DAC 004 11-03,
Congress of the United States
waning, BE,
January 29, 2003
‘Tne Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Inialigence
Washington, DC 20505,
Door Director Tanat:
‘As you know, the fina report ofthe Joint inquiy into the events of September 11
has bean submited to the intelligence Community for declassfication review. We look
{forward to early release ofthe public report so that offerts at reforms can be
accelerated,
Having been privioged to lead ths bipartisan, bicameral investigation tast year.
‘we are committed to working in the eurent Congress to help secura implementation of
‘ts recommendations. In furtherance ofthat goal, we are wring to the President and
heads of departments and agencies about portions ofthe Joint Inquiry's
recommendations that may De of particular concer to them.
(ur frst recommendation cals for ostablishment of a Director of National
{ntetigence, or DNI, wha In addhion to being the President’ principal intetigence
‘adviser “shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel
‘esponaibties needed to make the U.S. Ineligence Communty operate as a coherent
“whole.” To help promote both strong leadership af the entre Intaligence Community
Jeadership and an effective CIA, the Joint inquiry also recommended that Congress
provide thatthe ONI not simultaneously serve as director of the CIA or any other
‘2gency. In considering this recommondation, the Congress wil carianly, we believe,
DDenefft from leaming of your viws about the stengtnaning of tre role of haad of the
Inteligence Community.
‘A number ofthe recommendations tha folow scdress proposed taaks of the
Director of National Intaliganco, but as that reform wil require study and deliberation,
for the immediate future those further recommendations are rected to the Director of
Central ineligance as the present statutory head of the ineligonce Community.
‘The Joint inquiry found that prior ta Soptember 11 nelther the U.S, Goverment
‘28.8 whole nor the Inteligence Community had a comprehensive counierteresist
strategy. One of aur recommendations calls on te National Securty Counc, in
‘conjunction with key agoncy and depariment heads, o prepare such a strategy forthe
President's approval. The recommendation sites that he strategy should be“The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 23,2003
Page 2
“government wide,” apply both “home and abroad" and include “tha growing terrorism
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated
technologies.” The recommendation asks that this strategy dently and fuly engage the
Intetigence 2s well as foreign policy, economic, miltary and law enforcement elements
thal are “crcl to a comprehensive blueprint for success in he war against terrorism,”
‘The Director of Central iteligence's ful participation in this overall process willbe
‘essential, as wal the DC's development ofthe inteligence Community componant of
the full strategy. The Joint inquiry recommended thatthe Intaligence Community's
‘component of the overall salegy include a number of important items, among them
‘development of human sources to penetaleterorst organizations and networks.
“To provide to ie Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intaigence
‘estimates on terrorism, the Joint Inquiry has recommended establishment on the
‘Nationa! Intaligence Counc of the postion of Nationa inteligence Officer for
‘Terrorism. The recommendation sugges that the person holding his poston also
assist the Inteligence Community in davaloping a program for strategic analysis,
Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the
‘Administration to ensure development wihin the Department of Homeland Securty of
‘an effective all-source terrorism information fusion canter, s mandated by the
Homeland Seculy Act of 2002. The success of tat fusion center wil depend, as the
recommendation states, on the center's Tull and timely access to all counterterrorism
‘elated inteligence information, including Yaw supporting data es needed.” Your action
to ensure full cooperation betwesn the entire Inteligence Communily (including, of
course, the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Secury wil be fundamental to the
‘success ofthis vita reform. We applaud the President's announcament of tho
‘establishment ofa new Terrorist Treat Integration Centor. which we understand will be
located under the Director of Central ineligence. The important challenge, we believe,
1s to assure the ful and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion
requirement ofthe Homeland Securty Act and the center thatthe President announced.
‘The recommendations inctude als of significant reforms tha the Intligence
Committees beliave are essential for strengthening the FBI's domestic inteligence
‘capabilty. In regars to these critically needed reforms, the Joint Inquiry has.
‘recommended that Congress should droct thet the head ofthe Intaligance Community,
together wit the Atfomey General and the Secretary of Homeland Securily, should
‘eport to Congress on the FBI's progress. The report should include “the specific
‘manner in which a new domestic inteligence service could be estabished in the United‘The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 28, 2003
Page 3
‘States, recognizing the need to enhance national securty while fully protecting civil
Teries”
‘The Committees expressed their strong conviction that “the nteligence
‘Community's employees remain ts greatest resource.” They recommend that the head
ofthe inteligence Community “shauid requle that measures be Implemented to greatly
‘enhance the recrltment and development of a workforce wih the inteligence skis and
‘expertise needed for succass in counterertotst efor" Several pariculer actions are
set forth in the recommendation. One is that iteligence Community agencies should
‘expand and improve counterterarism taining, incuding about information sharing
‘among law enforcement and inteligance personnel, the use of he Foreign Inteligance
Surveliance Act, and waichlsting. The recommendation includes steps to improve
Inteligence Community language capablities and the ullization of the skils and
‘experionca of rtrd personnel. Itcals on the ntligence Community to “enhance
recrutment of @ more ethnically and culturally verse workforce.”
‘A further personnel recommendation proposes, in par, that Congress enact
legislation, modsied on the landmark Goldwaler-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, to help instil the concept of ointness” throughout the
Inteligence Community and ensure that its components wil work more closely together
‘han has been the case. ‘The mechanisms identified inthe resormendation inckide
‘such things as joint tours for intelligence and iaw enforcement personnel as wel as
incentives for joint service throughout the Intefigence Community. in developing these.
‘ideas, Congress would benefit from the Administration's deailad proposals.
“The Joint Inquiry identifed several important objectives conceming classified
information, including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Inteigence
‘Community, by state and local aulhories, and by the American public. To this end, we
recommended thatthe Director of Cental intaligence, in consutaton withthe heads of
key components of te ineligence Communty, including the Atoey General, should
‘oport tothe Intligence Commities on “proposals for & new and more realise
‘approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of
‘Sensitive and classified information.” The report should also address “proposals to
protect agains! the use ofthe classification process as a shield to protect agency self
Interest”
‘The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and
‘response to these and other matters dentfied Inthe course ofthe Joint Ingulry,
Further, we are confident that the Congress wal benefit fom other recommendations‘The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 28, 2003
Page
‘thet you might have for legislative or administrative action to improve the Nation's
‘counterterorist eapabilies.
‘Chairman, Senate Inteligence ‘Chairman, House Inteligence
‘Commitee, 107" Congrass ‘Commitse, 107° and 108"
‘Congresses
Richard Shelby / Nancy Pelos! {
Vico Chairman, Senate Inaligente Ranking Minority Member, House
‘Commitee, 107" Congress
inlefigence Commitee, 107" Congress
and Member ex office (as Minority
Leader), 108 Congress
Enclosure: As statedre
Lo Co
RES, 20SessiON HH, Rt. No, 107.
JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
REPORT
oF THE
US. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ELLIGENCE
AND
U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS
DECEMBER 2002PART FOUR—FINDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING CERTAIN
SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS
20. Biuding
contact with, aud received support ur assistance from, incviduals whe may be covaected to
‘White ia the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were ia
the Sauuti Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at last two
of those individuals were alle
rn
by some ta be Suud! intelligence officers. The Joint
uiry’s review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has Information, much of
‘whieh bas yet to be independently verified, indicating that incividuals associated with te
‘Saudi Government in the United States may have other testo alsQavlta aad other terrorist
groups. ‘The FU and CIA bave jaformed the Joint Laqutry that, stuce the September 11
attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only a limited
anderstand
2 ofthe Saudi Governments testo terrorist elements. In their testimony,
either CIA wor FBI witnesses were able to ideutfy defialtively the extent of Saud support
{or tervorist atvity globally or within the United States and he extent to which such
Chewct ss 1 SS
ES
ar
test n par ue othe Jolt Ingly's focus on sis, he PHT and CLA estab
13S tiene coverages unncepabe, ven the git nd immediacy ote
potent isk to US, uatiogalseceriy, The neligene Comunity eds to address tht
area of coucern as aggressively and as quickly ae possible
Discussion: One reator forthe limited underanding that it was only 8
11 that he US, Government
nto agpessvely i
tigate his seu
119, he FB apparcaly did not fous investigalve resources cn i
MMII 215 tions is te United Sates due to Sua Arabia's sats a en A
fay” Apreseaive of te
Prior to
—— SS ——_—_—_ asore
September 11,2001, the FBI received “no reporting fom: any member of the tateligence
Community” that thre as 2 presence inthe Unite Stats
According to vanous FBI documents and at least oxe CIA memorandum, some ofthe
September 11 hijackers, while inthe United States spparetly had contcts with individuals who
may be connected tothe Saudi Government. While the Joint inquiry uncovered his material
ring the course ofits review of FBI and C1A documents, it id not attempt to investigate aud
sssess the accuracy and significance of this information independently, recognizing that such a
{ask would be beyond the scope of ths Joint Inguty. Instead, the Jon nqusryrelerred. a
003 ic Abe ubasea'e poccersione; and
+ According to an FBI agent in Phoent, the FBI suspects Mohsmumed al-Qudhacein of
3
Wee light, whic the PI's Phoenix alice now suspects may have been a
ein was involved in s 1999 incident aboard
“iry rm to test asline seatity. using the fight, al-Quétsesin and his associate asked
the Might attendants « variety of suspicious questions; a-Qudhacsin thea attempted to
the cockpit on two ocestions. Al-Quihacein and bis asociate were ying 0
\Washingion, D.C. to atten a party atthe Saudi Embassy aud both claimed tha heir
ticigets wore paid forby the Saudi Embusry. During the comte of is investigation
FThas discovered thet both a-Quibacein and the ots
the
dividual involved in thie
incident had connections to teers
Finally, the Committees are parculary enneerned abou the serious norare of allegations
contined ins CLA memorandum foand by the Joint inquiry Staffn te files ofthe FOI's Sam
Dingo Field Office That memorandum, which discuss alleged Snearial connections besween
the September 11 hijackers, Sandi Goverament offices, and members ofthe Siudi Royst
Fomily, wes drofted by 2 C14 ce Ec!
information from FBI las. The CLA officer tent to the CTC 10 determine whether CIA bad
pomarily
ditional information. He alse provided 2 copy tothe FBI agent responsible forthe
investigation of one ofthe individuals dicusoud in the memorandum, Despite the
ienplcations of te CIA memorandum, the FBI agent inchuded the memoranéusn in an individual
jt
case fle ad didnot forward itte FBI Headguarters.
a9rere
os in the memorandum until the Joint Inquiry brought the memorandums
of etatere
Posse Sa
i Government Connections to Terrorists and Terrorist Groups
Walle in the United States, sme of the Septenber 11
jackere weve in contact with, and
cosived supporto
assistance from, individuals who may be connect tothe Saud
Govesument. Theres
catia, fo
toast wo of thao lividus were
allege vo be Sat
lgence officers. The Joint nguiry”
red thst the
Leuelligence Community also has information, such of whieh remains speculative and yet to be
independently verified, indicating that Saudi Government o United States may nave
ther ties to el-Qa’id and other terorstproups.
‘The Commitees are particularly concemed about the ations
conained in a CTA memorandum found within
“That memorandum, which discusses alleged financial cormections between the September 11
Iajackers, Saudi Government ufcisle, and membere of the Saudi Roysl Family, was dafled by
CA ofc: IAI, civ primarily on information from FBI fies.
In their est
before the Joint Iguity, nether the CUA nor the FRI was able to
tively identify for Wiese Committees the extent of Saud support for terorist activity
sloball or within the United Stater and the extent to whieh such suppor, fit exit, fs
Intentional o innocent in nature, Bott the FBI and CIA have indicated to the Commitee that
‘hey are now aggressively pursuing Saudi
ated terorit iates
net Seponbar 1 he FB appara did ot os inesigatl
a
the United States due to Soudi Arabia's statue as an American“: " ———
ete oes I i ctbeatings that, peor to Seplember 11°, the FBI received "no reporting from any member ofthe
(MMMM sco i the United Sits
Tncellignce Cosnmunity” thatthe
‘shouldbe clear that this Joa Inquiry has made no final detenniuations a 0 the
‘libilry or sufficiency ofthe information eganding thes: issues that
send CLA document
foun contained in PB
Iwas uot
tack of his Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive
investigation that would be required to det
mined the tras significance of eny such alleged
connections tothe Saudi Goverament. On the one tnd, it possible that these kinds of
connections could suggest 2 indicates is