People vs Tuanda - A case digest

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs.ATTY. FE T.
TUANDA, respondent.
Facts;
Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the
Supreme Court
finding her guilty of violating BP 22.Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her
suspension to be liftedarguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines
imposed to her inviolation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no
damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense
charged.
Issue;
WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.
Ruling;
The Supreme Court ruled to
DENY
the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals regarding the suspension. Thecourt found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving
moral turpitude citing Secs 27and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
Responsibility

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,

vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than a
decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite
sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed
the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of
P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's
house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25,
1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in
Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house
and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest
bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on
the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the
replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal
residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for
the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the
replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband
Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which
failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of
sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from
carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be
done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the
respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the

writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining
order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted
the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the
Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May
26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute
resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on
August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course
to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the onehalf share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending
decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case
No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.

Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition for
review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can
apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession,
ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the
latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ
of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a
party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have
Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal
properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the
actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present
case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may
not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said
appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The
assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim
ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction
sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of
possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also
has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the

writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is
clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the
properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of
possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in
the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it
belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the
levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties
in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when
Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied
upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only
on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue
that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the
logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the
issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them
from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.

5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the
properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate
interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when
only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at
naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may
never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago
spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ
of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review would prevent the
ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would
Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during
coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case
Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison,
have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in
and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).

We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of
justice.

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead
of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit
or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the
latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of
his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice,
and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the
appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986
(the mother case of the present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even
started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a
supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended
supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken
on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the
suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and amended
supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses
Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business
venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal
property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking
down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which
was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.

Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas and the
sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries, depriving
the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second
cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid
or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal
and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of
P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there
was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine
National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718
where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil
case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase
price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim
has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment."
(Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas but did not affect
the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was
dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by
prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the
acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the
preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must
necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a
consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500;
that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of
the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17,
1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking
advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and
evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale;
that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in

question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two
other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad
faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants'
bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the
inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs.
Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who
acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two
other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with
knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint
and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the
validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression
upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements
subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The
reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties
could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already
indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must
therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners'
counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor
Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this
decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY,
and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with
the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial

intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste,
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned
detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of
Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a
fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone,
gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding,
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda
and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For
this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife
and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two
separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan.
In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his
salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as
well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984,
docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of
full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1
holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment
was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of
P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to
the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City,
said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit, 5
petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or
not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3)
whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as
the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of
the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether
the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason
the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with
the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12,
1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive
Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the
special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could
very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For
this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and
therefore the only heir against his own father. 9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:

. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may
justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were personal matters

affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to
their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 10

I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want
of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also
charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as
only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in
seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner
for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of
page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling,
and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts
in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in
the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted
the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned
the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his
decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately
reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985,
and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually
decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process,

ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be
interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private
respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The
strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid
bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an
employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. 15 Suffering from a disease by
reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is
well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to
effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely
erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner
abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18
as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not
exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December
1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and
fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc.,
Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to
Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really
obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved
and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with
respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de
Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In
any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason;
and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson
Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p.
133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In
Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment
to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act
from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in
Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is
justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some medical
certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter

(Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal
when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had
no intention to abandon his employment. 20

The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment.
Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of
health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and
even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The
disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the
point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were
amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records are bereft of any
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for
petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal
to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute
abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably
may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could
do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly
require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be
subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is
essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved
to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during
the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from
illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by
private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the
control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin

with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer
of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed
his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic
rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate
an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on
the payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes,
and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end
of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that
petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have
abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee.
According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner
from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles
from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped
giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had
been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
(p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on
the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm
legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. 25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from
May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and
legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since
April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to
resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With
these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he
was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. 27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly
be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in
this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as
even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced"
that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services
directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment
from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and
machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29
getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 19831984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request
or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and
monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to
just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be
trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms,
specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed
petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private
respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner
to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would
then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority
an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to
perform work-related tasks:

It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed

by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill
District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing
payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-INFACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place
and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein
given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the
receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my
said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over
to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for
an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such
deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private
respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby

foreclosing his opportunity to

cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on
the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative
Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties
must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as
salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's
entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips
or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative
of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of
concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be
necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by
petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are
also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination
by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of
abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice
and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the
employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in
this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was
petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40

The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set
out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this
wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish
him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for
his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's
last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations as stated against
him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing
of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by
filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him
during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for
their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of employment, the
positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry
for policy guidance and statistical purposes.

Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that

petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin
requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that
no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification
issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department
of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted
thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as
the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires

service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance.
While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be
lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security
of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of
implied resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that
he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other
requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not complied with.
This however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence
of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must
be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed
on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor
Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In
Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he
must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due
process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even
worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. However,
the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case,
however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a
justifiable excuse. 43

II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed
employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the
penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process
requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in
imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required
under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.

Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in
some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there
are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages
and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly
when managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and
just share of what the law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to
wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the
time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs.
NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192,
this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be
made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a
company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and
profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and
ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the
same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated.
Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or
antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private
respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship is hardly possible. 49

III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other
employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate
one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or
omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary
damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They
are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not
they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad
faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel,
however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even
if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of
illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed
employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and
the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in
good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For
this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no
voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his
absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and
hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered

to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in
lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as
one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651).
But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault. 54

The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just
as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to
smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the
direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we
reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it
whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon
less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should
be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do
not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement
between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally
hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor
arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within
his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious
records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family
leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and
enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that
we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to
this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to

the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that
with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this
decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their
differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a
period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a
fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.

[Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a disbarmenti[1] case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against
Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City)
found Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension
from the practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand against him.ii[2]
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a demandletter from the respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian.
The full text of respondents letteriii[3] reads:
Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you
for your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims
which Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have
abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia
Garganian) and up to this moment you have not given said financial support.
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that
you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and
moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to
her house her television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and
without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be
constrained to file the proper action in court against you.

I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at
the above address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about
the preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your
intentional failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed
as your absolute refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an
emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional
financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action
that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to
support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant portion of the respondents second letter reads:
iv

[4]

These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):
1.P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of
P1,500.00 should be up to the completion of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is
subject to adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to his college
course).
2.
P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for
her planned business venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a
teacher in any government position because of her status, having a child without being lawfully
wedded. x x x.
3.
The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss
Garganian, without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4.
The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow
before noon in my Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex
Ong will be withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.

Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong
is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that
the complainant merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was
threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaintv[5] with the Office of the City Fiscal (now
Prosecutors Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one
Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy
Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong
and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the
Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of
the Solicitor General.vi[6] According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied
due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially, the
complainant alleged that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative cases
against him to blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent
solicited for any information that could be used against him in the aforementioned cases by
offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they could
get from him. The complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral,
unprofessional and unethical, constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming
of a lawyer.
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the aforequoted letters of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia
Garganians affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding the demands listed in the letter
addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent for the
complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganians son
illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for alleged violation
of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of
Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative of the
respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an offer

to give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong.
To further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant also included a
Supplemental Affidavit,vii[7] citing several cases previously filed against the respondent by other
parties.viii[8]
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint
lodged against him.ix[9] He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded
the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said
office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial
Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement.
After denying the respondents third request for postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with
the reception of the complainants evidence. The respondent was duly notified of the ongoing investigation but he did not show up. When it was the respondents turn to present
evidence, notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela,
Negros Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon City.
The return cards showed that he could not be located, although his wife received some of the
notices sent to his home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of them
inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2 Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondents absence as waiver of his right to present his
evidence. Finding merit in the complainants cause, the investigator recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be severely
reprimanded.
nd

The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General.x[10] Thereafter, the
OSG transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, for proper
disposition, conformably with adopted policies and procedures.xi[11] The IBPs Commission on
Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report and recommendation in toto.xii[12]
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the
importance of the legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in
Noriega vs. Sison.xiii[13] We then held:
In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and
respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an
attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the
attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say,
however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of
the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court when he said:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the
prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly
or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be
preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with
great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.xiv[14] It
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule
19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith
required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that
he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various
charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his
threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We find
the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not
have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent
has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide
him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions
against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceedingxv[15] and he shall not do any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.xvi[16] In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,xvii[17] we
held:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end
view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions
or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state, the lawyers

fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice,
and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
(emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.xviii
[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.xix[19]
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as
evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose
not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as
it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate
the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.xx[20] The respondent should keep in mind the
solemn oathxxi[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers
oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the
high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1) month
suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis--vis the misconduct of the
respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5830

January 26, 2004

MARY D. MALECDAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PERCIVAL L. PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW P. KOLLIN, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant case arose when Mary D. Malecdan filed a verified Letter-Complaint dated January
19, 2001 addressed to Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion, then President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Baguio and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty.
Matthew P. Kollin, with violation of the lawyers oath, as they "committed acts not only
prejudicial to [the IBP] but are in themselves in violation of the oath that they have sworn to
uphold as [a] condition for their admission to the bar."1
The undisputed facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On November 25, 1999, the complainant entered into a deed of sale with the Spouses
Washington and Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located in Baguio City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-71030.2 The complainant paid P10,000 as earnest money, and
P2,600,000 as the full and final payment of the consideration of the sale. The money was
received by Eliza Fanged and deposited in the account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then
counsel for the latter. The complainant later found out, however, that the said lot was the subject
of a controversy3 between the former owners and the Fanged Spouses.
When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the proceeds of the sale to Eliza Fanged, the latter,
through her new counsel respondent Atty. Kollin, filed a complaint for rescission of contract with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order with damages4 against the complainant,
Atty. Bustamante, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and Washington Fanged
on December 2, 1999.5
Eliza Fanged and the respondents thereafter caused the filing of a Manifestation of Compromise
Settlement with Motion dated December 14, 1999.6 It was prayed, among others, that an order be
issued directing defendant PCIB to transfer the amount of P30,000 from the account of Atty.
Bustamante to a joint account in the name of respondents Atty. Kollin and Atty. Pekas by way of
attorneys fees. The complainant was not a signatory to the compromise settlement, as she was in

the United States at the time. The money was then transferred to the respective accounts as
prayed for in the compromise settlement.
The Complainants Allegations
According to the complainant, respondent Atty. Kollin knew very well that the money entrusted
to him did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. Yet, when the complainants duly authorized
representative Wilfreda Colorado requested that the money be released to her, Atty. Kolin refused
to do so, on the pretext that there was no written authorization from the latter. The respondent,
however, admitted that the money was in his possession.7 The complainant further averred that:
11. The said lawyers were aware that the money in the bank which was the subject of
Civil Case No. 4580-R was the consideration for a supposed sale between me and Eliza
Fanged which did not materialize because it could not be registered aside from the fact
that it is void pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 4528-R. They knew that the
money is not owned by Eliza Fanged. Yet, despite this knowledge, they misled the court
by making it appear that all the parties agreed to the settlement by filing the manifestation
of compromise settlement with motion (Annex "G") knowing that I was abroad and could
not have given my consent thereto.
12. Worse, they made it appear that I was copy furnished of the pleading when in truth
and in fact I never received the same as I was in the United States of America. My
investigation of the matter reveals that the sister of Eliza Fanged, Veronica Buking,
received the pleading for me.
13. When confronted, Eliza Fanged admitted to me that the money was actually entrusted
to respondent Atty. Matthew Kollin.8
The complainant also alleged that she filed the complaint against the respondents because of the
latters connivance in causing the withdrawal of the money in the bank. She pointed out that
while the manifestation of compromise settlement does not bear the signature of Atty. Kollin,
paragraph (b) of the prayer clearly shows that the amount of P30,000 was appropriated to a joint
account belonging to the respondents by way of attorneys fees.
The complainant explained that respondent Atty. Kollin, as counsel for Eliza Fanged in Civil
Case No. 4580-R, prayed that the sale of the property to her (the complainant) be declared null
and void. Proceeding from this premise, then, Eliza Fanged had no right to the money in the
bank; the respondents, likewise, had no right to withdraw the amount of P30,000 to answer for
their attorneys fees. She further averred that the respondents made it appear to the trial court that
she (the complainant) was duly notified of the purported settlement, when she was, in fact, not a
party thereto as evidenced by the records. Thus:
[T]he records reveal that the person who received the copy of the document purporting to
cover the settlement intended for me is the very sister of his client, Eliza Fanged, in the person of
Veronica Buking. Veronica Buking is not and was never a resident of Dagsian, Baguio City, the
location of my permanent residence. Eliza Fanged could not have thought of this scheme.

9. But lawyer as he is, Atty. Kollin must have anticipated possible legal repercussion[s] that
would ensue as a result of this scheme. In the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with
Motion, he asked his co-respondent, Atty. Pekas, to sign as counsel for Eliza Fanged. Atty. Pekas
seem[ed] to be too willing to extend assistance to Eliza Fanged if only to get the money from the
bank. However, in the actual release, and the partition of the money, the respondents reportedly
actively participated to insure their share of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. Atty. Pekas did not
stop there. As counsel for Eliza Fanged, he signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16,
1999 with a misleading statement that "the parties have extrajudicially settled this case amicably
among themselves", when in truth and in fact, I was never consulted. 9
The Respondents Allegations
The respondents denied the foregoing allegations in their respective answers.
Respondent Atty. Kollin admitted that he knew that the money in the bank was the complainants
payment for the land purchased from the Fanged Spouses. He pointed out, however, that it was
unfair to state that his client Eliza Fanged was not entitled thereto, since in the first place, she
appeared as the vendor in the deed of sale executed between her and the complainant.
Furthermore, although Civil Case No. 4528-R had already been decided by the trial court, the
same was appealed to the Court of Appeals,10 and did not become final and executory as
erroneously stated by the complainant. Atty. Kollin also pointed out that he was not the original
counsel of the Spouses Fanged in the said case, but merely "inherited" the same from Atty.
Artemio Bustamante.11
The respondent further averred that because Atty. Bustamante and the Fangeds failed to settle the
problem, he filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale, and not for the release of the money
in Atty. Bustamantes possession. According to the respondent:
To me, this is the gist of the problem. Complainant Mary Malecdan strongly believes that she
was swindled because of the said decision. However, the only problem between Dato and Fanged
is the determination of the actual balance and the payment thereof. Settle the balance with Mrs.
Dato and everything would be settled likewise. As of this time, it is very safe to say that the issue
is still "SUB JUDICE" and complainant could not even be sure of the outcome of said case,
although there is a pending proposal for the eventual settlement of the case by the payment of the
unpaid balance.
Moreover, the title of the subject land is in the possession of the Complainant and could transfer
said title in her name anytime. Perhaps, what the complainant is saying is that the title could be
transferred in her name, however, a "notice of lis pendens" was annotated therein due to the
filing of the case between O. Dato and the spouses Fanged.
For all intents and purposes, complainant could transfer the title in her name and take possession
of the property although the "notice of lis pendens" will be transferred or be likewise annotated
in her title. Complainant knows very well that the problem between O. Dato and Eliza Fanged is
the actual balance to be paid as per the first deed of sale; 12

Respondent Atty. Pekas, for his part, admitted that the amount of P30,000 was transferred by
Atty. Bustamante to their account, but averred that it was done voluntarily. He denied the
allegation that they misled the court by making it appear that the parties agreed to the
compromise settlement with motion, since, as can be gleaned from the compromise agreement
itself, the complainant was not a party thereto.13 The respondent further alleged that:
20. As best as the respondent can recall, on the late afternoon of December 12, 1999,
Atty. Matthew Kollin called up respondent on the telephone. He was requesting for
respondent to attend a hearing of his case the following day, December 13, 1999, for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. This was on the pretext that he has another out
of town case on the same date and cannot attend the hearing. As it is a common practice
among lawyers, respondent acceded to the request;
21. As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a
special appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but
shall only manifest submission of the matter for resolution;

27. That after Eliza Fanged and Wilfreda Colorado related the foregoing story, respondent
asked about the settlement being proposed by the Honorable Court. Eliza Fanged then
expressed her willingness to accept the counter-offer of Atty. Artemio Bustamante to
settle the case in the amount of Two Million;
28. With the new development, respondent contacted the office of Atty. Matthew Kollin
to refer the matter but was informed that the latter is still out of town. Respondent then
advised that if Eliza Fanged is willing, he can assist her in the settlement, to which advice
Eliza Fanged acceded;
29. Respondent contacted Atty. Artemio Bustamante who likewise was willing to settle
and the details of the settlement were agreed upon. Afterwhich the proper manifestation
and motion was submitted to the Honorable Court for consideration and ultimately
dismissal of the case;
31. That during the whole time that respondent participated in the resolution of the case,
he never committed any act involving deceit and machination. He acted in a way which
he thinks is proper 14
Respondent Atty. Pekas prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit, averring that as a
new and young lawyer, there was no reason for him to risk his future for a measly sum, through
dishonest conduct.15
The Proceedings Before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline
On May 7, 2002, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan issued the following Order:

When this case was called for hearing, Atty. Percival Pekas appeared. Atty. Matthew P. Kollin
failed to appear despite the notice duly served on him.
Complainant Mary D. Malecdan appeared without counsel. She manifested that she is submitting
her case for resolution based on the pleadings on record.
The complainant was ordered to present certified true copies of Annex "A" attached to her
complaint, the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex "B" of her
complaint in favor of Mary Malecdan and the Decision Annex "D." Complainant is given ten
(10) days from today to present true copies of her documentary evidence.
Atty. Percival Pekas is given ten (10) days from today to file his rejoinder. Atty. Pekas likewise
manifested that after he shall have filed his rejoinder he submits this case for resolution.16
In his Rejoinder, respondent Atty. Pekas reiterated that he acted in good faith, and did not
commit any act of deceit or machination. He also averred that Atty. Artemio Bustamante would
have been a great help in determining the truth, but unfortunately, the complainant chose not to
implead him.17
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-395, finding
respondent Atty. Kollin guilty of dishonesty to the court, while dismissing the complaint as to
respondent Atty. Pekas, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Atty. Matthew P.
Kollins dishonesty to the court with resulting damage and prejudice to the complainant,
Respondent Atty. Kollins (sic) is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years. The complaint against Atty. Pekas is DISMISSED for there is no evidence on record to
prove that he was aware of the defect in Eliza Fange[d]s right to claim the sales proceeds with a
WARNING that Atty. Pekas should be more circumspect with respect to taking over other
lawyers cases and handling sensitive matters such as the compromise settlement in Civil Case
No. 4580-R.
According to IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juans Report dated May 30, 2002, the main
issue to be resolved in the case was factual in nature: whether or not the respondents knowingly
caused the withdrawal from the bank of the purchase price of the lot in question, despite their
knowledge of a defect in their clients right to claim the said amount. The Commission found that
respondent Atty. Kollin knew that his clients title was defective, having represented her in Civil
Case No. 4528-R. He should have been mindful that his client had no right over the purchase
price as paid by the complainant.1wphi1 Respondent Atty. Pekas was, however, exonerated of
the charges against him, thus:
Insofar as respondent Atty. Pekas is concerned, it should be noted that there is no evidence on
record to prove that respondent Atty. Pekas was aware of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to

claim [t]he sales proceeds. It is likely that respondent Atty. Pekas unwittingly played into the
hands of respondent Atty. Kolin when he signed said Manifestation of Compromise Settlement.
18
In his October 12, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing IBP Resolution, respondent
Atty. Kollin alleged that contrary to the finding of the Commission, he was unaware of the defect
in his clients (Eliza Fangeds) right to claim the sales proceeds. He filed the case for
nullification of contract with prayer for the rescission of the sale between the complainant and
his client on the ground that the latter would be disadvantaged if Atty. Bustamante succeeded in
taking a huge chunk of the money deposited in his name. According to the respondent, if he was,
indeed, interested in the money, he could have filed a case to compel Atty. Bustamante to release
the money to his client, and not a complaint for rescission of contract. The respondent also
reiterated that the reason why he requested respondent Atty. Pekas to attend the hearing of the
case as collaborating counsel was that he attended a hearing in Bontoc, Mt. Province on
December 14, 2002.19
According to the respondent, the complainant should have filed the instant case against Atty.
Bustamante who was "the real architect in the release of the money and the execution of the
compromise settlement with motion." The complainant should have also questioned the order of
the RTC judge concerned as to why no notice was issued to her before the money was released.
The Ruling of the Court
It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the
practice of law, the primary purpose of which is to render public service.20 The practice of law is
a profession and not a money-making trade.21 As they are an indispensable part of the system of
administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of
professional ethics a duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and
disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards
can begin with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would
progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary
business proposition but a serious matter of public interest. 22
Respondent Atty. Kollin knew that the money did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. He
admitted this much in the complaint he himself prepared in Civil Case No. 4580-R, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court:
I. BEFORE HEARING:
1. That it orders (sic) the issuance of a temporary restraining order directing the
manager of the PCIBank Session Rd., Baguio City branch, through its branch
manager, Oscar Aquino, to cease and desist from allowing withdrawal by Atty.
Bustamante of the amount of P2,450,000.00 deposit in his account;

II. DURING HEARING:

1. That it orders the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
defendant PCIBank or its agents from disbursing or allowing withdrawal by Atty.
Bustamante of the amount of P2,450,000.00 deposited in his account;
III. AFTER HEARING:
1. To order defendants Atty. Artemio Bustamante and the PCIBank, Session Rd.,
Baguio City branch, to release the amount of P2,450,000.00 in favor of Mary
Malicdan (sic);
2. To order defendant Atty. Artemio Bustamante to pay the amount of P30,000.00
as attorneys fees;
3. To order that the deed of sale executed between the Spouses Washington
Fanged and Eliza Fanged in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic) be declared null and
void;
4. To order Atty. Artemio Bustamante to release the original owners copy of title
no. T-71030 of the registry of deeds of Baguio City to the complainant;23
Respondent Atty. Kollin cannot now assert that the reason why the prayer in the complaint
included the release of the money in favor of the complainant was that "his client realized that
P600,000 would be too much to be given to Atty. Bustamante as attorneys fees." The respondent
is bound by this assertion in his pleading,24 which, as can reasonably be inferred, was made
because he himself believed that his client was not entitled to the money in question. The
respondent cannot, likewise, find refuge in the fact that his signature did not appear in the
compromise agreement executed between the parties. As found by the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline:
[A]lthough it was respondent Atty. Pekas who signed the Manifestation of Compromise
Settlement with Motion as counsel for Eliza Fanged, it is unbelievable that respondent Atty.
Pekas would dare to sign said Manifestation without the approval or consent of respondent Atty.
Kollin, the counsel of record of Eliza Fanged. As respondent Atty. Pekas himself stated his
authority with respect to Civil Case No. 4580-R was limited as follows: "As agreed by the
respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a special appearance for that
hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall only manifest submission of the
matter for resolution." If as respondent Atty. Pekas claims he was only authorized by respondent
Atty. Kollin to attend one hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R, why did he exceed such authority
by executing the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of Eliza Fanged, respondent
Atty. Kollins client?
The most plausible explanation in this matter is that respondent Atty. Kollin in fact authorized
respondent Atty. Pekas to execute the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of his
(respondent Atty. Kollin) client Eliza Fanged in order to pave the way for the release of the sales

proceeds. This maneuver was resorted to by the respondent Atty. Kollin in order to avoid any
responsibility for securing the release of the sales proceeds to his client despite his knowledge
that his client Eliza Fanged had no right thereto. By having respondent Atty. Pekas sign the
Manifestation of Compromise Settlement, it was the intention of respondent Atty. Kollin to
distance himself from such pleading and claim no responsibility or participation therein so that
the same would not be tainted by his apparent knowledge of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to
claim the sales proceeds. In this respect, respondent Atty. Kollin and his client Eliza [F]anged
have succeeded as they have secured the release of the sales proceeds to the detriment and
prejudice of herein complainant.25
Contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondent Atty. Pekas cannot validly claim that he acted in
good faith as his superior, respondent Atty. Kollin, merely authorized him to attend the
December 2, 1999 hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R. Atty. Pekas, in entering into a compromise
agreement, overstepped the authority he was purportedly given. He was only authorized "to
manifest submission of the matter for resolution." Furthermore, respondent Atty. Pekas himself
claimed that the complainant could not question the compromise agreement as she was not a
party thereto. Atty. Pekas, thus, knew that there was no valid compromise agreement, as one of
the parties in the case was absent at the time it was entered into. He knew that no valid notice
was given to the complainant, since the signatory to the notice of the manifestation of
compromise agreement was a certain Veronica Buking.26
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that
"a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."27 A lawyer is
expected, at all times, to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. Whenever it is made to
appear that a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not
only the right but the duty of the Court which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its bar to withdraw the privilege.28
A lawyer may legally apply a clients funds in his possession to satisfy professional fees which
the client owes him, in the absence of any dispute as to the legality of the amount thereof.29
However, the fact that a lawyer has a lien for his fees on the clients money in his possession or
the circumstance that the client owes him more than the clients funds in his hands may not
excuse him from making an accounting nor entitle him to unilaterally apply the clients money to
satisfy his disputed claims.30 In this case, the amount of P30,000 which the respondents took for
themselves as attorneys fees belonged to a third person, not their client, as admitted by them in
their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an adverse party. It was the possession of the money, its
entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the complaint for rescission of contract, and, if
respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the filing of the complaint itself. Thus, the
respondents could not, without a claiming partys knowledge, apply the amount of P30,000 for
themselves as attorneys fees. If there was someone liable for the respondents attorneys fees, it
was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said that there was a real "compromise" as to the
manner in which the amount of P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the complainant was not
present when the said agreement was made.1wphi1

In the recent case of Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Atty. Michael
Dioneda,31 we had the occasion to state, thus:
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the
courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession
persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.32
An attorneys only safe guide is high moral principle, as the torch to light his way; his best shield
is a clear conscience and an unblemished personal record; and his just reward is to find his
highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest
man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.33 The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what
places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from
any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only on
the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all
members of the bar are strictly required to, at all times, maintain the highest degree of public
confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession.34
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Matthew P. Kollin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of three (3) years. Atty. Percival L. Pekas is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of
land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can
make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind
of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as
well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague,
Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio
in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or
recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular.

You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of
suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here
in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on
the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary
public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal
profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week
day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you
that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and
affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in
the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would
then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not
the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly
and that I will have my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live
and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your
locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the
registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would
charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of
members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal
section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective

advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers,
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal
taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But
solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether
allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or
wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced
by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy
the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable
to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for
personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or
indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to
remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others
who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing
the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional
services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the
bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to
inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was
a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a
number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17
Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases
by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That
should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent
stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly,
the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The
provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the
oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our
action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of
which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances
working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the
impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not
to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the
case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in
view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this
particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of
practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis
B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of
one month from April 1, 1929,

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE
A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R.
SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and
JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint,
sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the
name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead
of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie
Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman
to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker &
McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office."
Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm
name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could
"render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See
Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name
Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97664 October 10, 1991

OUANO ARRASTRE SERVICE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. PEARY G. ALEONOR, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch XXI and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ** respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:p
Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("IPI") filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc.
("Mercantile") and petitioner Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. ("OASI") for replacement of
certain equipment imported by IPI which were insured by Mercantile but were lost on
arrival in Cebu City, allegedly because of mishandling by petitioner OASI.

Petitioner OASI's answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates
("LSA") and signed by Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch of LSA.
However, sometime thereafter, Atty. Trinidad resigned from LSA and Atty. Fidel Manalo,
a partner from the Makati office of LSA, filed a motion to postpone the hearing stating
that the case had just been endorsed to him by petitioner OASI.
On 12 January 1990, after trial which Atty. Manalo handled for OASI, the trial court
rendered a decision holding Mercantile and petitioner OASI jointly and severally liable
for the cost of replacement of the damaged equipment plus damages, totalling
P435,000.00.
Only Mercantile appealed from the decision.
On 19 June 1990, IPI filed a motion for execution of the decision against petitioner OASI
which public respondent judge granted on 25 June 1990.
On 26 June 1990 petitioner's counsel, through Atty. Catipay of the Cebu Branch of the
LSA, filed a notice of appeal 1 claiming that the decision was "mistakenly sent" by the
trial court to the law firm's Head Office in Makati. 2
On 27 June 1990, petitioner, through the same counsel, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the writ of execution alleging that: (1) the failure
seasonably to file an appeal was due to excusable neglect and slight "oversight" 3
claiming that there was miscommunication between LSA-Cebu and LSA main office as
to who would file the notice of appeal; and (2) Mercantile's timely notice of appeal
should benefit petitioner OASI, a solidary co-debtor.
On 2 July 1990, public respondent judge denied OASI's motion for reconsideration
declaring that the appeal cannot be given due course for lack of merit and ordered that
the writ of execution be enforced.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal upon the grounds that:
(1) there had been a valid service of the decision; (2) the decision had become final and
executory as to petitioner OASI; and (3) Mercantile's appeal does not inure to the
benefit of petitioner as they do not share common defenses.
Petitioner is now before this Court alleging that:
1. the honorable Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court when the former affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
undisputed timely appeal made by co-defendant Mercantile Insurance, Co., Inc., the cosolidary judgment debtor of petitioner herein, does not inure to the latter's benefit,

notwithstanding such ruling's resultant legal and procedural "complexities" or

"absurdities;"
2. the honorable Court of Appeals' questioned decision is contrary to law and the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court because its ruling that the undisputed timely
appeal taken by Mercantile Insurance does not inure to the benefit of petitioner, on the
ground that they do not share common defenses, is contrary to the provision of Article
1222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
3. the honorable Court of Appeals ' questioned decision is contrary to law and the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court since petitioner's Notice of Appeal was filed on
time, considering that the period to take an appeal had not commenced to run, there
having been a defective service to the petitioner of the copy of the trial court's Decision;
and
4. granting without admitting that petitioner's appeal was filed out of time, the Court of
Appeals' questioned decision is still contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court because it strictly applied a procedural technicality over matters relating
to substantial justice and equity, disregarding thereby Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court and the extensive jurisprudence on the matter.

The issues in the present petition may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether or not there was valid service of the decision of the trial court upon petitioner's
counsel; and
2. Whether or not the seasonable appeal filed by petitioner's co-defendant Mercantile
should stay the execution as against petitioner.

Deliberating on the instant petition for review, the Court believes that petitioner has
failed to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals ("CA") in rendering its
Decision dated 10 January 1991.
The Court is not persuaded by the contention that the period to file a notice of appeal
had not commenced to run as there had been no valid service of the trial court's
decision upon petitioner's counsel. The Court of Appeals found as a fact that a copy of
the decision was served upon Atty. Catipay but that he refused to receive it:
Finally, on this point, there is an uncontroverted sworn statement of the lower court's legal
aide, Mr. Jesus A. Lim, attesting to the fact that on February 7, 1990 he served on Atty.
Ronald Catipay a copy of the decision in the case, but that the latter 'refused to receive
copy of the decision and instead instructed me to send the copy of the decision to the
Makati Office of the law firm' and that Mr. Lim accompanied the lawyer to a place where a
xerox machine was located, copied the decision and gave to the lawyer a xerox copy of
said decision. This statement seems to find corroboration in the later allegation of Atty.
Catipay that their Cebu office never 'officially' received copy of the decision.

There was no justification for Atty. Catipay of LSA-Cebu to refuse the service, especially
if, as petitioner now alleges, the notice should have been sent to LSA-Cebu on the
theory that Atty. Catipay was the lead counsel.
Petitioner's counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (and not
any particular member or associate of that firm) which firm happens to have a main
office in Makati and a branch office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main
and branch offices operate under one and the same name, Saludo Ledesma and
Associates. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a single firm, LSA
should not be allowed at this point to pretend that its main office and its branch office in
effect constitute separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities and
responsibilities.
Petitioner does not deny that Atty. Manalo, a partner in LSA based in its Makati main
office, received the copy of the decision. Such a receipt binds the LSA law partnership.

The cases cited by petitioner will afford it no comfort. The case of Magpayo v. Court of
Appeals, 5 involved an invalid substitution of counsel, in the present case, there never
was any substitution of counsel as petitioner's counsel remained the law firm known as
Ledesma, Saludo and Associates and that firm only, but that firm as a whole. Neither
would Phil. Suburban Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 6 apply as said
case involved a notice addressed to the lawyer but sent to a wrong address; in the
present case, the Cebu and Makati addresses of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates
were both correct addresses.
The Court also finds no merit in the claim that the affidavit of Mr. Jesus Lim, which, as
already noted, stated that Atty. Catipay refused to accept a copy served upon him and
instead instructed that a copy be sent to the Makati office, had been given undue weight
by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals should have relied
more on the written admission that a copy was served on LSA-Makati on 21 February
1991. Petitioner cites Domingo v De Leon, 7 where it was held that, as proof of service,
an affidavit comes second only to written admission by the party. But that statement was
made in Domingo because there was an inconsistency there between the admission of
the party and the affidavit. There is no such inconsistency in the present case. Rather,
the affidavit in the present case tends to explain why the copy of the trial court's
decision had to be sent to the Makati office.
The trial court's decision was validly served upon petitioner's counsel, whether we look
to the unjustified refusal by Atty. Catipay of LSA-Cebu to accept a copy of the trial
court's decision on 7 February 1990 and the actual notice received by Atty. Catipay on
that date through his acquisition of a photocopy of that decision, or whether we look to

the receipt of the trial court's decision by LSA Makati on 21 February 1990. In view of
the unitary nature of the law firm retained by petitioner as its counsel, we believe that
the reglementary period for filing a notice of appeal actually began to run on 8 February
1990. However, even if the Court were to accept (which it does not) the supposition that
the reglementary period began to run only on 22 February 1990, the day after the copy
of the trial court's decision was received by LSA-Makati, it is quite clear that the notice
of appeal filed by petitioner's counsel on 26 June 1990 was wholly late. By the time the
notice of appeal was filed, the trial court's decision had become final and executory as
to petitioner and could be executed against it.
Petitioner complains that an immediate execution, pending Mercantile's appeal, would
result in "complexities" if the Court of Appeals were to absolve Mercantile of its
liabilities, that petitioner would have no recourse against its solidary co-debtor and
would in effect be held the only one liable under the trial court's judgment.
If that were to happen, petitioner has only itself to blame. It allowed the period for
appeal to lapse without appealing. Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that "[T]he
creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtor or some or all of them
simultaneously." Thus IPI, as solidary creditor, has the right to enforce the trial court's
decision against petitioner OASI.
Petitioner also argues that under Article 1222 of the Civil Code a solidary co-debtor can
raise the defenses personal to his co-debtor and that, therefore, petitioner OASI should
be exempt from paying the portion of the judgment corresponding to Mercantile. This is
not the first time this argument has been presented to this Court. In Citytrust Banking
Corporation v. IVth Division, Court of Appeals, 8 the Court rejected a similar claim made
to delay execution of a trial court's decision. There the Court held that:
With regard to the issue of whether or not private respondent is entitled to immediate
execution of the decision of the trial court, the answer should be in the affirmative.

Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that 'execution shall issue only upon a
judgment or order that finally disposes of the action. Such execution shall issue as a
matter of right upon the expiration of the period of appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.' Having failed to appeal during the reglementary period, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court against petitioner had become final and executory
against petitioner thereby making it the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant the
motion for execution filed by the prevailing party.
The argument of petitioner to the effect that execution should not be allowed during the
pendency of appeal of its co-defendant inasmuch as the same would result in an absurd
situation in case the findings of the trial court are reversed by the Court of Appeals, has

no leg to stand on. The law is clear and admits of no other interpretation. A final
judgment must be executed against the defeated party.
Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court held the two defendants jointly and severally
liable to plaintiff. Therefore, whether or not Marine Midland is absolved from liability on
appeal is of no moment. The fact remains that the judgment against Citytrust had
already become final and executory. Thus, there is no valid ground for the trial court to
deny the motion for execution filed by private respondent at this point in time.
(Emphasis supplied) 9
Moreover petitioner argues that defenses personal to co-debtors are available to the
other co-debtor because "The rights and liabilities of the parties are so 'interwoven and
dependent on each other, as to be inseparable.'" 10 The case cited by petitioner would
not change the situation, since it cannot be said that petitioner OASI's defenses are
similar to, let alone "dependent on" and "inseparable from," the defenses of Mercantile.
In Citytrust Banking Corporation v IVth Division, Court of Appeals (supra) the Court held
that for the rights and liabilities to be "interwoven" their defenses must be "similar":
It must be noted that the two defendants, Marine Midland and Citytrust, filed cross claims
against each other in their answer. Citytrust alleged that the proximate cause of the injury
should be attributed to co-defendant Marine Midland when the latter failed to promptly
inform Citytrust that the demand draft Citytrust issued was really paid by Marine Midland
on December 22 1980. For its part, Marine Midland alleged that Citytrust did not properly
advise it of the actual circumstances relating to the dates of payment of the draft and of
the receipt by the latter of the stop-payment instructions. The rights and liabilities of both
parties concerned are not so interwoven in such manner that their defenses are similar
and that a reversal of the judgment in one should operate as a reversal to the other.
(Emphasis supplied) 11

Petitioner's and Mercantile's defenses actually conflict with each other. Petitioner claims
that the goods were received by it from the carrier vessel in bad condition; Mercantile,
on the other hand, maintains that the goods did not sustain any damage or loss during
the voyage. Moreover, Mercantile claims that, in any case, the insurance contract with
IPI had already lapsed, a defense which petitioner, as the arrastre company responsible
for the damage, cannot invoke to avoid liability. Finally, by failing to appeal, petitioner
effectively waived any right it might have had to assert, as against the judgment creditor,
any defense pertaining to Mercantile. In other words, petitioner by its own act or
inaction, is no longer in a position to benefit from the provisions of Article 1222 of the
Civil Code.
In fine, the trial court's judgment can now be enforced against petitioner OASI. We do
not pass upon because

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-03-1690
April 4, 2003
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P)
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner,
vs.
EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363

April 4, 2003

EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC

April 4, 2003

IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN HIS PRIVATE

PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION THE OFFICE OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas
administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with "discourtesy,
disrespect, insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary
consideration and gross violation of the Civil Service Law." The case was docketed as A.M. OCA
IPI No. 00-956-P.
In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his co-employees, lawyers
and party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises despite
order to do so, thus amounting to insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually
absent from work or made it appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook in the
morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to
P200.00 before he released to them their Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what

was necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once failed to mail printed
matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount given to him for the purpose; and
divulged confidential information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a
monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of
Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).1
Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit,2 and
members of the court staff,3 by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the
cleanliness in and around the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge
Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero's affidavit also corroborated Judge Paas' allegation that
Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the morning and thereafter stay out of the office.
Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000,4 attested that the
alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of
registered mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date.
Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both assigned to the
Pasay City Jail, by their respective affidavits,5 attested that on several occasions, they saw
Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration of the release of
their Release Orders.
Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000,6 denied Judge Paas' charges, and alleged that the
real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she suspected him of helping
her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit
any information from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment; on
September 6, 2000, she hurled at him the following invectives before the other employees of the
court: "Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob,
pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong;" and she insisted that he sign a prepared
resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep.
Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following incidents of
oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the Judge to her chambers
where she berated him as follows: "Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka nagsasabi ng
totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng
estafa at falsification;" the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told him "Bakit ka nandiyan, magleave ka sa Lunes;" and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him again to her chambers and told
him "Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil driver
kita."
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing incidents to
Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to

the Office of the Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statementcomplaint7 against Judge Paas and went to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it,
but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who then told him that they should
forget all about it.
On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the
release of court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and Macabasag executed their respective
affidavits because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective weddings; Hernandez
was in fact indebted to the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his
charge; the court's mail matters were always sealed whenever he received them for mailing and
he never tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed printed matter was actually posted
on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail, because the
money given to him for the purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the
office, he was actually performing personal errands for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas,
who treated him as their personal driver and messenger.
As further proof of Judge Paas' oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez claimed that she
ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated September 7, 2000,8 even if he had
no history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of his
examination.9
The Court treated respondent's Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas and docketed
it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA, which
assigned them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for
investigation.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed that Judge Paas'
husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife's office as his office address in his
law practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty.
Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the
case of People vs. Louie Manabat, et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas'
address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City,10 the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC,
Branch 44.
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme Court to
motu proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the
matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM
No. MTJ-01-1363.

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution12 of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty.
Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit13 wherein they vehemently denied the
charge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address,
they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila
with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when
he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's Office, or when he lunches with or
fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party and her
birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the use
of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate sworn
statements of Atty. Paas' law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez14 and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula15
attesting that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of
the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel16 attesting that Atty. Paas' visits to the court are
neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the practice of his
profession.
On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit17 wherein she admitted that
Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 981197 to 98-1198, "People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita," (now
docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but
only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases were terminated, all
notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.
By Resolution of February 12, 2002,18 the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-011363, Judge Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002.19
On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated March 1,
2002.20
I. OCA Findings and Recommendations
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Almarvez of
exacting money from detainees, violating confidentiality of official communication, absence
without official leave, discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez' unsatisfactory
performance ratings for three rating periods covering January to June 2000,21 July to December
2000,22 and January to April 2001,23 however, the OCA recommended that he be duly penalized
for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1) Month suspension without

pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his
supervisor having failed to observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of employees from the
rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later portion of this decision.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of supporting
evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal
abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas "had used her administrative power of supervision and
control over court personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and pettiness"24 when she issued
her September 7, 2000 Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had
already filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the
purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to
support the administrative case she had already filed against him.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple misconduct in
office, and be penalized with reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
II. This Court's Findings:
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of
confidentiality of official communication against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in
Judge Paas' complaint-affidavit which reads:
That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which is
confidential in nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the
release of Court Order and Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving
undue advantage or favor to the paying party detrimental to the due administration of
justice.25
in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet
the same.
As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were echoed in the
affidavits of court personnel, they are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary to
what is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly,
with his fellow employees.

On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Absent
any evidence to support the charge, the affiants jail officers who claimed to have witnessed
Almarvez receive money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their Release
Orders not having been presented, hence, their claim remains hearsay, Almarvez' categorical
denial and counter-allegation that these affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear of or
favor to Judge Paas gain light.
As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would thereafter leave the
office, again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr.
While she submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum26 requiring
Almarvez to explain why he was not in the office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5,
2000, despite his affixing of his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that he
reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he
submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in her September 7, 200027 memorandum,
which explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog,
Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug Board.28 As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000,
Almarvez' explanation that he was actually present in the morning but left in the afternoon for
the Supreme Court29 was not controverted.
On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the OCA that he
should be faulted therefor:
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods covering
January to June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows
that he failed to perform his official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez never
disputed the performance ratings given him is tantamount to an implied acceptance
thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book V of Executive Order No. 292, quoted as
follows:
"Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him
may appeal through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or
Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his performance
rating. Failure to file an appeal within the prescribed period shall be deemed a
waiver of such right."
The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to drop him
from the Rolls. However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with
the requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil
Service Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he was able to make up and
cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to improve his performance in his
detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his performance rating for the period

April to June 2001 with a "very satisfactory" rating, dropping him from the roll will no
longer be appropriate30 (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the above-quoted findings
of the OCA reads:
2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may
be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or
employee concerned is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a
semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall
warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days
from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable
the employee to prepare an explanation. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by the OCA, is
thus in order.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failed
to substantiate the same.
Judge Paas' order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are required to undergo a
drug test prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a
pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of
productivity of the civil service. However, considering that the order was issued after Judge Paas
filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing
expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which
Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.
C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:
By Judge Paas' own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit,31 she was aware
that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a case
lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it, "[w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could
be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in
the same building and should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel."32

The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge and her spouse,
Atty. Paas:
SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice
and Promoting Respect for their Officials and Employers" reads:
As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be preserved
and enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court officials and
employees must:
1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for
disciplinary action under, as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of
Judicial Conduct; and Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully comply with
the norms of conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);
2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;
xxx

xxx

xxx

6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or
judicial functions. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. (Emphasis
supplied.)
SC Circular No. 3-92,33 dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR
RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used
only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice,
and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges
or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.

Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat
Guerra), a case involving unauthorized and improper use of the court's premises for
dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated
October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct
prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the service, and
imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of
the court's premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to
exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage. (emphasis supplied.)
By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge
Paas indeed "allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest,
in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct"34 and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars,
which violation is classified as a less serious charge under the Rules of Court35 and is punishable
under the same Rule.36
A judge's official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his
behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be
beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judge's official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judge's attributes depend the
public perception of the Judiciary.37
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that
had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his
client, that he has close ties to a member of the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 3 A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL
USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION
OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR
GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's case, instead of banking on his relationship with
a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court,
cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a
public office to enhance a lawyer's prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded
by such reprehensible and improper conduct.
This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure
receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his
court notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty.
Paas used his office address but there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to
that address. While a lawyer should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that he is
properly informed of any court action, these should not violate his lawyer's oath or the Code of
Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of the judiciary to breach
his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of
inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;
(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning
that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;
(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,
(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC
Circular No. 3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00),
with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely; and

(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and appended to respondents' personal record.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement;
but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in
the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further
mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that
he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for

the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing
circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations
were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of
the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto
Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.
RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:
Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No.
11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for
gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a
motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration dated April 26, 1995.
For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be deduced, separate
copies of the basic motion were furnished the Chief Justice, Judicial and Bar Council,
Solicitor General, Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator
and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and Ombudsman. Copies of the supplemental
motion were also furnished by him to the same officials or entities and, additionally, to
the individual members of this Court.
In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be
resolved in this case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
in granting the motion to quash the aforementioned criminal case. We quote the
pertinent portions of his ponencia not only for easy reference but to serve as a basis for
determining whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the administrative
offense, to wit:

The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the
light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the
Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted
LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his
opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have
immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in
implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI;
otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by
the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees,
such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers
have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the
former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and
effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order
issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement
P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly or impliedly
revoked or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law (Rollo, pp. 7-8).
xxx xxx xxx
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the
citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the
applicable law to a particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may
be the advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are
duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of
Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed of the existing
laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members
of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of
his duties is subject to censure. But where, as in the present case, the error could have
been entirely avoided were it not for the public respondent's irresponsibility in the
performance of his duties, it is but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and his
order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's error
is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance of the law which
could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's competence.

We could stop here, since the rehashed arguments raised by respondent judge in his
aforesaid original and supplemental motions are completely refuted by the foregoing
discussion demonstrative not only of his adjudicatory error but also of judicial

incompetence. In fact, just to cite a few representative cases, it may be worthwhile for
respondent judge to ponder upon the Court's observations in Aducayan vs. Flores, etc.,
et al., 1 Ajeno vs. Inserto, 2 Libarios vs. Dabalos, 3 and Estoya, et al. vs. Singson, etc., 4
which would put his asseverations at rest.
Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his other supplications,
arguments, and even his insinuations for that matter, which although born more of
fecundity in formulation and less of bases in law, we have decided to anatomize even
with some expense of prolixity.
Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that "(t)he only
purpose of (h)is motion is to plead with bended knees and with all humility for the kind
reconsideration" of the decision in this case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly
ignorant of the law and as such, (he) was reprimanded and fined in the amount of
P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid decision is to be spread on (his) personal records." 5
He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates that the error
primarily stemmed from the shortcomings of the public prosecutor and, on a personal
note, he expresses this concern: ". . . I am again begging with humility that the
spreading of the aforesaid Decision on my personal records be reconsidered because
doing so will foreclose any chance for me to aspire for promotion in the judiciary in the
future. This is very painful. I will agonize up to my last day and my last breath in life." 6
The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into
consideration and is not insensitive thereto, including his argumentum ad
misericordiam. It feels, however, that there is more than ample substantiation for the
findings of the ponente in the main case, and compelling legal warrant for the
administrative penalties imposed which are even milder than those meted by it under
similar and comparable situations.
The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official
procedure and requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very
Court to violate and forego, in suppression of facts which must appear in official
documents. His further argument that
The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only open criticisms on
my private qualifications as a minister in the temple of justice but will open more
comments on my official acts, competence and credibility as a judge that might
undermine the people's faith in the judicial system in the Province of Palawan, in Puerto
Princesa City and in the entire country because it is always difficult to disassociate my
private credential from that of my public qualifications. 7

is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic. The Court regrets
that respondent judge appears unaware that he is actually the recipient of uncommon
sympathetic consideration in this case.
Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrian chant to a public
career, judicial or otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by subsequently demonstrating
his true worth through observance of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a
misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and to rise to higher levels which is
the destiny of the deserving. Besides, it is a curious fact that assuming as valid his
meticulosity on the confidential nature of disciplinary cases, he nevertheless sent copies
of his motions to all the persons enumerated at the start of this resolution. It is
elementary that copies of such motions are merely filed with the court and furnished
only to the adverse party. Here, he wants us to keep sub rosa what he himself
publicizes.
From his initial exhibition of humility and penitential pose, respondent judge then goes
into a critical second gear by rhetorically wondering aloud in this fashion:
On July 27, 1994, the Third Division of the Honorable Supreme Court required me to
comment on the above-entitled petition. On August 23, 1994 I filed my comment thereto
and on October 24, 1994, in a Resolution the Third Division of the Supreme Court
resolved to note my Comment. When the Third Division of the Honorable Court required
me to comment in G.R. No. 116049, the supposition is that a valid raffle of said case to
that Division had already been made. That was my thinking and impression for, why
would the case go to that Division except thru a valid raffle. I am now in quandary,
however, as to why all of a sudden, G.R. No. 116049 was transferred to the Second
Division of the Supreme Court without us or any party being informed by the Honorable
Supreme Court about it. In our level at the Regional Trial Court in Palawan, we observe
the raffle of cases with solemnity and abide by the result of the raffle faithfully. And the
said Second Division meted me out excessive penalties when it was the Third Division
that required me to comment. Why did this happen? (Emphasis supplied.) 8

Since this was obviously spoken with the ascriptive courage of the uninformed, we
assure His Honor that the Supreme Court also conducts "a valid raffle," observes such
raffle of its cases "with solemnity," and abides by the result thereof "faithfully." This case
was validly and solemnly raffled to Mr. Justice Bidin who was then with the Third
Division of the Court. On January 23, 1995, he was transferred to the Second Division
where he served as working chairman until his retirement on April 7, 1995. In
accordance with the internal rules of the Court, this case remained with him as the
original ponente and he accordingly penned the decision therein for and as a member of
the Second Division. There is no rule in the Court that the parties be informed that a
case has been transferred to another division, as respondent judge would want or

expect. To do so would easily be revelatory of the identity of the ponente which is

precisely what some litigants used to, and still, watch for and speculate upon.
In anticipation of a similar insinuendo, respondent judge is further informed that
because of the retirement of Mr. Justice Bidin and the uncertainty of the date when his
replacement could act upon his unfinished cases and the subsequent proceedings
therein, after its summer session and working recess the Court en banc, after due
deliberation on respondent judge's successive motions, decided to assign the
preparation of this resolution to the present writer thereof, he having been and still is
with the Second Division. Respondent judge, with his claim of extensive magisterial
experience, should have verified all the foregoing facts from the records of this Court,
instead of proceeding upon speculations.
Finally, shifting to what he obviously fancies to be high gear on a constitutional basis,
respondent judge questions the competence of the Second Division of this Court to
administratively discipline him. Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a
constitutional issue as to require the referral of this case, or at least the disciplinary
aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter merely involves a
clarification of the misconception of respondent judge thereon, presumably because of
his unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this Court, some of them being
on internal procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court are aware
of the submissions of respondent judge on this point through the copies of the motions
which he furnished them, and he insistently harps on constitutional grounds therein, the
Court en banc resolved to accept this aspect of the case from the Second Division.
His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present
Constitution which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon." This provision is an expansion of and was taken from the second sentence of
Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution which provided: "The Supreme Court shall
have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
Members, order their dismissal."
Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase
"en banc" in referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution and,
from this, he argues that it is only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can
administratively punish him.
Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to take up that precise

matter with the committee chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by
pointing out the equivalent provision in the 1973 Constitution, hereinbefore quoted,
which merely referred to the "Court," without qualification. It was accordingly explained
and agreed that insofar as the power to discipline is concerned, the qualification was not
intended to make a difference, as a reference to the Court by itself necessarily means
the Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en banc" there because all internal
procedural and administrative matters, as well as ceremonial functions, are always
decided by or conducted in the Court en banc. On the other hand, where the reference
is to the Court acting through its divisions, it would necessarily be so specified. For lack
of transcription of the proceedings of the committees of said Commission, the writer has
perforce to rely on his recollection and notes, but he assures this Court of the foregoing
facts as they transpired.
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there
are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a
declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that
all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court
since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the
Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein."
Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and
decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court
en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar
Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various
Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee
of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a
period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxx xxx xxx

This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the
aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative
matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a
congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially
in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would
require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for
the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or
matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of
authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members. 10
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the
need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the
judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than
one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided
in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated
Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of
its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a
decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).

That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases assigned to a division
thereof rests on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute the
antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it
would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with situations like the
one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.
WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment
in the case at bar are hereby DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and
executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4646

April 6, 2000

ROSITA S. TORRES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. AMADO D. ORDEN, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Complainant Rosita S. Torres engaged the services of respondent Atty. Amado D. Orden to
represent her in Civil Case No. 1928-R for the recovery of possession of a market stall from
spouses Prudencio and Victorina Gayo before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Baguio
City. In time, a decision was rendered in favor of Torres. The Gayo spouses appealed the case to
the Court of Appeals. Respondent lawyer failed to submit an appellee's brief before the appellate
court; hence, the resolution, dated 05 July 1994, of the Court of Appeals"No appellee's brief having been filed per JRD Report of June 16, 1994, the Court resolved to
submit the case for decision sans appellee's brief. Let the case be re-raffled for study and
report."1
On 25 September 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in favor of the spouses Prudencio
and Victorina Gayo.
On 12 October 1995, respondent lawyer filed with this Court a Notice of Petition for Review on
Certiorari. On 15 January 1996, no Petition for Review on Certiorari having theretofore been
filed, this Court issued a resolution declaring the case terminated and the judgment of the Court
of Appeals final and executory. Thus"It appearing that petitioner failed to file the intended petition for review on certiorari within the
reglementary period, the Court further resolved to DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED
AND DIRECT the Clerk of Court to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be
reviewed has become final and executory, no appeal therefrom having been timely perfected."2
Complainant thereupon filed the instant Administrative Complaint against respondent for the
latter's failure to properly discharge his duty as such counsel despite his having allegedly
received the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for court expenses and
attorney's fees.3
In a manifestation, dated 11 January 1997, to this Court, respondent explained that"x x x when undersigned filed his Notice for Review on Certiorari, he had then expected to
receive a notice for the payment of fees and thereupon the number of days within which to file
his brief"Scjj

xxx

xxx

xxx

"x x x had undersigned been given notice to pay the fees and file the brief for the complainant
within such time as this Honorable Court may have directed, undersigned would have paid such
fees and filed the said brief."4
In its resolution of 17 February 1997, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Attorney Renato G. Cunanan, submitted in due time the results of his
investigation. The report dated 07 November 1998, adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution of 19 June 1999, contained the salient findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.5
"We note that inspite of Atty. Orden's repeated declarations which would create the unmistakable
impression that he had in fact prepared and completed his client's brief, no such brief was ever
submitted to the Supreme Court, either in connection with his Motion for Reconsideration dated
March 22, 1996, or his Manifestation of January 11, 1997.
"We are convinced that Atty. Amado Orden, despite his avowals has not prepared any such brief.
Worse, we are just as convinced that Atty. Orden has displayed a glaring ignorance of procedures
and a grossly negligent failure to keep abreast of the latest resolution and circulars of the
Supreme Court and the Appellate Court in regard to appeals. To be sure as a practitioner, Atty.
Orden ought to have kept himself attuned to the Rules of Court and the latest jurisprudence and
rulings of the Supreme Court. Briefly stated, respondent Atty. Orden has not been honest with the
Supreme Court. Worse, he has not been honest with his client and worst with himself.
"We recommend that Atty. Amado D. Orden be suspended from the practice of law for at least
one year."6
It does look apparent that Attorney Amado D. Orden has fallen far too short of the
circumspection required of every member of the Bar. Jjsc
A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance or
nonfeasance, would be binding on his client.7 Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the exercise of
utmost prudence and capability in that representation.8 Lawyers are expected to be acquainted
with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to
expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted
fealty to the client's cause.91wphi1
Upon appeal, the appellate court, not being in a position to hear firsthand the testimony of the
parties, can only place great reliance on the briefs and memoranda of parties. The failure to

submit these pleadings could very well be fatal to the cause of a client. Respondent's failure to
submit the brief to the appellate court within the reglementary period entails disciplinary action.10
Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but also to the court as well.11 His shortcomings
before the Court of Appeals is, in itself, already deplorable but to repeat that same infraction
before this Court constitutes negligence of contumacious proportions. It is even worse that
respondent has attempted to mitigate his liability by professing ignorance of appellate
procedures, a matter that, too, is inexcusable.
Regrettably, the Court is constrained to affirm the aptly considered recommendation of the IBP
on the matter.12
WHEREFORE, this Court so finds respondent Atty. Amado Orden remiss in his sworn duty to
his client, and to the Bar and the Bench as well, and imposes upon him the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year immediately effective upon
his receipt of this judgment.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as an attorney and as
a member of the Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant
Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision,
Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds
of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V &
G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its
subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification,
to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer
certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material
benefit from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending
official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds
to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the
V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration
of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require
V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the
transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron
suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a
certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him
with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money
per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G
or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably
on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory
affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to
respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare,
respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's
extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him
to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163
certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale
with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987,
Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen
(15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been
repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the
incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same
tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)

On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator,
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579),
the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the
NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with
assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June
4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent
Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed
respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be
taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on
the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of
directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official
transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear
Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a
formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of:
(1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated
requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the
registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material
benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a
public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for
himself in connection with pending official transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.
Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be
reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and
(3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence
supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave
misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for
registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious
action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the
documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof,
that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in
question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent
still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the
submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he
neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted
the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of
P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills
but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this
related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he
never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to
mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of
applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the
discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)

Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be

dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm.
Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government
service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA,
Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint
against said respondent.

The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as
a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official.
The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of
his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo,
1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and
efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and
justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige,
its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected
those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty,
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the
centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis
supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the

discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process
documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them
from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by
the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for
any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable"
may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer
must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court
Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a
public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of
the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo
G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred
from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant

City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.
I
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant
City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's
business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1,
1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was
scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking.
The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and
subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment.
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not
return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around
2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant
had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the
latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo
nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay."
Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his
right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI
Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found
positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money.
Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of
the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent
declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right
against self-incrimination.
On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of
administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him.
On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending
investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).

Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases
were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave
Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was
found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was
pending resolution.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant
surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and
consent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at
the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal
of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a
criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a
public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent
were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating
fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However,
upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was
transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent
be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving
the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI
agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and
criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of
extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony
(Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics
93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA
197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176
SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official,
which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's
oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 2001-9-SC

October 11, 2001

DOROTEO IGOY, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GILBERT SORIANO, Court Attorney VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, First
Division, respondent.
RE S O LUTI ON
PER CURIAM:
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost
responsibility "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers."1 Arrogating unto oneself, as in this case, the mantle of a Justice of the Highest Court of
the land for the purpose of extorting money from a party-litigant is an ultimate betrayal of this
duty which can not and should never be countenanced, because "[i]t is this kind of gross and
flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for the
law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds
of our polity."2
Complainant Doroteo A. Igoy is one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 141843, entitled "Heirs of
Gavino Igoy, et al. v. Mactan Shangrila Hotel".3 In a letter-complaint dated October 8, 2000,4
written in the Cebuano dialect and addressed to the Chief Justice, complainant alleged that while
the aforesaid case was still pending before the Court of Appeals, he tried to look for a person in
the Supreme Court who may assist him in obtaining justice. Sometime in July 1, 1999, a friend
introduced complainant to a certain "Justice" of the Supreme Court. He narrated to the said
Justice the history of their case. In turn, the said Justice asked for and received from him the sum
of P20,000.00. However, the said Justice reminded complainant that he could offer no help while
the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.
In February 2000, they received an unfavorable decision from the Court of Appeals. Thus,
complainant immediately visited the said Justice at his office in the Supreme Court to inform him
of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Justice offered to prepare the petition for review to
be filed with the Supreme Court. Complainant subsequently met the said Justice at the Max's
Restaurant, where the latter turned over the prepared petition for review. In consideration
therefor, the Justice asked for an additional P20,000.00. Since complainant did not have that
amount of money with him at that time, he undertook to send the same by courier as soon as he
arrives in Cebu. Complainant asked for the said Justice's complete name and address, which he
readily gave as: Atty. Gilbert Soriano, 22 Melon Street, Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las
Pias City.

As promised, complainant sent the amount of P20,000.00 through the Aboitiz Express on May 2,
2000. The parcel was received by a certain Alvin Soriano, who turned out to be respondent's son,
on May 5, 2000.
Complainant was surprised to learn that on May 31, 2000, this Court denied the Petition for
Review. Accordingly, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which this Court denied with
finality on July 31, 2000.
Together with his letter, complainant submitted the following documents:
l. Photocopy of the Petition for Review allegedly prepared by the "Justice;"5
2. Shipper's Copy of Prepaid Consignment Note No. EO993783C dated May 2, 2000,
addressed to one Atty. Gilbert Soriano of 22 Melon St., Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 313, Las Pias City, with telephone numbers 826-1018, containing cash in the amount of
P20,000.00,6 and sent by one Doroteo Igoy of Mactan, Lapu-lapu City, with telephone
numbers 495-8-49;7
3. Letter dated May 5, 2000 of one Atty. Gilbert F. Soriano, addressed to Aboitiz Express,
authorizing his daughter, Christine Soriano, or his son, Alvin A. Soriano, to receive
Parcel No. EO993783C on his behalf;8
4. Note dated May 5, 2000, evidencing receipt by one Alvin Soriano of the package on
that date at 11:30 o'clock in the morning.9
In his comment dated November 6, 2000,10 Atty. Gilbert Soriano denied that he was the "Justice"
alluded to. He alleged that his friend, Nic Taneo, introduced complainant to him because the
latter was seeking help regarding a pending case involving his poor relatives; that complainant
requested him to go over their petition to be filed with the Supreme Court, to ensure that the
same would not be denied on technical grounds; he acceded to the request, after which
complainant told him that he will be sending him a token of gratitude, but he did not know that it
was money.
Respondent further narrated that on May 4, 2000, he received a telephone call from Aboitiz
Express, informing him that complainant had sent him a parcel but the messenger was unable to
locate his given address, and asking him to execute a letter authorizing anyone in his house to
receive the parcel. He recalled complainant's promise of a token of gratitude, so respondent
authorized his children to accept the parcel. He was surprised to find inside the parcel cash in the
amount of P20,000.00. After several days of mulling over what to do with the money, respondent
asked his friend to contact Atty. Rodulfo Taneo. the counsel for petitioners in G.R. No. 141843.
Atty. Taneo told him to hold the money and wait until he arrives in Manila.

Respondent denied giving complainant any assistance other than checking the formal
requirements of the petition for review. He also denied that he entertained complainant in his
office in the First Division of this Court which, according to him, barely accommodates the staff
therein with very little elbow room. Assuming that complainant was thus accommodated in
respondent's office in the First Division, respondent could not have uttered the irresponsible and
degrading statements imputed on him by complainant. Further, respondent denied having
received the amount of P20,000.00 from complainant, arguing that, as a practicing catholic and
active church leader, he can not in conscience deceive anyone and ask for money.
Respondent likewise denied having demanded for an additional P20,000.00, countering that
complainant merely promised him a token gift for the little help that he extended, without
mention of any amount. In fact, he almost forgot about that promise, and he remembered it only
when he was notified by the courier service that he had a parcel from complainant. That was
almost two (2) months after the case petition for review was filed with this Court.
In closing, respondent insinuated that if this Court should find that he committed a misconduct
despite his explanation, he shall offer to retire from the service.
On November 16, 2000, complainant wrote another letter to the Chief Justice, again written in
the Cebuano dialect.11 Complainant averred that respondent was introduced to him by Engr.
William Redoblado as one of the Justices of the Supreme Court. He only learned that respondent
was not a Justice when they met at the Cebu Mactan International Airport on October 31, 2000.
Respondent offered to return the P40,000.00, but he refused to receive the same. Instead, he told
respondent to just wait for the outcome of the complaint he filed against him with the Office of
the Chief Justice.
In the same letter, complainant provided the following questions and answers, to wit:
1.

What is the name of the Justice of the Supreme Court whom you contacted?
Answer: Atty. Gilbert Soriano.

2.

Where did you meet/see him?

Answer: Inside the premises of the Supreme Court.

3.

Who was the person who introduced him as Justice?

Answer: Eng. William Redoblado was the one who introduced to me that Gilbert
Soriano is a Justice. I never knew that Gilbert Soriano is not a Justice.
4.

Where did you specifically give to the Justice the first P20,000.00?

Answer: At the ground floor of the Supreme Court beside the canteen where the
parking area is located.
5.

Who were with you at the Max's Restaurant when the petition was given to you?

&
Answer: Engr. William Redoblado, Leonardo Paquibot, Atty. Rodolfo Taneo,
Atty. Gilbert Soriano and myself (complainant Igoy). Atty. Taneo returned the petition
because it was lacking.
Respondent submitted his comment12 to the second letter, wherein he contended that when
complainant allegedly gave him the sum of P20,000.00 on July 16, 1999, his case was still
pending before the Court of Appeals; hence, there was then no reason for complainant to
approach respondent and give him money. Moreover, it is unnatural for a person to give money
to someone whom he does not know well and whom he met only for the first time. Respondent
brands as unbelievable the version that complainant handed the money to him at the parking area
beside the Supreme Court canteen, where many of the Court's employees and visitors frequently
pass. He claimed that it was not Engr. William Redoblado, but Mr. Taneo who introduced him to
complainant.
Respondent alleged that on October 30, 2000, he informed Atty. Taneo that he was returning the
money he received through Aboitiz Express. He was told ,by Atty. Taneo to meet him in Cebu.
On October 31, 2000, respondent arrived in Cebu and met Atty. Taneo and complainant at an
eatery near the airport. Respondent offered to return the P20,000.00 to complainant, but the latter
refused to accept it. Complainant stated that he will withdraw his complaint only after the
Supreme Court decides their case in their favor. Respondent, however, informed complainant
that as a mere employee of the court, he could not dictate the outcome of the case.
On January 8, 2001, Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under R.A. 1616,
without specifying its effectivity date.13
The Office of Administrative Services, to which this case was referred for evaluation, issued a
Memorandum on May 30, 2001, recommending respondent's dismissal from the service effective
immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits to which he may be entitled.
Respondent's offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may be
imposed on him. However, the mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate
him from the consequences of his acts. As this Court pointed out in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:14
. . . Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of

persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizen's may have in the proper
administration of justice.
Settled is the rule that in administrative cases of this nature, the Court may proceed with its
investigation and mete the appropriate penalty against erring officers of the court.15 Resignation
should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by
court personnel facing administrative sanction.16
In recommending the dismissal of respondent from service, the Office of Administrative Services
(OAS) reasoned that:
From the established facts, it is clear that complainant came to see respondent to plead for
help in preparing a Petition for Review. The respondent, on the other hand, saw it as an
opportunity to make the complainant believe that he has the "influence and connections"
in the court and would be easy for him (respondent) to help the complainant.
True, as respondent claimed, he was not urged by ulterior motives in preparing the
Petition for Review or at least reviewing the same, but not being his official duty to do
so, his actuation led complainant to believe that it should be for a fee. It would have been
very easy for him to decline the offer of P20,000.00 even if it was gratuitously given if
his real intention was merely to help. He knew for a fact that the petitioners have a
counsel who, presumably, knows the appropriate pleadings to be filed with this Court.
Sec. 7 (D) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Ethical Conduct and Standard for Public Officials and
Employees) specifically provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions
xxx

xxx

xxx

d. Solicitations or acceptance of gifts Public officials and employees shall not

solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan
or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official
duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transactions
which may be affected by the functions of their office.
Respondent, who is himself a lawyer, should have avoided all the circumstances in which
he might be accused of using his office in the guise of "helping others", for this taints the
integrity of the Court.

The denial of the respondent of the receipt of initial payment of P20,000.00 cannot
simply overcome the positive assertions of the complainant. If no such initial payment
took place, Atty. Soriano would not have claimed the subsequent payment through the
Aboitiz Express.
The claim of Atty. Soriano that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him
from any liability. To tolerate such acts would open the floodgates to fraud or graft and
corruption to be committed by officials and employees of the Court.
Likewise, the fact that respondent tried to return the amount to Mr. Igoy after the Chief
Justice required him to comment on the complaint only strengthened the case against
him. Even if the offer to return the money was accepted by the complainant, it will never
exculpate him of his administrative liabilities. Respondent by his brazen conduct
consummated an act that by itself is a disservice to the administration of justice and an
affront of the image of the court before the public.
It is admitted that respondent offered to resign, however, resignation should not be used
as an easy way to escape administrative liability by a court personnel facing
administrative sanction. Respondent therefore cannot go scot-free and be simply forgiven
for the damage he caused to the institution he was bound by his oath and The Canons of
Legal Ethics to serve with utmost integrity.
Respondent may have been in the service for 28 years, but he has blemished his record
irreparably and under the circumstances, this office believes that dismissal as a penalty is
warranted.
The Court adopts the foregoing findings and recommendation of the OAS. Time and again, this
Tribunal has emphasized that "[t]he conduct or behavior of all officials and employees of an
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.17 Their conduct must, at
all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and
maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary."18 Indeed, Canon 6, Rule 6.02, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states in no uncertain terms that
Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the prevailing facts of this case
considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of this Court. It bears stressing that government
lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is a

public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional
obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.19
The Court could not help but express its great disappointment over the conduct of respondent
who, as a lawyer with twenty-eight (28) years of government service behind him, should have
been among the first to set an example to his co-employees and fellow civil servants. Instead, he
badly tainted the image of this Tribunal as well as the judiciary. Only recently in In Re:
Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with
Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen,20 this Court said that:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness,
prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They
should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their
influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost
prudence and discretion. For theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence,
impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
Respondent should be reminded in this regard that the nature and responsibilities of public
officers enshrined in the Constitution, and oft- repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical
words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals
that should be matched with actual deeds.21 Those involved in the administration of justice must
live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service,22
In sanctioning errant officers and employees involved in the administration of justice, the Court
has held:
Since the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it ought to live
up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness. It bears stressing once
again that public service requires utmost integrity and the strictest discipline possible of
every public servant. A public office is a public trust that enjoins all public officers and
employees, particularly those serving in the judiciary to respond to the highest degree of
dedication often even beyond personal interest.23
All too often, this Court has declared that any act which falls short of the exacting standards for
public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall
not be countenanced.24 To reiterate, public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.25
This Court has also ruled that:

Time and again, we have emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court
personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public
faith. They must be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. As we have held in
the case of Mendoza v. Mabutas (223 SCRA 411 [1993], citing Sy v. Academia, 198
SCRA 70s [1991]), this Court condemns and would never countenance such conduct, act
or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the
faith of the people in the Judiciary.26
Respondent's acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the public in the entire
judicial system. What makes his infraction worse is the fact that he is not a mere court employee,
but a senior attorney employed in the Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his
record of government service spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing he has prejudiced the
integrity of the Court as a whole. Once more, this Court is called upon to apply disciplinary
sanction on an errant member, and again it will not shirk from its responsibility. Thus, this Court
imposes on respondent the only penalty that he deserves that of dismissal from the service.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This dismissal shall be immediately executory.
Further, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days
from notice hereof why he should not be DISBARRED. In the meantime, respondent is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the records of Atty. Gilbert Soriano and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 46371

February 7, 1940

FORTUNATO N. SUAREZ, petitioner,

vs.
SERVILLANO PLATON, Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas, The PROVINCIAL
FISCAL OF TAYABAS, VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas Hermogenes Caluag for respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez
with this court, to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 of the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course.

It appears on May 9, 1935, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the
respondents in this case, filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag,
Province of Tayabas, charging the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas,
with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint, upon preliminary
examination, was docketed and given due course. While the said case was pending preliminary
investigation, Lieutenant Orais, in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of
Tayabas, moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. This motion was granted by the justice
of the peace of Calauag on May 20, 1935, and the case thus dismissed.
At the instance of the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, the deputy provincial fiscal of
Tayabas, Perfecto R. Palacio, in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in
the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary detention committed,
according to the information under date of July 8, 1935, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of May, 1935, in the municipality of Calauag, Province of
Tayabas, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Vivencio Orais being
then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly
appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province of Tayabas, without warrant
of arrest and without any legal ground whatsoever, moved by personal grudge and illfeeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in
the train while the latter was going to Calauag, and with the purpose of concealing the
illegality of said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio
Orais conniving with the other accused, Damian Jimenez, justice of the peace of the said
municipality, prepared and subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the
commission of the crime of sedition; that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez,
conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the
illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez, without legal grounds
whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that there were merits in
the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato
Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours.
The justice of the peace of Calauag, being one of the accused, the preliminary examination was
conducted by the justice of the peace of Lopez, Tayabas, who thereafter bound the defendants
over to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as criminal case No. 6426.
While the case was pending in the latter court, on petition, of the accused, the provincial fiscal of
Tayabas, Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After such reinvestigation, he filed on
April 23, 1936, a motion for the dismissal of the case. Fortunato N. Suarez, the petitioner herein,
on May 5, 1936, asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal
to handle the prosecution, alleging, among other things, that the provincial fiscal had no courage
to prosecute the accused. On May 11, 1936, Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as
private prosecutor, and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial
fiscal. The Bar Association of Tayabas, through its president, Emiliano A. Gala, entered its
appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. On August 14,
1936, the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Hon. Ed.
Gutierrez David, after hearing, denied the motion, ruling that there was prima facie case against

the accused. The court, upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal, designated Deputy Provincial
Fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio to handle the prosecution. But Fiscal Palacio, being apparently of the
same opinion as the provincial fiscal, declined to proceed, and moved that a practicing attorney
or a competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead. Accordingly, the
provincial fiscal of Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson, at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by
the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over
the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. So, on September 23 1936, he moved for
reconsideration of the court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal
presented by the provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously objected to this
motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused.
The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres
David. Later, Judge Serviliano Platon, one of the respondents herein, was appointed to preside
over case No. 6426 corresponded, and the case was thus transferred to that sala for action. Judge
Platon, after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case, considered the court's
order of August 14, 1936, and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence was insufficient to
convict the accused of the crime charged. From this order, the petitioner herein appealed to this
Court and the case was here docketed as G.R. No. 45431. On June 30, by a closely divided court,
the appeal was dismissed.
The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition, in which, as stated in the
opening paragraph of this decision, we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by
the said judge. The petitioner gives the following grounds for the issuance of said writ:
Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de
discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio
Orais y Damian Jimenez, despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que
existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de que un Juez de Primera
Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por
creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados.
Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion
por cuanto que las pruebas existentes en la causa, en las cuales se fundo el fiscal
provincial al presentar la querella en el Juzgado de Paz, demuestran de un modo claro y
concluyente el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los acusados. [Las expresadas
pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A").]
Que el Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas
pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era
considerarlas bajo el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador". (E.U. vs. Barredo,
32 Jur. Fil., 462, 482.)
Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the
information by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais
and the justice of the peace of Lopez, the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case,
because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa, y

examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi como las
circunstancias del caso, ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la
prosecucion de esta causa." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his
said motion for dismissal of April 23, 1936:
En sintesis, los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935, en ocasion en que el abogado
Fortunato N. Suarez y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia, se encontraron en el
tren que iba a Calauag, aquel para defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio,
y este para atender a sus deberes officiales en relacion con el orden publico algo anormal,
por causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de Calauag, ambos tuvieron un
cambio de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli, y por haber el
abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado, de que los sakdalistas estaban perseguidos
en Calauag por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia, y que era un abuso de las
autoridades dicha persecusion, trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los
municipios de Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna, que se levantaron contra el
gobierno por los abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en dichos pueblos, y que lo mismo
podia tenerlugar en esta Provincia de Tayabas, y que el podia incitar a lossakdalistas,
teniendo en cuenta que con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que
los sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas, uno de los
acusados en el municipiode Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion,
que el abogado ayudaria a los sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion,fue el motivo por el
cual el arresto al abogado Suarez, conduciendoleal municipio como asi lo hizo con
respecto a Tomas Ruedas, quien salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a la estacion
del tren en Calauag, diciendo a este que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag.
Que despues de haberles arrestado, presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de
sedicion, en el juzgado de paz de Calauag, aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores,
dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia.
Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas, ni que haya
incitado a los sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las
autoridades y oficiales, sin embargo, de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la
acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son consistentes, se desprende claramente que el
abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden considerarse como sediciosas y
subversivas, maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque atravesaba el
municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los
sakdalistas, a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los
municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. Rosa.
La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr. Godofredo Reyes contra el
teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L. Jimenez, por el
delito de detencion arbitraria.
El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo
Penal Revisado, que dice asi:

El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno
sera castigado; etc. . . .
Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos, y
que a la acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito, el
que suscribe, haanalizado este extremo, relacionando los hechos que determinaron
laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el abogado FortunatoN. Suarez, con las
circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia
de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna, acondicionandolos con las palabras
proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y
subversivas,por lo menos eran abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno,
especialmente con las de la Provincia de Tayabas a las cuales se referian. Asi entendido el
aspecto legal de la cuestion, y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la misma ley en lo
en que consiste la detencion arbitraria, que para que exista este delito, la detencion tenia
que haber sido sin motivo legal alguno, creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la
detencion del abogado Sr. Suarez y su companero Tomas Ruedas, y estaba justificada por
haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello. (E.U. vs. Vallejo y otro, 11 Jur. Fil., 202; E.U. vs.
Santos, 36 Jur. Fil., 909.)
We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez
David of August 14, 1936. It appears, however, that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who, as stated
above was assigned by the Department of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case, moved
for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14, 1936, denying the motion for dismissal.
Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. In this
motion for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by
Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal, but adds:
(a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais, no existe prueba alguna en los autos de
esta causa que dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas,
solamente por el mero gusto de arrestarles. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente
Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o resentimiento alguno contra dicho
abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. Aunque es verdad que el
Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de
autoridad', sin embargo, no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y
Tomas Ruedas hayan intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma,
por tanto, no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse
de estos por dicha causa. (Vease pag. 1, Anexo O.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos,
en nuestra humilde opinion, existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de haber
cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas,
teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz
de los disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao
y Sta. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna, dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. Se debe
tener en cuenta, ademas, el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado
Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais presento
denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez, juez de paz de Calauag,
por infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting

officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by
such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in
appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they
have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of
the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one," (69 United States Law Review,
June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309.)
Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon, in granting the
motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the
justice of the peace of Lopez, abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of
justice, a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a
judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus.
This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of
questions of law and fact, since such a duty is not ministerial. (High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, sec. 156, pp. 173-175). Upon the other hand, it should be observed that in the case of
Lieutenant Orais, in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two
motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must
have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, the arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be
entirely unjustified. If, "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of
his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he
should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace
officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. See generally Voorhees on Arrest; 5
Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R.C.L., 450. (United States vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853, 855.)"
The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding cost. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, J., dissenting:

The majority decision takes for granted that which precisely is in issue in this case.
In the morning of May 9, 1935, the accused, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, and Attorney Fortunato
Suarez were both in the train on their way to Calauag, Tayabas. In the conversation which ensued
between them, Attorney Suarez made certain remarks about the abuses of authority committed by
the officers of the Government who conducted the raid against the Sakdalistas at Sariaya. Upon
inquiry of Lieutenant Orais as to what party Attorney Suarez belonged, and, pressed upon to state
whether or not he was a Sakdalista, Attorney Suarez replied "may be". On the strength of these
facts, Lieutenant Orais arrested Attorney Suarez for the alleged offense of uttering seditious
words, and conducted him to the municipal building of Calauag and there lodged him in jail. He
filed in the justice of the peace court of the same municipality an information against Attorney
Suarez for uttering seditious words, in violation of article 142 of then Revised Penal Code. On
the day following, Lieutenant Orais, acting under the instruction of his superior, moved for the
dismissal of the case. Thereafter, the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas, at the instance of
Fortunato Suarez, filed an information against Lieutenant Orais and Damian Jimemez, the latter
as justice of the peace of Calauag, Tayabas, for the crime of arbitrary detention, the information
reading as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of May, 1935, in the municipality of Calauag, Province of
Tayabas, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Vivencio Orais being
then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly
appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the province of Tayabas, without any legal
ground whatsoever, moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he entertained
against Attorney Fortunato Suarez, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter
was going to Calauag; and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and
detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other
accused Damian Jimenez, justice of the peace of said municipality, prepared and
subscribed under oath before said justice of the peace a complaint falsely charging said
Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of sedition; that the said justice of the
peace Damian Jimenez, conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same
purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez,
without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that
there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and
detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight
hours.
The justice of the peace of Lopez, Tayabas, conducted the preliminary investigation, and,
thereafter, remanded the case to the Court of First Instance. On April 23, 1936, the provincial
fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case upon the alleged ground, that after a supposed
reinvestigation, the new facts established therein disclose no sufficient evidence to sustain the
information. The motion was overruled by Judge Gutierrez David, then presiding the second
branch of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Jacinto Yamson, appointed as special fiscal to
take charge of the case, moved for the reconsideration of the order of Judge Gutierrez David. To
this motion, Attorney Suarez, through counsel, interposed an opposition. Judge Servillano Platon,
then presiding the first branch of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, acceded to the motion

and dismissed the information. From this order, Attorney Suarez appealed, but the appeal was
dismissed by this Court on the ground that mandamus was the proper remedy. Accordingly, the
present action is filed in this Court.
The sole question here involved is whether or not, according to the evidence in the hands of the
prosecution, there is sufficient ground to proceed with the criminal case for arbitrary detention
against Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Justice of the Peace Damian Jimenez. A close examination
of such evidence, which is attached to the record, will disclose that the arrest of Fortunato Suarez
by Lieutenant Orais in the morning of May 9, 1935, was prompted obviously, not by official
duty, but by personal resentment against certain statements made by the former. I have taken
pains to scrutinize carefully the testimonies of all the witnesses who testified in the preliminary
investigation, and they show nothing seditious in the utterances of Attorney Suarez on the
occasion in question. My conclusion, then, is that the detention of Attorney Suarez by Lieutenant
Orais was arbitrary, and that the charge made against Lieutenant Orais for arbitrary detention is
well founded on facts.
The fiscal, in moving for the dismissal of the case before the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
mentioned a reinvestigation conducted by him of the case, in which he supposedly found a new
evidence warranting its dismissal. Counsel for Attorney Fortunato Suarez, however, insisted on
the production of such new evidence before the court, but the prosecution could not respond to
such demand. This is an indication that the supposed additional evidence never existed.
But the majority, instead of deciding the issue as to whether or not the evidence in the hands of
the prosecution was sufficient to proceed with the charge for arbitrary detention, takes for
granted that such evidence was not sufficient, relying upon the assumption that the
"circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the
provincial fiscal of Tayabas . . . must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by
the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas." In other words, the majority
assumes that which is the subject of the petitioner's challenge, which is tantamount to a refusal to
consider his complaint after he has been told that he may come to this court by mandamus
proceedings.
Although a broad discretion must be conceded to prosecuting attorneys and trial courts in the
determination of sufficient grounds for dismissing or continuing a criminal prosecution, yet
when, as in this case, the basis for the action of both officers fiscal and judge is produced
in this court, and we are called upon to determine whether, on the basis of such evidence and
determine the question at issue. And, in the present case, it is my opinion that the evidence we
have in the record sufficiently shows that the prosecution for arbitrary detention against
Lieutenant Orais must take its course, and that its dismissal without trial by the Court of First
Instance is without basis on facts and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
I agree, however, that there is no reason for including in the charge for arbitrary detention the
justice of the peace of Calauag, Damian Jimenez. The evidence shows no connection between
him and Lieutenant Orais in the arbitrary arrest of Attorney Fortunato Suarez.

My vote, therefore, is that the petition for mandamus must be granted with respect to the
prosecution against Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, but denied with respect to the prosecution against
Damian Jimenez.

A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a
member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal
representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese
descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to

agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New
Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the
part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a
change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for
the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The
efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught.
Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law
is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to
make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the
complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this Court is left
with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared
as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he
held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the
law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that
his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the
grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The
respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the
NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had
been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection
to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set
the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed
to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the
same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not
file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the
reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16,
1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was
present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the
absence of his counsel, the complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that
he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action in
an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the
unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good
person." 2

The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of
his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the
suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila
may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service
Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed
and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police
Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel
to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving
illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General
recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is
in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the
authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of
the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently
adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there
might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession
while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to
be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the
Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not
be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of
impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living
true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much
of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume
was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that
labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant
called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his
future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to
such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him
but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable
profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is

dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
his record.

A.C. No. 7430

February 15, 2012

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,

vs.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion
(complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent)
for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment2 to the complaint.
In a Resolution3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation4 dated September 19,
2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as
follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against the members
of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRCNCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the
party-respondents are the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said
Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on
September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked for
additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David
Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in
the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration
of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.
xxxx

On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately
reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved,
however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20,
2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal
case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the
respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the parties to appear in his
Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze
claim of moral and exemplary damages.
xxxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by
him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by David Edward Toze,
and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was
thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending
before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David
Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David
Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a
relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the
Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the
aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the
respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the
complainants did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by
the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is
speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary restraining order

and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration directed against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to
keep the status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt
with more severe penalty.6
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-6447
which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said
resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously recommended the
respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.)
No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition,8 but it was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the
respondent should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.9 Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.10

Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the
respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in
support of the administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with the
discharge of the respondents quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer
entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a
lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which
characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence.11
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in the
discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing
disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he
has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such
nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.12
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,13 we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he
may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as
OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela
Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable
action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains
unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents
misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a
member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and
illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.

xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to
govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in
the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.14 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,15 we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts
committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering
that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan16 where the respondent-lawyer
was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs
official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be
approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of
rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be
erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error
was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.17
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic,
lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge
may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he

renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.18
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.19
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain
the status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at
the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is already in effect.
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper
cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1,
Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary injunction or restraining order
may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
(e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn
allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute
before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which
shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally
determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the
cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of
the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has
the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under
Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its
Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order
may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
(e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn

allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute
before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
(emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be
delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of
a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall
conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their
witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within
fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in
violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner
aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005
Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
xxxx
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of
procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first, states that it is the
Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While
the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of preliminary
injunction or restraining order only in a delegated capacity.20
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the
motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the
respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for
reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice
to the complainants.

On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:

The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006
and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the
respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David
Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze will render
work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July
2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of
International School of Manila until the resolution of the formers Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is
about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the respondent expediently
resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents because
any delay in the resolution thereof would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze
and unwarranted prejudice to International School Manila.
xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him,
there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze
and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the
Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There
appears an orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes
Employment Contract with International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering
the illegal dismissal case moot and academic.
xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed
Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is attendant with
the term of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School
Manila. The respondents lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him

for more than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the
respondents disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence.1wphi1 Failure to decide a case or
resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a
Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no
matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary x x x. 21
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning
sanction from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes".
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor
arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the
rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be
imposed.
Under Rule 14022 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of
the law is a serious charge,23 punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding
P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service.24
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally,
in parallel cases,25 a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of
suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident
would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondents
suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T.
Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is still pending.

It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon
lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private
practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms
of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private
interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the
discharge of their official functions.26
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the
Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,27 thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm
of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them
administratively liable.1wphi1 Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the
elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or
a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority."28 (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of
the law in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and
likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as attorney. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-11-2946
July 13, 2011
[Formerly A.M. No. 11-5-52-MTCC]
RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF CORNELIO RENIETTE CABRERA, Utility
Worker I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Lipa City.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:

The present administrative matter concerns Cornelio Reniette Cabrera (Cabrera), Utility Worker
I of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1 of Lipa City (MTCC). Records of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) disclose that Cabrera has failed to file his Daily Time Records
(DTRs) from October 2010 up to present and to seek leave for any of his absences.1
It appears that on October 22, 2010, the OCA received Cabreras sick leave applications2 for the
month of September 2010, which covered a total of eleven (11) days. Due to lack of proper
documentation, Presiding Judge Renato M. Castillo disapproved the applications for sick leave.
On October 28, 2010, the OCA sent a telegram3 to Cabrera requiring him to submit a medical
certificate to support his applications for leave. Cabrera, however, did not comply.
On December 1, 2010, the OCA forwarded Cabreras applications for sick leave to the Office of
Dr. Prudencio Banzon, Jr. (Dr. Banzon, Jr.), Senior Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Court,4
which also disapproved said application due to lack of proper documentation.5 The OCA sent
another telegram6 to Cabrera on December 1, 2010, requiring him to submit his DTRs for
October and November 2010. Once again, Cabrera failed to comply.
In a letter7 dated December 9, 2010, Percival C. Baaga, the MTCC Branch Clerk of Court,
informed the OCA that Cabrera had continuously failed to report for work without leave since
October 20, 2010 up to the present and that he had not filed his DTRs for the months of October
and November 2010.
This prompted the OCA to send two (2) tracer letters8 to Cabrera - one to his residential address
and another to his court station, directing that he submit his DTRs for the months of October and
November 2010. This time, the OCA warned Cabrera that his name would be recommended for
dropping from the rolls if he failed to comply.
Despite being served the tracer letters,9 Cabrera failed to heed the directive of the OCA. Thus, on
December 9, 2010, the OCA issued its Memorandum10 ordering the withholding of Cabreras
salaries and benefits.
In its evaluation of the matter, the OCA submitted its Agenda Report11 dated May 17, 2011,
wherein, referring to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave it recommended that
Cabreras name be dropped from the rolls for being absent without leave (AWOL). The OCA
further recommended that Cabreras position be declared vacant and that he be informed at his
residential address on record of his separation from the service or the dropping of his name from
the rolls.

The OCA Report also informed the Court that upon verification, Cabrera had not filed any
application for retirement and that no previous administrative complaint had been filed against
him.
The OCAs recommendation is well-taken.
Pursuant to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Civil Service
Resolution No. 070631, an employees absence without official leave for at least 30 working
days warrants his separation from the service. The Rule specifically provides:
Sec. 63. Effect of absences without approved leave.-An official or employee who is continuously
absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on
absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from
the rolls without prior notice. However, when it is clear under the obtaining circumstances that
the official or employee concerned, has established a scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring
substantial absences though less than thirty working (30) days 3x in a semester, such that a
pattern is already apparent, dropping from the rolls without notice may likewise be justified.
If the number of unauthorized absences incurred is less than thirty (30) working days, a written
Return-to-Work-Order shall be served to him at his last known address on record. Failure on his
part to report for work within the period stated in the order shall be valid ground to drop him
from the rolls.
In this connection, Section 63, Rule XVI, of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
as amended by Circular No. 14, s. 1999, provides:
Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be
considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or
dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall, however, be informed, at his address
appearing on his 201 files, of his separation from the service, not later than five (5) days from its
effectivity.
Every so often, it has been declared that any act which falls short of the exacting standards for
public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall
not be countenanced.12 Indeed, a public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency.13

By going on AWOL, Cabrera grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. He failed
to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in government
service.14
Specifically for court personnel, their conduct and behavior are circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility.1avvphi1 This Court shall not tolerate any act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.15
Under Section 2 (2.6), Rule XII of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions, the dropping from the rolls as a mode of separation from service is "nondisciplinary in nature and shall not result in the forfeiture of any benefits on the part of the
official or employee nor in disqualifying him from re-employment in the government."
While there is jurisprudence16 to the effect that a court employees AWOL for a prolonged period
of time warrants the penalty of dismissal from the service and the forfeiture of his benefits, the
Court, given the circumstances of the case, is inclined to adhere to the evaluation and
recommendation of the OCA, and refrain from imposing the administrative penalties of
forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from re-employment.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, Cornelio Reniette Cabrera, Utility Worker I of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 1 of Lipa City, is hereby DROPPED from the rolls of service and his position is
hereby declared VACANT.
Let a copy of this resolution be served upon Cornelio Reniette Cabrera at his address appearing
on his 201 files pursuant to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986

GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent.
Arturo M. de Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

ALAMPAY, J.:
The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6, 1984, by the
Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of
Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos.
6856-6867 of said Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its
Resolution of March 11, 1985.
The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law
are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted:
That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Numancia, Aklan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the Municipal
Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative
control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in
connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law
from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from
Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major
stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-174 in the amount of P558.80 by then and there awarding the
supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment
thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act.
except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and amounts involved.
Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and 6862 were allegedly committed in July, 1980; Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and
6864, in August, 1980; and Criminal Cases Nos. C-865, 6866 and 6867 in October, 1980. The separate vouchers involved in the twelve (12)
cases are said to be the following:
Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80
Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60
Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00
Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30

Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00

Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00
Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80
Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00
Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00
Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00
Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00
Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00
T o t a l - - - - P7,730.50
(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12)
criminal cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced,"...to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer perpetual
disqualification from the public office, and to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40, Decision; Rollo, 322).
After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition, herein petitioner
presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12, 1983, suspending him
from Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the petition for the lifting of
the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly, and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1,
1985, petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take effect
immediately.
A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on
record of petitioner. In this supplemental pleading, it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the
awards and payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered
and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve
informations filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass.
Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4, 1984, to the original petition
filed in this case dated April 30, 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He argued the dismissal of the petition
on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg. 20; Rollo, 341). The
submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:
xxx xxx xxx
The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with
which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law
from having any interest.

The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:

a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction;
b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.
Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. (Rollo, pp. 338-339).
The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen 'Corporation, which is
said to have been effected on February 25, 1980, before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest
opportunity before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case
against petitioner should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of
Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort, was presented. The
consolidated comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo, Aklan, showing
the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation. (Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)
Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor
General.
After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of
the decision of the Sandiganbayan, as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel, the Court in its
resolution of January 16, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs.
Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14, 1986, raised the following legal questions.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions arise:
1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases
of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former,
subsequently delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the
knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No.
3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official
capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law?
3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law, caused to the
Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto, was
undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation?
4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief, page 15)
It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the offense, and
more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts
or transactions.
Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however, be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General,
after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar, filed on October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For
Acquittal" (in lieu of the People's Brief). Rollo, 293).
The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General's
Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon acknowledging and concluding that:
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen

Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had already sold his
shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her
stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation.
Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. SEC records,
as the prosecution evidence show, do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President.
The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. Anyway, Trigen has
not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since.
Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. Reporting the sale is not a
mandatory requirement.
Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC
In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141,
Corporation Code of the Philippines).
Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in
his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of
the crimes charged. (Rollo, pp. 299-300).
In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on
record the following observations:
Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award
The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a public bidding conducted
because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen.
Q. In other words, in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding?
A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.
Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen?
A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)
In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the
transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen, how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply
and delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are
of course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself.
Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award, which of course
is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Respondent Court said:
. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award, but his liability may also come
in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it
appear that the transactions were regular and proper. (Resolution dated March 11, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration/new trial, page 7).
No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment
Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be
intervention after payment.

Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment
of construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid
the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, 1984).
The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers.
But it can safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega
signed and paid them., (Rello, pp. 301-303)
xxx xxx xxx
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment
Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of the case in the
following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla:
Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer, as you said, and
then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature, were the purchases in question already paid?
A. They had already been paid for, sir.
Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?
A. Yes, sir.
A.J. ESCAREAL:
Q. Under what authority were they paid?
A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.
Q. Who authorized the payment?
A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.
ATTY. CONSULTA:
Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to
indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste, the materials
had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir
Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued
by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by
Mayor Trieste?
A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing
payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared, what can you say about the other
municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality?
ESCAREAL:

Payment made by Trigen?

ATTY. CONSULTA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?
A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits
E, B, C, D, F, G, H, I were prepared, they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated
therein were already prepared by the municipal treasurer.
Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the
municipal treasurer?
A. Already paid.
Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts?
A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.
Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed
in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to
Trigen?
A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the
mayor. (Tsn., Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 19-49).
Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on
the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law.
xxx xxx xxx
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has
financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94,
Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does
not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence,
authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. 11, page 603).
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in
having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that
matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen.
Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction
Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it
even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that
Trigen's offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308;
Emphasis supplied).
It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions.
Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by
that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed
from cannot be rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case
truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally
defended and set free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted
recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice,
the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the
herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set
aside and reversing the appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said offenses charged
against him with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC

December 7, 2010

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating
Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests.
Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously
part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on
October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study,
evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open
for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of
Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by
the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the
complainants sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The
complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the
complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants sales application
and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent
prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the
latters alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent
brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondents deceased wife.
As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants sales application
was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to
Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded
Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As
a result of the respondents promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the
purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one
Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard
executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum
No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application
by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172
and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge
filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar
Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second
complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section
3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the
antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later
conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land
and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary
of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought.
In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his
application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the
DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the
Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainants allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that
the respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that
this allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel
Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainants sister.
(2) He denied the complainants allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for
the subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on
Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he
had an inordinate interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazos
affidavit where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely
attested to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell
his rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the
illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he
extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondents participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to
Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuels belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
January 20, 2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said
Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the
complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the
transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his fathers application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguezs application.
(7) The complainants allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel
Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights over the
subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the

conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not
included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting
claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2,
2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed
by law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in
the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of
law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint
in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting
applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not
submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.
The Courts Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondents actions constitute a
breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public
official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public
official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously
connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of
evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical
conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition
to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer
in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the
government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in
the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public
accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in
favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge
of their official functions.11
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or
her public duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who
use their public offices to promote their private interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may
be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private
interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also
ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his
or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on
Higher Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We
reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant
who had a pending application for visas before his office.18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for
violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence
showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case
before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof
that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought
before the Committee on Awards. By the complaints own account, the complainant filed a sales
application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants
sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due
to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of
the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondents elective public office and
membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his
private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was
not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no
sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in
this regard that the denial of the complainants sales application over the subject land was made
by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the
subject land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the
records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20
categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a
contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific
charge, Olazos disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondents alleged
participation, and we find it to be in the respondents favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support
his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the
letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated July 12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The
documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots
(covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted
as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts
that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have
influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainants sales application. At the
same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of
Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record.
We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the
force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel

Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21,
2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondents claim that the sums of money he extended
to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the
respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the
latters involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca
Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the
loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid
would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the
dates when the sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995,
September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance27 over the
subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were
extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are
consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the
subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing
medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation
from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent
legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces
of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover,
we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on
government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but
the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in
the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with his or her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception
to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to
practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits
lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously
interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.31
Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of
his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the
proceedings.1avvphi1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with
the sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent
was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent
was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we
specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made
before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it.
These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this
regard against the respondents favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the
above discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged
in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant.
The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots
covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the
DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales
application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the
President, the Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated
October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is
under no obligation to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what
the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be
rebutted in defense.39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainants failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed
unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule
6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 4749

January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR

and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates
"IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available).
Annex A "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil
Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC.
Annex B "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM.
Annex C "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal
Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787,
RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995
denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal
in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears
to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal
259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's
motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover
his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and
1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a
member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing,
were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the
February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light
felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his
right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple
farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in
view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted
upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only
to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even
with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and
honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent
guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he
pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied
by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the
Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's
suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP
O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he
has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes,
income taxes as an example.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since
1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he
had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss
this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having
paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he
is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court.
A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be
set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory
heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying
his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432,
4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that
their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,8 we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian
Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February
1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage
at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan,
was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had
finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981),
allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had
not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In
his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but
Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming
that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was
unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also
alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her
(Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the
Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June
1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he
admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the
marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his
law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable
our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to
take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as
single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared
public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her
conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be
dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was
Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of
a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing
her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78
and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time
praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me
assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage
institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the
affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to
his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended
me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his
wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with
the Supreme Court.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and

unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had
already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore
and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to
comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum
cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that
effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time.
He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in
shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and
there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court."
According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials
appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is
Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had
covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies
and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning
in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting
parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before
the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned
Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he
applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law,
he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General
submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from
the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and
conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter
recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage
is settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that
he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith,
for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known,
would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as
"single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under
wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning,
are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that
his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and
conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code
have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been
regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various
pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and
deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an
"Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married"
to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under
oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is
only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the
averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp.
59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes
reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to
Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and,
instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage
contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be
made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case,

however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in
order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to
Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his
Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with
the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had
reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar
Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have
been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic)
lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof
which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are
entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him
not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm:
"As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was
accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18
June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to
Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11
April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June
1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the

applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself,
not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to
do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper.
Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice
comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed
to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from
the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate
who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and
has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult
situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for
the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to
carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not
to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the
court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and
it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall
not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes
the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that
his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead
of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to his
community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith
or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar
the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has
been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding,
and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had
failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was
totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community

who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a
significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to
show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any,
of Raul Camaligan.

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of
law filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be
allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court,
however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his
willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character

and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to
take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly
abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the
highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170
SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan,
Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of
10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder
quoted, in part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and
Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath.
They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded
them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit
considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed
said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant
Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC
No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their
respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing
respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent
was "acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the
community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by
the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen
O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said
Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as
the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz
City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a
Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the
present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not
issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic
consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent

states that the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have
been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter
President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated
29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court
any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of
Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the
present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to
MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to
respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's
oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989,
and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the
respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify
him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however,
that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines,
Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal,
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan,
(Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion
pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent
and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation,
turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a
free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN)
Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction
and respondent has not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis
Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February
1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula,
to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the
Clerk of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City
Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any
crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him.
Based on the above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed
by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to
reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February
1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of
complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by
Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his
Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a
date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform
this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747),
pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13
March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the
oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as
manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May
1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in
Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been
restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she
finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that
she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere
repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a
member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly
recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court
to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the
Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from
complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5
November 1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal

disposition which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is
enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we
believe and maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable
Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any
party to change or amend said final resolutions which are already res
judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory
resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be considered as
anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and
dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality.
Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve
his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia,
Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge
Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990)
submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12
December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas
Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was
already considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been
reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by
the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under
Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural
Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of
Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by
the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts
of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the
Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our
Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and
Dagpin were required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by

Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that
Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his
admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February
1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a
Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on
the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29
January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a
Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is
"proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights
of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission
to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed
to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10)
years having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations,
after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken
cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and
civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant
Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case
against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas
Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of
respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging
to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At
that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any
defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The
controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering
the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy
peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo,
Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no
objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be

rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a

confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the
time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already
been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions
for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the
pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the
Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member
of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which
he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and
does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed
by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made
because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed
out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more,
he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took
advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding
the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift
a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was eventually
compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure
to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him
during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us
also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were
confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and
were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore,
outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in
SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no
moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That
complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the
balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject
matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a
high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and
legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the
licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil.
230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been
defined as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376,
April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been
held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness
or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the
BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4148

July 30, 1998

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly
immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous
circumstances. 1
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved
on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the
penalty of six months suspension without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos.
1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from the service of respondent. 4
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears
that complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart
Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo,
Rizal, where eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his
family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children
were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge
in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began
cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On
December 28, 1977, Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of
suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court
upon respondent. 5
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to
another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were
consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation
from the service. 6

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued
living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second
child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant
and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted
marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of
Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists,
as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained
in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their
father's acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having
previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to
file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to
shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father.
Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana TapucarBaua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the
Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent
be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was
premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him
by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena. 7
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and
the Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980
for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered
separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for
marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it. 8

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation,
as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and
that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved

and adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and
support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this
Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are
in agreement that respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain
one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law. 10 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For
they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community
approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails
this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized
accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the
judiciary, a fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that

place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any
appearance of impropriety. 11 For a judge is the visible representation of the law and,
more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that
fortifies their will to obey the law. 12 Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction
of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely,
respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its
moral imperatives. 14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an
attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the
administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the
faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A
high degree of moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he
resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. 16 Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the
responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive
qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all
times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the
public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court. 17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment proceedings
are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before
disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with
the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women
in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife
and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated
woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that

he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne
him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon
him by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his
lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate
thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he
exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The
IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges
extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For
indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be
explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one
still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children,
show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's
oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in
respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his
outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in
disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need
for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3910

August 14, 2000

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified letter-complaint1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the
lawyers oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was
discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on
February 3, 1996.2
In the letter-complaint,3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as
counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be
given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and
covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to
verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however,
complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and,
when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they were workers
of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay
authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it
and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were

watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about
the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent
Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin.
Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor
received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin
who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that
respondent Villalon claimed that complainants father allegedly gave the subject property to him
(respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant.
In his Comment,4 respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn, he
alleged that the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy
and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and
consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start a
piggery business without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then
signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent
Villalon with the name of respondent Canares included therein as protection because of the
improvements to be introduced in the subject property. Upon presenting the title covering the
subject property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr.
and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because
the land was actually owned by him and that he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat,
Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject property be transferred directly from Jose
Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he would
return the document already signed and notarized, which he did the following day. According to
respondent Canares, the trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to
know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the subject property by the caretaker of
respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote5 to this Court and averred that he neither signed the
Deed of Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo
Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be
disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his
signature and selling the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder6 , respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained that
he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high
standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the
Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the subject

property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the
conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose
Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the said document for and in his behalf and that this was
done with his consent and knowledge.
This Court referred7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty.
Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and
likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023
within ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and
candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the
Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent
failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel
them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony
of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commissions full faith and credence.
Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he
considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose
Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly,
respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give
to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a
Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has
vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too
difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property,
whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable
that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral
"giving" of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said
that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon
and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared
allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose
Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a
falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over
the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr.
Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his
wifes signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of
Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to
substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of
note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which
denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A3" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over
the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is
likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having
executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr.
whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe
to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the
consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no
payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it appear
that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew
or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as
another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.8
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts
and observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the
evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.9 Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require
in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be

done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.10
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in
Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein,
Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him
by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that
the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance
or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at
least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized.
Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse,
when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land,11 purportedly in favor of "Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.," respondent
Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any
Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose
Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word "Conforme". As regards the
subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same
property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted
that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that
document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible denial
that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and
that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent
Villalons acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the Bar.1wphi1 Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members
of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.12
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed
upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In
Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,13 this Court suspended therein respondent Atty.
Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of
his clients property merits the penalty of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board
of Governors; and

(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to

Gregorio Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it
was respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabels subdivision lots; (3)
Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds
date of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila
when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her
confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale.14
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that
respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public
Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991,15
which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied
having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated "this ___day of
October 1991," allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in
favor of respondent "Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr." was not notarized. The
record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that
they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that
respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of
gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant
Jose Ducat Jr., the latters TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of
sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do
so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalons personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133090

January 19, 2001

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of
court.1wphi1.nt
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil
Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala
of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court
issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to
annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on
April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On
November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996,
filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court.3
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following
incident transpired:
ATTY.
BUGARING:

For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY.
CORDERO:

Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion
for contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of
Deeds is properly notified for today's hearing.

COURT:

Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER:

Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

We are ready, your Honor.

COURT:

There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which
directed your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection with
this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the
subpoena.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the
Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please,
and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer,
opposition or pleadings or pleadings with respect to this motion.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the
Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our
office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received
this morning the subpoena, your Honor.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
respondent that he was not informed.

COURT:

That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is
recorded.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we
will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your
Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds
that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk not to
inform the parties concerned.

COURT:

Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the
video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that
such proceedings should be taken.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just
accompanied me this morning.

COURT:

Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the
permission of this Court.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.

COURT:

Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that
shots should be done.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an
occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could
prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your
Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please,
that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor
please.

COURT:

It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary

authority or permission should be secured.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.

COURT:

After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please,
that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being .

COURT:

That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary
evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.

COURT:

What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this
contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a
criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.

COURT:

If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the
Register of Deeds.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.

COURT:

That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply
represented.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing.

ATTY.
BARZAGA4:

Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just
mark our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and
thereafter your Honor please.

COURT:

You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by
newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the
privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this
contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the record of
this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.

ATTY.
BARZAGA:

Second call, your Honor.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COURT:

Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY.
BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the
case your Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed on

November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the
record of the case shows up to the filing of this motion, the Register as well as
the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated
February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efren A.
Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to the Register regarding this
notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250
and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation of the lis pendens clearly
shows that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry. We would
like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt
of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis
pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996,
your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has
already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in view
of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis
pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic)
and 51950 (sic).'
ATTY.
BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our
documentary evidence.

COURT:

You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The
counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us
wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do
to have an orderly proceedings in this case.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated
your Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis
pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just
request that we be given a period of ten days from today your Honor, within
which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.

COURT:

Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty.
Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the
lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty.
Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the record of this case, the
reason for that is because there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so stated. I
think it was dated March, 1996. May 1 have the record please.

ATTY.
BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor.

COURT:

This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this,

your Honor.

COURT:

Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be
guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter
started from that. After the submission of the . What are you suppose to

submit?
ATTY.
BUGARING:

Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in

contempt of Court.

COURT:

After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to
the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the
plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please,
that we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for
hearing for today, your Honor please.

COURT:

If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet
what are we going to receive as evidence.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

If your Honor please

COURT:

Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the
submission of the comment.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for
contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado
Concepcion.

COURT:

Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to
do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of
record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your
evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and
so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time
furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should
have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled
for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your
Honor

COURT:

(Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor.

COURT:

And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers
of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our
procedure, your Honor.

COURT:

If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first
and then do whatever you want.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the
Court of this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put
on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.

COURT:

Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.

COURT:

Do that right away.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.

COURT:

You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

I did not.

COURT:

With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his
comment.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on
anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying
this case.

COURT:

You can do whatever you want.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.

COURT:

As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT:

Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this
Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in many
certiorari cases, your Honor.

COURT:

Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court.
(Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in
jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)

ATTY.
BUGARING:

I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.

COURT:

You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of
this Court.

ATTY.
BUGARING:

I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is
one way I am protecting my client, your Honor.

COURT:

That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of
this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in
jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct contempt of
court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1)
operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was
ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of
court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the
appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from
a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the
cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are
open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not
sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed
the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to
present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring
started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite
of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written
pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the
issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that
Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to
disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the
Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so.
Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the
uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he has
won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of
Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly
being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the
Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's
sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and
contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three

(3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence
immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal
Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.6
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6,
1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.7
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in
direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that
respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct
contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant,
at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and
sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine
of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court,10 and ordered the
excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the
petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S
SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE
IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.11
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and
legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he always
addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."
We disagree.

Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if
it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial
court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the
proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the
other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from
attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the
proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to
Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain
towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance in the
administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was
making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the
petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December
5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics
which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III,
1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of

Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with
fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility
which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your
honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his
subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be
countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.12
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the
extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and
the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of
justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the
case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that
there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside
her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an
immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration
of the contempt order on the same day.15
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the
case of his client by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the
respondent judge's contrary order he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the
interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v.
Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432,
439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice
per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred
in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It
was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly
ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment
meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return
to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R.
Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION

SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co.,
the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.
Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion
that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause
order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally
signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous
and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur
International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation"
(Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the
bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to
Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of
the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of
the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and
purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor
General points out, contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to
the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and
excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus

difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent
justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect
does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment herein was rendered and signed
by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and
Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to
January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a
vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision
dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief
Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of
July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newlycreated Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a
number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968
decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's
belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of
"petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The
"incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared
unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce
evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal
from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of
leading to a wholesome development of the law but only served to delay respondent
for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed
it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no
reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the
Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous
decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double
standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.

(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and
has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said
decision without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts
through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano
Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor
General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and
justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that
if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law.
However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7,
paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion,
which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that
they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no
matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto
eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation
from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy
or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring
to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court seemingly totally
oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved and also of
Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an
accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for
such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution
of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were
of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on
his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6
of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through
inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to
inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit
themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on
judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in
withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did

not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic)
now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned
statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client
MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be
sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the
Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt
against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and
10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party
or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the
stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by
a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in
this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967,
one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that
Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was
outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned
down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer
agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or
any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in
any of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months'
leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that
he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case
(L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new
counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised,
and contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which condition
is prohibited by the New Rules of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices;
who may take part. ... . only those members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the
decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more.
This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio
Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest
for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the
graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,
required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to
the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or
to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million
dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show
cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of
court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for
reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him
to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground
that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion;
that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with
the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon
assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same;
that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially
the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling]
and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be
dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita
M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday,
August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard
by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty.
Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to
Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby
who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he
there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling.
Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to
Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago
started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second
paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same.
Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the

same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling.
While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his gosignal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to
Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that
elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and
Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court
set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation
is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common
practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan
to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to
the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in
oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second
contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed,
find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous
executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest
that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous
and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we
issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case:
Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and
ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply
to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or
against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member
thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful.
But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his
rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere
inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not
only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit

which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial
authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before
them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty
unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind
or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an
issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or
is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent
MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a
warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any
other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or
members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit
themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made
is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole
court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the
justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving
the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof
would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a
lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.'
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to
the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice." 2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve.

For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of
his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice,
oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his
well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it
is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a
trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may
happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err
in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse
conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court
finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice8 is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the
Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and
wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts
as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare
"the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically
changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same
case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a
litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were
taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner
justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language
should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of
the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused
convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his
own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A
simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a
small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,

protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a
disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered
offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should
be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For,
inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining
thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration
of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to
have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly
did Regala insist and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents that he had not
participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his
name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne
out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings
subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is,
indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows:
"Justices; who may take part. ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought
should be read thus
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at
the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether
such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission; however, only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that
effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.

Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about the portion
left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads
is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted
upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally
omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected.
More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of
[the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would
invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice
of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency
between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that
a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the
appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court.
Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the
contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the
fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last
minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of
contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion
for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It
goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced
him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of
the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On
the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even
started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he
spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly
improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned
from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes
should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should
have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from
doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct

towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the
lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief
that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not
yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so
desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no
alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July
31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this
invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We
repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond."
13
It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to
the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this
case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt
of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano
C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling
guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads,
P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action
he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as
he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation and University of the Philippines,
vs.
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10, 1969,
Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his
appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief
counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have
been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the
decision in this case became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano was in effect
asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. We thus considered it needful that he
explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to
show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance
at such a late date. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had
agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino
Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to
engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case

entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference,
Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two
cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969,
while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In
addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon the
assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan that indeed these two cases
were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8,
1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in
consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less)
involved in the two cases. It was on the same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the
preparation of his written appearance in the present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would
find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity
Hills case, for in this latter case, the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice,
an area of only about 19 hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the
respondents having been litigated in the present case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a
final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to
the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It
detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice,
generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that
something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in
putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care
which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case
already litigated or under litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the
conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should,
at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. 2 Atty. Soriano's
entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents
in effect sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of the premier
control over the case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he
exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being
convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did
he make mention of such efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary
are plainly mere after thoughts.

Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as
counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Atty.
Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10, 1969, certainly
knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a
prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano
accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case, he had
not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is the befitting thing to do when a
lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. 3 He did not bother either to
comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case,
something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he been less precipitate in his
actions, he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present
case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this
incident, that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their
former lawyer, then that circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the
imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. Atty. Soriano
cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still
pending with his Court which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this
incident, categorically denied having given. What Atty. Soriano should have done, in
keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession, was
to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly
accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue,
Manila). If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come
to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he could have posed the proper query to the
Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.
We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his
duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would
merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for
his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he
made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is
hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar
act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the
appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents
Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Clemente M.
Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this Court.

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.
Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.
Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking
the latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:

Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a

certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a
deed of assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from
the United States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed
of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid.
Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get,
demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City.
The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent
Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the
aforementioned special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City
post office that she was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence,
Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages against complainant.
Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting
and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on
23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the
Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant
in contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing
her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated
21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post
offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw
the pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel
of record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney
Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again
without the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was
stated that complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00.
It was likewise stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would
be paid in monthly installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per
annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by
the trial court on 15 August 1985.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment,
based on the following allegations:

7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and
signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or
at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the
same;
8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement;
(b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c)
respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents
foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;
9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent
complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1

Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,

Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other
counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon
the request of complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he
(respondent) made the compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was
informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers.
Complainant stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the
compromise agreement and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by
Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed
grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4
October 1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect
to any interest to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on
the promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was
hired by him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985,
complainant's debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the
lapse of only ten (10) months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five

percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise agreement provides that the
P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest
of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is required
to see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to
complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise
agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys.
Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from
informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier
quoted in this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the
compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial
court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel,
respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was
the execution of the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly
and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to
the law.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty.

Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this
Court. Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they
likewise prevent justice from being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4807

March 22, 2000

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE
V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically
Canon 9 thereof, viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the
lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores,
Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some
expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-9730549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then
counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had
taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission
Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had
nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole
purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC
who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal.
The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F.
Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and
Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had

caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found
the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President,
gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of
apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of
the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo,
assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President;
letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22 September
1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC
President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his
parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a
Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for
defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution,
dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed
Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed
Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case
against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the
civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate

with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer,
herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of
respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons
of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short
of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation1 which, among other
things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against
the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 will by filed them.1wphi1
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of
Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear
to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt
of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique
A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan)
Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578.
and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon.
Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan
conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in
those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both
the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner
assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending
the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused
in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his
Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the
"Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer
vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute
criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees,
and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and
12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and
Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).Acting on the special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon,
within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner
Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special
Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and
Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul
M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987

Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that
additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner
Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument
of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such
criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the
consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course
to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment
thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 8701394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof
and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution
of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered
consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance
by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the
Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which
issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this
Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an
extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which
to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as partyrespondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as
party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304
entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly,
from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines
vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan in said case.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we
required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in
Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts
of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing
certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the
proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his
Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in
the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique
Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress
of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult
for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the
Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over
the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed
against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the
latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer
Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a
graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the
Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if
they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me.
Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases
against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner

Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and

Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural
Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme
Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some
people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that
while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election
time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are
entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election
time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every
citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to
scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988

required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10)
days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per
curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28
April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal
merits of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any
legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and
he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report
on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the
Court;" and

3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases
against (two Members of the Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he

claimed were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for
cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his
Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated
to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the
next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and
embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution
in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No.
80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under
date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT
thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to
the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to
and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly
or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to
denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require
respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof,
why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in the media,
among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila
Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the
"Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he
had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating
cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf
of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure
him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be
too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report
on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three
(3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form
part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court
to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes
thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon
within the same period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed
to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the
Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution
on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an

Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that
the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have
overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely
doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to
him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be
able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent
Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the
Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation
and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the
Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made
"final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition

20

dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated
4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the
alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to
respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier,
respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and
Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the
contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached
to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with
annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers
of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and
guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which
includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to
the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish
for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial
officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any
manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is
"necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due
administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the
parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases
like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar

is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently,
where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme
Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of
court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of
the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is
acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus,
in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of
the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit
itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the
ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent
Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function
of the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then
Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this
contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court
are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this
instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are
sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is notand
does not involvea trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties.
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate
court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly
constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.
So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can
only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereofas well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention
in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in
the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept,
this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as
much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So
that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of the power because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is
such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim
any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting
in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also
appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on
this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has

burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory
upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms
of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists
of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation
of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent
Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any
case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his
defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise
of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are
issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is
compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was
saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the
above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the
statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per
curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That
decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by
the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court)
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government
prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some
of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot,
of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and
of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and
anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the
reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the
consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness
of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling
implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of
justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision
and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had
used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for

positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties.
It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon,
the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also
totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of
the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as
early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than
seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also
ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from
hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent
Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon
the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to
cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision
finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending
before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the
Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render
decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of
"cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge
too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the
handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to respondent
(which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and
respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the
said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578.
This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance
(at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent
that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some
members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by
respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause
among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from
prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect

discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and
defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and
small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present
the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred
against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of
revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges
'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The
Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements
made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly
was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and
willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its
critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and
lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack
against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2)
judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would
have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample
opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He
would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent
rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the
continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the
Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a
constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type
proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of
one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why
he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative
discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent
pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the
administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent
made, among others, the following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and
administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest
prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the
resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of
an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt
citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is,
respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion
and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire
Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have
confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely
difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased
demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process"
and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at
least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made,

respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of
being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law.
Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without
regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up
this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one
obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very
difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could
suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and
willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined
private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves
around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor
any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be
regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the
disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed
by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our

jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the

Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was
accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of
Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose
his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through
negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be
deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of
Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their
decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by
compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and
the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del
Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition
for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a
letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of
this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion
for Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs.
Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil
and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding
the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of
the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining
a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the
corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and
work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with
for making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made
the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It
is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or
reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I

have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving
to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law
saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and
injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R.
No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only
to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all
attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of
said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high
privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn
denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision
because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and
conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised
judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate
and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make
both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution
that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid
tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court
of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with
intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case
of his client.
xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose
to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to
imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the
courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic
institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar,
acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required
by this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for
Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit
filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or
aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal
decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered
in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this
case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states
[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment
referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The
motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of
side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the
July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion,
brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been
caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their
appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed
a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion
contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled
casewhich condition is prohibited by the New Rules of CourtSection 1, Rule
51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part... . Only those members present
when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration
and adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in the present
instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who
was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to
the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its
quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the
bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of
the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of
justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either
its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer
of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this
Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is
not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31,
1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges
that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and
predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a
reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of
this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice
president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and

Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any
judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He
puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known
to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be
less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or
party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free
from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship
did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all
times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a
member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, 'although the
process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and
in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or
indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or
their agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is
at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the
President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from
the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving
the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would
in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this
country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There
is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3
(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the

administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt

of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court
and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July
31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically,
the motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ...
to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar
price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the
case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in
Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has
already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear
that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change
of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome
of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield
to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31
SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he

asserted was "a great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme
Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that
his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had
become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that
"justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not
only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent
injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released
to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila
Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice,
who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at
565566; emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was
spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement.
We only described the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as
to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at
572; emphasis supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court
indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair
criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed
by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of
Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the most
important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all
means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives
satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are
violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the
cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in
the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila.
Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice
should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the
face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)

The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the
Court and required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not
be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual
events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid
repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these
explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September
19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86).
What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member
of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and

moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811812; emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press

Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his
by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and
author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number of
daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has
to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of
so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have
as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The
Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of
those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82
Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to
show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria,
saidTo hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the
adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in
many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine
the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last

bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances
or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the
law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is
in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the

Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of
this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery
of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas.
We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want
that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas,
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our
utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and
every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to
state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and
his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61
Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in
contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the
truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court
is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the
laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the
words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as
all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the
Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor

in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a
special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize
the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and
the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice,
it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good
practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and
hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial
matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion
contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein,
after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case
he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of
denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been
the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye,
that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in
the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a movement
with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public
knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise
than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on
the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good
reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend
its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a
right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of
justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing,
he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)

It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our
case law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court
punished for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made
statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907
(1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29
April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court
has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of
disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements here
made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's
statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily
implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to
wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of
disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact
outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the
filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a
repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately
rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising
his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of
qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.

No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom
of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are
indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an
independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated.
And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free
press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following
terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused
with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons
are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if
such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate
accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the
courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the
Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of
lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of
rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to
us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that
of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an
officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and
respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of
the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the
respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the
rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into
error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were
marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to
the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized
the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and
the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his
conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim
the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not
irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2)
explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the
judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion
for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and

amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of
actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for
a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the
Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after
careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to
bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and
statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free
and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury
that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in
cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in
general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions
might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely
be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and
countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts,
including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that
a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic
government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the
proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have
recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual
members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such
is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is
not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution
that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court
in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman,
the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.

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