have nothing to do with this", and after they shook hands, Cabagte left to go back to the
house of his neighbor. Accused-appellant, however, thereafter waited in ambush for Cabagte behind a
coconut tree along the path leading to the house of Capricio. When Cabagte by the coconut tree behind
which accussed-appellant was lurking, accused-appellant suddenly sprang out of ambush and struck
Cabagte with the rock he was holding, stunning and felling him. Thereupon, accused-appellant
immediately thrust his bolo into Cabagte's body several times and hacked the fallen Cabagte repeatedly
at several parts of his body as he lay still and motionless.
The claim of accused-appellant that he was attacked by Cabagte with a nipa frond is bereft of credence
considering that Cabagte was the first one to leave the house of Sergio Tonacao peacefully winding his
way toward the house of his neighbor Claudio Capricio, lulled into a false sense of security that accusedappellant bore him no enmity by accused-appellant's conciliatory but deceitful declaration that
"Manong, you have nothing to do with this."
Even assuming that Cabagte indeed attacked accused-appellant with a nipa frond, the killing of Cabagte
can not be justified for accused-appellant employed unreasonable means to repel the alleged attack. We
doubt that a nipa frond can inflict serious injuries much less cause death. Accused-appellant's reaction
to this imagined aggression was clearly excessive and unnecessary as shown by the multiple wounds he
had inflicted on the victim.
We, therefore, find that accused-appellant has failed to establish that he acted in self-defense when he
killed Cabagte. Consequently, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other elements of self-defense.
The crime committed by accused-appellant is murder qualified by treachery as the killing was sudden
and unexpected (People vs. Liston, 179 SCRA 415 [1989]). The killing, however, was not attended by the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty and disregard of age as erroneously found by the trial court.
Cruelty is to be taken into consideration where the multiple wounds of the victim were inflicted
unnecessarily while he was still alive in order to prolong his physical suffering (People vs. Curiano, 9
SCRA 323 [1963). The evidence in the case at bar shows that, when accused-appellant continued
hacking Cabagte, the latter was already dead or at least totally unconscious and could no longer feel or
experience additional pain that would prolong his physical suffering. Neither can the aggravating
circumstance of age be appreciated because the same is absorbed by treachery (People vs. Gervacio, 24
SCRA 960 [1968]).
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrenders should have been considered by the trial court in
the determination of the penalty. The evidence shows that immediately after slaying Cabagte, accusedappellant walked all the way straight to the Calinan Patrol Station in Calinan, Davao City to surrender.
The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and with no aggravating circumstance. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the
revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Pursuant to Article 64 (2) in
relation to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed should be 17 years, 4
months, and 1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, both within the range of reclusion temporal.
In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law which applies in this case, the minimum should be
within range of the penalty next lower in degree to be fixed in any of its periods in the discretion of the
Court. Under Article 61, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty prescribed for the
crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible
penalty, as in this case, the penalty next lower is degree shall be composed of the medium and
minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum of that immediately following in the
scale of penalties. The penalty next lower in degree, therefore, ranges from the maximum of prison
mayor to the medium of reclusion temporal (People vs. Ordiales, 42 SCRA 238 [1971]).

The award of civil indemnity should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the more recent
pronouncements of this Court (People vs. Jereza, 189 SCRA 690 [1990]; People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700
[1990; People vs. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754 [1990]; People vs. Iligan, 191 SCRA 643 [1990]).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. The penalty shall be an imprisonment term to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum
(People vs. Alcantara, 163 SCRA 783 [1988]); and
2. The civil indemnity to be paid by accussed-appellant to the heirs of the victim is increased to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).