Sci & Educ (2008) 17:2747

DOI 10.1007/s11191-007-9075-9
ORIGINAL PAPER

Students intuitive explanations of the causes of

homologies and adaptations
Kostas Kampourakis Vasso Zogza

Received: 26 September 2006 / Accepted: 4 January 2007 / Published online: 26 January 2007

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract This paper reports data from a study aiming to explore secondary students preconceptions and explanations about evolutionary processes. Students may
exhibit both alternative and scientifically acceptable conceptions and bring different
ones into play in response to different problem contexts. Hence, the examination of
their explanations before instruction within different problem contexts is expected to
highlight the concepts that instruction should put more emphasis on. To achieve this,
an open-ended questionnaire in conjunction with semi-structured interviews was
used to allow students to express their own views on issues related to evolution.
Students explanations highlighted their lack of knowledge of important evolutionary concepts such as common descent and natural selection. In addition, many
students explained the origin of traits as the result of evolution through need via
purposeful change or as carefully designed adaptations. Rather than evolutionary,
final causes formed the basis for the majority of students explanations. In many
cases students provided different explanations for the same process to tasks with
different content. It seems that the structure and the content of the task may have
an effect on the explanations that students provide. Implications for evolution
education are discussed and a minimal explanatory framework for evolution is
suggested.
Keywords Evolutionary explanations Intuitive explanations Teleological
explanations Causes Homologies Adaptations

K. Kampourakis (&)
Geitonas School, P.O. Box 74128, Vari Attikis, Athens 16602, Greece
e-mail: kkamp@ath.forthnet.gr
V. Zogza
Department of Educational Sciences and Early Childhood Education,
University of Patras, Rion, Patras 26500, Greece
e-mail: zogza@upatras.gr

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1 Introduction
Many studies have documented that secondary students, and undergraduates, tend
to attribute the origin of the traits that several organisms possess to a predetermined
end or to individual purposeful change (Clough and Wood-Robinson 1985; Bishop
and Anderson 1990; Jimenez 1992; Settlage 1994; Demastes et al. 1996; Jensen and
Finley 1996; Samarapungavan and Wiers 1997; Evans 2001; Passmore and Stewart
2002; Banet and Ayuso 2003). These views usually assume the existence of a
supernatural plan or of a vital power that helps organisms perfectly adapt to their
environment and are major obstacles to understanding evolution. In many of the
aforementioned studies, students preconceptions have been characterized as
Lamarckian; however this characterization does not adequately describe their
(predominantly teleological) intuitive explanations (Kampourakis and Zogza 2006).
The aim of this paper is the study of 1415 years old students emerging intuitive
explanations of evolutionary processes as well as the identification of their relation
to scientific explanations. In particular, we wanted to investigate which conceptions
were strongly held by them and arose in their explanations, despite the type of the
task, as well as to examine how the content of the task might influence the respective
explanation provided by each student. Students may exhibit both alternative and
scientifically acceptable conceptions and bring different conceptions into play in
response to different problem contexts (Palmer 1999). Thus, we wanted to investigate: (a) which are the preconceptions of 1415 year old students which guide their
explanations, (b) how these relate to biological explanations and (c) if their
explanatory frameworks are consistently applied, in other words if they provide the
same explanations to tasks with different content, in particular to tasks referring to
homologies and adaptations.

2 Theoretical background: scientific and intuitive explanations

What is a scientific explanation? In one view, to explain the phenomena in the world
of our experience, is to answer the question why? rather than only the question
what? (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). In general an explanation consists of an
explanandum (whatever is being explained) and an explanans (whatever is doing the
explaining). For example, if one asks why X? and the answer is because Y, then X
is the explanandum and Y is the explanans. When the explanandum is a particular
event, the explanans will require the description of the relevant factors that result to
the explanandum-event (Godfrey-Smith 2003, p. 191; Rosenberg 2005, p. 26). In the
philosophy of science there have been several views on what a scientific explanation
consists in. It has been suggested that to explain something is: (a) to show how it is
derived in a logical argument that includes a law in the premises (covering law
model: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948), (b) to give information about how it was
caused (causal account: Scriven 1959; Salmon 1984; Lewis 1986), (c) to connect a
diverse set of facts by subsuming them under a set of basic patterns and principles
(unification account: Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1981), or do both (kairetic account:
Strevens 2004). However, it seems that there is agreement among philosophers that
the concept of cause is central to the process of scientific explanation (Kitcher 1989;
Salmon 1990; Okasha 2002, p. 49; Godfrey-Smith 2003, pp. 196197; Woodward
2003; Rosenberg 2005, p. 27; Strevens 2005).

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When trying to explain the cause of a biological trait, one may ask two different
types of questions: a) why it exists or how it has come into existence (Why?
question) and b) how it operates or functions (How? question). The distinction
between Why? and How? corresponds to two different types of causes: ultimate
and proximate. Ultimate causes are related to the evolutionary history of the species
whereas proximate causes are related to the physiology of the individuals. This
distinction was first made by Ernst Mayr (1961) who in fact had divided biology into
functional biology that studied proximate causes and provided answers to How?
questions and evolutionary biology that studied ultimate causes and provided
answers to Why? questions. This has been considered as a major contribution to
the philosophy of biology (Beatty 1994). Mayrs distinction has been reconstructed
to include a broader conception of development (causal interactions between genes,
extra-cellular mechanisms and environmental conditions rather than just the
decoding of a genetic program), and a broader conception of evolutionary causes
(natural selection, migration, mutation, genetic recombination and drift rather that
just natural selection). In this perspective two distinct kinds of explanations exist: (a)
proximate explanations which are dynamical explanations for individual-level causal
events and (b) evolutionary explanations which are statistical explanations that refer
to population-level events (Ariew 2003).
Evolutionary explanations require the identification of a feature of the past that
bears a special relationship to the present and in particular a special kind of connection, such as a causal connection. In building the connecting links, the task is not
to show that the effect was the only possible one but how in fact it came about
(Scriven 1969). To give causes in an evolutionary explanation is not to give complete
accounts but useful and enlightening partial accounts. It is not possible to list all the
known causes of an evolutionary event, however when present the causes of an event
can be identified after the latter has taken place. The explanation of an event
requires another event that not only occurred earlier but also stands in a special
causal relation to the former (Scriven 1959). The answer to a why feature A exists?
question, given by an evolutionary biologist, will focus on the adaptive significance
of the feature. Evolutionary explanations exhibit historical elements because they
focus on properties which are unique in time and place and about which historical
statements can therefore be made. In addition, evolutionary explanations are not
very specific and those, which will be finally accepted, are the ones that have a
relatively high likelihood (Lewontin 1969). These explanations are probabilistic
because indeterminacies exist at the macro-levels and may also exist at the microlevels. Especially when general patterns are part of the explanandum, the explanans
describes properties shared by the individuals in probabilistic terms (Ariew 1998).
Evolutionary explanations make extensive use of natural selection; however a
controversy emerges when one looks in more detail at what natural selection actually explains. Hence, for some scientists natural selection has a positive role and may
help explain why individuals have the traits they do, whereas for others it has a
negative role as it only eliminates variants and so cannot explain why an individual
has particular traits. However, if one accepts that individuals belong to a lineage with
a particular evolutionary history, then the latter may help explain why they have
particular traits (Forber 2005).
It has also been argued that evolutionary explanations based on natural selection
are in fact teleological explanations, as the explanation of a traits existence is
explained in terms of its function and its contribution to the survival of its possessors.

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The explanation for the existence of an adaptation A is given by citing the effects of
past instances of A (or precursors of A) and showing how these effects increased the
adaptedness of A s possessors (or the possessors of As precursors) and so led to the
evolution of A (Brandon 1981). It is commonly thought that the only teleological
explanations are those which appeal to divine design or an internal vital force and
that Darwinian selection explanations appeal to neither. But selection explanations
are inherently teleological, in the sense that the advantage of a trait explains its
increase, or presence, in a population. The structure of Darwins explanations can be
described as follows: V is present in P and V has effect E and E is advantageous to P,
therefore V in P would be selectively favored, therefore E is the cause of Vs presence
in P. Darwins explanations have a teleological structure, but at the same time unlike
any of the standard forms of teleology in the nineteenth century (Lennox 1993).
Teleological explanations which are applied to non-intentional processes like natural
selection are consequence etiologies: causal explanations of a special kind that claim
that whatever a trait allows an organism to do in a given environment is causally
relevant to the organisms possessing this trait. Hence, as a result organisms may have
certain functional advantages that produce the biases in survival and reproductive
ability that are referred to as natural selection (Lennox 1992a, p.298). This kind of
explanations, consequence etiologies, is causal in an extended sense. One can explain
why an organ doing a specific function exists on the basis of this function by invoking
natural selection: if an organ has been naturally differentially selected-for by virtue of
a function, one can say that the reason the organ is there is that it performs that
function. In other words, the consequence of the organs existence (its function) must
be invoked to explain why the organ exists (Wright 1973).
The idea of teleology has its origin in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle
(Lennox 1992b; Ariew 2002). Platos teleology was external, meaning that a supernatural force, the Demiurge (God), had designed organisms forms based on ideal
plans (Lennox 2001, pp. 280298). On the other hand, Aristotles teleology was
internal and organisms forms were made in such a way in order to serve final causes,
although he did not see every natural process as for the best (Lennox 2001, pp.
225228). Besides the ultimate and proximate causes, Mayr (1961) had recognized
the issue of final causes and attempted to resolve it with the teleonomy-teleology
distinction: the existence of final causes can be accepted only in the developmental
process (teleonomy) but not in the evolutionary process (teleology). In this study we
restrict the meaning of the term teleological, according to the Platonic and the
Aristotelian sense, to explanations for intentional processes that are based on the
fulfillment of a predetermined end or a particular goal, although not all goal-seeking
cases are goal-intended (Beckner 1969). Non-intentional processes that can be explained by appeal to selection-based teleology are excluded from the meaning of the
term teleological and are included in the category of evolutionary explanations, as
our focus is on the kind of the cause on which the explanation is based (evolutionary,
proximate or final) rather than on the exact structure of the explanation.
Teleological explanations can be applied to intentional processes which exhibit
what has been called a design etiology, which satisfy the requirement of being preceded by an intention to have a function or achieve a goal (Lombrozo and Carey
2006). Conceptual development research suggests that teleological thinking of this
kind characterizes students intuitive explanations. Children predict and explain
biological phenomena, especially human bodily processes, on the basis of a vitalistic
causality regarding internal processes in living organisms as being governed by

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different laws from those which are valid for non-human entities. However, they also
rely on teleological causality rather than vitalistic causality for predicting and
explaining characteristics and behaviors of animals and plants. It seems that teleological causality is a complementary notion to vitalistic causality in childrens naive
biology (Inagaki and Hatano 2004). There have been two major propositions about
the origin of teleological causality. According to the first one of selective teleology,
children prefer teleological explanations for biological kinds but not for non-biological natural kinds. They view artifacts such as chairs, and biological properties
such as ears, as existing to perform functions and differentiate them from non-living
natural objects, such as mountains, which they view in entirely non-functional terms.
This proposal suggests that, like adults, preschool children have selective ways of
teleologically interpreting the world and that the teleological stance is a primary
component of human cognition that exists independently of other basic construals
such as a physical or an intentional stance (Keil 1992). Contrary to this proposition,
promiscuous teleology argues that teleological reasoning derives from childrens
knowledge of intentionality and is not restricted to any particular category of phenomena until later in development (Kelemen 1999). The bias to view objects as
designed for a purpose derives from childrens understanding of intentional behavior
and artifacts. This makes them prone to a promiscuous teleology in which artifacts
and natural objects of all types are viewed as existing for a function. Hence, the
existence of an early teleological bias does not definitely suggest that there is biological understanding that exists independently of a psychological construal of living
things (Kelemen 2004a).
We presented the major views concerning the nature of scientific explanations in
general and of biological explanations, in particular. We also provided findings of
conceptual development research which suggest that there is a strong teleological
thinking that guides young children intuitive explanations of natural phenomena.
Our task was to study students explanations of evolutionary processes under the
light of the aforementioned theoretical background on biological explanations on
one hand, and intuitive general modes of thinking and explanations on the other.
This study was undertaken as a preliminary step to identify students preconceptions
before any typical introductory teaching of evolution, in order to obtain a thorough
understanding of their way of thinking and explaining evolutionary processes, as a
prerequisite to design a related teaching sequence. In particular, the aim of the
present study was to explore 1415 years old students preconceptions about evolution through the analysis of the explanations they provided to open-ended tasks
and to identify their relation with biological explanations and intuitive teleological
explanations. The main task was to investigate which conceptions were strongly held
by them and to examine how the content of the task might influence the respective
explanation provided by each student.
The main research questions of this study were:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Which are the preconceptions of 1415 years old students that guide their
explanations on the origin of homologies and adaptations of organisms?
How do these relate to biological (scientific) explanations?
Do students provide the same explanations to tasks with different content?
Are there any dominant patterns or combinations of explanations?
In the case of students teleological explanations, what stands as the end or goal?
Do students make any kinds of metaphysical claims in their explanations?

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3 Method
In order to document students preconceptions about evolution and to determine if
their explanatory frameworks are coherent, an open-ended questionnaire in conjunction with semi-structured interviews was used to allow students to express their
own views on issues related to evolution, as well as to provide detailed explanations.
A group of 98 students (9th Grade, 1415 years old) attending a General Biology
course at Geitonas School in Athens, Greece, completed a written open-ended
questionnaire (September, 2004) including five tasks that demanded explanations of
the origin of certain traits (see Appendix).
3.1 Theoretical background
In a previous study it was found that the majority of students of several grades were
unable to offer a causal explanation of how phenomena occurred. In certain cases,
students redirected the question so that they could answer it, giving for instance a
why answer to a how question. These authors related how to the mechanism or
cause responsible for the change and why to the rationale that could be used to
explain the change (Abrams et al. 2001). In our study we follow a rather different
categorization, which draws upon the philosophy of biology. To describe this, we first
need to describe the main different types of causes one might seek for, in order to
explain a particular change or the existence of a particular trait. In our view, one can
perceive three different types of causes: (a) evolutionary causes, (b) proximate
causes, and (c) final causes. In the case of evolutionary causes explanations are based
on events that took place in the past and belong to the evolutionary history of the
species; these explanations include concepts such as common descent and natural
selection based on differential survival. In the case of proximate causes explanations
are based on the present developmental and physiological characteristics of organisms. In this study, this type of explanation forms a category wider than the corresponding philosophical one to include all non-evolutionary explanations, meaning all
those explanations that make no reference to either common descent or differential
survival and mostly involve individuals and not populations. Finally, in the case of
final causes explanations are based on the fulfillment of predetermined ends or
particular functions of the organisms or the species.
Why?, How? and What for? are the types of questions that have been
related to ultimate, proximate and final causes, respectively (Mayr 1961; Brandon
1981). However, Why? might mean How come? and What for? as well
(Mayr 1961, p. 1502) and the different uses of the same term may lead to a confusion
as both Why? and How? might refer to ultimate causes (how and why has this
mechanism evolved?) (Brandon 1981, p. 93). Moreover, explanations can be given
to How?, What?, Which? or When? questions, or even when no question is
asked at all. Hence, the identifying feature of an explanation cannot be in the
grammatical form of the question which produces it, although most answers to
Why? questions are indeed explanations (Scriven 1962).
The tasks given to students in our study demanded evolutionary explanations. In
particular they were asked to explain the origin of certain traits, in particular to
explain the origin of homologies and adaptations. We consider a Why? question to
refer to the cause of the change whereas a How? question to refer to the mechanism of the change. In other words, questions such as Why did trait A originated?

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or Why did trait B change to trait A? refer to the evolutionary cause that produced
trait A or changed B to A and questions such as How did trait A originated? or
How did trait B change to trait A? refer to the mechanism of change. However,
as there may be confusion on what one might really be asking for, and as the same
question may be asked in many different forms, in this study we avoided the
correlation of causes and explanations to specific grammatical forms of questions.
Moreover, as it has been found that students tend to give teleological explanations to
causal questions, we selected not to use the word why, in order to diminish the
amount of teleological explanations, and to ask students to provide explanations for
the mechanism of the change by using the word how instead. We expected that
through the description of the mechanism responsible for the change, the evolutionary
cause of this change might arise; or we would seek for that during the interviews.
3.2 The research tool
Five different tasks were developed and included in the open-ended questionnaire.
There were basically two types of tasks (see Appendix): those who referred to
homologies and demanded explanations based on common descent (tasks 1 and 5)
and those which referred to adaptations and demanded explanations based on
natural selection (tasks 2, 3 and 4). We should note that tasks were given in a rather
random order, or at least that their order had no significance for our research. The
questionnaire was completed before instruction (September 2004) and the objective
of the study was to provide an in-depth analysis and an overall description of
students preconceptions and explanations about evolution. Students written
responses were grouped based on their similarities so that we were able to distinguish between several major explanatory schemes for each task. Based on these
schemes we selected 15 students, representing a broad range of views, so that each
explanatory scheme could be examined in more detail during one interview at the
least. Then, we conducted semi-structured interviews with individual students in
order to gain a better understanding of their explanations. The interviews lasted
from 20 to 35 minutes, were audio-taped on students consent, and were transcribed
for analysis. Each initial interview plan included questions that aimed to clarify
students responses to the questionnaire.
In order to find out if students were aware of the concept of common descent or if
they might be able to explain the homologies between species based on common
ancestors, two tasks were included in the questionnaire in order to document this in
two distinct levels: (a) the species level (task 1) and (b) the cellular level (task 5). In
particular, students were asked to explain the similarities (morphological and
physiological) observed among the dog, the wolf and the fox (task 1) and the fact
that all organisms consist of one or more cells that, despite their differences, they all
contain DNA, ribosomes and cellular membrane (task 5). In both cases the same
type of question was practically asked and what was given was only the fact that
similarities were exhibited by different organisms. The difference between the two
tasks was only on the level of reference (species and cell, respectively). We should
note that although these tasks referred to homologies, this term was not explicitly
mentioned and reference to similarities was made instead.
In addition, in order to find out if students were aware of the concept of natural
selection or if they might explain adaptations as the result of the differential survival
of individuals of the same species that exhibited different traits and to the

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maintenance of these traits through reproduction, three tasks were included in the
questionnaire in order to document this in three levels: (a) given no information
about the initial state of the evolutionary process (task 3), (b) given information
about the initial state but without details about the existence of intra-specific
variation and of a natural selection factor (task 2), and (c) given information about
the initial state with details about the existence of intra-specific variation and of a
natural selection factor (task 4). We should also note that although these tasks
referred to adaptations, this term was not explicitly mentioned.
By analyzing students explanations to the aforementioned tasks, we were actually
seeking for answers to the following working research questions:
How many students provided the same type of explanation to tasks 1 and 5? Was
there any significant difference between the types of explanations that students
provided to tasks 1 and 5? In which task more evolutionary explanations were
given?
How many students gave the same type of explanation to tasks 2, 3 and 4? Was
there any significant difference between the types of explanations that students
provided to tasks 2, 3 and 4? In which task more evolutionary explanations were
given?
How many students provided the same type of explanation to tasks 15? Were
there any dominant patterns or combinations of explanations?
In the case of teleological explanations, what stood as the end or goal? Did
students make any kinds of metaphysical claims in their explanations?
It has been shown that students perceive tasks with different content differently
and, although the same type of explanation may be required, they might explain the
existence of particular traits in different terms (e.g. Abrams et al. 2001). In tasks 1
and 5 the difference was only on the level of reference (species and cell, respectively). Our hypothesis was that students would more easily and accurately explain
similarities between different species, as a result of their being more familiar with
them, than similarities between cells, a level of organization they had not previously
studied in detail. On the other hand, in tasks 2, 3 and 4 the difference was that
students were given different amount of information on which they could base their
explanations. Our hypothesis was that the more information students were given, the
more naturalistic and the less supernatural their explanations would be. This
hypothesis was based on results from an earlier pilot study we performed a year
earlier.

4 Results
Students explanations highlight their lack of knowledge of important evolutionary
concepts such as common descent and natural selection. In addition, many students
provided explanations for the origin of traits as the result of evolution through need
via purposeful change or as specially designed adaptations. In some cases students
provided different explanations for the same phenomenon that was presented in
different settings. All explanations were coded into three categories: evolutionary,
proximate or teleological, depending on the cause responsible for the origin of
trait (evolutionary, proximate or final, respectively). All cases in which unclear or no
explanations were provided were included in a no explanation category. Examples

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Table 1 Examples of students evolutionary, proximate and teleological explanations given to

tasks 15
Task Type of
explanation
1

Examples of students explanations in the questionnaire (S: student)

Evolutionary S39: Perhaps these three species have a common origin (e.g. from a prehistoric
animal), from which these three similar, but distinct species, originated.
Proximate
S91: All three animals possess similar features (e.g. sharp teeth) ...they have
possibly come from crosses between other species (e.g. a cross between a wolf
and a dog gave rise to the fox or a cross between a wolf and a fox gave rise to
the dog). This is how it is explained.
Teleological S19: Many different animal species may look alike. This happens because all
animals have approximately the same needs. All animals need food and thus
they have to find some prey. But to achieve this, they need some features such
as sharp nails and teeth ... Although these three animals belong to different
species they look alike for this reason.
Evolutionary S57: ... Survival was more difficult for those individuals with shorter necks
than for those with longer necks. Hence, more individuals with long necks
reproduced, and each successive generation had a larger average neck length
than the previous one.
Proximate
S24: The giraffes that used to have shorter necks in earlier times, as they were
trying to eat the leaves of trees, they had to stretch their... necks. But later this
need made them to stretch as much as possible in order to reach the taller trees.
Thus, as time went by, their necks were lengthened, since by stretching them
they become slightly longer.
Teleological S11: I believe that the neck of the giraffe was lengthened so that it could find
food more easily...Giraffes were stretching their necks in order to reach the
leaves of the trees. Thus, perhaps every new giraffe was born with a longer neck
because this particular need was recorded in the DNA of its mother.
Evolutionary S45: I think that these animals used to have other colors in earlier times but as
time went by only those who had the same color with their environment
managed to survive because they could hide better from the animals that
threatened them. On the contrary, the animals with other colors were more
easily identified. Thus, only those animals that had the same color with their
environment survived.
Proximate
S30: These animals were influenced by their environment and the respective
climate and thus they acquired these features.
Teleological S71: In order to overcome same dangers (e.g. being identified by other animals
or man), they were obliged to acquire some features, to imitate features of
other organisms so that it could be hard for their enemies to identify them.
Evolutionary S92: ...The birds can see their prey from far away, so since the green beetles
(that did not have the same color with their environment) were more easily
identified, the birds could see and eat only them. Hence, this species began to
vanish.
Proximate
S51: Some beetles while eating the leaves they use as food ... took the substances of the leaves in a different way. Thus, according to their DNA and the
nutrients they need for living they changed their structure (e.g. their coloration).
Teleological S62: Since birds could easily see the green beetles and eat them, something
had to be done so that they [the green beetles] could survive. Thus, there was
evolution and change in the DNA that produced the change in the color in
order to survive the attacks of the birds.
Evolutionary S20: The first organisms that appeared in earth possessed these features. As
time went by, more features were added, thus creating more complex organisms
which ... however maintained their initial features.
Proximate
S38: Perhaps ...a molecule has the property to produce these similarities.
Teleological S22: I believe that all organisms have genetic material, ribosomes and cell
membrane because these are necessary for their functions, and without those
they could not exist...

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Table 2 Students explanations to tasks 1 and 5

Type of explanation

Central concept of explanation

Task 1

Task 5

Evolutionary

Common descent (explicit)

Common descent (implicit)
Way of life
Inter-special crosses
Inherent property
Need
Unclear answer
Do not know
No answer

21
19
5
13
0
22
7
9
2
98

18
3
0
0
2
63
6
6
0
98

Proximate

Teleological
No explanation

Total

of the four types of explanations to tasks 15 are presented in Table 1. It is important

to note that students explanations were not always scientifically accepted. However,
the aim of the questionnaire was to document the types of cause that students
perceive and use in their explanations rather than just the number of their scientifically accepted or unaccepted explanations. The categorization of students
explanations as evolutionary, proximate and final was done independently by both
authors of this paper and a high degree of agreement was achieved.
4.1 Students explanations to tasks 1 & 5
Few students explained the similarities among species or among cells with appeal to
the idea of common descent. Students explanations to tasks 1 and 5 are presented in
Table 2 in detail and in Table 3 coded as evolutionary, proximate and teleological.
From the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 it is obvious that students provided
different explanations to tasks 1 and 5. In particular, 40 students provided evolutionary explanations to task 1 compared to 21 students to task 5. In addition, 18
students provided proximate explanations to task 1 compared to 2 to task 5. Finally,
the number of students who provided teleological explanations based on the
organisms needs to task 5 were many more (63 students) than to task 1 (22 students). The application of the Wilcoxon test resulted to a statistically significant
difference between students explanations to tasks 1 and 5 (p < 0.001). The fact that
more students provided evolutionary explanations to task 1 does not result from
their understanding of the concept of common descent, at least in the majority of the
cases. Task 1 made reference to organisms with which students were familiar. Thus,
perhaps anthropomorphically thinking, students may have attributed the similarities
Table 3 Students explanations to tasks 1 and 5 categorized as evolutionary, proximate and
teleological
Type of explanation

Task 1

Task 5

Evolutionary
Proximate
Teleological
No explanation
Total

40
18
22
18
98

21
2
63
12
98

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Table 4 Students explanations to tasks 2, 3 and 4

Type of explanation

Central concept of explanation

Task 3

Task 2

Task 4

Evolutionary
Proximate

Differential survival
Change through use
Environmental influence
Purposeful change
Natural plan
Unclear answers
Do not know
No answer

2
0
7
50
20
5
12
2
98

2
16
5
52
0
10
13
0
98

39
0
8
30
0
9
11
1
98

Teleological
No explanation

Total

of organisms to a kind of kinship among them. A first conclusion is that it might be

easy for many students to accommodate the concept of common descent since they
already have such a notion in mind. In addition, it seems that the content of the task
has an effect on the explanations that students provide. Although, the similarities
in both the species and the cellular level were explained by the idea of common
descent, students provided different amounts of the other types of explanations to
tasks 1 and 5.
4.2 Students explanations to tasks 2, 3 and 4
Only two students provided explanations with features of a natural selection process
to tasks 2 and 3, while there were more explanations of this kind to task 4. Students
explanations to tasks 2, 3, and 4 are presented in Table 4 in detail and in Table 5
coded as evolutionary, proximate and teleological.
From the results in Tables 4 and 5 it seems that students provided different
explanations to tasks 2, 3 and 4. One interesting finding is that the amount of
teleological explanations gradually diminished from task 3 towards task 2 and then 4.
Given the fact that more information was given to students in task 4 compared to
task 2, in which in turn more information was given compared to task 3, it seems that
the amount of the teleological explanations depended on the amount of information
relative to the task given to students. In particular, the less was the information given
to students, the larger was the amount of the teleological explanations they
provided. This finding may show a tendency to look for purpose or plan when they
do not have adequate information. On the other hand, the more was the information
given on the task, the larger was the amount of proximate and evolutionary

Table 5 Students explanations to tasks 2, 3 and 4 categorized as evolutionary, proximate and

teleological
Type of explanation

Task 3

Task 2

Task 4

Evolutionary
Proximate
Teleological
No explanation
Total

2
7
70
19
98

2
21
52
23
98

39
8
30
21
98

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K. Kampourakis, V. Zogza

Table 6 The amount of explanations provided to tasks 2, 3 and 4 accordingly with the information
given in each task
Task

3
2
4

Relevant information given

Final state
Final state, initial state
Final state, initial state, intra-specific variation,
natural selection factor

Type of explanation
Teleological

Proximate

Evolutionary

70
52
30

7
21
8

2
2
39

explanations. The amount of proximate explanations increased when students were

given the initial and the final state of the evolutionary process. Finally, evolutionary
explanations were much more in task 4 where students were given additional data
such as the intra-specific variation and the natural selection factor. All the above is
summarized in Table 6.
4.2.1 Comparison of students explanations to tasks 2 and 3
Despite the fact that two types of explanations were found only in one of each of the
two tasks, (change through use only in task 2 and natural plan only in task 3), in
general no significant differences existed between students types of explanations to
each task. Most students provided teleological explanations to these tasks (52 to task
2 and 70 to task 3) whereas only 2 students provided evolutionary explanations to
both tasks. The application of the Wilcoxon test resulted to a statistically nonsignificant difference between students explanations to task 2 and 3 (p = 0.199).
Less teleological and more proximate explanations were given to task 2 compared to
task 3, which probably was due to the different content of the tasks (see Table 6).
The fact that only the final state of the evolutionary process was given in task 3
whereas both the initial and the final state of the respective process were given in
task 2 seems to have influenced students explanations. It is possible that as students
were aware of the initial state in task 2 (that giraffes used to have shorter necks in
the past), they looked for mechanisms that might explain the change (e.g. the type of
explanation named change through use, see Table 4) which were probably considered more appropriate for the specific task than teleological explanations. Hence, it
seems that the content of the task had an influence on the explanations that students
provided, even in a way that makes these differences statistically non-significant.
Moreover, it is possible that students perceived the features under discussion as
having a different adaptive significance for the organisms which possessed them.
Perhaps the coloration of the body that provides concealment is more easily explained in teleological terms than the change in the length of the giraffes neck.
4.2.2 Comparison of students explanations to tasks 3 and 4
The comparison of students explanations to these tasks is particularly interesting
because the questions posed provided different amount of information about each
evolutionary process, but they both referred to the coloration of the body that
provided concealment in a given environment. Students explanations to task 4 were

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Students intuitive explanations of the causes of homologies and adaptations

39

quite different from those to task 3. More teleological explanations and less evolutionary explanations were given to task 3 compared to task 4. In particular, 30
students provided teleological explanations to task 4 compared to 70 to task 3 and 39
students provided evolutionary explanations to task 4 compared to 2 to task 3. The
application of the Wilcoxon test resulted to a statistically significant difference between students explanations to tasks 3 and 4 (p < 0.001). As shown in Table 6
students were aware of only the final state of the evolutionary process described in
task 3, while more relevant information was available in task 4. Consequently, 39
students provided evolutionary explanations to task 4 compared to 2 to task 3. It
seems that when some students realized that certain beetles had a different body
color and hence a different concealment capacity in the particular environment as
well as that there were predators around to which this difference was obvious, it
made sense that the extinction of green beetles could be due to the differential
survival of those of the initial population, in other words to the fact that only the
brown beetles survived. But what is more interesting is that despite this information,
30 students provided teleological explanations. In these they described how the
green beetles might have changed color to become brown and adapt to their environment. In other words, one third of the students provided teleological explanations to a task with much information available which had an obvious explanation
for some other students (that the green beetles vanished). This finding is another
evidence of how deeply held is the teleological view of life in students mind.
4.2.3 Comparison of students explanations to tasks 2 and 4
The comparison between these tasks differs from the previous one in that both the
initial and the final state of the evolutionary process were given in task 2. Thus, we
tried to find out if this additional information might diminish the amount of teleological explanations. But this was not the case. The additional information made
students provide less teleological and more proximate explanations compared to
task 2, however only 2 evolutionary explanations were given. Students who provided
teleological explanations to task 2 were 52 compared to 30 to task 4. It is important
to note that most proximate explanations were given to task 2. The application of the
Wilcoxon test resulted to a statistically significant difference between students
explanations to tasks 2 and 4 (p < 0.001). These results suggest that the initial and
the final state of the evolutionary process were not adequate for students to provide
evolutionary explanations. It seems that more data is needed; in task 4 this was the
intra-specific variation and the natural selection factor. The most important conclusion drawn from the comparison of the explanations provided to task 4 with those
provided to tasks 2 and 3 is that the information given on the task has an influence on
students explanations.
4.3 Students teleological explanations to tasks 15
One interesting finding in this study is that while several combinations of explanations to tasks 15 arose, several students provided exactly the same combination of
explanations. While 9 combinations were each provided by two students, 6 combinations were provided by 47 students (see Table 7).

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Table 7 Combinations of explanations provided to tasks 15 by more than 2 students

Type of explanation given to a task
Task 1

Task 2

Task 3

Task 4

Task 5

Evolutionary
Evolutionary
Proximate
Teleological
Teleological
Evolutionary

Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological

Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological

Teleological
Evolutionary
Teleological
Evolutionary
Teleological
Teleological

Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Teleological
Evolutionary

Total

Number
of students
7
5
5
5
5
4
31

What is even more interesting is that despite the large amount of teleological
explanations provided to tasks 15 (22 to task 1, 52 to task 2, 70 to task 3, 30 to task 4
and 63 to task 5, see Tables 3 and 5), only 5 students provided teleological explanations to all five tasks. In most other cases students provided both teleological and
evolutionary or proximate explanations. In addition, the 5 students who provided
only teleological explanations along with 2 other students who provided only evolutionary explanations were the only ones who provided the same type of explanation to all five tasks. These results are in agreement with a previous study
providing evidence that students may endorse both scientifically acceptable and
alternative conceptions, in that case both evolutionist and creationist explanations
about the origins of living kinds (Evans 2001). Finally, only 10 students did not give
any teleological explanation at all.
In most teleological explanations the end or goal was the survival of the species.
However, depending on the content of the task, students referred either to external
or internal factors, or to both. For example explanations coded as natural plan
provided to task 3 explicitly explained the possession of a coloration that resembled
the environment as the result of the plan of a benevolent external factor (God,
Nature or both) that acted for the sake of the organisms or the species. Of the same
kind were most explanations coded as need, provided to tasks 1 and 5. Students
implicitly explained the possession of certain traits by animals and by cells as the
result of design with the goal to assist their survival. On the other hand, explanations
coded as purposeful change provided to tasks 2, 3 and 4 explained the emergence
of particular features as the result of a process of purposeful adaptation guided
either by an external agent as previously described, or by internal agents, or by both.
External agents were often specified and in most cases were Nature, God or both.
Recent data suggests that childrens attributions of purpose in nature are related to
intuitions about intelligent design (Kelemen 2004b; Kelemen and DiYianni 2005).
Although we had intentionally avoided any reference to God or to the origin of life in
the tasks included in the questionnaire, students made relevant claims in their
explanations. Internal agents, when specified, often were the conscious actions of the
organisms which changed in order to adapt properly to the environment. In certain
cases, students expressed a kind of vitalistic causality where an unknown (vital) power
somehow succeeded to maintain organisms in existence. This concept of vital power is
similar to that of an unspecified substance for maintaining and enhancing life (Inagaki
and Hatano 2004). However, none of the students in our study who expressed such a
view provided a detailed account of how this vital power might operate.

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41

5 ConclusionsImplications for evolution education

To summarize, our findings from the analysis of students explanations of the origin
of homologies found in organisms, provide evidence that the unconscious bias of
anthropomorphically thinking may drive them to attribute the similarities of
organisms to a kind of kinship among them. Hence, a first conclusion is that it might
be easy for many students to accommodate the concept of common descent since
they already have such a notion in mind. On the other hand, students explanations
of the origin of adaptations consisted of either teleological conceptions, or biological
onesproximate or evolutionary. The less was the information given to students, the
larger was the amount of the teleological answers they provided, in other words they
had a tendency to look for purpose or plan when they did not have adequate
information. Moreover, the more was the information given on the task, the larger
was the amount of proximate and evolutionary explanations. The amount of proximate explanations increased when students were given the initial and the final state
of the evolutionary process. Finally, more evolutionary explanations were provided
in task 4 where students were given additional data such as the intra-specific variation and the natural selection factor. Even so, one third of the students provided
teleological explanations to this task with much information available that had an
obvious explanation for some other students, showing how deeply held is the teleological view of life in their mind. Hence, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
content of the task had an influence on the explanations that students provided.
In most teleological explanations the end or goal was the survival of the species.
However, depending on the content of the task, students referred either to external
or internal factors, or to both. External agents were often specified and in most cases
were Nature, God or both whereas internal agents often were the conscious actions
of the organisms which changed in order to adapt properly to the environment. In
certain cases, students expressed a kind of vitalistic causality where an unknown
(vital) power somehow succeeded to maintain organisms in existence, without being
able to provide a detailed account of how this vital power might operate. Since many
students were found to perceive evolution as a purposeful process and since most of
them provided explanations of evolutionary processes that depended on the content
of the task, we suggest that they should be assisted to overcome their preconceptions
by being presented an alternative new explanatory framework that would help them
to provide consistent evolutionary explanations of evolution related phenomena.
5.1 Overcoming students preconceptions
In order to help students overcome their preconceptions, two important conditions
need to be satisfied: (1) students should learn some basic concepts in order to be able
to understand complex processes like natural selection, and (2) students should be
brought to a kind of a cognitive conflict situation, where major components of their
conceptual frameworks would be challenged and eventually replaced by new ones
(Alters 2005, pp. 8794). To satisfy these conditions we have proposed a teaching
sequence (see Table 8) during which students are taught about the several levels of
biological organization (cells, organisms, ecosystems) and then about the mechanisms of heredity and of the origin of genetic variation. Then, all these concepts are
used to teach about evolution. It is important to note that in order to understand
evolution, students need to build a complex conceptual framework and be able to

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Table 8 The teaching sequence, the main concepts taught and the sources of contingency required
to satisfy conditions 1 and 2
Teaching sequence

Main concepts
Standard concepts

1. Cell structure
and function
2. Cells and the
organism
3. Ecology
4. Reproduction
and inheritance
5. Evolution

Cell types and their structure, cell

machinery, cell reproduction,
unicellular organisms
Multi-cellular organisms, systems,
organs
Populations, habitats, ecosystems
Meiosis, sexual reproduction
Genes and chromosomes
Genotype and phenotype
Species, fossil record, history of life,
common descent,
survival, extinction

Concepts-sources of contingency

Environmental changes
Mutation, random gamete
sampling
Natural selection

move from micro-concepts (e.g. cells) to macro-concepts (e.g. species) and vice
versa. On the other hand, condition 2 would be satisfied if emphasis was put on two
concepts entirely opposed to childrens preconceptions described above: chance and
unpredictability. A useful concept to achieve this goal might be the concept of
contingency, defined as the . . . affirmation of control by immediate events over
destiny (Gould 2000, p. 284). This idea was illustrated by the metaphor of the tape:
You press the rewind button and, making sure you thoroughly erase everything
that actually happened, go back to any time and place in the past . . . Then let the
tape run again and see if the repetition looks at all like the original (p. 48) . . . any
replay of the tape would lead evolution down a pathway radically different from the
road actually taken (p. 51). The evolutionary contingency thesis suggests that the
history of life on earth has been determined by contingent and unpredictable events.
For example, mutations and natural selection in changing environments are two
sources of contingency (Beatty 1995).
The teaching sequence described in Table 8 aims to help students to gradually
construct their own understanding of major biological phenomena, as well as to
cause a conflict between their own teleological views and the unpredictability view
of life. Since many students perceived evolution as a purposeful process it should be
made explicit that this is not how evolution proceeds, and that unpredictability is an
important feature of the evolution of life on earth. Instruction should focus on the
role of chance in the evolutionary process; students need to understand that many
important events are fortuitous: (a) which new genetic variations may arise in a
population, (b) which gametes of those available in each generation will fuse to
produce the offspring, (c) which proportion of a population may migrate to an
unoccupied niche and (d) which environmental changes may take place in an ecosystem. Hence, specific activities are required in order to teach effectively about the
major steps of the evolutionary process: the origin of new variation and natural
selection. One such activity was developed for lower secondary school students
(Kampourakis 2006). This is a simple pencil-paper activity that helps students recognize by themselves that intra-specific variation and differential survival depending
on the environment are two important components of the evolutionary process.
Before this activity, students have already been taught about the structure and

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43

function of cells, organisms and ecosystems and they have mastered basic Mendelian
principles; hence the activity is expected to make them combine their previous
knowledge and build their own understanding of how evolution proceeds.
5.2 A (minimal) explanatory framework for evolution
The explanations of certain evolutionary outcomes can be formulated in a narrative
of historical style that explicitly links them to invariant laws of nature and to the
specific contingencies of antecedent states, which would not have generated the
particular outcome, had they been constituted in a different way. These contingencies do not diminish the explanatory power of the narrative as the capacity to
explain after the fact can reach the same level of confidence as any physical resolution under invariant law, as long as enough factual detail about antecedent states
can be obtained in order to resolve their causal relation to the observed outcome
(Gould 2002, pp. 13331334). Interestingly enough, Gould noted that this view was a
central feature in Darwins theorizing that had been underemphasized by his followers in an attempt to win more prestige for evolution under the idea that science
explained by general laws and not by particular narration (p. 1336).
The reasoning in the Origin of Species (Darwin 1859) involved two central ideas:
the tree of life and natural selection. According to the first idea species changed over
time with some going extinct while others continued to exist or gave rise to multiple
descendent species. This idea involved two different ideas: transmutation, the idea of
one species changing into another and common descent, the idea of one species
splitting into two or more species. The second central idea, natural selection, offered
an account of how species changed through a process of selection akin to the method
of artificial selection used by breeders to modify domesticated varieties of plants or
animals. The idea of common descent is logically distinct from the idea of transmutation because individual species might dramatically change over time without
ever splitting. The idea of common descent is also distinct from the idea that natural
selection is the dominant mechanism of transmutation because natural selection
might occur without the splitting of one species into two. In addition, such a splitting
might be brought about by a process that did not involve natural selection; although
Darwin assumed that natural selection was the dominant mechanism of transmutation, he presented examples where the latter might take place without appealing to
natural selection (Waters 2003).
We should note that natural selection or the differential reproduction of organisms
according to their fitness (a recognizable but complex term) is not the only explanation
for the history of life on earth. What Darwin discovered was that the fitness of the
organism had very often been the explanation of its survival. But, it also happens that
well adapted individuals may accidentally die due to factors wholly unconnected to
their fitness while on the other hand other individuals survive despite the handicap of
the maladaptive characteristics they possess (Scriven 1959). Convergent evolution can
account for the similarities between different taxa and random drift for the respective
differences. However, since common descent and natural selection were two of
Darwins central arguments, we suggest that secondary students should start learning
to explain evolutionary processes in these terms and then proceed to more detailed
explanations. Students might first learn to give evolutionary explanations based on
historical hypotheses which are formulated through two of Darwins main arguments:
common descent and natural selection. Homologies (explanandum) may be explained

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through common descent (explanans), as features that were possessed by a common

ancestor that evolved splitting into multiple descendent taxa. On the other hand,
adaptations (explanandum) may be explained by the transmutation of species into
new ones through natural selection (explanans). We describe these types of explanation as preliminary evolutionary explanations and we suggest that they should form
the basis for teaching further about evolution. Evolutionary processes are very complex and involve many different concepts. We consider preliminary evolutionary
explanations as described above a minimal starting point for teaching about evolution.
The fact that only 7 out of 98 students provided the same explanations to all tasks
(2 provided evolutionary and 5 teleological explanations) supports the hypothesis
that they lack a coherent conceptual framework. Consequently, they provided
explanations that depended either on their previous knowledge (and their preconceptions), or on the content of the task, or on both. In addition, explanations of the
origin of traits in terms of an externally determined plan or of an internal vital force
are far from scientific and characterize their teleological explanations. Students
should be facilitated to learn to explain the origin of traits in purely naturalistic terms
by correctly applying some major concepts of evolutionary biology. An explanatory
framework based on the explanation of homologies as the result of common descent
and of adaptations as the result of evolution through natural selection is expected to
be coherent because homologies and adaptations would be attributed to particular
causal, non-intentional, processes. The efficiency of the teaching sequence and of the
proposed explanatory framework described above will be the focus of another paper.
If this explanatory framework is proved to be efficient, it will contribute to what we
consider an important target for biology education, the ability of students to explain
the history of life on earth in scientific terms.
6 Appendix
The open-ended questionnaire included the following five tasks.
6.1 Task 1
We know that the wolves, the dogs and the foxes are different species with their own
special features. However, these species exhibit many morphological and physiological similarities. How could these be explained?
6.2 Task 2
The giraffe, as we now know it, is an animal with a remarkably long neck. This
feature allows the giraffe to browse on the leaves from the trees, when there is no
adequate food on the ground. Nowadays we know that giraffes did not always
possess this feature but used to have a shorter neck. Can you explain how the neck of
the giraffe was lengthened?
6.3 Task 3
Many animals exhibit the same color with their environment (e.g. the white polar bear)
or look alike different species (e.g. leaf-like insects) that distracts their predators or
preys. Can you explain how these particular animals have developed these features?

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45

6.4 Task 4
Beetles may live on trees and feed on their leaves. Several years ago, both green and
brown beetles could be found in equal proportions a forest. However, birds could
spot the green beetles more easily than the brown ones on the ground or on the
trunks. Nowadays, if we attempt to estimate the proportions of green and brown
beetles, we will mostly find brown ones. Can you explain how the proportion of the
beetles living in the forest has changed?
6.5 Task 5
So far you have studied bacteria, protists, fungi, plants and animals in the cellular
level. Despite several differences, you have seen that all organisms exhibit some
major features: (a) all organisms are built up by cells, and (b) all cells contain DNA,
ribosomes and cellular membrane. Can you provide an explanation for the origin of
these similarities?

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