LEIDEN FERNANDEZ, et. al., petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, et. al., respondents.

G.R. No. 105892

January 28, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioners, who are employees of private respondent Agencia Cebuana-H.
Lhuillier and/or Margueritte Lhuillier, filed a complaint before Dept. of Labor for
illegal dismissal and payment of backwages when the latter denied them their
demand to increase their salaries and subsequently terminated their
employment.

In her opinion, SG recommended that the labor arbiters decision be reinstated

substantially, that the award of service incentive leave be limited to three years.
This is based on Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.

ISSUE:

WON the claim for service incentive leaves may be limited to a certain number of
years.

Law Applicable:

Case History:
On August 30, 1991, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
On appeal, Respondent NLRC vacated the labor arbiters order and remanded the
case for further proceedings. It subsequently denied the motion for

reconsideration. SC ruled that the petitioners, except Lim and Canonigo,were

illegally dismissed so it had to rule now on the money claims.

Ruling:
No.
Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides
that every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be
entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.

To limit the award to three years is to unduly restrict such right. The law does not
prohibit its commutation.

SGs recommendation is contrary to the ruling of the Court in Bustamante et al.

vs. NLRC et al. lifting the three-year restriction on the amount of backwages and
other allowances that may be awarded an illegally dismissed employee, thus:
Therefore, in accordance with R.A. No. 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up
to the time of their actual reinstatement.
Opinion:

Notes:
*** Implementing Rules clearly state that entitlement to benefit provided under
this Rule shall start December 16, 1975, the date the amendatory provision of
the [Labor] Code took effect.Hence, petitioners, except Lim and Canonigo,
should be entitled to service incentive leave pay from December 16, 1975 up to
their actual reinstatement.

***Full backwages, including the accrued thirteenth month pay, are also awarded
to the nine petitioners from the date of their illegal dismissal to the time of their
actual reinstatement.

G.R. No. 135547, Jan 23, 2002

RIVERA v. ESPIRITU

FACTS:
AL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with
bankruptcy and was forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor
force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association) went on a four-day
strike to protest retrenchment measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on
Sep 23, 1998.

PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it
proposed the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject
to certain conditions. PALEA members accepted such terms through a
referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998.

Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27,
1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.

ISSUE:
W/N CBA negotiations may be suspended for ten years

Law Applicable:

Case History:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners charge public
respondents with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for acts taken in regard to the enforcement of the agreement dated
September 27, 1998, between Philippine Airlines (PAL) and its union, the PAL
Employees Association (PALEA)
HELD:
YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for ten years.
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective
bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation
faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely
promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latter's closure.
There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor
Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability

and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial

peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose
of Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations
become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253A, prohibits the
parties from waiving or suspecting the mandatory timetables and agreeing on
the remedies to enforce the same.
It was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PAL 's ground
employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that
voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the
union's exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free collective
bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.
The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of
the PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the
Constitution. The agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the
shared responsibility between workers and employers; and they exercised
voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial
peace.

G.R. No. 168120 : January 25, 2012

MANSION PRINTING CENTER and CLEMENT CHENG, Petitioners, v. DIOSDADO

BITARA, JR., Respondent.

PEREZ,J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners engaged the services of respondent as a helper (kargador).

Respondent was later promoted as the companys sole driver tasked to pick-up
raw materials for the printing business, collect account receivables and deliver
the products to the clients within the delivery schedules.

Petitioners aver that the timely delivery of the products to the clients is one of
the foremost considerations material to the operation of the business.It being so,
they closely monitored the attendance of respondent. They noted his habitual
tardiness and absenteeism.

Thus, petitioners issued a Memorandumrequiring respondent to submit a written

explanation why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for his
habitual tardiness.

Despite respondents undertaking to report on time, however, he continued to

disregard attendance policies.

Consequently, Davis Cheng, General Manager of the company and son of

petitioner Cheng, issued another Memorandum(Notice to Explain) requiring
respondent to explain why his services should not be terminated. He personally
handed the Notice to Explain to respondent but the latter, after reading the
directive, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.He did not submit any
explanation and, thereafter, never reported for work.

Davis Cheng personally served another Memorandum(Notice of Termination)

upon him informing him that the company found him grossly negligent of his
duties, for which reason, his services were terminated.

On even date, respondent met with the management requesting for

reconsideration of his termination from the service. However, after hearing his
position, the management decided to implement the Memorandum.
Nevertheless, the management, out of generosity, offered respondent financial
assistance in the amount ofP6,110.00 equivalent to his one month salary.
Respondent demanded that he be given the amount equivalent to two (2)
months salary but the management declined as it believed it would, in effect,
reward respondent for being negligent of his duties.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is illegally dismissed?

Case History:

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners before
the Labor Arbiter.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the findings of the Labor
Arbiter was AFFIRMED en toto.

Before the Court of Appeals, respondent sought the annulment of the

Commissions Resolution on the ground that they were rendered with grave abuse
of discretion and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals found for the respondent and reversed the findings of the
Commission.
HELD: NLRC's decision is reinstated.

LABOR LAW

In order to validly dismiss an employee, the employer is required to observe both

substantive and procedural aspects the termination of employment must be
based on a just or authorized cause of dismissal and the dismissal must be
effected after due notice and hearing.

We, therefore, agree with the Labor Arbiters findings, to wit:

The imputed absence and tardiness of the complainant are documented. He

faltered on his attendance 38 times of the 66 working days. His last absences on
11, 13, 14, 15 and 16 March 2000 were undertaken without even
notice/permission from management. These attendance delinquencies may be
characterized as habitual and are sufficient justifications to terminate the
complainants employment.

On this score,Valiao v. Court of Appealsis instructive:

xxx It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated
incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. xxx The totality of infractions or
the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be
considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee.
The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and separately but in
their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized
into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and
independent of each other.

InValiao,we definedgross negligenceas want of care in the performance of ones

dutiesandhabitual neglectas repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period
of time, depending upon the circumstances.51 These are not overly technical
terms, which, in the first place, are expressly sanctioned by the Labor Code of
the Philippines, to wit:
ART. 282.Termination by employer.- An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:
(a) xxx

(b)Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

xxx
Clearly, even in the absence of a written company rule defining gross and
habitual neglect of duties, respondents omissions qualify as such warranting his
dismissal from the service.

We cannot simply tolerate injustice to employers if only to protect the welfare of

undeserving employees. As aptly put by then Associate Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing:

Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a

place in the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative xxx to
terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of
employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are
clearly management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those
rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or
valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.

Procedural due process entails compliance with the two-notice rule in dismissing
an employee, to wit: (1) the employer must inform the employee of the specific
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) after the employee
has been given the opportunity to be heard, the employer must inform him of
the decision to terminate his employment.