MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

GR 135962 March 27, 2000

FACTS: On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice
requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular
traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE: WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as
an agent of the state endowed with police power.
HELD: A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic
and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the
National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the
Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under
the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant
of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a
development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither
an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA
Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
Ganson vs Ca
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against
him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits
of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the
suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter
ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control
given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized
that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ
one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from
this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision
of the President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.

Limbona vs Mangelin
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with
local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the
Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance
of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays
that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he
was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the
SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's

membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous
governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the
autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it
and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an
inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to
obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the

Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents'
own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could
do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does
not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears
is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an
apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
GR 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in
the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed
Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved
by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight
Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under
the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to
the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations
Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed
conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local
autonomy of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy,
theConstitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general
supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v.
Limdistinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing

of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the
act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are
followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the just
share shall beautomatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic,
the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just share it shall
be released to them without need of further action. To subject its distribution &
release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would
violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than
40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not
apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC
of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control
over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate
lawand not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a
general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a
separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation,
whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended to
amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of
general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments
through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit
and liberty upon which these provisions are based.
Mathay vs Ca
In November 1972, Presidential Decree No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51 created
a Civil Service Unit (CSU) office in cities. Pursuant to said law, then Quezon City
mayor Brigido Simon appointed officers in the QC-CSU. Meanwhile, an ordinance
in QC was passed providing, among others, that the personnel of the CSU shall be
automatically absorbed into the QC Department of Public Order and Safety (QCDPOS). During the term of the next mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was determined
that PD 51 never became a law because it was never published. Mathay then did
not renew the contracts of the QC-CSU personnel, at the same time, they were not
reappointed to the QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the QC-CSU personnel

before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Eventually, the CSC Commissioner
ruled that based on the QC ordinance, Mathay should reinstate the CSU-personnel
to QC-DPOS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CSC Commissioner is correct.
HELD: No. The ordinance is invalid for when it provided for automatic absorption
of the QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it divested the mayor the power to
choose as to who should fill said office. Just like in the national government, the
local sanggunian can only create an office, it cannot choose the personnel who
should fill such office that is a power vested in the local chief executive (mayor).
This is also clearly provided for in the Local Government Code. The power to
appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power of the city council
or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited
to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by
local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. Had Congress intended to
grant the power to appoint to both the city council and the local chief executive, it
would have said so in no uncertain terms.
On the other hand, the CSC Commissioner cannot order the mayor to reinstate the
QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS. Such would be an encroachment of the
mayors right to choose as to who should be appointed. Further, the CSU never
came into existence for it has no legal basis to speak of. It created no right hence
the QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is
not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it.

Basco v. PAGCOR
GRN 91649, 14 May 1991)
FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant
to the policy of the government, to regulate and centralize through an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the
government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much
needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and
legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional
principle of Local Autonomy;3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms are
outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and4.) it is

contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and
crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.
HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But
the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it
in the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare.
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right
to impose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its
control. Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is
not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the
political branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all
state power.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Ordillo vs. COMELEC

Facts:
The province of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and
Baguio City cast their vote in a plebiscite held in pursuant to R.A. 6766 creating
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The result of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was only approved by Ifugao. In consideration of the proviso
in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in
the CAR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao can validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
Ruling:
No, in constuing the word region in Article X Sec 15 of the 1987 Constitution it
includes provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas, that a region is to
be made up of two or more constituent unit.
Therefore, Ifugao itself cannot solely constitute a region.
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes

in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed
that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only
the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao,
being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to
be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term region used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the
thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative
purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To
become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting
of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced
with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials
and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area.

ABBAS VS COMELEC
Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous
region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on
the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon
the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734
which declares that [t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite
called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution. Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the
creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces
vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed
of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to
be clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities
where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not
attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734
will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region
in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated
in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of
the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used

for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double
majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in
which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18
must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.