U.S.

Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals
Q[fice of the Clerk
5/07 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church. Virginia 2204/

OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - MIA

333 South Miami Ave., Suite 200
Miami, FL 33130

Name: MORA-ESPINOZA, JONATHON

A 079-069-141

Date of this notice: 6/14/2016

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,

DonnL C

aftA)

Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Wendtland, Linda S.
Pauley, Roger
Greer, Anne J.

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

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Dorsett, Tyler., Esq

Immigration Group, LLC
3030 Coral Way
Miami, FL 33145

U.. D"partm.ent of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: A079 069 141 -Miami, FL

Date:

JUN 1 't 2016

In re: JONATHON MORA-ESPINOZA

APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Tyler Dorsett, Esquire
ON BEHALF OF DHS: Brandon Josephsen
Assistant Chief Counsel
CHARGE:
Notice: Sec.

212(a)(6)(A)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1 l82(a)(6)(A)(i)] Present without being admitted or paroled

APPLICATION: Adjustment of status

The Department of Homeland Security (OHS) appeals from the Immigration Judge's
February 11, 2011, decision granting the respondent's application for adjustment of status
pursuant to section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. I255(a),
based on his marriage to a United States citizen. The DHS appeal will be dismissed, but the
record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion and for the entry of a new decision.
We review findings of fact, including credibility findings, for clear error. See 8 C.F.R.
1003.l(d)(3)(i); see also Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-H-,
23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). We review questions of law, discretion, or judgment, and all
other issues de novo. See 8 C.F.R. I003.l(d)(3)(ii).
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant in this matter. 1 On or
about June 23, 2002, the respondent, a native and citizen of Costa Rica, entered the United States
through Canada without first being inspected and admitted or paroled, and as a result he was
issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) on the same date, instituting these proceedings (I.J. at 1;
1

Some of the fact recited in this order were not formally found by the Immigration Judge but
may be administratively noticed based on the submission of records maintained by the DHS, the
United States Department of State, and the state of Florida. See 8 C.F.R. I003.1(d)(3)(iv)
(limiting our appellate fact-finding authority to "taking administrative notice of commonly
known facts such as the contents of official documents"); Matter of S-H-, supra, at 465-66
(same).
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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

A079 069 141

On May 16, 2009, the respondent married a United States citizen, and she subsequently filed
an Alien Relative Petition (Form 1-130) on his behalf that was approved on September 17, 2009
(Resp. Motion to Recalendar at l, Tab B). On May 17, 2010, the respondent filed an unopposed
motion to recalendar and transfer venue, requesting an opportunity to pursue adjustment of status
under section 245(a) of the Act before the Immigration Court (Resp. Motion to Recalendar;
Resp. Motion to Transfer Venue; DRS Nonopposition). His motion was granted on May 27,
2010 (May 27, 2010, I.J. Order).
On appeal, the DRS maintains that the Immigration Judge erred as a matter of law in finding
the respondent eligible for adjustment of status pursuant to section 245(a) of the Act in light of
the fact that he was not granted parole when he first arrived in the United States, but had
received, while within the United States, a parole grant that had since terminated (DHS Brief at
2, 4-5). The respondent, however, argues that the Immigration Judge properly found him eligible
for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, as he was paroled pursuant to section
212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, notwithstanding the fact that the parole was granted after his initial
arrival in 2002 and had since terminated (Resp. Brief at 3-4). The DHS further asserts that,
assuming the respondent otherwise would be eligible to pursue adjustment of status under
section 245(a) of the Act, he remains inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act
as charged in the NTA, in that he initially arrived in the United States at a location other than a
designated port of entry (DRS Brief at 5-6). Although the respondent acknowledges that he
entered in 2002 without inspection, he argues that he is not inadmissible under section
212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act because he was subsequently paroled under section 212(d)(5)(A) of
the Act, thus invalidating the original charge brought under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act
(Resp. Brief at 4-11).
Starting with the parties' arguments regarding the respondent's potential inadmissibility
under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act as it relates to his adjustment eligibility under section
245(a) of the Act, we note that these arguments also relate to the sole charge contained in the
NTA (DHS Brief at 5-6; Resp. Brief at 4-11 ). However, the Immigration Judge did not enter an
explicit removability finding in his oral decision (I.J. at 3; DRS Brief at 3). Moreover, while we
2

Several orders were issued by Immigration Judges in this case. Unless otherwise specified,
references to "1.J." relate to the Immigration Judge's February 11, 2011, decision.

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Tr. at 3-4, 50; Exh. 1; Resp. Motion to Terminate at Tab J).2 On July 3, 2002, the respondent,
without the assistance of counsel, admitted the factual allegations contained in the NTA, at
which time an Immigration Judge found him removable as charged (Tr. at 3-5, 53-54; Exh. 1).
Thereafter, the respondent was paroled into the United States in the public interest pursuant to
section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. l 182(d)(5)(A), and the parole was extended a
number of times before ultimately being terminated in 2008 (I.J. at 2; Tr. at 15-16, 20, 30, 53-54;
Resp. Motion to Recalendar at Tab D; Resp. Motion to Terminate at Tab I; Resp. December 13,
2010, Documentary Submission at Tab I). On July 2, 2003, based on the parole (granted for the
purpose of allowing the respondent to testify in a criminal trial against an accused alien
smuggler), the DRS requested administrative closure, and that request was granted (July 2, 2003,
I.J. Order; Tr. at 15-17).

A079 Oti9 141

Inadmissibility under section 2I2(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act may be triggered in one of two ways.
First, an alien is inadmissible if he is present in the United States without first being inspected
and either admitted or paroled. See id. Second, an alien is also inadmissible if he arrives in the
United States at any time or place not designated by the Attorney General. See id. The
regulations at 8 C.F.R. 235.l(d)(2) and 1235.l(d)(2) explain that an alien applies at a time and
place designated by the Attorney General if he presents himself at an identified port-of-entry
when the port is open or seeks entry "as otherwise permitted in this section." See also
United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1077-78, n. 10-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting generally
that an alien falls within section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act if he arrives in the United States at a
place other than an open, designated port-of-entry).
With respect to the portion of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act that provides that an alien is
inadmissible if he is present in the United States without first being inspected and admitted or
paroled, we note that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has analyzed
the impact of this ground of inadmissibility as it relates to an individual similarly situated to the
respondent, i.e. one who first entered without inspection but then is subsequently paroled under
section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act. See Memorandum from Lori Scialabba, Associate Director of
Refugee, Asylum, & International Operations Directorate, USCIS, HQ 70/21.1 AD07-18,
Section 212(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Rlegal Entrants and Immigration
Violators, 2009 WL 888664 at *5 (March 3, 2009) (hereinafter "Scialabba Memorandum");
see also USCIS Policy Memorandum, PM-602-0091, Parole of Spouses, Children and Parents
of Active Duty Members of the Armed Forces, the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, and
Former Members of the U.S. Armed Forces or Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve and the
Effect of Parole on Inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act

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acknowledge that the then-pro se respondent conceded the factual allegations contained in the
NTA, we will not bind him to his pleadings in these circumstances (I.J. at 2; Tr. at 3-5, 15-16,
20, 30, 53; Exh. 1). See Matter of Roman, 19 I&N Dec. 855, 856 (BIA 1988); Matter of
Velasquez, 19 l&N Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986); see also Gonzalez v. United States Attorney
General, 368 F. App'x 963, 965 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying the standard outlined in Matter of
Velasquez, supra, within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, the jurisdiction in which this case arises). Specifically, because (1) the respondent
entered his pleadings as a pro se alien before he was paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of
the Act and (2) his parole appears to bear on the validity of the factual allegations contained in
the NTA, the sole charge of inadmissibility remains at issue (Tr. at 3-5, 20, 30, 53; Exh. 1).
Often, under these circumstances, we would remand the record for the Immigration Judge to
engage in relevant fact-finding and to make legal conclusions in the first instance. However,
based on the specific facts and circumstances in this case, we conclude as a matter of law (as
applied to the specific arguments made by the parties) that the charge brought under section
212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, although valid when lodged, is no longer legally tenable, and that the
respondent's initial entry without admission or parole no longer bars him from adjustment of
status, for the reasons outlined below.

A079 069 141'

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 2013 WL 6623905, at **2-4 (November 15, 2013) (hereinafter "USCIS
Policy Memorandum"). 3

As a result, here, we conclude that the respondent's parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the
Act served to invalidate the portion of the charge brought under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Act as it relates to being present without admission or parole. In that regard, we note that the
OHS has not meaningfully argued on appeal, and apparently did not argue below, that the
eventual termination of the respondent's parole caused him again to become an alien who is
"present in the United States without being . . . paroled," for purposes of inadmissibility under
the first prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act. Rather, the DHS's argument of
inadmissibility has focused on the second prong.
Turning to that second prong, making inadmissible one who arrives at any time or place other
than at a designated port-of-entry, USCIS has opined that an individual similarly situated to the
respondent would not be inadmissible under this provision either. See USCIS Policy
Memorandum, supra, at *4; USCIS Field Adjudicator's Manual, supra, at Chapter 40.6.2(a)(l ).
Specifically, USCIS has reasoned that "since [the]... alien arrived in the United States only in the
past, the second inadmissibility ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [of the Act] is already
inapplicable (even without the parole), because the alien is not one who 'arrives' (present tense)
at an undesignated time or place. " See also USCIS Field Adjudicator's Manual, supra, at
Chapter 40.6.2(a)(l ). Noting that this prong has a temporal limit based on the express language
used by Congress, USCIS has reasoned that "It is not a question of parole curing or erasing the
3

Although not binding on the Board, USCIS memoranda provide useful, practical guidance to
the extent that they are not contradicted by sections 212 and 245 of the Act or any related
regulations. See Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 l&N Dec. 257, 263 (BIA 2010). Although we
have relied on both the Scialabba and USCIS Policy Memoranda, we note that the Scialabba
Memorandum has been superseded, in part, by the USCIS Policy Memorandum, and we rely on
the Scialabba Memorandum only for those portions that have not been superseded.

4
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In this scenario, USCIS has opined that such parole invalidates the ground of inadmissibility
at section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act insofar as it relates to presence without inspection and
admission or parole. See, e.g. , USCIS Policy Memorandum, supra, at *4 (explaining that an
alien who enters without inspection and then is subsequently paroled is no longer inadmissible
under this first prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act); Scialabba Memorandum,
supra, at *8 (providing that a subsequent parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act "purges
the [alien's] inadmissibility [under this first prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act].");
see also USCIS Field Adjudicator's Manual at Chapter 40.6.2(a)(l) (reasoning that "[a]n alien
who is paroled under ...section 212(d)(5)(A) [of the Act] will no longer be inadmissible under the
first ground in section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) .. .because the person has been paroled"). This is so
regardless of the reason underlying the DHS's decision to grant such parole.
See Scialabba Memorandum, supra, at *6 (clarifying the foregoing and explaining that this is
because "[p]arole is the discretionary decision, under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, to permit
an inadmissible alien to leave the inspection facility free of official custody, so that, although the
alien is not admitted, the alien is permitted to be in the United States.").

A079 069 14l

We are persuaded by USCIS's interpretation of this provision, which is grounded in the

specific language of the statute and is not otherwise contradicted by other relevant authority.
Accordingly, we conclude that, as a matter of law (as applied to the specific arguments made by
the parties), the respondent's parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act in 2003 invalidates the
ground of inadmissibility contained in the NTA, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent's
parole has since been terminated. That is, because the respondent's parole rendered the first
prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act inoperative (and the DHS has not meaningfully
argued that the parole's subsequent termination revived that prong), and because parole
(including its termination) is irrelevant to the second prong under USCIS's own interpretation,
the DHS has not persuaded us that either prong of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) now covers the
respondent's situation.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded by the DHS's assertion in this case that the respondent's
initial entry without inspection and admission or parole makes him statutorily ineligible for
adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, in light of his subsequent parole pursuant to
section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act (OHS Brief at 2, 4-5). Notably, the language at section
212(d)(5)(A) of the Act uses the phrase "paroled into the United States," which is identical to the
language used at section 245(a) of the Act in describing as eligible those aliens who have been
"inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States." See Matter of Castillo-Padilla,
supra, at 260. For this, and other reasons, this Board and several Circuit Courts, including the
Eleventh Circuit, have concluded that an alien who has been paroled under section 212(d)(5)(A)
of the Act has established that he has been "paroled into the United States" for purposes of
demonstrating eligibility for adjustment of status pursuant to section 245(a) of the Act. See id. at
260-63; see also Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2011); Delgado-Sobalvarro
v. Attorney General of the United States, 625 F.3d 782 (3d Cir. 2010); Ortega-Cervantes
v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116-20 (9th Cir. 2007); Castillo-Padilla v. United States
Attorney General, 417 F. App'x 888, 890 (11th Cir. 2011); Matter of C. Valdez, 25 I&N
Dec. 824, 826-27 n.1 (BIA 2012). Further, we agree with the respondent's argument that the
ultimate termination of his parole does not alter his status as someone who "was ... paroled," for
purposes of section 245(a) adjustment eligibility (emphasis added).
We conclude that a parole pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act following an entry
without inspection should be treated the same as any other parole under this provision, as such
treatment is reasonable and is consistent with the foregoing case law and cited agency guidance.
Moreover, both USCIS and its predecessor agency, the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), recognized the ability to parole individuals already physically present within the
United States. See, e.g., Memorandum from Tracy Renaud, Chief, Office of Field Operations,
5
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second inadmissibility ground. Rather, the alien who arrived in the past is already outside the
ambit of the second ground; past arrivals are the subject of the first ground."
See USCIS Policy Memorandum, supra, at *4. USCIS has reasoned that because the first
portion of the ground of inadmissibility at section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act becomes
inapplicable by virtue of an alien's parole and because the second portion is inapplicable in light
of the temporal limitation, an individual, like the respondent here, who first enters without
inspection and then is subsequently paroled under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act is no longer
inadmissible under any portion of section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act upon being paroled.

A079 069 141

For the same reasons that we conclude that the respondent is not inadmissible as charged
under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, we likewise conclude that he is not inadmissible on this
basis for purposes of otherwise evaluating his statutory eligibility for adjustment of status under
section 245(a) of the Act. See section 245(a)(2) of the Act. Accordingly, we agree with the
Immigration Judge to the extent that he so ruled (I.J. at 3-4).
However, because we have concluded that the respondent's parole under section
212(d)(5)(A) of the Act defeated the sole charge of inadmissibility contained in the NTA, we
note that-without a supporting charge-the current basis for these proceedings and the
Immigration Judge's jurisdiction over the respondent's adjustment application is eliminated. In
light of the unique circumstances in these proceedings, we conclude that remand of the record is
appropriate to allow the OHS to lodge any substituted charges the agency may wish to pursue.4
Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: The DHS's appeal is dismissed.

Cf Scheerer v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 445 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (determining that paroled alien
who had been found inadmissible under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act was eligible to
apply for adjustment of status), subsequent appeal, 513 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding
subsequent regulation allocating jurisdiction as between the Immigration Judge and USCIS).

6
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USCIS, HQ 70/10.10, Processing of Initial Parole or Renewal Parole Requests Presented by

Natives or Citizens of Cuba to USCIS Field Offices, 2008 WL 903947 at *1 (March 4, 2008)
(explaining that Cuban nationals who entered the United States without inspection may present
themselves at USCIS field offices within the United States to request parole in establishing
eligibility to apply for adjustment of status under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of
November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161, as amended (Cuban Adjustment Act))
(hereinafter "Renaud Memorandum"); Memorandum from Paul W. Virtue for Bo Cooper,
General Counsel, INS, HQCOU 120/17-P, Authority to Parole Applicants for Admission Who
are Not Also Arriving Aliens, 1998 WL 1806685 at *2 (August 21, 1998) (interpreting section
212(d)(5)(A) of the Act as permitting the parole of an "applicant for admission" who is not an
"arriving alien"). Notably, not only has USCIS recognized the agency's ability to parole
individuals physically present in the United States under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, but the
agency has also explained that those individuals are eligible to adjust their statuses on the basis
of such parole. See Renaud Memorandum, supra, at *1 (recognizing the public policy
consideration of allowing Cuban nationals who entered the United States without inspection to
receive parole from within the United States in qualifying for adjustment of status under the
Cuban Adjustment Act); see also Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner, INS,
Eligibility for Permanent Residence Under the Cuban Adjustment Act Despite Having Arrived at
a Place Other Than a Designated Port-ofEntry, reprinted at 2008 WL 903947 at Attachment A
**3-6 (April 19, 1999).

A079 069 1 41

FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge to allow the OHS to
lodge any substituted charges it may wish to pursue and for the Immigration Judge to conduct
further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the entry of a new decision.

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7
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. ..'-

U . S . DEPl11.TMENT OF JUST I CE
EXECUT IVE O FFICE FOR IMM IGRAT I ON REVIEW
IMM IGRAT I ON COURT
Miami , Flori da

I n the Matter o f
JONATHON MORA-E S P I NOZA ,

I N REMOVAL P ROCEEDI NGS

Re spondent
CHARGE :
APPL I CAT I ON :
ON BEHALF OF THE RES PON DENT :

ON BEHALF OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF HOMELAN D S ECURITY :

Ma rtin L luch , Esquire

3 0 3 0 Coral Way
M iami , Florida 3 3 1 4 5

B randon J . Jos ephsen , E s qu i re

3 3 3 South M iami Avenue
Mi ami , Florida 3 3 1 3 0 .

ORAL DEC I S I ON OF THE IMMI GRAT I ON JUDGE

Thi s c a s e came on to the record ba sed upon the Not i ce
to Appear that wa s dat ed June 2 3 , 2 0 0 2 ( Exhibi t 1 ) .

On that

not i ce the re spondent was des ignated as having been pre sent in
the United States without a dmi s s i on or parole .

I t a l leg e s that

the respondent is not a cit i z en or nat iona l of the United State s ,

that he i s a nat ive and cit i z en of Cost a Rica , t hat he a rrived in
the United S t a t e s at o r near Lew i s ton , New Yor k , on o r about June
f) tr'
2 3 , 2 0 0 2 , and that h e h a s been admitted o r paroled a fter

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February 1 1 , 2 0 1 1

Fi l e A 0 7 9 0 6 9 1 4 1

'

\,

jq
i n spect i on by an Immigration O f f i ce r .
The respondent gave t e s t imony and indica ted that he did
and was confronted by an Immi grat ion O f ficer .

There h a s been

argument from t he Service that a paro le did not i s sue t o h im at a

subs equent dat e .

As far as the parole i s conce rne d , a copy of

Fo rm I - 9 4 wa s s ubmi tted a s part o f one of the bri e fs .

I t was

f i le d by coun s e l for the re spondent , i ndi cat i ng that the

r e spondent wa s a l l owed to be pre s ent i n the Uni ted States and was
granted a parole i n the pub l i c intere s t unde r S ec t i on 2 1 2 ( d ) ( 5 )
o f the Immigrati on and Nationa l i t y Act .
The Court ha s been informed that the parole w a s
subs equent l y revo ked .

The i s sue rai s ed in thi s cas e i s whether

or not the respondent i s e l i gible to adj u s t his s tatus i n the

United States .
I n that respect , the Court h a s reviewed the memorandum
o n e l i gibi l i t y f o r permanent res i dent s .

I t wa s p repa red by

Commi s s ioner Dor is Mei s sner on Apr i l 1 9 , 1 9 9 9 .

From a cur sory

reading of that , it would appear that a p a r o l e should be adequate

for the s e purpo s e s .

T h i s seems to be the ca s e notw i t h s tanding

the fact that that memo rea l l y re l ated to the Cuban Adj u s tment
Act or Cuban/Hai t i an ent rance s t atus .

S t i l l , according t o ca se

l aw from the N inth C i rcuit , Ortega-Cervante s v . Gonz a l e s , 5 0 1

F . 3d 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 4 ( 9t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) , that an a l i en once paroled into
the United States i s e l igible to adj u s t pu rs uant to S e c t i on 2 4 5
A 079 069 141

Februa ry 1 1 , 2 0 1 1

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actua l l y receive a parole a fter he cro s s ed into the United States

((

'

o f the Irrunigrat i on and Nat i ona l it y Act .

The s tatute and

r egulat i ons do not requi re a paro l ed a l i en to ma int a i n parole

Rathe r ,

a l l that i s requ i re d i s an inspect ion and admi s s ion o r par o le

i nt o the Un ited States under S ect ion 2 4 5 o f the Immigrat ion Act .
Although the S e rvice may have argued and pres ent ed a
N o t i ce t o Appear cha rging that the respondent had not been
admit t e d or pa ro led, the Court finds that the re spondent wa s in
fact parol ed at some t ime whi ch o n one h and could be looked at a
f a ctor to defe at t h e Not ice to Appear , and on the other ba s i s a s
author i z ing t h e re spondent to have e l i g ib i l i t y t o adj ust h i s
s t at u s a s h e w a s paro l ed into the United S t at e s f o r humanitari an
r e a s on s .

See Matt e r o f Ca s t i l lo - Pa r r i l l a , 2 5 I &N De c . 2 5 7 , 2 5 9

/1
\\
( B IA 2 0 1 0 ) . S ince the re spondent was admitt ed pursant t o

S e ct i on 2 1 2 ( d ) ( 5 ) , t h spondent ' s s tatus can b e adj usted

b e caus e the re spondent was tempor a r i l y parol ed i nt o t he United
S t a t e s for a s igni f i cant publ i c bene f i t and i s thus , con s i dered
an app l i cant for admi s s i on who is not an a r r iving a l i en .

And a s

s u ch i s e l igible t o adj u s t h i s s t atus .

The Court has hea rd t e s t imon y from the re spondent as
far a s his app l i cation for adj u s tment of s ta t u s is concerned .

have reviewed h i s Fo rm I - 4 8 5 , it has been indicated that the

re spondent has no de fect s in that app l i cat ion , a nd there has not
been a rgued that there h a s been any de fect s in t hat app l i cat ion .
The re spondent h a s s ubmitted hims e l f t o finge rp r i nt che cks , and
A 079 069 141

February 1 1 , 2 0 1 1

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s t atus a t the time he f i l e s for adj u s tment o f s tatus .

jd
h e i s appa rent l y come acro s s we l l a s fa r a s that i s conce rned .
The respondent has had a medical examinat ion pre s ented wh i ch was
As s tated be fore , his f inge rprint s we re c l e a r .

The Court s e e s no ba s i s to not adj udicate thi s mat t e r and a s

s uch , t h i s Court w i l l adj udi cate the app l i c a t i on f o r adj us tment
of s tatus favorably and grant the re spondent permanent res idence
as the spouse of a c i t i zen .

mmig rat i on Judge

1 1 February 2 0 1 1

A 07 9 0 6 9 14 1

February 1 1 , 2 0 1 1

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

s at i s fact ory .

CERT I FICATE PAGE

I here b y c e rt i fy that the a t tached proceeding_

JONATHON MORA-ES P I NOZA

A 079 069 141
Miami , Florida
wa s held a s here in appe a rs , and that t h i s i s t h e original
transcript thereof f o r the f i l e o f the Exe cut ive O f f i ce for
Immigrat ion Revi ew .

athan Dougl as(Tran s c ribe r }

Depo s it i on S e rvice s , I n c .
1 2 3 2 1 Mi ddl ebro o k Road , Suite 2 1 0
Ge rmant own , Maryland 2 0 8 7 4
( 301 )

8 8 1-33 4 4

Apr i l 6 , 2 0 1 1
{ Comp l et i on Dat e }

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

be fore STEPHEN E . MANDER i n the mat ter o f :