F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

PUBLISH

JUN 21 2004

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICK FISHER

TENTH CIRCUIT

Clerk

TERESA ZOLTANSKI,
v.

Petitioner,

FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION,

No. 02-9551

Respondent.
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
(FAA Order No. 2002-12)
Patricia S. Bangert of Powers Phillips, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner.
Colette G. Matzzie, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division (Robert D.
McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney,
Appellate Staff, Civil Division, with her on the brief), Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Before KELLY and HARTZ , Circuit Judges, and

CASSELL, District Judge *.

HARTZ , Circuit Judge.

The Honorable Paul G. Cassell, United States District Judge for the
District of Utah, sitting by designation.
*

Teresa Zoltanski seeks review of a $250 fine imposed by the Administrator

of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Administrator assessed the
fine after holding that on October 21, 1999, Zoltanski violated 14 C.F.R. 107.20
(1999), which states, No person may enter a sterile area [the area past the
security checkpoint at an airport] without submitting to the screening of his or her
person and property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control
access to that area . . . . On appeal to this court Zoltanski contends that the
Administrators findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence and
that the Administrator erroneously concluded that her conduct violated the
regulation. She also raises several contentions relating to the fairness of the
administrative proceedings. Exercising jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110, we
affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In determining the relevant facts the Administrator used as her starting

point the findings in an initial decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

The following summarizes those findings, supplemented by some undisputed
facts. Zoltanski, an attorney, went to Denver International Airport late in the
evening of October 21, 1999, to meet an arriving passenger, the speaker at a
legal-education seminar she was hosting. She wished to meet her guest at the
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gate where passengers would be deplaning. At that time nonpassengers were

permitted to meet passengers at a gate if they successfully passed through a
security checkpoint. The FAA called the area beyond a checkpoint a sterile
area. Once inside the sterile area, Zoltanski could take an escalator to the trains
that transported visitors to the various concourses and gates.
At the checkpoint Zoltanski successfully passed through the metal detector,
and her purse passed through the X-ray machine without incident. As she
retrieved her purse from the end of the X-ray machines conveyor belt, Stephanee
Rose, a security screener, asked Zoltanski to submit her purse for explosivestrace-detection (ETD) screening, for which she had been randomly selected. Rose
was an employee of Argenbright Security, a private company operating under a
contract with United Airlines, as permitted by the regulatory scheme then in
effect.
Zoltanski asked how long it would take to test her purse for explosives and
expressed concern that it might be damaged. Rose explained the process to her
and told her that she could refuse to submit her purse for screening, but did not
tell her that she would not be able to proceed to the gate if she refused.
The checkpoint screening supervisor, Harold Avila, observed the
interaction between Zoltanski and Rose. He walked over to them and attempted
to explain the process to Zoltanski and assure her that her purse would not be
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damaged. Zoltanski insisted that she did not need to submit her purse for ETD
screening because it had successfully passed through the X-ray machine. Avila
told her that ETD screening was FAA policy, but did not inform her that refusal
to submit would preclude her from proceeding to the gate. Zoltanski refused the
ETD screening in rather rude tones and asked to speak to Avilas supervisor.
Avila told Zoltanski to wait, and left to get his supervisor. As he walked
away, Zoltanski proceeded to the escalators leading to the train platforms. Patrick
Badu, Avilas supervisor, observed Zoltanski on the escalator as he left his office.
He loudly called out to her from the top of the escalator to stop and return to the
security checkpoint, but she did not respond. (The ALJ concluded that this was
understandable because Badu spoke accented English and could be difficult to
understand.)
Badu approached Zoltanski on the train platform. The ALJ made
inconsistent findings regarding whether Badu was identifiable as a security
officer. First, the ALJ wrote, Like Avila, [Badu] wore a maroon blazer with an
airport ID badge. R., Vol. II, Doc. 35 at 4. Later in his decision, however, he
wrote: [Badu] wore a maroon jacket; identifiable security personnel wore blue.
Further, he was not wearing a badge or other marking readily associating him
with security. Id. at 5 (internal citation omitted). In any event, Badu told
Zoltanski that she needed to have her purse screened, but did not specifically
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mention explosives testing or inform her that she would need to leave the sterile
area unless she submitted her purse for further screening. The ALJ found that
Zoltanski could have reasonably believed that Badu was not associated with
security and thus permissibly ignored this admonition. When Zoltanski insisted
that she had been through screening, Badu radioed Avila to tell him to contact the
police. He continued to follow Zoltanski as she boarded the train, traveled to her
guests concourse, and disembarked. Zoltanski was eventually detained by the
Denver police, who released her after a search of her purse revealed nothing
dangerous.
B. Section 107.20
In response to increasing threats of terrorism, the FAA promulgated 14
C.F.R. 107.20 in 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 1350, 1350 (Jan. 10, 1986). The
regulation states: No person may enter a sterile area without submitting to the
screening of his or her person and property in accordance with the procedures
being applied to control access to that area . . . . 14 C.F.R. 107.20 (1999).
The regulation defines sterile area as an area to which access is controlled by
the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an approved security
program . . . . 14 C.F.R. 129.25(a)(7) (1999). The Background section
explaining the regulation contained the following:
Nonpassengers entering a sterile area generally understand that they
too must be screened in order to ensure the security of the area.
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There have been instances, however, in which nonpassengers have

refused to be screened and intentionally entered a sterile area. Even
when these persons turn out to be unarmed and have no intention of
hijacking or sabotaging an aircraft, their presence requires an
appropriate security response. That need to respond disrupts the
orderly conduct of passenger screening and requires the diversion of
security personnel from other duties. Should another incident
constituting a genuine security threat occur at the same time, the
ability to respond could be seriously compromised.
51 Fed. Reg. 1350. (Section 107.20 has since been recodified at 14 C.F.R.
108.201(c) in 2001, see 66 Fed. Reg. 37330, 37356 (July 17, 2001), and then at
49 C.F.R. 1540.107 in 2002, following the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration . )
Penalties for violating the regulation are authorized by 49 U.S.C.
46301(a)(1), which in 1999 stated: A person is liable to the United States
Government for a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for violating [certain
enumerated statutory provisions or] a regulation prescribed or order issued under
any [such] provision . . . . The FAA Administrator is authorized by 49 U.S.C.
46301(d)(2) to impose these civil penalties.
C. Proceedings Below
The FAA filed a Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty proposing that Zoltanski
be fined $250 for violating 14 C.F.R. 107.20. Zoltanski requested a hearing,
and the FAA filed a written complaint. Zoltanski filed an answer denying the
FAAs allegations and requesting that the complaint be dismissed as frivolous.
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The ALJ held a two-day evidentiary hearing at which Zoltanski, Badu, Avila, and
Rose, among other witnesses, testified. After the hearing the parties filed closing
briefs, and Zoltanski again moved to dismiss the complaint.
In his written decision the ALJ stated that the FAA had not proved its case.
The ALJ prefaced his findings by stating that despite the conflicting accounts
provided by the witnesses, [h]aving observed [their] demeanor and listened to
their testimony, I find that each believed in the truth of what he or she stated.
R., Vol. II, Doc. 35, at 3. The ALJ found: The preponderance of the reliable
and probative evidence did not suggest that Zoltanski made a deliberate effort to
evade screening procedures. Having successfully passed through the X-ray and
magnetometer, she believed that she had been cleared to go to the arrival gate to
meet her passenger. Id. at 4. In support of this finding regarding Zoltanskis
subjective belief, the ALJ said: Screening officials had explained to [Zoltanski]
no more than that an ETD screening was optional. She never understood it to be
mandatory, and understandably felt that she could proceed to the gates. Id. at 5.
Despite finding that Avila had told Zoltanski to wait, the ALJ also found that she
[d]eni[ed] that Avila had told her to wait, [and] asserted that no one had told her
that she could not continue to the trains. Id. at 3.
The ALJ appeared to find that Zoltanskis subjective belief was objectively
reasonable. According to the ALJ,
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While the behavior of screening personnel, particularly Badus

in calling her back and following her, might have reasonably
suggested that the screening process had not yet concluded, it was
also reasonable for Zoltanski to deduce that screening personnel were
mistaken or confused because (in her mind) she had actually cleared.
Id. at 5. The ALJ concluded that on the evidence before him he could not find
that Zoltanski knew or should have known that she had not submitted to the
entire screening process in effect at the checkpoint after passing through the Xray and magnetometer without incident. Id.
The FAA appealed the ALJs decision to the Administrator, contending that
the ALJ had erred in concluding that Zoltanskis conduct did not violate the
regulation. (Zoltanski cross-appealed, but her appeal was dismissed after she
failed to file a supporting brief.) The FAA argued that [t]he ALJ improperly
found that [Zoltanski] had no reason to know that she was required to undergo
ETD screening because [u]nderstood in its proper context, [Avilas] testimony
provide[d] ample basis for a reasonable person to be on notice of the procedures
involved in ETD screening. R., Vol. II, Doc. 39, at 15. The FAA objected to the
ALJs failure to attach any apparent significance to his express finding that
Mr. Avila told [Zoltanski] to wait while he consulted Mr. Badu regarding
[Zoltanskis] recalcitrance to undergo ETD screening, id., at 20, characterizing it
as one of several errors that were debilitating to [the ALJs] conclusion that

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[Zoltanski] did not have reason to suspect that she was subject to mandatory ETD
screening before being allowed access to the sterile area, id., at 21.
The FAA also contended that the ALJ had given improper weight to
Zoltanskis testimony, because his conclusion that [Zoltanski] neither knew nor
had reason to know that she might be, or in fact was, required to undergo a
second layer of screening in order to meet her passenger does not comport with
the testimony of Ms. Rose, and Messrs. Avila and Badu. Id. at 23. According to
the FAA, The record . . . reveal[ed] that the weight of the evidence support[ed]
the conclusion that [Zoltanski] knew, or should have known, that she was
required to submit her purse for ETD screening . . . . Id. In the FAAs view,
once the ALJ had found the testimony of all witnesses credible, the weight of the
credible evidence supported a finding that Zoltanski had violated the regulation.
Zoltanski countered that she did not violate 107.20, and that even if she
did, her violation was unknowing and could not be punished. She argued that she
lacked notice that ETD screening was a required secondary procedure because
none of the security personnel informed her that it was mandatory and that she
would have to leave the sterile area if she refused to submit to it. According to
Zoltanski, The Administrative Law Judge found, and the regulatory history of 14
C.F.R. 107.20 indicates that the Agency did not intend the regulation to be a
strict liability rule and thus, unknowing violations cannot be prosecuted. R., Vol
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II, Doc. 40, at 13. She also contended that mandatory ETD secondary testing
was not being applied the night of October 21, 1999, id. at 21 (emphasis
deleted), and that the ALJ correctly weighed the witnesses testimony and reached
the correct ultimate conclusion.
The Administrator reversed the ALJs decision. Focusing on whether
Zoltanskis alleged subjective belief was objectively reasonable, the
Administrator ruled:
The ALJ erred in holding that it was reasonable for Zoltanski
to conclude that the screening process was over and that she was free
to proceed to the gates. In light of the ALJs factual findings,
Zoltanski should have known that security personnel were not
satisfied that she had completed screening.
R., Vol. II, Doc. 42, at 8. Noting that the ALJ had found that Avila had informed
Zoltanski that the ETD screening was FAA policy, and had told her to wait when
he went to get his supervisor, the Administrator reasoned that although [t]he ALJ
wrote in his decision that no one specifically communicated to Zoltanski that she
could not proceed to the gates[,] . . . [g]iven that Zoltanski had been told to
wait, . . . what is more important is that no one told her to proceed. Id. at 10.
The Administrator also disagreed with the ALJs finding that Zoltanski could
reasonably have concluded, given the circumstances, that Badu was not associated
with security when he told her that she needed to have her purse screened. The
Administrator concluded that the preponderance of the evidence as recited by the
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ALJ himself indicates that [the FAA] successfully bore its burden of establishing
that Zoltanski violated Section 107.20, id. at 12, and fined Zoltanski $250.
II.

DISCUSSION
Before applying the law to the specific facts of this case, we address the

scienter required for a violation of 107.20 and then our standard of review.
A. Scienter
No scienter requirement appears in 14 C.F.R. 107.20 (1999) or the
penalty provision, 49 U.S.C. 46301(a). Section 107.20 states merely, No
person may enter a sterile area without submitting to the screening of his or her
person and property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control
access to that area . . . . And 49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(1) stated in 1999: A person
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not more than
$1,000 for violating the regulation.
Thus, on the face of the regulation and penalty provision, it appears that an
airport patron could be fined even if she had no idea that she was violating airport
security procedures, or even if a reasonable person in her circumstances would
not have known that she was doing so. Nevertheless, we assume without deciding
that a person is subject to a fine for improperly entering a sterile area only if she
did not reasonably believe that she had complied with required security screening.
In this case the FAA (contrary to Zoltanskis contention in her brief) has
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consistently advanced in this litigation that interpretation of the regulation. And

Zoltanski, although arguing that she cannot be fined if she bore no fault, concedes
in her reply brief that she has never contended that she could escape liability if
she had an unreasonable, subjective belief that she had completed screening.
Reply Br. at 23.
Zoltanski has not argued on appeal that she in fact complied with required
security procedures. Nor has the FAA challenged the ALJs finding that
Zoltanski actually believed that she had complied with security requirements.
This appeal therefore turns on whether the Administrator could properly find that
it was unreasonable for Zoltanski to believe that she had completed security
procedures when she entered a sterile area.
B. Standard of Review
Zoltanski contends that the Administrators finding that she violated
Section 107.20 because she failed to wait at the checkpoint is contrary to the
evidence, and the record as a whole. Aplt. Br. at 34-35. In particular, she
argues that the Administrator failed to afford proper deference to the ALJs
findings of fact and credibility determinations.
On appeal, however, we review the factual findings of the Administrator,
not those of the ALJ, and the Administrators findings are conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence. See 49 U.S.C. 46110(c) (Findings of fact
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by the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Administrator, if supported by substantial

evidence, are conclusive.). Our review under this standard is quite narrow.
U.S. Cellular Tel., L.L.C. v. City of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, 340 F.3d 1122,
1133 (10th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the
decisionmaker. Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla
but less than a preponderance. The possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial
evidence.
Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Thus, we may not
displace the agenc[ys] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though
the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo. Custer County Action Assn v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1030
(10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the ALJs findings are an important part of the record, they are
not dispositive. The applicable statute states: In an appeal from a decision of an
administrative law judge as the result of a hearing . . . the Administrator shall
consider only whether(i) each finding of fact is supported by a preponderance
of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence; . . . . 49 U.S.C.
46301(d)(7)(B). Accordingly, the Administrator must weigh the evidence to

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determine whether a preponderance supports a finding by the ALJ. As we have

stated in a similar context:
The Commission must consider the initial decision of the Law
Judge and the evidence in the record on which it was based. But the
findings and conclusions of the Law Judge are not sacrosanct and are
not necessarily binding on the Commission or the court; they are part
of the record to be considered on appeal.
Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 1974) (internal citation
omitted). Our review of the Administrators rejection of a finding of fact by the
ALJ depends on the type of factual finding:
If the Board rejects the ALJ's findings concerning credibility of
witnesses or evidence, the Board must have substantial justification
apparent from the record; however, if it has merely drawn inferences
from the established facts contrary to those of the ALJ, . . . the
Board's rejection of the ALJ's conclusions is less significant.
Nephi Rubber Prods. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1361, 1364 (10th Cir. 1992); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 2 Administrative Law Treatise 11.2, at 778 (4th ed. 2002)
(The ALJs finding is only a part of the record to be considered by a reviewing
court in determining whether the agencys finding is supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole. A finding by an ALJ is particularly influential
with a reviewing court, however, when the finding is a primary or testimonial
inference that is based largely on the demeanor of witnesses . . . .).
This view of the role of the ALJ has been embraced by the FAA. Although
the Administrator is permitted to reweigh the evidence found by the ALJ, In the
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Matter of Ronald C. Terry, FAA Order No. 91-31, at *1 (Aug. 2, 1991), the FAA
recognizes that [an administrative] law judge is in the best position to observe
the demeanor of witnesses at a hearing, and, as a result, the [ALJ]s credibility
findings deserve special deference. In the Matter of Nicholas J. Werle, FAA
Order No. 97-20, at *5 (May 23, 1997).
C. Propriety of the Administrators Ruling
We now turn to the particulars of the appeal before us. Zoltanski contends
that various of the Administrators findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence and that the Administrator erred in concluding that Zoltanski
violated 14 C.F.R. 107.20. There is no dispute, however, regarding most of the
historical facts relating to the airport incident. And the propriety of the
Administrators ruling turns only on whether she could find that it was
unreasonable for Zoltanski to believe that she had completed security screening.
Our discussion can therefore be relatively brief.
The controversy centers on Zoltanskis responses to Avila and Badu. The
Administrator found that (1) Avila told Zoltanski to wait at the checkpoint while
he got his supervisor, and (2) Badu, wearing a security officers coat and an
identification badge, told Zoltanski as she stood on the train platform that she
needed to have her purse screened. Each of these findings was supported by

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substantial evidence and we see no reason to refuse to defer to either finding. We

discuss each in turn.
As for the first finding, Avila testified, I told her to wait, and she just said
she wanted to talk to my supervisor. R., Vol. I, Doc. 15, at 90. Later he
explained, I was like not even like a foot away from her, and I told her to wait
while I go get my other supervisor. R., Vol. II, Doc. 29, at 283. Such testimony
based on personal knowledge constitutes quintessential substantial evidence.
Moreover, the ALJ credited this testimony, finding that Zoltanski asked to speak
to Avilas supervisor. . . . Avila told her to wait. R., Vol. II, Doc. 35, at 3
(internal citations omitted).
The only possible basis for challenging the Administrators finding is that
the ALJ apparently also made a finding contrary to Avilas testimony. The ALJs
decision seems to say that Avila did not tell Zoltanski to wait. See id. (Denying
that Avila had told her to wait, [Zoltanski] asserted that no one had told her that
she could not continue to the trains.) Perhaps the ALJs two findings could be
reconciled by saying that Avila told Zoltanski to wait but she did not hear him. It
is unclear, however, how that could be the case. Avila testified that he was only a
foot away from Zoltanski when he spoke to her, and the ALJ found that
checkpoint traffic was light at the time. If Avila told her to wait, she must have
heard him or intentionally avoided hearing him.
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Had the ALJ not believed Avila, the matter would be rather different. But
the ALJ made no adverse credibility findings, even saying that each witness
believed in the truth of what he or she stated. Id. When the ALJ makes such
hard-to-reconcile findings without making any effort to explain how they can be
reconciled, the Administrator need not defer to one finding over the other but can
draw her own reasonable inferences from the record. We therefore affirm the
Administrators finding that Avila told Zoltanski to wait.
The Administrators other critical findingthat Badu, clearly identified as
a security officer, told Zoltanski that she needed to have her purse screenedis
also supported by first-hand testimony and is undercut only by an ALJ finding
that contradicts another one of his findings supporting the Administrators
finding. According to Badus testimony, when he came out of his office and saw
Zoltanski descending down the escalator to the train station, he:
followed her, and . . . asked her to come back so that we could finish
screening her bag. She kept on descending. As she went down to the
train station, I went down there and told her, Maam, please, we need
to screen your bag. This is an FAA requirement. You cant board
the train.
R., Vol. I, Doc. 15, at 99.
Zoltanski contends that Badu was not identifiable as a security officer. She
argues that the Administrator improperly rejected the ALJs findings that Badus
jacket was a different color from that of other airport security personnel and that
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he was not wearing a badge. To be sure, the ALJ made these findings, but he also
found that Badu was wearing a badge and the same maroon blazer as Avila. It
would have been impossible for the Administrator to defer to both of the
contradictory findings by the ALJ. The Administrators finding was supported by
the record and must be affirmed.
We further hold that the Administrators findings of historical fact support
her determination that Zoltanski could not have reasonably believed that she had
completed the screening process. After all, (1) Zoltanski was asked to submit her
purse for ETD screening; (2) she was told that ETD screening was FAA policy;
(3) she objected to ETD screening and asked to speak to a supervisor; (4) she
departed the screening area without waiting (even briefly) for the supervisor and
even though Avila told her to wait; and (5) when Badu, who was wearing an
identification badge and the same maroon jacket as Avila, caught up to her on the
train platform and said her purse needed to be screened, she responded that she
had been through screening. Disagreeing with the ALJ as to the import of no
one specifically communicat[ing] to Zoltanski that she could not proceed to the
gates, the Administrator observed, Given that Zoltanski had been told to
wait, . . . what is more important is that no one told her that she could proceed.
R., Vol. II, Doc. 42, at 10. The Administrator also reasoned that in light of
Zoltanskis interactions with checkpoint personnel, it was not reasonable for
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Zoltanski to conclude that the man who approached her on the train platform
(Shift Supervisor Badu) was not associated with security. As a result, she should
have stopped and waited until the matter was resolved. Id. at 11. The
Administrator concluded that Zoltanski should have known that security
personnel were not satisfied that she had completed screening. Id. at 8. This is
a reasonable view of the evidence.
Zoltanski complains that the Administrator should have deferred to the
ALJs view regarding what it was reasonable for Zoltanski to think. We disagree.
As we have written in a similar context, [I]n cases in which the ALJ and the
Board reach contrary conclusions, we determine whether the Board sufficiently
articulated reasons for rejecting the ALJs findings or conclusions. Grubb v.
FDIC, 34 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir. 1994). If the Board . . . has merely drawn
inferences from the established facts contrary to those of the ALJ, . . . the Boards
rejection of the ALJs conclusions is less significant. Nephi Rubber Prods., 976
F.2d at 1364. The Administrator need not defer to the ALJ in deciding whether a
persons conduct was objectively reasonable in light of specified facts. The
ALJs observation of the witnesses during their testimony offers no advantage in
resolving the issue because it does not turn on credibility or any other feature of
the particular people involved in the incidentthe task is to decide what a
reasonable person would think or do.
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The record and common sense support the Administrators finding.

Accordingly, we uphold the Administrators ruling that Zoltanski violated the
regulation.
D. Additional Contentions By Zoltanski
We quickly dispose of Zoltanskis additional arguments for reversal. First,
she contends that the Administrator changed the elements of a 107.20 violation
from those argued by the FAA before the ALJ and the Administrator. We reject
this contention because throughout this litigation the FAA has consistently
adopted the position that the test is whether a reasonable person would have
thought that she had cleared security. Second, she contends that the
Administrator actually found her in violation of 49 C.F.R. 1540.109, which was
promulgated in 2002 and thus not in effect on October 21, 1999. This argument
has no basis in the record, and we reject it.
Next, Zoltanski contends that the Administrator denied her due process by
interpreting 107.20 to prohibit any failure to obey any instruction by a private
security employee, an unconstitutionally vague standard under which a person
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Aplt. Br. at 3940 (internal quotation marks omitted). This argument is without merit because
the Administrator did not adopt that interpretation. The actual interpretation
restricts coverage of 107.20 to individuals who should reasonably know that
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their conduct is in contravention of the airports security requirements. Zoltanski

conceded the permissibility of such an interpretation in her reply brief.
III.

CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the Administrators decision and order holding Zoltanski

liable for violating 14 C.F.R. 107.20 and fining her $250. The parties motions
to file their briefs under seal is GRANTED. The FAAs motion to file the
administrative record under seal is GRANTED.

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