1. G.R. No. 122917 MARITES BERNARDO et al. vs.

NLRCTHIRD DIVISION /
PANGANIBAN,
7FACTS:
The 43 petitioners are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by
respondent Far EastBank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly
worded agreement called "Employment Contractfor Handicapped Workers". The said agreement
provides for the manner of how they are hired and be rehired, the amountof their wages (P118.00
per day), period of employment (5 days a week, 8 hours a day, training for 1 month, 6
monthsperiod) and the manner and methods of how their works are to be done (Sort out bills
according to color; Count eachdenomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a
counting machine; Wrap and label bills per hundred; Putthe wrapped bills into bundles; and Submit
bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.) Many of their employmentswere renewed every
six months. Claiming that they should be considered as regular employees they filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and recovery of various benefits.
Labor arbiters decision: complaint is dismissed for lack of merit (the terms of the contract shall
be the law between the parties.). Affirmed by the NLRC (Art. 280 is not controlling herein but
Art. 80) (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons wasnot applicable, "considering the prevailing
circumstances of the case.") and denied motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Does petitioners considered as regular employees?
LAW:
Art.78 & 80 of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons.
RULING: Yes.
The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months
and whosecontracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment
was illegal.The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with Article 80,
however, the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code is justified because of the advent of
RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons) whichmandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualifiedable-bodied
person (compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances) 27 of the
petitioners areconsidered regular employees by provision of law regardless of any agreement
between the parties as embodied in article280 in relation to article 281 of the Labor Code.The
test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. Hence, theemployment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and
while such activity exist. Without a doubt, thetask of counting and sorting bills is necessary and
desirable to the business of respondent bank.When the bank renewed the contract after the
lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby becameregular employees. No
employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. Those who have
workedfor only 6 months and employments were not renewed are not considered regular
employees.
OPINION:
The Court correctly finds that 27 of the handicapped workers are regular employees. The test is
whether theactivity is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. The employment is consideredregular, but only with respect to such activity, and while
such activity exist. Without a doubt, the task of counting andsorting bills is necessary and
desirable to the business of respondent bank. As regular employees, the twenty-sevenpetitioners
are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or
authorized cause.

2. PNOC vs NLRC
Facts: Danilo Mercado, an employee of the Philippine National Oil Company- Energy
Development Corporation, was dismissed on the grounds of serious acts of dishonesty and
violation of company rules and regulations allegedly committed as follows:
1. Withdrew P1680.00 from company funds, appropriated P680.00 for personal use and paid the
nipa supplier P1000.00.
2. Withdrew P28.66 as payment for the fabrication of rubber stamp but appropriated the P8.66
for personal use.
3. Absence without leave and without proper turn-over thus disrupting and delaying company work
activities.
4. Vacation leave without prior leave.
Mercado filed a complaint against PNOC-EDC before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch.
After considerations of position papers presented by both parties, the labor arbiter ruled in
favour of Mercado.
Issues:
1. Whether or not matters of employment of PNOC-EDC is within the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the NLRC.
2. Whether or not the labor arbiter and the NLRC are justified in ordering the reinstatement of
the private respondent, payment of his savings, 13th month pay, and payment of damages as well
as attorneys fees.
Held:
The High Court affirmed the resolution of the respondent NLRC with modification: reducing
moral damages to P10000 and exemplary damages to P5000.
1. The test whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to Civil Service Law
is the manner of its creation. Those created by special charter are subject to its provision while
those created under General Corporation Law are not within its coverage. The PNOC-EDC, having
been incorporated under General Corporation Law, is subject to the provisions of the Labor Law.
2. PNOC-EDCs accusations are not supported by evidence. Loss of trust or breach of confidence
is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, but such loss or breach must have some basis.
3. San Miguel Brewer, Inc. vs. Democratic Labor Organization, et al
T he E i g ht- H o u r L a b o r L a w o n ly a p p li es to e mp l o y e e s w ho a r e pa i d o n a mo n t hl y
o r d a i l y b a si s . Employees who are paid on a piece-work basis are EXCLUDED.
FACTS:Respondent Democratic Labor Assoc. filed a manifestation claiming for the following against
petitioner SMB: overtime pay,night-shift differential pay, attorneys fees. Separation pay, and
sick and vacation leave compensation.- Judge Bautista ruled that those working outside the
companys premises are entitled to overtime compensation, hence, theEight-Hour Labor Law applies to
them.- Petitioner filed for an M.R. before the CIR. It was deniedHENCE THE PETITIONIssue:
Whether the Eight-Hour Labor Law applies to respondent workers.

Held: NoRatio Decidendi:

The Eight-Hour Labor Law only applies to an employee who is paid on a monthly or daily basis. This
lawhas no application to employees paid on a piece-work basis. CIR is wrong to apply the law to the
piece-work employees.According to a ruling by DOLE on Dec. 9, 1957, field sales personnel
receiving monthly salaries (such as the respondents inthis case) are not subject to the EightHour Labor Law (although they are paid on a monthly basis, their commission shall beconsidered
as payment for extra time he renders in excess of 8 hours).Additional Issue: Are the claimants
who are watchmen and security guards entitled to extra pay for work done on Sundaysand
Holidays?COURT: They are entitled to such pay as per Comm. Act No. 444. They shall be entitled to + 25% of their regular
salary.PETITION: GRANTED: Decision of the CIR, SET ASIDE
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), vs. BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.),
We used to have ten (10) regular holidays. This is the reason for the 251 divisor, used by some
companies in computing the daily wage, which represents the 365 days of the year, less 52
Saturdays, 52 Sundays and the 10 legal holidays. The new law added one more regular holiday
the Eidl Fitr. We thus have eleven (11) regular holidays under R.A. 9492:
New Years Day (January 1)
Maundy Thursday (Movable date)
Good Friday (Movable date)
Eidl Fitr (Movable date)
Araw ng Kagitingan Bataaan and Corregidor Day (Monday nearest April 9)
Labor Day (Monday nearest May 1)
Independence Day (Monday nearest June 12)
National Heroes Day (Last Monday of August)
Bonifacio Day (Monday nearest November 30)
Christmas Day (December 25)
Rizal Day (Monday nearest December 30)
The Labor Code provides that every worker shall be paid his daily wage during regular holidays.
Employers are now required to pay for an extra regular holiday.
Facts:

On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for claims of its monthly paid employees
for holiday pay.
Abitrator Vivar: Filipro to pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Art 94 of Labor
Code, subject to exclusions and limitations in Art 82.
Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2)
the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical
representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay,
and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential,
vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor.
Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity
of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled
to holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot
be diminished.
Arbitrator Vivar: On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that
the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of
effectivity of the Labor Code. He adjudged, however, that the companys sales personnel are
field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that with the grant
of 10 days holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the
reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due
to the use of 251 days as divisor.
Issues:
1) Whether or not Nestles sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and
2) Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed
from 251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of 251 as divisor resulted in
overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay.
Held:
1. Sales personnel are not entitled to holiday pay.
Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field
personnel as non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in
the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The
company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to

the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours

The respondent arbitrators order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a

in between in actual field work.

lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article
100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days,

Moreover, the requirement that actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with

then the dividend, which represents the employees annual salary, should correspondingly be

reasonable certainty must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing

increased to incorporate the holiday pay.

Rules which provides:

To illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employees annual salary is P25,100, then
Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
employer . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, in deciding whether or not an employees actual working hours in the field can be
determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employees
time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer.
2. The divisor in computing the award of holiday pay should still be 251 days.
While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to overtime pay, the same
rationale for their exclusion as field personnel from holiday pay benefits also applies.
The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrators ruling that, concomitant with the
award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to include the additional
10 holidays and the employees should reimburse the amounts overpaid by Filipro due to the use of

dividing such figure by 251 days, his daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of 10 days holiday
pay, his annual salary already includes holiday pay and totals P26,100 (P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing
this by 261 days, the daily rate is still P100.00. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestles
claim of overpayment of overtime and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits,
the computation of which are all based on the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same
before and after the grant of holiday pay.
SC Decision:
The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of
promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but
from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA case (Insular Bank of Asia and
America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, where the court declared that Sec 2, Rule IV,
Book III of IRR which excluded monthly paid employees from holiday pay benefits, are null and
void).
WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used
in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed
from October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby
AFFIRMED.

251 days divisor.

The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten (10)
legal holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid
for all non-working days, the divisor should be 365 and not 251.
In the petitioners case, its computation of daily ratio since September 1, 1980, is as follows:
monthly rate x 12 months / 251 days
The use of 251 days divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in
the employees salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261.
It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a
constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and
commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate should also be the
same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.

RED V COCONUT PRODUCTS, LTD., vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, TANGLAW

NG PAGGAWA, ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, ET AL.,respondents.
Red V Coconut Products, Ltd. is a corporation with principal office and place of business at Lucena
City. It has in that city a desiccated coconut factory. In said factory, it has several hundred
workers. About 800 of said workers are members of Tanglaw ng Paggawa labor union.

Tanglaw ng Paggawa and Red V Coconut Products, Ltd. entered into a collective bargaining
agreement on July 15, 1958. Subsequently, however, on October 5, 1961, the aforementioned
company and union entered into another collective bargaining agreement, to expire on October 31,
1965.
The 1958 collective bargaining agreement provided among other things for payment of
differentials to night shift workers in the desiccated coconut factory.1wph1.t

The 1961 collective bargaining agreement retained the same arrangement. It stated:

likewise denied a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. Red V Coconut Products, Ltd. filed
its answer on May 2, 1962.

The present shift differential will remain in effect, namely, 35 for the second shift
and 55 for the third Shift.

In the meanwhile, on April 25, 1962, Tanglaw ng Paggawa filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations a new and independent petition alleging unfair labor practice against Red V Coconut
Products, Ltd. (CIR Case No. 3150 ULP). It was asserted therein that the company refused to
grant 15 days leave with pay to the members of the union in violation of the 1961 collective
bargaining agreement.

In the factory, there are two groups of workers, the three-shift group let us call it Group A
and the two shift group which we shall call Group B. As observed by the parties thereto,
differentials were paid to workers, under the 1958 and 1961 contracts, thus:

Hours of Work
Group A

Group B

1st shift

4 A.M.

2nd shift

Differentials

12 Noon

(8 Hrs.)

None

12 Noon

8 P.M.

(8 Hrs.)

.35

3rd shift

8 P.M.

4 A.M.

(8 Hrs.)

.55

1st shift

4 A.M.

4 P.M.

(12 Hrs.)

None

2nd shift

4 P.M.

4 A.M.

(12 Hrs.)

.55

On January 17, 1962, Tanglaw ng Paggawa and some 300 workers in the above-stated factory,
members of the said union, who belong to Group B, filed a petition in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Petitioners therein alleged that the petitioners-workers are shellers, parers, counters
and haulers in the two shifts (Group B) consisting of 12 hours each shift, the first shift from 4:
00 A.M. to 4: 00 P.M. and the second shift from 4 P.M. to 4 A.M.; that said workers change shift
assignments every week; that, accordingly, all of them work from 4 A.M. to 4 P.M. (first shift)
for two alternate weeks per month and from 4 P.M. to 4 A.M. (second shift) likewise for two
alternate weeks in a month; that although said workers perform work from 4 P.M. to 4 A.M., they
receive only P.55 differential pay for the corresponding hours of night work; that their nightwork
is equivalent to the nightwork of the 2nd and 3rd shifts of Group A combined, so that they should
receive what the 2nd and 3rd shifts of Group A, combined, receive as differential pay, namely,
P.90 (P.75 plus P.35); that, therefore, they are entitled to payment of P.35 more as differential
pay, since up to the time of the petition, they received only P.55 per night as differential pay.
Said additional P.35 was asked by the petitioners-workers of Group B f or work done by them
from 4 P.M. to 4 A.M. Their claim referred to the time from July 15, 1958 to the date of the
petition, allegedly at P186.90 per sheller, parer, counter and hauler, or a total sum of P65,228.10
more or less.
Respondent company therein filed on January 28, 1962 a motion to dismiss, stating that the Court
of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the case for the reason that the claim asserted in
the petition is a simple money claim and that an interpretation of a contract (the collective
bargaining agreement is involved, which pertains to the regular courts.
The Court of Industrial Relations denied said motion by resolution of February 17, 1962 ruling
that the claim is for unpaid overtime pay of laborers still employed by the company. Said court

The Court of Industrial Relations, on January 19, 1963 after trial, rendered its decision on the
petition for differential pay (CIR Case No. 1642-V). It found therein that the petitionersworkers are engaged on pakiao or piece-work basis, and, therefore, are not entitled to overtime
pay under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Sec. 2, CA 444); that their petition for night shift
differentials based on the collective bargaining agreements is meritorious because the company
having paid night differentials indiscriminately to the night shift workers of Group A and Group B
alike, the payments should be uniform and equal for the night shifts of both groups, that is, P.90.
It therefore ordered payment of the deficiency in said differentials to the workers of Group B.
Red V Coconut Products, Ltd. moved for reconsideration of said decision on January 29, 1963.
The Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied said motion by resolution of February 25, 1963.
And, hence, Red V Coconut Products, Ltd. filed this petition for review herein.
Petitioner herein contends that the present case involves a mere money claim over which the
Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction. 1
It is exiomatic that to determine the issue of jurisdiction resort is to be made to the allegations
in the petition or complaint.2 The petition for shift differential in the present case, it is true, did
not expressly mention the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Nonetheless, it clearly asserted that (1)
petitioners-laborers "are working in the Red V Coconut Products, Ltd." and (2) they "work in two
(2) shifts (Blue and Red shifts) consisting of approximately 12 hours each shift." Accordingly,
from the said allegations, it is proper to regard the petition, as the Court of Industrial Relations
did, as one for overtime pay by workers still employed by the company. As such it falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. For the same is in effect an assertion not of a
simple money claim but, as respondent court rightly held, of a claim for overtime pay by workers
who are employees of the company.3
During the trial, as stated, evidence was adduced to the effect that the aforesaid petitionersworkers were engaged on a piece-work basis. The same, however, does not appear from the
petition or complaint filed with the respondent court. It therefore cannot affect its jurisdiction
over the case, which was already acquired. For jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until final
adjudication of the litigation.4
Furthermore, although the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides that it does not cover those workers
who prefer to be paid on piece-work basis (Sec. 2, CA 444), nothing in said law precludes an
agreement for the payment of overtime compensation to piece-workers. And in agreeing to the
provision for payment of shift differentials to the petitioners-workers aforementioned, in the
bargaining agreement, as well as in actually paying to them said differentials, though not in full,

the company in effect freely adhered to an application and implementation of the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, or its objectives, to said workers. It should be observed that while the provision in
the bargaining agreements speaks of shift differentials for the "second shift" and the "third
shift" and Group B has no third shift, said Group B has a second shift, which performs work
equivalent to that of the corresponding shifts of Group A. It follows that respondent court did
not err in ordering the company to pay the full and equivalent amount of said differentials (P.90)
corresponding, under the bargaining agreements, to the workers who performed 12 hours of work,
from 4 P.M. to 4 A.M.
And, finally, the laborers in question are not strictly under the full concept of piece-workers as
contemplated by law for the reason that their hours of work that is, 12 hours per shift are
fixed by the employer. As ruled by this Court in Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 780, 781-782, the
philosophy underlying the exclusion of piece workers from the Eight-Hour Labor Law is that said
workers are paid depending upon the work they do "irrespective of the amount of time employed"
in doing said work. Such freedom as to hours of work does not obtain in the case of the laborers
herein involved, since they are assigned by the employer to work in two shifts for 12 hours each
shift. Thus it cannot be said that for all purposes these workers fall outside the law requiring
payment of compensation for work done in excess of eight hours. At least for the purpose of
recovering the full differential pay stipulated in the bargaining agreement as due to laborers who
perform 12 hours of work under the night shift, said laborers should be deemed pro tanto or to
that extent within the scope of the afore-stated law.
Wherefore, the decision and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations under review are
affirmed. So ordered.
NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and DOMINADOR MALONDRAS,
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; SAILORS; OVERTIME COMPENSATION; CRITERION IN
DETERMINING. The correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors are entitled to
overtime pay is not whether they were on board and can not leave ship beyond the regular eight
working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of
hours.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE NOT DEDUCTIBLE. Inasmuch as the stipulation
of facts of the parties show that the subsistence allowance is independent of and has nothing to
do with whatever additional compensation for overtime work was due the petitioner, the same
should not be deducted from his overtime compensation.
The petitioner NASSCO, a government-owned and controlled corporation, is the owner of several
barges and tugboats used in the transportation of cargoes and personnel in connection with its
business of shipbuilding and repair. In order that its bargemen could immediately be called to
duty whenever their services are needed, they are required to stay in their respective barges,
for which reason they are given living quarters therein as well as subsistence allowance of P1.50
per day during the time they are on board. However, upon prior authority of their superior
officers, they may leave their barges when said barges are idle.
On April 15, 1957, 39 crew members of petitioner's tugboat service, including herein respondent
Dominador Malondras, filed with the Industrial Court a complaint for the payment of overtime
compensation (Case No. 1058-V). In the course of the proceeding, the parties entered into a
stipulation of facts wherein the NASSCO recognized and admitted
4. That to meet the exigencies of the service in the performance of the above

work, petitioners have to work when so required in excess of eight (8) hours a day
and/or during Sundays and legal holidays (actual overtime service is subject to
determination on the basis of the logbook of the vessels, time sheets and other
pertinent records of the respondent).
6. The petitioners are paid by the respondent their regular salaries and
subsistence allowance, without additional compensation for overtime work;"
While Malondras' daily time sheets do not show his actual working hours, nevertheless, petitioner
has already admitted in the Stipulation of Facts in this case that Malondras and his co-claimants
did render service beyond eight (8) hours a day when so required by the exigencies of the
service; and in fact, Malondras was credited and already paid for five (5) hours daily overtime
work during the period from May 1 to December 31, 1957, under the examiner's first report.
Since Malondras has been at the same job since 1954, it can be reasonably inferred that the
overtime service he put in whenever he was required to be aboard his barge all day from 1954 to
1957 would be more or less consistent. In truth, the other claimants who served with Malondras
under the same conditions and period, have been finally paid for an overtime of 5 hours a day, and
no substantial difference exists between their case and the present one, which was not covered
by the same award only because Malondras' time records were not found until later.
The next question is whether or not the subsistence allowance received by Malondras for the
periods covered by the report in question should be deducted from his overtime compensation.
We do not think so, for the Stipulation of the Facts of the parties show that this allowance is
independent of and has nothing to do with whatever additional compensation for overtime work
was due the petitioner NASSCO's bargemen. According to the petitioner itself, the reason why
their bargemen are given living quarters in their barges and subsistence allowance at the rate of
P1.50 per day was because they were required to stay in their respective barges in order that
they could be immediately called to duty when their services were needed (Petition, par. 5, p. 2).
Petitioner having already paid Malondras and his companions overtime for 1957 without deduction
of the subsistence allowances received by them during this period, and Malondras' companions
having been paid overtime for the other years also without deducting their subsistence
allowances, there is no valid reason why Malondras should be singled out now and his subsistence
allowance deducted from the overtime compensation still due him.
The last question involves petitioner's claim that it was error for the examiner to base
Malondras' overtime compensation for the whole year 1954 at P6.16 a day, when he was appointed
in the tugboat service only on October 1, 1954, and before that was a derrick man with a daily
salary of P6.00. In answer, respondent Malondras asserts that the report of the examiner, based
on his time sheets from January 1, 1954, show that he had already been rendering overtime
service from that date. This answer does not, however, deny that Malondras started to get P6.16
a day only in October, 1954, and was before that time receiving only P6.00 daily, as claimed by
petitioner. We think, therefore, that the records should be reexamined to find out Malondras'
exact daily wage from January 1, 1954 to
September, 1954, and his overtime compensation for these months computed on the basis
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is modified in the sense that respondent Malondras
should be credited five (5) overtime hours instead of sixteen (16) hours a day for the periods
covered by the examiner's report.
ARICA vs NLRC
1. LABOR LAW; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; NON-COMPENSABILITY OF
CLAIM ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN AN EARLIER DECISION REMAINS TO BE THE "LAW OF

THE CASE"; ISSUE RAISED BARRED BY THE RES JUDICATA. It is clear that herein
petitioners are merely reiterating the very same claim which they fled through the ALU and
which records show had already long been considered terminated and closed by this Court in G.R.
No. L-48510. Therefore, the NLRC can not be faulted for ruling that petitioners' claim is already
barred by res judicata. Be that as it may, petitioners' claim that there was a change in the
factual scenario which are "substantial changes in the facts" makes respondent firm now liable
for the same claim they earlier filed against respondent which was dismissed. It is thus axiomatic
that the non-compensability of the claim having been earlier established, constitute the
controlling legal rule or decision between the parties and remains to be the law of the casemaking
this petition without merit. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General that this petition is
"clearly violative of the familiar principle of res judicata. There will be no end to this controversy
if the light of the Minister of Labor's decision dated May 12, 1979 that had long acquired the
character of finality and which already resolved that petitioners' thirty (30)-minute assembly
time is not compensable, the same issue can be re-litigated again."
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES
GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. As a rule, the findings of facts of quasijudicial
agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters
are accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. The records show that the Labor Arbiters' decision dated October 9, 1985
(Annex "E", Petition) pointed out in detail the basis of his findings and conclusions, and no cogent
reason can be found to disturb these findings nor of those of the National Labor Relations
Commission which affirmed the same.

Code . . .
"Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice
of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with
complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal
pursuits. They are not new employees as to require the company to deliver long
briefings regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are situated
right on the area where the farms are located, such that after the roll call, which
does not necessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to their
houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not subject to the absolute
control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the
assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The
CBA does not contain any provision to this effect; the record is also bare of any
proof on this point. This, therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the
thirty (30)-minute assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of
the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their availability or nonavailability for
work during every working day." (Annex "E", Rollo, p. 57).
Accordingly, the issues are reduced to the sole question as to whether public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in its resolution of December
17, 1986. LLph

Petitioners contend that the preliminary activities as workers of respondents STANFILCO in the
assembly area is compensable as working time (from 5:30 to 6:00 o'clock in the morning) since
these preliminary activities are necessarily and primarily for private respondent's benefit.
Contrary to this contention, respondent avers that the instant complaint is not new, the very
same claim having been brought against herein respondent by the same group of rank and file
employees in the case of Associated Labor Union and Standard Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No.
26-LS-XI-76 which was filed way back April 27, 1976 when ALU was the bargaining agent of
respondent's rank and file workers. The said case involved a claim for "waiting time", as the
complainants purportedly were required to assemble at a designated area at least 30 minutes
prior to the start of their scheduled working hours "to ascertain
the work force available for the day by means of a roll call, for the purpose of assignment or
reassignment of employees to such areas in the plantation where they are most needed.

This Court has held:

"In this connection account should be taken of the cognate principle that res judicata operates to
bar not only the relitigation in a subsequent action of the
issues squarely raised, passed upon and adjudicated in the first suit, but also the
ventilation in said subsequent suit of any other issue which could have been
raised in the first but was not The law provides that 'the judgment or order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action . . .
litigating for the same thing and in the same capacity.' So, even if new causes of
action are asserted in the second action (e.g. fraud, deceit, undue machinations in
connection with their execution of the convenio de transaccion), this would not
preclude the operation of the doctrine of res judicata. Those issues are also
barred, even if not passed upon in the first. They could have been, but were not,
there raised."
Moreover, as a rule, the findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at
times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The records show that the Labor Arbiters' decision dated October 9, 1985 pointed out in detail
the basis of his findings and conclusions, and no cogent
reason can be found to disturb these findings nor of those of the National Labor Relations
Commission which affirmed the same.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.

The Minister of Labor held:

"The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by
mutual consent of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as 'waiting time' within the purview
of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor

RADA vs NLRC

Petitioners assign the following issues:

1) Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is
compensable under the Labor Code.
2) Whether or not res judicata applies when the facts obtaining in the prior case and in the case
at bar are significantly different from each other in that there is merit in the case at bar.
3) Whether or not there is finality in the decision of Secretary Ople in view of the compromise
agreement novating it and the withdrawal of the appeal.
4) Whether or not estoppel and laches lie in decisions for the enforcement of labor standards.

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION; APPEAL; SUPERSEDEAS BOND; LATE PAYMENT THEREOF ALLOWED IN THE
INTEREST OF BROADER JUSTICE. While it is true that the payment of the supersedeas
bond is an essential requirement in the perfection of an appeal, however, where the fee had been
paid although payment was delayed, the broader interests of justice and the desired objective of
resolving controversies on the merits demands that the appeal be given due course. Besides, it
was within the inherent power of the NLRC to have allowed late payment of the bond.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES ON EVIDENCE, NOT STRICTLY APPLIED. As provided by Article
221 of the Labor Code, "in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters,
the rules of evidence prevailing in Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters
shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUES MAY NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. The
issue of timeliness of the appeal being an entirely new and unpleaded matter in the proceedings
below it may not now be raised for the first time before this Court.
4. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT; PROJECT EMPLOYEES DIFFERENTIATED FROM NON-PROJECT
WORKERS. Project employees are those employed in connection with a particular construction
project. Non-project (regular) employees are those employed by a construction company without
reference to any particular project. Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they
are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they
are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a
particular construction company.
Moreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in
connection with such termination.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-PROJECT EMPLOYEES BELONG TO A WORK POOL FROM WHICH
THE COMPANY DRAW WORKERS FOR ASSIGNMENT TO OTHER PROJECTS. A nonproject
employee is different in that the employee is hired for more than one project. A non-project
employee, vis-a-vis a project employee, is best exemplied in the case of Fegurin, et al. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al. wherein four of the petitioners had been working with
the company for nine years, one for eight years, another for six years, the shortest term being
three years. In holding that petitioners are regular employees, this Court therein explained:
"Considering the nature of the work of petitioners, that of carpenter, laborer or mason, their
respective jobs would actually be continuous and on-going. When a project to which they are
individually assigned is completed, they would be assigned to the next project or a phrase
thereof. In other words, they belonged to a 'work pool' from which the company would draw
workers for assignment to other projects at its discretion. They are, therefore, actually 'nonproject employees'."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROJECT EMPLOYEE MAY BE TERMINATED AT THE COMPLETION OF THE
PROJECT AND AT THE EXPIRATION OF HIS CONTRACT; CASE AT BAR. From the
foregoing, it is clear that petitioner is a project employee considering that he does not belong to
a "work pool" from which the company would draw workers for assignment to other projects at its
discretion. It is likewise apparent from the facts obtaining herein that petitioner was utilized
only for one particular project, the MNEE Stage 2 Project of respondent company. Hence, the
termination of herein petitioner is valid by reason of the completion of the project and the
expiration of his employment contract.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; OVERTIME COMPENSATION; PROJECT DRIVER ENTITLED THERETO WHERE
OTHER EMPLOYEES ARE PICKED UP AND/OR DROPPED OFF AT DESIGNATED POINTS
PRIMARILY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE EMPLOYER. Anent the claim for overtime

compensation, we hold that petitioner is entitled to the same. The fact that he picks up
employees of Philnor at certain specied points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops
them off at the same points on his way back from the eld ofce going home to Marikina, Metro
Manila is not merely incidental to petitioner's job as a driver. On the contrary, said
transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of the employees,
but primarily for the benet of the employer, herein private respondent. Since the assigned task
of fetching and delivering employees is indispensable and consequently mandatory, then the time
required of and used by petitioner in going from his residence to the eld ofce and back, that is,
from 5:30 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. and from 4:00 P.M. to around 6:00 P.M., which the labor arbiter
rounded off as averaging three
hours each working day, should be paid as overtime work. Quintessentially, petitioner should be
given overtime pay for the three excess hours of work performed during working days from
January, 1983 to December, 1985.
"Petitioner's initial employment with this Respondent was under a 'Contract of
Employment for a Denite Period' dated July 7, 1977, copy of which is hereto attached and made
an integral part hereof as Annex A whereby Petitioner was
hired as 'Driver' for the construction supervision phase of the Manila North
Expressway Extension, Second Stage for a term of 'about 24 months effective July 1, 1977.'
"Petitioner's rst contract of employment expired on June 30, 1979. Meanwhile,
the main project, MNEE Stage 2, was not nished on account of various
constraints, not the least of which was inadequate funding, and the same was
extended and remained in progress beyond the original period of 2.3 years.
Fortunately for the Petitioner, at the time the rst contract of employment expired,
Respondent was in need of Driver for the extended project. Since Petitioner had
the necessary experience and his performance under the rst contract of
employment was found satisfactory, the position of Driver was offered to
Petitioner, which he accepted. Hence a second Contract of Employment for a
Denite Period of 10 months, that is, from July 1, 1979 to April 30, 1980 was
executed between Petitioner and Respondent on July 7, 1979.
"In March 1980 some of the areas or phases of the project were completed, but
the bulk of the project was yet to be nished. By that time some of those project
employees whose contracts of employment expired or were about to expire
because of the completion of portions of the project were offered another
employment in the remaining portion of the project. Petitioner was among those
whose contract was about to expire, and since his service performance was
satisfactory, respondent renewed his contract of employment in April 1980, after
Petitioner agreed to the offer. Accordingly, a third contract of employment for a
denite period was executed by and between the Petitioner and the Respondent
whereby the Petitioner was again employed as Driver for 19 months, from May 1,
1980 to November 30, 1981, . . .
"This third contract of employment was subsequently extended for a number of
times, the last extension being for a period of 3 months, that is, from October 1,
1985 to December 31, 1985.
It must be stressed herein that although petitioner worked with Philnor as a driver for eight
years, the fact that his services were rendered only for a particular project which took that
same period of time to complete categorizes him as a project employee. Petitioner was employed
for one specific project.

A non-project employee is different in that the employee is hired for more than one project. A
non-project employee, vis-a-vis a project employee, is best exemplied in the case of Fegurin, et
al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 14 wherein four of the petitioners had been
working with the company for nine years, one for eight years, another for six years, the shortest
term being three years. In holding that petitioners are regular employees, this Court therein
explained:
"Considering the nature of the work of petitioners, that of carpenter, laborer or
mason, their respective jobs would actually be continuous and on-going. When a
project to which they are individually assigned is completed, they would be
assigned to the next project or a phase thereof. In other words, they belonged to a
work pool' from which the company would draw workers for assignment to other
projects at its discretion. They are, therefore, actually 'non-project employees.'"
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner is a project employee considering that he does not
belong to a "work pool" from which the company would draw workers for assignment to other
projects at its discretion. It is likewise apparent from the facts obtaining herein that petitioner
was utilized only for one particular project, the MNEE Stage 2 Project of respondent company.
Hence, the termination of herein petitioner is valid by reason of the completion of the project
and the expiration of his employment contract.
3. Anent the claim for overtime compensation, we hold that petitioner is entitled to the same.
The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specied points along EDSA in going to
the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from the eld ofce going
home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to petitioner's job as a driver. On the
contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of
the employees, but primarily for the benet of the employer, herein private respondent. This fact
is inevitably deducible from the Memorandum of respondent company:
"The herein Respondent resorted to the above transport arrangement because
from its previous project construction supervision experiences, Respondent found
out that project delays and inefciencies resulted from employees' tardiness; and
that the problem of tardiness, in turn, was aggravated by transportation problems,
which varied in degrees in proportion to the distance between the project site and
the employees' residence. In view of this lesson from experience, and as a practical, if expensive,
solution to employees' tardiness and its concomitant problems, Respondent adopted the policy of
allowing certain employees not necessarily project drivers to bring home project vehicles, so
that employees could be afforded fast, convenient and free transportation to and from the
project
field office.
Private respondent does not hesitate to admit that it is usually the project driver who is tasked
with picking up or dropping off his fellow employees. Proof thereof is the undisputed fact that
when petitioner is absent, another driver is supposed to replace him and drive the vehicle and
likewise pick up and/or drop off the other employees at the designated points on EDSA. If
driving these employees to and from the project site is not really part of petitioner's job, then
there would have been no need to nd a replacement driver to fetch these employees. But since
the assigned task of fetching and delivering employees is indispensable and consequently
mandatory, then the time required of and used by petitioner in going from his residence to the
eld ofce and back, that is, from
5:30 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. and from 4:00 P.M. to around 6:00 P.M., which the labor arbiter rounded
off as averaging three hours each working day, should be paid as overtime work.
Quintessentially, petitioner should be given overtime pay for the three excess hours of work
performed during working days from January, 1983 toDecember, 1985.

WHEREFORE, subject to the modication regarding the award of overtime pay to herein
petitioner, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
UNION CARBIDE LABOR UNION (NLU), vs. UNION CARBIDE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND THE
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT;
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TO CHANGE THE WORKING HOURS OF ITS EMPLOYEES;
RULE. Verily and wisely, management retained the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the
service so require, to change the working hours of its employees. And as long as such prerogative
is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under
valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise.
Thus, in the case of Abbott Laboratories (Phil.), Inc. vs. NLRC, (154 SCRA 713 [1987]), We ruled:
". . . Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an
employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to
conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied."
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES;
RIGHT OF WORKERS TO SECURITY OF TENURE; SHOULD BE GIVEN PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION; EXCEPTION. The incident complained of took place sometime in 1972,
so there is no violation of the 1973 Constitution to speak of because the guarantee of security of
tenure embodied under Section 9, Article II may not be given a retroactive effect. It is the
basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given
prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit: "Finally, it should be observed that the provisions
of the Constitution should be given only a prospective application unless the contrary is clearly
intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed
or withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable intention
to place them within the scope of the Constitution."
The undisputed facts as found by the Secretary of Labor are as follows: Cdpr
". . . Complainants Agapito Duro, Alfredo Torio, and Rustico Javillonar, were
dismissed from their employment after an application for clearance to terminate them was
approved by the Secretary of Labor on December 19, 1972.
Respondent's application for clearance was premised on "willful violation of Company regulations,
gross insubordination and refusal to submit to a Company
investigation . . ."
Prior events leading to the dismissal of complainants are recited in the Arbitrator's decision,
which we quote:
'It appears that the Company is operating on three (3) shifts namely:
morning, afternoon and night shifts. The workers in the third shift normally work from Monday to
Saturday, the last working day being Friday or forty (40) hours a week or from Monday to Friday.
'Sometime in July 1972 there seems to be a change in the working schedule from Monday to
Friday as contained in the collective bargaining agreement aforecited to Sunday thru Thursday.
The change became effective July 5, 1972. The third shift employees were required to start the
new work schedule from Sunday thru Thursday.
'On November 6, 1972, the night shift employees filed a demand to maintain the old working
schedule from Monday thru Friday.
The demand was referred to the Labor Management Relation Committee and discussed from
November 15, up to November 24, 1972. In the discussions had, it was arrived at that all night
shift operating personnel

were allowed to start their work Monday and on Saturday. This excepted the employees in the
maintenance and preparation crews whose work
schedule is presumed to be maintained from Sunday to Thursday. The work schedule between
management representatives and the alleged officers of the Union (Varias group) was approved
and disseminated to
take effect November 26, 1972.
'In manifestation of their dissention to the new work schedule, the three respondents Duro,
Torio, and Javillonar did not report for work on November 26, 1972 which was a Sunday since it
was not a working day according to the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Their absence caused their suspension for fourteen (14) days."
On May 4, 1973, the Arbitrator rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages
of the complainants. On June 8, 1973, the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed
respondent company's appeal for having been filed out of time. A
motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal was then filed by respondent company
before the Secretary of Labor, resulting in the modification of the Arbitrator's decision by
awarding complainants separation pay. A motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by the
petitioner was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. The main issue in this case is whether or not the complainants could be
validly dismissed from their employment on the ground of insubordination for refusing to comply
with the
new work schedule. cdll
Petitioner alleges that the change in the company's working schedule violated the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement of the parties. Hence, complainants cannot be dismissed since
their refusal to comply with the re-scheduled working hours was based on a provision of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioner further contends that the
dismissal of the complainants violated Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which
provides "the right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and
just and humane conditions of work."
The petition has no merit.
Although Article XIX of the CBA provides for the duration of the agreement, which We
quote:
"This agreement shall become effective on September 1, 1971 and shall remain in
full force and effect without change until August 31, 1974. Unless the parties hereto agree
otherwise, negotiation for renewal, or renewal and modification, or a new agreement may not be
initiated before July 1, 1974." this does not necessarily mean that the company can no longer
change its working
schedule, for Section 2, Article II of the same CBA expressly provides that:
"SECTION 2. In the exercise of its functions of management, the COMPANY shall have the sole
and exclusive right and power, among other things, to direct the operations and the working force
of its business in all respects; to be the sole
judge in determining the capacity or fitness of an employee for the position or job to which he
has been assigned; to schedule the hours of work, shifts and work schedules; to require work to
be done in excess of eight hours or on Sundays or holidays as the exigencies of the service may
require; to plan, schedule, direct, curtail and control factory operations and schedules of
production; to introduce and install new or improved production methods or facilities; to
designate the work and the employees to perform it; to select and hire new employees; to train
new employees and improve the skill and ability of employees; to make rules and regulations
governing conduct and safety; to transfer employees from one job to another or from one shift
to another; to classify or reclassify employees; and to make such changes in the duties of its
employees as the COMPANY may see fit or convenient for the proper conduct of its business."

Verily and wisely, management retained the rerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so
require, to change the working hours of its employees. And as long as such prerogative is
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise
Thus, in the case of Abbott Laboratories (Phil.), Inc. vs. NLRC (154 SCRA 713 [1987]), We
ruled:
". . . Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an
employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives.
The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be
denied."
Further, the incident complained of took place sometime in 1972, so there is no violation of the
1973 Constitution to speak of because the guarantee of security of tenure embodied under
Section 9, Article II may not be given a retroactive effect. It is the basic norm that provisions
of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only,
unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
"Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be
given only a prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were
the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or
withdrawn even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within
the scope of the Constitution." (p. 10, Constitutional Law, Isagani Cruz, 1991
Edition).
We agree with the findings arrived at by both Arbitrator and the Secretary of Labor that
there is no unfair labor practice in this case. Neither was there gross and habitual neglect of
complainants' duties. Nor did the act of complainants in refusing to follow the new working hours
amount to serious misconduct or willful disobedience to the orders of respondent company. cdrep
Although no serious objections may be offered to the Arbitrator's conclusion to order
reinstatement with backwages of the complainants, We now refrain from doing so considering
that reinstatement is no longer feasible due to the fact that the controversy started more than
20 years ago aside from the obviously strained relations between the parties. WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.