G.R. No.

168081

October 17, 2008

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally
dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the
Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide
occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight
employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of
dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct.
Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58") with a large body frame. The
proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal
weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an
extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight
concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the companys weight standards, prompting
another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners
weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to
February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with
company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was

formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several
dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he
wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained,
instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the
limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his
residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds,
gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to
reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in
full, reads:
Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds
from today until 31 Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my
ideal weight is achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will
set for my weight check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain
grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was
directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to
comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on
different dates. He was reminded that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory
compliance with the weight standards.5
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport
for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight
check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates.6 Again,
petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner
was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.7
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was
still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for
leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205
pounds on November 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt
of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.8
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being
overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by
PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also
claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating
the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was
undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain
his ideal weight.10
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his
ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective
immediately."11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled13 that petitioner was illegally
dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the
complainants dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former
position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:

a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated,
which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at
P651,000.00;
b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
SO ORDERED.14
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of
the job of petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of
dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did,
petitioner could be transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative
factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were
promoted instead of being disciplined.18
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).19
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of
petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.20
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution22 of
PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as
modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion
of said decision concerning complainants entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to
complainants entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits
or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual
reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form
of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days
from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement through
payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both
appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the
amount of food intake, is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no intentional
defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.27

Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However,
it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the
performance of his duties as flight steward despite being overweight. According to the NLRC,
the Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to
attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.30
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31 the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC
decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents
complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it
"looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties.
Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing
qualification for an employees position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an
analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in
relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest.35 Said
the CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in
arriving at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper."36 In other words, "the
relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and
whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard."37
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable.38 Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the
prescribed weight standards.39 It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by
petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its
earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational
qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies an employees separation from the service."42
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH
(e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS
DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER
GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED
ASIDE PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY
FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor
Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an
employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as
prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the
"prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her
position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employees position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards
does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order
to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employers qualifying standards is in fact a
ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under
Article 282(e) the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is
hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to
meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation
is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of
Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job
irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x45
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical
abnormality and/or illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his
dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific
causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph
1(f) and says that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince
anyone that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any
stretch of imagination."
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly
enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Naduras
illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of them is beyond our understanding, there
being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his own voluntary act.48
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different
from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in
that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura,
thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was
laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure
to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in
Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages.
Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the
weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here,
petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with
the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a
disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible
for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed,
during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue

is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it
now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses."50 However,
petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly
failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation.
Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation
and Hospitals,52 decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook
worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally
retarded at the Ladd Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned
voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her performance met the
Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time,
"she stood 52" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity
of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her
at greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a
handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53
which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the
purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff
could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook based on "perceived"
disability. The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological
disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological appetite
suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the
musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that
"mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from a
given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily
and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the
District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more
than what is considered appropriate of her height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook
weighed "over 320 pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner
was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action
or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ).55 In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise
unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the
normal operation of a business or enterprise.56
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute
providing for it.57 Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.58
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons62 contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British
Columbia Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU),63 the Supreme Court of
Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is
justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3)
the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the
legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held
that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis
for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.67

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to
BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance."69
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,70 the Court
did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from
marrying employees of a rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable
considering that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against possible
competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting
statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding that the weight standards
of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it
transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.75
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only
logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting
obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly
the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be
viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin
crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times
in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when
something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding
public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the
whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care
for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs.
Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin
attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to

passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight
schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to
consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit
doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that "[w]hether the airlines flight attendants are
overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their
destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents
airlines," must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case.
What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight
engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60.
They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are
not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped
cabin space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin
attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese
cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can
judicially recognize without introduction of evidence.77 It would also be absurd to require airline
companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to
accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding
passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin
attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being
overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what
cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost
lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the
narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made
known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must
maintain at all times.78 In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was
repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith
demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang
napagkasunduan.

Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and
body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to
allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus,
the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the
part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate
against him.79 We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he
element of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private
respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a
confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the
reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondents failure to comply."80 It is a
basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.81
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner
has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support
the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply
naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial
proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment
petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner
miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the
periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to
them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have
adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL
really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."82
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative agencies are
experts in matters within their specific and specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a
hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial
evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such
nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be
reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul
their findings.

To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty86 of
the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals.88 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal protection guarantee,
is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee.91
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been
mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was illegally
dismissed" up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA.92
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated
in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not
require a writ of execution,93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement
belongs to the employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the
courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to frustrate his
"immediate return to his previous position,"94 there is evidence that PAL opted to physically
reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor
Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as
shown by his signature.96
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case97 that "[t]he
unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment
of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of
a writ of execution"98 and ""even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court."99 He failed to prove that

he complied with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he
actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the
payment of his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in
effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the
impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the
impossible.100
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced
from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social
justice,"101 or based on "equity."102 In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not
for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.103
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year
of service.104 It should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving.105 We are
not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which
would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for
more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount
equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, which should include his
regular allowances.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104768

July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of
the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its
Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its
evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG
to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to
conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of

this order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth
of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board
issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City.
The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all
covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC,
PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her
use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine
Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the
mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of
Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth
Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car
went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of
income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he

being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth
Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no
visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There
was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit
assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money
would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and
analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of
P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for illgotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried
for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property."3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
("RA No. 1379") 4 against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an
Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the
PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth
Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security
Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his

power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found
reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim
to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in
Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house
of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a
clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed
ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her
house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November
1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of
preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The
court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge
the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state
when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the
subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in
court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.

Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence
already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired
the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly
because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its
preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further
evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the
complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The
Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that
private respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it
had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however,
warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court
held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military
officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former
President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered
returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has
primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as
the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection
herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint

Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same
issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was
conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against
him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND
THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR
RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND
PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF
THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS
TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN
LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra,
are clearly not applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037
was cured and/or waived by respondents with the filing of their respective
answers with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they
were filed after commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the
petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE
OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE
EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and
cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under
RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to
make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be
taken based on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs
power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific
responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of
EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG.
Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG
could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a
subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders
directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President
Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated
within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to
recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black
on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association
with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative,
and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General19 does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes
of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas
was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close
association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos
acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us.
Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that
the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to
RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its
jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly
a subordinate of the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this

contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following
recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried
for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property."20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its
amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and
limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that
the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a
"subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas
allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other
legitimate income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association
with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not
contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with
former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent
Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal.
The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same
and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act
Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21 (Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the illgotten wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests
jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need
to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is
clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the
PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2
and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises
and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority and influence, connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said
ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling
under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman
and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of
unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the
Solicitor General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the
Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings
involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the
absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos.
The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority
by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and
its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended
Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should

have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must
also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be
taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government
be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the
forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as
well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in
the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to
it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President,
PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and
prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the
pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which
explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990.
Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the
proceeding.30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is
vested by law and not by the parties to an action.31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct
the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary
investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the
forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth
under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion
of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner
has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended
Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989.
Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion
sought "to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with
being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this
case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the
inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents
and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the
presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task
in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage,
when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a
situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a
five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff
Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary
investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36
The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March
1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the
court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date
set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its ReAmended Complaint.38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for

years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended
Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to
complete the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than
sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked
petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a ReAmended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners
evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case
against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the
raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the
seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team
seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition;
one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and
by the will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends
that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents
did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance
of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over
of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces
up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2)
whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration")
remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at
least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as

that which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new
order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly
known as the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an
existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right
of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional
methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable." It has been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people
of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter
any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government
which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of
the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then
in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by
mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government,43
petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom
Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the
Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of
sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the
previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing
of assets or accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that
the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration
orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in
defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues
that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner
Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument.
On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results
and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal
shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special
protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due
process, hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios,
fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not
an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me
elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization
and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian
protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is
tragic when we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee
report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the
convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee
report is asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of
disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin
to think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that
is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a
Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it
becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and
seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the
search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom
price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there
is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the
highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow
strong, only if it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price
that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of
Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If
Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo
argument that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law.
If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of

Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to
the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with
what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell,
Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake." I ask the
Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section
8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the
test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is
a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the
present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that
"[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court
has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations
under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say

that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos
as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.
The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law
that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside
from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some
jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in
said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason
why they also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money
and other jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron",

and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were
containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained
money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized
this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along
also the money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will
bring that because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your
Honor.49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby
armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your
Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for
search warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons
were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how
many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office
who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum
Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for
instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also
these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these
were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search
warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attach cases.1wphi1 These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols
or other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be
money. So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they
will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team,
like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its
own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team
exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,53 and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However,
we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor.
We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding
the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to
as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to
be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those
in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the
parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the
morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at
the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang
(2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who
acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated
that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,

who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon
meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd
shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company
shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as
follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March
4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees
who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation
to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the
CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge
was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex
"B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18,
1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P.
Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the
existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise
of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it
was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating
the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order
(p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969
fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September
15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for
ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of
the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969,
the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15
of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5)
days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their
motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two
(2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held
among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion
for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M",
pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated
October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73,
rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on
October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear
the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days
from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or

order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their
motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest
mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K",
"K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October
9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice
of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the
issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is
to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed
that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by
which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical

aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the
ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to
talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one
are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but
also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his
full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely
in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they
"need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a
mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other
hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr.
Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in

Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-ofinterests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated
by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration
was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the
occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad
faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and
political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It
was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up
the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself
at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it
encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own
employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive
police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly
employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly
and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and

laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing
only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation
was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were
by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss
can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the
shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice
have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers
the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of
Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual
tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the
freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or

strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in
the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular
shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm
will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union
members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate
the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the
part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they
raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover,
the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of
their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only
the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request
the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of
March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of
human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of
the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of
the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal
on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the
mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of
the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section
4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial

Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards
as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers
of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against
alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of
the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal
protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint
charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the
appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle
of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as
the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed
by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)"
(p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from
joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed
with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a
family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But

management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right
of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from
the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police,
it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to
the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such
complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation
and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company,"
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of
loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost
expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties
were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of
its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or
products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of
workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have
amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by
reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well
as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the
eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently
being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford
protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of
the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the

exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective

bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is
most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed
to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by
the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court
of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights.
Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who
is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights
and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned
orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely
delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of
the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech,
the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are
errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned.
Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time.
And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest
with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which
to pay for competent legal services. 28-a

VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its
order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments
in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such
motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were
promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2)
days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it
was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat
the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the
inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to
the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered
by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and
superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule
as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of
five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for
the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only
one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27,
1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in

accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp.
57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on
October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for
the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma
since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day
reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or
decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not
involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently
available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of
action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of
the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and
complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural
rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of
Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners
even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their
defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend
its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any
case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in

court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari
and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the
court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond
the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error
of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction.
If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court
has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said
decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of
judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course
of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this
particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which
denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right
to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar,
no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property
rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution
renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash
with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific
guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the
instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein
respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in
the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
with reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice
Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc.,
et. al., 30-e thus:

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new
trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for
the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial
Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial
Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as
generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged
from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even
restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as
may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No.
46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For
these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute
a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly
discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46
Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the
instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert
competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to
them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing
that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September
22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is
only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be
instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910].
The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84
Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy,
14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it
deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court
has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124
[1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never
"sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view
them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with
which courts have organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization the

administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly
opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As
succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the
situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843)
... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders
of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the
other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and
only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20,
respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent
firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for
which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the
unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not
all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a
consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply
to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the
eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the
Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their
respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the
same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to
destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow
their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish
involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however,
is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has

the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection
against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the
moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a
never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure
because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that
our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe. 31

The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack
of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being
subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to
conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their
freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is
sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent
company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and
implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the
petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a
patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that
the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group
of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected
by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of
self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324
U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine
Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied.
The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer
to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of
that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor
practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
(Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in
the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and
integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech,
free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the
company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from
the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation
from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal
Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department
of Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity
as General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners,
vs.
UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA
PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents' right to exercise their
profession and their right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On
December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA's charter.

Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage
profession, 1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on March 21, 1985, which embodied
the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots
must be holders of pilot licenses 3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for
three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have
achieved satisfactory performance 4 that they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself 5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of
70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA
General Manager. 6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize
themselves into pilot associations which would make available such equipment as may
be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot
associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every
new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association
and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed
to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it
paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 7
on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby
afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services."
This was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular appointments which
have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain
valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions
in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of
effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a
rigid evaluation of performance."
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila
Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92
before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed
by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or
annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as
its governing body."
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 8 which
laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilot,
viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: 9 safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and
(2) Criteria for Evaluation: 10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA
Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels
serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPAAO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within
the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the
Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance
the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said
administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order
in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued
earlier. 11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all
intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely
implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it "to control, regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district."
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its
implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of
this case. PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims
no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to
one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee's
performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession in PPA's jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, as regards the alleged "absence of ample prior consultation" before the
issuance of the administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857,
which merely requires the PPA to consult with "relevant Government agencies." Since
the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the
Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of
the National Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his knowledge
and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law

has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative
order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673.
On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment: 12
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted excess jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative
Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null
and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92
and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA,
recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v.
Carnation Philippines, Inc. 13 Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege may
be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots.
Consequently, any "withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be strictly made
in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was
apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the
issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its
publication in the newspapers. From this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this
Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties,
the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of
the Constitution, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . .

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely,
that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance
of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be
made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural
due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while
substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by
which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." 14 PPA-AO No. 04-92
must be examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No.
04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government
agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously
referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has
maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of
Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, 15 where it declared that "(a)s long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times 16
before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score,
however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast
Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations,"
was not consulted, 17 the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing
function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors
of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval
defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard
need not be consulted. 18
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the
validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. 19
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the
exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right
has become vested and can only be "withdrawn or shortened" by observing the
constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the

procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the
condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property
right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993,
decision that "(t)he exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee
against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due
process." 20 He merely expressed the opinion the "(i)n the limited context of this case,
PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that "PPA-AO 04-95
does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession."
As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to
perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals.
Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the
system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with
establishment standards." 21 A license is a right or permission granted by some
competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license,
would be illegal. 22
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to
pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations,
each followed by actual training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny,
the here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5)
government professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work,
train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he
must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work,
train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as
Captain of vessel for at least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally,
of course, that given for pilots.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in
pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of
PPA-AO No. 04-92, "(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously
issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December
1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal
or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a
measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years
of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their
retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under
the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license
which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now
dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this preevaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by
PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out
that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a "surplusage" 23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment.
PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine
Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation,
disciplining and removal of harbor pilots matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No.
04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or
substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents' insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was
responsible for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some
factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules
and regulations. The trial court's finding of animosity between him and private
respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court
between private respondents and Dayan, including cases which have reached this
Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO
No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have
acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his
actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of
the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-24693

October 23, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL

DEL MAR, INC. and GO HIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE, CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
J. M. Aruego, A. Tenchavez and L. U. Go for petitioners-appellees.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates for respondent-appellant.
RE S O LUTI ON
FERNANDO, J.:
A Motion for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967 was filed by petitioners,
followed by a Motion for new trial. As the Motion for reconsideration is clearly without merit,
there is no occasion for this sought-for new trial. Consequently, both motions are denied.
(1) No merit in the Motion for reconsideration.
In the decision of this Court of July 31, 1967, sought to be reconsidered, its basis was
categorically set forth in the following language:
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity. . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has
in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people. . ..
The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against
the ordinance set aside.
The O'Gorman principle1 fails to meet the approval of counsel of petitioners. They would restrain
unduly and unjustifiably its operation. In the language of the motion for reconsideration: "The U.
S. Supreme Court was not laying down as a general rule in constitutional cases that there must be
a factual foundation of record to offset the presumption of constitutionality of any and every
law."
To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, this interpretation is without support in authority or reason and
rests upon a misconception. It is to betray an almost total lack of awareness of the import and
significance of the O'Gorman doctrine in American constitutional law. Authorities on the subject
of proven competence and knowledge flatly reject such a view. Dodd,2 Dowling,3 Freund
Sutherland, De Wolfe Howe, and Brown,4 and Kauper5 in their standard casebooks quote the
same excerpt from O'Gorman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. appearing in the opinion of this Court.
Dodd entertained no doubt: "The accepted view is that stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
O'Gorman case."6
Frankfurter and Landis were equally explicit in their appreciation of what the O'Gorman dictum
means. "As doctrine, there is nothing new in the avowal of a need for concreteness in passing
judgment upon the legislative judgment. But perhaps last term marks a more sedulous attention
to its observance. Certainly the procedure followed by the Court in O'Gorman & Young v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., if regularly observed, will affect not a little the fate of legislation. If
insisted upon, it will compel the bar to argue questions of legislative validity in the perspective of
the circumstances which gave rise to a particular statute."7
The late Professor Hamilton of the Yale Law School, one of the most distinguished
constitutionalists, would have been appalled by the unorthodoxy of the view of counsel of
petitioners. For him, the O'Gorman opinion was a manifestation of the jurist's art at its best:
If the jurists have the feelings of other men, Monday, the fifth of January nineteen
hundred and thirty one, must have been a day of consequence in the life of Mr. Justice
Brandeis. On that day he handed down the judgment of the United States Supreme Court
in the O'Gorman case. The cause was a simple suit in contract: the result depended upon

the validity of a New Jersey statute regulating the commissions to be paid by insurance
companies to their agents for securing business. The more general question was the
tolerance to be accorded to legislative price-fixing under the Fourteenth Amendment.
And, as the fortunes of litigation broke, the issue came to be the intellectual procedure by
which the constitutionality of the acts which make up the public control of business are to
be determined. Upon that day the views of Brandeis became "the opinion of the court,"
and a new chapter in judicial history began to be written.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In form "the opinion of the court" is a very simple and unpretentious document. It begins
with a statement of the issue and a history of the case, continues with a brief summary of
the reasons for the statute and a statement that "the business of insurance is so affected
with a public interest that the state may regulate the rates," and concludes with a
declaration of the test for validity. As "underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character," it follows that "the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." It did not appear "upon the face of the statute, or from any
facts of which the court must take judicial notice" that in New Jersey "evils did not exist,"
for which the statute was "an appropriate remedy." Accordingly the court was compelled
to declare the statute valid; in fact it was left with no alternative.
Yet the simple lines of a short opinion present a superb example of the jurist's art. . . .8
This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order,
or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those
involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous. That in such an event there should not
be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented does not argue against the
force of the above excerpts on the weight to be accorded the O'Gorman doctrine in this case.
The prop here failing, is there anything else in the Motion for reconsideration that calls for a
modification of the decision of this Court? The answer must be in the negative. It ought not to
have escaped petitioners that the opinion of the Court after noting the lack of factual foundation
to offset the presumption of constitutionality went on to discuss the due process aspects to make
clear that on its face, the Ordinance cannot be considered void.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great
public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its

competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general
welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society."
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila, traceable in great
part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to
fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all
times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
There is nothing in the Motion for reconsideration that in any wise affects adversely or impairs
the force of the above conclusion. The task of proving that the challenged Ordinance is void on
its face is one attended with difficulty. Nonetheless, with the persistence worthy of a better cause,
petitioners would cite as fatal infirmity the alleged invasion of the rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, to liberty, and to property.
As the unchallenged rule, to paraphrase Laurel, is that unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance,9 he has no standing, the
invocation of petitioners as motel operators of their alleged right to being free from unreasonable
search and seizure need not be taken seriously. Nor does their claim of the alleged infringement
of their liberty deserve any further thought, its implausibility being self-evident, except perhaps
as to the liberty to contract, which is part and parcel of their right to the property. Unfortunately
for them, in this jurisdiction the liberty to contract, except in the Pomar10 case as noted in the
decision, has never stood in the way of the enactment of police power measures when called for
by circumstances such as undoubtedly exist in this case. The same is true in the United States,
where such a concept has definitely fallen from its previously high state under the impact of the
Nebbia,11 West Coast Hotel Co.12 and Olson decisions.13
That leaves only the alleged grievance that there was an unconstitutional invasion of property
rights. It goes without saying that petitioners themselves cannot ignore that one could,
consistently with the fundamental law, be deprived of his property as long as due process is
observed. The decision makes clear that such indeed was the case as far as this Ordinance was
concerned. To that aspect, a considerable portion of the opinion was devoted, citing a number of
applicable decisions of this Court, all tending to demonstrate that there was no due process
infraction. The Motion for reconsideration is conspicuously barren of any attempt to show that

under our previous decisions referred to, the challenged Ordinance could be successfully
assailed. It would follow then that this reiteration of an argument, previously shown to be far
from persuasive, is deserving of a similar fate.
That is all there is to the Motion for reconsideration. That and what Justice Cardozo aptly
referred to as reference to "grotesque or fanciful situations," which if they would arise could then
be appropriately dealt with. As the famed jurist aptly noted: "That they are conceivable though
improbable ought not to govern our construction."14 That is not the way then to impugn the
validity of an ordinance. Neither could it be rightfully looked upon as laying a foundation for
setting aside a decision. The Motion for reconsideration, to repeat, is palpably lacking in merit.
(1) No occasion for new trial.
Subsequently, a supplemental Motion for new trial dated September 25, 1967, was filed the same
day. As earlier pointed out, with the Motion for reconsideration having been shown to be devoid
of merit, the supplemental Motion for new trial should likewise be denied. In the main, what was
so unsuccessfully put forth by counsel for petitioners was adhered to. Additional counsel would
bring in new points, namely, the alleged denial of equal protection and the repugnancy to "the
laissez faire principle underlying our economic system, as it would substantially reduce return on
the investment." Neither suffices to justify any modification of the decision, much less its
reconsideration. A new trial would therefore be an exercise in futility.
The alleged denial of equal protection was predicated on the greater advantages that the motels
in the suburbs of Manila would enjoy as against those within the city limits. On its face, such
argument is clearly unfounded. If the legislative power of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila were not limited to its boundaries, if it could apply to the suburban area, then perhaps
plausibility could be imparted to such a claim. Since, as is undeniable, the challenged Ordinance
applies to all the motels in Manila, an assertion that there is denial of equal protection would, to
put it at its mildest, be extremely far-fetched.
Nor does the invocation of the laissez faire concept as bar against the enactment of regulatory
measures, which undoubtedly would result in the diminution of income and the loss of business,
occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of the decision arrived at by this Court with
controlling constitutional law principles. Did not petitioners take note of the view announced by
Justice Laurel quoted in the decision to the effect that the policy "of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest." The decision likewise cited this jurist,
speaking for the Court in Calalang v. Williams:15 "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Perhaps and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure, the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state. . . . To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated." That was in 1940. Then in 1955, came Co Kiam v. City of Manila,16
where Justice Reyes, A., for a unanimous Court categorically declared: "And surely, the mere
fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a
particular mode of earning a living can not prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said

in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power. (City of New Orleans v.
Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417)."
Nor does the reference by new counsel to American state court decisions call for a different
conclusion. The United States Supreme Court in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,17 decided in 1943, was equally explicit, saying "the laissez-faire concept
or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through
expanded and strengthened governmental controls." Two names of great repute, Freund and
Learned Hand, were cited by petitioners. Neither if properly understood, could help their cause at
all. According to Freund: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect, when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers'
judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption
of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values
within the due process clause."18 The illustrious Learned Hand writing on Chief Justice Stone's
concept of the judicial function had occasion to note the "discredited attitude" of what he referred
to "as the old apostles of the institution of property. . . ."19
What then is left? Clearly nothing to call for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967.
Nor is there the least justification for a new trial and reception of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for reconsideration of petitioners of September 16, 1967 and
supplemental Motion for new trial of September 25, 1967, are denied.

G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of
respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in
Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The
preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.)
FRANC
ISCO
ARCA
Judge 1
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE

PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE
ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY
OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE
MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in
any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00
except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical
assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working
in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination,
who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6)
months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment,
upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance
declared null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance
No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to
the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the
action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of
legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present
petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent
Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968: 9
I

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW

IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST
UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground
that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to
purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an
exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal
purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien
shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the
processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory
in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory
but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise
of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification
should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether
he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up
any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a
permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon
the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity
per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government
agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled

against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary
discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of
all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled
discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the
mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs.
Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American
jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a
slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in
every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of
state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political
existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be
considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to
resolve the constitutional questions presented.

I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is
taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained
toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to
make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public
land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary
of the Interior, and

"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial
governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order
No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected
a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary
of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to
the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby
direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and
Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan
Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction
be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were
necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among
them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of
Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by
the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of
articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed
the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action
was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the
paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor.
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by
the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any nonChristian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial
governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to
take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read:
Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various
special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section
69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will
later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order
to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government
of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first
of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these
"non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled
in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip
II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the
Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San
Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical
law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to
the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been
endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to
the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the
Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain
assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand
five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve
God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in
communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras
and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and
wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to
those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that
convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have
entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care
and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that
those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the
protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves,
and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered.
Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order
and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the
encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the
laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF
THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the
facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway
of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be
mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS
PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones.
Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the
places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and
that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate
them and profit therefrom.
xxx

xxx

xxx

LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING,
VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or
to remove the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our
express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided,
however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it
by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for
private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always
complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The

penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who
should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL
BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two
aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be
more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less
than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should
annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8,
1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip
IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following,
see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS,
NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live
in the reducciones and towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that
some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of
troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless
men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and
provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and
utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some
of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to
reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the
imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which
should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and
courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of
the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian

and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them,
and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it
appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol.
2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the
condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones,"
is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881,
reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory
recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force
therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all
governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which
living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the
moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection
and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation
and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian
towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of
Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the,
metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this
most important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help
and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end
that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the
means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the
work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases
and in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things,
taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which
every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part
of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises
by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important
interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints.
After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and
missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous
conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and

Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians,
Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities,
held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable
necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and
isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby
promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be
governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are
bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the
different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may
be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming
about without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans
who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain
and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials,
priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in
the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive
character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they
must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on,
with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the
inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary
regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the
construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of
communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns
or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the
beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect
the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years
they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously
indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate
for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses;
and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing

for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their
interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with
the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed
force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall
be determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia
(division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the
rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they
shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco
which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other
producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of
which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be
detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the
Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal
labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to
live in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and the right to
cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive;
support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and
customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their
own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions
and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them
security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the
exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of
tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as
the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province
or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages
offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of

constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in
communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these
towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good
conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a
place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their
rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and
vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's
Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in
conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such
tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily
be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately
order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall
take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other
subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority,
civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to
the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the
southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall
conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron,
a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions
relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for
consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing,
in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective
official centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15)
(Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the
best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.

1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later
expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians
to maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of these
tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they
are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant
and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic
Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a
legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the
Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and
the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The
Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department
of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to
appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the
Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec.
16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall
have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the
Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other nonChristian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province
of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for
the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the
organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic
Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United
States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos.
4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for
the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc,
Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No.
547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL
CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF
MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of
municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers
and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of
those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eightyseven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the
townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is
further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who

refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period
not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province
to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular
government, and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an
to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of
Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be
organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered
three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such
township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the
same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order
of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twentysixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn,
Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes
retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words
are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are
also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of nonChristian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections
701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws

which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550,
1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394,
Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917;
and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No.
1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative
Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in
giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the
Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion.
In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last
Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M.
Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands,"
1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p.
107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain
what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the
twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to
that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first
section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only
in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province,
Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine

Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not,
however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who
are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this.
( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of
their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is
predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually
introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the
Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty
of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known
as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United
States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose
of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to
provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of
the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et
seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253
charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference
to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for
bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States
vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal
marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises
his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following
language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage
of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that
province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . .

We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized
tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into
consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called
upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine
Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had
these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special
Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General
and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were
originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons
who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be
considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which
are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all
cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to
enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'nonChristians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not
so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking
sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the
Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to
which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For
practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your
province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced
Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be
afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you
are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in
the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the
governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal
Revenue Manual, p. 214.)

The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other
better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to
stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the
Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of
civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of
religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty
of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of
Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos
and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point,
who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment
of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to
mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to
the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all
persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt
from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians,
Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the
country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form
of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula
tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated
with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question
has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing
his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula
tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was
exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however,
continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc.,
residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid
by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite
widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in
Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being
collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized

people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations
are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part
reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding
cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills
for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the
Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and
digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the
fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and
low state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of
non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is
concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of
life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized
community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to
precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from and
after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other
taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration
of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from
foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such
period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished
him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or
not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does
not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations
with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in
civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as
members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law
is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of

life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots
and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue
Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue,
and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice.
Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been
baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain nonChristian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors,
does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable
under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting
the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the
person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors
both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the
provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions
place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the
provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase
does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of
the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to
those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living
without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and
order . . .

The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the
common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish
a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the
difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which
the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of
Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of
uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the
law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and
unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P.
Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the
Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands
[1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes
that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive
Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands,
prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title nonChristian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive
officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious
belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands
of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census
of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los
nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan,"
"negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos,
but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in

primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it today, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all
these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and
signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the
interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for
community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by
the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the
Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to
be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with
the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the
American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how
the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the
neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly
contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and
proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution
which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the
position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in
Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both
before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an
anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards
the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and
the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over
which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an
ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or
transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority.
When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United
States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could
be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to
make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation
are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as
nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with
the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under
the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These
Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United
States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They
owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local
ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise
the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the
Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The
power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of
those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits
of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce
its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be
considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress
could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the

admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different
superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent
upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general."
Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were
treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official
supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only
does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes,
but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions
have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its
borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether
within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been
deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the
government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the
Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay
[1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams
[1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co.
[1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla,
281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as
an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may
be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs.
Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of
judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This
was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe
of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some
time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith,
and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government;
that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the
United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,

George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed
therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the
Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and
return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had
caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by
habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the
Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the
Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the
court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of
Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian
country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer
upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon
the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is
wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough
to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be
upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a
federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of
authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military
department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the
United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate
white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,"
so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,

5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so
ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to
determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands,
is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a
writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do
exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and
placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that,
when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and
for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere
to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists
for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate
this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature
has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not
bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney,
and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make

decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.)
The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of
section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by
the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of
Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of
Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such
regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all
matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal,
especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the
rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been
treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In
the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See
also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S..,
364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914],
232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection
of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his
unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English,
and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of
'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs,
and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded;
religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional
guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants
according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of
legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of
to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be
enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual
is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the
possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal
and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood,
and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more
restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who
is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)

Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to
do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to
one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal
enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137
U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society
could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a
law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all
could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property,
regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with
which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute
the authority of any human government especially of any free government existing
under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally
true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the
pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the
upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to
Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as
are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including
epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to
choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.

In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are
ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277;
Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs.
Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258,
261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It
is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law."
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural
rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are
also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of
the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones
[1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster,
in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme
Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that
"every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a
judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not
requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law,
p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado
vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908],
10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of
law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the
United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law
providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite
possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the
Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271
inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes.
Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition
of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The
term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in
fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs.
Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their
freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if
section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this
moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its
weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs.
Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to
restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on

rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the
great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the
right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
"There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government
belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government."
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally
deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to
Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place.
There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made
in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be
encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which
they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a
somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit
of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less
than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and
development.

Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was
naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila,
made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live
a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will
follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their
children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit
them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if
not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse
them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the nonChristian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the
non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized
Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout
the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians,
to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among
them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in,
the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the
non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living
conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of
them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild

habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is
the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live
and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and
show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short,
they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading
them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly
civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the socalled non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674
in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards
the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and
foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral,
material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in
view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete
fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of
the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates
advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude
upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these
people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and
to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method
was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing
situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same
class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few
reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.

Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that
the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men
are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are
Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and
Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain.
Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will
leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code,
because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If
immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and
its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and
order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State.
Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from
destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity
is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the
forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but
instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people
with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in
court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they
will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests
and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they
allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of
what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should
not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand
liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and
with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The
progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and
the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful
citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply
because a certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such
a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this
people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even
blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now
willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this
time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them
and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and
become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the
nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are
being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to
understand that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed
and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are
being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being

done from them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity
may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or
put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for
anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places
under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this
people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property.
They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire
space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being
lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why
can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on
the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This
measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which
they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return
to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you
can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing
them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach
a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he
pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example
from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the
same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and
other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless
people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be
the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into
whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress
these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out
the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the
courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is
generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts,

it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the
accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right
and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the
Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the
beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by
force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue,
the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to
restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class
attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive
can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be,
impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread
belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately
have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this
progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that
the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that
power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law,
there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would
lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume
towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to

tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is
wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made
from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called nonChristians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been
effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the
Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal
before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich
and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The
public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine
Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is
toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving
consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson
[1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents,
the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its
duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts
as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145
of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to
the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 34163

September 18, 1931

GREGORIO PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Arsenio Santos for appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Opinion and Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of the appeal taken by the petitioner Gregorio Pedro from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing his action for the annulment of an
ordinance, with costs against him.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the
trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved by
the acting councilors, is valid and legal.
2. The lower court erred in denying the petitioner an acquired right, notwithstanding
Ordinance No. 35 and the permit giving him by the president in accordance therewith.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the opening, maintenance, and operation of the
Galas cockpit is injurious to the consumptive patients of the Santol Sanatorium.

4. The lower court erred in abstaining from making any ruling regarding the legality of
the action taken by the provincial board, suspending the effects of Ordinance No. 35 of
the municipal council of Caloocan, and in finally disapproving it, according to the
resolutions enacted by it and numbered 1135, series of 1928, and 154, series of 1929.
5. The lower court erred in dismissing this case and in not declaring permanent the
injunction sought, and in not sentencing the plaintiffs [respondents] jointly and severally
to pay the damages claimed in the complaint.
The following relevant facts are necessary for the decision of the question raised by the instant
appeal:
On May 8, 1926, there was organized in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, an
association for the construction and exploitation of cockpits, called "La Sociedad Bighani."
On May 22, 1926, Eugenio Tansioco, the president of the association, applied to the municipal
president of Caloocan and obtain a permit to construct a building of strong materials at Galas, in
said municipality, to be used as cockpit, upon payment of the proper fees. (Exhibit 1.)
While the construction was under way, Pablo, then president of Caloocan, addressed a
communication to Eugenio Tansioco on June 15, 1926, warning him that the site of the building
was not the one designated by the chief of police, and that it was within the radius of 1,500
meters from the hospital of the Philippine Antituberculosis Society in Santol, in direct
contravention of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926, enacted on May, 1926.
The permit having been annulled, and the payments theretofore made forfeited, the "Sociedad
Bighani" filed civil case No. 30537 in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 21,
1926, against said Pablo Pablo, as municipal president of Caloocan, et al., for a preliminary
injunction requiring them to refrain from impeding or obstructing the operation and exploitation
of the Bighani cockpit, which at that time was completed and ready to be thrown open to the
public.
On August 26, 1927, the Court of first Instance of Manila rendered judgment absolving the
defendants from the complaint, which was affirmed by this court on October 15, 1928.
(Company "Bighani" vs. 53 Phil., 886.)
On September 18, 1927, the municipal council of Caloocan enacted Ordinance No. 34, providing
in the first section, among other things, that outside the barrios of Loma, Talipapa, and
Novaliches, where only one cockpit might be established, cockpits might be established at a
distance of not less than 1,500 meters from another licensed cockpit, public schoolhouse, or any
hospital or charitable institution existing within the municipal radius.

As a result of the general election held on June 5, 1928, in the municipality of Caloocan, Rizal,
the municipal council, formerly comprising Pablo Pablo, as president, Blas Bernardino, as vicepresident, and Severino Paganiban, Diego Justo, Esteban Sanchez, Patricio Galuran, Raymundo
Andres, Emiliano Samson, Vicente Sevilla, Lucas Pascual, Placido C. del Mundo, Delfin
Rodriguez, Jorge Nadurata, Anacleto Victoria, Emilio Acab, and Mateo Austria, as councilors,
was substituted by another comprising the newly elected Dominador Aquino, as president, Diego
Justo, as vice-president, and Blas Bernardino, Flaviano de Jesus, Pedro Galang, Celestino C.
Celosa, Nicolas Carpio, Lucas Pascual, Basilio Biglang-awa, and Lucas Bustamante, as
councilors, who were inducted into office on October 16th of that year.
On December 21, 1928, the plaintiff herein, Gregorio Pedro, acquired by absolute sale all the
rights and interests of the "Sociedad Bighani" in the cockpit bearing its name. (Exhibit M.)
On the same date, December 21, 1928, said plaintiff, Gregorio Pedro, addressed a
communication to the municipal council of Caloocan soliciting a permit to open, operate,
maintain, and exploit said cockpit for a period of four years, binding himself to observe to the
letter all municipal ordinances on cockpits. (Exhibit A.)
On December 26, 1928, the municipal council of Caloocan passed resolution No. 202 approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, amending section 1 of Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927,
providing, among other things that only one cockpit could be established in each of the barrios of
Galas, Loma, Talipapa, and Novaliches, and any other place outside said barrios, provided, in the
latter case, said cockpits are at a distance of not less than 1,000 meters from another licensed
cockpit, and 500 meters from any hospital or charitable institution within the municipality of
Caloocan. (Exhibit C.)
On the same date, December 26, 1928, the municipal councilors of Caloocan, Blas Bernardino,
Flaviano de Jesus, and Pedro Galang, signed and forwarded to the provincial governor of Rizal
an accusation against Dominador Aquino, the municipal president, and the other councilors who
approved Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, alleging that they had been bribed to vote in favor of
that ordinance. (Exhibit 4.)
The provincial governor endorsed the accusation to the provincial board of Rizal, which through
resolution No. 1110 dated December 27, 1928, ordered the temporary suspension of the members
denounced pending the administrative investigation of the accusation. By virtue of said
resolution No. 1110 of the provincial board of Rizal, and using one of the powers conferred upon
him by law, the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval, suspended the municipal president
and the denounced members from their respective offices on December 28, 1928. (Exhibits 5 to
5-E.)

On the same date, December 28, 1928, between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning, the appellant
Gregorio Pedro paid into the municipal treasury the sum of P2,050 as a license fee on his cockpit
for the first quarter of the year 1929, and the proper receipt (Exhibit L), and the permit (Exhibit
D), were issued to him authorizing him to operate, maintain, exploit, and open to the public a day
cockpit in the barrio of Galas, Caloocan, Rizal, for a period of four years.
On December 29, 1928, the municipal council ad interim in Caloocan, passed resolution No. 9,
series of 1928, approving Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, suspending the effects of resolution
No. 202 of the suspended council, approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, while a special
committee created by the same ordinance investigated the expediency of permitting the
exploitation and opening of the Galas cockpit at the site applied for by the proprietor, Gregorio
Pedro. (Exhibit 6.)
On the same date, December 29, 1928, the provincial board of Rizal passed resolution No. 1135
suspending the effects of resolution No. 202 of the municipal council of Caloocan approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, pending final decision on the validity of said ordinance by said
board. (Exhibit H.)
On January 16, 1929, the Director of the Santol Tuberculosis Sanatorium addressed a
communication to the temporary president of the municipal council of Caloocan, Flaviano de
Jesus, stating that a cockpit established in the barrio of Galas, owing to the noise and clamor of
the crowd, would retard the recovery of the patients in said sanatorium, and would tend to
increase the danger of spreading the disease among those visiting the cockpit. (Exhibit 11.)
On February 1, 1929, the Chief of the Executive Bureau confirmed the resolution of the
provincial board of Rizal holding the respondents in the administrative investigation mentioned
above guilty of maladministration, and imposing upon each of them a punishment of thirty days'
suspension. (Exhibit 7.)
On the same date, February 1, 1929, following the decision of the Executive Bureau mentioned
above, the provincial board of Rizal, through resolution No. 154, disapproved said resolution No.
202 of the municipal council of Caloocan, approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928. (Exhibit
1.)
On February 2, 1929, the president of the third sanitary division of Rizal, acting upon the
appellant's application filed on January 30, 1929, issued a certificate to the effect that after a
proper inspection of the Galas cockpit, he had found it to be in good sanitary condition.
On February 7, 1929, Gregorio Pedro furnished a bond of P10,000 in favor of the municipality of
Caloocan to secure the payment of the fees accruing during the years from 1929 to 1932, which
is the period included in the license issued to him for the opening and operation of his cockpit in

Galas, and this bond was accepted and approved by the respondent municipal president,
Dominador Aquino, and certified by the provincial treasurer, Jose Villegas. (Exhibit E.)
On February 13, 1929, councilor Lucas Bustamante submitted a resolution at a special session of
the municipal council of Caloocan, whereby said council appealed to the Executive Bureau from
the aforementioned resolution No. 154 of the provincial board of Rizal, but the resolution did not
pass owing to the lack of two-thirds of the members necessary, with five members voting in
favor and three against it.
On February 14, 1929, the appellant Gregorio Pedro sent the municipal president of Caloocan a
communication, informing him that having fulfilled all the requirements of the law and the
ordinances then in force, he would open his cockpit in Galas to the public in the morning of
February 17, 1929. (Exhibit J.)
On February 15, 1929, the respondent municipal president of Caloocan addressed a
communication to the appellant Gregorio Pedro informing him that under no circumstance could
said president permit the appellant to open his cockpit in Galas, Caloocan, to the public, for
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, under which a permit had been given him to open and exploit
his aforesaid cockpit had been disapproved by the provincial board of Rizal in its resolution No.
154, series of 1928, as a result of which the aforementioned ordinance became null and void.
The first question to decide in this appeal is that raised in the first assignment of error, to wit,
whether Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved by the temporary councilors, is valid.
The appellant argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on December
29, 1928, by the temporary councilors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio
Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant; (2) it was enacted
on account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely
to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said
petitioner-appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee composed of persons who are not
members of the council, vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be delegated
by said council to that committee.
The petitioner-appellant contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit,
and open to the public the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the
requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has acquired a right which cannot
be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was subsequently approved.
This court has already held that an ordinance regulating the functioning of cockpits does not
create irrevocable rights and may be abrogated by another ordinance. (Vinco vs. Municipality of
Hinigaran, 41 Phil., 790; Joaquin vs. Herrera, 37 Phil., 705; 12 Corpus Juris, 958, sec. 494; 37
Corpus Juris, 168.)

The petitioner-appellant also contends that said Ordinance No. 36 was passed due to prejudice
"because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost,
the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner." The aforesaid
Ordinance No. 36 was not approved for the purpose of injuring the petitioner, but to correct an
irregularity consisting in the passage of Ordinance No. 35, which had been enacted to favor the
said petitioner-appellant. The "Sociedad Bighani," from which the herein petitioner-appellant
acquired the ownership of the cockpit here in question, was denied a license to operate it,
because it had been constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926, later amended
by Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927. The "Sociedad Bighani" instituted proceedings against the
president and municipal council of Caloocan, Rizal, in civil case No. 30537 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to prevent said defendants from impeding the operation and exploitation of
the Bighani cockpit, and the court decided in favor of said defendants, absolving them from the
complaint on the ground among other reasons, that the Bighani cockpit had been constructed
within the prohibited distance from the Antitubercular Sanatorium of Santol, and that decision
was affirmed by this court on appeal. (Company "Bighani" vs. Pablo, supra.) The cockpit in
question now is the former Bighani cockpit mentioned above; it occupies the same site; and the
same hygienic reasons which prompted the enactment of Ordinance No. 15, amended by
Ordinance No. 34, cited above, exist now; therefore, when this was amended by Ordinance No.
35, reducing the distance between a cockpit and any hospital, so that the Bighani cockpit would
be beyond said distance, the municipal council which amended it acted with partiality towards a
certain person, namely, the petitioner-appellant, to the prejudice of the patients in the aforesaid
sanatorium. According to Elliot in his work "Municipal Corporations," cited by said petitionerappellant himself, said Ordinance No. 35 is void because it is partial. (Elliot, Municipal
Corporations, sec. 147; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, p. 915).
Ordinance No. 36, which seeks to correct said irregularity, suspended the effects of said
Ordinance No. 35, impliedly reestablishing Ordinance No. 34, is therefore valid.
The other reason given by the petitioner-appellant to show that Ordinance No. 36, is void is that
the municipal council in approving it delegated its legislative powers to a special sanitary
committee.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, provides as follows:
SEC. 2. A committee is hereby provided for, to be composed of the president of the third
sanitary division of Caloocan, Rizal, a practising physician residing in this municipality,
and a member of the municipal council, whose duty it shall be to make the necessary
investigation to determine whether or not the exploitation of the cockpit in the barrio of
Galas for which Gregorio Pedro has applied for a permit, would be injurious to any
public or private interest. This special committee shall make such investigation and

submit a report in due form to this municipal council within the shortest time possible for
its definite action.
The municipal council of Caloocan pro tempore therefore does not delegate by that ordinance to
the special committee thereby created any legislative function, but only entrusts to it the study of
the effect of the operation and exploitation of the cockpit under consideration upon public and
private interests, in order to determine whether or not the license should issue. Informational
work of this nature, owing to its technical character, may be entrusted to technical committees.
(12 Corpus Juris, 846.)
Having arrived at the conclusion that Ordinance No. 36 is valid and that the petitioner-appellant
has acquired no irrevocable right by virtue of the license granted him under Ordinance No. 35,
approved to favor him, which is therefore void, we need not discuss the other assignments of
error by the petitioner-appellant.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and
exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due
process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require;
(2) that the work entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a
study of the sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not
legislative in character, but only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance,
approved by a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another which
had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149927

March 30, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR)
Under then Minister ERNESTO R. MACEDA; and Former Government Officials
CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN
MALAYANG, ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. VALERA and ROMULO
SAN JUAN, petitioners,
vs.
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PEDRO DEL
CONCHA, and ALEJANDRO and RUFO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law under which it is granted is
void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without
offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked
by the State in the public interest.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
May 29, 2001 Decision2 and the September 6, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 46878. The CA disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto."4
The questioned Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
On the other hand, trial courts Decision, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring that the cancellation of License No. 33 was done without jurisdiction and in
gross violation of the Constitutional right of the petitioners against deprivation of their
property rights without due process of law and is hereby set aside.

2. Declaring that the petitioners right to continue the exploitation of the marble deposits
in the area covered by License No. 33 is maintained for the duration of the period of its
life of twenty-five (25) years, less three (3) years of continuous operation before License
No. 33 was cancelled, unless sooner terminated for violation of any of the conditions
specified therein, with due process.
3. Making the Writ of preliminary injunction and the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction issued as permanent.
4. Ordering the cancellation of the bond filed by the Petitioners in the sum of 1 Million.
5. Allowing the petitioners to present evidence in support of the damages they claim to
have suffered from, as a consequence of the summary cancellation of License No. 33
pursuant to the agreement of the parties on such dates as maybe set by the Court; and
6. Denying for lack of merit the motions for contempt, it appearing that actuations of the
respondents were not contumacious and intended to delay the proceedings or undermine
the integrity of the Court.
No pronouncement yet as to costs."5
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
"The four (4) petitioners, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha, Alejandro De
La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble
deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering
marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part
of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.
"Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their tedious efforts
and substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and
Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble
deposits.
xxxxxxxxx
"After compliance with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau
of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners.
xxxxxxxxx

"Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the Department of
Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by him
through his letter to ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION dated
September 6, 1986 for the reasons stated therein. Because of the aforesaid cancellation, the
original petition was filed and later substituted by the petitioners AMENDED PETITION dated
August 21, 1991 to assail the same.
"Also after due hearing, the prayer for injunctive relief was granted in the Order of this Court
dated February 28, 1992. Accordingly, the corresponding preliminary writs were issued after the
petitioners filed their injunction bond in the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00).
xxxxxxxxx
"On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the herein questioned decision."6
The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents license had already ripened
into a property right, which was protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. Such
right was supposedly violated when the license was cancelled without notice and hearing. The
cancellation was said to be unjustified, because the area that could be covered by the four
separate applications of respondents was 400 hectares. Finally, according to the RTC,
Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law;
as such, it violated Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners asked whether PD 463 or the Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974 had been violated by the award of the 330.3062 hectares
to respondents in accordance with Proclamation No. 2204. They also questioned the validity of
the cancellation of respondents Quarry License/Permit (QLP) No. 33.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that the grant of the quarry license covering
330.3062 hectares to respondents was authorized by law, because the license was embraced by
four (4) separate applications -- each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the
limitation under Presidential Decree No. 463 -- that a quarry license should cover not more than
100 hectares in any given province -- was supplanted by Republic Act No. 7942,7 which
increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463.
It also ruled that the cancellation of respondents license without notice and hearing was
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. It added that under the clause
in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of obligations and contracts, respondents
license must be respected by the State.

Hence, this Petition.8

Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration:
"(1) [W]hether or not QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant contravention of Section 69, P.D. No.
463; and (2) whether or not Proclamation No. 84 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is
valid. The corollary issue is whether or not the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
law applies to Proclamation No. 84"9
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit.
First Issue:
Validity of License
Respondents contend that the Petition has no legal basis, because PD 463 has already been
repealed.10 In effect, they ask for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground of mootness.
PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases.11 While these arrangements were
provided under the 193512 and the 197313 Constitutions, they have been omitted by Section 2 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.14
With the shift of constitutional policy toward "full control and supervision of the State" over
natural resources, the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr. 15 declared
the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to or violative of the express mandate of the 1987
Constitution. The said provisions dealt with the lease of mining claims; quarry permits or
licenses covering privately owned or public lands; and other related provisions on lease, licenses
and permits.
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional mandate. It has
repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees, rules and regulations -- or
parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with any of its provisions.16
It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution does not
apply retroactively to a "license, concession or lease" granted by the government under the 1973
Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987.17 As noted in
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission18 emphasized the intent to apply the said constitutional provision prospectively.

While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its
own, it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses, as follows:
"SECTION 5. Mineral Reservations. When the national interest so requires, such as
when there is a need to preserve strategic raw materials for industries critical to national
development, or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or ecological value, the President
may establish mineral reservations upon the recommendation of the Director through the
Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral reservations and such other reservations
as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the Department or through a
contractor: Provided, That a small scale-mining cooperative covered by Republic Act No.
7076 shall be given preferential right to apply for a small-scale mining agreement for a
maximum aggregate area of twenty-five percent (25%) of such mineral reservation,
subject to valid existing mining/quarrying rights as provided under Section 112 Chapter
XX hereof. All submerged lands within the contiguous zone and in the exclusive
economic zone of the Philippines are hereby declared to be mineral reservations.
"x x x x x x x x x
"SECTION 7. Periodic Review of Existing Mineral Reservations. The Secretary shall
periodically review existing mineral reservations for the purpose of determining whether
their continued existence is consistent with the national interest, and upon his
recommendation, the President may, by proclamation, alter or modify the boundaries
thereof or revert the same to the public domain without prejudice to prior existing rights."
"SECTION 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to any existing rights or
reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private
lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral
agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that
may arise under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators."
"SECTION 19. Areas Closed to Mining Applications. -- Mineral agreement or financial
or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed:
(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written
clearance by the government agency concerned;
(b) Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and
historic sites, bridges, highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams or other
infrastructure projects, public or private works including plantations or valuable
crops, except upon written consent of the government agency or private entity
concerned;

(c) In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights;

(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;
(e) In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with prior
consent of the small-scale miners, in which case a royalty payment upon the
utilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties, said royalty forming a
trust fund for the socioeconomic development of the community concerned; and
(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness
areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal
forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law and
in areas expressly prohibited under the National Integrated Protected Areas
System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order
No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws."
"SECTION 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/ Quarrying Rights. All valid and
existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, mineral
production-sharing agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at the date of
effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not be impaired, and shall be recognized
by the Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share
in mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act
shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless the mining
lessee or contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said
provisions: Provided, further, That no renewal of mining lease contracts shall be made
after the expiration of its term: Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing
agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall comply with the applicable
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
"SECTION 113. Recognition of Valid and Existing Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry
Application. Holders of valid and existing mining claims, lease/quarry applications
shall be given preferential rights to enter into any mode of mineral agreement with the
government within two (2) years from the promulgation of the rules and regulations
implementing this Act." (Underscoring supplied)
Section 3(p) of RA 7942 defines an existing mining/quarrying right as "a valid and subsisting
mining claim or permit or quarry permit or any mining lease contract or agreement covering a
mineralized area granted/issued under pertinent mining laws." Consequently, determining
whether the license of respondents falls under this definition would be relevant to fixing their
entitlement to the rights and/or preferences under RA 7942. Hence, the present Petition has not
been mooted.

Petitioners submit that the license clearly contravenes Section 69 of PD 463, because it exceeds
the maximum area that may be granted. This incipient violation, according to them, renders the
license void ab initio.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the license was validly granted, because it was
covered by four separate applications for areas of 81 hectares each.
The license in question, QLP No. 33,19 is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of
Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The terms of the license allowed the corporation to
extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel,
Bulacan. The license is, however, subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, the governing
law at the time it was granted; as well as to the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.20
By the same token, Proclamation No. 2204 -- which awarded to Rosemoor the right of
development, exploitation, and utilization of the mineral site -- expressly cautioned that the grant
was subject to "existing policies, laws, rules and regulations."21
The license was thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463, which reads:
"Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 14 hereof, a quarry license shall cover an area of not more than one hundred
(100) hectares in any one province and not more than one thousand (1,000) hectares in
the entire Philippines." (Italics supplied)
The language of PD 463 is clear. It states in categorical and mandatory terms that a quarry
license, like that of respondents, should cover a maximum of 100 hectares in any given province.
This law neither provides any exception nor makes any reference to the number of applications
for a license. Section 69 of PD 463 must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Where the law is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.22
Moreover, the lower courts ruling is evidently inconsistent with the fact that QLP No. 33 was
issued solely in the name of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, rather than in the
names of the four individual stockholders who are respondents herein. It likewise brushes aside a
basic postulate that a corporation has a separate personality from that of its stockholders.23
The interpretation adopted by the lower courts is contrary to the purpose of Section 69 of PD
463. Such intent to limit, without qualification, the area of a quarry license strictly to 100
hectares in any one province is shown by the opening proviso that reads: "Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 14 hereof x x x." The mandatory nature of the provision is also
underscored by the use of the word shall. Hence, in the application of the 100-hectare-per-

province limit, no regard is given to the size or the number of mining claims under Section 14,
which we quote:
"SECTION 14. Size of Mining Claim. -- For purposes of registration of a mining claim
under this Decree, the Philippine territory and its shelf are hereby divided into meridional
blocks or quadrangles of one-half minute (1/2) of latitude and longitude, each block or
quadrangle containing area of eighty-one (81) hectares, more or less.
"A mining claim shall cover one such block although a lesser area may be allowed if
warranted by attendant circumstances, such as geographical and other justifiable
considerations as may be determined by the Director: Provided, That in no case shall the
locator be allowed to register twice the area allowed for lease under Section 43 hereof."
(Italics supplied)
Clearly, the intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license may cover
an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several applications. Such
ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law.
Second Issue:
Validity of Proclamation No. 84
Petitioners also argue that the license was validly declared a nullity and consequently withdrawn
or terminated. In a letter dated September 15, 1986, respondents were informed by then Minister
Ernesto M. Maceda that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of
PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal
of the license. The latter reason, they added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No.
84. According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was
excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato
national park.
They also contend that Section 74 of PD 463 would not apply, because Minister Macedas letter
did not cancel or revoke QLP No. 33, but merely declared the latters nullity. They further argue
that respondents waived notice and hearing in their application for the license.
On the other hand, respondents submit that, as provided for in Section 74 of PD 463, their right
to due process was violated when their license was cancelled without notice and hearing. They
likewise contend that Proclamation No. 84 is not valid for the following reasons: 1) it violates
the clause on the non-impairment of contracts; 2) it is an ex post facto law and/or a bill of
attainder; and 3) it was issued by the President after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

This Court ruled on the nature of a natural resource exploration permit, which was akin to the
present respondents license, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation v. Balite Portal
Mining Cooperative,24 which held:
"x x x. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133
merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are
matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration
permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview
of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the
State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in
accordance with the demands of the general welfare."25
This same ruling had been made earlier in Tan v. Director of Forestry26 with regard to a timber
license, a pronouncement that was reiterated in Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary,27 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
"x x x. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree
No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302]."28 (Italics supplied)
In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license may be revoked or rescinded by
executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.29 Respondents themselves
acknowledge this condition of the grant under paragraph 7 of QLP No. 33, which we quote:
"7. This permit/license may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines
and Geo-Sciences when, in his opinion public interests so require or, upon failure of the
permittee/licensee to comply with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as with the terms
and conditions specified herein; Provided, That if a permit/license is cancelled, or
otherwise terminated, the permittee/licensee shall be liable for all unpaid rentals and

royalties due up to the time of the termination or cancellation of the permit/license[.]"30

(Italics supplied)
The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of
all mineral resources. That determination was based on policy considerations formally
enunciated in the letter dated September 15, 1986, issued by then Minister Maceda and,
subsequently, by the President through Proclamation No. 84. As to the exercise of prerogative by
Maceda, suffice it to say that while the cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the
director of mines and geo-sciences, the latter is subject to the formers control as the department
head. We also stress the clear prerogative of the Executive Department in the evaluation and the
consequent cancellation of licenses in the process of its formulation of policies with regard to
their utilization. Courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion without any clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion.31
Moreover, granting that respondents license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the State
in the exercise of police power.32 The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is
clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State ownership of all natural
resources.33 This Regalian doctrine is an exercise of its sovereign power as owner of lands of the
public domain and of the patrimony of the nation, the mineral deposits of which are a valuable
asset.34
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. As
pointed out earlier, respondents license is not a contract to which the protection accorded by the
non-impairment clause may extend.35 Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of
existing laws and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a
subject impressed with public welfare.36 As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state.37
We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a
"legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial."38 Its declaration that QLP No. 33
is a patent nullity39 is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license
a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. There are six
recognized instances when a law is considered as such: 1) it criminalizes and punishes an action
that was done before the passing of the law and that was innocent when it was done; 2) it
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when it was committed; 3) it changes the
punishment and inflicts one that is greater than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed; 4) it alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a
less or different testimony than that required by the law at the time of the commission of the
offense; 5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a

penalty or a deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered lawful

when it was done; and 6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or an acquittal or
the proclamation of an amnesty.40 Proclamation No. 84 does not fall under any of the enumerated
categories; hence, it is not an ex post facto law.
It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.41
Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park
by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in character.
Finally, it is stressed that at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9,
1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of
1986.42 Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional
Constitution, granted her legislative power "until a legislature is elected and convened under a
new Constitution." The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in
Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.43
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby GRANTED and the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 157036

June 9, 2004

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
CHIEF OF THE PNP, ET. AL., respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The
maintenance of peace and order1 and the protection of the people against violence are
constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and
in harmony with these constitutional duties.
Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
"Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence"2 (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.,
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The facts are undisputed:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the
members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to
avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to
suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR),
thus:
"THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES THAT
TEND TO DISTURB THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF THE
COMMUNITY THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING OF FORMER NPA
LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR. I UNDERSTAND WE ALREADY HAVE THE
IDENTITY OF THE CULPRIT. LET US BRING THEM TO THE BAR OF
JUSTICE.
THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS
IF OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID THEMSELVES OF
RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN
PUBLIC PLACES.

THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY

THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES.
THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE LIMITED ONLY TO
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM
IN PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED MEN IN THE
MILITARY AND AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN
CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY PURSUANT TO
EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO LONGER BRING THEIR
FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO WANT TO USE
THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN SPECIAL AND
TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO TIME ONLY FOR THAT PURPOSE.
AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE
IN THE PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE.
WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW AND ORDER.
JUST AS WE CANNOT BE HEEDLESS OF OUR PEOPLES ASPIRATIONS
FOR PEACE."
Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines quoted
as follows:
"TO : All Concerned
FROM : Chief, PNP
SUBJECT : Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of
Firearms Outside of Residence.
DATE : January 31, 2003
1. Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
2. General:
The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is a privilege granted by the
State to its citizens for their individual protection against all threats of lawlessness and
security.
As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit,
certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of
residence. However, the Chief, Philippine National Police may, in meritorious cases as

determined by him and under conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or
persons to carry firearms outside of residence.
3. Purposes:
This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the
carrying of firearms outside of residence as provided for in the Implementing Rules
and Regulations, Presidential Decree No. 1866, dated June 29, 1983 and as directed
by PGMA. It also prescribes the conditions, requirements and procedures under which
exemption from the ban may be granted.
4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:
a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms
covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with
the conditions hereinafter prescribed.
b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from
carrying their firearms outside their residence except those covered with
mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by competent authority
pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall
pertain only to organic and regular employees.
5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence.
a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved,
provided, that the persons and security of those so authorized are under actual
threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and profession are under
imminent danger.
b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their
respective agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided,
that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the duration of the official
mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10) days.
c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security
agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such
DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration. d. Members of duly recognized
Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice
and competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded
with ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case detached from the
person. e. Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps. 6. Requirements for

issuance of new PTCFOR: a. Written request by the applicant addressed to Chief,

PNP stating his qualification to possess firearm and the reasons why he needs to
carry firearm outside of residence. b. Xerox copy of current firearm license duly
authenticated by Records Branch, FED; c. Proof of actual threat, the details of
which should be issued by the Chief of Police/Provincial or City Directors and
duly validated by C, RIID; d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly authenticated by
the Drug Testing Center, if photocopied; e. Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly
authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied; f. Copy of Neuro-Psychiatric
Clearance duly authenticated by NP Testing Center, if photocopied; g. Copy of
Certificate of Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly validated by Chief,
Operations Branch, FED; h. NBI Clearance; i. Two (2) ID pictures (2" x 2") taken
not earlier than one (1) year from date of filing of application; and j. Proof of
Payment
7. Procedures: a. Applications may be filed directly to the Office of the PTCFOR
Secretariat in Camp Crame. In the provinces, the applications may also be submitted to
the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and Provincial/City Police Offices (P/CPOs) for
initial processing before they are forwarded to the office of the PTCFOR Secretariat. The
processors, after ascertaining that the documentary requirements are in order, shall issue
the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount of fees payable by the applicant, who in
turn shall pay the fees to the Land Bank. b. Applications, which are duly processed and
prepared in accordance with existing rules and regulations, shall be forwarded to the
OCPNP for approval. c. Upon approval of the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR
valid for one (1) year from date of issue. d. Applications for renewal of PTCFOR shall be
processed in accordance with the provisions of par. 6 above. e. Application for possession
and carrying of firearms by diplomats in the Philippines shall be processed in accordance
with NHQ PNP Memo dated September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and Carrying of
Firearms by Diplomats in the Philippines. 8. Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms: a.
The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except those authorized in
uniform and in the performance of their official duties. b. The firearm shall not be
brought inside public drinking and amusement places, and all other commercial or public
establishments."
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the
present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives
Division. He anchored his petition on the following grounds:
"I

THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY MUCH LESS BY A MERE

SPEECH TO ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND THE LAW ON FIREARMS BY
IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND CANCELING EXISTING PERMITS FOR GUNS TO
BE CARRIED OUTSIDE RESIDENCES.
II
OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE ON THE GUN BAN; THE
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER INVOKED POLICE POWER TO JUSTIFY THE
GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTS VERBAL DECLARATION ON GUN BAN
VIOLATED THE PEOPLES RIGHT TO PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR PROPERTY
RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS.
III
THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED
GUIDELINES BECAUSE:
1) THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH
GRANTS THE PNP CHIEF THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE THE PNP
GUIDELINES.
2) THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PD 1866
CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER SET OF IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES.
3) THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE
PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTNG GUIDELINES ON THE GUN BAN.
IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES IMPLEMENT PD 1866,
AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO, THE PNP CHIEF STILL HAS NO POWER
OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE SAME BECAUSE
1) PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866, THE IRR SHALL BE
PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY THE DOJ AND THE DILG.
2) SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED BY
THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY.
V

THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE

CONSTITUTION BECAUSE:
1) THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM IS NECESSARILY
INTERTWINED WITH THE PEOPLES INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE AND TO
PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF
THIS RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR:
A) THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS MOST
POTENT, IF NOT HIS ONLY, MEANS TO DEFEND HIMSELF.
B) THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED PETITIONER OF
HIS MEANS OF PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE STATE COULD NOT POSSIBLY PROTECT ITS
CITIZENS DUE TO THE INADEQUACY AND INEFFICIENCY OF
THE POLICE FORCE.
2) THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS WHICH
CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE.
VI
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES WERE ISSUED IN
THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER, THE SAME IS AN INVALID
EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED THEREFOR ARE
UNREASONABLE AND UNNCESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
ITS PURPOSE TO DETER AND PREVENT CRIME THEREBY
BECOMING UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO LAW-ABIDING GUN-OWNERS.
VII
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND CONFISCATORY SINCE
IT REVOKED ALL EXISTING PERMITS TO CARRY WITHOUT, HOWEVER,
REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE PNP RECEIVED FROM THOSE WHO
ALREADY PAID THEREFOR.
VIII
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED AT AND OPPRESSIVE ONLY

TO LAW-ABIDING GUN OWNERS WHILE LEAVING OTHER GUN-OWNERS

THE LAWBREAKERS (KIDNAPPERS, ROBBERS, HOLD-UPPERS, MNLF, MILF,
ABU SAYYAF COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA) UNTOUCHED.
IX
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND UNFAIR BECAUSE
THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED LONG BEFORE THEY WERE PUBLISHED.
X
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX POST FACTO LAW SINCE
THEY APPLY RETROACTIVELY AND PUNISH ALL THOSE WHO WERE
ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO CARRY OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCE LONG
BEFORE THEIR PROMULGATION."
Petitioners submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major issues:
First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
Second, whether the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right?;
Third, whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines
is a violation of his right to property?;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police
power?; and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law?
The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioners arguments, he contends that: (1) the PNP Chief
is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to
own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is
not an iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of
national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed

with the judicial determination of the cases.3 The case at bar is of similar import as it involves the
citizens right to bear arms.
I
Authority of the PNP Chief
Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can
withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and
respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and arrogated upon themselves a power
they do not possess the legislative power.
We are not persuaded.
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among
three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the
judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere.4
Pertinently, the power to make laws the legislative power is vested in Congress.5 Congress
may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that
"delegata potestas non potest delegari" "delegated power may not be delegated."6
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns,
boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.7 Such licensing
power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.8
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the
legislatures tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780,9 delegated
upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove
applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal
protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time.10 Further,
it authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement
of the Act.11 With the enactment of Act No. 2711, the "Revised Administrative Code of 1917,"
the laws on firearms were integrated.12 The Act retained the authority of the Governor General
provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing complexity in the Office of the GovernorGeneral resulted in the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. On January
21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 813 authorizing

and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in approving and disapproving
applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This was followed by Executive Order
No. 6114 designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215,15 issued by President Diosdado
Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to
approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting license, but also the
authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the
Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent
issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential
Decree No. 186616 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2
specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm "shall first secure
the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary." With regard to the
issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: "The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases
as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of
firearms to carry them outside of residence." These provisions are issued pursuant to the general
power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of the decree.17 At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is
the chief law governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power.18 In an attempt to evade
the application of the above-mentioned laws and regulations, petitioner argues that the "Chief of
the PNP" is not the same as the "Chief of the Constabulary," the PC being a mere unit or
component of the newly established PNP. He contends further that Republic Act No. 829419
amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms
is now jointly vested in the Department of Justice and the DILG, not the Chief of the
Constabulary.20
Petitioners submission is bereft of merit.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,21 the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the
Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the
Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing authority. Section 24 thereof
specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and
explosives in accordance with law.22 This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs "power to issue
detailed implementing policies and instructions" on such "matters as may be necessary to
effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties" of the PNP.23
Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary
(now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866.
It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the
provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules

and regulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations dated September 15, 1997 jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the
DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of
convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent
provisions of R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts
into the community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed
guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyos declaration of a nationwide gun ban, arguing
that "she has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere speech."
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was just an expression of her policy
and a directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President Arroyo enacted a
law through a mere speech.
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: "The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed." As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the
course of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs.
Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the
power of control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her
subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty.24 Thus, when
President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just
directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of
her office.
II
Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?
Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-protected right. This,
he mainly anchors on various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative to determine
the nature of the right in light of American jurisprudence.
The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and American society. It antedates
not only the American Constitution but also the discovery of firearms.25

A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of firearms is
the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads:
"A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it pertains to
the citizens "collective right" to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens "individual
right" to own and possess arms. The setting under which the right was contemplated has a
profound connection with the keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed citizenry. That
this is how the right was construed is evident in early American cases.
The first case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment that reached the United
States Supreme Court is United States vs. Miller.26 Here, the indictment charged the defendants
with transporting an unregistered "Stevens shotgun" without the required stamped written order,
contrary to the National Firearms Act. The defendants filed a demurrer challenging the facial
validity of the indictment on the ground that the National Firearms Act offends the inhibition of
the Second Amendment. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment.
On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment as
referring to the collective right of those comprising the Militia a body of citizens enrolled for
military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right of citizen to bear arm. Miller
expresses its holding as follows:
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the
ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United States.27 Here, the Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Federal Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not conflict with the Second
Amendment. It ruled that:
"While [appellants] weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least familiarity
with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to use a comparable weapon of
military type and caliber, still there is no evidence that the appellant was or ever had
been a member of any military organization or that his use of the weapon under the
circumstances disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the only
inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the indictment was in
possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and

simply on a frolic of his own and without any thought or intention of contributing to
the efficiency of the well regulated militia which the Second amendment was
designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free state."
With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon
the American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the United States vs.
Cruikshank28 decreed: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right granted
by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument." Likewise, in
People vs. Persce,29 the Court of Appeals said: "Neither is there any constitutional provision
securing the right to bear arms which prohibits legislation with reference to such weapons as are
specifically before us for consideration. The provision in the Constitution of the United States
that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed is not designed to
control legislation by the state."
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second
Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of United States vs. Villareal:30
"The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim
that the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping
and the use of firearms without a license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of
the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States
Constitution against the infringement of the right of the people of the United States
to keep and bear arms (U. S. Constitution, amendment 2), which is not included in
the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that in no event could
this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar, not only because it
has not been expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has
been uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in State constitutions
apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18);
x x x."
Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule.
The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere
statutory creation. What then are the laws that grant such right to the Filipinos? The first real
firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907. It was
passed to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9
thereof provides:

"SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal
protection, or for use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition
therefor, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms or
ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application, and before
receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings bank in
the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be issued, or in
lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General may prescribe,
payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two hundred pesos for
each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons who are actually members
of gun clubs, duly formed and organized at the time of the passage of this Act, who at
such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not be required to make the deposit or
give the bond prescribed by this section, and the bond duly executed by such person in
accordance with existing law shall continue to be security for the safekeeping of such
arms."
The foregoing provision was restated in Section 88731 of Act No. 2711 that integrated the firearm
laws. Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the laws on
illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives
and imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions
of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right
to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.
III
Vested Property Right
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law." Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting that the
revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his "vested
property right" without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists.32 The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a
person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The
Director of Forestry,33 we ruled that "a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right." In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.34 that:

"Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of
the Constitution."
Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right, relied
heavily on Bell vs. Burson35 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "once a license is issued,
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interest of the licensees."
Petitioners reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a drivers license, not a license to
bear arms. The catena of American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is perfectly in
accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a property nor a property right. In Erdelyi vs.
OBrien,36 the plaintiff who was denied a license to carry a firearm brought suit against the
defendant who was the Chief of Police of the City of Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the
denial violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. The
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did not have a property interest in
obtaining a license to carry a firearm, ratiocinating as follows:
"Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not
arise whenever a person has only an abstract need or desire for, or unilateral expectation of a
benefit. x x x Rather, they arise from legitimate claims of entitlement defined by existing
rules or understanding that stem from an independent source, such as state law. x x x Concealed
weapons are closely regulated by the State of California. x x x Whether the statute creates a
property interest in concealed weapons licenses depends largely upon the extent to which the
statute contains mandatory language that restricts the discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny
licenses to applicants who claim to meet the minimum eligibility requirements. x x x Where state
law gives the issuing authority broad discretion to grant or deny license application in a closely
regulated field, initial applicants do not have a property right in such licenses protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180 (gaming license under Nevada
law);"
Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of Philadelphia,37 Conway vs. King,38 Nichols
vs. County of Sta. Clara,39 and Gross vs. Norton.40 These cases enunciated that the test whether
the statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted
to the issuing authority.
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is
evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state
that "the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under
such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of

residence." Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not
constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked
any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.41 A licensee takes his
license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.42 The US
Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,43 held: "The correlative power to revoke or
recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is
always revocable."
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the Philippines as early as 1908. Thus, in The
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra44 we ruled:
"x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or not is entirely
optional with himself, but if, for his own convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess
arms, he must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose, for the right
to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government can impose upon
him such terms as it pleases. If he is not satisfied with the terms imposed, he should
decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing possession of the arms he does
agree to such conditions, he must fulfill them."
IV
Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the
States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary
to the common good and general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional
guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace
and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by
the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President
Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the
issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In
the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What
they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish
to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we
believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime
incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not
wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for
criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to
apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as
reasonable exercise of the police power.45 In State vs. Reams,46 it was held that the legislature
may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the
promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we
are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of
police power. The ruling in United States vs. Villareal,47 is relevant, thus:
"We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to
restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We
do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend to increase the
security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community
wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being
unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its
enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state."
V
Ex post facto law

In Mekin vs. Wolfe,48 an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action
done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post facto law prohibits
retrospectivity of penal laws.49 The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto
law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioners argument, it would not
result in the punishment of acts previously committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERE

G.R. No. L-38415 June 28, 1974

CONSTANTINO A. NUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. AVERIA and EDGARDO H. MORALES, substituted by
RODOLFO DE LEON, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court sets aside respondent court's questioned order of dismissal of the pending
election protest before it on the authority of its recent decision of April 15, 1974 in Cases
L-36927-28, L-37715 and L-38831 1 ruling that courts of first instance "should continue
and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests" filed before
them.

Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting
the November 8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the mayoralty of Tarnate,
Cavite on the ground of fraud, irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee
was the proclaimed mayor-elect Edgardo Morales, who was ambushed and killed on
February 15, 1974 in a barrio of Tarnate 2 and hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor
Rodolfo de Leon who as the incumbent mayor is now substituted in this action as party
respondent. 3
Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted protestee's
motion for dismissal of the election protest on the ground "that this court has lost its
jurisdiction to decide this case for the reason that the same has become moot and
academic," citing the President's authority under General Order No. 3 and Article XVII,
section 9 of the 1973 Constitution to remove from office all incumbent government
officials and employees, whether elective or appointive.
Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Upon receipt of respondent's comment the Court
resolved to consider petitioner's petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action
and the case submitted for decision for prompt disposition thereof.
The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the above-cited cases of Paredes,
Sunga and Valley has already declared such dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling
that "(I)t must be emphasized that the `right' of the private respondents to continue in
office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New
Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective
positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law,
they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right
to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then
certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them
by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t is erroneous to conclude that under
Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents
expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are
of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they
have been elected, although the same is now indefinite."
The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he Constitutional Convention could not have
intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly
elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices
which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question would be tantamount
to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized
by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by
the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot."

In upholding the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide
election protests, the Court pointed out that "(S)ection 7 of Art. XVII of the New
Constitution provides that `all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly.' And
there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of section 220 of the Election
Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest
against those proclaimed elected," and that it is expressly provided under Article XVII,
section 8 of the 1973 Constitution that "`All courts existing at the time of the ratification
of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided
by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be
heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' . . . ."
ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's dismissal order of January 31, 1974 is hereby set
aside and respondent court is directed to immediately continue with the trial and
determination of the election protest before it on the merits. In line with previous
precedents involving election cases, this decision shall be immediately executory upon
promulgation hereof. SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, concur.

G.R. No. 112386 June 14, 1994

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, respondents.
Semaco P. Sacmar & Associates for petitioner.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Marcelino C. Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992
elections. He was among those charged before the Sandiganbayan, on 25 May 1992,
with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in an information, docketed
Criminal Case No. 17756, stating
That on or about 08 January 1991, and for sometime thereafter, in Borongan, Eastern
Samar, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Lutgardo B. Barbo,
Governor of Eastern Samar; Camilo A. Camenforte, Vice-Governor of same province;
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Marcos B. Alido, Nonato A. Gerna, Ismael G. Kho,
Marcelino C. Libanan, Nicolas O. Pimentel, and Generoso A. Yu, of the same province,
conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully, through evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, prevent and exclude Agustin B. Docena, a duly
appointed and Qualified replacement of deceased Sangguniang Panlalawigan member
Luis A. Capito, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body,
by promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 01,
Series of 1991, wherein accused expressed their recognition of Atty. Socrates B. Alar as
the official replacement of aforesaid deceased member, notwithstanding the recall of his
appointment by the Department of Local Government, to the damage and prejudice of
Agustin B. Docena.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

On motion of the prosecution for the suspension of the accused public officials
pendente lite, and finding that said accused were charged under a valid information, the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, dated 26 July 1993, to the
following effect:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Gov. Lutgardo Barbo, Vice-Gov. Marcelino
C. Libanan, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Nonato A. Gerna and Generoso A.
Yu are hereby suspended from their respective public positions, or from any other public
office that they may be holding, the same to commence upon their receipt hereof and for
a period of ninety (90) days thereafter.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Hon. Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, and the Hon. Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for their
information and guidance and they are hereby directed to inform this Court within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof of any action they have undertaken on the matter.
SO ORDERED. 2

Accused Barbo and Libanan filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which the
Sandiganbayan denied in its resolution of 30 September 1993. From the orders,
Libanan appealed.
Petitioner presents three grounds to support his appeal, to wit: That
I. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION IF EXECUTED WOULD
CONSTITUTE AN AFFRONT ON PETITIONER(S) CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION ONCE IMPLEMENTED WOULD
AMOUNT TO AN ASSAULT OF THE SACRED COVENANT REPOSED
ON PETITIONER VICE-GOVERNOR, MARCELINO C. LIBANAN BY
THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN SAMAR.
III. THE REASONS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY THE
SUSPENSION ORDER PENDENTE LITE NO LONGER EXIST.

The petition is without merit.

The amendatory provision of Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019, here applicable,
provides:
Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under title 7, book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. .
..

Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts
supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer
attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent
Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. The implementation of the suspension order, he
further claims, would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
In Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by
Governor Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was already
occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held
previously when charged with having violated the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 4 the suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot was also
sustained even as he was charged for acts committed as a government auditor of the
Commission on Audit. In both instances, this Court ruled that the term "office" used in

the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding
and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.
Obviously, the suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Public office is "a public agency or
trust," 5 and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision 6 which
petitioner invokes.
Libanans second contention neither holds water. His so-called "covenant" with the
people of Eastern Samar is far from being synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license,
and it is not one that can cut athwart the long arm of the law. In Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 7
we have said:
Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by
the fact of his reelection, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information
under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension
from office in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection by virtue of the provisions
of section 13 of the Act.

The third assigned error raised by petitioner need not be delved into. When the statute
is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the
suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him.
This Court has repeatedly held that
such preventive suspension is mandatory, 8 and there are no "ifs" and "buts" about it. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177828

February 13, 2009

ANNABELLE DELA PEA and ADRIAN VILLAREAL, Petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF BOLINAO, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Annabelle dela Pea and Adrian
Villareal (petitioners) seeks to nullify and set aside the October 31, 2006 Decision1 and May 8,
2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91338.
On October 20, 1983, respondent Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc. (respondent) extended a loan of
Eighty-One Thousand Pesos (P81,000.00) to petitioners. The loan was evidenced by a
promissory note,3 and was payable on or before October 14, 1984.
Petitioners failed to pay their obligation in full when it became due. Demands for payment4 were
made by respondent, but these were not heeded. Consequently, respondent filed a collection case
against the petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan, docketed
as Civil Case No. 838.5
At the pre-trial conference set on October 17, 1995, petitioners did not appear. Consequently,
upon motion by respondent, petitioners were declared as in default, and respondent was allowed
to present its evidence ex parte.
On November 2, 1995, the MTC rendered a Decision6 decreeing that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the [respondent] and against the
[petitioners], to wit:
1. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay the [respondent] the
remaining principal loan in the sum of P77,722.67 outstanding as of October 17, 1995,

plus interest of 12% per annum and penalty of 3% per annum, until full payment of the
principal loan thereof;
2. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay the [respondent] the interest
due as of October 17, 1995, in the sum of P105,951.91;
3. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay the [respondent] the penalty
due as of October 17, 1995, in the sum of P25,670.21;
4. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay the [respondent] the
litigation expenses, in the sum of P4,500.00;
5. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay attorneys fees in the sum of
P7,722.27;
6. ORDERING, the [petitioners] to jointly and severally pay the [respondent bank] the
collection fees in the sum of P50.00; and
7. To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal by petitioners, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) remanded the case to the MTC for
further proceedings, viz.:
This Court finds Exhibit A, which is Annex A to the complaint, as not material to the allegations
in paragraph 2 of the complaint since the Promissory Note was allegedly granted on October 20,
1983 and the due date October 14, 1984. By the allegations of paragraph 2 of the complaint
stating that the [petitioners] obtained a loan from the [respondent] on October 20, 1993 for
P81,000.00 which was to be paid on October 20, 1984, hence, it is indeed a very great error to
state in the complaint the date of October 20, 1993 as the date of the loan was obtained when the
evidence shows that it was granted on October 20, 1983.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this case is ordered remanded back to the lower court
for further proceedings in order to determine what was the exact date when the loan was taken
from the [respondent] by the [petitioners] and the due date of such Promissory Note and for other
matters. The declaration of the petitioners as in default is hereby set aside for purposes of
continuation of reception of parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8

After the case was remanded, respondent moved for leave to amend its complaint to conform to
the promissory note.9 The motion was granted by the MTC10 and the amended complaint11 was
admitted. The case was then set for hearing on November 16, 2000,12 but petitioners failed to
appear, thus, respondent introduced and offered the pieces of evidence which it had earlier
presented ex parte. Subsequently, on November 28, 2000, the MTC promulgated a Decision13
reiterating in full its November 2, 1995 judgment.
Petitioners again elevated this adverse decision to the RTC. On June 14, 2001, the RTC set aside
the MTC decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. In so ruling, it held that the
MTC did not adhere to the RTC order to conduct further proceedings. Despite its earlier ruling
setting aside the declaration of default against the petitioners, the MTC did not require
petitioners to file their answer. Likewise, it did not set the case anew for pre-trial and
presentation of evidence of both parties. Petitioners failure to attend the scheduled hearing can
only be construed as waiver of their right to cross-examine the witnesses, but not a waiver of
their right to present evidence. The RTC declared that petitioners right to due process had been
violated when they were not given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence.14 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In view of the foregoing consideration, the Court renders judgment declaring the proceedings of
the MTC of Bolinao in this case from after its admission of [respondents] amended [complaint]
as null and void; and setting aside the decision dated November 28, 2000, and ordering the
remand of this case to the said Court for further proceedings by allowing the [petitioners] to file
their answer to the amended complaint conducting the mandatory pre-trial conference of the
parties and hearing their respective evidences before rendering decision thereon.
SO ORDERED.15
Upon remand, respondent caused the re-service of summons upon petitioners,16 who filed their
Answer17 on July 7, 2003. Petitioners admitted obtaining a loan from respondent bank, but
alleged that they substantially paid their obligation.
On July 28, 2003, the MTC issued a notice setting the case for pre-trial on August 29, 2003.18
However, a day before the scheduled pre-trial, petitioners moved for postponement;19 thus, the
pre-trial was reset to September 26, 2003.20 On September 16, 2003, petitioners again moved for
postponement of pre-trial,21 which was also granted by the MTC. The pre-trial was again reset to
November 14, 2003.22
On November 14, 2003, respondent appeared, but no pre-trial was held because petitioners, for
the third time, moved for its postponement in a motion filed on November 11, 2003.23 The MTC
again granted the motion and rescheduled the pre-trial to December 12, 2003,24 but again no pretrial was held as it was further moved to January 30, 2004. On December 17, 2003, petitioners

filed another motion for postponement reiterating their request to conduct pre-trial on January
30, 2004.25
On January 30, 2004, respondent appeared, while petitioners did not. Consequently, the MTC,
upon motion of respondent, allowed the presentation of its evidence ex parte. Thereafter, on
February 9, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Render Judgment.26
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion to Set Aside Order of
Default).27 They averred that they were not able to attend the pre-trial conference on January 30,
2004 because petitioner Villareal suddenly felt weak, and petitioner Dela Pea took care of him.
They were not able to inform the court that they could not make it to the pre-trial because there
was no way they could immediately communicate with the court. Finally, they averred that they
have a meritorious defense. Accordingly, they prayed that they be allowed to regain their
standing in court.
Respondent opposed the motion. Citing Section 5, Rule 18 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, respondent averred that the MTC was correct in allowing the presentation of evidence
ex parte in view of petitioners failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. It also claimed that
the motion for reconsideration is already moot and academic, considering that the case had
already been submitted for resolution.281avvphi1
On March 12, 2004, the MTC issued an Order29 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit. It agreed with respondent that the motion is already moot and academic, and
further declared that granting the motion would give rise to endless litigation.
On August 16, 2004, the MTC rendered a Decision30 ordering petitioners to pay respondent bank
their unpaid obligation of P77,722.67 with interest at 3% per annum, from October 17, 1995
until its full payment. Petitioners were likewise held liable for the payment of the interests and
penalties due as of October 17, 1995 amounting to P105,951.91 and P25,670.21, respectively,
litigation expenses of P4,500.00, attorneys fees of P7,722.27, collection fees of P50.00 and the
cost of suit.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC. They objected to the form and substance of the MTC decision
on the ground that it did not state the law on which its findings were based, in utter disregard of
Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners further claimed denial of due
process, for they were not given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence.31lawphil.net
On May 25, 2005, the RTC set aside the MTC decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.32 It declared that the assailed MTC decision was a nullity for lack of legal basis.
According to the RTC, the MTC failed to clearly and distinctly state the law which was made the
basis of its decision. The RTC also found that petitioners were not duly notified of the scheduled

pre-trial conference as the record is bereft of proof that an order setting the case for pre-trial
conference on January 30, 2004 was issued. Neither was there any order allowing the respondent
to adduce evidence ex parte in view of petitioners failure to appear on the said date. The RTC
concluded that the MTC decision was issued without due process. Accordingly, the case was
remanded for pre-trial conference and for presentation of evidence.
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, respondent appealed to the CA. On October 31, 2006, the
CA rendered the assailed Decision. Reversing the RTC, the CA found that petitioners had
sufficient notice that the pre-trial conference will be held on January 30, 2004 for this setting had
been chosen and confirmed twice by the petitioners. According to the CA, petitioners should
have appointed a representative, armed with a special power of attorney, to appear on their behalf
if they could not make it to the scheduled pre-trial, especially in this case where several
postponements had already been granted. It added that petitioners cannot repeatedly ask for the
postponement of a pre-trial on account of their insistence to personally attend and participate in
the same; otherwise, the entire proceedings would be left at the mercy and whims of a cunning
litigant. Accordingly, the CA upheld the MTC in allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence,
and in rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence presented.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same on May 8, 2007.
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REIN[S]TATING THE DECISION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF BOLINAO WHICH IS NULL AND VOID FOR FAILURE
TO STATE THE LAW ON WHICH ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE BASED CONTRARY TO
THE REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 1, RULE 36 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REINSTATED THE DECISION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF BOLINAO EVEN WHEN THE LOWER COURT OMITTED
AND FAILED TO ISSUE AN ORDER AFTER THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMATION OF THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT OF BOLINAO AMOUNTS TO DENIAL OF THE PETITIONERS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW ON MERE TECHNICALITY.33
Petitioners fault the CA for reversing the RTC, and for reinstating and upholding the MTC
decision. Reiterating their arguments before the RTC, they assert that the MTC decision is null
and void for it does not conform to the requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and of the Rules of Court.

Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution directs that:

SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court reflects the foregoing mandate, thus:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of court.
The August 16, 2004 MTC decision reads in full:
This is an inherited case by the undersigned Judge-Designate, filed way back in September 14,
1994.
Likewise, the instant case is an off-shoot of the appealed decision of this court to the Regional
Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, which remanded back in its order dated August 29, 1996 x x
x.
Proceedings were held whereby [respondent] moved with leave of court to amend paragraph 2 of
the complaint to conform to evidence.
Accordingly, the amended complaint was granted by the court during the hearing on September
18, 2000. With the admission of the amended complaint of the respondent, the case was set for
hearing with due notices to [petitioners] and counsel for further reception of evidence the
[respondent] may desire to adduce. On the said scheduled date of hearing, the [petitioners] and
counsel did not show up in court. [Respondent], thru counsel, re-introduced in toto the
documentary evidences which they have previously presented which they then re-offered in
evidence and prayed for their re-admission and thereafter rested their case. There being no more
supervening facts or new documentary evidences introduced by the plaintiff in the instant case,
the court deemed no necessity in having a different decision from the appealed decision of this
court, except, of course maybe its change of date, so it was already wise and unmistakable to just
re-write and adapt the decision of this Court dated November 2, 1995 by the then Honorable
Antonio V. Tiong, Municipal Trial Judge.
From the evidence adduced by the [respondent], it has clearly been established that the
[petitioners] obtained a loan from [respondent] Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc., with office address
at Poblacion, Bolinao, Pangasinan, in the sum of EIGHTY-ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P81,000.00), on October 20, 1983, as evidenced by a promissory note duly signed and executed
by the herein [petitioners] spouses Annabelle dela Pea and Adrian Villareal at the place of

business of the [respondent] as a banking institution in the presence of the witnesses of the
[respondent], namely Cederico C. Catabay and Maximo Tiangsing who are both employees of
the [respondent], that the [petitioners] have paid a part of the principal loan with a remaining
outstanding balance of P77,772.67, but has from then defaulted in the last payment of the loan
which has and have matured on October 14, 1984 (Exh. "A"). Accordingly, letters of demand by
Mateo G. Caasi, then General Manager of the respondent Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc., were sent
by registered mail to [petitioners] at their given address but turned deaf eared (Exh. "C" & "D");
that, as a result of the utter disregard and failures of the [petitioners] in payment of their long
overdue loan, the [respondent] was constrained to engage the legal services of a lawyer in the
filing of the instant case for collection and has incurred litigation expenses and attorneys fees;
that, together with collection fees which [respondent] is legally entitled to and the remaining
unpaid balance up to the present; that the grand total amount of money the [petitioners] are
obliged to pay [respondent] as of October 17, 1995, as reflected in the Statement of Account
prepared and submitted by Lito C. Altezo, Bookkeeper of the [respondent] Rural Bank is Two
Hundred Twenty-One Thousand Six Hundred and Sixty-Seven Pesos and Six Centavos
(P221,667.06)- Exh. "B" 34
WHEREFORE, clearly viewed in the light of all the foregoing considerations, the court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the [respondent] and against the petitioners, to wit:
1. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the remaining
principal (obligation) loan in the sum of P77.722.67 outstanding as of October 17, 1995,
plus interest of 3% per annum, until full payment of the principal loan is made thereof;
2. Ordering [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the interest due as
of October 17, 1995, in the sum of P105, 951.91;
3. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the penalty due
as of October 17, 1995, in the sum of P25,670.21;
4. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the litigation
expenses in the sum of PP4,500.00
5. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally attorneys fees in the sum of
P7,722.27;
6. Ordering the [petitioners] to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the collection
fees in the sum of P50.00; and
7. To pay the cost of the suit;
SO ORDERED.35

We agree with the petitioners that the above decision did not conform to the requirements of the
Constitution and of the Rules of Court. The decision contained no reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions. It did not cite any legal authority or principle to support its conclusion
that petitioners are liable to pay respondent the amount claimed including interests, penalties,
attorneys fees and the costs of suit.
In Yao v. Court of Appeals,36 we held:
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and
just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled
to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that
the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court
for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.
Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the
justness of his decision.
Thus, the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of
Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier
attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the
Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the
parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a
summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties; convicted the accused of libel but
failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was
libelous; consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed
to support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were
quotations from the labor arbiters decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page
(two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings; was

merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes; or failed to
explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages.37
The CA, therefore, erred in upholding the validity of and in reinstating the MTC decision.
However, we cannot grant petitioners plea to reinstate the RTC decision remanding the case to
the MTC for further proceedings. Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case to a lower court
does not follow if, in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute
based on the records before it.
As a rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would not
be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case;
or (c) where the trial court had already received all the evidence presented by both parties, and
the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its merits. 38
Petitioners plead for a remand of their case to the MTC on ground that they were denied due
process. They claim that they were not given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence.
The argument does not persuade.
We perused the record of the case and we failed to see the lack of due process claimed by the
petitioners. On the contrary, petitioners had been afforded more than what is due them. This case
was remanded to the MTC twice to give petitioners an opportunity to be heard. Lest it be
forgotten, petitioners were first declared as in default on October 17, 1995 for their failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference. The MTC thereafter rendered judgment in favor of the
respondent. However, on appeal, the RTC set aside the judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings. Upon remand, the MTC set the case for hearing, but again petitioners failed
to appear at the scheduled hearing. Accordingly, respondent was allowed to present its evidence
ex parte, and a judgment in favor of the respondent was issued. But again on appeal, the RTC set
aside the MTC decision and remanded the case, for the second time, to the MTC, to give
petitioners ample opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Upon remand, respondent
caused the re-service of summons to petitioners, who filed their answer to the complaint. When
the case was set for pre-trial conference, petitioners repeatedly moved for its postponement; and
despite several postponements, petitioners still failed to appear at the pre-trial conference set on
January 30, 2004.
Clearly, petitioners abused the legal processes, effectively defeating the justice which had long
been denied the respondent. We note that this case was filed on September 13, 1994, and
petitioners, through legal maneuverings, managed to delay its resolution. To date, this simple
collection suit has been pending for more than fourteen (14) years. We will not countenance this

patent flouting of the law and the rules by petitioners and counsel. Accordingly, we will now
resolve the case based on the evidence before us.
Petitioners did not deny or question the authenticity and due execution of the promissory note.
They, however, offered the defense that the loan obligation covered by the promissory note had
already been paid.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in civil cases, the party who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence of the facts in
issue necessary to prove the truth of his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.39 Thus, a party who pleads payment as a defense has the burden of proving that such
payment has, in fact, been made. When the plaintiff alleges nonpayment, still, the general rule is
that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
nonpayment.40
In Alonzo v. San Juan,41 we held that the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, are deemed
the best evidence of the fact of payment. In this case, no receipt was presented to substantiate the
claim of payment as petitioners did not take advantage of all the opportunities to present their
evidence in the proceedings a quo. Not even a photocopy of the alleged proof of payment was
appended to their answer. Verily, petitioners failed to discharge the burden. Accordingly, we
reject their defense of payment.
By signing the promissory note, petitioners acknowledged receipt of the loan amounting to
P81,000.00, and undertook to pay the same, plus interest and penalty, on or before October 14,
1984.
Records show that as of October 17, 1995, petitioners unpaid obligation under the note is
P77,722.67,42 excluding interest of 12% per annum, penalty charge of 3% per annum, and
attorneys fees, which they bound themselves to pay under the note.43
As we held in Sierra v. Court of Appeals,44 and recently in Henry dela Rama Co v. Admiral
United Savings Bank:45
A promissory note is a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it
on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. A person who
signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him
through the signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he reneges on his promise
without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court and deserves instead its
sharp repudiation.

Thus, petitioners cannot renege on their commitment to pay their obligation, including interest
and penalty, to the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioners Annabelle dela Pea and Adrian Villareal
are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay respondent Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc. P77,722.67,
with interest at 12% per annum and penalty charge of 3% per annum from October 14, 1984 until
the loan is fully paid. In addition, petitioners are adjudged liable to pay respondent P40,000.00,
as attorneys fees.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170661

December 4, 2009

RAMON B. FORMANTES, Petitioner,

vs.
DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS, PHILS., INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57528, which affirmed with modification the Resolutions rendered by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Second Division, dated October 19, 19993 and December 21,
1999,4 respectively, in NLRC NCR CA 010480-96.
Petitioner Ramon B. Formantes was employed as a medical representative by respondent Duncan
Pharmaceuticals, Phils., Inc. on September 1, 1990. He later became the Acting District Manager
of respondent for the Ilocos District.
On March 18, 1994, petitioner received a long distance call from Rey Biscaro, Regional Sales
Manager of respondent, asking him to report at the head office on March 21, 1994. Thereafter,
petitioner went to the head office and was confronted by said Mr. Biscaro and Emeterio Shinyo,
Marketing and Sales Director, due to his attempt to sexually force himself upon his subordinate
Cynthia Magat, one of the medical representatives of respondent company. Petitioner and Ms.
Magat separately related their sides of the incident to the respondent companys officers.
Petitioner was then compelled by respondent to take a leave of absence.
Thereafter, Biscaro tried to induce petitioner to resign, which the latter refused. Petitioner's
salary was then withheld from him. He was not allowed to attend the meetings and activities of
the company. His subordinates no longer reported to him and the company directed one of its
district managers to take over his position and functions without prior notice to him. Due to the
foregoing, petitioner was constrained to file a case for illegal suspension, constructive dismissal,

payment of salaries, allowances, moral and exemplary damages on April 13, 1994 before the
NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. I, San Fernando, La Union.
On April 19, 1994, petitioner received a telegram from Lelet Fernando of the Human Resources
Department (HRD), advising him to report to the respondents' head office. Petitioner advised her
and Biscaro that he has not received his salary and reimbursements for incurred expenses. He
also informed them that he had already filed a case for constructive dismissal against the
respondent company.
On April 25, 1994, petitioner received a telegram5 dated April 22, 1994 from respondent,
advising him that his reasons for not reporting were unacceptable, and ordering him to report to
the office in the morning of April 25, 1994. Petitioner was not able to report due to time
constraints, as it was physically impossible for him to report on the very same day that he
received the telegram ordering him to do so. Thereafter, respondent sent several letters to
petitioner. These letters, among others, include the following: letter6 charging him of grave
misconduct on the attempted sexual abuse upon the person of Ms. Cynthia Magat, and directing
him to submit his written explanation thereon; letter7 recalling the company car issued to him;
letter8 informing him of violation of Rule IV.5.a of the respondent's company rules by failing to
turn over the company car, and directing him to explain in writing why no further disciplinary
action should be given to him; letter9 suspending him for one day for failure to carry out
instructions, and ordering him to report to the company's head office; letter10 placing him under
suspension without pay for eight days for failure to return the company car without explanation.
On May 19, 2004, petitioner received a letter11 dated May 18, 1994, terminating his employment
with respondent company due to insubordination; for failure to report to the respondent
company; for failure to submit the required operations report; and for failure to turn over the
company car.
In the meantime, Executive Labor Arbiter (LA) Norma C. Olegario rendered a decision12 dated
November 10, 1995, dismissing the complaint, finding that Formantes was validly dismissed for
an attempt to sexually abuse Cynthia Magat, but imposing a penalty on respondent for its failure
to give formal notice and conduct the necessary investigation before dismissing petitioner. The
LA found that when the first written notice was sent to petitioner on April 25, 1994, regarding
the incident with Cynthia Magat, petitioner had already been dismissed, or at least,
constructively dismissed, because as early as March 23, 1994, he was no longer allowed to
participate in the activities of the company and his salary was withheld from him. The LA
directed the respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P1,000.00.
Dissatisfied with the Labor Arbiter's finding, petitioner appealed to the NLRC, on grounds of
grave abuse of discretion; serious errors of law; and serious errors in the findings of facts, which,
if not corrected, would cause irreparable damage to petitioner. Petitioner alleged that the LA

erred in ruling that he was legally dismissed for sexual abuse, when the charge against him stated
in the termination letter was insubordination.
The NLRC, Second Division, in its Resolution13 dated October 19, 1999 affirmed the findings of
the LA. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in a Resolution14
dated December 21, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, alleging that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess of its jurisdiction in affirming the
decision of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner's dismissal from employment was justified on a
ground not alleged in the notice of termination and not established by substantial evidence.
Petitioner further alleged that the NLRC erred in not holding that petitioner was constructively
dismissed by the respondent.
The CA, in its Decision dated July 18, 2005, affirmed the resolutions of the NLRC, but with the
modification that the sanction imposed on respondent company for non-observance of due
process be increased from P1,000.00 to P5,000.00.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
November 23, 2005. Hence, the instant petition assigning the following errors:
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED [BY] THE NLRC [IS] NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND
OF LACK OF DUE PROCESS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT PETITIONERAPPELLANT WAS UNKNOWINGLY DEPRIVED OF COMPETENT LEGAL ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AS IT TURNED OUT THAT THE "COUNSEL" WHO REPRESENTED HIM
WAS LATER FOUND NOT TO BE A MEMBER OF THE BAR AS [HE REPRESENTED
HIMSELF TO BE].
THE COURT A QUO GROSSLY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED BY THE RESPONDENT COMPANY.
THE COURT A QUO GROSSLY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
NLRC THAT PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT WAS JUSTIFIED ON
ANOTHER GROUND NOT ALLEGED IN THE NOTICE OF TERMINATION AND WAS
NOT ESTABLISHED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.15

On the alleged deprivation of due process, petitioner alleged that he was not duly represented by
a competent counsel, as Rogelio Bacolor, who represented him in the proceedings before the
NLRC, was not a member of the bar, thereby depriving him of his right to due process. Hence,
he prayed that the case be remanded to the LA for further proceedings.
We are not persuaded.
Records will show that aside from Mr. Bacolor, petitioner was represented by other lawyers at
the commencement of the action before the NLRC and during the proceedings before the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner was duly represented by Atty. Jannette B. Ines in the filing of the Complaint,16 the
Position Paper,17 and the Reply18 before the LA. He was also represented by the same Atty. Ines
during the initial stage of the hearing before the NLRC.19 Further, although Mr. Bacolor appeared
in the several stages of the hearing before the LA and filed petitioner's memorandum of appeal,
he also retained the services of Guererro and Turgano Law Office, as collaborating counsel. Atty.
Arnel Alambra of said law office filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal20 and Reply21 to
the respondent's answer to the Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal in petitioner's behalf.
Thereafter, upon denial of the appeal by the NLRC, petitioner's motion for reconsideration22 was
filed by Arnold V. Guerrero Law Offices, together with its battery of lawyers, which includes
Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero, Atty. Ma. Josefa C. Pinza, Atty. Carmencita M. Chua and Atty. Ma.
Loralie C. Cruz. Petitioner was also represented by said law office in the proceedings before the
CA, more particularly during the filing of the Petition for Certiorari23 under Rule 65, the Reply24
and the Memorandum.25 Upon denial of the petition before the CA, petitioner was also
represented by another law office in the name of Argue Law Office, which filed the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and the present petition before this court.
In fine, petitioner was fully represented by a barrage of competent lawyers. Thus, he cannot
claim that he was deprived of due process of law.
In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,26 this Court
held that:
There is no question that the "essence of due process is a hearing before conviction and before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal" but due process as a constitutional precept does not, always
and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
ones defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Emphasis
supplied.)1avvphi1

Further, in Fernandez v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 respondents failed to attend the
hearing on the scheduled cross examination of the petitioner's witness. Due to the foregoing, the
LA deemed the case submitted for resolution. Respondents claimed denial of due process due to
non-reception of its evidence. On appeal, the NLRC vacated the LA's Order and remanded the
case for further proceedings. The issue is whether the failure to attend hearings before the LA is a
waiver of the right to present evidence. This court held that:
Private respondents were able to file their respective position papers and the documents in
support thereof, and all these were duly considered by the labor arbiter. Indeed, the requirements
of due process are satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers.
In any event, Respondent NLRC and the labor arbiter are authorized under the Labor Code
to decide a case on the basis of the position papers and documents submitted. The holding
of an adversarial trial depends on the discretion of the labor arbiter, and the parties cannot
demand it as a matter of right. In other words, the filing of position papers and supporting
documents fulfilled the requirements of due process. Therefore, there was no denial of this
right because private respondents were given the opportunity to present their side.
Taken altogether, although petitioner, during some parts of the trial proceedings before the LA
was not represented by a member of the bar, he was given reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence to support his arguments, through the medium of pleadings filed in the labor
tribunals. He was also able to present his version of the Magat incident during his direct
examination conducted by his lawyer Atty. Jannette Inez.28 Thus, he cannot claim that he was
denied due process.
On the issue of petitioner's dismissal on another ground not alleged in the notice of termination,
petitioner argued that the LA's justification for his dismissal on the ground of sexual abuse is not
proper, as said ground is not alleged in the notice of termination. The notice of termination stated
that petitioner was dismissed due to failure to report to the office; failure to submit reports; and
failure to file written explanations despite repeated instructions and notices.
The argument is not meritorious.
In Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC,29 we held that:
It is now axiomatic that if just cause for termination of employment actually exists and is
established by substantial evidence in the course of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the
fact that the employer failed, prior to such termination, to accord to the discharged employee the
right of formal notice of the charge or charges against him and a right to ventilate his side with
respect thereto, will not operate to eradicate said just cause so as to impose on the employer the
obligation of reinstating the employee and otherwise granting him such other concomitant relief
as is appropriate in the premises. x x x

Although petitioner was dismissed from work by the respondent on the ground of
insubordination, this Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that the ground of sexual abuse
committed against petitioner's subordinate actually exists and was established by substantial
evidence before the LA.
When petitioner filed the complaint for constructive dismissal on April 13, 1994, he was still
unsure of the actual ground for his suspension and constructive dismissal. The very reason why
he sought refuge in the labor tribunals was to ascertain the ground for his termination. In keeping
with its duties, the LA, in order to ascertain the petitioner's cause for constructive dismissal,
required the parties to submit their respective position papers and their respective replies thereto.
After analyzing the pleadings submitted before her and the proceedings taken thereon, the LA
made a finding that petitioner was validly dismissed due to the sexual abuse committed against
his subordinate. However, the LA imposed a monetary penalty upon respondent for its failure to
observe procedural due process.
The LA would be rendered inutile if she would just seal her lips after finding that a just cause for
dismissal exists merely because the said ground was not stated in the notice of termination.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, We hold that there exists substantial evidence to support the
ground for his dismissal.
The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies, which have acquired expertise in the specific
matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded by this Court not only respect but even
finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of
evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that in cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported
by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.30
After a meticulous review of the records, We find that the Decision of the LA, as affirmed by the
NLRC and the CA, is supported by substantial evidence. The LA arrived at her decision after a
careful consideration of all the facts and evidence on record.
The LA anchored her decision upon the Sworn Statement31 given by Cynthia Magat to the
Mangaldan Police Station, dated April 14, 1994, to wit:
xxxx
06.Q. - You have stated that you were attempted (sic) by you boss, MR. RAMON B.
FORMANTES, to sexually abuse you, will you relate briefly how the incident took place?

A. - That we have a meeting at about 10:30 o'clock in the morning of March 9, 1994 at the
Maraman Office at Caranglaan, Dagupan City. After the meeting, we proceeded to my apartment
at Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan to get the data he (Mr. Formantes) was asking.
07.Q. - Upon reaching you apartment at Anolid, Mangaldan, what happened, if any?
A. - We entered the apartment and then while I was looking for the papers needed, he asked
permission to see the apartment and so I showed him the lower portion. And then he asked again
and wished to go upstairs, so I consented since he is [an] outstanding friend and my boss without
any malice to him and we went upstairs.
08.Q. - Then, what happened, if any, when you were already upstairs of the apartment?
A. - That he went inside my room looking at my things. When I told him we better go downstairs
since it is not proper got (sic) us to stay there because I am alone, he suddenly opened my closet
without my permission. I closed the closet and as I persuading (sic) him to go downstairs, he
started teasing me and holding my hands saying "Cheng, na-e-excite yata ako sa iyo." I resisted
his touch and told him not to tease me that way. Then finally, we went downstairs and I started
again to look for the papers I needed. As I was looking at my things, he suddenly went upstairs
so I ran after him. I caught up with him at the door of my room. Then, he said, "Cheng, galing
ako sa La Union pagod ako, pwede bang magpahinga? Since I trusted him and he is like a
brother to me, I said yes. I turned on the electric fan and TV set and I went downstairs. Since it
was hot, I decided to buy coke, after which I went upstairs with the coke and my MBS reports.
When I entered the room, he was already wearing only his "kamiseta" since he said it was hot. I
was trying to give him a shirt but he said he was comfortable that way. I gave him the coke and I
asked him how to do my MBS reports. He taught me and after that when I decided to do my
reports downstairs, he stopped and suddenly embraced me from behind and pulled me down to
the bed.
09.Q. - And when you fell down on the bed, what did Mr. Ramon Formantes do, if any?
A. - Then, he said "Cheng, na-mimiss lang kita at ang barkada natin, palambing naman." I said
that was not my idea of "lambing" and I resisted him. As I was getting up, he then pulled me
again to the bed, this time he pinned me to the bed, he went on top of me and was asking for a
kiss. He said, "Cheng isang kiss lang titigil na ako." I was shocked. And then he was trying to get
in between my legs, but I kept on kicking him with my left leg. He was trying to get my mouth,
but I kept on banging my face on the bed. By then, my face was full of his saliva, as he started
kissing the right side of my face down to the neck. He then held my left buttock and held my
lower jaw with his left hand. He squeezed my left buttock and started to put his tongue in my
mouth. By now, I could not shout since he was kissing my mouth, but before he got my mouth I
told him, "Monching, don't do this to me, you are my friend." He said "I'm also your boss." Since

I was kicking him and pushing him, I was finally able to get away from him. When I stood up, I
asked him "Bakit mo nagawa ito sa akin, kaibigan kita." He said, "Cheng, I'm sorry. Nadala lang
ako." He told me not to tell this to Art, my counterpart in Baguio. Since I really wanted to get out
of the house as fast as I could, so I just said, just don't do it again. We went out and he went to La
Union."
The same Sworn Statement further provides that:
10.Q. - Was there any more incident that transpired after the one you have just related?
A - Yes, sir. On March 11, 1994, Friday, about 7:15 oclock in the morning, Mr. Ramon
Formantes arrived at my apartment saying he came from Manila. He asked me if he could sit
down. I let him in and left the door open. Then he said, "May tao ba sa taas?" I told him there
was none though my fiancee was upstairs. Then he started to hold my inner thigh saying, Cheng,
maligo ka na hihintayin kita. I told him I'll just meet him at Nipa or Maraman. I was resisting his
touch, but he kept on touching me and holding me at the back. Without my knowledge, my
fiancee was seeing what was happening downstairs so he started to make noise and Monching
heard this and he got scared and left. Then on March 18, 1994, Friday, Monching went to my
apartment again at around 7:20 o'clock in the morning, but this time I did not let him in, I just
opened the door a little. He got irritated with my defensiveness and left my place.
The evidence on record sufficiently supports the finding of sexual abuse against petitioner. In
addition to her sworn statement to the police, she sufficiently narrated petitioner's attempt to
sexually abuse her in her handwritten letter32 dated March 23, 1994 addressed to Reynaldo
Biscaro. She also narrated the same incident in another letter33 addressed to the president of the
union, Joel Soco.
It may be trite to point out that the findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve
great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge over an appellate justice in the
appreciation of testimonial evidence.34 The LA, being in the position to observe the demeanor of
both the petitioner and Ms. Magat during their testimony, gave more credence to the testimony35
of Ms. Magat. On the other hand, aside from his self-serving testimony, petitioner was not able to
sufficiently contradict the charge of sexual abuse against him. Moreover, the courts usually give
credence to the testimony of a woman who is a victim of sexual assault, because normally no
woman would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and testify on the details of
her ordeal if it be not to condemn an injustice.36
In Villarama v. National Labor Relations Commission,37 wherein a managerial employee
committed sexual harassment against his subordinate, the Court held that sexual harassment is a
valid cause for separation from service.

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethic. He failed to live
up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And
when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable
ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every
employer to protect its employees from over sexed superiors.
As a manager, petitioner enjoyed the full trust and confidence of respondent and his
subordinates. By committing sexual abuse against his subordinate, he clearly demonstrated his
lack of fitness to continue working as a managerial employee and deserves the punishment of
dismissal from the service.
Aside from the findings of sexual abuse, petitioner is also guilty of insubordination. Records
show that after filing a case for constructive dismissal on April 13, 1994 against the respondent,
petitioner continued working and performing his functions with the respondent company until his
termination on May 19, 1994.38 However, despite receipt of the various notices sent by
respondent to him to report to the office and to submit written explanations relative to his failure
to follow instructions, the records of the case are bereft of showing that he filed any written
explanation to any of these notices. His continued failure to carry out the reasonable oral or
written instructions of his supervisor is punishable by insubordination, which is provided under
Rule IV.5.a of the Operational Instruction OI-A-AP25, Work Rules.39 While petitioner cannot be
faulted in believing that respondent constructively dismissed him from work, he was still, strictly
speaking, respondent's employee when he received the written notices. As an employee, he
should have at least responded thereto, as instructed.
We now come to the issue of constructive dismissal.
Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego
with his continued employment.40
In the case at bar, petitioner, while still employed with the respondent, was compelled to resign
and forced to go on leave. He was not allowed to participate in the activities of the company. His
salary was no longer remitted to him. His subordinates were directed not to report to him and the
company directed one of its district managers to take over his position and do his functions
without prior notice to him.
These discriminatory acts were calculated to make petitioner feel that he is no longer welcome
nor needed in respondent company short of sending him an actual notice of termination. We,
therefore, hold that respondent constructively dismissed petitioner from the service.

Despite this, however, it is impractical and unjust to reinstate petitioner, as there was a just cause
for his dismissal from the service.
Thus, we hold the dismissal as valid, but we find that there was non-compliance with the twin
procedural requirements of notice and hearing for a lawful dismissal.
Well settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that
the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of
employment can be affected: (a) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (b) the second informs the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him.41
The barrage of letters42 sent to petitioner, starting from a letter dated April 22, 1994 until his
termination on May 19, 1994, was belatedly made and apparently done in an effort to show that
petitioner was accorded the notices required by law in dismissing an employee. As observed by
the LA in her decision, prior to those letters, petitioner was already constructively dismissed.
Since the dismissal, although for a valid cause, was done without due process of law, the
employer should indemnify the employee with nominal damages. In Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission,43 we found that the dismissal of the employees therein was for valid and
just cause because their abandonment of their work was firmly established. Nonetheless, the
employer therein was held liable, because it was proven that it did not comply with the twin
procedural requirements of notice and hearing for a legal dismissal. However, in lieu of payment
of backwages,
we ordered the employer to pay indemnity to the dismissed employees in the form of nominal
damages, thus:
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants
the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. x x
x. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the
statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules.44
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff that has been violated or
invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.45 Thus, for respondent's violation of

petitioner's statutory rights, respondent is sanctioned to pay petitioner nominal damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 57528 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sanction
imposed on respondent for non-compliance with statutory due process is increased from
P5,000.00 to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184337

August 7, 2009

HEIRS OF FEDERICO C. DELGADO and ANNALISA PESICO, Petitioners,

vs.
LUISITO Q. GONZALEZ and ANTONIO T. BUENAFLOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Amended Decision2 dated 29
August 2008 of the Court of Appeals Former Special Seventh Division, which reversed the
Original Decision3 dated 18 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals Seventh Division, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101196.
The Antecedent Facts
O11 March 2007, the police found the dead body of Federico C. Delgado (Delgado) at his
residence in Mayflower Building, 2515 Leon Guinto corner Estrada Streets, Malate, Manila. The
police was alerted by Annalisa D. Pesico (Pesico), who allegedly was present at the time of the
commission of the crime and was likewise injured in the incident.4
On 1 June 2007, on behalf of Pesico and the heirs of Delgado (petitioners),5 the Manila Police
District (MPD), represented by Alejandro B. Yanquiling Jr., Chief of the Homicide Section, filed
a complaint-affidavit6 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The MPD charged
respondents Luisito Q. Gonzalez (Gonzalez) and Antonio T. Buenaflor (Buenaflor) with the
murder of Delgado and frustrated murder of Pesico. Gonzalez is the stepbrother of the deceased
and Buenaflor was a former driver for 15 years of Citadel Corporation, owned by the Delgado
family.

Together with the complaint-affidavit, the police presented the following documents:
1. Sworn Statement ("Sinumpaang Salaysay") of Pesico dated 11 March 2007;7
2. Supplemental Sworn Statement ("Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay") of Pesico
dated 15 March 2007;8 and
3. Crime and Progress Reports of Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Virgo Ban Villareal
dated 23 March 2007.9
At petitioners request, the case was transferred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
preliminary investigation.10 On 20 June 2007, the MPD filed a Supplemental ComplaintAffidavit11 and attached the following additional documents:
1. Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Report dated 11 March 2007;12
2. Medical Certificate of Pesico from the Ospital ng Maynila dated 7 June 2007;13
3. Cartographic Sketch of one of the suspects dated 13 March 2007, drawn by an artist
sketcher of the MPD, as described by Pesico;14
4. Photographs of criminals and Delgados family members, relatives, friends and
employees, shown to Pesico, where she recognized Gonzalez and Buenaflor as the ones
who mauled her and murdered Delgado;15
5. Affidavit of SPO2 Virgo Ban Villareal dated 15 June 2007 attesting to the identification
made by Pesico after viewing said photographs;16
6. Affidavit of Retired Police Superintendent Leonito Manipol Cantollas, the forensic
document examiner who analyzed the questioned handwritten word "FRANCO," the
inscription on a wall found at the crime scene;17
7. Questioned Document Examination Report No. 004-07 of Leonito Manipol
Cantollas;18
8. Curriculum Vitae of Leonito Manipol Cantollas;19
9. Complaint-Affidavit for Robbery filed by Jose Mari C. Delgado, stepbrother of
Gonzalez, against Ruby Q. Gonzalez-Meyer, sister of Gonzalez;20
10. Letter via electronic mail dated 4 July 2003 written by Ruby Q. Gonzalez-Meyer to
her and Gonzalezs mother, Vicky Quirino Gonzalez-Delgado;21

11. Newspaper clipping taken from the Philippine Daily Inquirer dated 26 March 2007,
where Gonzalezs wife, Kuh Ledesma, talked about him, their relationship and the
accusations that her husband was facing;22
12. Newspaper clipping taken from the Philippine Daily Inquirer dated 22 March 2007,
referring to the family feud between the Delgado and Gonzalez siblings;23 and
13. Police Blotter dated 16 March 2007 reported by Atty. Augusto M. Perez, Jr., lawyer of
Francisco "Franco" Delgado III, regarding a threatening phone call by an unknown caller
made on 15 March 2007 at the latters residence.24
Gonzalez and Buenaflor filed their Counter-Affidavits, respectively.25 Together with his counteraffidavit, Gonzalez attached relevant documents26 establishing his confinement at the NeuroPsychiatric Unit of the Makati Medical Center from 7 March 2007 until 18 March 2007 and the
corroborative affidavits of 29 impartial and independent witnesses composed of physicians,
nurses and personnel of said hospital.27 On the other hand, Buenaflor presented the affidavit of
his employer, who attested that Buenaflor was on duty and driving for him at the time of
Delgados death.28
Acting City Prosecutor of Manila Cielitolindo A. Luyun (Investigating Prosecutor) conducted the
preliminary investigation and evaluated the evidence submitted by the MPD, as well as
respondents Counter-Affidavits, corroborating affidavits of 29 witnesses, and supporting
documentary evidence. In a Resolution dated 10 September 2007, the Investigating Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause that respondents committed the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder.29
On 18 September 2007, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice. On
15 October 2007, then Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera (Acting Secretary
Devanadera) reversed the finding of the Investigating Prosecutor and directed the filing of
separate informations for murder and less serious physical injuries against respondents.30
On 18 October 2007, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
Acting Secretary Devanadera in a Resolution dated 26 October 2007.31
On 30 October 2007, the corresponding Informations were filed. The charge for the crime of
murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 32, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257487. The charge of less serious physical injuries was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, docketed as Criminal Case No. 441878.32

Thereafter, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101196, assailing the Resolutions of Acting
Secretary Devanadera dated 15 October 2007 and 26 October 2007.33
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 18 March 2008, the Court of Appeals, in its Original Decision, dismissed the petition and
denied respondents application for preliminary and/or permanent injunctive writ. The appellate
court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Acting Secretary Devanadera in issuing
the Resolutions dated 15 October 2007 and 26 October 2007. It affirmed the existence of
probable cause when Pesico, the lone eyewitness of the commission of the crime, positively
identified respondents as the perpetrators. The relevant portion of the Original Decision states:
As held by public respondent, probable cause was met, and rightly so, when Pesico, the lone
eyewitness of the commission of the crime positively identified petitioners as the authors of the
bestial act. To cast doubt on Pesicos positive identification of petitioners, the latter pointed to the
alleged inconsistencies in the two affidavits that the former has executed and such other
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime showing the improbability of
identification. But as correctly ruled by public respondent, these are minor inconsistencies and
matters which are not enough, at that stage in time, to overthrow the possibility and credibility of
identification.
On the one hand are the following facts, established by the complaints: (1) That Pesico, who was
likewise injured, witnessed the commission of the crime; (2) Her condition, despite the injury
caused by the blunt object that was used to maul her, with swollen eyes, tied in the arms and
legs, does not totally forestall the possibility that she could have seen and identified the
assailants; (3) Pesico identified petitioners as the authors of the complained acts; and (4) No
evidence to show that Pesico and petitioners know each other as to entertain any possibility that
her identification may have been prompted by ill-motive. On the other, are petitioners defense of
alibi and denial which they assert were not considered by public respondent.
In order to overthrow the jurisprudential injunction of giving superior regard to positive
identification over the defenses of alibi and denial, these defenses should be clearly established
and must not leave any room for doubt as to its plausibility and verity. It (alibi) cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely
against the accused.
The burden of evidence, thus, shifts on the respondents to show that their defenses of alibi and
denial are strong enough to defeat probable cause, which was engendered by the prosecutions
alleged eyewitness positive identification of them as the assailants to the crime under
investigation. Moreover, for alibi to prosper, there must be proof that it was physically

impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. At this
juncture, We note the undisputed fact, concerning the accessibility of the distance between the
crime scene and the hospital where petitioner Gonzale[z] alleged to have been detailed/admitted.
The same is true with petitioner Buenaflor who was only in the vicinity of Roxas Boulevard.
Considering the distance of the locus criminis and the places petitioners alleged they were at the
time of the commission of the crime, neither their arguments nor the affidavits of their witnesses
draw out the possibility, nay create physical impossibility, that they may have been at the scene
of the crime when it was committed.
xxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Acting
Secretary of Justice in issuing the Resolutions dated 15 October 2007 and 26 October 2007.
ACCORDINGLY, the present Petition is hereby DISMISSED and petitioners application for
preliminary (and/or permanent) injunctive writ is necessarily denied.
SO ORDERED.34
Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals on 27 March
2008.35
Meanwhile, on 3 July 2008, the RTC ordered that warrants of arrest be issued against
respondents.36 On 16 and 21 July 2008, Gonzalez and Buenaflor, respectively, surrendered
voluntarily to the police.37 On 28 July 2008, respondents filed with the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Order dated 3 July 2008).
To address the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents, the Court of Appeals held oral
arguments on 17 July 2008. After said hearing, the appellate court issued an Amended Decision
dated 29 August 2008. In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for
reconsideration and ordered that the Informations charging petitioners with murder and less
serious physical injuries be quashed and dismissed. The relevant portion of the Amended
Decision states:
This Court has carefully evaluated the evidence of the parties once more, and its reassessment of
the evidence compels it to reconsider its previous affirmation of public respondent Acting
Secretary of Justices finding of probably cause. The Courts incisive scrutiny of the evidence led
it to the conclusion that there was really insufficient evidence to support public respondent
Acting Secretary of Justices finding of probable cause. It is significant to stress at this point that
while "probable guilt" and "evidence less than sufficient for conviction" is the threshold in

probable cause determinations, it is also important nay indispensable that there be sufficient and
credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause.
xxx
Public respondent Acting Secretary of Justices finding of probable cause against the petitioners
is based solely on the account of the prosecutions lone eyewitness, private respondent Annalisa
Pesico. x x x
It is once apparent that public respondent Acting Secretary of Justice did not really dwell on the
essential facts of the case, much less dig through the crucial details of private respondent
Pesicos account. Curiously, a close reading of public respondent Acting Secretary of Justices
assailed resolution reveals that except for the rather sweeping finding that private respondent
Pesico "positively identified" the petitioners, most of it were re-statements, without more, of
broad principles and presumptions in criminal law, such as the doctrines on alibi, denial, and
positive identification. Such disposition utterly falls short of the admonitions enunciated in
Salonga and reiterated in Allado. Indeed, while probable cause should be determined in a
summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage
to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play,
and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses
and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. x x x
The pivotal question then is, was there really positive identification of the petitioners?
In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., the Supreme Court explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification, thus:
"x x x Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru
show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is
done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is
also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up
for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of incourt identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its
fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure."

Taking into consideration the foregoing test, this Court finds sufficient reasons to seriously doubt
the identification made by private respondent Pesico pointing to the petitioners as the culprits.
First, a careful analysis of private respondent Pesicos account would reveal that she did not
really have sufficient opportunity to view the assailants at the time of the commission of the
crime. By her own account, private respondent Pesico narrated that as they were about to enter
Federicos room, two (2) men suddenly came out from the room and immediately stabbed
Federico, while she was also hit with a hard object on her head and body. Considering the
suddenness of the attack plus the fact that the assailants had "covers" or masks on their faces, it
was certainly not possible, at that instance, that she could have seen their faces. In a later
statement which she executed four (4) days after, she nonetheless repaired her account by
explaining that while petitioners had "covers" on their faces and while her own face was covered
with towel and some pieces of clothing, she nevertheless, can still see through them, as in fact,
she saw the face of petitioner Luisito Gonzale[z] when the latter allegedly removed the cover in
his face because of the humidity inside the room. At this point, private respondent Pesico was
obviously referring at that particular instance when she was lying down on the floor inside the
dressing room. This Court entertains nagging doubts in this respect. x x x
Second, private respondent Pesico utterly missed out important details in her first narration of the
events that transpired during the commission of the crime. Significant details such as the
"covers" or masks on the faces of the assailants, the strong Visayan accent of one of the assailant,
that the television was turned "on", that the assailants removed their masks because of the heat in
the room, that her face was covered with towel and some pieces of clothing, etc., were entirely
lacking in her first sworn statement, and were only supplied later in her second sworn statement.
While her first sworn statement undoubtedly counts as a "fresh account" of the incident, there are
valid reasons to suspect that the second sworn statement could have been tainted, if not supplied
or suggested, considering the intervening time between the execution of the first and second
statements.
Third, there was little certainty in private respondent Pesicos identification. There was no
mention at all of any distinguishing characteristics like the height, weight, built, complexion,
hair, moles, mustache, etc. of the assailants, not to mention the attire or the color of their
clothing, individual mannerisms or gestures, accessories, if any, that could perhaps specifically
identify the petitioners as the assailants. There was of course private respondent Pesicos account
that one of the assailants had a strong Visayan accent, fierce eyes and pointed face but such was
rather too general a description to discriminate petitioners against a thousand and one suspects
who would similarly possess such description. Furthermore, while private respondent Pesico
claimed to have seen the faces of both the assailant, there was only one cartographic sketch of
one suspect. Oddly enough, the cartographic sketch does not even strike any close resemblance
to the facial features of anyone of the petitioners.

Fourth, there was sufficient lapse of time between the time of the commission of the crimes when
private respondent Pesico allegedly saw the assailants and the time she made her identification.
The intervening period, i.e., four (4) days to be exact, was more than sufficient to have exposed
what was otherwise accurate and honest perception of the assailants to "extraneous influences",
which more or less leads this Court to conclude that private respondent Pesicos identification of
the petitioners could not have been uncontaminated. This, in light of the fact that prior to the
identification, private respondent Pesico was part of the joint inspection of the crime scene
conducted by the police investigators with the members of the Delgado family, who, at that time
floated the "family feud" theory of the case.
Fifth, this Court finds the "photo line-up" identification conducted by the police investigators to
be totally unreliable and particularly dangerous, the same being impermissibly suggestive. The
pictures shown to private respondent Pesico consisted mainly of the members of the Delgado
family, employees and close associates, let alone the fact that in the particular picture from which
petitioner Luisito Gonzale[z] was identified by private respondent Pesico as one of the assailants,
he was the only male individual. Juxtaposed with the "family feud" angle of the case, there is
compelling reason to believe that petitioner Luisito Gonzale[z] was isolated and suggested,
wittingly or unwittingly, by the police investigators as a prime suspect in the case.
In sum, this Court is of the view that petitioner Luisito Gonzale[z]s identification was less than
trustworthy and could not have been positive but merely derivative.
xxx
In light of the significant improbabilities, uncertainties and inconsistencies in private respondent
Pesicos account, as well as the total unreliability of the identification she made, the petitioners
alibi and denial thus assume commensurate strength. Their alibi and denial assume particular
importance in this case as the same are corroborated by no less than twenty-nine (29) impartial
and disinterested witnesses. x x x Thus taking into account these 29 sworn statements, it was
certainly impossible for the petitioners to have been at the locus criminis. x x x Alibi is not
always undeserving of credit, for there are times when the accused has no other possible defense
for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may
in fact tilt the scales of justice in his favor.38
The Solicitor General, who is now Agnes VST Devanadera, did not appeal the appellate courts
Amended Decision which reversed her Resolutions of 15 October 2007 and 26 October 2007
when she was Acting Secretary of Justice. In G.R. No. 184507, the Solicitor General filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review under Rule 45 before this Court.
However, the 30 day extension given had lapsed without the filing of said petition. Thus, the
Court, in a Resolution dated 8 December 2008, declared G.R. No. 184507 closed and terminated.

On 10 September 2008, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion to Order
the Amended Decision dated 29 August 2008 as Immediately Executory.39
On 18 September 2008, petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 before this Court.40
Respondents, in connection with the Petition for Review, filed a "Motion for the Release (On
Bond, If Required)."
On 2 October 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the motion filed on 10
September 2008.41 Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on 7 October 2008, the RTC issued an Order suspending the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 07-257487 and effectively deferred the resolution of respondents Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Order dated 3 July 2008) pending a decision by this Court on the Petition
for Review filed by petitioners. The RTC also ordered that both respondents remain in custody.42
On 5 November 2008, the Court of Appeals issued another Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of its 2 October 2008 Resolution, stating that with due deference to the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter of all controversies, the Court of Appeals forbids itself from declaring
the 29 August 2008 Amended Decision as immediately executory. It held further that since an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court had already been filed by petitioners, any motion for
execution pending appeal should now be filed with the Supreme Court.43
Hence, this petition.
On 10 December 2008, this Court conducted oral arguments to hear the respective parties sides.
In a Resolution dated 17 December 2008, this Court, acting upon the "Motion for the Release
(On Bond, If Required)" filed by respondents, ordered the RTC of Manila, Branch 32, to hear
respondents application for bail with deliberate dispatch, since this Court is not in a position to
grant bail to respondents as such grant requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by
the trial court where the murder case is pending.
On 5 January 2009, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution
dated 17 December 2008. On 16 March 2009, this Court denied the motion for reconsideration
and directed the RTC of Manila, Branch 32, to conduct a summary hearing on bail and to resolve
the same within thirty (30) days from receipt of the resolution.
The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, issued an Order dated 27 March 2009 setting a hearing on bail
on 2 April 2009. On 7 April 2009, respondents filed with this Court a Manifestation Waiving the
"Motion for the Release (On Bond, If Required)" dated 17 November 2008. Respondents
manifested that they waive and abandon their motion for bail.
The Issues

Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether petitioners possess the legal standing to sue and whether petitioners can be
considered as the real parties in interest; that the DOJ Secretary as represented by the
Solicitor General is a mere nominal party; that the "People" as represented by the City
Prosecutor of Manila was not an impleaded party before the Court of Appeals; that,
unnotified of, and unserved with the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, the
"People" is not bound thereby; and that, therefore, neither the Secretary of Justice nor the
"People" were called upon to appeal to the Supreme Court.44
2. Whether the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is final and can be the subject
of execution pending appeal.45
3. Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible and whimsical errors of law in the
amended decision warranting reversal of the same46 in view of the following reasons:
a. There were plain, speedy and adequate remedies available to respondents prior
to their filing of certiorari before the Court of Appeals.47
b. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in her
determination of probable cause.48
c. The Court of Appeals strayed from the determination of grave abuse of
discretion and instead evaluated the evidence de novo, and erroneously increased
the quantum of evidence required for determining probable cause.49
d. The Court of Appeals erroneously substituted its judgment for the Secretary of
Justice.50
e. The Court of Appeals undermined the jurisdiction of the RTC over the criminal
proceedings by virtue of the filing of the Information therein.51
The Courts Ruling
On petitioners standing to file the petition and
the finality of the Amended Decision
Petitioners contend that the parties impleaded in the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101196 were Acting Secretary Devanadera,
Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and Annalisa D. Pesico. The "People of the Philippines" was never
made as one of the parties and neither was it notified through the City Prosecutor of Manila.52

Petitioners claim that in criminal proceedings where the only issue is probable cause or grave
abuse of discretion in relation thereto, the private complainant and the private respondent are the
parties. In such proceedings, the "People of the Philippines" is not yet involved as it becomes a
party to the main criminal proceedings only when the Information is filed with the trial court.53
Petitioners allege that although Informations were filed before the lower courts after respondents
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, it does not change the reality that all the
proceedings before the DOJ, Court of Appeals and this Court involve only the issues on (1)
probable cause, (2) the alleged grave abuse of discretion by the Acting Secretary of Justice, and
(3) the reversible errors of law and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals
in promulgating the assailed Amended Decision.
It is petitioners contention that while the Acting Secretary of Justice is a public respondent, she
is at best a nominal or pro forma party. Hence, the Solicitor General had no obligation to appeal
the case to this Court to represent the Secretary of Justice as a nominal party.54 Further, the
Solicitor Generals non-participation in this case is not a fatal defect that jeopardizes petitioners
legal standing as complainants in the preliminary investigation proceedings, appellants before the
Secretary of Justice, respondents in the Court of Appeals and petitioners before this Court.55
Petitioners state that they are the real parties in interest who can naturally be expected to file a
case for the death of their brother. Citing Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,56 petitioners claim that a
sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant who is akin to the offended party.
Respondents argue that petitioners cannot claim that the instant proceeding is not part of the
criminal case proper because the preliminary investigation has already been concluded.57
Quoting Section 9 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal,58 respondents claim
that an information may be filed even if the review of the resolution by the Secretary of Justice is
still available. The preliminary investigation, having been concluded, the private offended parties
no longer have the personality to participate by themselves in the succeeding proceedings.
Respondents insist that when petitioners asserted their right to prosecute a person for a crime,
through the filing of an information, the State, through its prosecutorial arm, is from that point
on, the only real party in interest.59
Respondents maintain that only the Solicitor General may represent the State in appellate
proceedings of a criminal case.60 The Acting Secretary of Justice cannot be properly
characterized as a nominal party because it is the real party in interest, whose right to prosecute
offenses is at stake. The Acting Secretary of Justice, in issuing a resolution that there is probable
cause to charge a person with an offense, asserts the right of the State to prosecute a person for
the commission of a crime.61 Thus, the participation of the private offended parties before the
Court of Appeals is not necessary for complete relief to be had, and it is certainly not
indispensable for a final determination of the case.62

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that the
Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, thus:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It
shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings ; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (Emphasis supplied)
The law clearly requires the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the
Supreme Court in all criminal proceedings before this Court. As in every case of statutory
construction, we begin our analysis by looking at the plain and literal language of the term
"criminal proceeding." Criminal proceeding is defined as "a proceeding instituted to determine a
persons guilt or innocence or to set a convicted persons punishment."63 Proceeding is defined as
"any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency. It is the business conducted
by a court or other official body."64
Section 1(a) of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:
(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 of Rule 112,
by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation.
It should be observed that a criminal action shall be instituted by filing the complaint with the
proper officer for the purpose of conducting the preliminary investigation. In this case, the
criminal action was instituted when Alejandro Yanquiling, Jr., Chief of the Homicide Section of
the MPD filed the Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.65 The
Complaint-Affidavit was supported by Pesicos sworn statement, affidavit of consent from the
heirs of Delgado, crime report, progress report, SOCO report, and cartographic sketch.66

Preliminary investigation, although an executive function, is part of a criminal proceeding. In

fact, no criminal proceeding under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court is brought to trial
unless a preliminary investigation is conducted. We explained, thus:
[T]he right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a
criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. A preliminary investigation should therefore be
scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be
protected from any material damage.67
In Ricafort v. Fernan,68 this Court had the occasion to rule:
As stated by counsel for the respondents, the petition herein is an offshoot, an incident of said
criminal case for qualified theft. For all purposes, therefore, it is a continuation of that case and
partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This being so, the party defeated by the order of
the respondent Judge dismissing the information in Criminal Case No. 2819 of the court of First
Instance of Davao must be the People of the Philippines and not the petitioner, the complaining
witness. Consequently, the proper party to bring this petition is the State and the proper legal
representation should be the Solicitor General and not the attorney for the complaining witness
who was the private prosecutor in said Criminal Case No. 2819. It is true that under the Rules of
Court the offended party may take part in the prosecution of criminal cases and even appeal in
certain instances from the order or judgment of the courts, but this is only so in cases where the
party injured has to protect his pecuniary interest in connection with the civil liability of the
accused. Petitioner did not institute the case at bar for the purpose of protecting his pecuniary
interest as supposed offended party of the crime charged in the information that was dismissed,
but to cause the restoration of the case and to have it tried as if nothing had happened. This,
certainly, falls within the province of the representative of the People who in this case has not
appealed nor joined the private prosecutor in bringing this case before Us.
Based on the above discussion, the term criminal proceeding includes preliminary investigation.
In any event, this issue is academic because on 30 October 2007, the Informations against
respondents were filed with the trial court. Petitioners admit that the "People of the Philippines"
becomes a party in interest in a criminal proceeding when an information is filed with the trial
court.
We have ruled in a number of cases69 that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. However, jurisprudence lays
down two exceptions where a private complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a
petition directly with this Court. The two exceptions are: (1) when there is denial of due process
of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of

the State and the private offended party,70 and (2) when the private offended party questions the
civil aspect of a decision of a lower court.71
The first exception contemplates a situation where the State and the offended party are deprived
of due process because the prosecution is remiss in its duty to protect the interest of the State and
the offended party. This Court recognizes the right of the offended party to appeal an order of the
trial court which denied him and the State of due process of law.
In Merciales v. Court of Appeals,72 this Court granted the petition of the offended party and ruled
as invalid the dismissal of the case in the trial court for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is,
due process. The public prosecutor who handled the case deliberately failed to present an
available witness which led the trial court to declare that the prosecution had rested its case. In
this sense, the public prosecutor was remiss in his duty to protect the interest of the offended
party. As a result, the public prosecutor was found guilty of blatant error and abuse of discretion,
causing prejudice to the offended party. The trial court was likewise found guilty for serious
nonfeasance for passively watching the public prosecutor bungle the case notwithstanding its
knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict and it could have,
motu proprio, called for additional witnesses. Thus, petitioner, who was the mother of the private
offended party in the criminal cases for rape with homicide, had been deprived of her day in
court. She could do nothing during the proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the case in
the hands of the public prosecutor. All she could do was helplessly watch as the public
prosecutor, who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on the familys behalf, renege on
that obligation and refuse to perform his sworn duty. This Court explained that it is not only the
State, but also the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. The issue on
whether private complainant can bring an action was, however, rendered moot when the Solicitor
General, in representation of the People, changed his position and joined the cause of petitioner,
thus fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor.
Likewise, in People v. Nano,73 this Court took cognizance of the offended partys petition
because of the gravity of the error committed by the judge against the prosecution resulting in
denial of due process. Aside from the denial of due process, the Solicitor General also
manifested to adopt the petition as if filed by his office. Thus, we ruled in Nano:
The petition being defective in form, the Court could have summarily dismissed the case for
having been filed merely by private counsel for the offended parties, though with the conformity
of the provincial prosecutor, and not by the Solicitor General. While it is the public prosecutor
who represents the People in criminal cases before the trial courts, it is only the Solicitor General
that is authorized to bring or defend actions in behalf of the People or Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought up before this Court or the Court of Appeals (People v. Calo, 186 SCRA
620 [1990]; citing Republic v. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]; City Fiscal of Tacloban v.

Espina, 166 SCRA 614 [1988]). Defective as it is, the Court, nevertheless, took cognizance of the
petition in view of the gravity of the error allegedly committed by the respondent judge against
the prosecution denial of due process as well as the manifestation and motion filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General praying that the instant petition be treated as if filed by the said
office. In view thereof, We now consider the People as the sole petitioner in the case duly
represented by the Solicitor General. Payment of legal fees is therefore no longer necessary in
accordance with Sec. 16, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the second exception, it is assumed that a decision on the merits had already been rendered by
the lower court and it is the civil aspect of the case which the offended party is appealing. The
offended party, who is not satisfied with the outcome of the case, may question the amount of the
grant or denial of damages made by the court below even without the participation of the
Solicitor General.
In Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,74 we ruled that in criminal cases, the State is the offended
party. Private complainants interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. We
explained:
Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public
prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private
complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on
the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as
the civil aspect thereof is concerned.
In De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,75 citing People v. Santiago,76 we held:
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by
the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may
file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of said complainant.
These two exceptions do not apply in this case.

In the Memorandum, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals committed reversible and
whimsical errors of law in the Amended Decision. Petitioners raised the following errors:
a. There were plain, speedy and adequate remedies available to respondents prior to their
filing of certiorari before the Court of Appeals.77
b. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in her determination
of probable cause.78
c. The Court of Appeals strayed from the determination of grave abuse of discretion and
instead evaluated the evidence de novo, and erroneously increased the quantum of
evidence required for determining probable cause.79
d. The Court of Appeals erroneously substituted its judgment for the Secretary of
Justice.80
e. The Court of Appeals undermined the jurisdiction of the RTC over the criminal
proceedings by virtue of the filing of the Information therein.81
Petitioners do not claim that the failure of the Solicitor General to appeal the Court of Appeals
decision before this Court resulted in the denial of due process to the State and the petitioners.
Petitioners do not assert that the prosecution and the Solicitor General were remiss in their duty
to protect the interest of the State and the offended party. Neither do petitioners claim that the
Solicitor General is guilty of blatant error or abuse of discretion in not appealing the Court of
Appeals decision.
The Solicitor General did not manifest to adopt petitioners appeal before this Court. On the
contrary, the Solicitor General manifested on 3 December 2008 its refusal to participate in the
oral arguments of this case held on 10 December 2008. This Court cannot take cognizance of the
petition because there is clearly no denial of due process to the State and the petitioners. In short,
the first exception does not apply because petitioners do not claim, and neither is there any
showing in the records, that the State and the petitioners have been denied due process in the
prosecution of the criminal cases.
The Solicitor General, on 19 September 2008, had filed before this Court a Motion for Extension
of Time to file a Petition for Review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 184507. However, the
30-day extension given had lapsed without the filing of the petition.82 Consequently, this Court,
in a Resolution dated 8 December 2008, declared G.R. No. 184507 closed and terminated.
Petitioners are also not appealing the civil aspect of the criminal case since the lower courts had
not yet decided the merits of the case. In People v. Santiago,83 this Court explained that in
criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private offended party is

limited to the civil liability. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal from the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private complainant or offended party may not appeal the criminal, but only the
civil, aspect of the case.
Here, since there was no decision promulgated on the merits by the lower court and the
Informations had been quashed, petitioners have nothing to appeal on the civil aspect that is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal cases. There is no longer any criminal case on
which a civil case can be impliedly instituted. Petitioners recourse is to file an independent civil
action on their own.
On 31 March 2009, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Comment
in G.R. No. 184337.84 The Solicitor General reasoned that she opted not to file a petition for
review in G.R. No. 184507 because she learned that a similar petition was filed before she could
prepare the intended petition for review. In her comment, the Solicitor General stated that she is
not a direct party to the case. However, the Solicitor General alleged that she would file a
comment as it is undeniable that she issued the Resolutions of the Department of Justice at the
time she held the position of Acting Secretary of Justice concurrent with her being the Solicitor
General. The Solicitor General submitted that her position on the issue of probable cause should
be heard.1awphi1
On 17 April 2009, respondents filed an Opposition and Motion to Strike "Motion for Leave to
Admit Attached Comment" and "Comment." Respondents contended that the Solicitor General is
not a party to the case and has no personality to participate in any manner. Respondents claimed
that the Solicitor General failed to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari within the prescribed
period and she cannot now use a "Comment" as a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In a Resolution dated 1 June 2009, this Court expunged from the records the motion for leave to
admit attached comment and the aforesaid comment filed by the Solicitor General. The Court
ruled that the Solicitor General is not a party in G.R. No. 184337.
We reiterate that it is only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
State in all criminal proceedings before the appellate courts. Hence, the Solicitor Generals nonfiling of a petition within the reglementary period before this Court rendered the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals final and executory with respect to the criminal aspect of the
case. The Solicitor General cannot trifle with court proceedings by refusing to file a petition for
review only to subsequently, after the lapse of the reglementary period and finality of the
Amended Decision, file a comment.

In view of our holding that petitioners have no standing to file the present petition, we shall no
longer discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 August 2008 Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101196. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171175

October 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARTURO F. DUCA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which seeks to set aside and annul the Decision1 dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
The CA decision reversed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-D3 which affirmed an earlier decision4 of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent
Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:
It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged of the crime of
Falsification of Official Document defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article
171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information which reads:
"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
confederating together and mutually abiding each other, with intent to cause damage, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of a Declaration of Real
Property over a bungalow type residential house covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01116131 of the Municipal Assessors Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that
the signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth
of the matter is not because the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines
only on December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature
thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private complainant Pedro Calanayan."
Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty. Then trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan (hereinafter
"Calanayan"), private complainant herein, filed an action for ejectment and damages against
Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca before the 4th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No.

960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed by
the aforesaid defendants, the said decision became final and executory. On November 22, 1999, a
writ of execution was issued by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the
money judgment was likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca
covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of
Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.
On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution
and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff
IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor
Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20000304-D.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected on the
lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she
presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At the back of the said
exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair market value of the property, which
is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F.
Duca and subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of
San Fabian, Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The signature on top of the typewritten name
Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that
the signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at that time. Aldrin arrived
in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it appear that his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No.
03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother Aldrin. That because of the
misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to
get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from evicting the
plaintiffs from the property in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had
no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that time.
On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was his.
However, he intersposed the defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to procure the said
tax declaration.
On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and

hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term of two years, four months and one day to six (6)
years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is acquitted for lack of
evidence.
The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness actual damages
in the amount of P60,000.00 moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.
SO ORDERED."
Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of Dagupan
City, Branch 44, rendered a decision, disposing the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of the crime of Falsification
defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon said
accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision
Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and ordering him to pay to the complaining witness actual
damages in the amount of P60,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED.
x x x.
SO ORDERED."5
Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review.
On November 23, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime
charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held:
However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly authorized by
Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the contrary, the defense was able to establish that
Arturo Duca was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on the house
erected on the land registered under their mothers name.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified the Tax
Declaration of Real Property under Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit "B") by
making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated in the accomplishment of the said
document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of the latter. It must be noted that as
early as June 2001, Arturo has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the
house in the latters name as he cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of

Arturo was confirmed by the latters execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002
confirming the procurement of the said tax declaration (Exhibit "6") as well as a Special Power
of attorney executed on June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7"). Thus, what appeared to be defective from
the beginning had already been cured so much so that the said document became valid and
binding as an official act of Arturo.
If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was signing, this deficiency was
cured by Aldrins subsequent execution of Exhibits "6" and "7".
The RTCs conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere
afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any criminal liability has no basis since from the
very start, it has been duly established by the defense that Aldrin had verbally instructed Arturo
to cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering his house constructed on his
mothers lot for taxation purposes.6
Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCAS APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.7
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the
respondents appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his
comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the
CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting
respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.
In his Comment,8 respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because the
prosecution was properly represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private
prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence under the control and supervision of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred on the private prosecutor by
the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim that the
prosecution was not afforded a chance to be heard in the CA. According to the respondent, he
should not be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutors failure to inform the Solicitor General of
the pendency of the appeal.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme
Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12,
Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cario v. De Castro,9 it was
held:
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority
to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No.
478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to "represent the government in
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." This provision has
been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter
12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all
criminal cases.10
Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,11 the Court made the following pronouncement:
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents
the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional
trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or this
Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal.12
And in Labaro v. Panay,13 the Court held:
The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the Government or
the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any matter, action, or

proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare of the people as the
ends of justice may require.14
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate
counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to
be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor
General to file his Comment on Ducas petition. A copy of the CA Resolution15 dated May 26,
2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for
Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge
Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy
of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment
deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.
Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.16 ruled as follows:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino
vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293
[May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the States right to due process raises a serious
jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan.
30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co.
vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).17
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given
the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently
adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may
be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a
party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.18
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General
the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to
refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is,
therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,19 we held:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must
be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.20
Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason
and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
(emphasis supplied)
Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case,
the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition
on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.21 The
service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would
be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People
of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondents failure to
have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA,
instead of dismissing respondents petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even acquitted

respondent without the Solicitor Generals comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed decision.
On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ
of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed before
the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari
as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.22 This rule, however,
is not without exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals,23 we held:
However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that while
generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to
give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule admits of exceptions and is not
intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion
for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or
where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the
same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.24 (emphasis
supplied)
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari
without a motion for reconsideration is justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA
in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA for
further proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15972

October 11, 1920

KWONG SING, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or general
interest in the subject-matter of this action, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.

G. E. Campbell for appellant.

City Fiscal Diaz for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The validity of Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requiring receipts in duplicate in
English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries
and dyeing and cleaning establishments, must be decided on this appeal. The ordinance in
question reads as follows:
[ORDINANCE No. 532.]
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE DELIVERY AND RETURN OF
CLOTHES OR CLOTHS DELIVERED TO BE WASHED IN LAUNDRIES, DYEING
AND CLEANING ESTABLISHMENTS.
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the city of Manila, that:
SECTION. 1. Every person, firm or corporation in the city of Manila engaged in
laundering, dyeing, or cleaning by any process, cloths or clothes for compensation, shall
issue dyed, or cleaned are received a receipt in duplicate, in English and Spanish, duly
signed, showing the kind and number of articles delivered, and the duplicate copy of the
receipt shall be kept by the owner of the establishment or person issuing same. This
receipt shall be substantially of the following form:
No. ______________

MANILA, _______________________________________________, 19________

Received of Mr.__________________________________________
(Name)
_______________________________________ the following articles delivered
(Residence.)
to me to be _______________________________________
(Washed, cleaned or dyed.)

"__________________________________________________
"__________________________________________________
"__________________________________________________
"__________________________________________________
This articles will have been ___________________________________________
(Cleaned, washed or dyed.)
may be taken at ___________m. on the ________ day of ______________, 19 _____
upon payment of P________ the amount of compensation for the work done.
_________________________________________
(Owner or person in charge.)
Provided, however, That in case the articles to be delivered are so many that it will take
much time to classify them, the owner of the establishment, through the consent of the person
delivering them, may be excused from specifying in the receipt the kinds of such articles, but he
shall state therein only the total number of the articles so received.
SEC. 2. No person shall take away any cloths or clothes delivered to a person, firm, or
corporation, mentioned in the preceding section, to be washed, dyed or cleaned, unless he returns
the receipt issued by such person, firm, or corporation.
SEC. 3. Violation of any of the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine of
not exceeding twenty pesos.
SEC. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect on its approval.
Approved February 25, 1919.
In the lower court, the prayer of the complaint was for a preliminary injunction, afterwards
to be made permanent, prohibiting the city of Manila from enforcing Ordinance No. 532, and for
a declaration by the court that the said ordinance was null and void. The preliminary injunction
was granted. But the permanent injunction was not granted for, after the trial, judgment was, that
the petitioner take nothing by his action, without special finding as to costs. From this judgment
plaintiff has appealed, assigning two errors as having been committed by the trial court, both
intended to demonstrate that Ordinance No. 532 is invalid.

The government of the city of Manila possesses the power to enact Ordinance No. 532.
Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
section 8, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of
the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the
following: . . . laundries . . .
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and
such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter. . . .
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code,
means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be
construed as synonymous with "supress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to
regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode
in which the employment or business shall be exercised. And, under the general welfare clause
(subsection [ee], section 2444 of the Manila Charter), the business of laundries and dyeing and
cleaning establishments could be regulated, as this term is above construed, by an ordinance in
the interest of the public health, safety, morals, peace good order, comfort, convenience,
prosperity, and the general welfare.
The purpose of the municipal authorities in adopting the ordinance is fairly evident.
Ordinance No. 532 was enacted, it is said, to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their
patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters
from being defrauded. The object of the ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion of peace and
good order and the prevention of fraud, deceit, cheating, and imposition. The convenience of the
public would also presumably be served in a community where there is a Babel of tongues by
having receipts made out in the two official languages. Reasonable restraints of a lawful business
for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The legislative body is the best judge
of whether or not the means adopted are adequate to accomplish the ends in view.
Chinese laundrymen are here the protestants. Their rights, however, are not less because
they may be Chinese aliens. The life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken
without due process of law; they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws without regard to
their race; and treaty rights, as effectuated between the United States and China, must be
accorded them. 1awph!l.net

With these premises conceded, appellant's claim is, that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class
legislation; that it unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it
constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. To an extent, the evidence for the
plaintiffs substantial their claims. There are, in the city of Manila, more than forty Chinese
laundries (fifty-two, according to the Collector of Internal Revenue.) The laundrymen and
employees in Chinese laundries do not, as a rule, speak, read, and write English or Spanish.
Some of them are, however, able to write and read numbers.
Plaintiff's contention is also that the ordinance is invalid, because it is arbitrary,
unreasonable, and not justified under the police power of the city. It is, of course, a familiar legal
principle that an ordinance must be reasonable. Not only must it appear that the interest of the
public generally require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. If the ordinance appears to the judicial mind to be partial or oppressive, it must be
declared invalid. The presumption is, however, that the municipal authorities, in enacting the
ordinance, did so with a rational and conscientious regard for the rights of the individual and of
the community.
Up to this point, propositions and facts have been stated which are hardly debatable. The
trouble comes in the application of well-known legal rules to individual cases.
Our view, after most thoughtful consideration, is, that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether
they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception,
and each everyone of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. There is no
privilege, no discrimination, no distinction. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all
engaged in the laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.
The oppressiveness of the ordinance may have been somewhat exaggerated. The printing
of the laundry receipts need not be expensive. The names of the several kinds of clothing may be
printed in English and Spanish with the equivalent in Chinese below. With such knowledge of
English and Spanish as laundrymen and their employees now possess, and, certainly, at least one
person in every Chinese laundry must have a vocabulary of a few words, and with ability to read
and write arabic numbers, no great difficulty should be experienced, especially after some
practice, in preparing the receipts required by Ordinance No. 532. It may be conceded that an
additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance. Yet,
even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result
to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to

uphold the hands of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control
of private interests for the public welfare.
Numerous authorities are brought to our attention. Many of these cases concern laundries
and find their origin in the State of California. We have examined them all and find none which
impel us to hold Ordinance No. 532 invalid. Not here, as in the leading decision of the United
States Supreme Court, which had the effect of nullifying an ordinance of the City and Country of
San Francisco, California, can there be any expectation that the ordinance will be administered
by public authority "with an evil eye and an unequal hand." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.
S., 356, which compare with Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27.)
There is no analogy between the instant case and the former one of Young vs. Rafferty
[1916], 33 Phil., 556). The holding there was that the Internal Revenue Law did not empower the
Collector of Internal Revenue to designate the language in which the entries in books shall be
made by merchants, subject to the percentage tax. In the course of the decision, the following
remark was interpolated: "In reaching this conclusion, we have carefully avoided using any
language which would indicate our views upon the plaintiffs' second proposition to the effect that
if the regulation were an Act of the Legislature itself, it would be invalid as being in conflict with
the paramount law of the land and treaties regulating certain relations with foreigners." There,
the action was taken by means of administrative regulation; here, by legislative enactment.
There, governmental convenience was the aim; here, the public welfare. We are convinced that
the same justices who participated in the decision in Young vs. Rafferty [supra] would now agree
with the conclusion toward which we are tending.
Our holding is, that the government of the city of Manila had the power to enact Ordinance
No. 532 and that as said ordinance is found not to be oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it is
valid. This statement disposes of both assignments of error, for the improprietry of the question
answered by a witness for the defense over the objection of plaintiff's attorney can be conceded
without affecting the result.
After the case was submitted to this court, counsel for appellants asked that a preliminary
injunction issue, restraining the defendant or any of its officers from enforcing Ordinance No.
532, pending decisions. It was perfectly proper for the trial and appellate courts to determine the
validity of the municipal ordinance on a complaint for an injunction, since it was very apparent
that irreparable injury was impending, that a municipality of suits was threatened, and that
complainants had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. But finding that the ordinance is
valid, the general rule to the effect that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution should be followed.
Judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 146494

July 14, 2004

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,

vs.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated 13 December 2000 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City ("trial court"), which held that Milagros Orbiso
Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship pension.
The Facts
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros ("Nicolas") married Milagros Orbiso
("Milagros") on 10 July 1983.3 Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros
who was then 43 years old.

On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") an
application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No.
1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 ("PD 1146"). In his retirement
application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary.4 Nicolas' last day of
actual service was on 17 February 1985.5 On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas'
application for retirement "effective 17 February 1984," granting a lump sum payment of annuity
for the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter.6 Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros
filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied
the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship
pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension.7 According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10
July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on "17 February 1984."
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
pension.
On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including
interest. Citing Articles 1158 and 1179 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement
benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has
contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement
benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property.
The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being
inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does
not prejudice or impair vested rights.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition for review.
In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has
accepted GSIS' decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case.10 Commenting on Milagros' letter, GSIS asserts that the
Court must decide the case on the merits.11
The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves not
only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who are similarly situated and
whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso. Social justice and public interest
demand that we resolve the constitutionality of the proviso.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerous and
conjugal because the pension came from the deceased pensioner's salary deductions. The Court
of Appeals held that the pension is not gratuitous since it is a deferred compensation for services
rendered.

The Issues
GSIS raises the following issues:
1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;
2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;
3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code repealed Section 18 of PD 1146.12
The Court's Ruling
The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read:
SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall
be entitled to survivorship benefits provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen
hereunder. The survivorship pension shall consist of:
(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly pension; and
(2) dependent's pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly pension payable
in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the System.
SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries
shall be entitled to:
(1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years; Provided, That,
at the option of the beneficiaries, it may be paid in lump sum as defined in this
Act: Provided, further, That, the member is entitled to old-age pension at the time
of his death; or
(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and the
dependent's pension; Provided, That, the deceased had paid at least thirty-six
monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his
death, or a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his
death.
(b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a), the
survivorship pension shall be paid as follows:
(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall receive the basic
survivorship pension for life or until he remarries;
(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the
survivorship pension for as long as they are qualified;

(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, they
shall be entitled to the survivorship pension so long as there are dependent
children and, thereafter, the surviving spouse shall receive the basic survivorship
pension for life or until he remarries.
(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries designated by the
deceased and recorded in the System, shall be entitled to:
(1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the basic survivorship pension when
the member is qualified for old-age pension; or
(2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average monthly
compensation for each year he paid contributions, but not less than five hundred
pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions
within the five-year period immediately preceding his death or paid a total of at
least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death.
(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits mentioned in paragraph
(a) of this section, they shall receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of
the average monthly compensation for each year the member paid contributions, but not
less than five hundred pesos. In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall
revert to the funds of the System.
SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries
shall receive the applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen
of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension
if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies within the period covered
by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the
said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act,
but the survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being received at the
time of death. (Emphasis supplied)
Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until such spouse
remarries, and (2) the dependent children.13 The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent
parents and legitimate descendants except dependent children.14 The law defines dependent as
"the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one
years of age but physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support." The term
also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the member, and the legitimate
parent wholly dependent on the member for support.15
The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which
proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent
spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension
("the proviso").

We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros' claim,
is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory
and denies equal protection of the law.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly
contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the
necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government
employer to take off and withhold from the employees' monthly salaries their contributions and
to remit the same to GSIS.16 The government employer must also remit its corresponding share to
GSIS.17 Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the
government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that
employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms
of employment.18 The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the
government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage
and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to government
employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.19
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested
right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause.20 Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.21 Thus, a
pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of
the public employees' pension statute.22 No law can deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.23
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors
of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one
of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widow's right to receive pension following the
demise of her husband is also part of the husband's contractual compensation.24
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly
denying a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted
marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation
of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be
heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and
integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents
in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
The "whereas" clauses of PD 1146 state:

WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System in promoting the efficiency and
welfare of the employees of the Government of the Philippines, administers the laws that
grant to its members social security and insurance benefits;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds
administered by the System; to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits
due him; and to expand and increase the benefits made available to him and his
dependents to the extent permitted by available resources;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and effective
discharge by the System of its functions and have unduly hampered the System from
being more responsive to the dramatic changes of the times and from meeting the
increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino public servant;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the
government employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather
than facilitated the payment of benefits, must now yield to his paramount welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government employees must be
continuously re-examined and improved to assure comprehensive and integrated social
security and insurance programs that will provide benefits responsive to their needs and
those of their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, retirement, and other
contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service;
WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions affecting the welfare of
government employees, there is a need to expand and improve the social security and
insurance programs administered by the Government Service Insurance System,
specifically, among others, by increasing pension benefits, expanding disability benefits,
introducing survivorship benefits, introducing sickness and income benefits, and
eventually extending the compulsory coverage of these programs to all government
employees regardless of employment status.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made
available to him and his dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits
expanding disability benefits
introducing survivorship benefits

 introducing sickness income benefits

extending compulsory membership to all government employees irrespective of
status25
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the
deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects
resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner.26
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under a
pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the
employee for a certain period before the employee's death to prevent sham marriages
contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts
survivor's annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at least
one year before the employee's death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those
married less than one year before a member's death and those married one year or more. The
classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages where a
terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for
benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employee's Retirement System of Illinois,27 the Appellate
Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and
circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in
violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law.28 The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the
same class.29 Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.30
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against
the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension.31 Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married
the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner's death, the dependent spouse would
still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not
provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent
"deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition
from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The
classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those
marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been
contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress
deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 ("RA 8291"),32 otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance Act of 1997," the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD
1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member
immediately before the member's death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless
the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.33
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before
retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits.
The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving
spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the member's
retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer
prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and
defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative
of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in
Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that "the dependent spouse
shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension." The Government Service Insurance System
cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this
invalid proviso.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April
24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,
when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of
the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding,
he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that
publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as
pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature
could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they
did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of
the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on

the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an

ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,
and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally,

in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically
for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be
made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this
Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is
not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment
has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved
by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of
the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,
of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for
an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again
an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the
acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234,
265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406,
415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594,
599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644,
1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293,
297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609,
1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742,
1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804,
1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840,
1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892,

1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568,
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92,
94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns
a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino
vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose

instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed.,
sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual,
as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel
for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those
in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings
no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official

Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
[4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which
he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of
Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as
to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court
had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights
and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual

existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject
matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws
until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12172

August 29, 1958

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendantsappellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950,
of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the
municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F.
Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the
ordinance in question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should,
before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and
P1.00 for each repair permit issued.
SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall
make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or
imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of
the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public
property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs.,
P. 3)
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's
name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh.
D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed
building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954,
defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was
turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.
On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace
court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to
the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine
of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the
view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National
Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the
constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.

A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has
absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up
any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the
permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case
of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a
settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71;
Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in
the respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the
city is to be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously
grant the privilege to some and deny it others; to refuse the application of one landowner
or lessee and to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for
precisely the same privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an
ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested.
Fundamental rights under our government do not depend for their existence upon such a
slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a
discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a
favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule
by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above
sustain this conclusion.
As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A.
587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180: "It seems from the foregoing authorities to be well established
that municipal ordinances placing restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use of
property must, in order to be valid, specify the rules and conditions to be observed in
such conduct or business; and must admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens
alike who will comply with such rules and conditions; and must not admit of the exercise,
or of an opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal
authorities between citizens who will so comply. (Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City
of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d), pp. 394-395).
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the
proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as
stated in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to
the appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of
the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted,

the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive

appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the
comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them
solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands,
every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands
condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the
public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land
remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in
character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation
and an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used
for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as
a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction
and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment
of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay
Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is
confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum
vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville,
133 So. 114).
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such
property without just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein.
Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly
destroyed without compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our
government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks the
sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused, then
certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable
compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of
private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827)
(Emphasis supplied.)

The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243,
par. (c), of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal
council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may
be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair
thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which
shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair
permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to
the municipal school fund.
Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council
to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous
parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired
within them. As there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings
to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear
that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243
(c) aforequoted.
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact,
and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said
accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades
"Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626
and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and
carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in

violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and

forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E.
MARCOS
Preside
nt
Republic of the
Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority
and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, * 3 which
upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on
certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court
as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication
of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving
the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of
lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the
first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not
by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear
showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to
make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated
otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the
issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9
and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential
decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was
issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No.
6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was
unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action,
he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction
that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to
justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed,
to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of
the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a

phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we
reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in
precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their
correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however,
this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous.
In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by
the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue
of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of
due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of
the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it
were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process
and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise
that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any
of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they
thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is
now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at
Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder
to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage
of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair
play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those
who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half
must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality.
A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or
worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the
law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights
of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure,
there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example,
bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on
human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of
the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be
summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be
cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy
restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may
be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved
or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present
danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as
the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and
is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the
three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him
even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond
the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is
a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power
is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which
call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No.
626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the
reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely
on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on
these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it
had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating
the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation
of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder
for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to
the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid
police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly
needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction
of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had
caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating
more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court
held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in
part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular

class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect
the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community
may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in
the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine.
There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are
at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or
breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the
live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly
taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought
to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se
as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No.
626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose
the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission

may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.)
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition
it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better
still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive
order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and
it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even
the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the
competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as
he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property
under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity.
We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have
ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its

obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten
in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the
people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons
on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the
role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by
those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except
as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas
bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy
really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic
impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and
within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for
economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival
and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the
competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against

persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of
citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged
in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business
for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1
and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and
the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional

requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind
certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection
clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function
and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their
application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly
resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or
extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions
of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L.
ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges

conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is
by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and
wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted
to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has
been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative.
Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the
wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be

no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and
prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which
from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live
in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of
things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under
modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified
to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru
him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy
reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru
which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community.
He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little
gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store
with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He
has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out.
The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale
in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred
and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets
and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely
useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him.
In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent
control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it
is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law
is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not
an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control
virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and
the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail
trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets

Year and
Retailers
Nationality

No.Establishme
nts

Pesos

Gross Sales

Per cent
Distributi
on

Pesos

Per cent
Distributi
on

194
1:

Filipino
..........

106,671 200,323,1
38

55.82 174,181,9
24

51.74

Chines
e .........
..

15,356 118,348,6
92

32.98 148,813,2
39

44.21

Others
............

1,646 40,187,09
0

11.20 13,630,23
9

4.05

Filipino
..........

111,107 208,658,9
46

65.05 279,583,3
33

57.03

Chines
e .........
..

13,774 106,156,2
18

33.56 205,701,1
34

41.96

Others
...........

354 8,761,260

.49 4,927,168

1.01

Filipino
..........

113,631 213,342,2
64

67.30 467,161,6
67

60.51

Chines
e .........
.

12,087 93,155,45
9

29.38 294,894,2
27

38.20

422 10,514,67
5

3.32 9,995,402

1.29

194
7:

194 (Censu
8:
s)

Others
..........

194
9:

Filipino
..........

113,659 213,451,6
02

60.89 462,532,9
01

53.47

Chines
e .........
.

16,248 125,223,3
36

35.72 392,414,8
75

45.36

Others
..........

486 12,056,36
5

3.39 10,078,36
4

1.17

Filipino
.........

119,352 224,053,6
20

61.09 466,058,0
52

53.07

Chines
e .........
.

17,429 134,325,3
03

36.60 404,481,3
84

46.06

347 8,614,025

2.31 7,645,327

87

195
1:

Others
..........

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Year and Retailer's

Nationality

Item
Assets
(Pesos)

Gross
Sales
(Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,878

1,633

Chinese .....................................
.........

7,707

9,691

Others .......................................
........

24,415

8,281

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,878

2,516

Chinese .....................................
......

7,707

14,934

Others .......................................
.......

24,749

13,919

1,878

4,111

1947:

1948:

(Census)

Filipino ......................................
.......

Chinese .....................................
........

7,707

24,398

Others .......................................
.......

24,916

23,686

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,878

4,069

Chinese .....................................
.........

7,707

24,152

Others .......................................
.......

24,807

20,737

Filipino ......................................
.......

1,877

3,905

Chinese .....................................
........

7,707

33,207

Others .......................................
........

24,824

22,033

1949:

1951:

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their
assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many
Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more
capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report,
pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the
Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents,
the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of
capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is
the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been
adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance
and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it
is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail
trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67
of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution
were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien
interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern
of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but
of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of
the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus
. . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation
not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic

subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th
ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution
No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and
a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of
Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance
and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to
alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved
by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as
the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in
the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose
an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer
does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for
its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it
from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and
free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests
of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the
mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to
the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has
had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous
hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods
and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No.
1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that
they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the

law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who
would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and
enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money
into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in
derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting
public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in
the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals;
what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods
and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the
alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution
is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of
alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The
alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is
for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of
stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of
that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him
from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the
earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his
customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt
the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution,
but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's
economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient
and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function
of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above,
their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the
welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they
are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the
trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification
adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to
prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and
reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found
between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To
this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that
the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and
as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare
that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities
we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co.
(1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection
clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry

the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the
Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a
valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat.,
I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance,
is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which
is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping
of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a
monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American
shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It
is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has
been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American
privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from
fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial
marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system
is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking,
the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of
hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has

declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following
reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to
have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of
liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to
discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our
institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to
our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,
274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an
ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms)
to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it
could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a
parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the
right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said
that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and
loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker,
pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar
vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's
findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the
health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission,
92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters
and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further
added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry.
However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally
as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a
state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons
over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this
decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious,
or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of

public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the
United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of
books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the
main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be
no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud,
because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its
conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit
would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese
of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220
(1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of
laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power
granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the
administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial
hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as
hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens
do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom
they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in
so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the
land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions
and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of
the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without
the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it
is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our
fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign
born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental
environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of
the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without
plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations
against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,
when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination
to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940,
950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,

oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health,
safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that
it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit
and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption
and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has
been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without
harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility
and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the
privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs
and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly
stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores
the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer
is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The
test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed
the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no
allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and
who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our
destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other
people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power
that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to
the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions
of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have
given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the
supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization
of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate
for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the
National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is
provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the
retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary
objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and
unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public

interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and
similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the
Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied
to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the
law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to
judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in
favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These
principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the
law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no
need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are
directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and
the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate"
does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But

"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in
page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors,
etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly
included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308,
quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint
and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While
word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason
why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection
with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State
vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the
title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more
general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains
other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which
would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the
principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been
appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions.
The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons
affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must
therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of
the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the

United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such
as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations
of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April
18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other
country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution,
are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes
upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title,
and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close.
Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed
in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the
Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,

G.R. No. L-24693

October 23, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL

DEL MAR, INC. and GO HIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE, CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
J. M. Aruego, A. Tenchavez and L. U. Go for petitioners-appellees.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates for respondent-appellant.
RE S O LUTI ON
FERNANDO, J.:
A Motion for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967 was filed by petitioners,
followed by a Motion for new trial. As the Motion for reconsideration is clearly without merit,
there is no occasion for this sought-for new trial. Consequently, both motions are denied.
(1) No merit in the Motion for reconsideration.
In the decision of this Court of July 31, 1967, sought to be reconsidered, its basis was
categorically set forth in the following language:
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity. . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has
in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people. . ..
The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against
the ordinance set aside.
The O'Gorman principle1 fails to meet the approval of counsel of petitioners. They would restrain
unduly and unjustifiably its operation. In the language of the motion for reconsideration: "The U.
S. Supreme Court was not laying down as a general rule in constitutional cases that there must be
a factual foundation of record to offset the presumption of constitutionality of any and every
law."
To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, this interpretation is without support in authority or reason and
rests upon a misconception. It is to betray an almost total lack of awareness of the import and
significance of the O'Gorman doctrine in American constitutional law. Authorities on the subject
of proven competence and knowledge flatly reject such a view. Dodd,2 Dowling,3 Freund
Sutherland, De Wolfe Howe, and Brown,4 and Kauper5 in their standard casebooks quote the
same excerpt from O'Gorman v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. appearing in the opinion of this Court.
Dodd entertained no doubt: "The accepted view is that stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
O'Gorman case."6

Frankfurter and Landis were equally explicit in their appreciation of what the O'Gorman dictum
means. "As doctrine, there is nothing new in the avowal of a need for concreteness in passing
judgment upon the legislative judgment. But perhaps last term marks a more sedulous attention
to its observance. Certainly the procedure followed by the Court in O'Gorman & Young v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., if regularly observed, will affect not a little the fate of legislation. If
insisted upon, it will compel the bar to argue questions of legislative validity in the perspective of
the circumstances which gave rise to a particular statute."7
The late Professor Hamilton of the Yale Law School, one of the most distinguished
constitutionalists, would have been appalled by the unorthodoxy of the view of counsel of
petitioners. For him, the O'Gorman opinion was a manifestation of the jurist's art at its best:
If the jurists have the feelings of other men, Monday, the fifth of January nineteen
hundred and thirty one, must have been a day of consequence in the life of Mr. Justice
Brandeis. On that day he handed down the judgment of the United States Supreme Court
in the O'Gorman case. The cause was a simple suit in contract: the result depended upon
the validity of a New Jersey statute regulating the commissions to be paid by insurance
companies to their agents for securing business. The more general question was the
tolerance to be accorded to legislative price-fixing under the Fourteenth Amendment.
And, as the fortunes of litigation broke, the issue came to be the intellectual procedure by
which the constitutionality of the acts which make up the public control of business are to
be determined. Upon that day the views of Brandeis became "the opinion of the court,"
and a new chapter in judicial history began to be written.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In form "the opinion of the court" is a very simple and unpretentious document. It begins
with a statement of the issue and a history of the case, continues with a brief summary of
the reasons for the statute and a statement that "the business of insurance is so affected
with a public interest that the state may regulate the rates," and concludes with a
declaration of the test for validity. As "underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character," it follows that "the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." It did not appear "upon the face of the statute, or from any
facts of which the court must take judicial notice" that in New Jersey "evils did not exist,"
for which the statute was "an appropriate remedy." Accordingly the court was compelled
to declare the statute valid; in fact it was left with no alternative.
Yet the simple lines of a short opinion present a superb example of the jurist's art. . . .8

This is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order,
or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those
involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous. That in such an event there should not
be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented does not argue against the
force of the above excerpts on the weight to be accorded the O'Gorman doctrine in this case.
The prop here failing, is there anything else in the Motion for reconsideration that calls for a
modification of the decision of this Court? The answer must be in the negative. It ought not to
have escaped petitioners that the opinion of the Court after noting the lack of factual foundation
to offset the presumption of constitutionality went on to discuss the due process aspects to make
clear that on its face, the Ordinance cannot be considered void.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great
public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general
welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society."
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila, traceable in great
part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to
fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all
times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of

the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
There is nothing in the Motion for reconsideration that in any wise affects adversely or impairs
the force of the above conclusion. The task of proving that the challenged Ordinance is void on
its face is one attended with difficulty. Nonetheless, with the persistence worthy of a better cause,
petitioners would cite as fatal infirmity the alleged invasion of the rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, to liberty, and to property.
As the unchallenged rule, to paraphrase Laurel, is that unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance,9 he has no standing, the
invocation of petitioners as motel operators of their alleged right to being free from unreasonable
search and seizure need not be taken seriously. Nor does their claim of the alleged infringement
of their liberty deserve any further thought, its implausibility being self-evident, except perhaps
as to the liberty to contract, which is part and parcel of their right to the property. Unfortunately
for them, in this jurisdiction the liberty to contract, except in the Pomar10 case as noted in the
decision, has never stood in the way of the enactment of police power measures when called for
by circumstances such as undoubtedly exist in this case. The same is true in the United States,
where such a concept has definitely fallen from its previously high state under the impact of the
Nebbia,11 West Coast Hotel Co.12 and Olson decisions.13
That leaves only the alleged grievance that there was an unconstitutional invasion of property
rights. It goes without saying that petitioners themselves cannot ignore that one could,
consistently with the fundamental law, be deprived of his property as long as due process is
observed. The decision makes clear that such indeed was the case as far as this Ordinance was
concerned. To that aspect, a considerable portion of the opinion was devoted, citing a number of
applicable decisions of this Court, all tending to demonstrate that there was no due process
infraction. The Motion for reconsideration is conspicuously barren of any attempt to show that
under our previous decisions referred to, the challenged Ordinance could be successfully
assailed. It would follow then that this reiteration of an argument, previously shown to be far
from persuasive, is deserving of a similar fate.
That is all there is to the Motion for reconsideration. That and what Justice Cardozo aptly
referred to as reference to "grotesque or fanciful situations," which if they would arise could then
be appropriately dealt with. As the famed jurist aptly noted: "That they are conceivable though
improbable ought not to govern our construction."14 That is not the way then to impugn the
validity of an ordinance. Neither could it be rightfully looked upon as laying a foundation for
setting aside a decision. The Motion for reconsideration, to repeat, is palpably lacking in merit.
(1) No occasion for new trial.

Subsequently, a supplemental Motion for new trial dated September 25, 1967, was filed the same
day. As earlier pointed out, with the Motion for reconsideration having been shown to be devoid
of merit, the supplemental Motion for new trial should likewise be denied. In the main, what was
so unsuccessfully put forth by counsel for petitioners was adhered to. Additional counsel would
bring in new points, namely, the alleged denial of equal protection and the repugnancy to "the
laissez faire principle underlying our economic system, as it would substantially reduce return on
the investment." Neither suffices to justify any modification of the decision, much less its
reconsideration. A new trial would therefore be an exercise in futility.
The alleged denial of equal protection was predicated on the greater advantages that the motels
in the suburbs of Manila would enjoy as against those within the city limits. On its face, such
argument is clearly unfounded. If the legislative power of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila were not limited to its boundaries, if it could apply to the suburban area, then perhaps
plausibility could be imparted to such a claim. Since, as is undeniable, the challenged Ordinance
applies to all the motels in Manila, an assertion that there is denial of equal protection would, to
put it at its mildest, be extremely far-fetched.
Nor does the invocation of the laissez faire concept as bar against the enactment of regulatory
measures, which undoubtedly would result in the diminution of income and the loss of business,
occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of the decision arrived at by this Court with
controlling constitutional law principles. Did not petitioners take note of the view announced by
Justice Laurel quoted in the decision to the effect that the policy "of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest." The decision likewise cited this jurist,
speaking for the Court in Calalang v. Williams:15 "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Perhaps and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure, the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state. . . . To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated." That was in 1940. Then in 1955, came Co Kiam v. City of Manila,16
where Justice Reyes, A., for a unanimous Court categorically declared: "And surely, the mere
fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a
particular mode of earning a living can not prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said
in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be
affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power. (City of New Orleans v.
Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417)."
Nor does the reference by new counsel to American state court decisions call for a different
conclusion. The United States Supreme Court in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,17 decided in 1943, was equally explicit, saying "the laissez-faire concept

or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social

advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through
expanded and strengthened governmental controls." Two names of great repute, Freund and
Learned Hand, were cited by petitioners. Neither if properly understood, could help their cause at
all. According to Freund: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect, when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers'
judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption
of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values
within the due process clause."18 The illustrious Learned Hand writing on Chief Justice Stone's
concept of the judicial function had occasion to note the "discredited attitude" of what he referred
to "as the old apostles of the institution of property. . . ."19
What then is left? Clearly nothing to call for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967.
Nor is there the least justification for a new trial and reception of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for reconsideration of petitioners of September 16, 1967 and
supplemental Motion for new trial of September 25, 1967, are denied.

G.R. No. L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL

DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and
void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being
a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del
Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and
to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par.
1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities,
regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and
representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June
13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on
June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor
of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact
insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila
or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would

impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the
room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as
to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that
a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of
such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and
the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying
motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a
conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a
dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack
of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the
penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would,
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ
of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance
No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel
or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of
its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the

petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable
relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the
police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the
assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent
Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and
Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both
with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of
Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then
the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances
of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its
4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted
with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license
fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City
of Manila.1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on
the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of
conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v.
Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted
point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks
later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what
was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American
authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed:
"The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the
Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It
does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed
upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City
of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No.
4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made
permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain
him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in
both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action
of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with
all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not

the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to
declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable
and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute."
No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as
being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation
of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from
such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power
which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself
to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the
genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga
included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels,
which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then
proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a
lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the
kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income
of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a
license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other
than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting
any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where
opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise
of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the
life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by
the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to
the question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of
legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not
outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason
drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and
what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted

deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City
of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth,
none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of
deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to
single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of
freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter,
first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500
yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could
be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the
regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22
As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful
occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the
determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of
privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of
liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's
police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing
authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so
levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in
imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is
given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator
of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of
this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the
ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they

can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community
may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent
the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark
in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that
power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel,
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to
curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be
unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out
by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law
for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the
public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium,
which means peace and order and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking
the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that
what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed
and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a
guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or
entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a
restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be
charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be
asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness
or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33
to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles
so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the
appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith.
With costs.

G.R. No. L-65848 May 24, 1985

HERNANDO C. LAYNO, SR., petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
THE HONORABLE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
Cecilio L. Pe for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 1
suspending from office any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under such statute, is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence. 2 Petitioner Hernando Layno Sr.. is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur. He was accused in an information filed by respondent
Tanodbayan "of grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his
official and/or administrative duties" for "knowing fully well that he has no authority," he
suspended and prohibited Vice-Mayor Bernardita Resus and three Sangguniang Bayan
members 3 from participating and exercising their official functions" as such thus causing
them injury "consisting of the salaries due to said officials not [being] received by them."
4

The information against petitioner was filed by respondent Tanodbayan with respondent
Sandiganbayan on May 17, 1983. 5 He was charged with violating paragraph (e),
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. 6 Petitioner was then arraigned on
October 3, 1983, and he pleaded not guilty. 7 There was earlier submitted as far back as
August, 1983 with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. 8
Notwithstanding petitioner's opposition to such motion, respondent Sandiganbayan
suspended him on October 26, 1983. 9 Accordingly, on October 3, 4 and 5, 1983,
respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings and received evidence of the
prosecution. 10 It was further alleged that respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
set the case for further hearings on January 11, 12, and 13, 1984. 11

In the resolution issued by this Court on January 5, 1984, respondents were required to
file an answer within ten days from notice. That was done. There was on the whole
admission that the facts were as alleged. Respondents denied, however, that the law is
as set forth in the petition. More specifically, it was asserted that the order of the
Sandiganbayan "suspending petitioner pendente lite does not violate the latter's
constitutional right to be presumed innocent." 12 Such a presumption "is a guaranty that
no person shall be convicted of a crime except upon his guilt [being] established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt." 13 Accordingly, such suspension "does not impair
petitioner's foregoing constitutional right since the same is not a penalty or a criminal
punishment, because it was not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction or as
a result of judicial proceeding." 14 Further: "The suspension is merely a precautionary or
preventive measure issued even before the case is tried on its merits, purposely to
ensure the fair and just trial of the case." 15
The plea for restraining order was not granted by this Court. Thereafter the memoranda
by both parties were submitted. Before a decision could be rendered on the merits,
there was an urgent motion to lift the order of suspension filed on February 13, 1985
stressing the need for a resolution of such question. This Court, after dealing on such
motion as wen as on the merits of the case, is of the view that this petition need not be
resolved by a ruling on the validity of the provision on mandatory suspension. It suffices
at this stage that this Court rules that there is an unconstitutional application of the
assailed provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
1. A succinct statement of the doctrine on unconstitutional application was set forth in
Pintacasi v. Court of Agrarian Relations 16 in these words: "A law may be valid and yet
susceptible to the charge of its being unconstitutionally applied." 17 This is one such
case.
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of
office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension
decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal
mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable
to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that
the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be
established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.

Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only
victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived
of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the
order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise
an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in
character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided
that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there
is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension
shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." 18 It may be
recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national
government officials. So it was held in the leafing case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive
Secretary. 19 According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of
respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges,
can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where
the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt
after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil
Service law." 20 Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could
be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly
established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution." 21 Clearly then, the policy
of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In
this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to
negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
4. Hence the conclusion reached by the Court as to the unconstitutional application of
the mandatory suspension as applied to petitioner in accordance with the circumstances
of this case.
WHEREFORE, this certiorari petition is granted and the preventive suspension imposed
on petitioner Hernando C. Layno, Sr. is set aside, thus enabling him to assume once
again the functions of municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, without prejudice to
the continuance of the trial of the pending case against him in the Sandiganbayan. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO
HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER
and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and
reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers
and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify
persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and
social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to
achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A
decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social
security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee
(IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the
System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as
members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office

Managing Director, National Computer Center.

Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as
secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to
the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated
by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social
Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics
Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press
Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead
agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information
dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and
use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be
sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular
reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of
this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen
Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,
1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO.
308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE,
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF
THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION. 2

Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A
JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE
CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3

We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to
the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More
specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of
public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails
A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature
for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the

respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System
(SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly
announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show
their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of
the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence
that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be
to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is allencompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking
domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between
the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute
laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the
exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a
stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative
power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and
unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant
of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative
body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to matters of general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. 14 The executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He

represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. 18 He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the
duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under
his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects
of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders. 23

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to

specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is
a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in
administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with
Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers
of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President,
Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book
VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative
Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and
offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the
national government budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by

administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code

covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization,
personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the
functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties
outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the allimportant freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates
the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under
A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will
refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is
thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his
rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of
administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to
make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of
administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear
directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its
scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general
policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not
an independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot
pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the

right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case
of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to
the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that
there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from
these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is
a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice,
Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional
invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has
come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of
the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and a totalitarian society."

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized
and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in
section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill
of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as
may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts
by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the
rights and liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
dwelling. 40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping

Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The
Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to
provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities
and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is
not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to
biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has
evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an
individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral
characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical
characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A
behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice
print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or
personal identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement
is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate
owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans
a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called
a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of
identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be
scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan.
Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the
retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51
Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically

analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The
latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found
that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution
pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute
to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science
fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of
fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in
encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is
noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its
coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O.
No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification
but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O.
No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of
the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual
must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic
services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge
formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be
gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation
that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name,
address and other basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that
hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again

said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information
gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data,
under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the
computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there
are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear
of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse,
manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may
interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave
dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most
graphic threats of the computer revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a
comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for
varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information
up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a privileged character
finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the
subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end
of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would
dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we
cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the
ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks
that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology

as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy

depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes
as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness
of the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings
and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69
The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of
reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the
reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical
inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer
technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its
provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and
regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives
the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID
System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data
furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No.
1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74 These laws,
however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether
they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the
National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another
reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of
privacy by using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O.
No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government
services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate
population data for development planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the
incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police
power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an
annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses,

did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a
statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed.
The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly
drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a
worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn.
And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will
give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will
not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational
for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not
act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests
and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach
is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human
rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean
towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen,
the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State
of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of
all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New
York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify parties
obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized
medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of
Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might
decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be
readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may
stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest
in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute
did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found
that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize
the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of
an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially
appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the

statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate
disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering,
storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the
data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its
violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy
was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308
lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per
se agains the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit
data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency
which both government and private industry seek. Many information system in different
countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objective, such as
better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of
credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of
financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good
administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have
to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has
revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the
concept of cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual, armed
only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of
information from libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It
merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law
or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.
The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic disctinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute
state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity
and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society
has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In

modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 87

IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.
The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power
to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note
of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone
will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the
threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity
to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the
right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null
and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171396

May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY

L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI,
ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171409

May 3, 2006

NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR
GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171485

May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO,

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S.
HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO
B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE
ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR,
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS
FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.,
SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA,
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171483

May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C.

LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO
C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN
CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE
PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171400

May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA,
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171489

May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE

AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III,
MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO
V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO
SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171424

May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTORGENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, Respondents.
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.1
Superior strength the use of force cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts
should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their
liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In
cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in
favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws
and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against
their constitutional validity."2
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected
by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the
Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny,
with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?3
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President.
. . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article
12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme
Right, represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic
Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic
conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May
2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain
segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance
including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in
government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme
Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine
State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of
the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral
effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine
State and of the Filipino people;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State
and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of
the national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance,
including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the
government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right
the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral

effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State
and of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of
National Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested
in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-inChief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February
24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and
men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and
after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No.
1021 which reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national
emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were
issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and
to undertake such action as may be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts
lawless violence and rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust
or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts
leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from
petitioners counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He
emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While
he explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation,
however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento,
Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the
Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public
statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the
people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our
disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left
arms." 5
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which
detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni
Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet
members and President Arroyo herself.6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo
decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a
bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings
between members of the Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder,
audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt.
San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006,
the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the
PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF
Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly
obeyed and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of
responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory
Aquinos brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down
the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon,
longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if President
Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen.
Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for
the planned movement against Arroyo."8

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso
Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of
soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo
protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way
they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to
join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his
Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim
and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the
military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key
officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and
revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year
of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to
weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it."9
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North
Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are
growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers
and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He claimed
that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political
parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that
the Presidents ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3)
soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests.10
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several
cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed
both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command
remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might
break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National
Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the
permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales
stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of

destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that

"warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed,
groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor
Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with
the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site
were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used
truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching
groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the
protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and
EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held
along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.12
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the
dispersal of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner
Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp
Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper;
while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the
premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a strong
presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in
bringing down this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any media
organization that would not follow "standards set by the government during the state of national
emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the
standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not
subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a
takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and
radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national
emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events
surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not
hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media
coverage when the national security is threatened.14

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the
Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in
Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that
the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime,
had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they
could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and
detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a
public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art,
were taken into custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was
arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias,
Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael
Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza.
Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City.
Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5"
decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran,
Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these
petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1)
it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc.
challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or
"prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon,
hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the
issuance of PP 1017.

In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and
twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of
expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely
abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of
the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."
In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to
enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom
of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16
2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the
Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an
"arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming
that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an
exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition,
petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as
defined under the Revised Administrative Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate
rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public
concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she
stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions
should be dismissed for being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424
(Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no
legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate
the peoples right to free expression and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above
interlocking issues which may be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483
(KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
I- Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial
review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple
foundation -The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all
political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the
government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some
authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to
vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This
power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial
review.22
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."23
Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must
be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the
decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.24
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our
discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending

that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyos issuance of
PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.27
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions
moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers,
according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues
that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is
not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative."30
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction
over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics
interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and
of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and
in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.
Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they
failed to take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may
still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this
exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative
to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In
private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "realparty-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he
has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
"citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public
actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the
plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is
but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in
People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the
real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that
a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and
a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent
"direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.43 The same Court
ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result
of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members
of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera
doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,45 Manila
Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and
Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers

Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted
the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v.
Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching
implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had
no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.51
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct
injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance."
Pertinent are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of
the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural
resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with
locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the
transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing
requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the
parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file
suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the
exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the
cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be
relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal
standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples
organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line
lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it
cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue
as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court
reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving
constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act."
In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to
its leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members
of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of
rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their
legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society,
the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond
doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune
Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful
search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General
does not question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative
powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary
whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of
justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the
attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60
Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of
the laws.

In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful
assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted
standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement
by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies
following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury
which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP
No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that
the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the
transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as
there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former
Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her
prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is
a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement
of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has
pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance.
She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But
considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax
the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality
doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5
is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase
Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this
Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
"transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of
his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes
the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many
great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the

operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable
to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people68 but he may be removed
from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.69
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for
President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon
v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining
"political questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."75 Barcelon and
Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has
arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts.
Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the
conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order
to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it
shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, "under which the President is
supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law,
and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the
unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost
evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political
or justiciable question.78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It
declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or
national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the
nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to
his conscience, the People, and God."79
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at
bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents "callingout" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of
1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power,
the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a

broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.81 It
speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test
that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision
is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that
"it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of
factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court
cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP
1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine
Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that
the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply
fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of
emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an
adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of
prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law
enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of
action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative
"power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the
law and sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not
suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the
prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat,
suggesting that "the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they
have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85

Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes
of government in time of emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances,
may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the
ruin of the State
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to
suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their
preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and
suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general
will, and it clear that the peoples first intention is that the State shall not perish.86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he
termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to
rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed
duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.87
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from
condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of
a temporary dictatorship."88
Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited
government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized
and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra constitutional
measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if
the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under
that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law
provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it.89
Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the constitution
a regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and
controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining
a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with
effective constitutional restraints.90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency
by constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.91
Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the
defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect established institutions from
the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a
prompt return to the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key

elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance:

increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time "imposing
limitation upon that power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional
dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The period of
dictatorship must be relatively shortDictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in
characterFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must
never rest with the dictator himself"94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship
should be "strict political conservatism."
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of
concentrating power in a government where power has consciously been divided to cope
with situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of
powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how
long, and to what end."96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of
scheme of emergency powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by
constitutional means i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine
the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time
limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the
constitutional order."97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great
Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of
"constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.98 Like
Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the "constitutional
dictatorship," thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be
initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and
its constitutional order
2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of
the man or men who will constitute the dictator
3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific
provisions for its termination
4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the
government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements
5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure
altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .
6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should
never be permanent in character or effect

7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the

citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a
constitutional dictatorship. . .
9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one
should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for
which it was instituted
11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to
the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the
constitutional dictatorship99
Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers
than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or
termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional
investigating committees.100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience,
were one in saying that, "the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of
government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is not based
upon sound constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional
dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not
whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is
employed to embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used,
"constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of the
processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept of constitutionalism"
articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency
powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H.
McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations
upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural
limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose
adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted
that the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate
processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the
enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and
substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on
despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of
it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating
constitutionalism with "limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain
meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of

force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of
liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political
responsibility of government to the governed.101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists - from
Locks "theory of prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and,
eventually, to McIlwains "principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real
problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary
power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense
of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive
regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to
create a government in the concept of Justice Jacksons "balanced power structure."102 Executive,
legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of
power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check
upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the
language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably
demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief
Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed
procedural limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that
its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III
of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment
cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speechrelated conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. In United States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme Court held that "we have not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment"
(freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:

It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on
its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is,
at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional
rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure
speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that
PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is
obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not
before the Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to
some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts
carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications
on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor
that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to
examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to
petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v.
Harris,109 it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for

the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous
nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind
of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the
assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation
exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a
law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that
PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common
intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power

The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most
to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in
the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she
is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But
every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a
greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our
Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to
declare a "state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national
emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from
her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter
2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition
of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.
President Arroyos declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied
on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless,
without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial
Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that
what the President invoked was her calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called
upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the
emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will
in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."113
In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza,114 an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat
to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used
to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the
purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can
enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a
call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it
cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its
use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its
command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants;
(b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship;
and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is
merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her
in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President
is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to
it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming
office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the
Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the
President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief
of all the armed forces of the country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.119
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael
Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as
it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the
clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
\

Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it

was lifted120 from Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do
hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under
martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling
clause states: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling
clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the

departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance,

shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue
decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees
are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued
by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
the 1973 Constitution.121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state
of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that
these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call
the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family
and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency
under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all
decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued
PP 1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports
to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law"
thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was
President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary
of National Defense to take over "the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric
Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila
(and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort
to contain, solve and end the present national emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President
Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures
emergency powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can
be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but
also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend
that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national
emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the
existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together.
Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the
same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other.123
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate
to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some
provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants
this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the
aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in
Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a

number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting
in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an
expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take
possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.
This is a job for the nations lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that
grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the
Presidents power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the
Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President
is to execute. The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . ."126
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article
XII refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited
view of "emergency."
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the
degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit
in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.127 Emergencies, as
perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a
wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,128 b) natural
disaster,129 and c) national security.130
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of
nationwide proportions or effect.131 This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional
Commission, thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of "national emergency" which appears
in Section 13, page 5? It reads:
When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or
natural disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and
riots?
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency."

MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government
service.132
xxxxxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national
emergency or could this be economic emergency?"
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.
MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133
It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene
and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which
extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.
"x x x
After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation
of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its
defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of
men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they
share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.
The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the
time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United
States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions
of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we
regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no,
not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death
struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government,
in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing
PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business

affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that
military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our
history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and
the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights
suffered the greatest blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were
arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People
Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office.
Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization."
Again, the basis was PP 1017.
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members
were "turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to
celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they
resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal
acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be
abused and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose
and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP
1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to
command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is
nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or
violate the citizens constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its
implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the
statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a
mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of
situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing
them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen
in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders
are "acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his
subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and
regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who
receives them.139 They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their
source, and obedience, their object.140 For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be
valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the
Constitution, and which is invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the
phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a
law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.
In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism"
confronts not only our country, but the international community as well. The following
observations are quite apropos:
In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become
one of the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain
states and against groups operating internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of
terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not
always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.
The basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force as the
most recent by the United States against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of
terrorism.
Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by
states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.
The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One countrys terrorist is another countrys
freedom fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term

"terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation
movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed
Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who
controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing
those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach
a consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently,
but has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate "terrorism" with any violent
act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military
installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance
against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups
within a state is concerned.
The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the
contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs
and Muslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who are terrorists in the perception of India,
liberation fighters in that of Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua freedom fighters for the
United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen
(later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of
freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet
Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that
cannot be reconciled in any way because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of
those perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one
and the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these
striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in
the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a
given territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see
itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore
speak of a "liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are
concerned, and vice-versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of
terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each
and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard
to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital issue of
international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.
This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states and not of
peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become
even more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the

decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium
powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.141
The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part
of the police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a
drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and
immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their
part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining
the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated
January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is
entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for
Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the following
provision: "That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by
reclusion temporal x x x."
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws,
however, do not define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts
constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently,
there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking
over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly
to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far
beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of
the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is
unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts
beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the
limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."142 The plain import of the language
of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective

authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest.143
In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was
arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third,
he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and
booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by policemen who "held his head
and tried to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7)
hours; and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest.
During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts
with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was
the leader of the rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the
subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting
to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation
of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against
warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.
Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the
right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less

denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression,
the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned
upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of
course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place,
and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising
their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a
showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be
gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were
mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the
arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot
be made a crime, thus:
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings
cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and
peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons
assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a
conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or
other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly
and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the
members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done
merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local
government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing
that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens right to
exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed
acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits,
the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due
notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here,
petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.150 The first time
they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When
a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see
to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.

G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the
freedom of the press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute,
established the following: first, the Daily Tribunes offices were searched without
warrant;second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search
was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was
conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong presence,
to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing
down this government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow
the standards and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the
government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No.
1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald
Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of
the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend
the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during
times when the national security is threatened.151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps
in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in
the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime,
unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were
violated by the CIDG operatives.
Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of
Staff152 this Court held that -As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives
exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning
of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as
to disobey.153 Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions
because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a
constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on
public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the
Tribunes offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and
that the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus:
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the
Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to
get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken
from the Tribune?
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your
Honor, and these are inadmissible for any purpose.155
xxxxxxxxx
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get
those past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the morning and without any
search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to
sedition or what?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not
based on Proclamation 1017.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says
that the police could go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other
newspaper.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Is it based on any law?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature to say this,
we do not condone this. If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue
them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.156
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the
Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed
on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for,
as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their
responsibility.157
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and
"should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter."
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been
exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling

out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare
such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is
considered an integral part of this ponencia.
S U M M AT I O N
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would
have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still
operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no
guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been
media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1
rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the
parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional
aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court
also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with
public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting
as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP
1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take
only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally
defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.
While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the
military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out
this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1)
the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the
rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of
standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the
Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials,

are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid
provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been
individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action
and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due
process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights
are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic
without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a
democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity
from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing
political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises
without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal
limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision
in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not
yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless
arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that
these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles
for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

G.R. No. 121777

January 24, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large
scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces
the penalty imposed upon her.
The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an information
alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having previously
obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to
engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in
Singapore thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and
Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already
advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised
employment which did not materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in
the said sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to economic sabotage
in that the same were committed in large scale.1
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty2 to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin
Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration
is gathered from their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman
inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.
Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately
contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan
Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken.
Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and
pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he

was able to see around six (6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified
as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the
documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came
out with a bio-data form in hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. Also present
were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional Director of the PNPCIS for Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap
the illegal recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza pose as an applicant.3
On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin
Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National Police who was assigned as an investigator of
the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the report of illegal recruitment.
Accordingly, he, along with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The
two did not enter the house where the recruitment was supposedly being conducted, but
Fermindoza interviewed two people who informed them that some people do go inside the
house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt. Mendoza
who organized a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain
Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported scene at 9:30 that morning. There they
met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then proceeded to enter the house while the
rest of the team posted themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza was instructed to come
out after she was given a bio-data form, which will serve as the team's cue to enter the house.4
Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners
of the house, and went inside. There, she saw another woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming
out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier introduced herself told Jasmine that
Fermindoza was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a towel, told her
that she would just get dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked Fermindoza what position she
was applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a babysitter or any other work
so long as she could go abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that Fermindoza was an
applicant. Fermindoza asked Carol what the requirements were and whether she (Fermindoza)
was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a passport, she could fill up the application
papers. Fermindoza replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she need not worry since
Jasmine will prepare the passport for her. While filling up the application form, three women
who appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications and to

give their advance payment. Jasmine got their papers and put them on top of a small table.
Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to enter the
same. The owners granted permission after the raiding party introduced themselves as members
of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some supposed applicants. Application forms,
already filled up, were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she
had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt.
Mendoza nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was
holding as the raiding party seized the other papers5 on the table.6
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women
suspected to be applicants, to the office for investigation.7
In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases,
among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. The accused was not able to present any
authority to recruit when asked by the investigators.8 A check by Ramos with the POEA revealed
that the acused was not licensed or authorized to conduct recruitment.9 A certification10 dated
February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the
POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and
Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the Cabato Medical Hospital, who executed their
respective written statements.11
At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the
afternoon of January 30, 1994. Araneta had learned from Sandra Aquino, also a nurse at the
Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's house at around
4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit down. They listened to the "recruiter"
who was then talking to a number of people. The recruiter said that she was "recruiting" nurses
for Singapore. Araneta and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit
pictures and a transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be
salary deduction." Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not
give any money because she was "not yet sure."
On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro residence to
submit her transcript of records and her picture. She arrived at the house 30 minutes before the
raid but did not witness the arrest since she was at the porch when it happened.12

Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A
friend of Jasmine had informed her that there was someone recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon
arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by Jasmine.1wphi1.nt
Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she arrived. Carol
Figueroa asked if they would like a "good opportunity" since a hospital was hiring nurses. She
gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000
as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while
P30,000 will be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave
the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured Lourdes that she was authorized to receive
the money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes went back to the house to get back the
money. Jasmine gave back the money to Lourdes after the raid.13
Denial comprised the accused's defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman
from Cebu, the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the Grollier International Encyclopedia. They
own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to students.
The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to
Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the Philippines on October 20 of the
same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December 10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party
sponsored by the Zamboanga City Club Association. On that occasion, she met a certain Laleen
Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in Singapore for six (6)
years. Her employer is a certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then seriously ill.
Malicay was not sure, however, whether her father received the money so she requested the
accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She informed the accused that she had a
cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's telephone number,
address and a sketch of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to
Zamboanga City on January 23, 1994 to give some presents to her friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to
inform her that she would be going to her house. At around noon that day, the accused,
accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she found Jasmine

entertaining some friends. Jasmine came down with two of her friends whom she introduced as
her classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message regarding the money the latter had sent.
Jasmine assured her that they received the money, and asked Carol to tell Malicay to send more
money for medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told her that she would send something
for Malicay when the accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she just needed
to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting
with Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in the house
for only fifteen (15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to
confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to Cebu City. She then proceeded to Jasmine's residence, arriving
there at past 8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are you Carol from Singapore?" The
accused, in turn, asked the woman if she could do anything for her. The woman inquired from
Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining that she was there just to say
goodbye to Jasmine. The woman further asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the
woman) were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol
was talking with then stood up and went out. A minute after, three (3) members of the CIS and a
POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a member of the CIS and informed her
that they received a call that she was recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman
from the CIS. She denied this, and said that she came only to say goodbye to the occupants of the
house, and to get whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed
them her ticket for Cebu City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and returned with some papers. The accused said
that those were the papers that Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine to give to her (the accused).
The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted to go home but could not find a
replacement, one of the applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told
the accused to explain in their office.
The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She
claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom she could confide since she
and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she
brought information sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect
P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing fee.14

The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.

The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first time only on
January 30, 1994 when the latter visited them to deliver Laleen Malicay's message regarding the
money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their
house for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol came back to the house a few days later on February 2 at
around 8:00 in the morning to "get the envelope for the candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did
not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused
conducted recruitment. She claimed she did not see Carol distribute bio-data or application forms
to job applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding the P2,000 application fee.15
The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused
stayed in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for four (4) days before her arrest,
although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he did not notice that she conducted
any recruitment.16
On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the
accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay
the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her
detention during the pendency of this case under the condition set forth in Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.17
The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B)
OF P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF POEA AND CIS
REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E]
ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF, SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY
PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION
3, (2) OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN
SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E]
ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE
THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING
THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED
BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED;
V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT
NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT
MARIA LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE
EXCULPATED;
VII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE
INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED

ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE
ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE
INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS COMMITTED NOT ON [sic]
LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE
IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THOSE EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO
AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,]
ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA;
X
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT EVEN A
SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID NOT SUFFER
DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER
ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.18
In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment and placement"
violates due process. Appellant also avers, as part of her sixth assigned error, that she was denied
the equal protection of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and placement" is
void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.19
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.20 A
criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary
and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness.21 The constitutional vice in a vague or

indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature
of which he is given no fair warning.22
We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario:23
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
We added, however, that:
x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by
either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying
to persons passing by." Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one
may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.'"
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is
evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in
imprecise languagebut which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively
phrasedin which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment activities are
punishable as follows:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this
Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance
with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any
provision of this Title or its implementing rules and regulations, shall upon conviction
thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years or a fine of not less
than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the
discretion of the court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found
violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon
conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor
more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both
such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invokes People
vs. Panis,24 where this Court, to use appellant's term, "criticized" the definition of "recruitment
and placement" as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack
of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor

Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be, and
sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The
not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and,
as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background
facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision," appellant
asks, what more "the ordinary citizen" who does not possess the "necessary [legal] knowledge?"
Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute "recruitment and placement" suffer from
overbreadth since by merely "referring" a person for employment, a person may be convicted of
illegal recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.
Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the
proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only "whenever
two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee." The
Court held in the negative, explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with
two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is
made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute
recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely
lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer
of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them
shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be
deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example,
regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property
entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put them to
personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the

instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a
disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack
of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor
Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be, and
sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The
not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and,
as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background
facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against
illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better
life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of
their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own
countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above
out of context. The Court, in Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed
light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was
able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law
and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a
"perfectly vague act" whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely
couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for
vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only
upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any
reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot
pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of
uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An
Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate
means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can
devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within
the reach of those intrusted therewith."25
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless
acts such as " labor or employment referral" ("referring" an applicant, according to appellant, for
employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant
misapprehends concept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual
freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion.
A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally
punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the
boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute.26
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,27 for instance, we struck down as void for
overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place including
private vehicles other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held
that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property
but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in
Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and,
hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what
constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of "recruitment and
placement" that would render the same constitutionally overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause28 in her defense. She points out that although
the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even
received Lourdes Modesto's payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro,
on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution
discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro
is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of the statute under
challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.29 Though the law
itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.30
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is
not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.31 Where the official action purports to
be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the
statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.32 The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face,
resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of
equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful

discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class
or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over
another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not
presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination."33 Appellant
has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional
discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment whether the
evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense.34 The
presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,35 and this
presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed,
appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that
appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the
guilty party in appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the
prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does
not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable,
for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with
impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the
exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to
all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to
demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.36
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be
converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the
district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged
with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown.37
We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of which involve the finding of
guilt by the trial court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code.38 In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element

is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.39
In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay
states that appellant is not licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement
under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that
appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate each other on
material points: the briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees
involved. Appellant has not shown that these witnesses were incited by any motive to testify
falsely against her. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal
witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper motive existed and that
their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.40
Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses.
Affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides
negative testimony.41
That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no
moment. From the language of the statute, the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it
suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for
illegal recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do from credible witnesses, meet the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed recruitment and placement.
We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve into the second and third assigned errors assailing
the legality of appellant's arrest and the seizure of the application forms. A warrantless arrest,
when unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto and the articles so
seized are rendered inadmissible in evidence.42 Here, even if the documents seized were deemed
inadmissible, her conviction would stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth assigned error
that Erlie Ramos of the POEA supposedly "planted" the application forms. She also assails his
character, alleging that he passed himself off as a lawyer, although this was denied by Ramos.
The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove.43 Apart from her self-serving
testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she was indeed framed by Ramos. She has
not even hinted at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary.44

Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an
activity constituting recruitment and placement are present, appellant, at the very least, is liable
for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? We find
that she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal
recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group.45 In this case, only two
persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person
named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not
presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is
necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three
or more persons.46 In this case, evidence that appellant likewise promised her employment for a
fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta,
who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that they
(she and her "friends") filled up application forms.
The affidavit47 Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support Araneta's testimony. The
affidavit was neither identified, nor its contents affirmed, by Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove
that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible.48 In any case,
hearsay evidence, such as the said affidavit, has little probative value.49
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other
persons present in the briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is accused of recruiting only the
three persons named in the information Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The information does not
include Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as among those promised or
offered employment for a fee. To convict appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons
other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate
her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.50
In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza,
respectively, was limited as follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the oral testimony of the witness, as one of
those recruited by the accused, and also to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution and as well as to identify the accused.51
xxx

FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the
fact about her recruitment by the accused and immediately before the recruitment,
as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution, and also the accused in
this case, Your Honor.52
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was
connected with the CIS, that she was instructed together with a companion to
conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal recruitment was supposed to
be going on, that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the
truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the accused, as well as
to identify some exhibits for the prosecution.53
xxx
Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered,54 and the
purpose of the offer of their testimonies did not include the proving of the purported recruitment
of other supposed applicants by appellant.
Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the information is fatally defective since it
charges her with committing illegal recruitment in large scale on January 30, 1994 while the
prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she committed the crime on February 2, 1994.
We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date of the commission of the crime
does not vary from that charged in the information. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto
testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro residence, appellant offered them
employment for a fee. Thus, while the arrest was effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime
had already been committed three (3) days earlier on January 30, 1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment
imposed by the trial court as well as the constitutionality of the law prescribing the same,
appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being unduly harsh.55 Section 19 (1), Article III of
the Constitution states: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted."
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because the
prosecution was able to prove that appellant committed recruitment and placement against two

persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, which requires that
recruitment be committed against three or more persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two
counts of "simple" illegal recruitment, one for that committed against Nancy Araneta, and
another count for that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each
count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error, which assumes that the proper
imposable penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby
declared guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is sentenced, for each count, to suffer
the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169364

September 18, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA,
Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo painted,
or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well
that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did
his job well.
Martin Luther King, Jr.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order1 of Branch 11, Davao
City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents Petition
for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code
unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant
to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18,
2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to
Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any
visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.2
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to
work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping
or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and
those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code,
shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another
without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in
its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to
2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to

Quash3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed
respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also
declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States police power and justified
by the Latin maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex," which calls for the subordination of
individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on
police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power "as the power of promoting
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." (Citations omitted).
In fact the persons acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the police power of the state. The
justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex" (the god of the people
is the Supreme Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the
greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA
with Annex "A" lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the
reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other
women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer. Thus, on
that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the interest of
substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the
prosecution proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the
accused in the indictment cant be categorized as a crime.5
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay
Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area
reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the
prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the
evidence.1avvphi1
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City,6 directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law,
claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being
vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime
includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They
likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution
because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Courts ruling
in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech

cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and
constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared
unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners
Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the subject criminal cases
against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.8
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it
violated the equal protection clause. It held that the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally
applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,9
where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
the United States, the trial court ruled:
The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance
are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found loitering about public or
semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without
visible means of support" offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should
be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of
recession when there are many who are "without visible means of support" not by reason of
choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the entire
country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the
fact that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.10
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, the trial court declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs
afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification
between those covered by the law and those who are not.

Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or
inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case
offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised
Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who
have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about
and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial
scrutiny of its constitutionality.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE12
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are
not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the
presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by
the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public
welfare in the exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionallyguaranteed rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process
vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to
declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of
constitutionality was adequately overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature
and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police
power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and
lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged.14 However, in exercising its
power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with
reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable
rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid.15 This requirement has come to be
known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily

guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."16
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application of the void-forvagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring
to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be
deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should
be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189
the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering
provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for
judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.18
The first statute punishing vagrancy Act No. 519 was modeled after American vagrancy
statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870
which was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on
vagrancy.19 While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on
vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal
Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to
work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and
those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code,
shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another
without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in
its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to
2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person
found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about
the country or the streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on the
second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as "every person found
loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support." The second clause was essentially retained with the
modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in
general terms public or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support
mainly from the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville20 case,
which in essence declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the
offending conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391;
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the
field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow
category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337;
United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S.
1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted
to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding
of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the
vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws
v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally
innocent. "Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one
night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the
ordinance describes it, "common night walkers." We know, however, from experience that
sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.

Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was a
national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in
Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and
Vachel Lindsay. The qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for
innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served" would literally embrace
many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or
loiterers may be "casing" a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family
matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for
numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have
known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten
amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and
self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and
have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have
encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those
convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the
magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for
almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and
convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate solution."
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice
given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of
the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancytype law as offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes, though long common in Russia, are
not compatible with our constitutional system.

xxxx
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where
liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to
become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these
generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the bud -- is too extravagant to
deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they
are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality
and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of
justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law,
evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great
mucilage that holds society together.21
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance "fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute;" and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory
law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2)
in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application
here because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal
conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule
that admits of exceptions.23
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific
provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville
Ordinance Code 257) provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons
who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers,
thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons,
keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons,
persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses
of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able
to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed
vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D
offenses.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because
such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are
otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities
not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) "any person found loitering about
public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the
streets without visible means of support" from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object." But
these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by "without visible means of
support" while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling "without any lawful
purpose or object," which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent
acts."
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.24 Thus, as with any other act or offense, the
requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that
may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating
Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered
discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged
by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but
more than suspicion or possibility.25
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain
of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest.26
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their
houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an
impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and
sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents
him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the
most unhappy in some measure agreeable.27

As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting
previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies
the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by
respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their
case.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the
constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the
streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car"
boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals
performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and
parks have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and
battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking
people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled if not killed by the scourge of the streets.
Blue collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs
(automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit publicly their
mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by
are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are
stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and
snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by
conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester and
panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers and
citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or
night.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or
else we can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid
the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in
them.
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws
were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human
society. These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also
come to be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens quality of life, which is
guaranteed by our Constitution.28 Civilly, they are covered by the "abuse of rights" doctrine
embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end,
in part, that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.29 This
provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to embody
certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order."30

In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal
disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to
the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to
assert their claims.31 Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious
to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without
committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.32
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public indecencies and
immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by
their offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of
the people of society. For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a
public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be abated.33 As a matter of public policy,
the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return
said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.34
Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a community.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against
the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as
for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to
endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or
unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a
public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time
which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to
the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should
train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives
difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning,
dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize lawabiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugbysniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for
customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants.
Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous
groups wander around, casing homes and establishments for their next hit. The streets must be
made safe once more. Though a mans house is his castle,35 outside on the streets, the king is fair
game.

The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.

Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be
presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is
elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in
mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor
of its constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions
and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the
acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.37
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast
and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals,
and the general welfare.38 As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be
viewed in a constitutional light.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2
of the Revised Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.
No costs.

G.R. No. L-11390

March 26, 1918

EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng,
defendant-appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a
mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in
question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio
Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon

March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per
centum per annum, payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage
at that time estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about
P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor,
he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon
January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was
necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by
publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was
accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of
the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in
a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last
place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made
pursuant to the following provision contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known,
the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by
the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his
place of residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however,
among the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo
Chan y Garcia, an employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had
deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the
summons, and the order of the court directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from the
postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as
the receipt purports to show that the letter emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having
appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had
been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having been given
mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to
P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant
should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to
the satisfaction of the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to
satisfy the judgment within such period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila
should be exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order was never made; and
upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon July 30,

1908, and the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200. Upon August 7,
1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a
motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the
court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3,
1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set
forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of
the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from
this action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
has appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to the
action of the court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be
the sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the
purpose of argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order
of the court in the matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in
Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary
jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether
those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to
the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the
litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may
entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over
the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the

law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions
of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter
case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken
into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in
attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration
of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title
of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner,
to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the
petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem
yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its
narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty
wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the
proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the
defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way
thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known treaties, has
said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon
seizure; they treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification abovementioned, they are substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled
hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the enforcement of the lien against the res; in
the common law, they would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional
conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so, in
both, the suit is real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial
recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings
In Rem. sec. 607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however,

does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem;
and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of attachment,
concerning which the Supreme Court of the United States has used the following language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added
incident, that the property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to
answer to any demand which may be established against the defendant by the final
judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of
process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only
effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the defendant which
the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary
seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case
the lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to
subject the property to that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or
statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in
the manner provided by law precisely as though the property had been seized upon attachment.
(Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that
in an attachment the property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, while in the
foreclosure suit it is not taken into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not
materially affect the fundamental principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here
exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage
foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from
the statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the
cause of action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the
defendant or by the personal service of process upon him within the territory where the process is
valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the
personal process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction
over the person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is
the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the
jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it
possesses over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the
property, considered as the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based upon the following
conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that

the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into
custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An
obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be
enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative to the
foreclosure proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and
submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is
derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person
is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to
such as can be enforced against the property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are many
expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires
personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not
the case. In truth the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be
acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the American courts
until after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and
of other decisions which have subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the
proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by publication and notice is
no longer open to question; and it is now fully established that a personal judgment upon
constructive or substituted service against a nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid.
This doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by
publication and personal service outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered;
and the only exception seems to be found in the case where the nonresident defendant has
expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A.
[N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from
the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law
requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process
within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the
question of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United
States on this point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is
binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the
state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L.
ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an

action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected
exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs.
Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below offends
against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact entered a
personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by
the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all
cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This
step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was
entered contains the following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, is indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco
Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc.,
etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a
compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence
of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment
against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold
and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of
the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in
Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for
in our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by
any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that many
reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of
publication or notice in a case of this kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and
the court is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology
was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the analogy between service by the
publication and personal service of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been
suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal
effects of the two forms of service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of
expression which had already been molded into legal tradition before that case was decided have

been brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here involved is not
effected by the peculiar language in which the courts have expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the
proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was
secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed.
(Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions involving the application of the
constitutional provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme Court of the United States
has refrained from attempting to define with precision the meaning of that expression, the reason
being that the idea expressed therein is applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make
any attempt ay precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding,
however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must
be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we
observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner,
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in
addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a
means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect
it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguish master of constitutional law has used the
following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is
rather from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for
a hearing shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that
form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may
never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as
upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the
provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of

notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is
known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of
this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification
which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in
some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he
fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually
been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. (6
R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive
notice, then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations,
without either force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the
court, no personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate upon the
property, then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result would be
that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident. Such a result
would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other
form of notice against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the
publication of notice in the newspaper it may be stated that strict compliance with the
requirements of the law has been held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove
etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where newspaper publication was made
for 19 weeks, when the statute required 20, the publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail, the
requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of
the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We
consider this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the
principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged
property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible
failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the
mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it

should reach its destination and be delivered to him. This idea seems to be strengthened by the
consideration that placing upon the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail, the performance of
that act is put effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is
obvious that so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as relates to the sending of
notice by mail was complied with when the court made the order. The question as to what may
be the consequences of the failure of the record to show the proof of compliance with that
requirement will be discussed by us further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a
denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not
avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the
only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was
absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether
it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In
the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court
either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be
considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the
conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the
application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so
rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is
an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper,
it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that
in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes
of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the
exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think
that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the
clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and
(2) that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a
consequence of these conclusions the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its
potency. It is still necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as a simple irregularity of
procedure; and it would be idle to pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave
enough. From this point of view, however, it is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment
on the ground of the irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was
prejudiced by that irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be required of the proponent of such
a motion is to show that he had a good defense against the action to foreclose the mortgage.

Nothing of the kind is, however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which
accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the
proceedings is usually required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the
relief is sought, and in addition to this showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held
that a general statement that a party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The
necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its face a showing of the
existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this
connection we quote the following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of
publication:
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if
permitted to stand on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi
equitable powers to vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was
entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends of justice, and where it appears that the
party making the application is himself without fault and has acted in good faith and with
ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed
sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled.
Something is due to the finality of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is
fatal to motions of this character, since courts are always reluctant to interfere with
judgments, and especially where they have been executed or satisfied. The moving party
has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively the court will
not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L., 694, 695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died
January 29, 1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far back in
1906; and the proceedings in the foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the
sale dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to suppose that a man
who had placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from
the scene of his life activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long
remained in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold,
even supposing that he had no knowledge of those proceedings while they were being conducted.
It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of things that he should have acquired information
as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of this rational assumption
we are authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that he did have, or soon
acquired, information as to the sale of his property.

The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that things
have happened according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of
a situation more appropriate than this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver.
In support of this presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to consider the
probability that the defendant may have received actual notice of these proceedings from the
unofficial notice addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's
attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of the wellknown skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery of letters defectively
addressed, we think the presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the defendant,
there being no proof that it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was
delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability that the
recipient was a person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents
to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon
the mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be
idle and frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety
of applying to this situation the legal presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that
presumption, supported by the circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the
conclusion that the defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the
obligation which he had placed upon it; that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to
him; and that he acquiesced in the consequences of those proceedings after they had been
accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear that the merit of this motion is, as we have
already stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in asking for relief. Nor is it an
adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an administrator who only qualified a
few months before this motion was made. No disability on the part of the defendant himself
existed from the time when the foreclosure was effected until his death; and we believe that the
delay in the appointment of the administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance
which is imputable to the parties in interest whoever they may have been. Of course if the minor
heirs had instituted an action in their own right to recover the property, it would have been
different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank
became the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that which
had been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this connection, it
appears that in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended
by the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the
effect that the value therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale
in case the debt should remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset
price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is

said in behalf of the appellant that when the bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200
it violated that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does
not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings.
(Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Espaol Filipino vs.
Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases here cited the property was
purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether
the same rule should be applied in a case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser
has apparently not been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this question need not
here be considered, since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing
for a price below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived from
the contract of mortgage; and as we have already demonstrated such a liability could not be the
subject of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference between the upset
price and the price at which in bought in the property, that liability remains unaffected by the
disposition which the court made of this case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such
an obligation can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment entered in the Court of First
Instance.
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the
action or that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may
be permitted to add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial
proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which
appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld.
The maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer,
afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in those
proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects are
adjudged potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the
property, for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and buying that title
which he has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept away through some occult and
not readily discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain foreclosure
proceedings on the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based
erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State. It was
held that this mistake did not affect the validity of the proceedings.

In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send the notice by post as
required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper
assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a legal
presumption that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which
presumption is not overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a
presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared
that there is a presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed." These
presumptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been
recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium. There
is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this
notice; and we think that strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should be
allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has
no control over the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business of the
clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no control over this officer, the litigant must
depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is
no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a
court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to
every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation
to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the
record is silent with respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could
have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The
Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to have
adjudged every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of the
owners; that the petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was
insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the
manner of sale, were within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that all the
provisions of the law as to notices which are directory to the administrators have been
complied with. . . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on which
any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially
does all this apply after long lapse of time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive
discussion in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to
foreclose a mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that
publication should be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also be posted at the

front door of the court house and be published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service,
in such church as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a
nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of
the proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files of an
ancient periodical that publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but no proof
was offered to show the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front
door of the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment of the court was
void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore every
presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. .
. . It is to be presumed that the court before making its decree took care of to see that its
order for constructive service, on which its right to make the decree depended, had been
obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral , or indirect attack,
while in the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief against
it. The same general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of
general jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack the only difference being
that in case of indirect attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the record
affirmatively shows it to be void, while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its
validity may in certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the
knowledge that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to
support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that
there ought to be found among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as required by section
400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and
no such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very
purpose of the law in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior
judgment in the face of such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is
void because the proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call the record, the
result would be that in the future every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now
before us would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit among the
papers and would be liable at any moment to be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of
paper. We think that no court, with a proper regard for the security of judicial proceedings and
for the interests which have by law been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a
conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case of this kind is to hold that the legal
presumption that the clerk performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence from
the record of the proper proof of that fact.

In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the
Philippine Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the
collective mass of papers which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a case and
which are finally deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It
is a matter of general information that no judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly
kept in our courts for the purpose of recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in actions
which have been terminated; and in particular, no such record is kept in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which
directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but this provision has, as a matter of
common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we do not have
the assistance of the recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this
judgment and as already stated the question must be determined by examining the papers
contained in the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing
that upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at
Manila, Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court
failed in his duty and that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail, he
relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that this is by any means a necessary
inference. Of course if it had affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to
comply with this order and had directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed
it to Amoy, this would be conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of the
order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a
notification to the defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight basis for
supposing that the clerk may not have sent notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the
evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed
that there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than
stated. If, to give an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the summons was
served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that service was
also made at another place or in a different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a
person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was
made upon the defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97
U. S., 444, 449). While we believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the
case where the person making the return is the officer who is by law required to make the return,
we do not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, the affidavit was made
by a person who, so far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the cause is
admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the

judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will
be renewed, proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not
been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being permitted to
interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end
that the litigation may again resume its regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the
authority of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the
litigation in the same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal
representative from the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through
his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That application
thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same
Code. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as
follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party
thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally
adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a
hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first
learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and
praying to have judgment set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the
remedy provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other
means recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause,
procure a judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it
contains provisions describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of
such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and
concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is
declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are
exclusive of all others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has
been once concluded.

The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these
provisions; and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot
suppose that this proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear
that, if based on such an error, the came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we
have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of jurisdiction
over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is
a nullity it can be attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its
face, that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be
something in this. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the
alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment
could be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party
aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under
accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in
such case, after the time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an
action to enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already
been disposed of he may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an
appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken without due process, the law
concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have been
void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original
proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure
defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for
this court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under conditions different from those defined
by law. Upon the point of procedure here involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison
(84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse
of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases, after the
lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the
lapse of such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for
that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted
taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error,
and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a
result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not as simple as
that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the
petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has

been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in authority.
This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular
support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally
heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the
electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition
candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments
were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to
question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private
respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already
indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos,
was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the
assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was
possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the
February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present
government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their
separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the
legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot
grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also
for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that
elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration of
the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters,
falsified returns, and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular
will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the
sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human
lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the
barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that
also elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of
elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as
demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of
the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition
leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with
fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of
the Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of
record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the
electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active
step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest
elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve
massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its
transparent bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition
candidates without recourse except only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the
election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the
impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the

petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress,
threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the municipalities of Caluya,
Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the petitioner
claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in
cement bags or Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend
the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the
same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. 4 On
certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime
Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that
he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused. 7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election
cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving

members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en

banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided
within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have
arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous and some of the pleadings
are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession
of the law-despite all the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and
considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.
The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid
because all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to
insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The
respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en
banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of
the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible
distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his
contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the
private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly
heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3.
The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission
under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, 9 not its
authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the
same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have
himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when the
petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private
respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no Member of the Batasang
Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined by
the Commission on Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding
election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general
rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement
would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed
as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All

matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division
of the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the
proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its
administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could
be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated
otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its
divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the
Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way,
the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do,
i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the
Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases
involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including preproclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise
first administrative and then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc,
its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was
filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only
of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole,
granting to the division while denying to the banc. We do not think this was the intention
of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it
full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters
related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called
"pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having
been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978
Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be
the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions,
orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written
petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the

proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been

made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of
public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal
from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not
have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was
adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the
electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and
to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative
and the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2)
was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a
contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971,
which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being
drafted, election contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any
voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was
himself not claiming the office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should
receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the
Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the
term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to
an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the
contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given
a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and
Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary
to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the
listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of
the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in
a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar
as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article

XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en
banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and
decided by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except
where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which
had to be heard and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases.
Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc
only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are
all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many
unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the
virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make
this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature,
could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care and
deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in
time the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in
the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric
victory because the term of his office would have already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation
question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission
en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power
embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act
for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the provision, which precisely
limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases
in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole
judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the
Commission A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc
would not meet the exacting standard of care and deliberation ordained by the
Constitution
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation
controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body sitting
en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs. Commission
on Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.

Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier
attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient
guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner
Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law
partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case,
denying he was biased. 14
Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at
the time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP
Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of
the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's
refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division
cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his
wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division
when it rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement,
we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The
litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the
other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and
the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the
law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible,
due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza.
For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a

lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial
conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote
for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null
and void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not
the least significant of which was the February revolution of "people power" that
dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive
nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by
assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared
with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself
has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the
Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without reason, to
send the recrds of this case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is
closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in
the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a
meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of
safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him.
Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting
obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the
barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier
nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his
race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of
dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very
real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and
Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice
Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel
Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in
the election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of
others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution
of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my
prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to see justice to my son
and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have not stopped praying that
the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."

That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of
the February revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the
oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new spirit
is now upon our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with
new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign
in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow with only his
conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be
won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can
do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly
say that the case is finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the
supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would
have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23,
1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:
Through their separate petitions for review, 1 Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta
(Tabuena and Peralta, for short) appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12,
1990, 2 as well as the Resolution dated December 20. 1991 3 denying reconsideration,
convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Tabuena
and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt Of having malversed the total
amount of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during
their incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager,
respectively, of MIAA, and were thus meted the following sentence:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 11758, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of
TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount malversed. He shall also
reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public
office,
(2) In Criminal Case No. 11759, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
minimum, and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of
TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount malversed. He shall also
reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public
office.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 11760, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as minimum and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and for each of them to pay separately a fine of FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000.00) the amount malversed. They shall also reimburse jointly and severally
the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000.00).
In addition, they shall both suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from
public office.

A co-accused of Tabuena and Peralta was Gerardo G. Dabao, then Assistant

General Manager of MIAA, has remained at large.
There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total
amount of P55 Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena

appears as the principal accused he being charged in all three (3) cases. The
amended informations in criminal case nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760 respectively read:
That on or about the 16th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in
the City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being then the General
Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being the
only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to
its board resolutions, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government,
take and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P25,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a manager's check for
said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's Savings
Account No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International
Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena would
personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding
obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned
manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both
accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 16th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in
the City of Pasay. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being then the General
Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being the
only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to
its board resolutions, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government,
take and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P25,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a manager.s check for
said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's Savings
Account No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International
Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena would
personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding
obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned
manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both
accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in
the City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta, both public officers, being then the General

Manager and Acting Manager, Financial Services Department, respectively, of the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds belonging to the
MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash
accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions, conspiring, confederating and
confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with
intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriate the amount of FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P5,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a manager's
check for said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against
MIAA's Savings Account No. 274-500- 354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila
International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused
Tabuena would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no
outstanding obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the abovementioned manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and
thereafter both accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential
antecedents:
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later,
Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a
Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS
Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction, to wit:
Office of the President
of the Philippines
Malacanang
January 8, 1986
MEMO TO: The General Manager
Manila International Airport Authority
You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction
Corporation, thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS
in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said Company mentioned in a
Memorandum of Minister Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985 and duly
approved by this Office on February 4, 1985.
Your immediate compliance is appreciated.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND
MARCOS. 4
The January 7, 1985 memorandum of then Minister of Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin
referred to in the MARCOS Memorandum, reads in full:

MEMORANDUM
For: The President
From: Minister Roberto V. Ongpin
Date: 7 January 1985
Subject: Approval of Supplemental Contracts and
Request for Partial Deferment of Repayment of PNCC's
Advances for MIA Development Project
May I request your approval of the attached recommendations of Minister Jesus S.
Hipolito for eight (8) supplemental contracts pertaining to the MIA Development Project
(MIADP) between the Bureau of Air Transport (BAT) and Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, as follows:
1. Supplemental Contract No. 12
Package Contract No. 2 P11,106,600.95
2. Supplemental Contract No. 13
5,758,961.52
3. Supplemental Contract No. 14
Package Contract No. 2 4,586,610.80
4. Supplemental Contract No. 15
1,699,862.69
5. Supplemental Contract No. 16
Package Contract No. 2 233,561.22
6. Supplemental Contract No. 17
Package Contract No. 2 8,821,731.08
7. Supplemental Contract No. 18
Package Contract No. 2 6,110,115.75
8. Supplemental Contract No. 3
Package Contract No. II 16,617,655.49
(xerox copies only; original memo was submitted to the Office of the
President on May 28, 1984)
In this connection, please be informed that Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), formerly CDCP, has accomplishment billings on the MIA Development Project
aggregating P98.4 million, inclusive of accomplishments for the aforecited contracts. In
accordance with contract provisions, outstanding advances totalling P93.9 million are to
be deducted from said billings which will leave a net amount due to PNCC of only P4.5
million.

At the same time, PNCC has potential escalation claims amounting to P99 million in the
following stages of approval/evaluation:
Approved by Price Escalation Committee
(PEC) but pended for lack of funds P1.9 million
Endorsed by project consultants and
currently being evaluated by PEC 30.7 million
Submitted by PNCC directly to PEC
and currently under evaluation 66.5 million

Total P99.1 million

There has been no funding allocation for any of the above escalation claims due to
budgetary constraints.
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet
residual amounts due to PNCC have not been paid, resulting in undue burden to PNCC
due to additional cost of money to service its obligations for this contract.
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending
escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's approval for a deferment of the
repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million corresponding to about 30%
of P99.1 million in escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.5 million has been officially
recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing MIA
Project funds. This amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC of P98.4
million over the undeferred portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9 million.
(Sgd.)
ROBER
TO V.
ONGPI
N
Minister
5

In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao
and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
The first withdrawal was made on January 10, 1986 for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed
by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of
MIAA funds, to issue a manager's check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed,
however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the
money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash were then placed in peerless
boxes and duffle bags, loaded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs.
Gimenez located at Aguado Street fronting Malacanang. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the
money received
Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25
Million, made on January 16, 1986.

The third and last withdrawal was made on January 31, 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's cosignatory to the letter- request for a manager's check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to
the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the
counting, the money was placed in two (2) peerless boxes which were loaded in the trunk of Tabuena's
car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez' office at Aguado Street. It was
only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received
from Tabuena. The receipt, dated January 30, 1986, reads:
Malacanang
Manila

January 30, 1986

RECEIVED FROM LOUIE TABUENA THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FIFTY FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P55,000,000.00) as of the following dates:
Jan. 10 P 25,000,000.00
Jan. 16 25,000,000.00
Jan. 30 5,000,000.00
(Sgd.)
Fe RoaGimene
z
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of the
ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support
the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was
presented. Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate
Comptroller of PNCC, even affirmed in court that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the
months of January to June of 1986.
The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at the
time of the disbursement of the P55 Million. On the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and Peralta, in
short, was that they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the
MARCOS Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the President P55
Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he (Tabuena) was of the belief
that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC. Peralta for his part shared the same belief and so he heeded
the request of Tabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in the release of P5 Million.
With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their
conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors 6 committed by the Sandiganbayan
for this Court's consideration. It appears, however, that at the core of their plea that we acquit them are
the following:
1) the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended informations, and
2) they acted in good faith.
Anent the first proposition, Tabuena and Peralta stress that they were being charged with intentional
malversation, as the amended informations commonly allege that:

. . . accused . . . conspiring, confederating and other, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriated the
amount of . . . .
But it would appear that they were convicted of malversation by negligence. In this connection,
the Court's attention is directed to p. 17 of the December 20, 1991 Resolution (denying Tabuena's
and Peralta's motion for reconsideration) wherein the Sandiganbayan said:
xxx xxx xxx
On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that accused Tabuena delivered the P55
Million to people who were not entitled thereto, either as representatives of MIAA or of the
PNCC.
It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or
abandonment, some other person to take such public funds. Having done so, Tabuena,
by his own narration, has categorically demonstrated that he is guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of P55 Million of public funds. (Emphasis supplied.)
To support their theory that such variance is a reversible flaw, Tabuena and Peralta argue that:
1) While malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence, both modes cannot be committed
at the same time.
2) The Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to convict them of malversation of negligence where the
amended informations charged them with intentional malversation. 7
3) Their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be informed
of the accusation. 8
We do not agree with Tabuena and Peralta on this point. Illuminative and controlling is "Cabello v.
Sandiganbayan" 9 where the Court passed upon similar protestations raised by therein accused-petitioner
Cabello whose conviction for the same crime of malversation was affirmed, in this wise:
. . . even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case
of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under
the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation
would still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. . . .
In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., we held that an accused charged with willful or
intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in
Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor. G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995, but a distinct
crime in our Penal Code, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may
however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case.
Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the
parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible

the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely
failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real
claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges
acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent.
This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and
proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover; Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the
essential elements of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient
that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established to constitute
the crime proved. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly,
having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at
the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.
Subsequently, we ruled in People vs. Consigna, et. al., that the aforestated rationale and
arguments also apply to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with
willful malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to those involved in
the present case, can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation through
negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.
Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Thus, in the two (2) vintage,
but significantmalversation cases of "US v. Catolico" 10 and "US v. Elvina," 11 the Court stressed that:
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent.
The rule was reiterated in "People v. Pacana,"
documents and estafa:

12

although this case involved falsification of public

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent in
embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly
entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is
innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose. 13 The accused may thus always introduce evidence to
show he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to convert. 14 And this, to our mind,
Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously shown.
In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum
we are swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by
reason of such memorandum. From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that
would buttress his innocence of the crime of malversation.

First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably
Tabuena's superior the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised
control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. 15 In other words, Marcos had a say in
matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing
payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a
recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should
be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum.
Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." 16 The subordinate-superior relationship between
Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS
Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA)
to another (PNCC). However, the unlawfulness of the MARCOS Memorandum was being argued, on the
observation, for instance, that the Ongpin Memo referred to in the presidential directive reveals a liability
of only about P34.5 Million. The Sandiganbayan in this connection said:
Exhibits "2" and "2-a" (pages 1 and 2 of the memorandum of Min. Ongpin to the
President dated January 7, 1985) were mainly:
a.) for the approval of eight Supplemental Contracts; and
b.) a request for partial deferment of payment by PNCC for advances made for the MIAA
Development Project, while at the same time recognizing some of the PNCC's escalation
billings which would result in making payable to PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of
existing MIAA Project funds.
Thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of ifs
pending escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's
approval for a deferment of repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent
of P30 million corresponding to about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation
claims of PNCC, of which P32.6 million has been officially recognized by
MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million
out of existing MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess of
the gross billings of PNCC of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of
the repayment of advances of P63.9 million."
While Min. Ongpin may have, therefore recognized the escalation claims of the PNCC to
MIAA to the extent of P99.1 million (Exhibit 2a), a substantial portion thereof was still in
the stages of evaluation and approval, with only P32.6 million having been officially
recognized by the MIADP consultants.
If any payments were, therefore, due under this memo for Min. Ongpin (upon which
President Marcos' Memo was based) they would only be for a sum of up to P34.5 million.
17

xxx xxx xxx

V. Pres. Marcos' order to Tabuena dated January 8, 1986 baseless.

Not only was Pres. Marcos' Memo (Exhibit "1") for Tabuena to pay P55
million irrelevant, but it was actually baseless.
This is easy to see.
Exhibit "1" purports to refer itself to the Ongpin Memorandum (Exhibit
"2", "2-a"); Exhibit "1", however, speaks of P55 million to be paid to the
PNCC while Exhibit "2" authorized only P34.5 million. The order to
withdraw the amount of P55 million exceeded the approved payment of
P34.5 million by P20.5 million. Min. Ongpin's Memo of January 7, 1985
could not therefore serve as a basis for the President's order to withdraw
P55 million. 18
Granting this to be true, it will not nevertheless affect Tabuena's goad faith so as to make him
criminally liable. What is more significant to consider is that the MARCOS Memorandum is
patently legal (for on its face it directs payment of an outstanding liability) and that Tabuena acted
under the honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt and that it was just a
portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. This belief is supported by defense witness Francis Monera
who, on direct examination, testified that:
ATTY ANDRES
Q Can you please show us in this Exhibit "7" and "7-a" where it is
indicated the receivables from MIA as of December 31, 1985?
A As of December 31, 1985, the receivables from MIA is shown on page
2, marked as Exhibit "7-a", sir, P102,475.392.35
xxx xxx xxx 19
ATTY. ANDRES
Q Can you tell us, Mr. Witness, what these obligations represent?
WITNESS
A These obligations represent receivables on the basis of our billings to
MIA as contract-owner of the project that the Philippine National
Construction Corporation constructed. These are billings for escalation
mostly, sir.
Q What do you mean by escalation?
A Escalation is the component of our revenue billings to the contractowner that are supposed to take care of price increases, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 20
ATTY ANDRES

Q When you said these are accounts receivable, do I understand from

you that these are due and demandable?
A Yes, sir. 21
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its
illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in
good faith. 22 Such is the ruling in "Nassif v. People" 23 the facts of which, in brief, are as follows:
Accused was charged with falsification of commercial document. A mere employee of
R.J. Campos, he inserted in the commercial document alleged to have been falsified the
word "sold" by order of his principal. Had he known or suspected that his principal was
committing an improper act of falsification, he would be liable either as a co-principal or
as an accomplice. However, there being no malice on his part, he was exempted from
criminal liability as he was a mere employee following the orders of his principal. 24
Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the ordinary", did
not comply with certain auditing rules and regulations such as those pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to
wit:
a) [except for salaries and wages and for commutation of leaves] all disbursements above P1,000.00
should be made by check (Basic Guidelines for Internal Control dated January 31, 1977 issued by COA)
b) payment of all claims against the government had to be supported with complete documentation (Sec.
4, P.D. 1445, "State Auditing Code of the Philippines). In this connection, the Sandiganbayan observed
that:
There were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no bills
to support the disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of funds for
an unquestionably staggering sum of P55 Million. 25
c) failure to protest (Sec. 106, P.D. 1445)
But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the
luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact that the
MARCOS Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with the directive that he forward to
the President's Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape
responsibility for such omission. But since he was acting in good faith, his liability should only be
administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal. This follows the decision in "Villacorta v. People"
26
where the Court, in acquitting therein accused municipal treasurer of Pandan, Catanduanes of
malversation after finding that he incurred a shortage in his cash accountability by reason of his
payment in good faith to certain government personnel of their legitimate wages leave
allowances, etc., held that:
Nor can negligence approximating malice or fraud be attributed to petitioner. If he made
wrong payments, they were in Good faith mainly to government personnel, some of them
working at the provincial auditor's and the provincial treasurer's offices And if those
payments ran counter to auditing rules and regulations, they did not amount to a criminal
offense and he should only be held administratively or civilly liable.
Likewise controlling is "US v. Elvina" 27 where it was held that payments in good faith do not
amount to criminal appropriation, although they were made with insufficient vouchers or improper
evidence. In fact, the Dissenting Opinion's reference to certain provisions in the revised Manual

on Certificate of Settlement and Balances apparently made to underscore Tabuena's personal

accountability, as agency head, for MIAA funds would all the more support the view that
Tabuena is vulnerable to civil sanctions only Sections 29.2 and 295 expressly and solely speak of
"civilly liable," describe the kind of sanction imposable on a superior officer who performs his
duties with "bad faith, malice or gross negligence"' and on a subordinate officer or employee who
commits "willful or negligent acts . . . which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acted under order or instructions of his superiors."
Third. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the
P55 Million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC, proceeding from the
following definitions/concepts of "conversion":
"Conversion", as necessary element of offense of embezzlement, being the fraudulent
"appropriation to one's own use' of another's property which does not necessarily mean
to one's personal advantage but every attempt by one person to dispose of the goods of
another without right as if they were his own is conversion to his own use." (Terry v. Water
Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa County, 64 p, 2d 904, 906, 179 Okl. 106)
At p. 207, Words and
Phrases,
Permanent Edition 9A.
Conversion is any interference subversive of the right of the owner of personal property
to enjoy and control it. The gist of conversion is the usurpation of the owner 's right of
property, and not the actual damages inflicted. Honesty of purpose is not a defense.
(Ferrera v. Parks, 23 p. 883, 885 19 Or. 141)
At
page
168, id.
xxx xxx xxx
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own. They presuppose that the thing has been
devoted to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To appropriate to one's own
use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage but every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right.
People vs. Webber,
57 O.G.
p. 2933, 2937
By placing them at the disposal of private persons without due authorization or legal
justification, he became as guilty of malversation as if he had personally taken them and
converted them to his own use.
People vs. Luntao,
50 O.G.
p. 1182, 1183 28
We do not agree. It must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena "to pay
immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this office the sum of FIFTY

FIVE MILLION. . .", and that was what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the money to
Mrs. Gimenez. Such delivery, no doubt, is in effect delivery to the Office of the President
inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos' secretary then. Furthermore, Tabuena had reasonable
ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55 Million since he was certainly
aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and control over government
agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the President's office
(thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum, was not at all affected
even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the money. Thus, it has been said that:
Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is malversation
only if the public officer who has custody of public funds should appropriate the same, or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence
shall permit any other person to take such public funds. Where the payment of public
funds has been made in good faith, and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
public officer to whom the fund had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have
acted in good faith, there is no criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is
unauthorized, renders him only civilly but not criminally liable. 29
Fourth. Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphonout public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed
to Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the
MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the felonious scheme. In short, no
conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P5 Million. In the cases of
"US v. Acebedo" 30 and "Ang v. Sandiganbayan", 31 both also involving the crime of malversation, the
accused therein were acquitted after the Court arrived at a similar finding of non-proof of conspiracy. In
"Acebedo", therein accused, as municipal president of Palo, Leyte, was prosecuted for and found guilty
by the lower court of malversation after being unable to turn over certain amounts to the then justice of
the peace. It appeared, however, that said amounts were actually collected by his secretary Crisanto
Urbina. The Court reversed Acebedo's conviction after finding that the sums were converted by his
secretary Urbina without the knowledge and participation of Acebedo. The Court said, which we herein
adopt:
No conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary has been shown in this case, nor
did such conspiracy appear in the case against Urbina. No guilty knowledge of the theft
committed by the secretary was shown on the part of the appellant in this case, nor does
it appear that he in any way participated in the fruits of the crime. If the secretary stole the
money in question without the knowledge or consent of the appellant and without
negligence on his part, then certainly the latter can not be convicted of embezzling the
same money or any part thereof. 32
In "Ang", accused-petitioner, as MWSS bill collector, allowed part of his collection to be converted
into checks drawn in the name of one Marshall Lu, a non-customer of MWSS, but the checks
were subsequently dishonored. Ang was acquitted by this Court after giving credence to his
assertion that the conversion of his collections into checks were thru the machinations of one
Lazaro Guinto, another MWSS collector more senior to him. And we also adopt the Court's
observation therein, that:
The petitioner's alleged negligence in allowing the senior collector to convert cash
collections into checks may be proof of poor judgment or too trusting a nature insofar as

a superior officer is concerned but there must be stronger evidence to show fraud,
malice, or other indicia of deliberateness in the conspiracy cooked up with Marshall Lu.
The prosecution failed to show that the petitioner was privy to the conspirational scheme.
Much less is there any proof that he profited from the questioned acts. Any suspicions of
conspiracy, no matter how sincerely and strongly felt by the MWSS, must be converted
into evidence before conviction beyond reasonable doubt may be imposed. 33
The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to
Peralta in relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he acted in good
faith when he, upon the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the
P55 Million of the MIAA funds.
This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed
order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious
disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the
signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it
was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment
of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act
swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia. Besides, the case could not be detached from the
realities then prevailing As aptly observed by Mr Justice Cruz in his dissenting opinion:
We reject history in arbitrarily assuming that the people were free during the era and that
the Judiciary was independent and fearless. We know it was not: even the Supreme
Court at that time was not free. This is an undeniable fact that we can not just blink away.
Insisting on the contrary would only make our sincerity suspect and even provoke scorn
for what can only be described as our incredible credulity. 34
But what appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused's basic
constitutional right to due process. "Respect for the Constitution", to borrow once again Mr. Justice Cruz's
words, "is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused." 35
While going over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena and Peralta may not have
raised this as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter as additional
basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and
it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not. 36
Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. At the taking of the testimony of
Francis Monera. then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, Atty. Andres
asked sixteen (16) questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes only asked six (6) questions on
cross-examination in the course of which the court interjected a total of twenty-seven (27) questions
(more than four times Prosecutor Viernes' questions and even more than the combined total of direct and
cross-examination questions asked by the counsels) After the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct
examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10) questions. 37 The trend intensified during Tabuena's
turn on the witness stand. Questions from the court after Tabuena's cross-examination totalled sixtyseven (67). 38 This is more than five times Prosecutor Viernes' questions on cross-examination (14), and
more than double the total of direct examination and cross-examination questions which is thirty-one (31)
[17 direct examination questions by Atty. Andres plus 14 cross-examination questions by Prosecutor
Viernes]. In Peralta's case, the Justices, after his cross-examination, propounded a total of forty-one (41)
questions. 39
But more importantly, we note that the questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations
characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. 40 (The insinuating type was best exemplified in
one question addressed to Peralta, which will be underscored.) Thus we beg to quote in length from the

transcripts pertaining to witness Monera, Tabuena and Peralta. (Questions from the Court are marked
with asterisks and italicized for emphasis.)
(MONERA)
(As a background, what was elicited from his direct examination is that the PNCC had receivables from
MIAA totalling P102,475,392.35, and although such receivables were largely billings for escalation, they
were nonetheless all due and demandable. What follows are the cross-examination of Prosecutor Viernes
and the court questions).
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q You admit that as shown by these Exhibits "7" and "7- a", the items
here represent mostly escalation billings. Were those escalation billings
properly transmitted to MIA authorities?
A I don't have the documents right now to show that they were
transmitted, but I have a letter by our President, Mr. Olaguer, dated July
6, 1988, following up for payment of the balance of our receivables from
MIA, sir.
*AJ AMORES
*Q This matter of escalation costs, is it not a matter for a conference
between the MIA and the PNCC for the determination as to the correct
amount?
A I agree, your Honor. As far as we are concerned, our billings are what
we deemed are valid receivables And, in fact, we have been following up
for payment.
*Q This determination of the escalation costs was it accepted as the
correct figure by MIA ?
A I don't have any document as to the acceptance by MIA your Honor,
but our company was able to get a document or a letter by Minister
Ongpin to President Marcos, dated January 7, 1985, with a marginal note
or approval by former President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Basically, the letter of Mr. Ongpin is to what effect?
A The subject matter is approval of the supplementary contract and
request for partial deferment of payment for MIA Development Project,
your Honor.
*Q It has nothing to do with the implementation of the escalation costs?
A The details show that most of the accounts refer to our escalations,
your Honor.

*Q Does that indicate the computation for escalations were already billed
or you do not have any proof of that
A Our subsidiary ledger was based on billings to MIA and this letter of
Minister Ongpin appears to have confirmed our billings to MIA, your
Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Were there partial payments made by MIA an these escalation
billings?
A Based on records available as of today, the P102 million was reduced
to about P56.7 million, if my recollection is correct, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Were the payments made before or after February 1986, since Mr.
Olaguer is a new entrant to your company?
WITNESS
A The payments were made after December 31, 1985 but I think the
payments were made before the entry of our President, your Honor.
Actually, the payment was in the form of: assignments to State
Investment of about P23 million; and then there was P17.8 million
application against advances made or formerly given; and there were
payments to PNCC of about P2.6 million and there was a payment for
application on withholding and contractual stock of about P1 million; that
summed up to P44.4 million all in all. And you deduct that from the P102
million, the remaining balance would be about P57 million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q What you are saying is that, for all the payments made on this P102
million, only P2 million had been payments in cash ?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q The rest had been adjustments of accounts, assignments of
accounts, or offsetting of accounts?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This is as of December 31, 1985?
A The P102 million was as of December 31, 1985, your Honor, but the
balances is as of August 1987.
*Q We are talking now about the P44 million, more or less, by which the
basic account has been reduced. These reductions, whether by

adjustment or assignment or actual delivery of cash, were made after

December 31, 1985?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And your records indicate when these adjustments and payments
were made?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q You said there were partial payments before of these escalation
billings. Do we get it from you that there was an admission of these
escalation costs as computed by you by MIA, since there was already
partial payments?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q How were these payments made before February 1986, in case or
check, if there were payments made?
A The P44 million payments was in the form of assignments, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The question of the Court is, before December 31, 1985, were there
any liquidations made by MIA against these escalation billings?
A I have not reviewed the details of the record, your Honor. But the
ledger card indicates that there were collections on page 2 of the Exhibit
earlier presented. It will indicate that there were collections shown by
credits indicated on the credit side of the ledger.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your ledger does not indicate the manner of giving credit to the MIA
with respect to the escalation billings. Was the payment in cash or just
credit of some sort before December 31, 1985?
A Before December 31, 1985, the reference of the ledger are official
receipts and I suppose these were payments in cash, your Honor.
*Q Do you know how the manner of this payment in cash was made by
MIA?
A I do not know, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA

*Q But your records will indicate that?

A The records will indicate that, your Honor.
*Q Except that you were not asked to bring them?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q At all events, we are talking of settlement or partial liquidation prior to
December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Subsequent thereto, we are talking merely of about P44 million?
A Yes, your Honor, as subsequent settlements.
*Q After December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And they have liquidated that, as you described it, by way of
assignments, adjustments, by offsets and by P2 million of cash
payment?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your standard operating procedure before December 31, 1985 in
connection with or in case of cash payment, was the payment in cash or
check?
A I would venture to say it was by check, your Honor.
*Q Which is the safest way to do it?
A Yes, your Honor.
"PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And the business way?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.

PROS VIERNES
Q You mentioned earlier about the letter of former Minister Ongpin to the
former President Marcos, did you say that letter concurs with the
escalation billings reflected in Exhibits "7" and "7-a"?
WITNESS
A The Company or the management is of the opinion that this letter, a
copy of which we were able to get, is a confirmation of the acceptance of
our billings, sir.
Q This letter of Minister Ongpin is dated January 7, 1985, whereas the
entries of escalation billings as appearing in Exhibit "7" are dated June
30, 1985, would you still insist that the letter of January 1985 confirms
the escalation billings as of June 1985?
A The entries started June 30 in the ledger card. And as of December 31,
1985, it stood at P102 million after payments were made as shown on
the credit side of the ledger. I suppose hat the earlier amount, before the
payment was made, was bigger and therefore I would venture to say that
the letter of January 7, 1985 contains an amount that is part of the
original contract account. What are indicated in the ledger are escalation
billings.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q We are talking about the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A The letter of Minister Ongpin refers to escalation billings, sir.
*Q As of what date?
A The letter is dated January 7, 1985, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS. VIERNES
Q In accordance with this letter marked Exhibit "7" and "7-a", there were
credits made in favor of MIA in July and November until December 1985.
These were properly credited to the account of MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q In 1986. from your records as appearing in Exhibit "7-a", there were no
payments made to PNCC by MIA for the months of January to June
1986?

A Yes, sir.
Q And neither was the amount of P22 million remitted to PNCC by MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY ANDRES
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ AMORES
*Q From your records, for the month of January 1986, there was no
payment of this escalation account by MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor. But on page 2 of Exhibit "7" there appears an
assignment of P23 million, that was on September 25, 1986.
*Q But that is already under the present administration?
A After February 1986, your Honor.
*Q But before February, in January 1986, there was no payment
whatsoever by MIA to PNCC?
A Per record there is none appearing, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The earliest payment, whether by delivery of cash equivalent or of
adjustment of account, or by assignment, or by offsets, when did these payments begin?
A Per ledger card, there were payments in 1985, prior to December 31,
1985, your Honor.
*Q After December 31, 1985?

A There appears also P23 million as credit, that is a form of settlement,

your Honor.
*Q This is as of September 25?
A Yes, your Honor. There were subsequent settlements P23 million is just
part of the P44 million.
*Q And what you are saying is that, PNCC passed the account to State
Investment. In other words, State Investment bought the credit of MIA?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And the amount of credit or receivables sold by PNCC to State
Investment is P23 million?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is there a payback agreement?
A I have a copy of the assignment to State Investment but I have not yet
reviewed the same, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q As of now, is this obligation of MIA, now NAIA, paid to PNCC?
A There is still a balance of receivables from MIA as evidenced by a
collection letter by our President dated July 6, 1988, your Honor. The
amount indicated in the letter is P55 million.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Any clarifications you would like to make Mr. Estebal?
ATTY ESTEBAL
None, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Viernes?
PROS VIERNES
No more, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
The witness is excused. Thank you very much Mr. Monera. . . . 41

(TABUENA)
(In his direct examination, he testified that he caused the preparation of the checks totalling P55 Million
pursuant to the MARCOS Memorandum and that he thereafter delivered said amount in cash on the three
(3) dates as alleged in the information to Marcos' private secretary Mrs. Jimenez at her office at Aguado
Street, who thereafter issued a receipt. Tabuena also denied having used the money for his own personal
use.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q The amount of P55 million as covered by the three (3) checks Mr.
Tabuena, were delivered on how many occasions?
A Three times, sir.
Q And so, on the first two deliveries, you did not ask for a receipt from
Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
Q It was only on January 30, 1986 that this receipt Exhibit "3" was issued
by Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So January 30 is the date of the last delivery?
A I remember it was on the 31st of January, your Honor What happened
is that, I did not notice the date placed by Mrs. Gimenez.
Q Are you telling us that this Exhibit "3" was incorrectly dated
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Because the third delivery was on January 31st and yet the receipt
was dated January 30?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was Exhibit "3" delivered actually by Mrs. Gimenez?
A January 31st, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES

Q You did not go to Malacaang on January 30, 1986?

A Yes, sir, I did not.
Q Do you know at whose instance this Exhibit "3" was prepared?
A I asked for it, sir.
Q You asked for it on January 31, 1986 when you made the last delivery?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see this Exhibit "3" prepared in the Office of Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
Q This receipt was typewritten in Malacaang stationery. Did you see
who typed this receipt?
A No, sir. What happened is that, she went to her room and when she
came out she gave me that receipt.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Q What you are saying is, you do not know who typed that receipt?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Are you making an assumption that she typed that receipt?
A Yes, your Honor, because she knows how to type.
*Q Your assumption is that she typed it herself?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Proceed.
PROS. VIERNES
Q This receipt was prepared on January 31, although it is dated January
30?
A Yes, sir, because I was there on January 31st.
Q In what particular place did Mrs. Gimenez sign this Exhibit "3"?

A In her office at Aguado, sir.

Q Did you actually see Mrs. Gimenez signing this receipt Exhibit "3"?
A No, sir, I did not. She was inside her room.
Q So, she was in her room and when she came out of the room, she
handed this receipt to you already typed and signed?
A Yes, sir.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q So, how did you know this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez?
WITNESS
A Because I know her signature, your Honor. I have been receiving
letters from her also and when she requests for something from me. Her
writing is familiar to me.
So, when the Presiding Justice asked you as to how you knew that this
was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez and you answered that you saw Mrs.
Gimenez signed it, you were not exactly truthful?
A What I mean is, I did not see her sign because she went to her room
and when she came out, she gave me that receipt, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
That is why you have to wait for the question to be finished and listen to it
carefully. Because when I asked you, you said you saw her signed it. Be
careful Mr. Tabuena.
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Was there another person inside the office of Mrs. Gimenez when she
gave you this receipt Exhibit "3"?
A Nobody, sir.
Q I noticed in this receipt that the last delivery of the sum of P55 million
was made on January 30. Do we understand from you that this date
January 30 is erroneous?

A Yes, sir, that January 30 is erroneous. I noticed it only afterwards. This

should be January 31st, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ANDRES
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why did you not ask for a receipt on the first and second deliveries?
A Because I know that the delivery was not complete yet, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So you know that the total amount to be delivered was P55 million')
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Response by Mr. Peralta to the testimony of Mr. Tabuena.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
We are adopting the testimony of Mr. Tabuena and we will also present
the accused, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
"Q From whom did you receive the President's memorandum marked
Exhibit "1"? Or more precisely, who handed you this memorandum?
A Mrs. Fe Roa Gimenez, your Honor.
Q Did you ask Mrs, Fe Gimenez for what purpose the money was being
asked?

A The money was in payment for the debt of the MIA Authority to PNCC,
your Honor.
*Q If it was for the payment of such obligation why was there no voucher
prepared to cover such payment? In other words, why was the delivery of
the money not covered by any voucher?
A The instruction to me was to give it to the Office of the President, your
Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Be that as it may, why was there no voucher to cover this particular
disbursement?
A I was just told to bring it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Was that normal procedure for you to pay in cash to the Office of the
President for obligations of the MIAA in payment of its obligation to
another entity?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor, I was just following the Order to me of the President.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So the Order was out of the ordinary?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
Did you file any written protest with the manner with which such payment
was being ordered?
A No, your Honor.
*Q Why not?
A Because with that instruction of the President to me, I followed, your
Honor.
*Q Before receiving this memorandum Exhibit "1", did the former
President Marcos discuss this maitter with you?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was that?

A He called me up earlier, a week before that, that he wants to me pay

what I owe the PNCC directly to his office in cash, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q By "I OWE ", you mean the MIAA?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q And what did you say in this discussion you had with him?
A I just said, "Yes, sir, I will do it/"
*Q Were you the one who asked for a memorandum to be signed by
him?
A No, your Honor.
*Q After receiving that verbal instruction for you to pay MIAA's obligation
with PNCC, did you not on your own accord already prepare the
necessary papers and documents for the payment of that obligation?
A He told me verbally in the telephone that the Order for the payment of
that obligation is forthcoming, your Honor. I will receive it.
*Q Is this the first time you received such a memorandum from the
President?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And was that the last time also that you received such a
memorandum?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you not inquire, if not from the President, at least from Mrs.
Gimenez why this procedure has to be followed instead of the regular
procedure?
A No, sir.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Why did you not ask?
A I was just ordered to do this thing, your Honor.

*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q You said there was an "I OWE YOU"?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Where is that "I OWE YOU" now?
A All I know is that we owe PNCC the amount of P99.1 million, your
Honor. MIAA owes PNCC that amount.
*Q Was this payment covered by receipt from the PNCC?
A It was not covered, your Honor.
*Q So the obligation of MIAA to PNCC was not, for the record, cancelled
by virtue of that payment?
A Based on the order to me by the former President Marcos ordering me
to pay that amount to his office and then the mechanics will come after,
your Honor.
*Q Is the PNCC a private corporation or government entity?
A I think it is partly government, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the former CDCP?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why were you not made to pay directly, to the PNCC considering that
you are the Manager of MIA at that time and the PNCC is a separate
corporation, not an adjunct of Malacaang?
WITNESS
A I was just basing it from the Order of Malacanang to pay PNCC
through the Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q Do you know the President or Chairman of the Board of PNCC?
A Yes, your Honor.
"Q How was the obligation of MIAA to PNCC incurred. Was it through the
President or Chairman of the Board?
A PNCC was the one that constructed the MIA, your Honor.

*Q Was the obligation incurred through the President or Chairman of the

Board or President of the PNCC? In other words, who signed the
contract between PNCC and MIAA?
A Actually, we inherited this obligation, your Honor. The one who signed
for this was the former Director of BAT which is General Singzon. Then
when the MIA Authority was formed, all the obligations of BAT were
transferred to MIAA. So the accountabilities of BAT were transferred to
MIAA and we are the ones that are going to pay, your Honor.
*Q Why did you agree to pay to Malacaang when your obligation was
with the PNCC?
A I was ordered by the President to do that, your Honor.
*Q You agreed to the order of the President notwithstanding the fact that
this was not the regular course or Malacaang was not the creditor?
A I saw nothing wrong with that because that is coming, from the
President, your Honor.
*Q The amount was not a joke, amounting to P55 million, and you
agreed to deliver money in this amount through a mere receipt from the
private secretary?
A I was ordered by the President, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q There is no question and it can be a matter of judicial knowledge that
you have been with the MIA for sometime?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Prior to 1986?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Can you tell us when you became the Manager of MIA?
A I became Manager of MIA way back, late 1968, your Honor.
*Q Long before the MIA was constituted as an independent authority?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And by 1986, you have been running the MIA for 18 years?
WITNESS

A Yes, your Honor.

*Q And prior to your Joining the MIA, did you ever work for the
government?
A No, your Honor.
*Q So, is it correct for us to say that your joining the MIA in 1968 as its
Manager was your first employment ,with the government?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q While you were Manager of MIA, did you have other subsequent
concurrent positions in the government also?
A I was also the Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board, your
Honor.
*Q But you were not the executive or operating officer of the Games and
Amusement Board?
A I was, your Honor.
*Q As Chairman you were running the Games and Amusement Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q What else, what other government positions did you occupy that
time?
A I was also Commissioner of the Game Fowl Commission, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the cockfighting?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Here, you were just a member of the Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So you were not running the commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Any other entity?
A No more, your Honor.

*Q As far as you can recall, besides being the Manager of the MIA and
later the MIAA for approximately 18 years, you also ran the Games and
Amusement Board as its executive officer?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And you were a commissioner only of the Came Fowl Commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Who was running the commission at that time?
A I forgot his name, but he retired already, your Honor.
*Q All of us who joined the government, sooner or later, meet with our
Resident COA representative?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And one of our unfortunate experience (sic) is when the COA
Representative comes to us and says: "Chairman or Manager, this
cannot be". And we learn later on that COA has reasons for its procedure
and we learn to adopt to them?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q As a matter of fact, sometimes we consider it inefficient, sometimes
we consider it foolish, but we know there is reason in this apparent
madness of the COA and so we comply?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And more than anything else the COA is ever anxious for proper
documentation and proper supporting papers?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Sometimes, regardless of the amount?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Now, you have P55 million which you were ordered to deliver in cash,
not to the creditor of the particular credit, and to be delivered in armored
cars to be acknowledged only by a receipt of a personal secretary. After
almost 18 years in the government service and having had that much
time in dealing with COA people, did it not occur to you to call a COA
representative and say, "What will I do here?"

A I did not, your Honor.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Did you not think that at least out of prudence, you should have asked
the COA for some guidance on this matter so that you will do it properly?
WITNESS
A What I was going to do is, after those things I was going to tell that
delivery ordered by the President to the COA, your Honor.
*Q That is true, but what happened here is that you and Mr. Dabao or
you and Mr. Peralta signed requests for issuance of Manager's checks
and you were accommodated by the PNB Office at Nichols without any
internal documentation to justify your request for Manager's checks?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Of course we had no intimation at that time that Mr. Marcos will win
the elections but even then, the Daily Express, which was considered to
be a newspaper friendly to the Marcoses at that time, would occasionally
come with so-called expose, is that not so?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And worst, you had the so-called mosquito press that would always
come out with the real or imagined scandal in the government and place
it in the headline, do you recall that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Under these circumstances, did you not entertain some apprehension
that some disloyal employees might leak you out and banner headline it
in some mosquito publications like the Malaya at that time?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
I bring this up because we are trying to find out different areas of fear.
We are in the government and we in the government fear the COA and
we also fear the press. We might get dragged into press releases on the
most innocent thing. You believe that?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q And usually our best defense is that these activities are properly
documented?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In this particular instance, your witnesses have told us about three (3)
different trips from Nichols to Aguado usually late in the day almost in
movie style fashion. I mean, the money being loaded in the trunk of your
official car and then you had a back-up truck following your car?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is that not quite a fearful experience to you ?
A I did not think of that at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
"Q You did not think it fearful to be driving along Roxas Boulevard with
P25 million in the trunk of your car?
WITNESS
A We have security at that time your Honor.
ATTY. ANDRES
Your Honor, the P25 million was in the armored car; only P5 million was
in the trunk of his car.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you for the correction. Even P1 million only. How much more with
P5 million inside the trunk of your car, was that not a nervous
experience?
A As I have said, your Honor, I never thought of that.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much, Mr. Tabuena. You are excused. . . .

42

(PERALTA)
(He testified on direct examination that he co-signed with Tabuena a memorandum request for the
issuance of the Manager's Check for P5 Million upon order of Tabuena and that he [Peralta] was aware
that MIAA had an existing obligation with PNCC in the amount of around P27 Million. He affirmed having
accompanied Tabuena at the PNB Villamor Branch to withdraw the P5 Million, but denied having
misappropriated for his own benefit said amount or any portion thereof.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS VIERNES

Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court why was it necessary for you
to co-sign with Mr. Tabuena the request for issuance of Manager's check
in the amount of P5 million?
A At that time I was the Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, sir,
and all withdrawals of funds should have my signature because I was
one of the signatories at that time.
Q As Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, you always co-sign
with Mr. Tabuena in similar requests for the issuance of Manager's
checks by the PNB?
A That is the only occasion I signed, sir.
Q Did you say you were ordered by Mr. Tabuena to sign the request?
A Yes, sir, and I think the order is part of the exhibits and based on that
order, I co-signed in the request for the issuance of Manager's check in
favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena.
PROS VIERNES
Q Was there a separate written order for you to co-sign with Mr.
Tabuena?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir, an order was given to me by Mr. Tabuena.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Was that marked in evidence?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What exhibit?
WITNESS
I have here a copy, your Honor. This was the order and it was marked as
exhibit "N".
PROS VIERNES
It was marked as Exhibit "M", your Honor.
Q How did you know there was an existing liability of MIAA in favor of
PNCC at that time?

A Because prior to this memorandum of Mr. Tabuena, we prepared the

financial statement of MIAA as of December 31, 1985 and it came to my
attention that there was an existing liability of around P27,999,000.00,
your Honor.
Q When was that Financial Statement prepared?
A I prepared it around January 22 or 24, something like that, of 1986, sir.
Q Is it your usual practice to prepare the Financial Statement after the
end of the year within three (3) weeks after the end of the year?
A Yes, sir, it was a normal procedure for the MIAA to prepare the
Financial Statement on or before the 4th Friday of the month because
there will be a Board of Directors Meeting and the Financial Statement of
the prior month will be presented and discussed during the meeting.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This matter of preparing Financial Statement was not an annual
activity but a monthly activity?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This Financial Statement you prepared in January of 1986
recapitulated the financial condition as of the end of the year?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You made mention of a request for Escalation Clause by former
Minister Ongpin. Did you personally see that request?
A When this order coming from Mr. Tabuena was shown to me, I was
shown a copy, sir. I have no file because I just read it.
Q It was Mr. Tabuena who showed you the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
And that will be Exhibit?
ATTY. ANDRES
Exhibit "2" and "2-A", your Honor.

PROS VIERNES
Q You also stated that you were with Mr. Tabuena when you withdrew the
amount of P5 million from the PNB Extension Office at Villamor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was it necessary for you to go with him on that occasion?
A Mr. Tabuena requested me to do the counting by million, sir. So what I
did was to bundle count the P5 million and it was placed in two (2)
peerless boxes.
Q Did you actually participate in the counting of the money by bundles?
A Yes, sir.
Q Bundles of how much per bundle?
A If I remember right, the bundles consisted of P100s and P50s, sir.
Q No P20s and P10s?
A Yes, sir, I think it was only P100s and P50s.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q If there were other denominations, you can not recall?
A Yes, your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
Q In how many boxes were those bills placed?
A The P5 million were placed in two (2) peerless boxes,
Q And you also went with Mr. Tabuena to Aguado?
A No, sir, I was left behind at Nichols. After it was placed at the trunk of
the car of Mr. Tabuena, I was left behind and I went back to my office at
MIA.
Q But the fact is that, this P5 million was withdrawn at passed 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon?
A I started counting it I think at around 4:30, sir. It was after office hours.
But then I was there at around 4:00 o'clock and we started counting at
around 4:30 p.m. because they have to place it in a room, which is the
office of the Manager at that time.

Q And Mr. Tabuena left for Malacaang after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of that date?
A Yes, sir. After we have counted the money, it was placed in the
peerless boxes and Mr. Tabuena left for Malacanang.
PROS VIERNES
Q And you yourself, returned to your office at MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q Until what time do you hold office at the MIA?
A Usually I over-stayed for one (1) or two (2) hours just to finish the
paper works in the office, sir.
Q So, even if it was already after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, you still
went back to your office at MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Did you not consider it as odd that your obligation with the PNCC had
to be paid in cash?
WITNESS
A Based on the order of President Marcos that we should pay in cash, it
was not based on the normal procedure, your Honor.

*Q And, as Acting Financial Services Manager, you were aware that all
disbursements should be covered by vouchers?
A Yes, your Honor, the payments should be covered by vouchers. But
then, inasmuch as what we did was to prepare a request to the PNB,
then this can be covered by Journal Voucher also.
*Q Was such payment of P5 million covered by a Journal Voucher?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you present that Journal Voucher here in Court?
A We have a copy, your Honor.
*Q Do you have a copy or an excerpt of that Journal Voucher presented
in Court to show that payment?
A We have a copy of the Journal Voucher, your Honor.
*Q Was this payment of P5 million ever recorded in a cashbook or other
accounting books of MIAA ?
A The payment of P5 million was recorded in a Journal Voucher, your
Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the recording was made directly to the Journal?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q There are no other separate documents as part of the application for
Manager's Check?
A Yes, your Honor, there was none.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q After the payment was made, did your office receive any receipt from
PNCC?
A I was shown a receipt by Mr. Tabuena, the receipt given by Mrs. Fe
Roa Gimenez, your Honor. Inasmuch as the payment should be made
through the Office of the president, I accepted the receipt given by Mrs.
Fe Gimenez to Mr. Tabuena.
*Q After receiving that receipt, did you prepare the necessary supporting
documents, vouchers, and use that receipt as a supporting document to
the voucher?

A Your Honor, a Journal Voucher was prepared for that.

*Q How about a disbursement voucher?
A Inasmuch as this was a request for Manager's check, no disbursement
voucher was prepared, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Since the payment was made on January 31, I986, and that was very
close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any doubt
that the amounts were being used for some other purpose?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, we are objecting to the
question on the ground that it is improper.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't think
there was any basis, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection on
record.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q As a Certified Public Accountant and Financial Manager of the MIAA,
did you not consider it proper that a check be issued only after it is
covered by a disbursement voucher duly approved by the proper
authorities ?
A Your Honor, what we did was to send a request for a Manager's check
to the PNB based on the request of Mr. Tabuena and the order of Mr.
Tabuena was based on the Order of President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In your capacity as Financial Services Manager of the MIAA, did you
not think it proper to have this transaction covered by a disbursement
voucher?

WITNESS
A Based on my experience, payments out of cash can be made through
cash vouchers, or even though Journal Vouchers, or even through credit
memo, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q This was an obligation of the MIAA to the PNCC. Why did you allow a
disbursement by means of check in favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena, your own
manager?
A We based the payment on the order of Mr. Tabuena because that was
the order of President Marcos to pay PNCC through the Office of the
President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor.
*Q You are supposed to pay only on legal orders. Did you consider that
legal?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, the question calls for a
conclusion of the witness.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering that tire witness is an expert, witness may answer.
WITNESS
A The order of president Marcos was legal at that time because the order
was to pay PNCC the amount of P5 million through the Office of the
President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor. And at that time, I
know for a fact also that there was an existing P.D. wherein the President
of the Republic of the Philippines can transfer funds from one office to
another and the PNCC is a quasi government entity at that time.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Are you saying that this transaction was made on the basis of that
P.D. which you referred to?
A I am not aware of the motive of the President, but then since he is the
President of the Philippines, his order was to pay the PNCC through the
Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q As Financial Manager, why did you allow a payment in cash when
ordinarily payment of an obligation of MIAA is supposed to be paid in
check?

A I caused the payment through the name of Mr. Tabuena because that
was the order of Mr. Tabuena and also he received an order coming from
the President of the Philippines at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the Journals to
correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the same journal?
In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal Voucher is
to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper, you
are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of the
transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally authorize
such a movement of money unless it is properly documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the question
is misleading because what the witness stated is. . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the
language you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that. . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness stated
earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was supported,
your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled, may answer.

WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of the
General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos, your
Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate
basis for the movement of money?
A Yes, your Honor, because at that time we have also a recorded liability
of P27 million.
*Q we are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we are
saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate with no
other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
A Yes, your Honor. The order of Mr. Luis Tabuena was based on our
existing liability of P27,931,000.00, inasmuch as we have that liability
and I was shown the order of President Marcos to pay P5 million through
the Office of the President, I considered the order of Mr. Luis Tabuena,
the order of President Marcos and also the existing liability of P27 million
sufficient to pay the amount of P5 million. Inasmuch as there is also an
escalation clause of P99.1 million, the payment of P5 million is fully
covered by those existing documents.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not
asking you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not asking
you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether or not this
particular order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to justify the
movement of funds?
WITNESS
When we pay, your Honor, we always look for the necessary documents
and at that time I know for a fact that there was this existing liability.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to the
question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I know you
are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your statement that there
are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the order
of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
WITNESS
A As far as I am concerned, your Honor, inasmuch as we have a liability
and I was shown the Order of President Marcos to pay PNCC through
his office, I feel that the order of the General Manager, the order of

President Marcos, and also the memorandum of Minister Ongpin are

sufficient to cause the payment of P5 million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to transfer
funds from one department to another, is this not the one that refers to
the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is concerned?
WITNESS
A Because at that time, your Honor, I have knowledge that the President
is authorized through a Presidential Decree to transfer government funds
from one office to another.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA
covered by the Appropriation Act?
A I think the liability was duly recorded and appropriations to pay the
amount is. . . . (interrupted)
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are you
just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the question
is?
A No, your Honor.
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA ate covered by the
Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in the same
level as the realignment of funds authorized the President? Or are you
telling as you did not read the Decree?
A I was aware of that Decree, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the Decrees
authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not an
officer of the MIAA, was he?

A No, your Honor.

*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different officers and
different officials in any company either government or private, which are
supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by
authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain him?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one person
can dispose of funds in any way he likes?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to documents
and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In the other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as
Financial Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a position to
tell Mr. Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this disbursement
is not proper and, therefore, I will not sign it"., if in your opinion the
disbursement is not proper?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, as a co-signatory, you expected to exercise your judgment
as to the propriety of a particular transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant?
A Yes, your Honor.

*AJ DEL ROSARIO

*Q You admit that the payment of P5 million and P50 million were
unusual in the manner with which they were disposed?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you submit a written protest to the manner in which such amount
was being disposed of?
A A written protest was not made, your Honor, but I called the attention of
Mr. Tabuena that since this payment was upon the order of President
Marcos, then I think as President he can do things which are not
ordinary.
*Q If you did not prepare a written protest, did you at least prepare a
memorandum for the record that this was an extra-ordinary transaction?
A I called the attention of Mr. Tabuena that this was an extra-ordinary
transaction and no written note, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much Mr. Peralta, you are excused. . . . 43
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his
mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. 44 But
not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, 45 the right should be
sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible,
neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. 46 Here, these limitations were not observed.
Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more
precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when
the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross- examinations supplementing those made by
Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter's questions in length. The "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its
overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. In this connection, the observation
made in the Dissenting Opinion to the effect that the majority of this Court was "unduly disturbed" with the
number of court questions alone, is quite inaccurate. A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in
the majority opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show that the court
questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that common standard of
fairness and impartiality. In fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the records, confronted with
"numbers" without necessarily realizing the partiality of the Court. In "US v. De Sisto" (2 Cir., 1961, 289 F
2d 833), for example, a new trial was required because the trial judge, as in this case, indulged in
extensive questioning of defendant and his witnesses, and the reviewing court also had to amplify on
"numbers" to bolster this. It was pointed out in the "De Sisto" case that the judge asked 3,115 questions of
all witnesses, the prosecutor asked but 1,381, defense counsel 3,330. The judge's questions to the
defendant De Sisto totalled 306, the prosecutor's 347, and the defense counsel's, 201. After referring to
these figures, the court stated:
. . . It is indeed an impressive proportion, but no such mathematical computation is of
itself determinative. However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and vigorous
examination of the defendant himself by the judge, and the repeated belittling by the
judge of defendant's efforts to establish the time that Fine left the pier, we fear that in its
zeal for arriving at the facts the court here conveyed to the jury too strong an impression

of the court's belief in the defendant's probable guilt to permit the jury freely to perform its
own function of independent determination of the facts. . . .
The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive
that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard
employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in propounding
questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence. At the risk of being repetitious,
we will amplify on this via some specific examples. Based on the evidence on record, and on the
admission of Tabuena himself, the P55 million was delivered to the President's Office thru Mrs.
Gimenez, in obedience to the Presidential directive. One Sandiganbayan Justice, however, hurled
the following questions to Peralta:
AJ DEL ROSARIO
Q: Since the payment was made on January 31, 1986, and that was very
close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any doubt that
the amounts were being used for some other purposes?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, We are objecting to the
question on the ground that it is improper.
AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't think
there was any basis, Your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection on
record.
Nothing from the preceding questions of counsels or of the court would serve as basis for this
question. How then, can this be considered even relevant? What is the connection between the
payment made to the President's office and the then forthcoming presidential "snap election"? In
another instance, consider the following questions of Presiding Justice Garchitorena:
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the Journals to
correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the same journal?
xxx xxx xxx

*Q In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal

Voucher is to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
xxx xxx xxx
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper, you
are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of the
transactions?
xxx xxx xxx
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally authorize
such a movement of money unless it is properly documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the question
is misleading because what the witness stated is . . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the
language you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that . . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness stated
earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was supported,
your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of the
General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos, your
Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate
basis for the movement of money?

*Q We are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we are
saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate with no
other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not
asking you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not asking
you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether or not this
particular order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to justify the
movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to the
question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I know you
are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your statement that there
are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the order
of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to transfer
funds from one department to another, is this not the one that refers to
the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is concerned?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA
covered by the Appropriation Act?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are you
just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the question
is?
xxx xxx xxx
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA are covered by the
Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in the same
level as the realignment of funds authorized the President? Or are you
telling as you did not read the Decree?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the Decrees
authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL

Yes, your Honor.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not an
officer of the MIAA, was he?
*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different in officers
and different officials in any company either government or private, which
are supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by
authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain him?
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one person
can dispose of funds in any way he likes?
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to documents
and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
*Q In other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as Financial
Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a position to tell Mr.
Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this disbursement is not
proper and, therefore, I will not sign it.", if in your opinion the
disbursement is not proper?
*Q Therefore, as co-signatory, you are expected to exercise your
judgment as to the propriety of a particular transaction ?
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant? 47
How can these questions be considered clarificatory when they clearly border more on crossexamination questions? Thus, the Dissenting Opinion's focus on the distinction between the two
kinds of trial to justify the Sandiganbayan's active participation in the examination of petitioners
Tabuena and Peralta and witness Monera, with due respect, appears insignificant to this case.
Let it, therefore, be emphasized anew that:
A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the
impression that he is allied with the prosecution. 48
We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth of the
transaction, but it is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting
attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should
always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime,
and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of
safeguarding the interests of society. 49

Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses at
length. The circumstances may be such in a given case as to justify the court in so doing.
. . . This court, however, has more than once said that the examination of witnesses is the
more appropriate function of counsel, and the instances are rare and the conditions
exceptional which will justify the presiding judge in conducting an extensive examination.
It is always embarrassing for counsel to object to what he may deem improper questions
by the court. Then, in conducting a lengthy examination, it would be almost impossible for
the judge to preserve a judicial attitude. While he is not a mere figurehead or umpire in a
trial, and it is his duty to see that justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to
conduct such examinations. The extent to which this shall be done must largely be a
matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case, but in
so doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of an advocate. . .
50

While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is largely in the
discretion of the trial judge, it must be understood that we have not adopted in this
country the practice of making the presiding judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to
observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial procedure, even at the expense of
occasional delays. . . . The judge is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and while
he has the right, and it is often his duty, to question witnesses to the end that justice shall
prevail, we can conceive of no other reason, for him to take the trial of the cause out of
the hands of counsel. 51
The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and it is
believed the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional in a high degree which will
justify the presiding judge in entering upon and conducting an extended examination of a
witness, and that the exercise of a sound discretion will seldom deem such action
necessary or advisable. 52
He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and
prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in
mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in, the examination of
witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are
excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. 53
The impartiality of the judge his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the
advocate of either one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and
essential rule of special importance in criminal cases. . . 54
Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear
or favor, and to dispose of these cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is
possible for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of onesided or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the
minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the people's faith in our courts. 55
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as
a minimum guaranty of due process. 56

We are well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set a dangerous precedent in
that those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public would be able to escape criminal
liability by the mere expedient of invoking "good faith". It must never be forgotten, however, that we render
justice on a case to case basis, always in consideration of the evidence that is presented. Thus, where
the evidence warrants an acquittal, as in this case, we are mandated not only by the dictates of law but
likewise of conscience to grant the same. On the other hand, it does not follow that all those similarly
accused will necessarily be acquitted upon reliance on this case as a precedent. For the decision in this
case to be a precedent, the peculiar circumstances and the evidence that led to the petitioner's acquittal
must also be present in subsequent cases.
Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a "dangerous precedent" and an actual violation of
constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For the most
dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so that it becomes
lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to bring to justice the
malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest
injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated
December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 131638-39

March 26, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORETA MEDENILLA y DORIA, accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 262,
promulgated on November 26, 1997, in Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D finding
accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.1
Accused-appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. 3618-D for violating Section 15,2 Article
III of R.A. No. 6425. The information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 5.08 grams of white crystalline
substance positive to the test for methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is
regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.3
Accused-appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 3619-D for violating Section 16,4
Article III of R.A. No. 6425 with an information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and/or (sic) under his custody and control four (4)
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of
200.45 grams, which were found positive to the test for methampetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.5
Arraigned on June 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.6 Joint trial
ensued thereafter.
The prosecution's version, as gathered from the testimonies of SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral, SPO1
Neowille De Castro and P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. De Villa, is as follows:
On April 14, 1996, a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) in camp Crame and reported to SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral that there is a certain person
engaged in illegal drug pushing activities in Caloocan, Malabon and Mandaluyong. SPO2 Cabral
reported the matter to his superior, Police Senior Inspector Manzanas.7 Accordingly, Sr. Insp.
Manzanas directed SPO2 Cabral to confirm the veracity of the report. Thus, SPO2 Cabral
requested the confidential informant to contact the suspected drug pusher to introduce him as a
possible buyer.8
On April 15, 1996, the informant returned to the NARCOM office and told SPO2 Cabral that he
had arranged a meeting with the suspected drug pusher. The two then proceeded to the prearranged meeting place at a Seven Eleven Store along Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong City. At

around 5:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived on board a Toyota Corolla.9 Without alighting from
his car, accused-appellant spoke with the informant.10 The informant introduced SPO2 Cabral to
accused-appellant as a prospective buyer of shabu. Accused-appellant inquired how many grams
of shabu he wanted to buy and SPO2 Cabral replied that he needed five (5) grams. The suspect
then offered the shabu at the price of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per gram to which SPO2
Cabral agreed.11 Accused-appellant told SPO2 Cabral to return the following day. They agreed
that the pick up point would be at the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Building also along
Boni Avenue. Upon their return to Camp Crame, SPO2 Cabral and the informant reported the
results of their meeting to Sr. Insp. Manzanas. Based on their information, a buy-bust operation
was planned. SPO2 Cabral was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 de Castro as his
back-up. Sr. Insp. Manzanas was assigned to stay in the car and await the signal to be given by
SPO2 Cabral, through his pager, before apprehending accused-appellant.
At around 3:30 in the early morning of April 16, 1996, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
agreed meeting place at the UCPB Building in Boni Avenue.12 Upon reaching the area, SPO2
Cabral alighted from the car while the other operatives positioned themselves in strategic areas.13
After thirty (30) minutes, accused-appellant arrived.14 after talking for a short time with SPO2
Cabral, accused-appellant asked the former if he had the money.15 SPO2 Cabral showed the
bundle of money16 and accused-appellant told him to wait. When he returned, SPO2 Cabral gave
him the money and, in exchange, accused-appellant handed a pack containing a white crystalline
substance.17 As planned, SPO2 Cabral turned on his pager which prompted the backup operatives
to close in and apprehend accused-appellant.18 SPO2 Cabral asked accused-appellant if he could
search the latter's car. Accused-appellant acceded to the request and, as a result, SPO2 Cabral
found a brown clutch bag at the driver's seat of the car. Inside the clutch bag, they found therein
four plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance which they suspected was shabu.19
Accused-appellant was brought to Camp Crame for booking. SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro
then submitted the substance they confiscated to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.20
They thereafter brought accused-appellant to the PNP General Hospital for a medical and
physical examination.21
The laboratory report on the white crystalline substance showed that the same tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu22 and that the contents of the substance sold weighed
5.08 grams while those taken from the bag had a total weight of 200.45 grams. The report reads:

PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-448-96

CASE: Alleged Viol of RA 6425

TIME AND DATE RECEIVED:
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT:

SUSPECT/S:
LORETO
MEDENILLA
2145H 16 April 1996
C, SOU-HQS-PNPNARCOM
Camp Crame, Quezon City

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh "A" One (1) brown "MARUDINI CLUTCH BAG" containing the following
specimens:
1. One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag marked as Exh "A-1" with 5.08
grams of white crystalline substance:
2. Four (4) transparent plastic bags marked as Exhs. "A-2" through "A-5" each
with white crystalline substance and having a total weight of 200.45 grams. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug. xxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave positive
result
to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. "A-1", "A-2" through ""A-5" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug.
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED:

0740H 17 April 1996.23

For his defense, accused-appellant presented a different version of the events leading to
his arrest.
On or about April 12, 1996, accused-appellant rented a car, a Toyota Corolla, from a certain Jess
Hipolito. It was to be used by his brother for a trip to Pangasinan.24 On April 15, 1996, his
brother turned over the car to accused-appellant with the instruction to return the car to Jess
Hipolito.25 However, before returning the car, accused-appellant decided to use the same for a
night out with his friends. Accused-appellant, along with four (4) of his friends, namely, Joy,
Tess, Willy and Jong-jong, went to Bakahan in Quezon City for dinner and, thereafter,
transferred to Music Box Lounge located in front of the said restaurant,. After having some
drinks, accused-appellant decided to return the car to Jess Hipolito and just take a taxicab with
his friends in going back to their place in Caloocan City.26 They all proceeded to the
condominium unit of Jess Hipolito located along Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong City.27 they
reached the place at around 2:30 a.m.28 Accused-appellant told the guard of the condominium
building that he wanted to see Jess Hipolito to retun the car he rented. The guard instructed him
to park the car in front of UCPB. After doing so, accused-appellant, together with Jong-jong and

Joy went up to the unit of Jess Hipolito while their two companions, Willy and Tess, stayed in
the lobby.29 While inside the unit of Jess Hipolito, accused-appellant was introduced to Alvin.30
Accused-appellant told Jess Hipolito that he wanted to return the car. However, Jess Hipolito
requested accused-appellant to drive Alvin, using the rented car, to quezon City since the latter
was carrying a large amount of money.31 Accused-appellant acceded to the request of Jess
Hipolito. They then all went down and, along with Willy and Tess who were then at the lobby,
boarded the vehicle.32 However, when accused-appellant was about to back out the vehicle, a
white car blocked the rear portion of the car.33 The passengers of the white car then stepped out
of their vehicle and approached them. One of the passengers of the white car, SPO1 de Castro,
asked accused-appellant to roll down his window and, after doing so, SPO2 Cabral introduced
himself and his companions as police officers.34 Accused-appellant then asked: "Bakit po, sir?"35
In response, one of the police officers said: "May titingnan lang muna kami, baba muna kayo."36
after alighting from the vehicle, accused-appellant and his companions were frisked.37 Thereafter,
SPO2 Cabral noticed a brown clutch bag being held by Alvin and confiscated the same. SPO2
Cabral then asked accused-appellant if he can search the car. The latter agreed. SPO2 Cabral
searched the car for about 15 minutes but found nothing.38 SPO2 Cabral then opened the brown
clutch bag he confiscated from Alvin and found plastic sachets containing a white crystalline
substance. The police officers then instructed accused-appellant and his companions to board
their vehicle. They were all brought to Camp Crame.39 When they reached the said camp, they
were instructed to alight from the vehicle one by one. The first one to step out of the vehicle and
go inside the office was Alvin. After 20 minutes, the two women, Tess and Joy, were brought
inside the office and, after 30 minutes, accused-appellant, along with the two remaining
passengers, Willy and Jong-jong, followed.40
When they were all inside the NARCOM office, their personal circumstances were taken down.
Thereafter, Jong-jong, Willy and accused-appellant were separated from the group and placed
inside the detention cell. Alvin and the two women were left behind in the office and were later
on released.41 After a few hours, Jong-jong and Willy were brought out of the detention cell
while accused-appellant, who was then sleeping, was left in confinement. Jong-jong and Willy
were brought into the office and were made to sign a document on a yellow pad, prepared by the
police officers. The police officers then cautioned the two that they will be implicated in the case
if they interfered. They were then released and accompanied out to Camp Crame by a police
officer.42 Accused-appellant was the only one who remained in detention and was, subsequently,
solely charged for the illegal sale and possession of shabu.
While in detention, accused-appellant learned that the vehicle he borrowed from Jess Hipolito
was owned by a certain Evita Ebora, who was also detained in the Mandaluyong City Jail for a
drug-related offense.43
On November 17, 1997, the trial cour found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accuse LORETO MEDENILLA y
DORIA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16, in relation to
Section 20, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Said accused is hereby sentenced to: (a) with respect to Criminal Case

No. 3618-D, suffer an indeterminate sentence of a minimum of one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days, to a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional; (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 3619-D, suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and pay a fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00);
(c) suffer all the accessories penalties consequent thereto; and (d) pay the costs.
The shabu involved in this action is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and
ordered to be forwarded to the Dangerous Drugs Board to be disposed of in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.44
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following issues:
I. Was the accused arrested illegally?
II. Was there in fact any buy-bust operation?
III. Was the accused accorded his right to due process?45
Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and second issues jointly.
The defense insist that there was no prior agreement between accused-appellant and SPO2
Cabral for the sale of 5 grams of shabu on April 16, 1996 and that no buy bust operation actually
took place. The prosecution's claim that there was a buy-bust operation is, according to the
defense, belied by the testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus that when the
incident took place, accused-appellant was not alone but was accompanied by five (5) other
persons.46 thus, the defense argues that since there was no buy-bust operation, the arrest of
accused-appellant was illegal since the arresting officers were not properly armed with a warrant
of arrest.
Accused-appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. The prosecution through the
testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro adequately established the fact that there was a
legally conducted buy-bust operation. Their testimonies clearly showed that their confidential
informant reported the drug operations of accused-appellant; that a meeting took place between
accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral where they agreed on the sale of 5 grams of shabu; that the
NARCOM operatives planned a buy-bust operation; that the said operation was indeed
conducted; and that the same resulted in the arrest of accused-appellant and the confiscation of 5
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance. In this regard, the testimonies of the police
officers were given full credence by the trial court, to wit:
The prosecution witnesses gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension of accused Medenilla from the time Cabral was introduced to accused
Medenilla up to the buy-bust operation, which culminated in the arrest of accusedMedenilla. This Court can find no inconsistency in their testimonies and, as such, gives
full faith and credit thereto. In addition, it is to be noted that no evidence exists to show

that the law enforcers failed to perform their duty regularly. Neither was any evidence
presented to show that there was improper motive on the part of said witnesses to falsely
implicate accused Medenilla. On the contrary, it was established that they did not know
accused Medenilla prior to the buy bust operation. xxx47
The trial court's determination of the credibility of the police officers deserves the highest respect
by this court, considering that the trial court had the direct opportunity to observe their
deportment and manner of testifying.48 Furthermore, in the absence of any proof of any intent on
the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against accused-appellant,
the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro on the buy-bust operation are deserving of
belief due to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to law
enforcers.49 Clearly, accused-appellant's mere denial and concoction of another arrest scenario
cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the police officers.
Even the supposed corroborative testimony of Wilfredo de Jesus is not credible since the said
witness appeared to have been making a mockery of the proceedings before the lower court as
noted by the trial judge, to wit:
COURT:
You better refrain from smiling, I have been warning you. You keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Your Honor, because he laughs.(interrupted)
COURT:
No, he is laughing.
xxx
COURT:
And keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
He is smiling your Honor.
COURT:
No, he is not smiling, you can ask him. I do not understand why this guy is keep (sic) on
laughing.
Atty. Arias:

"Binabalaan ka na bata. Huwag kang tatawa, huwag kang ngingiti kundi magsalita ka ng
maayos at tiyak at tahasan."50
The testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus are not convincing since they are
replete with numerous inconsistencies and improbabilities. First, accused-appellant testified that
the Bakahan restaurant and the Music Box lounge they went to on the evening of April 15, 1996
are located in Quezon City.51 However, Wilfredo de Jesus claimed that the said establishments
are located in Mandaluyong.52 The divergence of their assertions on the location of these
establishments goes into the credibility of their claim that they were together with other people
and had a night out on the evening of April 15, 1996. Second, accused-appellant claimed that at
the time the police officers approached the car prior to the arrest, one of the officers requested
them to alight from the vehicle.53 On the other hand, Wilfredo de Jesus testified that when the
police officers approached them, they were forcibly pulled out of their vehicle.54 Their
inconsistency on this matter renders questionable the veracity of the claim of Wilfredo de Jesus
that he was present during the arrest of accused-appellant by the NARCOM operatives. Third,
their claim that they were at the parking lot of UCPB in Boni Avenue at around 3:00 o'clock in
the morning of April 16, 1996 to return the rented vehicle to Jess Hipolito is hard to believe.
Human experience dictates that one does not return a rented vehicle to its owner in the early
hours of the morning. Business transactions, such as returning a rented car, would ordinarily be
transacted during regular hours of work or, perhaps, even earlier but definitely not during the
hours of dawn. Fourth, both accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus claimed the improbable
scenario that, after they were accosted by the police officers, they were all brought to camp
Crame by riding the same vehicle they rented. If this is believed, then two unlikely situations are
made to appear. Either all the six original passengers boarded the vehicle along with a seventh
passenger, one of the NARCOM operatives who will ensure that they will proceed to the camp,
or only the six original passengers boarded the car to go to Camp Crame and they were just
escorted by the police officers who all rode another vehicle. The first situation is implausible
since a bantam car, like a Toyota Corolla, can only accommodate five, at most six, fully grown
adults but, definitely, not seven. On the other hand, the second situation is contrary to human
experience since it will not be in accord with good police operating procedure to allow a group
of suspects arrested for a drug-related offense to board a vehicle by themselves and drive the
same to the police headquarters.
Furthermore, if there were indeed five other passengers on board the vehicle aside from accusedappellant, why were they not charged or, at least, booked in the records of the NARCOM? No
proof, not even an allegation, was presented by the defense to reasonably explain why charges
were not lodged against these alleged other passengers. The most that accused-appellant did was
to claim in his appeal brief that the reason why the other suspects were not charged was because
the police officers feared that bad luck might befall them if all were charged. Thus, he argues:
xxx Due to the belief of karma, the Narcom operatives instead of filing case or cases
against all the other occupants of the car together with the accused, the Narcom
operatives filed only one case and that is against the accused and in open court denied the
presence of the other companions of the accused.55

Clearly, such type of reasoning and justification shows that accused-appellant is already grasping
at straws in order that he may be acquitted, through whatever allegation, legal or otherwise, of
the crimes he is charged with.
We now come to the third issue raised by accused-appellant that he was denied due process. In
this regard, accused-appellant claims that he was deprived of such constitutional right on the
following grounds:
a) the denial of the court a quo of the motion of the accused through his counsel to have
the questioned shabu quantitatively examined; and
b) the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the lower court.56
Accused-appellant admits the veracity of the quantitative test conducted by the PNP Crime
Laboratory on the 5 plastic containers of the white crystalline substance which resulted in the
issuance of Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96.57 This was stipulated upon by accusedappellant when the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. de Villa,
was presented as a witness, to wit:
Prosec. Paz:
The testimony of the witness is formally offered to prove in both cases, Crim. Cases No.
3618-D and 3619-D, that in Crim. Case 36180D that the white crystalline substance
which was sold by the accused Loreto Medenilla to the police operatives was examined
by the witness and found positive to the test of shabu and weighs 5.08 grams and in
Crim. Case No. 3619-D to prove that accused Loreto Medenilla y Doria that the four (4)
transparent plastic bags found in the possession of the accused with a total weight of
200.45 grams was found positive to the test of shabu as examined by the witness, your
Honor.
May we know from counsel for the accused if he is willing to enter into a stipulation?
COURT:
Atty. Arias, are you willing to enter into stipulation?
Atty. Arias:
I will admit that the witness is an expert, second, I admit that there was an examination
conducted by her and that the result of her examination was reduced into writing.
COURT:
And it was found positive that the specimen submitted to the crime lab was shabu.
Atty. Arias:

Yes, your Honor, according to the examination and I will also state for the record that the
witness does not know where the specimen came from, how the specimen came into
being.
xxx
Prosec. Paz:
May we request counsel for the accused to admit the authenticity and veracity of this
document prepared by witness after examining the specimen and the findings as stated in
the initial laboratory report.
Atty. Arias:
As we have stated earlier, your Honor, that the result of her examination was reduced into
writing, this is the result of the examination, so be it, your Honor.
xxx
Prosec. Paz:
May we also request that the counsel will admit the weights of the specimens as found by
the forensic chemist.
Atty. Arias:
Everything is written in the document.58
However, despite this admission, accused-appellant filed a motion to require the forensic chemist
to conduct a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis on the subject menthamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu to determine its purity.59 The trial court, after the prosecution filed its
Comment/Opposition60 to the motion, issued an Order, dated March 17, 1997, denying the
motion, to wit:
This resolves the motion filed by the accused through his counsel praying that the
forensic chemist be required to conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis on the
subject methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Records will show (TSN dated October 23, 1996) that the defense counsel, with the
express conformity of the accused, had agreed to enter into stipulations or admissions of
facts concerning the nature, quality and quantity of the specimens submitted for chemical
analysis. The results of said analysis indicated that said specimens were positive to the
test for shabu, and they weighed 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively. These results were
explicitly admitted by both the accused and his counsel. The only matter that was not
admitted was the alleged source of the stuff, it being denied that it was found in and taken
from the possession of the accused. The defense counsel who was given the opportunity

to cross-examine raised the forensic chemist when she was presented, never raised the
issue or even suggested that what was examined could not have been pure shabu, and that
if such was the case, it was necessary to determine which part is shabu and which was
otherwise. It appears that this idea is merely an after-thought. To the mind of the Court,
the attempt to have the specimens examine at this stage of the action, when the
prosecution had already terminated the presentation of its evidence and is, in fact, about
to make a written formal offer of exhibits, can have no other purpose than to repudiate the
findings of the forensic chemist, which had already been previously admitted. This
cannot be permitted bythe Court as it detracts from the full respect that must be accorded
to judicial admissions that have been freely and intelligently made. As correctly observed
by the prosecution, said judicial admissions are conclusive and binding upon the accused.
The judicial admission that the stuff submitted for analysis, weighing 5.08 and 200.45
grams, respectively, are indeed shabu forecloses any further challenge as to its alleged
purity. To speculate at this stage of the action that the stuff is not pure shabu is to virtually
repudiate the findings of the forensic chemist, previously admitted without any
qualification that the stuff analysed were indeed such illegal drug. This can no longer be
permitted by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DENIED for lack of merit.61
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that he should have been allowed by the trial court
to have the shabu subjected to a quantitative test by the PNP Crime Laboratory. He argues that
such a test is crucial in view of the nature of the penalties for the violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, which are graduated depending on the amount of regulated or
prohibited drugs involved in a case. Accused-appellant claims that a quantitative test will
definitely show that the shabu involved herein is not pure and, as such, is less than 200 grams
contrary to the assertion of the prosecution that it is 200.45 grams. He anchors this argument on
the contention that shabu is never 100% pure but, at most, is only 85% unadulterated.62
We find that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying the motion. When the
defense stipulated with the prosecution that the results of the laboratory examination, as reflected
in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96, were true and correct, the accused-appellant, in
effect, admitted that the substance examine was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride having
a weight of 5.08 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3618-D, and 200.45 grams, for Criminal Case No.
3619-D. Accused-appellant made no qualifications on the veracity of the PNP Crime
Laboratory's finding on the total weight of the examined shabu. In fact, no cross-examination
was conducted by accused-appellant's counsel on the witness, P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa,
regarding this matter. Thus, when the defense tried to renege on the previous stipulation by filing
a motion requesting for a quantitative test on the shabu involved herein, the trial court was
correct in denying the same.
Furthermore, in the case of People vs. Barita,63 we held that there is no need to examine the
entirety of the submitted specimen since the sample testing is representative of the whole
specimen, we held:

We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted of
selling 2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that Republic
Act 7659 impose a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity of drugs seized or taken.
This court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to be
representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accusedappellant.64
This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai Hui,65 thus:
To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a substance weighing 992.3 grams.
This amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law to warrant the
imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating, circumstances, the
death penalty. Appellants however foist the probability that the substance sold could
contain additives or adulterants, and not just methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the
actual weight of pure shabu could be less than 992.3 grams, thereby possibly reducing the
imposable penalty.
The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:
Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were not done for the entire amount
of drugs allegedly found inside the bags. It is suggested that since the law,
Republic Act No. 7659, imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or quantity of
drugs seized or taken, then laboratory test should be undertaken for the entire
amount or quantity of drugs seized in order to determine the proper penalty to be
imposed.
The argument is quaint and even borders on being ridiculous. In the present case,
even assuming that the confirmatory tests were conducted on samples taken from
only one (1) of the plastic packages, accused-appellant's arguments must still fail.
It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages weighed 1.1 kilograms, an
amount more than sufficient to justify imposing the penalty under Sec. 14 of Rep.
Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. A sample taken from one (1) of
he packages is logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the
package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant. Therefore, a positive
result for the presence of drugs is indicative that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in
the plastic package from which the sample was taken. If it is then proved, beyond
reasonable doubt, xxx that accused appellant transported into the Philippines the
plastic packages from which samples were taken for tests, and found positive as
prohibited drugs, then conviction for importing "shabu" is definitely in order.
Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, it can be presumed that the entire substance is shabu. The burden of
evidence shifts to the accused who must prove otherwise. Appellants in this case have not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.

It is clear, therefore, that when accused-appellant stipulated that the weight of the examined
specimens for Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D totaled 5.08 and 200.45 grams,
respectively, he in effect admitted that the said amounts of shabu are pure and unadulterated.
Moreover, accused-appellant made no reservations as to his admission on the veracity of the
results as reflected in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96. His only concern, at that time,
was to make it clear that the forensic scientist who examined the confiscated substance was not
aware of where the specimen came from.66 This was in accord with the theory of the defense that
it was not accused-appellant but a companion, Alvin, who was in possession of the confiscated
substance. Thus, due to the absence of any reservation on the total weight of the shabu examined,
accused-appellant can no longer be heard to go back on his previous admission by requesting a
quantitative test of the same.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant argues that a quantitative test should be allowed in view of an
alleged circular issued by this Court sometime in 1996 directing the PNP Crime Laboratory to
conduct a qualitative and a quantitative examination on all illegal drugs submitted to the said
office in relation to a case.67
This argument of accused-appellant is totally bereft of any legal basis. This Court never issued
any such circular requiring the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct quantitative and qualitative
tests on substances which they examine. It is clear that this argument was resorted to by counsel
for the defense in order to mislead the trial court and this court into acquitting his client. This
contemptuous conduct of counsel for the defense will be dealt with appropriately.
Accused-appellant also claims that the biased attitude of the trial judge deprived him of due
process. In this regard, he cites in his appeal brief a single instance when the judge allegedly
revealed his bias, to wit:
COURT:
Mark it.
Q What happened after the accused handed to you one pack of crystalline substance?
A Immediately, I switched on our voyager pager which prompted my backup to subdue
the suspect and introduce ourselves as Anti Narcotics police, sir.
COURT:
By the way, did you not give the money to the accused when he handed to you the
alleged substance?
A I gave it to him, your honor.
COURT:

So the money was already in the possession of the accused when you received the shabu
from him.
A Yes, your Honor.68
We fail to see how this single noted instance of questioning can justify a claim that the trial judge
was biased. We have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined
that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover,
a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the purpose of
which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. Thus, in Zheng Bai Hui, we said:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense
in an effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a
charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction,
or that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded
a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are
judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of
their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a
proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as
will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the
witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may
propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony
may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be
taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain
truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.69
The sale of less than 200 grams of methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, is
punishable with a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, depending on
the quantity.70 Thus, if the regulated drug weighs less than 66.67 grams, then the penalty is
prision correctional, if 66.67 grams or more but less than 133.33 grams then the penalty is
prision mayor, and if 133.33 grams or more but less than 200 grams then the penalty is reclusion
temporal. In Criminal Case No. 3618-D, the amount of shabu involved weighs 5.08 grams, as
such the appropriate penalty is prision correccional. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period or from 2 years, 4 months and
1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty
shall be within the range of prision correccional medium and the minimum penalty shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed or, in this case, arresto mayor. It is,
therefore, clear from the foregoing that the trial committed an error in imposing an indeterminate
sentence of 1 year, 8 months and 20 days, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months, as maximum, of
prision correccional. Accordingly, this must be modified.
On the other hand, the possession of 200 grams or more of shabu carries with it the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)

to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Since no aggravating circumstance attended the

commission of the offense, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, was correct in imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria is hereby found GUILTY of
violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
and hereby sentenced: (a) in Criminal Case No. 3618-D, to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6
months of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional; and (b) in Criminal
Case No. 3619-D, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days
why he should not be cited in contempt for citing an inexistent circular in his pleadings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122389 June 19, 1997

MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
(PAL), respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Assailed in the petition for certiorari before us is the Resolution of the public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission 1 (hereinafter NLRC) reversing the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter 2 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10- 05750-91 finding the dismissal of
petitioner Miguel Singson illegal and ordering his reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent in an Order dated June
27, 1995.
The antecedent facts reveal that petitioner Singson was employed by private
respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter PAL) as Traffic Representative
Passenger, Handling Division. His duty consisted of checking in passengers and
baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991, petitioner was assigned to serve the
check-in counter of Japan Air Lines (hereinafter JAL) the for Flight 742. Among the
passengers checked in by him was Ms. Lolita Kondo who was bound for Narita, Japan.
After checking in, Ms. Kondo lodged a complaint alleging that petitioner required her to
pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage without issuing any receipt. A confrontation
took place where petitioner was asked by the security officer to empty his pockets. The
dollars paid by Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession. However, when the lower
panel of the check-in counter he was manning was searched, the sum of two hundred
sixty five dollars (US $265) was found therein consisting of two (2) one hundred dollar
bills, one (1) fifty dollar bill, one (1) ten dollar bill and one (1) five dollar bill. Petitioner
was administratively charged and investigated formed by a committee formed by private
respondent PAL. 3
In an affidavit presented to the investigators, Ms. Kondo declared that she was with
three (3) Japanese friends when she checked in on June 7, 1991, for their flight to
Narita, Japan. While in line, a man approached her and told her that she had excess
baggage. She denied the allegation since the pieces of baggage did not only belong to
her but also to her Japanese companions. The man did not believe that the Japanese
were her companions and he charged that she just approached them at the airport. To
settle the matter, he told her to give him two hundred dollars (US $200) and he
apologized for their argument. She gave him one (1) one hundred dollar bill and two (2)
fifty dollar bills or a total of two hundred dollars (US $200) as excess baggage fee. She

placed the money at the side of his counter desk and he covered it with a piece of
paper. He did not issue a receipt. She then reported the matter to JAL's representative.
Ms. Kondo identified the employee who checked her in as the petitioner. 4
In his affidavit, petitioner admitted that he was the one who checked in Ms. Kondo and
her Japanese companions. They checked in five (5) pieces of luggage which weighed
80 kilos and within the allowed limit for check-in baggage. He attached the claim checks
to the jacket of their tickets, returned the tickets and passport to Ms. Kondo. He then
heard an altercation involving a woman passenger with excess hand-carried baggage
who was being charged for it; she was insisting she had paid for it in the counter but
could not produce a receipt. The passenger turned out to be Ms. Kondo and she was
accusing Cocoy Gabriel as the one who charged her for excess baggage. Mr. Gabriel at
that time was assigned at the THAI Airways counter, hence, it was impossible that a
passenger for a JAL flight would pay him US $200. Petitioner was talking to the JAL's
representative when two PAL employees and Ms. Kondo approached them. He was told
of Ms. Kondo's claim that she paid the excess baggage fee to him. Petitioner was
surprised at the accusation since Ms. Kondo had no excess baggage when she
checked in. 5
The investigation committee found petitioner guilty of the offense charged and
recommended his dismissal. Private respondent PAL adopted the committee's
recommendation and dismissed him from the service effective June 7, 1991. 6
On September 12, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint against respondent PAL before
the NLRC-NCR for illegal dismissal, attorney's fees and damages. The case was
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91 and raffled off to then Labor Arbiter
Raul T . Aquino. Aquino found the evidence adduced by private respondent PAL in
terminating petitioner's employment insufficient. Aquino declared petitioner's dismissal
illegal and ordered his reinstatement with backwages. Respondent PAL appealed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. On May 19, 1995, the Second Division of public
respondent NLRC, composed of Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay, Rogelio I.
Rayala and Raul T . Aquino as presiding commissioner, promulgated its Resolution
reversing the decision of then Labor Arbiter Aquino and dismissing the complaint
against respondent PAL. Petitioner filed on June 5, 1995, a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution and an Amended Motion for
Reconsideration on June 15, 1995. Public respondent NLRC, thru the Second Division
with only two commissioners taking part, namely, Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala,
denied the motion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where petitioner
submits the following assignment of errors:

I. Public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
jurisdiction when the Hon. Raul T. Aquino, in his capacity as Presiding Commissioner of
the Second Division of the NLRC and as a member thereof, participated actively in the
promulgation of the aforesaid decision and in the consultation of the members thereof in
reaching the conclusion before it was assigned to the ponente, Hon. Calaycay.
II. Public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion as in fact it exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared the affidavit of Lolita Kondo sufficient to declare his dismissal
from employment legal even without any cross-examination during the investigation
conducted by Philippine Air Lines.
III. Public respondent NLRC seriously and gravely erred amounting to abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of its jurisdiction when it declared in the assailed decision that the
quantum of evidence necessary to justify the supreme penalty of dismissal of the
petitioner have been complied with, and in not imposing the burden of proving the legality
of the dismissal of the petitioner.

We find merit in this petition.

Petitioner assails the Resolution of the public respondent NLRC on account of
Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal his
own decision as labor arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91. Respondents
contend that Commissioner Aquino's failure to inhibit himself is a harmless error that will
not infirm the subject resolution. We do not agree. In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 7 we laid down the requisites of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself;
(4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate; (7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. In addition, administrative due
process includes (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of
the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to
appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his
favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that
tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least
ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. 8 It is self-evident from the ruling
case law that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person

whose decision is the subject of review. Thus, we have ruled that "the reviewing officer
must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review. 9
In the case at bar, we hold that petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner
Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a
former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, 10 each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act
as the Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers
sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation
and impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3)
commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who
decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation
in this case.
Prescinding from this premise, the May 19, 1995 resolution of the respondent NLRC is
void for the Division that handed it down was not composed of three impartial
commissioners. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion
for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the
participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his
appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial
tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an
impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner's right to an impartial
review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the Second Division of the NLRC dated May 19,
1995 and its Order dated June 27, 1995 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91 is
SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the NLRC for further proceedings. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159190

June 30, 2005

CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with application for temporary
restraining order, seeks to nullify the Ombudsmans disapproval of the memorandum1 dated 03
November 1999 of Special Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654, as well as the memorandum2 dated 09
June 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident
Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, on his investigation regarding an alleged

unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G)
under Savings Account No. 365-5355-6-4.
The report, as summarized by Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus A. Micael, is as follows:3
. . . [I]n the morning of 17 July 1992, Emilio P. Montesa (Bank Executive Officer of PNB Cebu)
handed a note to Jane Rita Jecong (Cashier) instructing her to include her cash requisition for the
day from Central Bank Cebu, the amount of P2.2 M at P1,000.00 denomination; that on 20
July 1992 at about past 10:00 A.M., Juanito Mata (Cashier III), upon the instruction of Cayetano
A. Tejano Jr. (Vice President and Branch Manager of PNB Cebu), took the P2.2 M from Ms.
Jecong and delivered the same to Mr. Tejano; that at about noontime of same day, Mr. Mara
handed to Ms. Jecong a pre-signed withdrawal slip against SA No. 365-535506-4 under the name
of V & G Better Homes for the same amount to replace the cash withdrawn and to serve as cashon-hand at the end of the days transaction; that the withdrawal slip was approved by Mr. Tejano
and was postdated 21 July 1992; that as of 20 July 1992 V & G Better Homes SA No. 365535506-4 has only P33,436.78; that in the afternoon of 20 July 1992 the amount of
P2,336,563.32 (consisting of P2,200,000.00 in cash; P100,000.00 in check; and P36,563.22 in
withdrawal slip) was received by Teller Mary Ann Aznar as payment for the loan of V & G
Better Homes for which PNB Official Receipt No. 952981E was issued; that the transaction was
recognized as an increase in PNB Cebu Branchs cash-on-hand and a decrease in the loan
account of V & G Better Homes; that the PNB Cebu Credit Committee approved the loan at the
rate of 23% lower than the 26% interest rate on its first renewal and 27% on its second renewal;
that the loan proceeds was credited to the account of V & G Better Homes on 21 July 1992, the
same day that the withdrawal slip of P2.2 M was taken by Mr. Montesa from Ms. Jecong and
given to Irene Abellanosa to be taken as her transaction for the day; and that upon the instruction
of Montesa, Savings Account No. 365-535506-4 of V & G Better Homes was debited and the
withdrawal slip was validated by Teller Abellanosa although no actual cash withdrawal was
made.
The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano,
Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane
Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz
of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds.
In an order dated 22 December 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
ordered Tejano, Montesa, Jecong, Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz to file their respective
counter-affidavits.4
In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton
recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019,5 as amended, against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente

dela Cruz of V&G.6 The case against Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for lack of evidence.
The resolution was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III Orlando I. Ines of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
In a Memorandum7 dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of Graft Investigation
Officer Edgardo G. Canton.
On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer recommended the approval of
the memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer Ines.
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the
approval of Ferrer.8 Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez concurred thereto on 11 November 1994.
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed as Criminal Case No.
21654.
On 08 December 1994, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of
Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation.
In an order dated9 12 December 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation.
On 22 December 1994, petitioner filed his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
On 20 April 1995, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation.10 The reinvestigation was assigned to Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus
Micael.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and
Vicente dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum11 dated 03 November 1999,
recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special
Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the
dismissal of the case with the marginal note "assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute
the case aggressively."

On 02 February 2000, Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a
copy of his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman
Desierto of his recommendation to dismiss the case.
On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by
Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael.
Apparently, petitioners motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27
June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for
Arraignment alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due course to the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that the results of the reinvestigation were already submitted
to the respondent court before receiving the motion for reconsideration.12
Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutors failure to
resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution13 dated 24 March 2003, the
respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion.
In a memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the
denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E.
Kallos changed his previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal
of the motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio
concurring in the denial.
On 14 July 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when
he retired, approved Joselito Ferrers memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 25 August 2003, the First Division of this Court issued the temporary restraining order
prayed for.
On 28 July 2004, the instant petition was transferred to the Second Division of this Court.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISAPPROVED THE EARLIER
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST ALL THE
ACCUSED WITHOUT ANY COGENT OR VERIFIABLE REASON AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY:
1. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE
DISAPPROVAL OF THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1999 AGAINST ALL
ACCUSED FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS MANDATED UNDER SECTION 13
R.A. 6770 IN RELATION TO SECTION 3, RULE 112 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
2. THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROCECUTOR DID NOT DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN A RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FOR APPROVAL BY THE NEW OMBUDSMAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS A CLEAR CASE OF
PERSECUTION AND NOT PROSECUTION CONTEMPLATED UNDER R.A. 3019, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1374 AND CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII, BOOK II OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.
Ruling of the Court
Quite apart from the above, we find a focal issue apparently glossed over by the parties - whether
or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving the 03
November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 21654 against petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz
of V&G for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, where he had earlier participated in
the preliminary investigation of the said criminal case recommending the filing of the
information.
This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, and respect the
initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who "beholden to no one, acts as the

champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service."15 Such discretionary
power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court to review, save in cases where
there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of
the latter.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.16
Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner attributes
partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the
instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of
the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing
of the information before the Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who reviews a case on
appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. 17 In Zambales Chromite
Mining Company v. Court of Appeals,18 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an
appeal of the Secretarys own previous decision, which he handed down while he was yet the
incumbent Director of Mines. We have equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second
Division of the National Labor Relations Commission, because one of its members,
Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of the case which he had earlier decided
on as a former labor arbiter.19 Likewise, this Court struck down a decision of Presidential
Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which
he, then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred.20
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having
recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to
recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should
have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770, which
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
...

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as
shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions and duties herein or
hereinafter provided; . . .
In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was already
convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It becomes a
farfetched possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would make
a turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding.
Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on
appeal.21 We take our bearings from Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals22 which
succinctly explained that:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view
since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government23 concedes the applicability of
the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus:
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the
judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from
handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This
is an instance when appearance is as important as reality.
The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a preliminary
investigation. This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the former Revised Administrative
Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has supervision over the prosecution arm of the government,
is given ample power to designate another prosecutor to handle the investigation and prosecution
of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise disqualified by personal interest, or
is unable or fails to perform his duty. (Underlining supplied)
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desiertos disapproval of the 03
November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo,
does not cure the infirmity of Ombudsman Desiertos actuation. As stressed in Singson v.
NLRC:24

. . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration
of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of
Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the
time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners.
The denial of petitioners right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It
negated his right to due process. (Underlining supplied)
With the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Ombudsmans disapproval of the memorandum dated 03 November 1999,
where Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654, as well as the memorandum dated 09 June 2003, which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
Office of the Ombudsman for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 138874-75

January 31, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERT CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL
BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias 'TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES
ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM,"
Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over ones action.1 Our
legal system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it sees youthful
misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we
have applied the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some extent of leniency in
favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is presumed to have acted with less discernment.
The case at bar is another instance when the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must
apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration2 filed by brothers James Anthony and James
Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed upon the latter
on the ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.

On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with

Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag of
the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal
Cases Nos. CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA
alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY;
ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA
alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY;
ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a
minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages; and (d)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as
it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law
is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration anchored on the
following grounds:
I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES
ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY
HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN,
CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED
THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.4
The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by Larraaga, Aznar,
Adlawan, Cao and Balansag in their separate motions for reconsideration, we deemed it
appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a painstaking evaluation of every piece and specie
of evidence presented before the trial court in response to the movants plea for the reversal of
their conviction, still we are convinced that the movants guilt has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we denied all the motions.
However, left unresolved is the issue of James Andrews minority.
Hence, this disquisition.
In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and two
hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed. To substantiate such
claim, he begs leave and pleads that we admit at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate
of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. In the
ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
Considering that the entry of James Andrews birth in the proffered Certificate of Live Birth is
not legible, we required the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the City Civil Registrar of
Cotobato, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Certificate
of Live Birth, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers motion, solely
on the issue of James Andrews minority.

On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his comment.1wphi1 Attached
therewith are clear and legible copies of James Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the
Office of the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both documents
bear the entry October 27, 1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed only 17
years and 262 days old when the crimes were committed on July 16, 1997.
Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed on James Andrew be
modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be reduced to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his brother James Anthony in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the
paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower
than the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion
perpetua.5 On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is
reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion temporal.6 There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.7

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty
upon him is twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our Decision dated
February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. CBU45303, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 138874-75 July 21, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL
BALANSAG, DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG"; JAMES
ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", AccusedAppellants.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco Juan
Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4)
James Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004
convicting them of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal
Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO
alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious

illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by
lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias
PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO
alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at
the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period,
as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in
each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as
it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law
is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.
SO ORDERED."
Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:
A. LARRAAGA
"I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN
FROM TESTIFYING;
II
THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;

III
LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE;
V
THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY; AND
VI
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS."1
B. AZNAR
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE
WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF RUSIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT
AZNAR.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
APPELLANTS."2
C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO
"I
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE WITNESS
UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

II
RUSIAS TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE
INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.
III
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY
THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
IV
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."3
D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY
"I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES
ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY
HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN,
CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED
THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;"4
In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larraaga submitted a
separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the
examination conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan,
Carcar is inadequate.
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration5, Aznar submitted to this Court the Affidavit
dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was flawed;
(2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but because he
had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment6 praying that the four (4)
motions for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He
responded to appellants assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our
challenged Decision.

In his consolidated comment7 to Aznars supplemental motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor
General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarins Affidavit should not be given consideration.
On February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General "read out of
context" certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his
arrest, there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a
rejoinder stating that Aznars reply "actually supports the undersigned counsels (Solicitor
Generals) position that Atty. Villarins Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or
at least even acquit them on reasonable doubt," thus, "it would be useless to call for new trial on
the basis of such Affidavit." On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the
Affidavit should be given due consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James Andrews alleged
minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not
impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant
which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and
evaluated in our Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco,8 we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a
reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the
arguments advanced by the movant."
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larraaga, Aznar,
Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric
matters demanding new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth
in their respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered
the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it necessary to
stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.
The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:
This Court erred
first, in according credence to Rusias testimony;
second, in rejecting appellants alibi;
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded the
testimony of other defense witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.

In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its entirety.
The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus,
averting general conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a
criminal case opens its entire records for review.9
I
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusias testimony hook, line
and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that
Rusias testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to Rusias testimony, the
trial court took into consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of
other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial courts findings.
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusias testimony worthy of
belief is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the
highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.10 The
presence of Marijoys ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her
mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly
bolstered Rusias testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan.
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness
who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its
corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando
Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacquelines two failed attempts to escape from appellants
near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person
who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997.
Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nenes Store while the
white van, driven by Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of
"quarreling male and female" emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and
Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larraaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of
July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusias narration. Now, with such
strong anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why
should we not accord credence to Rusias testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing
alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered
with the other evidence presented by the prosecution.
II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial courts rejection of their
alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.11 Being evidence
that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.12 On top of its inherent
weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or
close friends of the accused.13

This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants alibi
supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other
end is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were
not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that
the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants
failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place.14 They failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence
is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the
vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical
impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane
from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the
defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning,
afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was
proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one
of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson
testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach
Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of
Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows
Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on
the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline
talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as
Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her
office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at
Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo
Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about
3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van.15
And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of the participes
criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we are
convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes
and was one of the principal perpetrators thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larraaga was charged
with or complained of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before the
abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about
Larraagas attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic.
It happened just near the gate of Rochelles school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a
portion of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:
"ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:

Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a
Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of San
Carlos,P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander
Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High
School, and for the record, I will read the content:
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high school student of your
University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are writing your good office about an
untoward incident involving our daughter and another student of your school.
xxxxxx
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates, Michelle Amadar and
Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a ride home near the school campus, a black
Honda Civic with five young male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside
them, and simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to
get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted and got away from him. Sensing some people
were watching what they were doing, they hurriedly sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still now, she is suffering the shock and
tension that she is not supposed to experience in her young life. It is very hard for us
parents to think about what shed been through."16
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larraagas
chance of securing an acquittal.
III
Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial courts exclusion of Professor
Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses.
Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an
archaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of
the exhibits already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the trial
court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental
motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and
conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was
the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The trial
court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his intended testimony. Indeed, we
agree with the Solicitor Generals observation that such Affidavit "is neither helpful nor
encouraging to Aznars cause." We quote his keen reflection on the matter:
"xxxxxx

Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof, acknowledged that the body
found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with
accused-appellant Aznars claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not
Marijoys. Surely, something is amiss in accused-appellant Aznars recollection of his defense.
Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused-appellant Francisco
Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this
Honorable Courts findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.
Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarins affidavit, he stated that: The arrest of Juzman Aznar
was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case because witnesses came out
and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those allegedly seen talking to the victims on the
night they disappeared. Hence, accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a firstgrade suspect in the Chiong sisters celebrated abduction and killing.
Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: x x x I did not take this
against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman Aznar as we were
already placing him under surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest
desire to help solve the crime x x x. Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the
investigation that the police undertook in the subject crimes.
Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged influence peddling
by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of the
lawyers and police officers who unearthed the evidence against accused-appellants and
successfully prosecuted the latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin
would want to impress that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarins inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due solely to the
prosecutions action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an argument openly discussed in
court. Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the defense
lawyers who did everything to make a mockery of the criminal proceedings.
And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarins affidavit of the quality of a "smoking gun" that
would acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the
police investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and short of his miniscule role in the
instant case. Indeed, judging by the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in
case a new trial is held on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except
his own unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his selfcongratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion
when almost everyone else did."17
Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show that the
examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot
be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larraaga
could have produced it during trial had he wished to.

IV
Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia testimony, appellants
endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan,
Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to
such argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,18 a fingerprint expert, testified that the
fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy.19 Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff
found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were
being detained.20 Third, the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was
abducted.21 And fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be
that of Marijoy22 which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the
ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very
moment, appellants still fail to bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a claim on
the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other families who had lost someone of
similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and claimed the body. The above
circumstances only bolster Rusias narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep
ravine, following Josmans instruction "to get rid" of her.
On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years
and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records
bear that on March 1, 1999, James Andrews birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as
part of the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence,23 with the statement that he was eighteen (18)
years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the
Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17)
years old.24
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the proceedings
his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal
Certificate. He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely
difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a
significant factor in the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General
(a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics
Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an
extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James
Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there being
nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of evaluating every
piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to appellants plea for
the reversal of their conviction. But, even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by
appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions.

Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of
appellants clear culpability which demands retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The
Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City,
as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth
Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the motion
for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews
claim of minority. The motion is likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-69640-45 April 30, 1985

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, AS CITY MAYOR OF GINGOOG CITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE CESAR R. AZURA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXVI, 10th JUDICIAL REGION MEDINA, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FIRST DIVISION

In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner, as City Mayor of Gingoog City, seeks to annul
respondent Judge's Order denying the Motion for Inhibition which he (petitioner) had
filed.

The grounds advanced for the inhibition of respondent Judge from hearing, deciding
and issuing Orders in any of the seven pending cases 1 in his Court wherein the City of
Gingoog, its officials, including petitioner, are parties, may be summarized as follows:
1. Loss of trust and confidence in the competence and impartiality of respondent Judge,
particularly in view of the administrative complaints filed against him by petitioner and
others before this Court.
2. Entertaining suits assailing the validity of auction sales of tax delinquent properties by
issuing restraining orders enjoining the City Treasurer of Gingoog City from proceeding
with the auction sales of said properties when under Sec. 64 and 83 of P.D. 464, the
remedy to stay execution of auction sales of tax delinquent properties is by paying the
tax, pursuant to Sec. 74 of P.D. 464, supra, and not by issuance of restraining orders;
3. Bias, oppressive dispensation of justice, and abuse of his power of contempt in
ordering the arrest of petitioner and the members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
Gingoog City and imposing upon them an excessive fine of P10,000.00 and an excessive
bond of P50,000.00 when the claim for salary was only for P5,000.00, and by
sensationalizing their arrest with the aid of the Provincial Commander at Campa Alagar,
Cagayan de Oro City, as if they were hardened criminals and fugitives from justice, for
the purpose of embarrassing them before the public.
4. Issuing of Orders against the interests of the City of Gingoog.

Respondent Judge denied the Petition for Inhibition on the ground that loss of trust and
confidence by petitioner in his neutrality is unfounded, notwithstanding the
administrative charges filed against him, and that the plea for inhibition was prompted
more because the "City Attorney (petitioner's counsel) appears to have persisted in his
grotesque arguments and haughty conduct in his subsequent pleadings which already
constitute direct contempt for which he may be cognizant of his inevitable punishment,
and for which reason he now entertains the resultant fears from his own indiscretions, to
appear before this presiding judge."
Petitioner assails said Order denying inhibition for having been issued despotically,
whimsically, and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondent Judge, in his Comment filed pursuant to this
Court's requirement, states:
1. He merely followed the provisions of Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, in resolving
petitioner's Motion for Inhibition, there being no legal ground for him to inhibit himself from
proceeding to hear any of the several cases therein enumerated;
2. In regard to the tax cases, he submits that if, indeed, he has no jurisdiction, the proper
remedy is not a petition for inhibition but an action for prohibition in accordance with Sec.
2, Rule 65;

As regards the cases of Barro v. City of Gingoog and Rafael Rodriguez v. City of
Gingoog, he had rendered the corresponding decisions which had already attained
finality for lack of appeal; although in the Barro case, a petition for review is pending
before the IAC;
In the case of Ayensa v. Paderanga involving a public high school teacher, who was not
paid his salaries although he was continually rendering services, he had ordered
petitioner to pay the aforesaid salaries, but since the Order was defied, petitioner and
other officials were cited for contempt pursuant to the Rules.

Considering the antagonistic positions taken by the parties in their respective pleadings,
and, particularly, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner, which prompted
him and others to file administrative charges against respondent Judge, we advert to
this Court's guidelines on the matter of inhibition in Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-27934, 21
SCRA 160 [1967], prescribing as follows:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw
attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try
and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of
the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with
bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self- examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the
fairness and integrity of the judge ... 2
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the
cases enumerated in paragraph 4 of the Petition involving the City of Gingoog or its
officials, including petitioner. The venue of said cases is hereby transferred to Cagayan
de Oro City each to be assigned by raffle to the Regional Trial Courts thereat. SO
ORDERED

G.R. No. L-52241 November 19, 1984

PEDRO M. AZUL, doing business under the names and styles of JERLYN
TRADING & CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES & BERLYN SERVICE CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX at Quezon City, and ROSALINDA P. TECSON,
respondents.

Edmundo A. Baculi for petitioner.

Benjamin Grecin for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner raises due process questions in this petition for certiorari contending that
the respondent court gravely abused its discretion-(l) when it denied a motion to lift an
order of default issued seven (7) days before the petitioner received the order to file
responsive pleading; (2) when it denied a motion for new trial or reconsideration on the
ground that it was pro-forma; (3) when it rendered a decision, not supported by the facts
and the law, granting a total amount of P1,187,615.69 covering the principal and
damages in a connection case for only P250,092.55; (4) when it issued orders denying
an extension of time to file the record on appeal and dismissing the appeal; and (5)
when it issued a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P250,000.00 with no basis
for the allegation that he is about to remove or dispose of his properties to further
defraud his creditors.
On March 14, 1979, respondent Rosalinda Tecson filed a complaint for collection of the
sum of P250,092.55 with interests. Tecson also prayed for P100,000.00 actual and
compensatory damages, P500,000.00 moral damages, exemplary damages as may be
proved during the trial, twenty five percent (25%) attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs. The complaint alleged that Tecson, on various occasions, loaned a total of
P391,822.78 to Azul to finance the latter's deliveries of supplies and construction
materials to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As inducement for the loans in addition
to her share of the profits, the private respondent alleged that she was authorized to
collect the checks due to Azul from the AFP Finance Center. However, Tecson was able
to collect only P141,730.23 thus leaving a balance of P250,092.55, subject matter of the
suit filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City, then presided by Judge
Ulpiano Sarmiento.
The copy of the complaint was received by petitioner Azul on March 27, 1979. On April
10, 1979, the petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for extension of time to file a
responsive pleading. He asked for fifteen (15) days from April 11, 1979.
Judge Sarmiento having retired, Judge Lino Anover took over the sala temporarily and
gave Azul only five (5) days from April 11, 1979 within which to file his responsive
pleading.

Unfortunately, the petitioner received this order dated April 11, 1979 to declare the
petitioner in default since the extended period had expired.
On April 18, 1979, respondent Judge Jose Castro over the sala vacated by Judge
Sarmiento. Among his acts on that first day in office was an order declaring Azul in
default and directing the presentation of evidence ex-parte before the branch clerk of
court "at such time and date convenient to both."
The reception of evidence was conducted by the court's commissioner on April 19,
1979. On April 27, 1979, the respondent court rendered the questioned decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff as
follows:
a. The sum of P250,092.55 the principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from the date of filing of the complaint on March 14, 1979 until fully paid;
b. the sum of P100,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages in both causes of
action;
c. the sum of P350,000.00 as moral damages in both causes of action;
d. the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages in both causes of action;
e. the sum equivalent to 25% percent of the total claims involved in all the causes of
action in the complaint as attorney's fees;
f. to pay the expenses of litigation and costs of suit.

On May 2, 1979, petitioner Azul, as yet unaware of the decision, filed a motion to lift the
order of default. Together with the motion, he also filed his answer.
On May 7, 1979, the decision adverse to the petitioner was received by his counsel.
On June 6, 1979, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial.
On July 20, 1979, the court issued an order denying the motion to lift the order of default
followed by another order on July 24, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration or
new trial.
On August 1, 1979, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and a motion for
extension of time to file his record on appeal.

On August 3, 1979, the respondent court denied the motion for extension of time to file
record on appeal stating that the motion was filed late. The petitioner asked that this
denial be reconsidered because the decision was actually received on May 7, 1979.
The petitioner explained that the date "May 5, 1979" given as the date of receipt was a
clerical error and, therefore, the motion for extension of time to file record on appeal
was filed within the reglementary period.
On August 7, 1979, the court reconsidered its earlier denial and stated, "while the
instant motion is not sufficiently meritorious, if only to give the defendant a final chance
to ventilate his case on appeal and in the interest of justice, said defendant is given ten
(10) days from receipt of this order within which to file his record on appeal.
The petitioner filed his record on appeal on August 21, 1979. The court approved it on
August 27, 1979. However, acting on an August 30, 1979 opposition filed by respondent
Tecson, the court on August 31, 1979 issued an order setting aside its August 27, 1979
order approving the record on appeal. On September 11, 1979 the respondent court
issued the order dismissing the appeal.
We agree with the petitioner that he was denied due process. The constitutional
provision on due process commands all who wield public authority, but most
peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain standards of fundamental fairness and
to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are observed at all stages of
a proceeding.
From the earliest inception of constitutional government in our country, the concepts of
notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice
would be impossible without the right to notice and to be heard. The emphasis on
substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process clause
sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially
concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school the
definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which
means "the general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society."
A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful
hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due
process.

We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA 392), which, unlike the
case before us now, was only a summary action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate that a judgment, based only
on plaintiff's evidence adduced ex parte and rendered without hearing defendant's
evidence, should be avoided as much as possible. In order that bias may not be imputed
to the judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party
a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not
be adequate to overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A display of petulance and impatience
in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge".

It is true that a party should be vigilant of his rights. It may be argued that when the
petitioner's counsel asked for a fifteen (I 5) day extension from April 11, 1979 to file his
answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for bum to assume that said first extension
would be granted. However, the records show that Atty. Fernando P. Camaya personally
went to the session hall of the court with his motion for postponement only- to: be
informed that Presiding Judge Ulpiano Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion
would be considered "submitted for resolution." Since the sala was vacant and pairing
judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases,
counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the very least, lie had the requested
fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading.
It is likewise inexplicable why Judge Lino Anover, who had not permanently taken over
the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day
extension, would be allowed. And to compound the petitioners problems, the order was
sent by mail and received only twelve (12) day later or after the five-day period. Before
the much publicized Project Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have known
that court orders requiring acts to be done in a matter of days should not be sent by
mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was declared in default. The motion to declare defendant
in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted
upon on April 18, 1979, the very first day in office of the respondent judge in Quezon
City.
Jurisprudence on default judgments is clear and abundant. Our ruling in Amante v.
Sunga (64 SCRA 192) is appropriate:
In the attendant circumstances, We cannot perceive how the interest of justice was
served and promoted by the precipitate action of the trial court. A default judgment does
not pretend to be based on the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified by
expediency. It may, however, amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the
defendant. The possibility of such serious consequences necessarily requires a careful
examination of the circumstances under which a default order was issued. And when no
real injury would result to the interests of the plaintiff by the reopening of the case, the

only objection to such action would, therefore, be solely on a technicality. On such an

infirm foundation, it would be a grievous error to sacrifice the substantial rights of a
litigant. For the rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective in
assisting the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
cases.

Shortly afterwards, the often cited case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425)
reiterated the same principle:
After careful scrutiny of all the above-related proceedings in the court below and mature
deliberation, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that petitioners should be granted
relief, if only to stress emphatically once more that the rules of procedure may not be
misused and abused as instruments for the denial of substantial justice. A review of the
record of this case immediately discloses that here is another demonstrative instance of
how some members of the bar, availing of their proficiency in invoking the letter of the
rules without regard to their real spirit and intent, succeed in inducing courts to act
contrary to the dictates of justice and equity, and, in some instances, to wittingly or
unwittingly abet unfair advantage by ironically camouflaging their actuations as earnest
efforts to satisfy the public clamor for speedy disposition of litigations, forgetting an the
while that the plain injunction of Section 2 of Rule 1 is that the "rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining" not only
'speedy' but more imperatively, "just . . . and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding." We cannot simply pass over the impression that the procedural
maneuvers and tactics revealed in the records of the case at bar were deliberately
planned with the calculated end in view of depriving petitioners and their co-defendants
below of every opportunity to properly defend themselves against a claim of more than
substantial character, considering the millions of pesos worth of properties involved as
found by respondent judge himself in the impugned decision, a claim that appears, in the
light of the allegations of the answer and the documents already brought to the attention
of the court at the pre-trial, to be rather dubious. What is most regrettable is that
apparently, all of these alarming circumstances have escaped respondent judge who did
not seem to have hesitated in acting favorably on the motions of the plaintiff conducive to
the deplorable objective just mentioned, and which motions, at the very least, appeared
to be of highly controversial merit, considering that their obvious tendency and immediate
result would be to convert the proceedings into a one-sided affair, a situation that should
be readily condemnable and intolerable to any court of justice.

The defendant's failure to answer on time was excusable. Moreover, the lower court
was presented with defenses which, on their face, appeared to warrant a setting aside
of the default order and a full-fledged hearing where both parties could present their
respective evidences. The petitioner stated:
11. That defendant has good and valid defenses consisting of:
a) I did not borrow the huge sum of THREE HUNDRED NINETY ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY TWO PESOS & 781100
(P391,822.78) from plaintiff Rosalinda Tecson;

b) I did not issue to Rosalinda Tecson the receipt mentioned in par. 8 of

her complaint;
c) That the same receipts mentioned in par. 8 of her complaint did not
state that sums of money stated on the face of these receipts were
received as loan, in fact it does not appear on the face of the receipts for
what purpose the said money were allegedly received;
d) That the checks she mentioned in par. 8 were issued by her and
encashed by her which is very unnatural for a person who is lending
money to another;
e) That there is pending between Rosalinda Tecson and myself Civil
Case No. 113565 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled "RIZAL
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION versus PEDRO M. AZUL,
ROSALINDA P. TECSON and PURITA DE CASTRO," where the said
amount of THREE HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY TWO PESOS & 78/100 (P391,822.78) and in
addition the same amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS & 20/100 (P141,730.20) mentioned
in pars. 8 and 9 of plaintiff's complaint are the subject matter of
compulsory cross- claim between the said parties;
f) Plaintiff was never authorized to withdraw, collect and receive the
checks whose face value amounted to ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS & 20/100 (P
141,730.20) mentioned in par. 9 of her complaint;
g) Plaintiff was never authorized to endorse and encash the checks
mentioned in par. 9 of her complaint;
h) Plaintiff up to this time was not able to show any authority authorizing
her to withdraw, receive and endorse checks intended for me;
i) The estafa case, I.S. 78-20883, I filed against plaintiff before the City
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City is valid and fully supported by a document
and in fact, it was filed with and was endorsed by the authorities at Camp
Crame after an investigation was conducted, wherein plaintiff Rosalinda
Tecson was given the opportunity to present evidence;
j) That I filed the said estafa case in the exercise of my right and within
legal bounds;
12. That, if given the opportunity to present my evidence before this Court, I would be
able to prove my defendant and support them with sufficient documentary and oral
evidence; that I need only about three (3) hours to present my evidence in support of
these defenses;

13. Attached to this motion is an affidavit of merits as required by the Rules of Court.

The private respondent contends that the default judgment has become final and
executory and may no longer be set aside. As in the Lim Tanhu case, we cannot simply
pass over the impression that the procedural maneuvers and tactics revealed in the
records of the case at bar were deliberately planned with the calculated end in view of
depriving petitioners of an opportunity to defend themselves, not only against the claim
of P250,092.55 but damages and attorney's fees quadruple that amount and of the right
to elevate the decision to a higher court.
The petitioner cryptically refers to an "unseen hand" orchestrating proceedings. His
counsel, Atty. Camaya, went to court with a motion for extension of time to file answer.
Instead of being informed that even with the retirement of the presiding judge, he had
only five (5) days to answer, he was told to file the motion and consider it submitted.
The order granting five days extension was mailed with the near certain knowledge he
would not get it on time and after petitioner's being knocked out by an order declaring
him in default, there was the well-founded "hope that procedural mistakes along the way
will bury forever the presence of an irregularity."
The fears of the petitioner turned out to be justified, His counsel fell into some
procedural lapses as the respondent's counsel ably blocked every attempt to set aside
the default judgment and keep it from becoming final.
Not only was the petitioner not furnished a copy of the motion to declare him in default
but no time and date of hearing were fixed. The motion is dated April 17, 1979. It was
granted on April 18, 1979. On April 19, 1979, evidence was presented ex-parte before
the branch clerk of court. About one week later, the decision was rendered. In addition
to the principal claim of P250,092.55, the court awarded interest at the legal rate until
paid, P600,000.00 in damages, and P237,523.14 attorney's fees for counsel whose
most difficult work up to that point was preparing the complaint and the motion to
declare the defendant in default and presenting evidence ex-parte before the branch
clerk of court.
The July 24, 1979 order of the lower court denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration or new trial on the ground that it is "pro forma". Even a cursory
appraisal of the motion will indicate that it is far from pro forma. The motion discusses in
seven (7) typewritten legal size pages why the defendant's failure to file responsive
pleading should be excused on grounds of excusable mistake and negligence and why
the default judgment should be deemed null and void. The lower court which had just
awarded extravagantly liberal damages in a default judgment should have given better

reasons for rejecting the motion instead of relying on the conventional finding of a "pro
forma" presentation.
On August 1, 1979, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of
time to file record on appeal. The lower court denied the motion for extension of time to
file record on appeal on August 3, 1979 on the ground that it was filed two days late.
Upon a motion for reconsideration explaining a typographical error which mistakenly
indicated that a decision actually received on May 7 was received on May 5, the court
granted ten (10) days extension to file the record on appeal only to reverse itself when
on September 11, 1979, it granted the respondent's motion to dismiss appeal.
The private respondent capitalizes on procedural errors allegedly committed by the
petitioner's counsel after he failed to file his answers within the given five-day period.
Counsel has explained the delays but without going into the merits of the explanations,
we find the delays insufficient reason to warrant our countenancing the denial in this
case and the disregard of our many admonitions for courts to be wary and reluctant in
deciding cases through default judgments.
The petitioner alleges that the decision awarding P1,187,615.69 to the private
respondent is not supported by the facts elicited during the hearing ex-parte before the
branch clerk of court. The merits of the collection case should be determined after both
petitioner and respondent are afforded full opportunity to present their respective
evidences.
The petitioner's mention of an "unseen hand" orchestrating the proceedings in this case
should also be referred to the office of the Court Administrator for investigation and
appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's
order dated March 19, 1979 issuing a writ of preliminary attachment, the order dated
April 18, 1979, declaring the petitioner in default, the decision dated April 27, 1979, the
order dated July 20, 1979 denying the motion to lift the order of default, the order dated
July 24, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial, the order dated
Septemeber 11, 1979 dismissing the appeal, and the order dated October 29, 1979
issuing a writ of execution to enforce the court's judgment are SET ASIDE as NULL and
VOID. The appropriate branch of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City is ordered to
ADMIT the ANSWER filed by the petitioner and CONDUCT trial on the merits. The
Acting Court Administrator is ordered to conduct and INVESTIGATION as abovestated.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.

HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We
have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the
argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution.
The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign
texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this
jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of
the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to
charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct
contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez
is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae"
as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the
United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as
"contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded
the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before
the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent
Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal
assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system.
What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May
1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected
to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given
the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he
wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily

impose punishment upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as
constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this
Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the
Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of
Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court,
especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.

The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for
referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to
Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139,
referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not
the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under
Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or
suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or
(2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The
procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for
suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another
person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court
on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio
proceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an attorney.
Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made
"for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if
it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present
case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no
need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed
to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present
his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but
that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the

exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are
issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to
resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for
Reconsideration is from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United
State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr.
Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to
impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts
are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US)
Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be
based on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious
manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of
the United States the constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the
intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a
power on the federal courts in the very act of their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of
the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five member
including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates
to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb
Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no
less than nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously introduced the
Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse under this
power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more explicitly the summary power
vested in the courts, it did not remotely deny the existence of the power but merely
defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court throughout its
existence . In at least two score cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass of
decisions in the lower federal courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted
without question. ... 2

To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at
best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for
contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he
upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its
claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most
especially from those who are officers of the court.

3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to
apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger"
rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more
modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court
which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic
incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in
the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to
exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending
apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for
marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by
courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the
"hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without
limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right
is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a
literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to
insist that all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights,
1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we
believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature
and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the

permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam
Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil"
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case,
relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public
order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair
hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation
of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive
evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or
rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for
society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court
to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court
actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and
plain import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that the respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no
repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).

The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the
processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from
an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail
over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear
import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind
incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one
accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting
that while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from
high motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court
to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern
trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt.
We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our

jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law on
this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this
case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed for at
least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to consider this a
substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent's
suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the
effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and
privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of
giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his
contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting
appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to
live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. The denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988
and the Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION &
COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER,
NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio
Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the
mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged
that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual
basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative
action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the
respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The
petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that

the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose
from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and
the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing
upon all the issues raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina
suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting
station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station
DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment;
2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness
to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to
operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said
station DYRE;
3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new
owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further.

The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of
inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court
issues the following guidelines:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this
Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed
before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. 1
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of
due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must
conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate
case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor,
20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of
the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent,
In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test (Primicias v.

Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag
v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA
931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA
285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the
clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and
all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among
qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency
without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and
print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation
(438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program,
explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives
the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented
over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home.
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture
theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the
same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is
constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives
of all Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and
in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even
here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and
magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce
enjoy high priorities.

On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also
becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or
regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the
airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to
persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions
to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact
of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the
radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances
of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by
government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent
and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners
to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to
be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts
are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are
the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public
issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731)
this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only
thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.

(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to
withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.

YAP, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October
16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of
April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August
12,1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or any other proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los
Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information
(DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report
with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who
was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had
submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on
December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP
Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices
in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint
repeated the charges embodied in the previous report filed by complainant before the
Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los
Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June
16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC,
submitted his Investigation Report, with the following conclusion, ". . . evidence
gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA
3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable under
Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from
prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his
motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982,
all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On
July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by

Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that the following informations be

filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions through manifest partiality and evident
bad faith;
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of P125,000.00
from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing
services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978.

Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then the
Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there,
wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
payment to said Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for
the Constitutional Convention Referendum of January, 1973, wherein the accused in his
official capacity had to intervene under the law in the release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10500

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practice Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a public officer

being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a
true detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year (1973), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10501

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of
Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing
Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private corporation of which his brother-in-law,
Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official functions, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by
allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia
Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered with the
Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose organization and
operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department of Public
Information as it was organized to undertake research, projects for the government,
without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by the Department of Public
Information and reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10502

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer
being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then

and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a
true and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including
a statement of the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1976), as required of every
public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10503

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD with
Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being
then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the President, a true,
detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year (1978), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to
quash the informations on the follow grounds:
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a
speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file
the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of Assets
and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos. 10500,
10502 and 10503;

5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10199 for
Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No. 10501
(for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.

On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion
to quash, stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said motion
that needed refutation, namely:
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have already
prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 For failure to file
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.

On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the
fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases
were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were
committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although
the charges were actually filed in Court only on July 9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still
the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10) year prescriptive period
has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal
prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets
and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any natural
or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement
of assets and liabilities "... regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is
for ALL government employees and officials to submit a statement of assets and
liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and distinct from
each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it
render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law
which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period
of ten (10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's

"Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit.
Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect
in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which could be cured by
amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said information to change the
date of the alleged commission of the offense therein charged from January 31, 1974 to
September 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8,

1985, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500,
changing the date of the commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22,
1985, the Court, without giving due course the petition, resolved to require the
respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining order effective
immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said
resolution, the respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their
comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering
the supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and
the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as the Public
respondents were concerned, which requires the successor official to state whether or
not he maintains the action or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20,
1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not political offenses
and they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the
cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any
event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law,
such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The
new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred
with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a
motion for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying
that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court
is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan.

However, be that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the
Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the duty of this Court to resolve the
issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with
the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to
due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against
him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the
Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty
raised by the petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence
of prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the
quashal of the questioned informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of
"due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of
the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more
than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted
to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent
Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the applicability of the
authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for
the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the
proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify
acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any
alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or
administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse"
committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such
facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process
and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed
out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the
proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April

17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which do not appear on record and
which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could even be
logically inferred that the delay may be due to a painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by the
Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In this respect, We are
the considered opinion that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended,
regarding the resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from
termination of the preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the
nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise
language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other
grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it
would be itself remiss in the performance of its official functions and subject to the charge
that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such facts and circumstances which could
otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the prosecution
to comply with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented
during the trial wherein evidence for and against the issue involved may be fully threshed
out and considered. Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant
such a radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a pre-cocious
or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.

This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his
constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases
against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head
in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the
issue only after the trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief"
and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial
where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the
application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely
undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a
report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October
1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then
Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in
the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary
(then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07.

The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months
after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the
complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On
June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the
case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5,
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5)
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against
petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but
revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial
process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically
motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and
should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the
basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without
fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the
public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not
be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a tenday period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him
from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by
law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law has
included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be
treated as a dead letter.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused
to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the
conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of
the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not
only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at
bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long
delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double
standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the
five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement
of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not
involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took
the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a
preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But
an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for
until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to
hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on
the other issues raised by petitioner.

Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the
same. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111397

August 12, 2002

HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES and BISTRO PIGALLE, INC.,
respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 25, 1993,2 and its Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The assailed Decision sustained the orders dated December 29, 1992, January
20, 1993 and March 2, 1993,4 issued by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
trial courts orders enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim ("Lim" for brevity), then Mayor of Manila,
from investigating, impeding or closing down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club
and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by respondent Bistro Pigalle Inc. ("Bistro" for brevity).
The Antecedent Facts
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition5 for mandamus and prohibition,
with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims
instructions inspected and investigated Bistros license as well as the work permits and health
certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistros night club and restaurant
operations.6 Lim also refused to accept Bistros application for a business license, as well as the
work permit applications of Bistros staff, for the year 1993.7
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lims refusal to issue the business license and work permits
violated the doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,8 to wit:
"Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business."
Acting on Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued the first assailed
temporary restraining order on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and representatives are ordered to refrain
from inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation of the establishments of
petitioner (Bistro Pigalle, Inc.)."9

At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in support of their respective positions. On
January 20, 1993, the trial court granted Bistros application for a writ of prohibitory preliminary
injunction. The dispositive portion of the trial courts order declared:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Petitioners application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction is granted, and Respondent, and any/all persons acting
under his authority, are and (sic) ordered to cease and desist from inspecting,
investigating and otherwise closing or impeding the business operations of Petitioner
Corporations establishments while the petition here is pending resolution on the merits.
Considering that the Respondent is a government official and this injunction relates to his
official duties, the posting of an injunction bond by the Petitioners is not required.
On the other hand, Petitioners application for a writ of mandatory injunction is hereby
denied, for to grant the same would amount to granting the writ of mandamus prayed for.
The Court reserves resolution thereof until the parties shall have been heard on the
merits."10
However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros operations
effective January 23, 1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order.
On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the
policemen who stopped Bistros operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the motion for
contempt on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect
the courts injunction.
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through
his agents and policemen, again disrupted Bistros business operations.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January
20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to inspect and
investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city
mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory power is
expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order
dated March 2, 1993, the dispositive portion of which stated:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby orders:

(1) The denial of respondents motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or the dismissal of the instant case;
(2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove the wooden cross-bars or any other
impediments which were placed at its establishments, namely, New Bangkok Club and
Exotic Garden Restaurant on February 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993, respectively, and
thereafter said establishments are allowed to resume their operations;
(3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue working in the aforenamed
establishments of petitioner-corporation if they have not yet reported; and
(4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is deferred to give sufficient time to
respondent to elevate the matters assailed herein to the Supreme Court."11
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the trial judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction.
On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision.12 In a resolution dated
July 13, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied Lims motion for reconsideration.13
On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered
the Western Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which
order the police implemented at once.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying Lims petition, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion since it issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the evidence adduced.
The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
"x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will
cause irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can
be had on the merits of the case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is primarily intended to maintain
the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of the case.

In the case at bar, We find that the respondent Judge did not act improvidently in issuing
the assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction in order to maintain the
status quo, while the petition is pending resolution on the merits. The private respondent
correctly points out that the questioned writ was regularly issued after several hearings, in
which the parties were allowed to adduce evidence, and argue their respective positions.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is within the limits of the sound exercise
of discretion of the court and the appellate court will not interfere, except, in a clear case
of abuse thereof. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is accordingly
DISMISSED."16
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. "DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS SAID
ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29, 1992, JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH
2, 1993?"
2. "DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN
RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993 AND ITS ASSAILED
RESOLUTION OF JULY 13, 1993?"
3. "DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381
BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB AND THE
EXOTIC GARDEN RESTAURANT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WERE CLOSED
ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE NO. 7783?"
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before the trial court
or the Court of Appeals, and this issue is still under litigation in another case,17 the Court will
deal only with the first two issues raised by petitioner.
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction

Bistros cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial court is the
violation of its property right under its license to operate. The violation consists of the work
disruption in Bistros operations caused by Lim and his subordinates as well as Lims refusal to
issue a business license to Bistro and work permits to its staff for the year 1993. The primary
relief prayed for by Bistro is the issuance of writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The
mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept Bistros 1993 business license application
and to issue Bistros business license. Also, the mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to
accept the applications of Bistros staff for work permits. The writ of prohibitory injunction seeks
to enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from interfering,
impeding or otherwise closing down Bistros operations pending resolution of whether Lim can
validly refuse to issue Bistros business license and its staffs work permits for the year 1993.
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the prohibitory injunction. Lim relies
primarily on his power, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse municipal licenses
and business permits as expressly provided for in the Local Government Code and the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the powers granted by these laws implicitly
include the power to inspect, investigate and close down Bistros operations for violation of the
conditions of its licenses and permits.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not apply to the
instant case. Bistro maintains that the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila do not expressly or impliedly grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of
night clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by Bistro of the conditions of its licenses and
permits. In refusing to accept Bistros business license application for the year 1993, Bistro
claims that Lim denied Bistro due process of law.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the prohibitory preliminary injunction.
We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question. The law
expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila, reads:
"Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the
mayor shall be:
x x x.

(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the
same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts
prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of
such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been
granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code provides:
"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
City Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any
violation of the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance." (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business
licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse
to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is
expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws
specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were
issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits is premised on noncompliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must
observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for
any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power
to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these
commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid
the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance
No. 771618 which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit:
"Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall conduct inspection of food
and other business establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and
regulations, inspecting licenses and permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and

customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should be properly exercised by Local
Government Authorities and other concerned agencies." (Emphasis supplied)
These local government officials include the City Health Officer or his representative, pursuant
to the Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila,19 and the City Treasurer pursuant to
Section 470 of the Local Government Code.20
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in Manila
without due process of law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or
impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without
notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of
the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law.21 Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically.
In the instant case, we find that Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights that
are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or
permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even before the expiration of its business
license on December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistros license application for 1993,
in effect denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites.
Lims zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The presumption is that he acted
in good faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents when he implemented his
campaign against prostitution in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim for
arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro. For this
reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of Lim.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the trial courts orders. The sole
objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the
merits of the case can be disposed of.22 In the instant case, the issuance of the writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction did not dispose of the main case for mandamus. The trial court issued the
injunction in view of the disruptions and stoppage in Bistros operations as a consequence of
Lims closure orders. The injunction was intended to maintain the status quo while the petition
has not been resolved on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129900

October 2, 2001

JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, finding petitioner Jane Caras y
Solitario guilty of 15 counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) violations.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

JANE S. CARAS has appealed from the judgment of conviction in fifteen (15) related
cases of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The first Information (docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-93-44420) against her reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1992 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Chu Yang T. Atienza to apply on account or for value PCI Bank,
Commonwealth Ave. Branch Check No. 017744 dated March 18, 1992 payable to
the order of CASH in the amount of P14,125.00 Philippine Currency, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment which check when presented for payment was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Chu Yang T. Atienza the amount
of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-44421 to Q-93-44434, the informations were similarly
worded as above, except for the respective amounts involved, dates, numbers of checks
and dates of commission.
When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial
proceeded.
The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18, 1992, up to
May 31, 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang
T. Atienza on installment various gift checks and purchase orders from Uniwide Sales
and in payment thereof, the accused issued to the complainant the following checks
drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank:

Check No.

Date

Amount

017744

3-18-92 P 14,125.00

017743

3-03-92 P 14,625.00

017627

3-03-92 P 14,125.00

017745

4-03-92 P 14,125.00

017664

4-18-92 P 23,500.00

017746

4-18-92 P 14,125.00

017789

3-18-92 P 14,125.00

017790

4-03-92 P 14,125.00

017663

4-02-92 P 23,500.00

017662

3-18-92 P 24,440.00

017768

3-18-92

017788

3-03-92 P 14,125.00

017665

5-02-92 P 23,500.00

017767

3-03-92

017769

3-31-92 P540,318.35

P 7,062.50

P 7,062.50

When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for
the reason "Account Closed". Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her
to replace the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and refused to do so.
The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen (15) checks. She claimed, however, that
they were given to Marivic Nakpil,2 alleged sister of the complainant, as "guarantee
deposit," that is, for every gift check and purchase order given to the accused, she issued
personal checks to guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be encashed nor
deposited with any bank. With regard to Check No. 017769 in the amount of P540,316.35

(Exh. "O"), accused claimed that she entrusted the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank,
with her signature but without any amount or numerical figures on the face of the check.
On May 13, 1994, the Court a quo rendered its judgment with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44420 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,125.00 and to pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44421 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambans Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,625.00 and to pay the costs;
3. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44422 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,125.00 and to pay the costs;
4. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44423 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,125.00 and to pay the costs;
5. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44424 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P23,500.00 and to pay the costs;
6. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44425 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,125.00 and to pay the costs;
7. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44426 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,125.00 and to pay the costs;
8. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44427 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,125.00 and to pay the costs;

9. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44428 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P23,500.00 and to pay the costs;
10. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44429 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P24,440.00 and to pay the costs;
11. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44430 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of two (2) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P7,062.50 and to pay the costs;
12. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44431 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P14,125.00 and to pay the costs;
13. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44432 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P23,500.00 and to pay the costs;
14. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44433 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of two (2) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P7,062.50 and to pay the costs;
15. In Crim. Case No. Q-93-44434 the Court finds accused Jane Caras GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of eight (8) months and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P540,318.35 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.3
On June 13, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court in an Order dated September 22, 1994. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals which rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.4

On April 11, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution dated July 15, 1997.
Hence, this petition, in which petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:
I - IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES BROUGHT OUT IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION;
II - IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE PURPOSE OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CHECKS;
III - IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE LACK OF PERSONALITY OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO INITIATE AND PROSECUTE THESE CASES;
IV - IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION (AS
TO PCIB CHECK NO 017769 FOR P540,318.35) AND FOR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HER FUNDS;
V - IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THAT THE COURT A QUO HAD NO
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE.5
Petitioner admits having issued the checks subject of this case, save for one, but insists that she
issued them merely to guarantee payment of her obligation to a certain Marivic Nakpil; they
were not supposed to have been deposited in a bank. Petitioner also denies having transacted
with private complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza, and asserts that the latter did not have personality
to prosecute this case.
Petitioner argues that one of the checks, PCIB check no. 017769, was issued in blank. She claims
that this check was issued without consideration and that the element of the crime that the check
must be issued for value is lacking as regards this particular check. Also in relation to her fourth
assignment of error, petitioner asserts that she was not properly notified of the dishonor of her
checks. She maintains that the prosecution failed to show that she received the notices of
dishonor purportedly sent to her. She points out that no return card nor acknowledgment receipt
for the first demand letter was presented in evidence. While there was a return card attached to
the second demand letter, this was not marked nor offered in evidence, and hence must be
ignored.6
Petitioner also assails the jurisdiction of the Quezon City RTC over the case, maintaining that
there is no evidence showing that the checks were issued and delivered in Quezon City. Neither
is there evidence as to where the private complainant received the checks, and whether or not she
received them from the accused herself.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that B.P. 22 does not make any distinction
regarding the purpose for which the checks were issued. Thus, it is of no moment even if it were
true that, as claimed by accused, the checks she issued were meant only to guarantee payment of
her obligation. Criminal liability attaches whether the checks were issued in payment of an

obligation or to guarantee payment of that obligation.7 There is violation of B.P. 22 when a

worthless check is issued and is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The OSG also
points out that accused did not deny having issued the subject checks.
After a careful consideration of the records and the submissions of the parties, we find that the
resolution of this petition hinges on the issue of whether the prosecution evidence suffices to
convict the accused, herein petitioner Jane Caras. The elements of the offense under Section 1 of
B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2)
knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment;
and (3) said check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.8
What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which the
check was issued, nor the terms and conditions of its issuance. There are matters we need to
pursue, because, as said in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,9
to determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for
their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in
banking communities.
Thus, petitioners contention that she issued the checks subject of this case merely to guarantee
payment of her obligation is hardly a defense. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is
malum prohibitum and is punishable under B.P. 22, provided the other elements of the offense
are properly proved.
In particular, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. Knowledge of
insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing,
and issuing a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
when presented within 90 days from the date of issue. However, this presumption may be
rebutted by the accused-petitioner. Such presumption does not hold when the maker or drawer
pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check within five banking days after
receiving notice that such check had been dishonored.10 Thus, it is essential for the maker or
drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make
arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law.
Petitioner denies having received any notice that the checks she issued had been dishonored by
the drawee bank. After carefully going over the records of this case, we find that indeed no clear
evidence is shown on whether petitioner was informed that her checks had been dishonored.
The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of Appeals,11 may be sent by the offended party or
the drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired lawyers to prepare and send the demand
letters.12 The prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters demanding payment
which were purportedly sent to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no evidence that

would establish petitioners actual receipt of any demand letter which could have served as
notice to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication that they were actually received
by petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt nor return card for the first and second demand
letters were offered in evidence. Such omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is fatal
to its cause.
There is testimony on record that private complainant asked petitioner to pay the value of the
checks. However, there is no mention of when the demand to pay was made, whether before or
after the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank.13 It is possible that payment was requested
before the checks were deposited, since, as testified to by petitioner, the usual arrangement was
that she issues checks and then she replaces them with cash. The checks were not deposited but
were, instead, returned to her.14 However, according to the prosecution, petitioner started having
problems with her cash flow resulting to her inability to replace the checks she issued with cash.
But such problems leading to illiquidity of petitioner are not material elements of the crime.
What is pertinent here is prior notice to the drawer that her checks have been dishonored, so that
within five banking days from receipt of such notice she could pay the check fully or make
arrangements for such payment.
Even the testimony of Manuel Panuelos, branch manager of PCI Bank where petitioner
maintained her checking account, indicates that the bank also failed to send notice to petitioner
for her to pay the value of the checks or make arrangements for their payment within five days
from the dishonor of the said checks. Note his testimony on cross-examination:
Q:
Did you give the accused notice within five (5) banking days within which to
make arrangement with the bank within ninety (90) days regarding the bounced checks?
Atty. Palaa:
Your Honor, that is already answered by the witness.
Atty. Dela Torre:
No, that is not the answer, what I want is that.....
Court:
Reform
Atty. Dela Torre:
Is it not your procedure that when a check bounced, you give notice to the ....
A:

It is not our procedure.

Q:

It is not your procedure?

A:

No. In fact we do it verbally....

Q:
Is it not standard operating procedure in your bank to give customers notice
within five (5) banking days to make arrangement with the bank within ninety (90) days
regarding the bounced check?
A:

No, that is not our procedure.

Q:

You do not follow that procedure?

A:

We do not. That is not our standard procedure.15

Petitioner on the witness stand denied receiving any notice from the bank.
Q:
Madam Witness, all these checks were deposited with the bank in one day. Will
you please tell this Honorable Court when the first check bounced by the reason of DAIF,
were you notified by your depositary bank which is PCIB within five (5) banking days to
make arrangement within...days regarding that bouncing checks?
A:

No, sir, I did not receive any notice.16

The absence of proof that petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her checks
were dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make arrangements for
payment of the said checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that she had
knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she issued the checks. Absent such
presumption, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said checks, otherwise, she cannot be held liable
under the law.17
Even more crucial, the absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the
accused is a violation of the petitioners right to due process. This is in effect our ruling in Lao
vs. Court of Appeals,18 where we held:
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a compromise
by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he
opts to perform it the action is abated". This was also compared "to certain laws"(citing E.O.
107, 83 O.G. No. 7, p. 576 (February 16, 1987), and E.O. 122, 89 O.G. No. 44, p. 6349
(November 1, 1993) allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender
the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability"
(citing Nitafan, David G., Notes and Comments on the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22), pp.
121-122). In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking
days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense" (citing Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 234
SCRA 639). The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity
to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the
basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received

by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Underscoring and
emphasis supplied.)
Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given
the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, we cannot with
moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove
that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal.19
Discussion of the other assigned errors need no longer detain us.
However, it should be stressed that this decision in no way prejudices the civil obligations, if any,
that she might have incurred by reason of her transactions with private complainant. For we note
that petitioner does not deny having issued the subject checks.20 And while no criminal liability
could be imposed in this case for lack of sufficient proof of the offense charged, a fair distinction
should be made as to civil aspects of the transaction between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jane Caras is ACQUITTED on the ground
that her guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. This decision is without
prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil case, if warranted, to determine the civil aspects of
petitioners transactions.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 139465

October 17, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25,
and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner
to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.1
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He
assails the decision on the following grounds:
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of
value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing
of an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation.

II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial
of fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no
higher objective.
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine
Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government
and the rights of an individual.
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice
and hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch
necessitating notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court
has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two coequal branches of government.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition
proceedings."2
On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez,
opposing petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the
attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of
the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000
Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to
Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its attached note verbales.
Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action, the Court denies these
pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
First. P.D. No. 10693 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when
an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting
papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. - (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the
order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons
fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for
the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee.
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition
request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while
the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving
private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot alter,
amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its
conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation,
upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice."4
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of
their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of
its object and purpose."5 (emphasis supplied) The preambular paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069
define its intent, viz:
"WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;

WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed
but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the
foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of
civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished;
WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other
interested countries;
x x x." (emphasis supplied)
It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest
the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking.
Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be
frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the
unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory
state.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize
if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. The
submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his extradition and its
supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of
Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the
demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the
executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our government in charge of
the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In addition,
it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents demand for advance notice can delay the
summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanying papers.
The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:
"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a
criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in
somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him
guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government
requires his surrender."6 (emphasis supplied)
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution.
Justice is best served when done without delay.

Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves
to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question
by other countries with similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while
courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of
government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great
weight.7 The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,8
where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption
that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and
given the force of law in the country."
Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty and
P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of an extradition process.9 This understanding of the treaty is shared by the
US government, the other party to the treaty.10 This interpretation by the two governments
cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the Court to assume that both
governments did not understand the terms of the treaty they concluded.
Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines have
expressed the same interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US governments.
Canadian11 and Hongkong12 authorities, thru appropriate note verbales communicated to our
Department of Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal language that it is not an international
practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a convergence of views
unless it is manifestly erroneous.
Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the right to
notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by likening an
extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding
which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To
begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused.13 His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by
one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.14 As held by the US Supreme Court
in United States v. Galanis:

"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that
accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a
valid treaty."15
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial.16 In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards.17 In terms of the quantum
of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction18 while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case."19 Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.20 The United States
adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making
the ultimate decision to extradite.21
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an
extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action."22 The concept of due process
is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure."23
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice
and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than
life."24 The supposed threat to private respondents liberty is perceived to come from several
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest
and temporary detention.
We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:
"PROVISIONAL ARREST
1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person
sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional
arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the
Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice.

2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:

a) a description of the person sought;
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and
location of the offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or
judgment of conviction against the person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.
3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its
application and the reasons for any denial.
4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the
expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the
executive authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for
extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the
relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with
Section 4 of this Decree.
(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or
telegraph.
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his
behalf shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional
arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the
province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the
provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of
its request.

(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in
Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody." (emphasis
supplied)
Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private respondent
may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA
has long received the extradition request from the United States and has turned it over to the
DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not requested for private
respondents provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private respondents liberty has passed. It
is more imagined than real.
Nor can the threat to private respondents liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which
provides:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
[H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served
anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. . .
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (emphasis supplied)
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the
accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the
extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still in
the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition for
extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondents
liberty is merely hypothetical.
Sixth. To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves serious consideration
involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides
with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the
greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which
is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law."25 The approach requires that we "take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation
or type of situation."26 These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic
freedoms on the one hand, and the governments promotion of fundamental public interest or
policy objectives on the other.27

In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondents claim to due
process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of
doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords
paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give
more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the
extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its laws. Petitioner
also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to foreign
affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation
stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the
degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the
interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."28 Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of
the Philippines.29 Executive power includes, among others, the power to contract or guarantee
foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or international agreements.30 The task of
safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department which
has the competence and authority to so act in the international arena.31 It is traditionally held that
the President has power and even supremacy over the countrys foreign relations.32 The executive
department is aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations considering the
Presidents most comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene
of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultrasensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited.33 The deference we give to the executive
department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the
cornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our
government.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is
to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government. More
and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress
of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not
ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length
and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination
of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior
determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and
when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be
"condemned to suffer grievous loss."34 We have explained why an extraditee has no right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No.
1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient
opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for
the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in
court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily
withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more
compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be
precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less
compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the
judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by
our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to
state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the
extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution
stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on
private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental
fairness is assured a party.
We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not suffice to
resolve the conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at a rapid pace,
propelled as it is by technological leaps in transportation and communication, we need to push
further back our horizons and work with the rest of the civilized nations and move closer to the
universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."35 In
the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of peace and prosperity from these efforts.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case
at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by the public
respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571

September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before
warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these
two novel questions is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to,
this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void
and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners
application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at
the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause
against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the
respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail
for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the
same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his
passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include
the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond,
and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C.
Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated
June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly
authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the
Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity
of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No.
139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant
the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October
17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution
has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition
for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged,
inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code
Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18
US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US
Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest"
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the
case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the
procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter,
the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12

Hence, this Petition. 13

Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of
first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD
No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for
bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of
any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended,
which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition
proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or
proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or
proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special
circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings,
the public respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may
justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance
exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not
ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the

case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent
in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders."
14

In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is
entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is
entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court
of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition
postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration
in the Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the
parties to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the
filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a
patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely
urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and
avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following
reasons: "(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court
takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this
Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent
that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a
judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there
are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless
guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant
bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause
adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the
inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law,

(2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court
has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of
certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already
been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of
this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public
interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22
we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has
been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz,
Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in
Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.
x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the
present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created
by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file
their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and
money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is
well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant
petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts
and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo

warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special
and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in
extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such
proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the
treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to
ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the
implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding
certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of
affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and
evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting
their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international
boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon
extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the
suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal
and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that
criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is
that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the
extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a
significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so
the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of
return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of
flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence
of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one
way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered
[into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one
world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One
manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal
whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great
interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its
vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding
ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own
country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that
both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly
authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the
capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to
be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon
extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that
will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in
extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To
begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings
involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited

upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case
where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby
the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and
the demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to
extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain
the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of
a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the
function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person
sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition
Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its
implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the
requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad
image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states
from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if
the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words,
"[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be
ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in
order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed,

extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to
trial in the requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state
right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the
requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes
he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point
to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity
and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity,
from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a
fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is
seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner
pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition
cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and
arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts
that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of
that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of
justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the
summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or
set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall
be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
(Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing
the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.

1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
"immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare
and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
"immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole,
as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive
determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the
petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to
get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others,
were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E.
Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the
US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly
authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3)
Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit
of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table
of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5)
Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the
Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these
records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone
who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have
determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of
fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In
the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its]
request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the
existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a
priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting

documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did
exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon
failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently,
had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence,
the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and
something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor
with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty
is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the
request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the
escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not
require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses
they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the
extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient

supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to
conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine
personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do
not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent
judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage
would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be
heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so
desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly
make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not
sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a
different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be
justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must
study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in
form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the
person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants
and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58
is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate
must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the
issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the

proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in
extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right
to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions
are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine
Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and
arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that
the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons

judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to
bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the
right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United
States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings
are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply
for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o
one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar
doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time,
point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity
to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence,
there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate
deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be
arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its supporting
documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his
arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his
opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the noinitial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the
jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered
from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead
of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating
its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of
time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of
liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the governments
interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a

vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against
exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who,
instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not
be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection
or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape
from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not
granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to
the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives
life to Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily
surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention
pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the
judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as
the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we
believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every
person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied
for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The
Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature
of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that
the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it
also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling
enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully
examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the
House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his
Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has
already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person
with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that
at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may
not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes
the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the
mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one
of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the
need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under
the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a

prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat
in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his
extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of
the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule
against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy,
it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced.
We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to
determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not
to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the
constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the
proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of
this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason
would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to
himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?

Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he
learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not
actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot
be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears
the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled
from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at
anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has
been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence
on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this
Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally
unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been
given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and
exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not
only petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position
papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy
Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in
Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this
Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential
extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by
both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was
Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The
trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal
arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his
legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated
and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any
useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and

deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the
merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms
when a case is one of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also
unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance
of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the
request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be
adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to
assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally
escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed
its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner,
as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in
which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in
which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if
at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large
or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape
again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in
form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the
petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or
witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a
warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to
appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is
no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian
or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting
state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as

a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to

judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A
subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to
enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a
bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the
limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other coequal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to
implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion
in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise
review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow
contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these
summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted
into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify,
mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international
cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate
speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE
insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private
respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of
our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37051 July 31, 1978

ANITA U. LORENZANA, petitioner,
vs.
POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
RESOLUTION

GUERRERO, J:
There is presented to Us by petitioner a second motion for modification filed with leave
of court praying that the possessory aspect of the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals which We had affirmed be modified and that the same should now be
converted into a judgment for damages.
Petitioner admits the damage aspect of the appealed decision which ordered her to pay
actual and moral damages in the amount of P5,500.00 to private respondent, Polly
Cayetano. She submits, however, that the possessory aspect of the decision, to wit: "to
restore to appellant the possession of the property invaded and occupied by her as
shown in Exhibits L-1 to L-4; to put back appellant's fence and other valuable
improvements in their place before the writ of demolition was served;" can no longer be
enforced at this stage, first, because the question of possession thereof has become
moot and academic, and second, because enforcement thereof or execution is legally
impossible. In support of said motion for modification, there is attached a copy of the

contract of lease (Annex A) dated May 16, 1974 whereby the Bureau of Building and
Real Property Management of the Department of General Services (administrator and
custodian of the subject property) leased to petitioner Lot 11-B, Block 2201 of the
Cadastral Survey of Manila, with an area of 700 square meters, which includes the
subject property. The contract of lease is duly approved by the Secretary of General
Services and petitioner as lessee, has taken possession of the leased premises and
since May 16, 1974 has been paying the monthly rentals therefor.
Respondents, in a pro forma comment, merely prays for the dismissal of the motion for
modification.
Previously, upon an amended motion of petitioner for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a restraining order filed May 30, 1978,
We issued in this case a restraining order on June 8, 1978 " restraining the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII and the sheriff thereof and private respondent
from executing and/or enforcing the judgment issued by the said Court a quo."
We agree with the petitioner that the possessory aspect of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals which We had affirmed has become moot and academic for the reasons
adduced by her. Considering that the owner of the land, subject of the controversy
which is the government, acting thru the Director of the Bureau of Building and Real
Property Management with tile approval of the Secretary of General Services, had
turned over the possession of the premises under a lease contract in favor of petitioner,
which lease is admittedly legal and lawful, petitioner can no longer be compelled to
restore possession of the same to the prevailing party, the private respondent herein. To
do so would certainly be a violation of petitioner's property rights. By reason of a lawful
act which supervened after the institution of this case, petitioner's possession of the
premises has been legalized.
However, to remand this case to the lower court for execution and to assess and
determine after due notice and hearing, the amount of indemnity which will be paid by
petitioner to private respondent for the loss or destruction of the improvements made by
the latter on the subject property prior to the service and execution of the writ of
demolition, as prayed for by movant petitioner, would unduly delay the final disposition
of this case. A protracted hearing on the amount of damages is not far-fetched to see.
Hence, an amount fixed by Us in the sum of P1,500.00 as the value of the fence
destroyed, flower pots, trellishes, electric installations and other decorations, cement
garden or patio destroyed, would appear to Us to be reasonable and satisfactory to both
parties in the interest of peace as well as in fairness to both, and thus terminate this
litigation once and for all.

WHEREFORE, the judgment promulgated by Us in this case is hereby modified. We

hereby declare that part of the appealed decision ordering petitioner to restore
possession of the property invaded and occupied by her to the private respondent and
to put the fence and other valuable improvements in their place as moot and academic.
For the value of the fence and other valuable improvements destroyed, petitioner is
hereby ordered to pay respondent the sum of P1,500.00. In all other respects, Our
decision stands.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168668

December 16, 2009

Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) and Philippine Economic Zone Authority
Board, represented by its Director General Lilia B. de Lima, Petitioners,
vs.
Pearl City Manufacturing Coroporation, Bernardino Abala, Rogina Abala, Jovelyn
Abellana, Catherine Agapay, Joseph Agapay, Rolando Agapay, Vivencia Alangilan,
Conchita Albaracin, Leonor Amodia, Wilson Arcilla, Joan Aying, Ma. Rebecca Bayon,
Mary Ann Besteis, Marifi Cabardo, Hazel Cala, Carmen Castil, Leonard Castil, Jicardo
Castro, Esther Ceballos, Eusebio Ceniza, Gemma Ceniza, Merchu Chua, Leonarda Cueva,
Victoria Dacay, Estrellita Deiparine, Dexter del Castillo, Maurino Devibar, Josephine
Dizon, Ian Dizon, Lorna Dupit, Rizza Durano, Lucita Fernandez, Godofredo Gac-ang,
Thelma Gallardo, Ma. Lourdes Git-gano, Sonny Go, Juliet Gutierrez, Samuel Gutierrez,
Melba Hermosi-sima, Juvane Into, Josefina Isagan, Louie Isagan, Fe Jaron, Judy Jaron,
Florencia Labiste, Josefina Lamanilao, Jimmy Latonio, Marifi Lavinna, Jonjon Layos,
Lolit Libres, Renfel Almeda, Raul Barbosa, Alfie Durado, Noel Go, Lorena Lomactod,

Sulpicio Mabug-at, Rodrigo Malazarte, Rosalina Mangubat, Dario Mansay, Arlene Mariot,
Melchor Matos, Vergenia Matos, Ponsito Maturan, Robinson Mejos, Guadalupe Miao,
Adoracion Opong, Roger Pagal, Zena Pantonial, Librada Pareja, Ariel Patalinghug, Teresa
Patalinghug, Edesa Patigayon, Lucita Payac, Jona Pejana, Benjamin Pepito, Josephine
Pepito, Flordelina Peres, Ramel Pogado, Anastacia Ponce, Yves Reyes, Ma. Dolores Rivera,
Rubelita Rosacina, Michelle Rosaroso, Eleuterio Saberon, Jr., Zenaida Sague, Aida
Satierra, Ma. Salome Senoc, Rhodelyn Senoc, Ma. Victoria Sususco, Jimmy Sy, Israel
Tejero, Roger Tejero, Alcide Tuico, Franklin Ty, Larry Uy, Rodina Ybalane and Vilma
Zapanta, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
praying for the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00352
dated June 22, 2005. The challenged Decision of the CA reversed and set aside the Decision2
dated September 7, 2004 and Order3 issued on January 20, 2005 of the Office of the President
(OP) in O.P. Case No. 04-G-324.
The factual and procedural antecedents, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Petitioner Corporation [herein respondent Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation] is a PEZAregistered Ecozone Export Enterprise located at the Mactan Economic Zone (MEZ) I in LapuLapu City, [province of Cebu] engaged in the business of recycling and processing, for export, of
used clothing into wool, fiber, cotton fiber, polyester fiber, useable clothing and industrial rags.
Individual petitioners are the employees of the petitioner Corporation.
Sometime in March 2004, petitioner Corporation, along with two (2) other PEZA-registered
companies importing used clothing, was informed of a physical inventory to be conducted by the
PEZA officers in their respective zones on their businesses.
After the completion of the physical inventory on the petitioner Corporation, PEZA officers
discovered that it had an unaccounted importation of 8,259,645 kilograms of used clothing for
the period of fifteen (15) months covering January 2003 up to March 2004.
Petitioner Corporation was then instructed to submit its explanation regarding the said
unaccounted shortage in its import-export liquidation. After submitting the required explanation,
petitioner Corporation was subjected to a special audit conducted by PEZA to determine the
amount of wastage generated by the company.

On the basis of the results of the physical inventory and the special audit conducted on the
petitioner Corporation, respondent [herein co-petitioner] PEZA Board passed a resolution
[Resolution No. 04-236] canceling the PEZA Registration of petitioner Corporation as an
Ecozone Export Enterprise at MEZ I.1avvphi1
An administrative appeal was filed by the petitioners to the Office of the President from the
resolution canceling its registration. The case on appeal was docketed as O.P. Case No. 04-G324. On September 7, 2004, the Office of the President rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE premises considered, the Resolution sought to be revoked on appeal is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.4
Herein respondent, Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the OP denied it in its Order dated January 20, 2005.
Aggrieved, PCMC filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the above-mentioned
Decision and Order of the OP.
On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The Decision of the Office of the President dated
September 7, 2004 in O.P. Case No. 04-G-324 and the Order dated January 20, 2005 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Board Resolution No. 04-236 of the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA) dated July 13, 2004 canceling petitioner corporation's PEZA
Registration as an Ecozone Export Enterprise at MEZ I is hereby DECLARED NULL AND
VOID.
The respondents are further ORDERED to REINSTATE all the Ecozone privileges of the
petitioner Corporation.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PCMC WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PEZA
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 04-236 AND THE OP DECISION AND ORDER.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENT PCMC'S PEZA

ACCREDITATION IS PROPER.6
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The Court agrees with petitioners' contention in the first issue raised that respondent PCMC was
afforded due process.
On May 11, 2004, Jimmy Sy, the General Manager of PCMC sent a letter7 to the Director
General of PEZA explaining the discrepancy in its import and export liquidation. Subsequently,
on May 25, 2004, Sy wrote to the Deputy Director General for Operations of the PEZA
explaining PCMC's unaccounted shortage of imported used clothing which amounted to
8,259,645 kilograms between January 2003 and March 2004.8
Thereafter, Sy executed an Affidavit9 dated May 26, 2004, explaining the discrepancy and
shortages in its import and export accounts. This affidavit was submitted to the PEZA, the receipt
of which was duly acknowledged by the PEZA Deputy Director General for Operations in her
letter dated June 11, 2004 addressed to Sy.
On June 14, 2003, Sy again wrote a letter10 to the PEZA Deputy Director General for Operations
reiterating the explanations they have earlier submitted and praying that their import permits be
approved pending investigation of their unaccounted imported materials.
In a letter11 dated July 5, 2004, the law firm representing PCMC wrote a letter addressed to the
Group Manager, Legal Services Group of PEZA explaining in detail its supposed unaccounted
shortage in its business of recycling used clothing.
In the course of explaining its position, PCMC even secured letters,12 joint affidavits,13 and
certifications14 from its plant manager and various persons to show that the supposed discrepancy
in its import-export liquidations found by PEZA investigators represented part of the waste
materials generated in its recycling business.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones
side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.15 The essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.16 In the recent
case of Pagayanan R. Hadji-Sirad v. Civil Service Commission,17 the Court had the opportunity
to reiterate the following pronouncements, to wit:
In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means
the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be

heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.18
In the present case, since PCMC was properly informed of the supposed discrepancy in its
import and export liquidations, that it was given ample opportunity by the PEZA management to
be heard or to explain its side in relation to its unaccounted imported materials and that it was
subsequently informed of the decision of the PEZA Board to cancel its registration on the basis
of its assessment of the evidence presented or lack thereof, petitioners cannot claim that they
were denied their right to due process of law.
The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement of the CA that there should have been
interrogations or inquiries conducted by the PEZA Board to give PCMC the opportunity to
defend itself from any charge directed against it.
The Court agrees with the petitioner's averment that the power and authority to conduct inquiries
is lodged with the PEZA Director General and not with the PEZA Board. Thus, Section 14(g) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7916 provides:
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Director General. The director general shall be the
overall coordinator of the policies, plans and programs of the ECOZONES. As such, he shall
provide overall supervision over and general direction to the development and operations of
these ECOZONES. He shall determine the structure and the staffing pattern and personnel
complement of the PEZA and establish regional offices, when necessary, subject to the approval
of the PEZA Board.
In addition, he shall have the following specific powers and responsibilities:
xxxx
g) To acquire jurisdiction, as he may deem proper, over the protests, complaints and claims of the
residents and enterprises in the ECOZONE concerning administrative matters;

In consonance with the above-quoted authority, the PEZA Director General is also empowered,
under Section 14(h) of the same law, to recommend to the PEZA Board the grant, approval,
refusal, amendment or termination of the ECOZONE franchises, licenses, permits, contracts and
agreements in accordance with the polices of the said Board.
It necessarily follows from the foregoing that the primary authority to conduct inquiries and factfinding investigations is bestowed upon the office of the PEZA Director General simply because
no complaint, protest or claim can be properly addressed, and neither can any reasonable
recommendation to the PEZA Board be made by the PEZA Director General without conducting
any such inquiry or fact-finding. While nothing prohibits the PEZA Board to conduct its own
inquiry on matters brought before it, it does not mean that the absence of such inquiry by the
Board is a denial of due process on the part of the entity being investigated. In the present case,
however, such inquiry, if conducted, would be a superfluity considering that a physical inventory
and a full-blown audit was already made by a special team from the PEZA Head Office and the
MEZ between March 2004 and June 2004. During the said inventory and audit, PCMC was
given sufficient opportunity to explain whether it really incurred any shortage or whether the
materials it imported were properly disposed of or withdrawn from the MEZ. The PEZA Board
did not arbitrarily arrive at its decision to cancel the registration of PCMC. The results of the
inventory and audit are precisely the bases upon which the cancellation was made.
Stated differently, the audit and inventory conducted under the direction and authority of the
PEZA Director General are sufficient for purposes of complying with the requirements of
procedural due process. Conversely, the absence of formal proceedings conducted before the
PEZA Board does not mean that the requirements of procedural due process were not complied
with.
The Court also finds it apropos to reiterate the well-settled rule that in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative
due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.19 In fact, it is
well settled that, in administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote
full adversarial or trial type proceedings.20
Moreover, it is not legally objectionable for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as
affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies.21 In the present case, the
various letters of explanation, as well as certifications, joint affidavits and other documents,
submitted by the PCMC constitute evidence to support its contentions and are sufficient bases for
the PEZA Board to arrive at a sound decision with respect to the present case.
In any event, the Court agrees with petitioners that any procedural defect in the proceedings
before the PEZA Board was cured when the PCMC appealed PEZA Board Resolution No. 04-

236 before the OP. Petitioners were also able to move for the reconsideration of the adverse
ruling of the OP. In Autencio v. Maara,22 the Court ruled that where the party has the
opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in
procedural due process may be cured. Likewise, in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission,23 the
Court ruled that any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration and that denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a
party who has had the opportunity to be heard thereon.
Respondents insist that the question of whether the PCMC was denied its right to due process of
law is a question of fact which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from
the Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing
errors of law. Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive upon this Court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the interference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in
making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.24
The present case falls under the seventh exception considering that the PEZA Board and the OP,
on one hand, and the CA, on the other, arrived at conflicting findings of fact. This necessitates a
review of the evidence on record which leads the Court to the conclusion, as earlier discussed,
that the OP did not err in ruling that the PCMC was not denied its right to due process of law.
Anent the second issue raised, the Court agrees with the petitioners' averment that the Resolution
of the PEZA Board, which was affirmed by the Decision of the OP, is supported by substantial
evidence.
Petitioners correctly argue that the CA erred in holding that the PCMC was able to sufficiently
explain the adverse findings of the PEZA in the audit and physical inventory that the PEZA
conducted. The Court notes that the CA did not specify the reasons why it made such
pronouncement. On the other hand, it is clear from the letter25 dated June 11, 2004 of the PEZA
Deputy Director General for Operations addressed to Sy that the PEZA finds Sy's explanation of
PCMCs shortage as inadequate, specifying therein the grounds for such finding. In the same

manner, the Group Manager of the Legal Services Group of PEZA in a subsequent letter26 to Sy
dated June 17, 2004, reiterated the findings of the PEZA Deputy Director General for
Operations. He also specified the reasons why the PEZA Audit Team found the explanations of
the PCMC's Plant Manager as unsatisfactory. Despite these letters directing the PCMC to submit
all essential documents to substantiate its claims, PCMC still failed to do so.
In this regard, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition made by the OP in resolving
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the OP, dated September 7, 2004, to
wit:
In answer to the many requests of PEZA to submit affidavits and documents in support of its
position, Petitioner submitted inadequate explanations. Its statements attributing the
unaccountable shortages to an honest mistake [where the clerk assigned to record its
importations in kilograms vis-a-vis pounds was new in his job and relatively inexperienced] and
that it could not produce the required importation records because these were destroyed when
heavy rains drenched their office, are at best, self-serving. Thus, the failure on the part of
Petitioner to account for the importation shortages, as well as the proper disposal of waste,
constitutes prima facie proof that the goods or merchandise were illegally sent out of the
restricted areas.27
Settled is the rule that Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special and technical training and knowledge of such agency.28 Administrative agencies are given
wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions,
latitude which includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within their special
competence.29 Based on the foregoing discussions, the Court finds that the PEZA Board and the
OP were correct in ruling that, based on the evidence presented, or the insufficiency thereof, the
PCMC failed to account for the unexplained shortage in its imported materials between January
2003 and March 2004.
Lastly, the Court agrees with petitioners that the cancellation of the PCMC's registration as an
ECOZONE enterprise is warranted by the law. Section 8(c), Rule XXV, Part XI of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 7916 provides, thus:
C. Cancellation/Revocation Registration, permit and/or franchise of an ECOZONE enterprise
may be canceled for any of the following grounds:
a. Failure to maintain the qualifications of registration/permit/franchise as required;
b. Violation of any pertinent provisions of the Act/Code and/or Decree; and

c. Violation of any of these Rules and Regulations, the corresponding implementing

memoranda or circulars or any of the general and specific terms and conditions of
the Registration Agreement between the PEZA and the ECOZONE enterprise or
violation of the terms and conditions of the permit/franchise issued by PEZA.
(emphasis supplied)
xxxx
In this respect, it is worthy to note that on May 18, 1999, the PEZA Board issued Resolution No.
99-134 imposing a fine of P377,890.00 on the PCMC for having illegally withdrawn from its
factory in MEZ 102 bales of used clothing, weighing approximately 5,000 kilograms, in
violation of the provisions and implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7916, otherwise
known as the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. The Resolution stated that the PCMC violated
Section 3, Rule X, Part VI,30 in relation to Section 8, Rule XXV, Part XI of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7916. The Resolution also contained a "final warning to the
company that a similar violation in the future shall be dealt with most severely and shall
constitute a sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of its registration with
[PEZA]."
In the presently assailed PEZA Board Resolution, it is clearly stated therein that the PCMC's
PEZA registration was canceled due to its failure to account for the shortage in its imported used
clothing; failure to secure the required permits for the withdrawal of goods and merchandise
from specified zones; and noncompliance with various EPZA/PEZA rules, procedures and
guidelines on the disposition of scraps and/or excess materials, which are in violation of Section
2, Rule XI, Part VI31 and, again, Section 3, Rule X, Part VI of the same Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Office of the President, dated September 7,
2004, and its Order dated January 20, 2005 in O.P. Case No. 04-G-324, as well as Board
Resolution No. 04-236 of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority, dated July 13, 2004, are
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 177878

April 7, 2010

SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLE'S LAW
ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB) Chairman, New Corella, Davao del Norte, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioner SPO1 Leonito Acuzar assailing the March 23, 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77110. The assailed decision
reversed and set aside the October 15, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum City, Branch 31, which had annulled the Decision3 of the Peoples Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB) of the Municipality of New Corella, Davao del Norte, finding petitioner guilty of
Grave Misconduct and ordering his dismissal from service.
The facts are as follows:

On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-014 against
petitioner before the PLEB charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit
relationship with respondents minor daughter.
On May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of New Corella, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1712, for Violation of
Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.
On May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit5 before the PLEB vehemently denying
all the accusations leveled against him. In support thereof, petitioner attached the affidavit of
complainants daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the
petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person.
On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending
resolution of the criminal case filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for
lack of merit and a hearing of the case was conducted. The PLEB also denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration on August 9, 2000 for allegedly being dilatory.
On August 17, 2000, after due proceedings, the PLEB issued a decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the respondent, SPO1 Leonito Acuzar,
PNP New Corella, Davao del Norte Police Station GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child
Abuse) which is punishable by DISMISSAL effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.6
Immediately upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order7 with the RTC of Tagum
City, Branch 31, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 384. Petitioner alleged that the subject
decision was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. He likewise averred that the
respondent Board acted without jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the petitioner
having been first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. Petitioner pointed out
that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act
on the administrative case considering that the charge was actually for violation of law, although
denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct.
On September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the Philippine National Police
(PNP) by the Chief Regional Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police Regional Office 11, effective
September 7, 2000.

On October 15, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB.
The trial court noted:
xxxx
But nothing in the record would show that the Board scheduled a hearing for the reception of the
evidence of the petitioner. In a nutshell, the petitioner was not given his day in Court. The Board
could have scheduled the hearing for the reception of petitioners evidence and if he failed to
appear, then the Board could have considered the non-appearance of the petitioner as a waiver to
present his evidence. It was only then that the decision could have been rendered.
xxxx
The hearing at the Peoples Law Enforcement Board, although administrative in nature, has
penal sanction of dismissal and for forfeiture of benefits of the petitioner. It is along this context
that the petitioner should be afforded all the opportunities of hearing which principally includes
the reception of his evidence consistent with our established rules. Due process of law embraces
not only substantive due process, but also procedural due process.
xxxx
While this Court does not tolerate any form of misconduct committed by members of the
Philippine National Police, yet it equally considers the right of the petitioner enshrined under the
Bill of Rights and the deprivation of petitioners gainful employment which is the economic life
blood of the family, especially the innocent dependents.8
Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the CA. On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered its
Decision reversing and setting aside the trial courts decision.
The CA found merit in respondents argument that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
before the RTC was not the proper remedy because (1) appeal was available and (2) the issues
raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact. According to the CA,
the existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one (1)
of the requirements for its availment is the absence of the remedy of appeal or any other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy. The CA ruled that petitioner should have appealed the decision of
the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari before the
court. The CA added that while it is true that there are instances where the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, petitioner, however, failed to
demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate resort to it. Thus, it held that the trial court erred
in giving due course to the petition.

Petitioner now assails the Decision of the CA in this recourse raising the following assigned
errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Certiorari was not a proper
remedy [to assail] the Decision of the Respondent-Peoples Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB), New Corella, Davao del Norte, because (1) appeal was available; and (2) the
issue raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact. And that
herein Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was accorded with due
process before the Respondent-Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), New Corella,
Davao del Norte, and was given his day in court for his defense.9
In essence, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners resort to certiorari
was not warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him.
Petitioner contends that the petition he filed before the trial court was appropriate because the
instant case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
decision being patently illegal. Petitioner maintains that a conviction should have been first
obtained in the criminal case filed against him for child abuse before the PLEB can acquire
jurisdiction over his administrative case. He also maintains that the Boards decision was reached
without giving him an opportunity to be heard and his right to due process was violated. The
Boards decision having been rendered without jurisdiction, appeal was not an appropriate
remedy.
We affirm the appellate courts ruling.
To reiterate, petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on the pretext
that the PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted
before the regular court. According to petitioner, although the case filed before the PLEB was
captioned as "Grave Misconduct," the offense charged was actually for "Violation of Law,"
which requires prior conviction before a hearing on the administrative case can proceed. Thus,
petitioner insists that the PLEB should have awaited the resolution of the criminal case before
conducting a hearing on the administrative charge against him.
The contention however is untenable. A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint
against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in
an illicit affair with respondents minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation
of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.10 It
usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no

discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment.11 On the
other hand, "violation of law" presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance.12 The settled rule is that
criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other.13 In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings.14 The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints
against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975,15 is explicit, thus:
SEC. 43. Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). - x x x
xxxx
(e) Decisions The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided, That a
decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with
the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal from the decision of the
PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was available,
filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari.16 Corollarily, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of
administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be utilized before resort
can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes
without the intervention of the court.
Moreover, for a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.17 For sure,
petitioners bare allegation that appeal from the judgment of the Board may not be adequate does
not justify immediate resort to certiorari. Moreover, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be
issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic

manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.18 Here, not only was an appeal available to
petitioner as a remedy from the decision of the PLEB, petitioner also failed to sufficiently show
any grave abuse of discretion of the Board which would justify his immediate resort to certiorari
in lieu of an appeal.
Contrary to petitioners claim that he has not been afforded all the opportunity to present his side,
our own review of the records of the proceedings before the PLEB reveals otherwise. The PLEB
summarized its proceedings as follows:
The Board issued a summon to SPO1 Leonito Acuzar on May 03, 2000 informing him of the
case filed against him. On May 4, 2000, the respondents wife Mrs. Arcella Acuzar made an
informal letter addressed to the Chairman of the PLEB that the respondent cannot answer the
summon because he was still in a critical condition in the hospital as alleged. After three days,
May 9, 2000 the respondent through his legal counsel filed a motion for extension of time to
submit counter affidavit. The Board received the sworn statement of the respondent on May 16,
2000. Subpoenas were sent to both parties informing them of the first hearing which was set on
June 01, 2000; 8:00 a.m. at the SB session hall, New Corella, Davao del Norte. Then the Board
set for a second hearing on June 15, 2000; 8:30 a.m. but the respondents counsel moved for a
postponement because he was slated to appear before the Regional Trial Court Branch 1, Tagum
City of the same date and time; the third hearing on June 21, 2000; 8:30 a.m.; the fourth hearing
on July 13, 2000, 8:30 a.m.; the fifth hearing on July 19, 2000, 9:00 a.m.; [and] the sixth hearing
on July 26, 2000 [were] postponed because the respondents counsel filed motions for
postponement and to suspend proceedings pending resolution of criminal case before the regular
court and the final hearing was set on August 03, 2000; 9:00 a.m. of the same place but the
respondent walked out during the hearing because of the non-appearance of his legal counsel but
the PLEB Members continued to hear the case without the respondent and legal counsels
presence based on sworn affidavit in the hands of the PLEB Members.19
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.20
In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had
submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings
together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot
claim that he had been denied of due process. Due process in an administrative context does not

require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses
may take the place of direct testimony. Here, we note that petitioner had more than enough
opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot
claim that his right to due process has been violated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 23, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77110 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR.,
ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents, LAURO
VIZCONDE, intervenor.
G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 274, respondents.
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995
ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR.,
ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge

of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against
petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal
Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the
aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica
Alfaro as one of the accused therein. 1
From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other
persons, 2 with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R.
Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation 3 of those charged with the rape and killing
on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; 4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, 5
and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer 6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn
statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who
allegedly saw the commission of the crime; 7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the
former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S.
Gaviola; 8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9,
1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who
expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4) the
sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated
the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar; 9 (5) the
sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids,
and the sworn statements of Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan,
an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and they showed
that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen
(19). 10 The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa. 11

Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a
Motion for Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to
produce the following:
(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and stay
of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;
(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan,
M.D.;
(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7,
1991);
(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the investigation;
(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;
(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated
September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;
(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other
than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police agencies;
(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by
Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;
(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their
respective positions and duties;
(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.

The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the
documents. It alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro.
This compelled petitioner Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said
sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L.
Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena duces
tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner Webb to the DOJ Panel together
with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain from
the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request
for its production.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the
crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the
Philippines on October 27, 1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon,

Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture
and Pamela Francisco. 13 To further support his defense, he submitted documentary
evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on
said dates 14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No.
A8818707 on June 14, 1991. 15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July
25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records
tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9,
1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.
The other respondents Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio
"Tony Boy" Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong submitted
sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the
rape-killing of the Vizcondes. 16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong"
Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in
their last known address. 17 In his sworn statement, petitioner Gatchalian alleged that
from 11 o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the morning of the
following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner
Lejano was with him.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause
to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with
homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents, 18 On the same date, it
filed the corresponding Information 19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was,
however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who
issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality
considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995,
petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa
Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up
to the authorities after filing their petitions before us.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and
Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise
gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with
the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right

to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully
intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
Information as an accused.
We find the petitions bereft of merit.
I
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that
the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and
uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility for
her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize
the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to
clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the
witnesses for the NBI.
We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section
1 of Rule 112 provides that a preliminary investigation should determine " . . .
whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Section 3 of
the same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation,
thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied
by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents,
in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file.
The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public,
who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the respondent
shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent
shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies
thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counteraffidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution
on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which
the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine
or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating
officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer
shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced,
the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold
the respondent for trial.

Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to
hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding
information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses,
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ."
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature . . ." 20 An arrest without a probable cause is an
unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not
to be intruded by the State. 21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept
in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 22 Other
jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent
and cautious man. 24 The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not to a
person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man
on the street. 25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel
gravely abused its discretion when it found probable cause against the

petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a)
she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b)
she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement, thus: 26
xxx xxx xxx
To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn
statements of Alfaro:
On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question
First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.
Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."
On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies
First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She
just said "on the following day I read in the newspaper that there were
three persons who were killed . . ."
Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two
bodies on top of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top
of Carmela."
On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde
First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.
Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of
Carmela and pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I
saw tears on her eyes."
On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more
than a meter high."
Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."
On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: She never entered the house.
Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty
kitchen."

In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and
inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent
ruling, viz.: 27
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument
merely that she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-conspirator
may be taken as evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's participation in
the commission of the crime (see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).
Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would such a prior
agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only
rarely documented by agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing
that the several accused had acted in concert or in unison with each other, evincing a
common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992],
citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).
Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two sworn
statements. In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness accusing
therein petitioner for the slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though said witness
failed to name Angelo in his affidavit which was executed five (5) months earlier.
Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony is untrue, such
circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the witness.
On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his memorandum
suggesting that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the month to give time
to the NBI to coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of Hubert
Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based witnesses."
In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the maxim
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's statements,
among others. This is untenable. As held in Angelo:
There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the
testimony of a witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously
rejecting other parts which the court may find incredible or dubious. The
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a rule of law, let alone a
general rule of law which is universally applicable. It is not a legal
presumption either. It is merely a latinism describing the conclusion
reached by a court in a particular case after ascribing to the evidence
such weight or lack of weight that the court deemed proper.
In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations
when she first executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her
natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in

Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially specially so
where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the
truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and
credit. As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because
they are usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and
fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the
incidents which transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court
of Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been
committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by the
complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of
the imputed offense.

We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance
of counsel 28 and consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the
crime was planned and then executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel
evaluated the supporting sworn statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former
housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a passenger in United Airlines Flight No.
808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The Panel assayed their
statements as follows: 29
xxx xxx xxx
According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29,
1991, between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home inside
his room with two male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-housemaid, Loany,
were instructed by Hubert to bring them three glasses of juice. It was the last time she
saw Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that Hubert was in the United
States.
While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served as
a laundry woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa Rosales,
that on June 30, 1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as what she used
to do, she entered the rooms of the Webbs to get their clothes to be washed. As a matter
of fact, in that early morning, she entered Hubert's room and saw Hubert, who was only
wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while he was sitting on his bed. She
picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them together with the clothes of the
other members of the family to the laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she began
washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she
noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After she finished the laundry, she went to the
servant's quarters. But feeling uneasy, she decided to go up to the stockroom near
Hubert's room to see what he was doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small door
going to Hubert's room and in that door there is a small opening where she used to see
Hubert and his friends sniffing on something. She observed Hubert was quite irritated,
uneasy, and walked to and from inside his room.

On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and came
back at around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the secret
door of the house. It was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the Webb family.
On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in
the morning, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then scheduled
to take the United Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the
airport's lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie Webb with a male companion. He
greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko ang anak ko
papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often watched him then in a
television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom Freddie Webb
referred to as his son, was of the same height as Freddie. The son referred to has fair
complexion with no distinguishing marks on his face. He (son of Webb) was then wearing
a striped white jacket. When he and his children were already inside the plane, he did not
see Freddie anymore, but he noticed his son was seated at the front portion of the
economy class. He never noticed Freddie Webb's son upon their arrival in San Francisco.
He claims that, while watching the television program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw
the wife of Freddie Webb with her lawyer being interviewed, and when she described
Hubert as "moreno" and small built, with a height of five feet and seven inches tall, and
who was the one who left for United States on March 9, 1991, he nurtured doubts
because such description does not fit the physical traits of the son of Freddie, who left
with him for United States on the same flight and date.
Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with him for
almost three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four (4) years old.
Their relationship started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him in September
1993. She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play
mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the back of the Paraaque
Municipal Hall.
At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the
Paraaque police told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio
room, she was instructed to take him over and after somebody won the game, she
followed Biong at the radio room where she overheard him uttering, "Ano?, Saan?
Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o sige." When he put
the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan, ikaw muna ang
maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty
minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived with a male passenger sitting at the backseat
and parked near the canteen. After it made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong
rode thereat at the front seat beside the driver and then, they left. She was not able to
recognize the male passenger because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came
back at around 7:00 of the same morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed
his hands and face, and took his handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the
trash can. She asked him why he threw his handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . .
amoy tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and he replied, "Putang inang mga
batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."

Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she observed
him doing something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy. Moments later,
Galvan, another policeman of Paraaque, arrived and said, "Oy Biong, may tatlong patay
sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako." Biong went to
the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who offered to accompany him and with whom she
asked permission to go with them. Before they proceeded to the place where the killings
happened, she asked Biong if he knew the exact address and the latter immediately
responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was surprised because Galvan never told him the
place of the incident.
As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the housemaids to
contact the victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the barangay chairman and
the president of the Homeowners Association. When all these persons were already in
the house, Biong started recording the wounds of the victim. Inside the master's
bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry box. Because she could not
tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out of the room and proceeded to
the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the scattered contents of a shoulder
bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room and proceeded to the front door to
remove the chain lock; asked the keys from the housemaid and it was only then that the
main door was opened. Biong noticed a stone in front of the broken glass of the door and
requested Capt. Bartolome to go inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the
housemaids' claim that they heard nothing unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong
broke the remaining glass of the door panel. Bartolome then came out of the room and
told Biong that he can hear the sound of the glass being broken. At the garage, Biong
also noticed same marks on the hood of the car.
On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with the
Vizconde housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him remove
from his pocket the things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit: calling cards,
driver's license, ATM card, a crossed check worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring, bracelet,
necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry box inside the room of the Vizcondes.
These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of
Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue, Paraaque. The next day, she saw Biong took
from his locker at the Paraaque Police Station an imported brown leather jacket, which
the latter claimed to have been given to him by the person who called him up in the early
morning of June 30, 1991.
Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in 1993.
She observed that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of the
Vizconde case. In fact, when Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and
brought him to the Paraaque Police Station, she was surprised that Biong halted the
investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being interrogated. After the
father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and instructed Biong to
bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the last thing she remembered
regarding this case.

The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory
evidence of petitioners. It ruled: 30

xxx xxx xxx

The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his
defense of denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough
evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by
the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a
prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive
identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and
relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316
and a long line of cases).
Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters
(People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and
becomes even more weaker when arrayed against the positive identification by the
witness for the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]).
Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he
claimed was with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than claiming
that he "was not and could not have been at or near the area of the Vizconde residence
at the time of the alleged commission of the crime," respondent Lejano proffered no
evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi in the
form of documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when the
incident occurred. We have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence submitted
by respondent Webb in support of his absence from the country since March 9, 1991 to
October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to exonerate him of the offense charged.
The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While respondent Webb may
have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a California driver's license on
June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not have been in the country on the
dates above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in the allegation that respondent Webb
personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in California in view of his positive
identification by Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of the Webb family who testified that
he was here in the country on said dates. Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing
the purchase of a bicycle in California is no conclusive proof that the name appearing
thereon was the actual buyer of the merchandise.

Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold
that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty

of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, 31 while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect
to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding
of probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its
discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The
decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand
already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory
hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should
be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish
his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough
evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing
was unnecessary.
II
We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon
and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against
them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners
support their stance by highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of
warrants of arrest in a matter of few hours; (2) the failure of said judges to issue
orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to the trial court were incomplete and
insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause; and (4) that even
Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a mere accessory had a
"NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was
impossible to conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and evaluation of
the documents" on the part of said judges.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is
regulated by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III
of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both
with respect to issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities
and differences of their requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are
pointed out by Professors LaFave and Israel, thus: 32 "It is generally assumed that
the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned with
probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But each requires a
showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances, and
thus one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be
supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by
virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person be
implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it, which
of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found
at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do
not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of
arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to
be followed in issuing search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5
of Rule 126 provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the
facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed
by these Rules.

We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and

search warrants in Soliven vs. Makasiar, 33 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers
as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate
the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted
"searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against
them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an
order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring
the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report,
the two (2) sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos
Cristobal and Lolita Birrer 35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners.
Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in
the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the
certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see
if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process
cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took
the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. 36
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno 37 is misplaced. Our Allado
ruling is predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of
probable cause. Not even the corpus delicti of the crime was established by the
evidence of the prosecution in that case. Given the clear insufficiency of the
evidence on record, we stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a
further personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses to reach a
correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable cause before
issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests
on a different factual setting. As priorly discussed, the various types of evidence
extant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a finding of
probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime is a given
fact. There is an eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The
alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by sworn statements of their
former maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the
further step of examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses with
searching questions.
III
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their
alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They
also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not
conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given
fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. The fairness of this
opportunity is well stressed in the Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor
General, viz.:
Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities
to be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by
appearing in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July
14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply to the compliance and
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" on
July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6,
Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to
Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner
Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel requesting the latter to furnish him a copy of the
reports prepared by the FBI concerning the petitioner's whereabouts during the material
period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995).
In fact, not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not to issue subpoena duces
tecum to Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a "Petition for Injunction,
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Makati
in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro
for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed the petition
after Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of
Alfaro, without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and
inconsistent sworn statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a copy
of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated July 28, 1995)
marked as Annex "F."
It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the
preliminary investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the
panel continued to conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the photo-copies of
the submitted documents with the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The panel
even entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel Rodriguez on July 18,
1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even announced that any party
may submit additional evidence before the resolution of the case. (p. 8, Petition) From the
time the panel declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995,
twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before the resolution was promulgated, and the
information eventually filed in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque on August 10, 1995.
This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court
that the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the
termination of the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties
to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the
resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During
the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present
additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.

Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the
conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the
adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.

Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court
against them for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to
appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The
filing of said Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223,
series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a resolution
of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no
appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the
appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed
motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however,
shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be
interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from
receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run from the time the resolution denying the
motion shall have been received by the movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)

Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an
Information in court after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even
if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's
recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information
considering her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with
homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And
Benefit Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro
qualified under its Section 10, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime
and desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act
and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;
(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order
that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the
other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an
accused so that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates
her non-inclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. The certification of
admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the
provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court
for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order
the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information.
Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal
prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all
the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.

The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that

they constitute ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court
which has the power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an
accused as a state witness." The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 38
which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to
be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty
assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth,
the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government

whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right
to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a
wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally
impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and
who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. 39 Section 9 of Rule 119 does
not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness
is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the
power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part
of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial
function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond
change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice
system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help
government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the
reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the
Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic
dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of
criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases
have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more
effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law
protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their
appearance in investigative bodies/courts." 40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the
validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery
proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28,
1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The
argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the
rights of persons under preliminary investigation it deserves serious
consideration. To start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not expressly
provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a
criminal proceeding. 41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the
right to move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material
evidence in possession of the prosecution. 42 But these provisions apply after the
filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the
accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare
for trial. 43

This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does

not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable
to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary
investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of
the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed,
the object of a preliminary investigation is to determine the probability that the
suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself
subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In
the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they
are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when
the evidence of guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of
preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of
preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and
impartial. 44 As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 45 "the
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for
trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some
other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right." A
preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any
material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand
from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation
considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to
the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional
protection of due process which we rule to be operational even during the
preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3) (a)
of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a
sworn complaint, which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and
be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from
other jurisdictions. In the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United
States Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to
guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney v. Holohan 47 which laid down the
proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to procure
conviction violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the

prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence in its

possession. 48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady 49 "society
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair."
Indeed, prosecutors should not treat litigation like a game of poker where
surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is not punished.
But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory
evidence in their favor, we are not prepared to rule that the initial non-production
of the original sworn statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted
in the reasonable likelihood that the DOJ Panel would not have found probable
cause. To be sure, the NBI, on July 4, 1995, upon request of petitioners,
submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement. It explained it
cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately, petitioners, on July
28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo Mercader in
the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099. 50 As petitioners admit,
the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement as
a part of their evidence. 51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the
DOJ Panel then still conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory
aspects of this sworn statement. Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still
found probable cause to charge them despite the alleged material discrepancies
between the first and second sworn statements of Alfaro. For reasons we have
expounded, this finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with
grave abuse of discretion. 52 On the other hand, the FBI Report while
corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable
cause finding of the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of evidence presented by
the NBI.
Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its
impartiality due to the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast
media by the NBI.
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due
process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural
impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty
while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in
constitutional law where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the
press, the public's right to information, and an accused's right to a fair and
impartial trial collide and compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing
where the balance should be struck has divided men of learning as the balance

keeps moving either on the side of liberty or on the side of order as the tumult of
the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance of balance is a difficult
act to follow.
In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be
avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match
the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case
continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with
views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal
actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media
abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be
completely closed to the press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 53 it was wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging
perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In
addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized:
when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often
follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of
justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be
provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must
be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L
Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily
closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First
Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been

regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free
exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to
the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly
guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated
rights. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under

certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair
trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., 54 we held that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the
tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ
Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the
DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State
Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider
in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity.
Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does
not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence
properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness.
At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member
of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity.
It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as
petitioners will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable
cause is not synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good
disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's
right to fair trial. Without imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of
supervising every specie of speech relating to the case at bar, it behooves her to
be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile criminal cases to control
publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. 55 The Court reminds

judges that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in
every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More
than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the
judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is
done and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar
of public opinion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 121039-45

October 18, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN
BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accusedappellants.

RE S O LUTI ON
MELO, J.:
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our January 25, 1999 decision, penned by Justice
Antonio M. Martinez, affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch 70 of the
Pasig City Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellants Mayor Antonio Sanchez, George
Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Pepito Kawit
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and additionally, ordering
each of them to pay the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) to the heirs of
the two victims as additional indemnity. While accused-appellants Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama,
Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration, it
was only on December 6, 1999 that the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment thereto.
And since Justice Martinez had retired earlier on February 2, 1999, in accordance with A.M. No.
99-8-09 promulgated by the Court on February 15, 2000, the motions for reconsideration filed by
accused-appellants was assigned by raffle only on September 18, 2001 to herein ponente for
study and preparation of the appropriate action.
In his motion for reconsideration, Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and
conviction by publicity and that the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio
Malabanan presented by the prosecution are lacking in credibility. He likewise contends that the
testimony of his 13-year old daughter vis--vis his whereabouts on the night of the felony should
have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan. Lastly,
Mayor Sanchez seeks the reconsideration of the amount of the "gargantuan" damages awarded
on the ground that the same have no factual and legal bases.
In the same vein, accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit, in their
motion for reconsideration, maintain that prosecution witnesses Centeno and Malabanan have
been sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent statements allegedly pertaining to material and
crucial points of the events at issue. Not only that, they assert that independent and disinterested
witnesses have destroyed the prosecutions version of events.
Preliminarily, it may be observed that, except for the issue of civil damages raised by Mayor
Sanchez, accused-appellants have not presented any issue new or different from that which they
had previously raised before the trial court and this Court. Moreover, the issues they have raised
have been discussed at length and passed upon by both the court a quo and by this Court. Thus,
on the charge that accused-appellant Sanchez is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity, in
our January 25, 1999 decision, citing People vs. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), we declared:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now,
we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be
sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed
out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field The press does not simply publish

information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge
due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In
Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice
and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records
do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence
of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a
result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez, having
failed, in his motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the part of
the trial judge. Not only that, accused-appellants case has been exhaustively and painstakingly
reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown by an iota of proof that
the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity in affirming the
sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. The charge of conviction by publicity leveled
by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand on.
As to the claim that witnesses Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility and that they were
sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent statements, the same is old hat, to say the least. It is
hornbook doctrine in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate courts
will respect these findings considering that trial courts are in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial (People vs. Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485 [2000]). In the instant case, then
Judge Harriet Demetriou found both Centeno and Malabanan to have testified in a frank,
spontaneous, and straightforward manner; and that despite gruelling cross-examination by a
battery of defense lawyers, their testimony never wavered on the substantial matters in issue.
As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan, suffice it to say
that the points raised have all been carefully and assiduously examined, not only by the trial
court but also by the Court itself, and that the inconsistencies were found to refer to minor and
collateral matters. It is well-settled that so long as the witnesses declarations agree on substantial

matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the witnesses
credibility nor the verity of their testimony (People vs. Agomo-o, 334 SCRA 279 [2000]).
Accused-appellants have not shown in their motions for reconsideration new evidence to warrant
disregard for the above-rule, nor have they shown that the Court has overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some fact of weight and circumstance that would have materially affected the
outcome of the case.
Accused-appellant Sanchezs argument that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter, Ave Marie
Sanchez, as to his whereabouts on the night of the crime should be given full faith and credence
is likewise unavailing. While it is true that statements of children are accorded great probative
value, it is likewise true that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. Where nothing
supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, it deserves but scant consideration (People
vs. Waggay, 218 SCRA 742 [1993]). Moreover, accused-appellant Sanchezs alibi cannot prevail
over the positive declarations of the prosecution that he was at Erais Farm that fateful night. The
alibis of accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit are even worse, not
having been corroborated by any other evidence. The assertions of these accused-appellants as to
their innocence are thus entitled short shrift from this Court.
Accused-appellant Sanchezs asseverations as to the amount of damages awarded is, however,
meritorious. The trial court awarded the Sarmenta family P50,000.00 as civil liability for the
wrongful death of Eileen Sarmenta, P106,650.00 for the funeral expenses they incurred, and
P3,276,000.00 for the loss of Eileen Sarmentas earning capacity; or a total of P3,432,650.00 as
actual damages. On the other hand, the Gomez family was awarded by the trial court a total of
P3,484,000.00 as actual damages, broken down as follows: P50,000.00 for the wrongful death of
Allan Gomez, P74,000.00 for the latters funeral, and P3,360,000.00 for the loss of the latters
earning capacity.
Similarly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00 to the
Sarmenta family and another P2,000,000.00 to the Gomez family as moral damages. Lastly, the
trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the Sarmenta and Gomez families the sum of
P164,250.00 and 191,000.00, respectively, for litigation expenses incurred.
The Court, in its decision dated January 25, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision of the lower
court. However, we also ordered each accused-appellant to pay the respective heirs of Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez an additional indemnity of P350,000.00 each, stating that since each
accused-appellant had been found guilty of seven counts of rape with homicide, jurisprudence
dictated that for each count, each accused-appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00, or
a total of P350,000.00.
Since the trial courts award of actual damages to the Gomez and Sarmenta families already
included civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, to order each accused-appellant to pay an
additional P350,000.00 as civil indemnity would be "double recovery" of damages on the part of
the Gomez and Sarmenta families for the same act or omission. Thus, the amount of P50,000.00
awarded by the trial court must each be deducted from the amount of actual damages due to the
Gomez and Sarmenta families.

As for funeral expenses, the Court had occasion to declare in People vs. Timon (281 SCRA 577
[1997]) that "burial expenses, which are by nature actual expenses must be proved. Since no
proof of burial expenses was ever presented in the instant case, its award will not be allowed." It
is a settled rule that there must be proof that actual or compensatory damages have been suffered
and evidence of its actual amount (People vs. Nablo, 319 SCRA 784 [1999]). While the funeral
expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family were supported by the appropriate receipts, the same
is not true for the funeral expenses incurred by the Gomez family. Not having been duly
receipted, the amount of P74,000.00 awarded to the Gomez family as funeral expenses must,
perforce, be deleted. However, as the heirs of Allan Gomez clearly incurred funeral expenses,
P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages should be awarded. This award is adjudicated so that a
right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of
indemnification (see People vs. Candare, 333 SCRA 338 [2000]).
The award of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00, representing the alleged loss of earning capacity
of Sarmenta and Gomez, respectively, also merit review. Eileen Sarmenta, at the time of her
death, was a graduating student of the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines
at Los Baos (UPLB), majoring in Food and Nutrition for Large Animals. Allan Gomez was
likewise a senior student of the College of Agriculture of UPLB, majoring in Beef Production.
The trial court, using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, pegged the life expectancy of
Sarmenta, 21 years old at the time of her death, and Gomez, 19 years old at the time of his death,
at 39.1 and 40.6 years, respectively. Believing that the victims would have earned a monthly
salary of P15,000.00 and incurred living expenses of P8,000.00 per month, the trial court
awarded P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 as the amount recoverable by the Sarmenta and
Gomez families, respectively, for the loss of the earning capacity of Eileen and Allan.
While accused-appellant Sanchez contends that the awards of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00
are baseless in fact and law, no evidence having been adduced to prove that the victims had any
actual income at the time of their demise, it is well-settled that to be compensated for loss of
earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, be gainfully
employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of
capacity to earn money (People vs. Teehankee, supra). Likewise, the fact that the prosecution did
not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity
of the deceased does not preclude recovery of the same (People vs. Quilang, 312 SCRA 314
[1999]; People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690 [1999]). On the part of Eileen Sarmenta, her mother
testified that Eileen had an offer for employment from Monterey Farms. On the other hand, Allan
Gomezs mother testified that her deceased son planned to work on a private farm after
graduation.
Moreover, in Cariaga et al. vs. LTB and Manila Railroad Co. (110 Phil. 346 [1960]), the Court
awarded compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity to Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th year
medical student at UST, stating that while his scholastic record may not have been first rate, it
was, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished the course,
would have passed the board in due time, and that he could have possibly earned as a medical
practitioner the minimum monthly income of P300.00.

Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the countrys leading
educational institution in agriculture. As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims
would have graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived them of their
future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are entitled to compensation.
Difficulty, however, arises in measuring the value of Sarmentas and Gomezs lost time and
capacity to earn money in the future, both having been unemployed at the time of death. While
the law is clear that the deceased has a right to his own time which right cannot be taken from
him by a tortfeasor without compensation the law is also clear that damages cannot be
awarded on the speculation, passion, or guess of the judge or the witnesses. In this case, Eileen
Sarmentas mother testified that for a new graduate of UPLB, the basic salary was more or less
P15,000.00 per month. Allan Gomezs mother, on the other hand, testified that her son could
have easily gotten P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per month. Clearly, the testimony of said witnesses
are speculative, insufficient to prove that in 1993, Sarmenta and Gomez would have indeed
earned P15,000.00 a month had they managed to graduate. However, considering that Sarmenta
and Gomez would have graduated in due time from a reputable university, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that in 1993 they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All
factors considered, the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that
the two would have earned in 1993 at P8,000.00 per month (or P96,000.00/year) and their
deductible living and other incidental expenses at P3,000.00 per month (or P36,000.00/year).
Hence, in accordance with the formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31
SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the loss of Sarmenta
and Gomezs earning capacity is to be computed as follows:

Net earning
capacity

Life expectancy x (Gross Annual

Income Living Expenses)

where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80

the age of the deceased)

Heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:

= 2/3 (80-21) x (96,000 36,000)

= 39.353 x 60,000

= P2,361,180.00

Heirs of Allan Gomez:

= 2/3 (80-19) x (96,000 36,000)

= 40.687 x 60,000

= P2,441,220.00

As to the award of P2,000,000.00 each as moral damages to the Sarmenta and Gomez families,
these must also be reduced, the same being excessive. While the assessment of moral damages is
left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each case (Article 2216, Civil
Code), the purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or
correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense
of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the
defendants culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (Dela Serna vs. CA, 233 SCRA 325 [1994]). The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or the means of the offender.
The death caused by a beggar is felt by the parents of the victim as intensely as that caused by
the action of a wealthy family. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, thus reduces the
amount of moral damages awarded to the heirs of Eileen Gomez and Allan Sarmenta to
P1,000,000.00 each. As to the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses, the same is
reasonable and justified, this case having dragged on for over eight years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellants for
seven counts of rape with homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them
for each of said counts, with MODIFICATION that the accused be ordered to pay the heirs of the
victims as follows:

To the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:

1. Death indemnity

P 350,000.00

2. Moral damages

1,000,000.00

3. Funeral expenses

4. Loss of earning capacity

5. Attorneys fees & litigation

expenses

Total

106,650.00

2,361,180.00

164,250.00

P
3,982,080.00

To the heirs of Allan Gomez:

1. Death indemnity

P 350,000.00

2. Moral damages

1,000,000.00

3. Nominal damages

4. Loss of earning capacity

5. Attorneys fees & litigation

expenses

Total

SO ORDERED

10,000.00

2,441,220.00

191,000.00

P
3,992,220.00

G.R. No. 120223 March 13, 1996

DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN CESAR Y. NITORREDA, ET AL.,
respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:p
The instant motion for reconsideration has its origin in an administrative case (OBMMIN-ADM-94-059) filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao by private
respondents Jesiela Antiporta and Aida Salmeo against petitioner Dr. Ramon Y. Alba in
his capacity as Director III of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS)
accusing the latter of violating certain provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards For Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713).
The facts are as follows:
Private respondents were among the twenty five (25) graduating students of the
Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI) in Tagum, Davao
who sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute with the said school arising
from the implementation of certain school policies. Acting on the request for
intervention, petitioner scheduled a meeting with the students on March 20, 1994 at
8:30 in the morning. Thus, on the said date, private respondents and the other
complaining students travelled all the way from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in
Davao City. Their presence in the said office was duly noted by DECS Administrative
Officer V, Aquilina Granada who advised them that petitioner will forthwith meet with
them. However, instead of conferring with the aggrieved students, petitioner instead met
with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI-who admittedly did not even have a
previous appointment with petitioner with the result that the students were left waiting at
the anteroom for several hours. In view of this apparent discrimination, the students
contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was
impelled to proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner for not conferring with
both parties at the same time in order to hear both sides of the controversy. Thereafter,
petitioner presided over the conference between the Arriesgados and the aggrieved
students. On March 29, 1994, petitioner submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao (Office of the Ombudsman), a report on the said conference wherein he
claimed that he had succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement between the
parties. However, petitioner's claim of having settled the dispute between the

Arriesgados and the complaining students is belied by private respondents' affidavitcomplaint 1 attesting to the fact that as a result of the said dispute, they were barred from
taking the, final examinations and participating. in the graduation rites. In the same
affidavit-complaint, private respondents pointed out petitioner's evident bias and
partiality in favor of the Arriesgados in the conduct of the conference held on March 20,
1994. Petitioner denied the said charges in his counter-affidavit 2 and justified his
actuations by posturing that the reason why he decided to talk to the school owner first
was "to thresh out the complaints of the students in order to have a complete view of the
situation before talking jointly with the student and the owner of the
school." 3 Petitioner also theorized that private respondents were not allowed to take the
final examinations and participate in the graduation rites due, to their failure "to settle
their obligations with the school and/or . . . pass their academic subjects . . .," 4 However,
in a rejoinder filed by petitioner, he averred that after inquiry from AIMSFI, he was
informed that private respondents' taking of the final examinations and their graduation
were conditioned upon their withdrawal of the complaint filed against petitioner with the
Office of the Ombudsman. 5
After both parties failed to attend the preliminary conference scheduled by the Graft
Investigating Officer assigned to the case, a resolution dated April 28, 1995 was
rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner guilty of violating Section
4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713 6 and holding as follows:
There is no denying that respondent Director Alba was partial to the AIMSFI school
owners and acted against the interest of the complainants. Complainants' averments
were confirmed by the school itself, thru School Principal Ma. Clara Arriesgado, that the
complaining students were not allowed to take the final examination until and unless they
agree to the withdrawal of the case they filed in this Office against herein respondent
Assistant Regional Director. Clearly, respondent and the school jointly coerced the
students to submit to such an illegal, improper and immoral demand. Respondent did not
comfort himself in accordance with justness, sincerity and professionalism required by
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees R.A. 6713).
7

For such gross misconduct, petitioner was meted a suspension of thirty (30) days
without pay and warned that any other instance of non-observance of the Code of
Conduct will result in graver punishment. 8
When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied, he
filed an "Appeal Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition With Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction" (petition) with this
Court. In a Resolution dated June 27, 1995, the said petition was dismissed on the
ground that it was moot and academic because the questioned suspension of petition a
which was effective from May 26, 1995 to June 24, 1995 had already expired or

become functus oficio on June 28, 1995 when the petition was filed. Alleging, first and
foremost, a misreading of the correct date of filing of the petition, petitioner filed the
instant motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the said petition. A closer scrutiny
of the records shows that the petition was indeed filed on June 2, 1995 and not on June
28 as initially deciphered by this Court from the misleading sequence of numbers on the
stamp of receipt, that is "JUN 2 8 28 PM 95". Thus, as correctly averred by petitioner, at
the time of the filing of the petition on June 2, 1995, there were still a good twenty two
(22) days left of the suspension imposed on him. Consequently, we set aside our
original finding that the petition is moot and academic.
With that error rectified, it is now incumbent upon this Court to resolve the following
issues raised in the petition to the end that the latter may be finally disposed of on its
merits.
A) Whether or not Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of
1989") which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary (sic) shall be final and
unappealable.
and Section 7, Rule III, of Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10, 1990 (otherwise
known as the "RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN" . . .),
which states:
Sec. 7. Finality of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charged (sic) and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one 1 month salary, the
decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become
final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a
motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
are valid or constitutional, or constitute an undue curtailment or deprivation of Petitioner's
right to DUE PROCESS and a denial of his constitutional right to property. 9
and
(b) Whether or not the thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner, without pay and
"unappealable", imposed by herein respondent DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN for MINDANAO,
Cesar E. Nitorreda, was in accordance with a valid or constitutional law/legislation and/or
in accordance with due process, supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary,
whimsical and a grave abuse of discretion or authority on the part of said Nitorreda. 10

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III
of Administrative Order No. 7 for their failure to provide for the right of appeal in certain
cases from the decision of the Ombudsman, maintaining that the same is tantamount to
a deprivation of property without due process of law. As regards this threshold matter,
suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that:
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law. 11

Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied

notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one's case. 12
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the power to promulgate its own
rules of procedure, 13 and a perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative
cases manifest sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. Thus,
Sec. 5 Administrative Adjudication; How Conducted
a) If the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes enumerated in Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6770, the respondent shall be furnished with copy of the affidavits and
other evidences submitted by the complainant, and shall be ordered to file his counteraffidavits and other evidences in support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, together with proof of service of the same on the complainant who may file reply
affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the counter-affidavits of the respondent.
b) If, on the basis of the affidavits and other evidences submitted by the parties; the
investigating officer finds no sufficient cause to warrant further proceedings, the complaint
may be dismissed. Otherwise, he shall summon the parties to a preliminary conference to
consider the following matters:
1) Whether the parties desire a formal investigation or are willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and such other evidences they will
present at such conference;
2) Should the parties desire a formal investigation to determine the nature of the charge,
stipulation of facts, a definition of the issues, identification and marking of exhibits,
limitation of witness and such other matters as would expedite the proceedings;
c) After the preliminary conference, the investigating officer shall issue an order reciting
the matters take up during the conference, including the facts stipulated, the evidence
marked and the issues involved. The contents of this order may not be deviated from
unless amended to prevent manifest injustice.

d) Should hearing be conducted, the parties shall be notified at least five (5) days before
the date thereof. Failure of any or both of the parties to appear at the hearing is not
necessarily a cause for the dismissal of the complaint. A party who appears may be
allowed to present his evidence in the absence of the adverse party who was duly
notified of the hearing;
e) Only witnesses who have submitted affidavits, served on the adverse party at least five
(5) days before the date of his being presented as a witness may be allowed to testify at
the hearing. The affidavit of any witness shall constitute his direct testimony, subject to
cross-examination re-direct examination and re-cross-examination;
f) The parties shall be allowed the assistance of counsel and the right to the production of
evidence thru the compulsory process of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum.

Petitioner further assails the failure of the Graft Investigating Officer to call the parties to
another preliminary conference after their failure to appear at the first one. He contends
that the lack of any kind of hearing for evidence presentation resulted in "what may be
termed, in the lingo of 'civil procedure', a 'judgment on the pleadings'" 14 . At the onset, it
is worth pointing out that petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to present his side at
the scheduled preliminary conference. His non-appearance thereat is attributable to no
one else but himself and he cannot be allowed to now pass the buck to the Graft
Investigating Officer who had complied strictly with the above quoted procedure in the
conduct of administrative investigations. Furthermore, undisputed is the fact that not
only did the Office of the Ombudsman give due course and consideration to petitioner's
counter-affidavit, but it also entertained and resolved his motion for reconsideration
which is not ordinarily allowed in the adjudication of administrative cases where the
penalty imposed is suspension of not more than one month. Thus, contrary to
petitioner's claim, he was in fact given all opportunity to be heard, albeit through
pleadings.
In point is the case of Concerned Officials of the MWSS vs. Hon. Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, 15 where this Court upheld the validity of an order issued by the Ombudsman
without prior hearing, in this wise:
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, One may be heard, not solely
by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings,
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense. 16

Hence, a formal or trial type hearing is not, at all times, necessary. So long as a party is
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side, the requirement of due
process is complied with. 17

That the petitioner and all other public officials are deprived of a legal recourse in the
event that the Ombudsman or his Deputy "hastily, arbitrarily, if not oppressively and/or
inhumanly, acts to find him administratively liable for an imagined violation of Sec. 4 of
R.A. 6713 . . ." 18 is belied by the fact that the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is always available to an aggrieved public officials
in such a case. The Rules of Court which apply suppletorily to the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman 19 provides that in the absence of an appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
by any decision rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, may file a petition for certiorari with
this Court. 20
Petitioner's asseveration that his suspension is not substantiated by evidence is a mere
desperate attempt to lure this Court into reviewing the factual findings of the Office of
the Ombudsman. Squarely applicable to the findings of fact in the administrative
proceedings against petitioner is the settled the rule that:
. . . factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but finality,
because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial tribunals
from handling specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. Courts cannot take
cognizance of such factual issues. In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing
court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence. . . . 21

Nonetheless, even a review of the evidence against the petitioner does not
warrant a reversal of the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Finally and as a last ditch effort, petitioner secured a joint-affidavit of desistance
dated May 19, 1995 from private respondents in the hope that the Office of the
Ombudsman will be persuaded into discontinuing the prosecution of the case
against him. The joint-affidavit of desistance was executed by private
respondents only after all evidence against petitioner had been documented and
evaluated by the Office of the Ombudsman, and in fact, only after it had issued
its resolution finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charges against him.
The joint-affidavit of desistance is not binding on the Office of the Ombudsman
and cannot prevail over the provision of law which categorically allows the Office
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute on its own any act or omission
of a public officer or employee, office or agency which appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. 22 Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained
from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally
mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond
the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. 23 Such initiative and

independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as

the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the aforegoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated June 27, 1995 is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July
1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila,
heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way
street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson

and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner
then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was
able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at
the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake
Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the
credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of
the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the
same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably
the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to
verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two
(2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was
at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That
same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his
lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he
must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot
wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for
frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No
bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the
Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.

Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial

Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the
motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional
liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to
expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the
sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by
petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation 8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in
the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro,
who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to
the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct
preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until
after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10
embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled;
petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16
July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for
bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the
information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously
conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension
of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition;
this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the
arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his
arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the
Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial
Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to
enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set
the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and
17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of
Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the
petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus
prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for
habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's
motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and
academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution
presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision
dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:

14

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested
and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through
investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing
manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness
positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest.
He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably
under the Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order
because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as
to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid
commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities
whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for
habeas corpus could not be granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial.
Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with
petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14
October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in
abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether
or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to
preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case,
petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the
gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established
by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police
Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16
one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a
warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in
connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the
Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were
applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for
murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had
allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed"
at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him
had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the
"personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there

had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in
respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the
circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the
Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1)
to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such
offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership
in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the
offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously
commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had
pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact
just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was
the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one

stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's
name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112,
which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without
a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask
for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he
must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen
(15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of
the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into
San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at
the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering"
himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead,
as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7
of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation.
This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and
that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be
released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded
that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day
that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed
with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have
been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should
accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not
believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be
predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by
the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the
Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this
fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v.
Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated,
the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in
Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding
and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the
right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary
investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a reinvestigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the
5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus

motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the
trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such
preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised
of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial
court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been
substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament,
since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or
some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The
accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation,
humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process
painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure
of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary
investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August
1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused
fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant
case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation
before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the
Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a
preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner
had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold
that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because
immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously
claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant
case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and
ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of

preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a
motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if
impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate
one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord
preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure
of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information
for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was
entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor
that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that
the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and
requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was
plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all and certainly no new or additional
evidence had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall
of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the
instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already
presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary
investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue
to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge
against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner
remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already
began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary
investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in
view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable
cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the
conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In
any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was
entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo
arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with
extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner
of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the
date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very

clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of
the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's
counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared
him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the
trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once
again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation:
petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly
gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of
the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. 30 If
he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it
was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by
the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what
is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of
record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong,
the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would
then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on
record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence
subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due
process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable
omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the
vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a
ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it
would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights
and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to
respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED,
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby
REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a
preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete
such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement

thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be
SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash
bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without
prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148468

January 28, 2003

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769

January 28, 2003

EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116

January 28, 2003

EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the
resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in
February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance
studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a
donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor
Luis "Chavit" Singson through the latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received
the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundation's treasurer who later deposited it
in the Foundation's account with the Equitable PCI Bank.

In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E.
Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the
illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the
Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints were: Volunteers Against Crime
and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera,
Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No.
0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The other
respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman
conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint
resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be charged
with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations against
former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post as President of the Republic of
the Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, charged
Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an amended Information
in said case charging Estrada and several co-accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No
bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the accused, including petitioner. The
case was raffled to a special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The
amended Information reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PUBLIC OFFICER BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE

FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A

combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit
public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED
MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND

PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE

CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS,
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of
MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution finding
probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner likewise filed
on said date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a
Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused's Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the
Charges against accused Edward Serapio.3
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended
Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal
Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the
accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date
for the arrest of petitioner.5 When apprised of said order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered at
9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner
has since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case
No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For his
part, petitioner's co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution
moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring
that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioner's arraignment on June 27, 2001
and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for
bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioner's
petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioner's petition for bail, the Ombudsman
filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner
and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The
following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the propriety of including Joseph
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioner's) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on petitioner's
petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the prosecution's pending
motions as well as petitioner's motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as possible,
which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's April 6, 2001
Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had already been
resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his coaccused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as
well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for
bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to participate in the
said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending
incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again
proceed because on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the

amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does not
allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him,
the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended Information
to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in
Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of bribery and
illegal gambling.10 By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioner's
motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending
incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan could
resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on
June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468,
praying that the Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process.
Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be
declared to have waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and,
premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioner's guilt of plunder,
that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash the
amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date a copy of said
resolution.12 The motion to fix bail filed by Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada was also resolved by the
Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested
to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment. The
Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in the
Sandiganbayan's rules granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of
an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment.
Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory
allegations of the amended Information against him do not constitute the crime of plunder; and
that he is charged, under the said amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No.
148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his
April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S MOTION TO QUASH
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST PETITIONER
SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to have
been illegally received or collected does not constitute 'ill-gotten wealth' as defined in
Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with plunder only
in paragraph (a) which reads:

"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,

MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a
"combination or series of overt or criminal acts" constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d)
of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended Information allege "a pattern of criminal
acts." He avers that his single act of toleration or protection of illegal gambling impelled by a
single criminal resolution does not constitute the requisite "combination or series of acts" for
plunder. He further claims that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in
furtherance of said resolution turned over to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada
"on several occasions" does not cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner insists that
on the face of the amended Information he is charged only with bribery or illegal gambling and
not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by
former President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth
as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the
court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes. The

purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the Information is to
inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare for his defense.16 Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.17 The use of derivatives or
synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including
petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder
"through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means."
And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused are charged with
receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate
amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et
al.,19 we held that the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances"; it
refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We
further held that the word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two
different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that "plainly, subparagraph (a) of the
amended information charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a
series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law" and that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances,
money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former
President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the
offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x
x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080
specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence
need not be alleged in the Information.21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan22 that the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act
7080, as amended, and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information
conspired and confederated with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of having
conspired and confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire
to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of law, the act

of the conspirator is the act of each of them.23 Conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath,
they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declarations
of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended information of bribery and illegal
gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not charged with the
predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only with one crime that of plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE
OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more
than one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation
of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e)
of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not
charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not
make any express reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080,
as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any of the overt or
criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the combination or
series of act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from 'malversation' of public
funds, the law also uses the generic terms 'misappropriation', 'conversion' or 'misuse' of
said fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise be penalized under other laws is
incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and
the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as allegations
charging separate criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended Information
that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the
predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts
of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the crime of plunder. Resultantly then,
the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116

Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his April 4,
2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED
31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY
DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND
MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO
SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO." 26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to
direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner asseverates that
the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of
discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to
support an indictment for plunder as against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even mention him in
relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in 199828 and that the
Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation was
a money laundering front organization put up by Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even
though the latter presented evidence that said Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private
foundation.29 More importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he knew
that the P200 million he received for the Foundation came from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million he received
does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080;31 (2) there is
no evidence linking him to the collection and receipt of jueteng money;32 (3) there was no
showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of
receiving the P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause for plunder as against him,34 and hence he should
be spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial.35

Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond judicial
scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of probable
cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may do so in exceptional
circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that
he raised proper grounds for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint
resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of
plunder and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his
interest.37 He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the various charges
against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was only one of the eight
charges against Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor given
the opportunity to refute the evidence presented in relation to the other seven cases, even though
the evidence presented therein were also used against him, although he was only charged in the
plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable cause to
charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction
over the case and to proceed to try the same. They further argue that "a finding of probable cause
is merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused," and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial
where his guilt or innocence may finally be determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's omnibus motion asking for, among others, a reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's joint resolution did not
raise the grounds of either newly discovered evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which
under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which a motion for reconsideration may
be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with plunder as a
co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct
of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan42 , the Court ruled:

"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsman's
discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference
in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish 'probable cause' for filing of
information against the supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in
assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through falsification of public
documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments are
anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts. Petitioner
cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the
consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither question of fact nor
even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we find that no grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by respondents which would warrant the granting of the
writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for
that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution,
respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause
against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amended Information. In
its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that
probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER and examining
carefully the evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the affidavits and sworn
statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of
documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former
President Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada dated
February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio
dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that probable cause for the offense
of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioner's omnibus motion, the
Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in accordance with
Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23
and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that all the basic
complaints and evidence in support thereof were served upon all the accused.45 It was in light of
such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the allegation that accused
therein (including petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's Resolution dated April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with
plunder after the conduct of preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that
the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only
grounds for which a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's resolution may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is
merely a right conferred by statute.47 The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair
the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information.48 If
the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a motion
for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.49 As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, "[a]
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized
to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and
determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the
function of the prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to
establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with

irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported
by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate petitioner's claim that it gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that an accused shall not be deemed to have
waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been arraigned over his
objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the
merits does not apply in the instant case because petitioner merely prayed for a reinvestigation
on the ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been
conducted by the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and that petitioner
had participated therein by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had
already denied his motion for reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration thereon
prior to his arraignment.54 In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the issues for
resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his
petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the
amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of
the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is
mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the
petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the
crime charged; and (5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal
Case No. 26558 and should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition
for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him
when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can
stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard immediately.55 Petitioner maintains that his
arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to
the offense charged, as is evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the
Senate investigation of the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it would present all its
evidence before his arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession
of guilt is mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution,57 and

petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the bail
hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that
evidence present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced during the trial.58 Petitioner
likewise assures the prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail
bond should he be granted bail.59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced, because
it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The People stress that it is only when an
accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge,
there would be no more need for him to file said petition. Moreover, since it is during
arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise charge against him, he must be
arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail
hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the charge against him, especially
considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented
during such proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at the trial.60 Likewise, the
arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an accused's flight
from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an
accused escapes after he has been arraigned.61 The People also contend that the conduct of bail
hearings prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of being
appraised of the prosecution's evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty
reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty had
been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the issue as to whether an
arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in petitioner's case moot, the Court
takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic
function of educating the bench and bar.63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to
the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.64 An accused need not
wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on the issue of whether an accused must first
be arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with violation
of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial court's imposition
of the condition that he should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We held
therein that "in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise
the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash."66

However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him.67 The
Court's pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in
said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him.
Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash
and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on
his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be
granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for
bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard
even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is
entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional
liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be "authorized" under the
circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the
hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash during the
pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for
bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each other. While he agrees with the
prosecution that a motion to quash may in some instances result in the termination of the
criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein, thus rendering the petition for bail
moot and academic, he opines that such is not always the case; hence, an accused in detention
cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to
file a petition for bail or to withdraw one that has been filed.69 He also insists that the grant of a
motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an accused from detention nor
render moot an application for bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail
and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any
court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court.71 Its purpose is to
obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the

same time securing his appearance at the trial.72 As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail
from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.74 An accused may
file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly,
the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense
punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong,
does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such
offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become
moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for
bail of petitioner and accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of
the said case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to have his petition
for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings might be converted into a full
blown trial on the merits by the prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from having to hear the
same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidence where it would allow separate
bail hearings for the accused who are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate
in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was made was in the interest
of the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio were
to be excused from participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused Serapio,
under the pretext that the same does not concern them and that they will participate in any
hearing where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if and when they will
already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they
will participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody will be faced with the
daunting prospects of having to go through the process of introducing the same witness

and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four times, as many times as there are
petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to the speedy
termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be characterized as an orderly
proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of
the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different
accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case
against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more
petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly
with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court
will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into
account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the
accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a
speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases and of the
factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may
echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every
citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding
criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when
that fashion has become rampant over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,80 this Court held that in a petition for bail
hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method
of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given
to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of
corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication
of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the
accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the
commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially the same evident against
them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of petitioner
with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different

matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioner's petition
for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely different dimension. The proceedings will no
longer be summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a
full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover, following our
ruling in Jose Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada can
only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended
Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof
conspired with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that
petitioner can only be charged with having conspired with the other co-accused named in subparagraph (a) by "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x
from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling.81
Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the
evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or
collection of money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended
Information. With the joinder of the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the
former President, the latter will have the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the
witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will
adduce evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its
evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The
joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E.
Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of
the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is
denied by the respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application
for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in his treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable certainty
insure the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable
to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a greater or lesser
degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not determined that he has
not committed any crime."82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered "to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case,"83 the Court finds that it gravely abused its
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of former President
Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged
in its May 4, 2001 Order the "pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to
have the matter of his provisional liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary delay,"84 only to make
a volte face and declare that after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held
simultaneously. In ordering that petitioner's petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial of

the case against his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect
allowed further and unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of petitioner. In
fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a
simultaneous hearing of petitioner's petition for bail with the trial of the case against former
President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by
filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and his co-accused who caused the
delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of numerous manifestations and
pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.85 They assert that they filed the motion for joint bail hearing
and motion for earlier arraignment around the original schedule for the bail hearings which was
on May 2125, 2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses.87 In support thereof, they
cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to
bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to
obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person,
bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the court.90 Had the rule been otherwise, the
Rules would not have provided for an application for bail by a person charged with a capital
offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:

"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the
court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside
the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a
person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an
application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be
conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong.92 The prosecution shall be
accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may deem necessary for this purpose.93
When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to
deny the application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a
matter of right.94
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the proceedings.
Petitioner's claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for
purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing
thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly,
its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted
that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioner's application for
bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the
parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail
hearing was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not
push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's application for bail is therefore not imputable
solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is
evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:

Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2)
conduct a determination of probable cause as would suggest the issuance of house arrest;
(3) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and other proceedings pending
determination of probable cause;

Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;

Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant of

Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on Recognizance, dated April 25,
2001;

Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated May
11, 2001;

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for Resolution of
May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the earliest possible time;

Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated May 27,
2001;

Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated June 13,
2001, praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for Reinvestigation; and

Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95

Motions filed by the prosecution:

Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;96

Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;97

Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to

Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;98 and

Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in Filipino, dated

June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid delay by their
filing of the following motions:

Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that the Amended
Information be quashed;


Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that he be (1)excluded from the Amended Information for lack of probable cause;
(2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3) be allowed to post bail;

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest during the
pendency of the case;

Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;

Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;

Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by

reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, requesting for five (5) days within which to respond to the Opposition to Motion
to Quash in view of the holidays and election-related distractions;

Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed
by Joseph Estrada;

Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;

Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;

Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;

Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that they be allowed to be confined in Tanay;

Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit" Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;


Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
seeking reconsideration of denial of requests for house arrest, for detention in Tanay or
Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;

Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that the resolution compelling them to be present at petitioner Serapio's
hearing for bail be reconsidered;

Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;

Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house arrest;

Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving
their right to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their right
to trial with assessors;

Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production, Inspection

and Copying of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed
by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;

Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada;

Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates
for parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for gag
order of prosecution witnesses, availing of production, inspection and copying of
documents, requesting for status of alias case; and

Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for
permission to attend some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital
offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said application.101 The rationale
for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs.
Rapatalo:102

"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court,
the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a
hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be
a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner, he
contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the
prosecution's refusal to present evidence and by the Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail
hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of guilt for the
capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution launched "a
seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the conduct of bail
hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioner's arraignment before the
commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada
and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing;
manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence in chief,
meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire
case upon the accused; and argued that petitioner's motion to quash and his petition for bail are
inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two remedies.104
He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and resolutions
postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of
law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail
hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition for issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioner's
right to bail.106 He argues further that the fact that he was arrested and is detained pursuant to
valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of
his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,107 where the Court held that habeas corpus
extends to instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.108

However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was arrested
pursuant to the amended information which was earlier filed in court,109 the warrant of arrest
issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
jurisdiction to do so.111 In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes."112 Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the
deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become invalid,113 and even
though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty.114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The
general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to
issue the same115 applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the
amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant
for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty
which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no
application in the present case because the hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet to
commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail cannot be
pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is
partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting one's right to bail.117 It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a
matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in
refusing to grant bail,118 or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file
an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt
the Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of
petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of petitioner's petition for bail
and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET
ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,

respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of
Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the aboveentitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his
motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion
o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las
partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en
la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus
tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser
empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega
a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es
culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213
del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros
pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser
empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather
soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of
the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable
in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion
for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not
necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed
to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however,
we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of

orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record
of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found
no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and
is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with
sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and
expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject
to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial
or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as
regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers
or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary
of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest.
(Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor
to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph
2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and
study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or
share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or
tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in
the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or
recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is

in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.
R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall
not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In
the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law.
ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct.
906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598,
"the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This

principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81
Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board,
4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir.,
97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2
Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct.
185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225,
74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative
force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed.
No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter
be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and
decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of
the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such

delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming
before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as
to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed
by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of
the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is
not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion

for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall
be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive
all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

G.R. No. 150540

October 28, 2003

DIMALUB P. NAMIL, ABDULNASSER TIMAN, TERESITA G. AKOB, MALIGA

AMILUDIN and EPAS GUIAMEL, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, public respondent.
JOENIME B. KAPINA, MONIB B. WALINGWALING, MAULANA G. KARNAIN,
ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSTAPHA, ABDULRAKMAN TALIKOP and WILSON
SABIWANG, private respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to set aside the November 6, 2001 Resolution No. 4615,1 promulgated by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc2 installing the private respondents as members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, although the petitioners had already
taken their respective oaths and assumed offices in the same elective positions.
The antecedents are as follows:
On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of the Sangguniang Bayan was held in
Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (COCVP) No. 80311083 which contained, inter alia, the
petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan winning candidates:
1. NOREN B. APIL
2. MALOD B. MOSADI
3. DIMALUB P. NAMIL
4. ABDULNASSER A. TIMAN
5. TERESITA G. AKOB
6. MABANING P. SAMAMA
7. EPAS T. GUIAMEL
8. MALIGA M. AMILUDIN
The above-named candidates took their oath, and assumed their offices on June 30, 20014 as
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang.
The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued COCVP
No. 8031109 which listed the private respondents as winners, namely:
1. JOENIME B. KAPINA
2. MONIB B. WALINGWALING
3. MAULANA G. KARNAIN

4. ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSATAPHA
5. MALOD B. MOSADI
6. ABDULRAKMAN A. TALIKOP
7. WILSON K. SABIWANG
8. MABANING P. SAMAMA
Thereafter, private respondent Joenime B. Kapina wrote the COMELEC requesting that she and
the others who were proclaimed as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as the winning
candidates and the new members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
Appended to said letter was a certification issued by Regional Election Director Clarita N. Callar,
Region XII, Cotabato City, that the private respondents named in the COCVP No. 8031109,
issued on May 21, 2001, were duly proclaimed as the winning candidates for the said
municipality. When apprised of the said letter, the Commissioner-in-Charge for Region XII,
Mehol K. Sadain, conducted an investigation on the matter of having two (2) sets of winning
candidates as members of the Sangguniang Bayan for Palimbang. He issued Memorandum No.
2001-09-005 requiring the Law Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial
Election Supervisor to submit their respective reports/comments on the letter. The said officers
submitted their respective memorandum, thus:
1. Memo dated September 11, 2001 of Atty. Jose Balbuena, Director Law Department, to
the effect that, "our Comelec field officials in Region XII who directly participated in the
canvassing who were named in (Memo No. 2001-09-001) could best provide the needed
explanation and information" on the double proclamation of Sangguniang Bayan winners
in Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
2. Memo dated September 6, 2001 of Atty. Clarita Callar, Regional Election Director,
Region XII, to the effect that the Election Assistant Amy Laguda who issued the
certification on the proclamation based on Certificate No. 8031109 dated May 21, 2001
verified the genuineness of her signature on the said certification, and further said that at
the time she issued the certification the PES had not yet received a copy of Certificate
No. 8031108 dated May 20, 2001. Further, Atty. Callar referred to the verification of Ms.
Celia Romero that per records of the RSD, "the names appearing as elected members of
the Sangguniang Bayan for the Municipality of Sultan Kudarat ... are those proclaimed in
Certificate of Canvass of Votes & Proclamation No. 8031109." Incidentally, Ms. Romero
also issued a certification that the serial numbers of the Certificates of Canvass of Votes
and Proclamation were 8031108 for Lambayong, SK and 8031109 for Palimbang, SK.

3. Memo filed on September 6, 2001 by Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, PES, Sultan Kudarat,
recommending that the parties should file the appropriate case/s before the Commission,
instead of coursing their redress through the PES of Sultan Kudarat or the RED of Region
XII.
4. A confidential certification of EO Malic Sansarona dated September 12, 2001 to the
effect that "the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation ... No. 8031109 dated
June 21, 2001 is [the] genuine and valid proclamation of elected Municipal Officials of
the Municipality of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat," and that the other proclamation [No.
8031108] "is fictitious and falsified.
Acting on the said Memoranda, Commissioner Sadain submitted his Recommendation5 to the
COMELEC, thus:
1. Finds that there was a VALID PROCLAMATION of the winning candidates for
positions of Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat as
contained in Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation No. 8031109;
2. That there being a VALID PROCLAMATION, there is NO NEED for adjudication on
this matter; and therefore
3. Respectfully RECOMMENDS to the Commission En Banc, the adoption of the
following recommendation [Annex "D"] of Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Dir., Law Department
and Atty. Gregorio T. Saraos, Attorney II, IPD, Law Department.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department RECOMMENDS to issue an Order for the
immediate installation of the winning members of the Sangguniang Bayan [of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat], namely: JOENIME B. KAPINA, MONIB B. WALINGWALING, MAULANA G.
KARNAIN, ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSTAPHA, MALOD B. MOSADI, ABDULRAKMAN A.
TALIKOP, WILSON K. SABIWANG, AND MABANING P. SAMAMA... and for said purpose,
to direct the Brigade Commander, 60 1st Brigade Pulutana of General Santos City, Saranggani
Province, to effect and enforce the said Order and to submit his compliance within five (5) days
from notice hereof.
Acting on the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain, the public respondent issued on
November 6, 2001 the assailed Resolution No. 4615. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, (1) that the proclamation of the winning candidates contained in Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation No. 8031109 is a valid proclamation; (2) to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department which is in accordance with the result of the

investigation conducted by the Commissioner-in-Charge; and herein orders the immediate

installation of JOENIME B. KAPINA, MONIB B. WALINGWALING, MAULANA G.
KARNAIN, ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSTAPHA, MALOD B. MOSADI, ABDULRAKMAN A.
TALIKOP, WILSON K. SABIWANG, AND MABANING P. SAMAMA as the duly elected
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.6
The petitioners contend that the public respondents Resolution No. 4615 is null and void since it
was issued without according them due notice and hearing, contrary to the enshrined principle of
due process. The public respondent thus committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The petitioners allege that they were never accorded the chance to present their side in
connection with the investigation that was purportedly conducted by Commissioner Sadain and
on the memoranda/report of the public respondents officers. The public respondent simply
approved the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain. The petitioners were kept in the dark,
learned about the controversy only when they were notified of the assailed resolution of the
public respondent.1awphi1.nt
The public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, as well as the private
respondents, asserts that the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision before instituting this action with this Court; hence, the petition is premature. It is
pointed out that the public respondent has broad powers to enforce all election laws, it has the
power to control and supervise the proceedings of the board of canvassers, and the power to
suspend or annul proclamation. When it learned about the two (2) sets of winning candidates as
members of Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, the public respondent required
an investigation to be conducted by one of the commissioners, who required the election officers
in the place concerned to submit their reports on the matter. After a study of the various reports,
it was ascertained that COCVP (C.E Form No. 25) No. 8031108 was null and void, fictitious and
falsified. The public respondent made a finding that the genuine COCVP was that one bearing
Serial No. 8031109, intended for the Municipality of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. It was thus
incumbent upon the public respondent to order the immediate installation of the winning
candidates on the basis of the genuine COCVP to give effect to the will of the electorate,
conformably to its mandate under Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code and the ruling of
this Court in Aguam vs. Commission on Elections.7
The public respondent further asserts that the twin requirement of notice and hearing in
annulment of proclamation is not applicable when the proclamation is null and void, citing Utto
vs. Commission on Elections.8
The petition is meritorious.

While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all election laws, the
same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. In this case, the petitioners had been
proclaimed as the winning candidates and had assumed their office. Since then, they had been
exercising their rights and performing their duties as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. Their proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of
regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the same. The
petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Due process in the
proceedings before the public respondent exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due
notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate
cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, we also ruled in Farias
vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission
on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or
suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.9
In this case, the public respondent nullified the proclamation of the petitioners and ousted them
from their office as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, based solely on the
recommendations of its law department and of Commissioner Sadain, and on the memoranda of
its officers. The petitioners were not accorded a chance to be heard on the said recommendations
and the memorandum of Regional Election Director Clarita Callar, certification of Celia Romero,
and certification of Election Officer Malic Sansarona dated September 12, 2001 before it issued
the assailed resolution.
The conclusion of the public respondent that the basis of the petitioners proclamation was a
fictitious and falsified document was grounded, inter alia, on a "confidential certification" of
Election Officer Malic Sansarona dated September 12, 2001.10 However, it appears that a
certification11 was earlier issued by the same election officer on June 25, 2001, stating that the
petitioners whose names were listed as winning candidates as Sangguniang Bayan members in
the COCVP (C.E. Form No. 25) No. 8031108, the very certificate declared by the public
respondent in its Resolution No. 4615 as fictitious and falsified document, won in the elections.
In the case of Caruncho III vs. Commission on Elections,12 this Court has held that due process in
quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. The
proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion
to set aside his proclamation. This Court also ruled in Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections13
that:
... Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC
No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality.
We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been
rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing.
Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support

its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his
evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner
without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely
on private respondents allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is
not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a
vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings
before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing,
among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul
or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on
Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that
the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the
effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
The public respondents reliance on the ruling of this Court in Utto vs. Commission on
Elections14 is misplaced. The Court, in that case, held that the twin-requirement of notice and
hearing in an annulment of proclamation is not applicable because of the illegality of petitioners
proclamation.15 The factual circumstances in the instant petition are far different from those
obtaining in Utto. In the Utto case, a notice of appeal was filed questioning the ruling of the
board of canvassers but, the latter proceeded in proclaiming Utto as the winning candidate. This
made the proclamation illegal. In the present case, nobody questioned the petitioners
proclamation.
We rule that the petition in this case was not prematurely filed. Generally, a motion for
reconsideration is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action for certiorari. However,
there are exceptions to the rule. The aggrieved party is not obliged to first file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution before filing a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended where, as in this case, (1) the question is purely legal, (2) judicial intervention
is urgent; (3) its application may cause great and irreparable damage; and (4) the controverted
acts violate due process.16
The private respondents cannot invoke Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code to fortify their
cause, because the said law specifically refers to pre-proclamation controversies, thus:
Sec. 242. Commissions exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. The
Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu
proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any

proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the
succeeding section.17
Even the fact that the public respondent initiated the proceedings for the partial or total
annulment of an illegal proclamation would not dispense with the requirements of notice and
hearing. This was made clear in Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections:18
Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent argues that the COMELEC
is authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing because the law
states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made. ...
...
The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of proclamation but to the manner of
initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. The law
provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be initiated. It may be at the own
initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either case, notice and
hearing is required. This is clear from the language of the law.19
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No.
4615 of the public respondent COMELEC en banc dated November 6, 2001, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner.
Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.

REGALADO, J.:
This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public
utility services of the petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering such services in the
Philippines.
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

(hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of
the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by
fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being
violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power
and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of
Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct,
maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select,
station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to
"construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications
services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the following
activities and established the following installations:
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I
provided direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the United
States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand
and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was established.
Pinugay II provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe, Middle
East, Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries operating within the region) thru the Indian
Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna (Pinugay III) was established to
temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were being
refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or reserved antenna for possible
contingencies.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air
Field, Pampanga as a television receive-only earth station which provides the U.S.
Military bases with a 24-hour television service.
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third standard "A" earth station
(Pinugay IV) to take over the links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3

By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory
for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member
nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International

Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global

commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by
various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner
enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication
services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live
television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or
vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of
the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196,
respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public
convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as
the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC
an application 4 for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it
has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the
international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since
1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and
maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the
aforesaid rates therein applied for.

On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue

operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge
the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date
of said order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was
extended for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the
petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed
the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent
(15%) on the present authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said
reduction on the following ground:
The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an
initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization
Department of the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in
some of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic)
in its further evaluation that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a
provisional authorization or in the final consideration of the case. 6

PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons:

1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix
rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards
constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC;
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally
conferred, the same was exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires,
in that (a) the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued
without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust,
unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due
process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546,
providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of
Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC,
can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its
rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the
issue of undue delegation of legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue
delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise
of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of

Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a standard
for the exercise of the power therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon
the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in
making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated
power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this
case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable
and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement
as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent
NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered,
among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public
service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and
regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No.
546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public
interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities
in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which
provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with
control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems
contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an
in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude that
respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements
of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due
process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the
benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial
evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an

opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory
nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could
have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function
involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not
quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof
results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the
function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required,
but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function
involved is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the
order in question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued
pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is
merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's
application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only
primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a
continuing review of the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 9 we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such
rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it
is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital,
which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker
of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain
or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a
function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the
Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the

administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing

are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested
rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same
rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ...
It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452
and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved.
In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential
to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise
of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative
body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate
rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected
by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. 11

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact,
although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates
charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without
affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects
of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization
was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not farfetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates visa-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an
exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a
public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to
lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its
questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists
that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental
to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of
merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not

exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not
exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order
as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of
statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same
matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the
applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission
shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and
provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and
followed thereafter by any public service; ...

There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent
NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive
Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such
order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.
That such a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987
in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to
continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to
charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and
the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may modify,
revise or amend the rates ..." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other
sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should
act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information
otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced,
petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified
date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in
force pending the final determination of the case. 13 An order of respondent NTC
prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable

or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility
permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in
effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is concerned.
Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and
will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its
nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation
would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business.
On the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its
communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has
no vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be
revoked at will by the State at any time without necessarily violating any vested property
right of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters
that the withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor
arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so
requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a
showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common
good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public
utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility,
or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the
private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the
regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless
enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due
regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its
patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws. 15
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate
the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the
rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates
which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be
confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. 16

What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business
judgment based upon the evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. 18 In
determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in
determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the
public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining the
reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary
to meet competition. 19
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and
primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner,
contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information
without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an
attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily
declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction
without any elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred
by it from said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the
financial statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction.
On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent
detriment to the public service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be
unreasonable and improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in
that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment
on the other end of the transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition,
rehabilitation, or refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major
adjustment or innovation on the business of petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any
change in the sending end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in
the receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad has to
be matched with the corresponding change in the sending end in the Philippines. An
inability on the part of petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be technology
could result in a deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite communications.
At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating,
and renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing
charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the
technological advances abroad. There projected undertakings were formulated on the
premise that rates are maintained at their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an
undue reduction thereof may practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we
concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate and efficient service, the

same is not necessarily to be equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates
assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer.
Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates
provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be
nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with
the hearing and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved
in the present controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly
adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements
herein.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated
September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically
directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on
petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-9430

June 29, 1957

EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, and THE HONORABLE
CARLOS P. GARCIA, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, respondents.
Federico Agrava for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor, General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E.
Torres and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City directing

. . . the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs for them
to take proper steps in order that the accused, Emilio Suntay y Aguinaldo, who is alleged
to be in the United States, may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law, (Exhibit D)
and of prohibition to enjoin the Secretary for Foreign Affairs from cancelling the petitioner's
passport without previous hearing.
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified
complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, as follows:
On or about June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in
Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in
Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is
a minor of 16 years.
On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the
City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December
1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein
he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged
that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.
On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (No. 5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for
San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955
the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction
which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had
been conducted (crim. case No. Q-1596, Exhibit B). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor
filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may
be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign
Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be
dealt with in accordance with law." (Exhibit C.) On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the
motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the
United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport
issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal
charges against him. "The Embassy was likewise directed to make representation with the State
Department that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is considered detrimental to the
best interest of this Government, that his passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not
considered under the protection of the Philippines while abroad." (Exhibit E.) However, this
order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in
order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner

wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered
(Exhibit F), and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider
its order of 10 February 1955 (Exhibit G). On 7 July 1955 the respondent Secretary denied
counsel's request (Exhibit H) and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for
reconsideration (Exhibit I). Hence this petition.
The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the" petitioner "may be brought back to the
Philippines, so that he may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may default with in
accordance with law," may be carried out only "through the cancellation of his passport," the said
order is illegal because "while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court
cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself
order a passport to be cancelled."
The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the department of
Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the" petitioner "may be brought back to the
Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," may be carried out only
"through the cancellation of his passport," the said order is illegal because 'while a Court may
review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief
when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, take the
discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled." The
petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the
cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the
right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the
Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the
order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps
in order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with
in accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is
not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding
may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6,
Rule 124.)

Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to
compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against
him.
Section 25, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946, 42 Off. Gaz, 1400, prescribing rules and
regulations for the grant and issuance of passports, provides that
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs as well as ally diplomatic or consular officer duly
authorized by him, is authorized, in his discretion, to refuse to issue a passport for use
only in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to
withdraw a passport for the purpose its validity or use in certain countries. (Emphasis
supplied.)
True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport
already issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to
answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant City Attorney
recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of
the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City Attorney
of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His
suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as
a deliberate attemption his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to
complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In
issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of
justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he
cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.
Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-judicial
hearing" by the respondent Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to
him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is
facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued,
cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is
exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious
criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a
prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due
process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot
be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should
always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ
of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.

In the cases of Bauer vs. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445; Nathan, vs. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951; and
Schachtman vs. Dulles No. 12406, 23 June 1955, all decided by the States Court of Appeals for
the district of Columbia, cited by the petitioner, the revocation of a passport already issued or
refusal to issue a passport applied for, was on the vague reason that the continued possession or
the issuance thereof would be contrary to the best interest of the United States.
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-23794

February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY,
HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendantsappellees.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Taada for
plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series
of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale
to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March
20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc
as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III,
Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside
from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It
further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under
Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or
charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both
the sale and export of sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's
power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited
constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of
First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the

ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local
Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing
ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc
City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal
sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the
only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export
tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal
councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the
power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and
merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an
import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of
bridges or otherwise, shall be void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just
and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v.
Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our
awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will
have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was
no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable
results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power
of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were
infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1)
it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the

purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of
the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to
Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the
ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is
declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the
P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO
P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for
Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of
the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE
JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of
the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES
LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by
themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as
Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted
by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and
circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these
measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at

the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We
shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along
with certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land
Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities,
such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On
its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass
the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its
final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption
of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature
and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly
shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected
and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution
providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2)
to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which
the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly
and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such

publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation

that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew
the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does
it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for
Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the
unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables,
and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance
the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services
as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and
5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated
October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and
conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged
act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of
the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but
would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of
the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the
same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for
its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they
should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a
statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute
on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid,
notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the
repeal of previous legislations connected therewith." 4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and
not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an
act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act
which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act.
Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD
26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No.

4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They
stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and
so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been
duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals

like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the

bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the
old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection
clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the
Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the
National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints
against public offices and officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a
valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking
privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult
Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons. 11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless
been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide
for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the
franking privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on
Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the
lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or
because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it
were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole
was carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally
enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was
given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking
privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is
unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to
the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The
same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion
used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census
and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the
government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no
question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it
is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this
basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service
Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails
amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other
agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the
intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to
P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and
those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The
respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking
privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like
the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the
courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery
although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not
belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we

may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court
should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of
the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that
a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the
privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which,
like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank
mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the
public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange
for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys
under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage
of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10
billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives
substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the
exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the
Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of
justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this
serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents
themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service
for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The
Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the
Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .
84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the
increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every
process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On
the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly

situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is
a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in
its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to
provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be
accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own
favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of
life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate
with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the
duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration
Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be
RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-45685

November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI

BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the
writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court
may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649
entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly
the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions
of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further
action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the

defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the
final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is
the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard
the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of
Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in
the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on
January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional
to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on
March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six
months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17,
1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant
thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in
November, 1936. This court, on
November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file
a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to
the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on
November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding,
set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an
opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has
not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws
for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11
of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution
also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the
opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a
finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del
peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su
inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda
racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying
the latter's petition for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la
historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al
peticionario acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos
y las suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite
atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la
eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente
differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del
veredicto judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception
to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration.
An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937.
This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937.
The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at
the petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to
intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been
filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid
motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on
the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet
given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the

same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited
me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for
the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to
commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and
that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same
who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August
10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the
movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the
last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for
execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but,
upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the
hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for
execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as
amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August
19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process
to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance
of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to
criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make
effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance
of a temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to
apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made
applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.

(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in
the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the
City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also
true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only
to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the
salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would
not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as
required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation
Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in
section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer
provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application
for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction
or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to
commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937,
denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the
granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on
June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify
or change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the
crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only
presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this
court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to
commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and

Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature
providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted
of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the
Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon
the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or
otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper
delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by
the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art.
VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in
contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the
authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without
uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the
first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No.
4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that
probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive
power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal
filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the
pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative
power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums,
signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the
Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the
other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day,
October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal
protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further,
that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity
of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack
the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional
question in prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the
petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance
of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.

(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners
is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending
resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of
judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court
nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has
assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should
not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court
while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question
submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie
because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the
Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal
from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule
in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is
appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason
that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial
within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to
resolve in view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this
court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution
of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his
answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing
of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the

accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism
because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on
an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the
trial court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court
retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with
law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the
courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the
petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as
respondent allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for
then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from
the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs.
Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain
that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does
not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In
an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view
that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition,
that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the
validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from
questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time
before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No.
4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court
and filed anew on
November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the
points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case,
we noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering
the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding
the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final
judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of
the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either
directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the

printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in
Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and
every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme
Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty
of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners
and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two
fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not
said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain
incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is
necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases
and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp.
76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in
ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly
where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and
adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the
question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus
proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
(1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the
Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in
habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117),
although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action
under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even
on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional
question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as
regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271
U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac.,
875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one,
an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly

known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the
constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised
"relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in
prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices
dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held
that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction,
however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the
Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of
first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of
first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the criminal
statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in
review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26
Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and
extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme
Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and
decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy
upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.]
932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed.,
131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs.
New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann.
Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the
petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a
decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court
under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of
prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having
jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be
subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate
remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or
tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented
by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874,
51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84

A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46
S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely
from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to
accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their
sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the
execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including
those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts
(Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156
Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288;
Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States
([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the
common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the
contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the
criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial,
and it is equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such
subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial,
discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no
ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition
that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so.
And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the
Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the
authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in
advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute,
elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial
authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained
according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs.
Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the
conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is
not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory
authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.)
Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First
Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such
proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.

It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on
application for prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of
the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex
rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable
that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the
petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O
Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the
ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may
not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I,
p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass.,
59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack
made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his
rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu
proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare
a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due
regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore,
the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider
the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this
view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the
hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No.
42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not
properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a
suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held
that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will
be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect
to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue
was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue
may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a
general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if
not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber
Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of
exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question
affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y.,
135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said
that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial
court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a
court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it

appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's
Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St.
Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co.,
[1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below
(State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn
again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the
hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private
prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not
now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by
the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really
violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused
by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge
the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50
Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189;
72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins
([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its
Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to
renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right
was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief
law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general
rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved
in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in
question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of
the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And,
even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the
proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of
certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J.,
p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But
we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute

should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for
the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p.
786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the
constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of
the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R.
Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo.
685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.)
And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any
time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561;
57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the
first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the
case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the
constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion
that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City
of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes
without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines,
in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the
well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the
legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the
State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the
right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the
respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts.
The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute
was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity
of a law enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan
of usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an
adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is
unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more
saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution
is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must

bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such
constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an
acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people
have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the
exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus)
was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the
state. In disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme
Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action.
The state is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is
involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not
disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of
fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac.,
118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its
Attorney-General, or county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of
action he will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its
validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus
to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by
injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City
of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co.
[1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley
[1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286;
First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State
{1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11).
In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being
charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is
unconstitutional. In support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel.
Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex
rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So.,
592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So.,

746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a
statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to enforce.
In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should not,
merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district
attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In
other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the
question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in
order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is
authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of
enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the
statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from
responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority
for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state
treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a
statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and,
above all, to support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he
finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his
judgment, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other;
and, in order to do so, he is compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of
the statutes is unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be
free from constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition
that the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running
clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that
the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked
by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the
principal reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from
attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its
application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,.
10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that
time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has
been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the
Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the
question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.

The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is
held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question
with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for
the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also
Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a
constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J.,
p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454
[aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs.
Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co.,
vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is
founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass
Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74
N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation
solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact
that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before
been passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of
Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people
will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the
decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance
which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public
policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77,
78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616;
Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489;
Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra,
an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of
nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No.
2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for
the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of
jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation
which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the view we have
taken can not be found.

We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221
has been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce
the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1,
and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature
invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law
by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the
legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The
responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as
well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of
Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute
finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the
Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be
presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular
law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its
power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the
governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the
judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an
elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative
of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called
attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion
against the constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution
of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the
integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his
message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal
of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of
the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against
his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and
very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill
referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons
which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the

determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the
Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within
his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending
determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine.
Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our
judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course
of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance
during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive
no less than of the Legislative department of our government independent in the performance
of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity,
and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we
understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That
said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones
Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act,
vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the
Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution
differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from
the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after
the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United
States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the
Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person
before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power
can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning
power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the
United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is
different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says
Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells
[1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am.
Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the
distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal
from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may,

by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or
imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from
office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes
specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons
he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may
be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National
Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is
sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been
impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief
Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered
by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer
or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning
power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution."
(20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive
without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither
exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper
exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any
pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte
United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72;
Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities,
expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited
to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was
vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of
Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice:
". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as
fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may
devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of
an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for
judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very
nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5,
6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment
by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap.
521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray

the salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service.
(Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed.,
309), the Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person
sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no
power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at
which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of
the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act
and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of
Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts
exercised a form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants
under state probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States,
242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend
sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress
if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation
legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed
the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to
the House, but it was never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government
with reference to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in
harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the present time every state has a
probation law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile
offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal
courts. In Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under
consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7
F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no
manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found
to contain an able and comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under
the act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is
made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of

Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the
Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and
unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation
laws, that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the
Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently
sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United
States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and
all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915],
20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the
province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for
each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33
L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power
to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly
may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as
to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or
conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the
Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation.
Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts particularly the
trial courts large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular
cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being
in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly
circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a
sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such
case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it
may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset
one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according
to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and
Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code
empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty
prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the
imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law,
considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the
wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the
same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen

but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two
degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of
the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed
is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of
the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in
view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case
the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social
danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either
arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is
deducted form the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art.
29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age,
or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are
not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47,
see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the
death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date
of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art. 83);
and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced,
or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with
regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the
penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation
Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently
amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts
large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides;
"hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by
section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the
Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559.
Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently
reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again

manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the
modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension
of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after
investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the
convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no
punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are
faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict
with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the
language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for
the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and
within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and
conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parte Bates,
supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the
constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it attempted to
delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is
vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power
of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in
such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it
unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a
sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of
the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W.,
177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182
Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67
N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac.,
291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858;
State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54
Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590;
Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th],
14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re
Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265
Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897],
118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs.
Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.
E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind.,
534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882;

People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125
Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State
vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley
vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl.
424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex
rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am.
Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928;
People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180;
281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex
parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455;
95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas.,
1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169
S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70
Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S.
W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932],
122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S.
W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va.,
802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel.
Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to
follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however
characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A.
L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided
for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and
required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during
the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional
and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the
pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App.,
166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district
and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of
Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep.,
675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons,
as understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their
nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of
the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of
the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the
civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon

reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It
releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law,
the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were,
a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall.,
333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote
vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with
the principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these
instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the
words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the
English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18
How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any
part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the
authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the
exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts has so long
maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were
still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by
the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes
courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, a
power inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when the
constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its
adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution. It does not
encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been
understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of
Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring,
at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally
and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely
terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of
probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and
the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation.
The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the
control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to
serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)

The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may
be far from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a
proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws.
For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out
the law deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is
against the criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and
above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible
unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F.
[2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the
sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S.
W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their
contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon
the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by
means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have
examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the
probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons
to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one
hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the
Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held
that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve
postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an
indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264;
40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be
hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of
punishment, for a commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less
punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the
Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the
state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court
held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous
decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood
meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to
comprehend the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed
in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power

intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United
States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis,
111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26
N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a
remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one
originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.
Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding
of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a
postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary
suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to
our section 12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against
parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the
power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a
reference to the numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100;
169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L.,
524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,
remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may
yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest
and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the
executive and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an
undue delegation of legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which,
in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature
by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI,
sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may
not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority.

Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of
agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free
government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers.
(5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke,
namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else,
or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge
Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims
in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the
responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it
substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court
posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh
vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes
[1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs
shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence
while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation
of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that
rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the
grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject
of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick,
supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same
relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs.
Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr
vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas.,

697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some
authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing
People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However,
the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption
of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep.,
224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain
progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well
drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan
vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by
the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates,
import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of
the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the
absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise
the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has
been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43
Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so
far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation
fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See
and cf. Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34
Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters

of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by

executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective
provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing
delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at
least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on
delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but,
it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard
or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising
the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is
insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N.
E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec
174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their
discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed
to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix
and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the
recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards
of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply
to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other
interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton
County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec

68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil.,
660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court
sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust
provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the
legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to
be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it
was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at
his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be
raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle
has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple
transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials
of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our
own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina
[1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co.
vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it
leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular
community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227).
In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the
United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself
rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W.,
738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.
There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the
basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the
government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896],
93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W.,
210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding
the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority
on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern
industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of
Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun
Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox
pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in
Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language
speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which

permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the
circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the
time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act,
is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines
that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and
that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but
simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms
of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd
ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative
will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which
the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p.
864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The
legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the
power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the
legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire
operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary
because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find
any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited
by no principle of expendiency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration
certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It
need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the
salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at
some future time we cannot say when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the
salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not
save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon
the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency,
or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature
itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of
suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some
jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its
authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of
suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article
I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be
suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not
confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the
legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be

suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension
must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden
vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this
commonwealth, it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of
the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from
it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide
for. Many of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta
of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill
of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert
and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the
first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending
the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article in
the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such
power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of
the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante
of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void
and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied
reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because,
according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which
must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com.,
160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the
sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise
what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of
the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his
right to protection, "according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a
number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general
principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to
bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive
prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws,
that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others
under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or
actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog
liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a
knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of

supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed
by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the
legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a
power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of
grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman
[1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs.
Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road
system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the
provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the
operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become
inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads
to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . .
this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is
left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit
the question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether
the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in
every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any
act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions
superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . .
empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the
question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is
urge before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which
under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the
state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of
Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order
suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject
of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable
to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts
in may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the
vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely
local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under
different circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks,
or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different
localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject,
though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and
ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper
that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.)
So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving
matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small

communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that
which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion
may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True,
the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to
appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are
given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in
their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to
suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance
until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The
validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its
provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p.
786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in
the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution
thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs.
Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the
inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no
further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the
restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz.,
1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of
power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative
power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights
which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1
subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof,
and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The
equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law.
ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep.,

357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of
the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431;
46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13;
Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255;
Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353;
133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540;
530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55
Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs.
Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs.
Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247;
Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of
his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the
Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that
a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for
all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation
officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious
reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action
of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the
purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will
there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate
any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the situation now and, also, if
we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be
considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any
appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show,
indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the
benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be
the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant

authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume
the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the
equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By
analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor
[1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed.,
676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885],
113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220;
Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey
vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs.
Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words,
statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co.
vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat.
Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs.
Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.
W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only
may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but
one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have
probation during that year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no
probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which
delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which
is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the
guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis
[1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United
States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that
there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis
(Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the
equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this
case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by
General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial
of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612,
amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that
"in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall
not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting

attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him
in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision
indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney although not in the form had in the
provinces was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the
peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to
a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state
from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the
constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The
provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that
makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void
because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already
stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a
statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision
is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its
removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially
unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485;
55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73
Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir
([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule concerning partial
invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be
enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the
invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by
itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual
Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of
Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough
must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions
must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a
manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla.,
617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N.

S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim,
240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La.,
414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal
force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative
will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs.
Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs.
Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U.
S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation
officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid
and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said
section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the
elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any
practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial
result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination
of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for
probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such
action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the
actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer,
probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation
officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the
probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care,
the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions
which are imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among
those conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode
or elsewhere;

(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g)
Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or
losses caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of
probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of
the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with
the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer
finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is noncompliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for
the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon
arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the
probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed.
Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation
officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the
period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep
informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice
and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by
court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to
report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two
months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report
as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and
to perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as
the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole
officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities
thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons
released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional
compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in
the provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:

There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision
and control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be
appointed by the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall
receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is
hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby
authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation
officer under civil service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications,
training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the
compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions
shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing
section are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under
section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in
section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office
known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of
the Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate
and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit
the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer
officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall
truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his
conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing
of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in
charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of
the legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer
officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in
the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct
him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned
to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as
there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on
what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far
cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law
better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law
matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute
from the doom of invalidity.

Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular
Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces
defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000,
appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to
receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have
been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the
Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to
include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000
appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative
personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be
sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial
notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously
contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in
each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial
fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is
complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in
our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation
laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the
"individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the
criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid
in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be
reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of
an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of
reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313;
48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief
end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that
probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be
welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy
to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects
presented by able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral
argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to
reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the
examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to
adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more
conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.)
Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases

brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear
implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United
States. This line of approach is justified because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the
United States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which
does not obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with
reference to the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the
province with respect to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th
Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not
embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran
[1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs.
New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . .
new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co.
vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal,
Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted
having in view existing local conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45685 December 22, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Solicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orence and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for the
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.:
After rendition of the judgment of this court in the above-entitled case, the respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng, on November 26, 1937, gave notice of his intention to petition the Supreme Court of
the United State for a writ of certiorari for the review of said judgment and, desiring to stay
execution during the pendency of the application for the writ and of the proceedings relative
thereto in the Supreme Court of the United State, now prays that the corresponding supersedeas
bond be fixed, as provided by the rules of this court. The People of the Philippines and the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, petitioners in the above-entitled case, oppose the
application of the respondent for the granting of a supersedeas bond.
The original action instituted in this court which resulted in the declaration of unconstitutionality
of the Probation Act (No. 4221 ) was for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng, thru counsel, states that as certiorari and prohibition are civil remedies, it is mandatory
upon this court to stay enforcement of its judgment in the above-entitled case. (Sec. 46 [a] infra,
Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.) He also calls attention to the principle that
probation can not be granted after the defendant has begun the service of his sentence and to the
policy of this court to encourage review of its decisions and judgments on certiorari by the
Federal Supreme Court. In opposition, the petitioners state that the judgment of this court
declaring the Probation Act unconstitutional and void is self-executing; that there is no judgment
in the instant proceedings to be executed and that the supersedeas will serve no useful purpose.
The petitioner gave answer to the foregoing objections raised by the respondent and reiterated
the arguments advanced by him in support of his petition for the fixing of the bond.

Section 46 (a) of the rules of this court provides that:

Whenever it is made to appear by notice in writing that any party to a civil case in which
final judgment has been rendered by this court intends to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for a writ of certiorari for the review of the decision and judgment of
his court, and it appears that the case is one which, by reason of the amount involved or
the nature of the questions of law presented, may be removed to the Supreme Court of the
United States by writ of certiorari, and it further appears that the party intending to make
application for such writ desires to stay the enforcement of the judgment of this court
during the pendency of the application for the writ of certiorari and of the proceeding in
the Supreme Court of the United States, it such is granted, this court shall grant a stay, for
a term not to exceed ten days, within which the moving party may give a supersedeas
bond, and shall designate one of its members to determine the sufficiency of such bond.
The foregoing rule requires that in any civil case in which final judgment has been rendered by
this court, if any party thereto gives notice in writing of his intention to remove the case to the
Supreme Court of the United States by writ of certiorari, this court shall grant a stay for the
period therein mentioned within which said party may give a supersedeas bond, the sufficiency
of which is to be determined by one of the members of this court. It is admitted that certiorari
and prohibition are civil remedies but the certiorari and prohibition proceedings originally
instituted in this court were, like the proceedings for probation, an incident of the criminal case.
Apart from this, it will be noted that the appeal taken is from the judgment of this court declaring
the Probation Act unconstitutional and void. That judgment does not command or permit any act
to be done. There is nothing there to be actively enforced by execution or otherwise. Because of
its negative or prohibitive character, there is nothing to supersede; nothing, as petitioners assert,
upon which the stay bond can operate. In reality, the supersedeas is intended to operate on the
decision and judgment in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippines Islands vs.
Mariano Cu Unjieng et al." The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in that case,
rendered on January 8, 1934 (Criminal Case No. 42649), was affirmed by this court on March
26, 1935 (G.R. No. 41200), 1. The decision of this court in that criminal case has already become
final and the petition for a writ of certiorari to review said decision was denied by the Supreme
Court of the United States in November of last year. At bottom, supersedeas is being sought to
stay the execution of the final judgment in said criminal case. Thereby, the petitioner will
continue to be at large and this is the status quo desired to be maintained. We do not think that
this should be allowed. (Sec. 46 [f], Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.) The
suspensive effect of supersedeas can only operate in this case on the judgment sought to be
reviewed and cannot arrest the execution of the final judgment rendered in the criminal case
against the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. (Cyc. of Fed. Proc., Civil and Criminal, Longsdorf,
vol. 6, sec. 2869, p. 362.)

The public interest and the interest of the speedy administration of justice demand prompt
execution of the final sentence of conviction rendered against the petitioner. Said petitioner has
had all the time and opportunity which the law can possibly afford to anyone in self-defense. He
had the assistance of able counsel and opportunity to appeal to this court and the Supreme Court
of the United States, and the least that can be said is that he must abide by this judgment and
serve his term. It is further to be observed that the petition for probation of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng has already by the trial court.
There is force in the argument that where the case is appealable under the Constitution and law to
the Supreme Court of the United States, this court is but an agent of that court and must permit
the case to take its due course. In such a case, the appeal is a matter of right. But from this
premise it does not follow that a stay must be granted by this court where nothing can be stayed,
or that the final decision in a criminal case which can no longer be appealed from should be
superseded. Upon the other hand, the wide latitude necessarily possessed by this court in the
interpretation of its Rules must be exercised in favor of what is believed to be a matter of public
interest in the present case.
As a rule of federal practice in the United States, section 8 cd. of the Act of Congress of February
13, 1925 (43 Stat., 936, 940; 28 U.S.C.A., sec. 350), provides that in any case the execution and
enforcement of final judgment or degree which is subject to review by the Supreme Court of the
United States on writ of certiorari is discretionary with "a judge of the court rendering the
judgment or decree or by the Justice of the Supreme Court," and this rule is reiterated in
paragraph 6 of Rule 38 of the Supreme Court of the United States. (Robertson & Kirkham, sec.
413, p. 831 et seq.) In Magnum Import Co. vs. De Spoturno Coty (262 U.S., 159,163; 43 S. Ct.,
531; 67 Law. ed., 922), the Supreme Court of the United States, though Chief Justice Taft,
said:lawphil.net
The petition should, in the first instance, be made to the circuit court of appeals, which,
with its complete knowledge of the cases, may, with full consideration, promptly pass on
it. That court is in a position to judge, first, whether the case is one likely, under our
practice, to be taken up by us on certiorari; and, second, whether the balance of
convenience requires a suspension of its decree and a withholding of its mandate. It
involves no disrespect to this court for the circuit court of appeals to refuse to withhold its
mandate or to suspend the operation f its judgment or decree pending application for
certiorari to us. If it thinks a question involved should be ruled upon by this court, it may
certify it. If it does not certify, it may still consider that the case is one in which a
certiorari may properly issue, and may, in its discretion, facilitate the application by
witholding the mandate or suspend in its decree. If it refuses, this court requires an
extaordinary showing before it will grant a stay of the decree below pending the
application for a certiorari, and even after it has granted a certiorari, it requires a clear
case and decided balance of convenience before it will grant such stay. These remarks, of

course, apply also to applications for certiorari to review judgments and decrees of the
highest courts of states.
Petition for stay of execution and the fixing of a supersedeas bond is denied. So ordered.

G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

RUFINO R. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG, as
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 109446 October 3, 1994
CARAG, CABALLES, JAMORA AND SOMERA LAW OFFICES, CARLO A. CARAG,
MANUELITO O. CABALLES, ELPIDIO C. JAMORA, JR. and BENJAMIN A.
SOMERA, JR., petitioners,
vs.
RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF FINANCE and JOSE
U. ONG, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.
Rufino R. Tan for and in his own behalf.
Carag, Caballes, Jamora & Zomera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. 109446.

VITUG, J.:
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No.
109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the

Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code and, in
G.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated
by public respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of
the amendatory legislation.
In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7496 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

In G.R. No. 109446, petitioners, assailing Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-93,
argue that public respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying
SNIT to general professional partnerships.
The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
The Court has given due course to both petitions. The parties, in compliance with the
Court's directive, have filed their respective memoranda.
G.R. No. 109289
Petitioner contends that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act No.
7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No.
109289).
The full text of the title actually reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and
29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.

The pertinent provisions of Sections 21 and 29, so referred to, of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as now amended, provide:
Sec. 21. Tax on citizens or residents.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Simplified Net Income Tax for the Self-Employed and/or Professionals Engaged in the
Practice of Profession. A tax is hereby imposed upon the taxable net income as
determined in Section 27 received during each taxable year from all sources, other than
income covered by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this section by every individual
whether
a citizen of the Philippines or an alien residing in the Philippines who is self-employed or
practices his profession herein, determined in accordance with the following schedule:
Not over P10,000 3%
Over P10,000 P300 + 9%
but not over P30,000 of excess over P10,000
Over P30,000 P2,100 + 15%
but not over P120,00 of excess over P30,000
Over P120,000 P15,600 + 20%
but not over P350,000 of excess over P120,000
Over P350,000 P61,600 + 30%
of excess over P350,000
Sec. 29. Deductions from gross income. In computing taxable income subject to tax
under Sections 21(a), 24(a), (b) and (c); and 25 (a)(1), there shall be allowed as
deductions the items specified in paragraphs (a) to (i) of this section: Provided, however,
That in computing taxable income subject to tax under Section 21 (f) in the case of
individuals engaged in business or practice of profession, only the following direct costs
shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Raw materials, supplies and direct labor;
(b) Salaries of employees directly engaged in activities in the course of or pursuant to the
business or practice of their profession;
(c) Telecommunications, electricity, fuel, light and water;
(d) Business rentals;
(e) Depreciation;

(f) Contributions made to the Government and accredited relief organizations for the
rehabilitation of calamity stricken areas declared by the President; and
(g) Interest paid or accrued within a taxable year on loans contracted from accredited
financial institutions which must be proven to have been incurred in connection with the
conduct of a taxpayer's profession, trade or business.
For individuals whose cost of goods sold and direct costs are difficult to determine, a
maximum of forty per cent (40%) of their gross receipts shall be allowed as deductions to
answer for business or professional expenses as the case may be.

On the basis of the above language of the law, it would be difficult to accept petitioner's
view that the amendatory law should be considered as having now adopted a gross
income, instead of as having still retained the net income, taxation scheme. The
allowance for deductible items, it is true, may have significantly been reduced by the
questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to the amendment;
limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neither discordant with,
nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. The fact of the matter is still that various
deductions, which are by no means inconsequential, continue to be well provided under
the new law.
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent
log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one
of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud
upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its
proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. 1 The above objectives of
the fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be
to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of
the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it
imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets,
however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even
prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that
all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity
does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative
purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future

conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the
same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA
52).
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the
legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular
approach 2 in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large,
the present global treatment 3 on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this
classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
Petitioner gives a fairly extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, in the
process, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those
covered by the amendatory law and those who are not. With the legislature primarily lies
the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage
(subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This court cannot freely delve into those matters
which, by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Of course, where a tax
measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of
property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for, despite all its plenitude, the power
to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been
demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy
before us.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared
unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process
clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or
constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so
evident to us.
G.R. No. 109446
The several propositions advanced by petitioners revolve around the question of
whether or not public respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating
Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, to carry out Republic Act No. 7496.
The questioned regulation reads:
Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership The general professional partnership (GPP)
and the partners comprising the GPP are covered by R. A. No. 7496. Thus, in
determining the net profit of the partnership, only the direct costs mentioned in said law
are to be deducted from partnership income. Also, the expenses paid or incurred by
partners in their individual capacities in the practice of their profession which are not

reimbursed or paid by the partnership but are not considered as direct cost, are not
deductible from his gross income.

The real objection of petitioners is focused on the administrative interpretation of public

respondents that would apply SNIT to partners in general professional partnerships.
Petitioners cite the pertinent deliberations in Congress during its enactment of Republic
Act No. 7496, also quoted by the Honorable Hernando B. Perez, minority floor leader of
the House of Representatives, in the latter's privilege speech by way of commenting on
the questioned implementing regulation of public respondents following the effectivity of
the law, thusly:
MR. ALBANO, Now Mr. Speaker, I would like to get the correct
impression of this bill. Do we speak here of individuals who are earning, I
mean, who earn through business enterprises and therefore, should file
an income tax return?
MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. This does not apply to
corporations. It applies only to individuals.
(See Deliberations on H. B. No. 34314, August 6, 1991, 6:15 P.M.; Emphasis ours).
Other deliberations support this position, to wit:
MR. ABAYA . . . Now, Mr. Speaker, did I hear the Gentleman from
Batangas say that this bill is intended to increase collections as far as
individuals are concerned and to make collection of taxes equitable?
MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker.
(Id. at 6:40 P.M.; Emphasis ours).
In fact, in the sponsorship speech of Senator Mamintal Tamano on the Senate version of
the SNITS, it is categorically stated, thus:
This bill, Mr. President, is not applicable to business corporations or to
partnerships; it is only with respect to individuals and professionals.
(Emphasis ours)

The Court, first of all, should like to correct the apparent misconception that general
professional partnerships are subject to the payment of income tax or that there is a
difference in the tax treatment between individuals engaged in business or in the
practice of their respective professions and partners in general professional
partnerships. The fact of the matter is that a general professional partnership, unlike an
ordinary business partnership (which is treated as a corporation for income tax
purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer.

The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax exempt, but
on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive
shares of partnership profits. Section 23 of the Tax Code, which has not been amended
at all by Republic Act 7496, is explicit:
Sec. 23. Tax liability of members of general professional partnerships. (a) Persons
exercising a common profession in general partnership shall be liable for income tax only
in their individual capacity, and the share in the net profits of the general professional
partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled whether distributed or
otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid in accordance with the
provisions of this Title.
(b) In determining his distributive share in the net income of the partnership, each partner

(1) Shall take into account separately his distributive share of the
partnership's income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit to the extent
provided by the pertinent provisions of this Code, and
(2) Shall be deemed to have elected the itemized deductions, unless he
declares his distributive share of the gross income undiminished by his
share of the deductions.

There is, then and now, no distinction in income tax liability between a person who
practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through partnership
(whether registered or not) with others in the exercise of a common profession. Indeed,
outside of the gross compensation income tax and the final tax on passive investment
income, under the present income tax system all individuals deriving income from any
source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably the same manner and under a
common set of rules.
We can well appreciate the concern taken by petitioners if perhaps we were to consider
Republic Act No. 7496 as an entirely independent, not merely as an amendatory, piece
of legislation. The view can easily become myopic, however, when the law is
understood, as it should be, as only forming part of, and subject to, the whole income
tax concept and precepts long obtaining under the National Internal Revenue Code. To
elaborate a little, the phrase "income taxpayers" is an all embracing term used in the
Tax Code, and it practically covers all persons who derive taxable income. The law, in
levying the tax, adopts the most comprehensive tax situs of nationality and residence of
the taxpayer (that renders citizens, regardless of residence, and resident aliens subject
to income tax liability on their income from all sources) and of the generally accepted
and internationally recognized income taxable base (that can subject non-resident
aliens and foreign corporations to income tax on their income from Philippine sources).
In the process, the Code classifies taxpayers into four main groups, namely: (1)

Individuals, (2) Corporations, (3) Estates under Judicial Settlement and (4) Irrevocable
Trusts (irrevocable both as to corpus and as to income).
Partnerships are, under the Code, either "taxable partnerships" or "exempt
partnerships." Ordinarily, partnerships, no matter how created or organized, are subject
to income tax (and thus alluded to as "taxable partnerships") which, for purposes of the
above categorization, are by law assimilated to be within the context of, and so legally
contemplated as, corporations. Except for few variances, such as in the application of
the "constructive receipt rule" in the derivation of income, the income tax approach is
alike to both juridical persons. Obviously, SNIT is not intended or envisioned, as so
correctly pointed out in the discussions in Congress during its deliberations on Republic
Act 7496, aforequoted, to cover corporations and partnerships which are independently
subject to the payment of income tax.
"Exempt partnerships," upon the other hand, are not similarly identified as corporations
nor even considered as independent taxable entities for income tax purposes. A general
professional partnership is such an example. 4 Here, the partners themselves, not the
partnership (although it is still obligated to file an income tax return [mainly for
administration and data]), are liable for the payment of income tax in their individual
capacity computed on their respective and distributive shares of profits. In the
determination of the tax liability, a partner does so as an individual, and there is no
choice on the matter. In fine, under the Tax Code on income taxation, the general
professional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere mechanism or a flowthrough entity in the generation of income by, and the ultimate distribution of such
income to, respectively, each of the individual partners.
Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the
above standing rule as now so modified by Republic Act
No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual
income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of
the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing
or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their
respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional
partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO
PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number, for
their release from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion
with murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez 1 doctrine,
negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them was not
handed down until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this the first instance,
a proceeding of this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2
likewise a petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer
given was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would
premise their stand on the denial of equal protection if their plea would not be granted.
Moreover they did invoke the codal provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines,3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the
Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit
mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having such character even if at
the time of their application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is
serving the same."4 These arguments carry considerable persuasion. Accordingly we
find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.

Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and
Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in
decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12,
1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then
imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has served more than 13
years.5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, 6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the
information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there
being no such complex offense.7 In the recently-decided case of People vs. Lava,8 we
expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor
General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the
petitioners that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum penalty
that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued
detention being illegal.9
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas
corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be
appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition
without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing, there being a failure to invoke
the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as to
the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious
jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable
to one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
To repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We have to grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under
the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint
and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of
liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining
whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless
there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid
sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by
law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.

Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the fundamental law. 10 Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as
"one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the greatest
of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by
whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick echoed a similar
sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel
made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby
the rule of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of
liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief
Justices Arellano, 15 Avancea, 16 Abad Santos, 17 Paras, 18 Bengzon, 19 and the present
Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a few times
the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the remedy
came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent Mayor of
Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the
transportation of more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring
to the writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and existing "as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of Justice
Malcolm continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if
presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v.
Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone
the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its
motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas
Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera,
25
to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the
writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of
jurisdiction and entitles the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to
obtain his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter
thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law,
the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869 decision 28 of the then Chief
Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the

best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years has
only served to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other
year, Justice Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of
habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The scope and flexibility of the writ its
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by
courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with
the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach
are surfaced and corrected." 29 Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone,
who spoke of it as "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement."
Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is his adoption of Holmes' famous
dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to
the very tissue of the structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been
judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably
narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to
1902, 32 when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the
person detained was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
magistrate. This is understandable, as during the time the Philippines was under
American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative doctrines of
constitutional law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As
summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground
on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give
relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is
the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter
rendering its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial
of equal protection. According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were

convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez,
Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the
very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been
changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in
conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only
prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people
similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required
constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued
incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly
convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That
is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would
happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly
sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as
noted in the petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who were
mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the rest of their natural
lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid their penalty to society,
and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive
effect. In support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S.
vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While
reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts,
petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny
its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was
previously noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would
even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:

"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who
is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or
spoke them." It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist
John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the
above observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present purposes
that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call for, a
retroactive application.
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect
petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is
habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as
1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45 Thus: "The
courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the
power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the
courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts
are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ
of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46
There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of Prisons 47 where it was
explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of giving retroactive effect to a
penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While the
above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the
remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only
means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision
holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying
their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that
petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.
G.R. No. 128845

June 1, 2000

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary
of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,
respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than
their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees
should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this
jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle
we uphold today.1wphi1.nt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying
out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same
decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by
it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt
from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests
to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is
classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are
also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the
difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a)
the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his
family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path all for

the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The
new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for
one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's
children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit
of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic
reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country
where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after
along period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive
on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of
international education.3
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members"4 of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether
foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE
Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997.
Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38
in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local
hires.5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same
benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless
of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid
equally as Filipino local hires.6

The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case.
The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal
with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain
amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their
services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international
market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of
employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore,
in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of
employment which include the employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for
salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the
discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and
conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff
(OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of
system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the
tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the
status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It
is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and
apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between
foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no

amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation
package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution
and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice
and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. 11 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 13 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
14
the Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work."
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field
but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment. 20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135,
for example, prohibits and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee
as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor

practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage

membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7
thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal
truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This
rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work
equal to that of foreign-hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize
the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the
"[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry
in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully
from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as
an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as
foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the
"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires,
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25
"to afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. 27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the localhires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School
also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the
same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and
home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify
the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with
local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining
rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN
PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March
19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS
D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise

to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1,
it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to
be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and
irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of
Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary
lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong,
United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the
challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined
as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It
is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin
to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very
fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State
"to govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is
not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that

inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute
guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is
not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For
all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at
the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives

for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court
sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been
afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is
not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What
the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic
workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful
or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable
indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court
cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as
classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the
evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the
Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For
their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by
which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to
question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for
determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature
itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively
enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with
this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making
powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of
such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions
indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind
the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no
quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself
("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the
host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means

impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap
measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances
of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may,
upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift
the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of Filipino workers. 19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument
for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or
group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the
ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would
obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic
case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It
would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless
to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such
distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of
minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the
young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.
There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls
for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation
against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of
equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to
certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban
has hot been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of
similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines
and are exempted from the suspension.

5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and

Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government
officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited
international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have
[sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS-Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process
with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to
finish an existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to
worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision
of these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may,
upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift
the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the
welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the
right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public
safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested
in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply
because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the
legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated.

As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and
Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken.
The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities
of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all. 30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all,
decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling
expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from
home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it
has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of
its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to
certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to
the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise,
like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where
laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to
maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that
suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a
decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that
this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of
discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA
ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitionersintervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
(for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary
proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat
(PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the

Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief

Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that
what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub
out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified
modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of
the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as
principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second
Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them
to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11)
amended informations 5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only
as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of
the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a
and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank
of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none
has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned

by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices
Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration,
insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by
petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the
issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1,
1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill
No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills
sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c)
of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the
President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14
denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands
pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature
enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February
5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and
Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special
Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and

that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been
issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court
admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1
neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases 16
(Empahasis supplied)

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including
Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues
that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad
faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at
the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from
the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue
therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit
the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial
had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will
no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan
alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right
of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due
process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions
in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan
law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of
statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic
Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply
specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the
Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no
longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under
R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in
support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and
praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a
nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime
charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the
said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret
to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following
provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological
order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D.
No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos.
1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed
or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme
Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and
from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975
provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are
afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned
in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the
final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in
the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word
"accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at
loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors,
relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under
the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to

represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d)
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e)
other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which
is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This
paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a
of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated
in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused
public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In
enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606
which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right
to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification
made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness. 34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has
not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes
real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented,
whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress
to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7
placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely,
paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public
officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any
court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened
that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those
cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what
is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya
38
for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed
that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the

Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee
headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against
him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was
acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives,
and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally,
by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner
during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to
nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings
was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves
the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member
thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by
the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are
deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the twotiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In
Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different
testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not
penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor
their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect.
The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering
that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated
by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to
matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
come within the prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the
mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme
Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts,
the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of
innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of
the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it
"defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its
jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because
such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill

must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and
should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D.
1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general
subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted
within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the
legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of
Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7
of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions
over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the
evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls
under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged
must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the
Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations,
"in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate
was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder
was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. 65 This

intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must
be alleged in the informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the
actual recital of the facts." 67 The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained
in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such a
descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second
to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order
that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every
crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances.
In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to
him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged
and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO,
SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO
GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO
F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and
members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR.,
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN,
INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and
members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-thefact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing
that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18,
1995.
CONTRARY LAW.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,

the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague
on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above
alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the
"arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is
no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by
the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid,
arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling.
Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we,
however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation
in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion
between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy between
the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and
the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him with
pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipotipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control where his

co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and

conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the
authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and
without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his
orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who
denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused
because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held
their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus,
there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court
below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then
killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the
accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted,
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot;
and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these
allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the
trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed
in relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that
the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the
close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder
was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP
officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos.
23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-52304 January 28, 1980

RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL and
ALEJANDRO R. ALINSUG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Petition for prohibition and mandamus moth a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51
providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. Section of the statute provides:
SEC. 3. Cities. There shall be in each city such elective local officials as provided in
their respective charters, including the city mayor, the city vice-mayor, and the elective
members of the sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom shall' be elected by the qualified
voters in the city. In addition thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang panglungsod
members consisting of the of the city association of barangay councils, the President of
the city federation of the kabataang barangay, and one representative each from the
agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by the President (Prime
Minister) whenever, as de by the sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient
number in the city to warrant representation.
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component cities in accordance with
the standards established in the Local Government Code as provided for in Article XI,
Section 4(1) of the Constitution. any city now existing with an annual regular derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at
the time of the approval of this Act shag be classified as a highly urbanized city. All other
cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically
located.
The City of Baguio, because of its special functions as the summer capital of the
Philippines, shall be classified as a highly urbanized city irrespective of its income.
The registered voters of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the
officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its charter so provides.
However, voters registered in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall not
participate nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the highly
urbanized city is geographically located.

To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for short) adopted
Resolution No. 1421, which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 in calling for the election of the provincial governor,
provincial vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in each
province classified the chartered cities of the Philippines into "highly urbanized" and
"component" cities based on the annual regular income of each city, and provided that
"the registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the
officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its charter provides", but that
"voters registered in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of
the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located";
WHEREAS, inasmuch as the charters of the different cities vary with respect to the right
of their registered voters to vote for the provincial officials of the provinces where they are
located, there is need to study the various charters of the cities and determine what cities
shall and shall not vote for provincial officials pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 51;
WHEREAS, the voters in the cities should be accordingly informed if they are going to
vote for provincial officials or not, for their proper guidance;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 (51)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the qualified voters in each city shall or shall
not be entitled to vote for the provincial officials of the province where they are
geographically located, to wit:
A. Cities not entitled to participate in the election of pro- provincial
officials

.
B
a
g
u
i
o

11.
Ma
nd
au
e

2
.
B
a
i
s

12.
Ma
nil
a

3
.
C
a
n
l

13.
Na
ga

a
o
n

4
.
C
a
l
o
o
c
a
n

14.
Or
mo
c

5
.
C
e
b
u

15.
Or
oq
uie
ta

6
.
C
o
t
a
b
a
t
o

16.
Oz
am
is

7
.
D
a
g
u
p
a
n

17.
Pa
sa
y

8
.
D
a

18.
Qu
ez
on

v
a
o

9
.
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
S
a
n
t
o

19.
Sa
n
Ca
rlo
s
(P
an
ga
sin
an)

1
0
.
I
l
o
i
l
o

20.
Za
mb
oa
ng
a

Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147,64, it is classified as a highly

urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in the election of the elective
provincial officials of the province of Cebu, although the Charter of Cebu City 1 allows
the qualified voters of the city to vote in the election of the provincial officials of the
Province of Cebu.
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than ?40 million,
is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the city cannot vote for the
provincial elective officials because its Charter 2 expressly provides that the registered
voters of the city cannot participate in the election of the provincial officials of the
Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate therefor.
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the Cities of
Cebu and Mandaue. They are members of a civic and non-partisan group known as DO-E-R-S (an accronym for "DEMOCRACY OR EXTINCTION: RESOLVED TO
SUCCEED) which counts lawyers among its members, and extends free legal
assistance to citizens regardless of economic and social status in meritorious cases
involving violation of civil liberties and basic human rights. They vigorously assail

Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as
the basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial officials of the province
where the city is geographically located; and Republic Act No. 5519, otherwise known
as the Charter of Mandaue City, which went into effect without the benefit of ratification
by the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum. They pray that upon filing of
the instant petition, a restraining order be issued "temporarily prohibiting the holding of
election for Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials in the province
where the 18 cities listed by the respondent COMELEC are located, particularly Cebu
City and Mandaue City, and temporarily prohibiting the National Treasurer to release
public funds and the COA to pass in audit said funds in connection with and for the
purpose of holding local elections in said provinces; and after hearing, to make the
injunction permanent declaring unconstitutional and therefore void Section 96, Art. XVIII
of the Charter of Mandaue, otherwise known as RA 5519," and should the stopping of
the provincial elections in the provinces concerned be not possible, the respondent
COMELEC be directed "to allow the qualified registered voters in the cities listed by said
respondent, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, to participate in the election of,
and vote for, the Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials and preparing
the corresponding official ballots for this purpose which shall provide spaces therein for
Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials of the provinces concerned,
particularly the province of Cebu."
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 3 insofar as it classifies cities
including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate
to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law
which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection."
We find no merit in the petition. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest
autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
it is stated that "The state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as selfreliant communities." 4 To this end, the Constitution directs the National Assembly to
"enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by the
majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local
government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different
local governments their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the
qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of local
government units," 5 and empowered local government units "to create its own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to limitations as may be provided by law." 6 Art. XI,
Section 4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the
supervisory power of the province where they are geographically located. This is as it
should be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly urbanized city due to
a bigger population and greater economic activity which require greater autonomy.

Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate in

provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since
these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and
authority over said city. Thus, in the case of Teves vs. Commission on Election 7 this
Court, in holding that the registered voters of the City of Dumaguete cannot vote for the
provincial officials of Negros Oriental because the charter of the city does not expressly
allow the voters in the city to do so, ruled:
The creation of Dumaguete City has made it a political entity separate from and
independent of the province of Negros Oriental. The purpose of an election is to enable
the electorate to choose the men that will run their government, whether national,
provincial, municipal or city. It so, no useful end will be served by allowing in the
absence of express legislative preference the voters of a city to ceased to have any
governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city.
To confirm our view that the city of Dumaguete has been segregated from the province of
Oriental Negros for purposes of provincial elections, we should point to the penultimate
section of the charter providing that "until otherwise provided by law, the City of
Dumaguete shall continue as part of the first representative district of the Province of
Oriental Negros." This is an express exception to the general effect of separation an
exception that serves to reiterate or even establish the rule. In other words, the Congress
meant that the inhabitants of the city may not vote for provincial officials, but may vote for
their representative in Congress.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis
of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a
city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a
relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether
the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the
continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal
protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for
provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one
component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in
another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the
Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage. In the case of Teves v. Commission on
Election 8 the Court said.
Petitioners' contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete City is silent as to the right of
its qualified voters to participate in the election of provincial officials of Negros Oriental
and as said voters are residents of the province, they are clearly entitled to vote for said
provincial officials.
The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on the matter. Thus, in the case
of Bacolod, Cabanatuan Legaspi Naga, and Ormoc, their charters expressly prohibit the
residents therein from voting for provincial officials of the province to which said cities
formerly belonged. Upon the other hand, the charters of Cagayan de Oro, Butuan,

Cavite, Iloilo, Calbayog Lipa San Pablo, and Dagupan contain provisions extending their
part in the election of the provincial official cities were previously included.
The question that presents itself has reference to the effect of the omission in the charter
of Dumaguete City of an express provision on the right of its residents to vote for
provincial officials of Negros Oriental, in the light of the legislative practice that, when
desired, the right is either recognized or withdrawn expressly. We are inclined to overrule
petitioners' position.

The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights
and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the
equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the
city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another individual or groups of
voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage
since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial
officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote
for elective city officials in local elections which the questioned statues neither withdraw
nor restrict.
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for elective
provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the exercise of suffrage
and would violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to the provisions of Art. VI, Section
1 of the Constitution. The prohibition contemplated in the Constitution, however, has
reference to such requirements, as the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs.
Virginia Board of Elections, 9 or the New York requirement that to be eligible to vote in a
school district, one must be a parent of a child enrolled in a local public school, nullified
in Kramer vs. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, which impose burdens on the
right of suffrage without achieving permissible estate objectives. In this particular case,
no such burdens are imposed upon the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They
are free to exercise their rights without any other requirement, save that of being
registered voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is
maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of republicanism as it
would deprive a citizen his right to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the
government unit through the exercise of his right of suffrage. It has been pointed out,
however, that the provincial government has no governmental supervision over highly
urbanized cities. These cities are independent of the province in the administration of
their affairs. Such being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and
election of the provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally
affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having
been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of
the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval

by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected
10
is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is
prospective 11 in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of
Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the
passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend
that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick
and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, 234,582 are from Cebu City
and 44,358 come from Mandaue City, so that 278,940 electors, or close to one-third
(1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu. Such charge has no factual and legal basis.
"Gerrymandering" is a "term employed to describe an apportionment of representative
districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. 12 The
questioned statutes in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The
said representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an
unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor
General pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of
the administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes will work
to their disadvantage.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118533 October 4, 1995

MAYOR PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the HON. OMBUDSMAN, Special
Prosecutor ANIANO DESIERTO and Deputy Special Prosecutor JOSE DE G.
FERRER, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In this original action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner Mayor Pablo R. Olivarez
seeks to annul the following:
1. Resolution dated February 9, 1994 issued by Special Prosecutor (SP) Aniano Desierto
and approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on February 15, 1994 reversing
Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) I Cornelio Somido's recommendation to dismiss the
case against petitioner; 1
2. Resolution dated December 9, 1994 issued by Deputy Special Prosecutor (DSP) Jose
De G. Ferrer and approved by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez on December 23, 1994
reversing SPO III Angel Mayoralgo's recommendation to withdraw the case against
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence; 2 and
3. Resolution dated January 16, 1995 issued by the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's
Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of Reinvestigation conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman. 3

The facts are succinctly summarized in the Comment 4 of the Solicitor General as
follows:
1. On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board
member Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Paraaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a
mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Paraaque Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 744, Series of 1992 which petitioner himself approved on October
6, 1992. Resolution No. 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's fair during
the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from November 11, 1992
to February 15, 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas
Boulevard from the corner of Opena to Rivera Streets (Annex "D", Petition). Attached to
the affidavit-complaint were: (i) a letter dated October 29, 1992 of Councilor Winnie
Esplana to Arch. Vita of Paraaque Engineering Department;
(ii) four letters all dated November 13, 1992 of BCCI General Manager Mr. Steve Espina
to petitioner, Arch. Vita, Municipal Health Officer
Dr. Oscar de Leon and Municipal Treasurer Silvestre de Leon requesting assistance for
the issuance of a mayor's permit; (iii) Letter dated November 24, 1992 of BCCI counsel
Atty. Renato Dilag to petitioner formally demanding implementation of Res. 744 (Annex
"H"); (iv) petitioner's reply letter dated November 27, 1992 to Atty. Dilag stating among
others that the non-implementation of Res. 744 was due to BCCI's failure to apply for
appropriate permit and license to operate the Night Manufacturer's Fair which was one of
the conditions in the authorization (Annex "I").
2. On March 12, 1993, petitioner filed his counter-affidavit stating that the charge of
violation of Sec. 3(f) of RA 3019 has no legal and factual basis because (a) HCCI, which
actually started operation, never applied for a mayor's permit as evidenced by his letter
reply to
Atty. Dilag and the affidavit dated March 11, 1993 of Business Permit and License Office
Officer-In-Charge Mrs. Elenita T. Paracale (Annex "J"). Moreover, the four letters of Mr.

Steve Espina requesting assistance in the issuance of mayor's permit were not filed with
the municipal office concerned.
3. In his Reply Affidavit dated April 1, 1993, complainant BCCI denied conducting actual
operations but only commenced soliciting participants and would-be sponsors to the fair.
Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but petitioner
simply refused to issue the same unless it gives money to petitioner. Attached to the
Reply-Affidavit was a copy of Executive Order dated Nov. 23, 1992 issued by petitioner
granting a group of Baclaran-based organizations/associations of vendors the holding of
"Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair sa Baclaran" from November 28, 1992 to February 28,
1993 using certain portions of the National and Local Government Roads/Streets in
Baclaran for fund raising (Annex "L").
4. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Rogelio A. Ringpis conducted a preliminary
investigation and issued on September 22, 1993 a resolution recommending the
prosecution of petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended. The
recommendation was approved by EPIB Head Raul Arnau and endorsed by Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera to Special Prosecutor (SP) Aniano Desierto for
review and possible preparation of criminal information. The endorsement was duly noted
by Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa.
5. On December 22, 1993, Special Prosecutor (SP) II Luz L. Quinones-Marcos, upon
review of the Ringpis resolution, recommended the filing of information against petitioner
for violation of Sec. 3(e) instead of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019. The recommendation was
approved by
Deputy Special Prosecutor (DSP) Jose De G. Ferrer and SP Desierto. On January 11,
1994, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the report and recommendation and
directed the government prosecutors to file the necessary information against petitioner
with the Sandiganbayan.
6. The Information for Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed on February 16, 1994 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 20226, reads as follows:
That in or about the month of November, 1992 or for sometime prior
thereto, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
a public officer being then the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
the exercise of his administrative and official functions, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, without valid reason, refuse to
issue a mayor's permit and/or refuse to act favorably on the application
of the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI) to operate a "night fair"
along the service road of Roxas Boulevard (Baclaran) for a period of
sixty (60) days in accordance with Resolution No. 744 series of 1992 of
the Municipal Council of Paraaque, and that instead the accused issued
and signed an executive order on November 23, 1992 granting an
unknown or unidentified group of Baclaran-based
organizations/associations of vendors the privilege to operate a "night

fair" at certain portions of the national and local roads/streets in

Baclaran, thus, causing undue injury to the Baclaran Credit Cooperative,
Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Annex "P").
7. On January 17, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and on ground of newly discovered
evidence (Annex "O"). Although opposed by the prosecution on January 24, 1994, the
same was granted.
8. On February 7, 1994, Special Prosecu(tion) Officer (SPO) I Cornelio Somido to whorn
the reinvestigation was assigned, issued an order recommending the withdrawal of the
information against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. This recommendation
approved by DSP de G. Ferrer was however disapproved by SP Desierto noting that:
Respondent does not refute the allegation and evidence that complainant
and representative approached him and he refused to issue the permit
despite follow up. Neither does respondent claim that in refusing to issue
the permit, he advised complainant and representatives that they had
failed to comply with requirements. Bad faith is, therefore, evident in the
respondent's persistent refusal to issue permit.
On February 9, 1994, Ombudsman Vasquez concurred with Special Prosecutor Desierto
and disapproved the recommendation (Annex "A").
9. On February 18, 1994, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond
with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary release.
10. On February 21, 1994, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-examination and
re-assessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set
aside the determination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of
the case (Annex "Q").
11. On March 3, 1994, the Sandiganbayan, after finding that sufficient probable cause
exist(s) against petitioner, denied for lack of merit petitioner's Omnibus Motion in open
court and proceeded to arraign him as scheduled that day. But in view of petitioner's
refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty" entered into his record.
12. On March 8, 1994, the prosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite.
13. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To
Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With Entry of Appearance) (Annex "R"), Supplemental
Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused and
Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused (Annex
"S"), respectively. Petitioner sought the following relief, to wit:

a) to set aside plea of "not guilty" entered for him by the court during the
arraignment on March 3, 1994;
b) to dismiss the case after a re-study of probable cause;
c) to order preliminary investigation for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019;.
d) to deny the motion for suspension.
14. On March 23, 1994, the prosecution opposed the supplemental motions and prayed
that the denial of petitioner's Omnibus Motion be maintained.
15. On April 4, 1994, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion but in the interest of
justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of the case due to
technicalities, it set aside the proceedings conducted on March 3, 1994 including
petitioner's arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in his record. The
arraignment was set to April 7, 1994 but further action on the prosecution's motion to
suspend petitioner pendente lite was deferred, without prejudice to the reiteration or
revival thereof at the proper time and upon notice (Annex "T").
16. On April 20, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted on
May 15, 1994 (Annex "V"). Consequently, the case was remanded to the Office of the
Ombudsman for another reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice.
Petitioner's arraignment was again reset to July 13, 1994 in the event of adverse
resolution on the re-investigation.
17. During this reinvestigation, petitioner filed a Memorandum with Additional Evidence to
SP(O) III Berbano to whom the case was assigned (Annex "W"). Meantime, several
scheduled arraignments were deferred on the ground that the reinvestigation has not
been terminated and, later, the recommendation has yet to be acted upon by superior
officers.
18. On September 23, 1994, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr. issued a memorandum
recommending the withdrawal of the Information on the ground that no probable cause
exist(s) to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. (3019). He alleged that to
grant an exclusive mayor's permit demanded by BCCI will subject petitioner to liability for
violation of R.A. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefit to BCCI. Moreover, BCCI failed to
show compliance with the requirements of Res. 744, hence petitioner had all the reasons
to refuse issuance of mayor's permit. Also,
the issuance of Executive Order dated November 23, 1992 allowing Baclaran-based
vendors associations to hold a night fair did not in any manner cause injury to BCCI as
the authority given to them under Res. 744 was not exclusive. Petitioner merely
considered the best interest of the municipality.
19. On October 3, 1994, complainant Manuel A. Vizcarra, formally requested the
Ombudsman to disqualify SP(O) Berbano on the ground of lack of confidence, bias and
undue delay in the reinvestigation of the case.

20. The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on November
3, 1994 recommended the dismissal of the case stating that petitioner "cannot be held
liable for violation of either Section 3(f), the original charge, or Section 3(e), R.A. 3019,
the pending charge against Mayor Olivarez, because he neither neglect[ed]/refuse[d] to
act without sufficient justification on the letter request addressed to him, nor acted
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence causing
undue injury to BCCI. If ever the latter sustained injury for the non-implementation of
Council Resolution No. 744, S-92, the same is due to the fault and indiscretion of its
officers."
21. On December 9, 1994, DSP de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation with the
following observation:
Even discounting evident bad faith on the part of respondent for the sake
of argument, he is liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 by giving
unwarranted benefit THRU MANIFEST PARTIALITY, to another group on
the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit.
The merits of respondent's justification (insufficient as it is) should be
passed upon by the court.
(Annex "B")
The reversal was concurred (in) by SP Desierto and approved by Ombudsman Vasquez,
who on December 27, 1994, directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing
information.
22. On January 13, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and
SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr.
23. On January 16, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of
Reinvestigation praying that:
(a) the Ombudsman's Resolution of January 9, 1995 sustaining his
original finding that probable cause (exists) against petitioner be stricken
off the record;
(b) the information be dismissed
(c) or in the alternative, for the court to review Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause against him" (Annex "X").
24. On January 16, 1995, the motion was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. . . .
(Corrections in parentheses supplied.)

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner assails the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the

recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve or disapprove the
same through a mere marginal note, without conducting another preliminary
investigation. Similarly, petitioners fault respondent Sandiganbayan for, allegedly in
grave abuse of discretion, refusing to review the finding of the Ombudsman that there
exists probable cause to hold petitioner liable for violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
considering that the Ombudsman did not comply with the guidelines set forth by
respondent court in the conduct of the reinvestigation.
We shall first deal with the propriety or impropriety of the questioned marginal notes,
dated February 9, 1994 and December 9, 1994, issued by then Special Prosecutor
Aniano Desierto (now Ombudsman) and Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de G. Ferrer,
respectively. Petitioner contends that these marginal notes are null and void on the
ground that the same were issued without the benefit of a new preliminary investigation
and that the findings therein were not based on the facts and the evidence presented. It
is likewise averred that the above-named government prosecutors were engaging in a
fishing expedition when they changed theories, that is, from "evident bad faith" to
"manifest partiality," but only after the Sandiganbayan had issued a Resolution declaring
that the original finding of bad faith was unwarranted.
After a careful scrutiny of the issues raised in the petition for certiorari, the arguments in
support thereof, as well as the comments of the public respondents thereon, we are not
convinced that herein public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion or
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in a
marginal note is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of
respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely abused their
discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to
dismiss or withdraw the case against petitioner. Neither are these marginal notes tainted
with or indicative of vindictiveness or arbitrariness as imputed by petitioner. Public
respondents disapproved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors because
they sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict the accused.
The Ombudsman's conformity thereto is but an exercise of his powers based upon
constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the

courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise
of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 5
It may be true that, on the face thereof, the marginal notes seem to lack any factual or
evidentiary basis for failure to specifically spell out the same. However, that is not all
there is to it. What is actually involved here is a situation wherein, on the bases of the
same findings of fact of the investigating prosecutors, respondent special prosecutors
were of the opinion that, contrary to the former's recommendation, petitioner is probably
guilty of the offense charged. Obviously, therefore, since it is merely a review of the
conclusions arrived at by the investigating prosecutor, another or a new preliminary
investigation is no longer necessary.
The case of Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al., 6 which involves substantially the same issues,
has ruled on the matter in this wise:
It may seem that the ratio decidendi for the Ombudsman's order may be wanting but this
is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the
evidence presented. What is actually involved here is merely a review of the conclusion
arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as a result of his study and analysis of the
complaint, counter-affidavits, and the evidence submitted by the parties during the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman here is not conducting anew another
investigation but is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the
recommendation given by the investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable cause
actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary
upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating
prosecutor in making a review of the latter's report and recommendation, as the
Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him
from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of
the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the
corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or
state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation."
With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different
from that of the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot
be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he
opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is
probable cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the offense charged.
. . . (f)rom the tenor of respondent Ombudsman's statement, it is clear that he agreed with
the findings of facts of the investigating prosecutor but disagreed with the latter's
conclusion on the import and significance of said findings. On the basis of the findings of
fact of the investigating prosecutor, which were not disputed by petitioner, respondent
Ombudsman believed that there was sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief

that a crime had been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof. (Italics in
the original text.)

The alleged shift in theory from "evident bad faith" to "manifest partiality" fails to present
a sufficient indicium that respondent prosecutors gravely abused their discretion.
Manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence are but elements
of the offense defined in and punishable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for
which petitioner stands charged. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime
are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of which can be best
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Thus, the issue of whether there was
bad faith or manifest partiality on the part of petitioner should best be determined, not in
the preliminary investigation, but during the trial proper. 7
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it
is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be seasonably charged
with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in
jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a wellgrounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. 8
Consequently, petitioner's asseveration that the reinvestigation is null and void because
the respondent prosecutors failed to consider all the evidence presented in his defense
has no leg to stand on. A perusal of the records will show that all the documentary
evidence, as well as the additional documents submitted by petitioner during the
reinvestigation, were thoroughly examined and fully evaluated in the determination of
probable cause.
Probable cause, as explained in the aforecited case of Pilapil, is
. . . a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a
state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of
the prosecution in support of the charge.

Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the same
was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be made out by proper and
sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the case has
already proceeded on sufficient proof.
. . . the court should not be guided by the rule that accused must be shown to be guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether there is sufficient evidence which inclines
the mind to believe, without necessarily leaving room for doubt, that accused is guilty
thereof. 9

We have meticulously analyzed the arguments raised by the parties in the various
pleadings and motions, together with their documentary evidence, which all formed the
basis for the issuance of the questioned resolutions, and we are convinced that there
exists probable cause as to warrant the filing of charges against herein petitioner for a
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019.
Petitioner's main defense is that BCCI was not issued a mayor's permit by reason of its
failure to apply therefor and to comply with the conditions set forth in Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 744. There are several flaws to this argument.
First. The purported absence of an application for the issuance of a permit is actually
more apparent than real. Initially, petitioner claims that he could not grant a permit to
BCCI, which was allegedly demanding an exclusive authority to operate, on the pretext
that he can be held liable for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving unwarranted
benefits to BCCI to the detriment of other Baclaran-based vendors' associations.
Subsequently, but in the same vein, petitioner tries to justify the issuance of an
executive order granting a permit to the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors'
associations, in that the same did not cause injury to BCCI since the authority to
operate given to the latter is not exclusive.
It would appear, therefore, that petitioner had taken it upon himself to categorize and
determine the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the authority to operate granted to BCCI,
depending on whether or not it would suit his purpose or predilection. The inconsistent
stand taken by petitioner with regard to the true character of BCCI's authority to operate
is indeed quite perplexing and suffices to cast sufficient doubt on the real motive behind
the non-issuance of the required permit.
Second. It is asserted that the executive order granting a permit to the Baclaran-based
vendors' associations was issued by petitioner supposedly in the best interest of the
municipality as evidenced by its earnings from the night fair in the total amount of
P13,512,948.00. While the avowed purpose may prove noble, still it miserably pales in
contrast to what appears to be bad faith or manifest partiality on the part of petitioner in

refusing to grant a permit to BCCI. Petitioner could not plausibly demonstrate how the
issuance of a permit to BCCI would so adversely affect public interest as to warrant its
denial. On the contrary, the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque had even passed a
resolution, which notably was approved by herein petitioner, expressly allowing BCCI to
hold the night fair. This is concrete proof that the grant of authority to operate in favor of
BCCI was not at all contrary to law and public policy, nor was it prejudicial to public
interest.
Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in
favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of
an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it
could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner failed to show, in apparent
disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaranbased vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance
of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would
seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of herein
petitioner.
Petitioner likewise submits that no permit could be issued because BCCI never filed an
application therefor with the proper office, that is, the Business Permit and Licensing
Office. This is actually begging the question. It is not denied that on November 13, 1992,
BCCI, through its general manager, wrote petitioner requesting for a permit to operate,
but this was rejected outright by him on the theory that the application should be made
with the proper municipal official. The indifference shown by petitioner to BCCI's
application taints his actuations with dubiety.
As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his
authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letterapplication of BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal
procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the
licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether petitioner was
impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond us for the moment
since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are
sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be
completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification.
Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly
authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities
for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign
total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI..

On the basis of the foregoing, we are reasonably convinced that there is enough
evidence to warrant the filing of a formal charge in court against herein petitioner for a
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Considering that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are supported by
substantial evidence, the same should be considered conclusive. Furthermore, the
Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said
findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion
in holding that petitioner is liable for the offense charged, the petition at bar clearly
raises questions of fact. The arguments therein are anchored on the propriety of or error
in the Ombudsman's appreciation of the facts of the case.
Petitioner cannot be unaware of our oft-repeated injunction that this Court is not a trier
of facts, more so in an application for the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither
questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, since only questions of lack or excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion are authorized. 10 On this issue, therefore, we
find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which would
warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari, especially where the circumstances
attending the recourse therefor are strongly suggestive of dilatory purposes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999

CONRADO L. TIU, JUAN T. MONTELIBANO JR. and ISAGANI M. JUNGCO,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., BASES CONVERSION
AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY,

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, CITY TREASURER OF OLONGAPO and

MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF SUBIC, ZAMBALES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The constituttional rights to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive
order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to the bussiness and
residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Econimic Zone and denying
them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. The
Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all
persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and
required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and
reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals' Decision 1 promulgated on August 29, 1996, and
Resolution 2 dated November 13, 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 37788. 3 The challenged
Decision upheld the constitutionality and validity of Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A),
according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized
under Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) were limited to the business enterprises and
residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ).
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA
7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this
Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created
the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges, as follows:
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of
the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special
Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of
Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its
contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of
Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and

bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the

Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government
unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to
the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a
proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein.
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution
and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic
Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to
attract and promote productive foreign investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate
customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and
exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as
tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However,
exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to
the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding,
no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone.
In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all businesses
and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National
Government, one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the
declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors. In
addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the
gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special
Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of
Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to the base
areas.
In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption
privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the
latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange,
gold, securities and future shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special
Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the
operations of banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic
Zone;

(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency
depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks
with minimum Central Bank regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment
shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and
dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent
resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall have the freedom of
ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of
special authorization form the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas
renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly
technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as
certified by the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted
permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days
after issuance thereof;
(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of
the National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall provide and establish its own security and firefighting forces; and
(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be
governed by their respective charters and the municipalities shall operate and function in
accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991.

On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO
97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives thus:
Sec. 1. On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to
raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the
SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ, whether by
business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to taxes and duties under
relevant Philippine laws.
The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to
other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant
Philippine laws.
Sec. 2. On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes
and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax
specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.

Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO
97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative,
viz.:
Sec. 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ [Subic Special
Economic and Free Port Zone]. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and
foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital
goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items, however,
must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of raw materials, capital goods,
equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ
registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may be
provided herein.

On October 26, 1994, the petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of
EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. In a
Resolution dated June 27, 1995, this Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.
Incidentally, on February 1, 1995, Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President
Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and
Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the provisions of
EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and welldefined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous
extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'" The
appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO
97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the
coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to include the "entire Olongapo City
and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law." It relied on the following
deliberarions in the Senate:
Senator Paterno. Thank you, Mr. President. My first question is the extent of the
economic zone. Since this will be a free port, in effect, I believe that it is important to
delineate or make sure that the delineation will be quite precise[. M]y question is: Is it the
intention that the entire of Olongapo City, the Municipality of Subic and the Municipality of
Dinalupihan will be covered by the special economic zone or only portions thereof?

Senator Shahani. Only portions, Mr. President. In other words, where the actual
operations of the free port will take place.
Senator Paterno. I see. So, we should say, "COVERING THE DESIGNATED PORTIONS
OR CERTAIN PORTIONS OF OLONGAPO CITY, SUBIC AND DINALUPIHAN" to make it
clear that it is not supposed to cover the entire area of all of these territories.
Senator Shahani. So, the Gentleman is proposing that the words "CERTAIN AREAS". . .
The President. The Chair would want to invite the attention of the Sponsor and Senator
Paterno to letter "C," which says: "THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IS HEREBY
AUTHORIZED TO PROCLAIM, DELINEATE AND SPECIFY THE METES AND BOUNDS
OF OTHER SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES WHICH MAY BE CREATED IN THE CLARK
MILITARY RESERVATIONS AND ITS EXTENSIONS."
Probably, this provision can be expanded since, apparently, the intention is that what is
referred to in Olongapo as Metro Olongapo is not by itself ipso jure already a special
economic zone.
Senator Paterno. That is correct.
The President. Someone, some authority must declare which portions of the same shall
be the economic zone. Is it the intention of the author that it is the President of the
Philippines who will make such delineation?
Senator Shahani. Yes Mr. President.

The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as
being within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of
serving] some public benefit or interest." It ruled that "EO 97-A merely implements the
legislative purpose of [RA 7227]."
Disagreeing, petitioners now seek before us a review of the aforecited Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution.
The Issue
Petitioners submit the following issue for the resolution of the Court:
[W]hether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Specifically the issue is whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A
confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the
residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or not. 4

The Court's Ruling

The petition 5 is bereft of merit.

Main Issue:
The Constitionality of EO 37-A
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the
City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly
occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed
down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply
to the present "fenced-in former Subic Naval Base" only. It has thereby excluded the
residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by
the law. It has effectively discriminated against them without reasonable or valid
standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
On the other hand, the solicitor general defends, on behalf of respondents, the validity
of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the
authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance
fully complies with the requiretnents of a valid classification.
We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not
violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find
real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtain;ng inside and those
outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. 6 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class. Explaining the nature of the equal
protection guarantee, the Court in Ichong v. Hernandez 8 said:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which it is directed
or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable. grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to

the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class. 9
We first determine the purpose of the law. From the very title itself, it is clear that RA
7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive
uses. Obviously, the "lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement" are its
object. Thus, the law avows this policy:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. It is hereby declared the policy of the Government to
accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the
Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air
Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and
Capas Relay Station), to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military
camps, and to apply said funds as provided herein for the development and conversion to
productive civilian use of the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended.

To undertake the above objectives, the same law created the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, some of whose relevant defined purposes are:
(b) To adopt, prepare and implement a comprehensive and detailed development plan
embodying a list of projects including but not limited to those provided in the LegislativeExecutive Bases Council (LEBC) framework plan for the sound and balanced conversion
of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions consistent with
ecological and environmental standards, into other productive uses to promote the
economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in
general;
(c). To encourage the active participation of the private sector in transforming the Clark
and Subic military reservations and their extensions into other productive uses;

Further, in creating the SSEZ, the law declared it a policy to develop the zone into a
"self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center." 10
From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be deduced that the real concern of
RA 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into
economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it
necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage investors, both local
and foreign. Among such enticements are: 11 (1) a separate customs territory within the
zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importation's, (3) restructured income tax rates on business
enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations
on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of
working visas to certain foreign executives and workers .

We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of
some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area
which the government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an
abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone,
particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their
businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for the big investors? Undeniably,
they are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the
country and to generate employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of
the government for such conversion. The classification is, therefore, germane to the
purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes, "The intent of a statute is the law." 12
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being
lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the
present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billionpeso investments and thousands of new, jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of
such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only
local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured
area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to
turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy.
There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and
incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will
be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the "secured area," which is
already fenced off, to prevent "fraudulent importation of merchandise" or smuggling.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity
of laws. 13 As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there
is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the
petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same
benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off
free port zone.
We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply
merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a
"self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center" in the area.
There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment center and the
areas outside it.
Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses
within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing
directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further.

Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations
required.
All told, the Court holds that no undue favor or privilege was extended. The
classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded.
To repeat, it was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were
germane to the legislative purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and
Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128845

June 1, 2000

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary
of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,
respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than
their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees
should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this
jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle
we uphold today.1wphi1.nt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying
out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same
decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by
it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt
from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests
to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is
classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are
also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the
difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a)
the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his
family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path all for

the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The
new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for
one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's
children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit
of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic
reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country
where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after
along period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive
on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of
international education.3
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members"4 of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether
foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE
Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997.
Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38
in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local
hires.5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same
benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless
of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid
equally as Filipino local hires.6

The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case.
The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal
with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to
foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain
amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their
services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international
market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of
employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore,
in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of
employment which include the employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for
salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with
Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the
discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and
conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff
(OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of
system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the
tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the
status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It
is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and
apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between
foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no

amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation
package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution
and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice
and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. 11 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 13 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
14
the Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work."
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field
but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment. 20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135,
for example, prohibits and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee
as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor

practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage

membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7
thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal
truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This
rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work
equal to that of foreign-hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize
the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the
"[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry
in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully
from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as
an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as
foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the
"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires,
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25
"to afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. 27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the localhires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School
also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the
same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and
home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify
the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with
local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining
rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN
PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March
19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148208

December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,

INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that
its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the
passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file
employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case

First the facts.

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central
Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection,
hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall
aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in
accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board
shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for
under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic
Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut
between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from
the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (nonexempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation,"
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG
of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of
arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not
appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed
by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation
of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and
even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the
BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL;
thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions
(GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious,
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A.
No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety
of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994
when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso
has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take
cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with
other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in
accordance with sound principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of
the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
national government.11
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph
of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No
person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."12

III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification
created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional
infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that
it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over
matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude

the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to
evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15 The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.17 The classification
must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same
class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20
and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rankand-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the
rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational
basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate
Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this
Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision
of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was
merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved
in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive,
is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that
the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs
leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison
of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.24

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.25
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even
though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of
changed conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the
Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which
placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a
business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except
for parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court
found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to
constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the
use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to
promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the
constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is
so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for
which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted
will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation
under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater
part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate
case.28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29
upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid
exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the
otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes
in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its
continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors.
The landmark ruling states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic
Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global
war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage
Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar
obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their
losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said
obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after
settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law
is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation

conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have
suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the
debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and
would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar
debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language
means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before
they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period
seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible,
and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes
extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent
when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation
of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the
only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open
to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same
should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is
illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes
authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for
animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor
carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they
were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes
became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since
their enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company
of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars.
This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been
previously sustained. Ruled the Court:

The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar
corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of
property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent
inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public
highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the
safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals.
Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject
to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads
as are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when
enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The
police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted
arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support
of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq.
imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was
that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing
livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part
of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it
was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation
rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had
killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the
operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the
law."34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining
whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its
face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.35 (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also
violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS,
LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted
from the coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the
BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also
undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs,
from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation,
(SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs
share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of
the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. xxx

xxx

xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification

system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the
private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once
every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification

standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible
with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)

Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an
actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable
compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such
methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and
economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however,
That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the
SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President,
except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by
the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only
from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided,
finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758
and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation
Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management,
the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the
employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those
extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other
government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the
GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish,
fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and
employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and
other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and
administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430,
otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)

Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an
organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation
of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions
in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job
analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to
periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to
yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank
shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall
however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the
principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and
administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification
system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors

based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities:
Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from
Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and
from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to
establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and the employee's
contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

3.
xxx

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's
human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation
shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of
actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be
subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice
to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The
Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however
endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other
GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the
BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable
because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to

more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification
- albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rankand-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable,
but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as
practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that
Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the
exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of
the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is
Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment,
simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but
gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a
classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly,
or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining
the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is
articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among
several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere
assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination
by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a
magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection
challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection
of the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the
rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between
BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at
issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the
oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-andfile and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational
discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In
the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination,
directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or
permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other
GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL,
there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other

rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long
been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental
entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to
provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable
positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But even then,
GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already
identified as a distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided,
"[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees, additional
financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for
their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions
as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies."42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b)
provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification
System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be
comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance
with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position
Classification System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis
of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the
Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following
principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions
maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the
private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of
Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational
Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:46
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;

(7) decision-making responsibility;

(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1
to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects
pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IXB of the 1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the
Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and
below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each
government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and
institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without
distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption
from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned
considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character;
(2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector,
not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining
competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling
up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for
the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution,
and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48
and the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and
authority to issue currency;50 provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and
credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions
performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that
the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their
institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily
varies with the particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is
there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was

granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the
seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions
to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was
granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it
bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the
deliberations show that the raison d'tre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for
the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the
economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out
the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not
competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP
was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did
not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification
made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and
NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the particular
circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express
reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by
the employees and personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within
the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from
the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC
- which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],"53 then granted a blanket
exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the
rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced
with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting
the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees
would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that
the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per
alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is
prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that
rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other
GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The
fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them
members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in
Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared
by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other
characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the
two groups."

The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the
classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by
Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the
peculiar characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused
by alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is
obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves
a six-year commitment
xxx

xxx

xxx

Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers
are qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom
during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes
part of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty.
Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in
consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment
benefits55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are
no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of
the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary.
It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-andfile and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice CarpioMorales would put it - whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and
sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the
GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A.
Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a
"preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at
the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative
power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in
and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate
exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the
compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP
(whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central
Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court resolved the issue of
constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested
in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely
raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly

situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court
held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of the
proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other
GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal
protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy
exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the
exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is
superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those
included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the
power to correct.59 As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to
law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another,
even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven
GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with
candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes
are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality
but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the
seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso
anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have
followed the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64
A. Equal Protection in the United States

In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test.
Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit:
65

Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most

contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must not
impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused
solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the
statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process,
equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental
values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification
requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between
classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal
protection" and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention
tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon
the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and
social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as
everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new areas
for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier approach
evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new"
equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated
with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means
but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit
between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility
traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary"
to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal
protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new
equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide
spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for
two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on
"fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren
Court's major contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally
interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there
might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But
it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved
particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests
included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel .]

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Burger Court and Equal Protection.

The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection,
although its best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting
discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection
doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to
the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the fundamental interests
identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect"
classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx

xxx

xxx

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an
increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and
interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that
would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap
between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from
Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his
dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two
neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere
rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled
reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in
reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause. This spectrum
clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize
particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal
importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions,
although it is a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger
Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection law:
First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with
the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually
automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the
minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find
the statute unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth
standards for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the
deference of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the
"new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an
"intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect to both

ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely
"legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where
means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally
related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive
the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone
forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic
law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that
require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as
particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing
states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits
derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language,
religion or social origin."67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which
varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court
set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention
only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the
European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR,
a much higher level of justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect"
(sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz,
70
the European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member
States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be
advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as
compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would
have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively
on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention."72 The European Court will
then permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination
on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to
distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73
C. Equality under International Law

The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal
protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of
human rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
discrimination and/or provisions about equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent
to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77 the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as
the American Convention on Human Rights;78 the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and
revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular
importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the
Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States
of the League.81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first
generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than
requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective
protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European
Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights
guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment
of the rights guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States
Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of
discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions
administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. 84 Additionally,
many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions
relating to employment.85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to
view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights.86 In
Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory
provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26.
The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit provision was not
within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR.
They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil
and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26
did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee

rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the
rights in other international treaties such as the right to social security found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of
itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by
legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide
for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be
struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International
law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee90
took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring
that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing,
of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its
conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There
should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate
every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives
in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this
approach.92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we
held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article
on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No.

111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody
the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice.
The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor
of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of
work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the
office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities
for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit
and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote
and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article
7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long

honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should
be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or

prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution
requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this
jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions.95
We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable
mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of
our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the
light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and
always with our own concept of law and justice.96 Our laws must be construed in accordance
with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of
each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must
be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws.
And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that:
"[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of
which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings
and needs."98 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a
tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities
in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in
"all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear
commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality.
[T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law
bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the obligation to
afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but
also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls for the

humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.104
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with
Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653.
Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly
been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would
call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or
the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one
of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the
settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form
of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances,
one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable
obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty,
rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept
within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and
stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935
Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking
through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well
as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the

1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of the government.107
(citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officeremployee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP
now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the
poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications
are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the
SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities
for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose
status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is
they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and
improve the quality of life for all."108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the
private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for
better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor
practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is
almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in
compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and
they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous
treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be
asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from
reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last
proviso

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking
to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain
provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the

forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a

qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared
as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against
him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds
and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following
statutory provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence
on the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in
any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January
30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The
period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January
28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also
question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as
authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section
9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any
public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question
of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs.
COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null
and void for being violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural
infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a
misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of
petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and
Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The
respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has
joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot
and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead
nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a
modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and
Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly
procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function
of judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that
the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the
constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65
Phil. 56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the
parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases
and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the
application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed
before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which
this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract,
a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to
be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is
clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice
Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as
provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which
reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which
provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof.

B. Proper party.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their
Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied
that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has
been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory
provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no
personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they
can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's
suit, and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in
Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

In the same vein, it has been held:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51,
and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public
funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
"being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against
abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a
misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of
Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine

Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's
suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs.
Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this
Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to
a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present
is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and
Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require
that this suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the
Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict
procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta
(35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the
Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief
Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved
and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed
with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal
protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another

class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject
to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may
not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can
also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local
official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial,
city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present,
and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality
will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision
does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law
and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
[1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez
101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger
blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the
objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of

the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws
shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair
4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the
compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to
become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge,
may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact ...

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of
the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and
that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear
case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear
case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against
him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to
run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty
of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold
office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the

proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly
possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment
of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is
hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of
the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1
hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment
of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been
65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired.

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa

Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption
of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. November 16, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs., ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accusedappellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape is clear and
unmistakable. Under certain circumstances, some of them present in this case, the offender may
be sentenced to a long period of confinement, or he may suffer death. The crime is an assault on
human dignity. No legal system worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic
consequences for the unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the
community.i[1]
Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel of moral
depravity, when committed against a minor.ii[2]
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with extreme caution.iii[3]
In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to devote an even more
painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record and a similarly conscientious
evaluation of the arguments of the parties. The victim of rape in this case is a minor below

twelve (12) years of age. As narrated by her, the details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and
repulsive. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as
a foster father. Because the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by
several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused is also a most
unlikely rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his having been charged and convicted
by the trial court for statutory rape, his constituents liked him so much that they knowingly reelected him to his congressional office, the duties of which he could not perform.
Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11) year old
commercial sex worker is bound to attract widespread media and public attention. In the words
of accused-appellant, he has been demonized in the press most unfairly, his image
transmogrified into that of a dastardly, ogre, out to get his slimy hands on innocent and nave
girls to satiate his lustful desires.iv[4] This Court, therefore, punctiliously considered accusedappellants claim that he suffered invidiously discriminatory treatment. Regarding the above
allegation, the Court has ascertained that the extensive publicity generated by the case did not
result in a mistrial; the records show that the accused had ample and free opportunity to adduce
his defenses.
This is an appeal from the decisionv[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, convicting accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos of two
(2) counts of statutory rape, and in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 961992, and 96-1993, for six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also
known as the Child Abuse Law.
There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 961997, and 96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted of the charges of acts of
lasciviousness for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape; and twelve (12) for
acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, were filed against accused-appellant. The
accusatory portion of said informations for the crime of statutory rape state:
In Criminal Case No. 96-1985:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 18, 1996 at Room No.1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn
Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.vi[6]

In Criminal Case No. 96-1986:

The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 20, 1996 at Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn
Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.vii[7]
For acts of lasciviousness, the informationsviii[8] under which accused-appellant was convicted
were identical except for the different dates of commission on June 14, 1996; June 15, 1996;
June 16, 1996; June 20, 1996; June 21, 1996; and June 22, 1996, to wit:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)-year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
committed as follows:
That in the evening of June 14, 1996, or thereabout, in Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati
City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kiss, caress
and fondle said complainant's face, lips, neck, breasts, whole body, and vagina, suck her nipples
and insert his finger and then his tongue into her vagina, place himself on top of her, then insert
his penis in between her thighs until ejaculation, and other similar lascivious conduct against her
will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1988; 96-1990; and 96-1993, there were added averments that on the
different dates, the accused gave the complainant P10,000.00, P5,000.00 and P5,000.00
respectively.
Upon arraignment on January 29, 1997, accused-appellant refused to enter a plea. Hence, the
trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. At the trial, the prosecution presented eight (8)
main witnesses and seven (7) rebuttal witnesses as well as documentary evidences marked as
Exhibits A to EEEE, inclusive of submarkings. The defense, on the other hand presented twentysix (26) witnesses. Its documentary evidence consists of Exhibits 1 to 153, inclusive of
submarkings. The records of the case are extremely voluminous.
The Peoples version of the facts, culled mainly from the testimony of the victim, are as follows:

Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight black hair and
almond-shaped black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care
of Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting
boarders at his house. On the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn never got to see her mother, though she had known a younger brother, Shandro, who was
also under the care of Simplicio. At a very young age of 5, fair and smooth-complexioned
Rosilyn was exposed by Simplicio to his illicit activities. She and her brother would tag along
with Simplicio whenever he delivered prostitutes to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was
offered by Simplicio as a prostitute to an Arabian national known as Mr. Hammond. Thus begun
her ordeal as one of the girls sold by Simplicio for sexual favors.
Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office
located near Robinsons Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and introduced by a
talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn
become an actress. When he saw Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio
answered, 10. She is going to be 11 on May 11. Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows
how to sing. Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, Tell Me You Love Me.
Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and then raised her skirt up to the midthighs. He asked if she was already menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant
further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody answered, accused-appellant
cupped Rosilyns left breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them that he would help
Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the producers of the TV programs, Valiente and
Eat Bulaga.
Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for Rosilyns movie career.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, said that he would adopt Rosilyn and that the latter would
have to live with him in his condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn
went home, accused-appellant gave Rosilyn P2,000.00.
The second time Rosilyn met accused-appellant was at his condominium unit, located at Room
1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City. Accused-appellant and Simplicio discussed the contract and his
plan to finance Rosilyns studies. Accused-appellant gave Simplicio P500.00, thereafter,
Rosilyn, Shandro and Simplicio left.
The third meeting between Rosilyn and accused-appellant was also at Ritz Towers to discuss her
acting career. Accused-appellant referred the preparation of Rosilyns contract to his lawyer,
who was also present. After the meeting, Simplicio and Rosilyn left. As they were walking
towards the elevator, accused-appellant approached them and gave Rosilyn P3,000.00.
On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned to accusedappellants condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant came out of his bedroom,
Simplicio told Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside.
After a while, accused-appellant entered the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television.
He walked towards Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came

in and bid her goodbye. Rosilyn told Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which
Simplicio replied, Halik lang naman.
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time, accused-appellant
came in and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long white T-shirt on which was
printed the word, Dakak. In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told
Rosilyn that he wanted to change her clothes. Rosilyn protested and told accused-appellant that
she can do it herself, but accused-appellant answered, Daddy mo naman ako. Accusedappellant then took off Rosilyns blouse and skirt. When he was about to take off her panties,
Rosilyn said, Huwag po. Again, accused-appellant told her, After all, I am your Daddy.
Accused-appellant then removed her panties and dressed her with the long white T-shirt.
The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-appellant turned off the
lamp and the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt,
touched her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out,
Tama na po. Accused-appellant stopped. He continued to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts.
Later, accused-appellant told Rosilyn to sleep.
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom she found bent over
and kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led her to the bathroom. He removed
Rosilyns shirt and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyns
body, he caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her
body, dried her with a towel and applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and
told her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accusedappellant took a shower.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom watching television. When
accused-appellant entered the room, he knelt in front of her, removed her panties and placed her
legs on his shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn
P10,000.00 and told his housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the
Ritz Towers, Simplicio was waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to
Simplicio what accused-appellant did to her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the
Ritz Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was alright as long as accused-appellant does not
have sexual intercourse with her.
That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the
Ritz Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed Rosilyns clothes and dressed her
with the same long T-shirt. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant sat
beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her
breasts, and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own
clothes, placed his penis between Rosilyns thighs and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated
on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed her and told her to sleep.
The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and bathed her. Again, he
rubbed soap all over her body, washed her hair, and thereafter rinsed her body and dried her hair.
While accused-appellant was bathing Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he caressed

her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After their shower, accused-appellant ate
breakfast. He gave Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the condominium
unit. On their way home, Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to insert his penis
into her vagina, she should refuse.
At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. They
found accused-appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio told Rosilyn to approach
accused-appellant, then he left. Accused-appellant took off Rosilyns clothes and dressed her
with a long T-shirt on which was printed a picture of accused-appellant and a woman, with the
caption, Cong. Jalosjos with his Toy. They watched television for a while, then accusedappellant lay beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He raised her shirt and parted her legs.
He positioned himself between the spread legs of Rosilyn, took off his own shirt, held his penis,
and poked and pressed the same against Rosilyns vagina. This caused Rosilyn pain inside her
sex organ. Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled her breasts and told her to sleep.
When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-appellant was no longer
around but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that morning, she had felt somebody
touching her private parts but she was still too sleepy to find out who it was. Rosilyn took a
bath, then went off to school with Simplicio, who arrived to fetch her.
The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996, at about 9:00
oclock in the evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant stripped her naked
and again put on her the long shirt he wanted her to wear. After watching television for a while,
accused-appellant knelt beside Rosilyn, raised her shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his
finger into her vagina. Then, he clipped his penis between Rosilyns thighs, and made thrusting
motions until he ejaculated. Thereafter, Rosilyn went to sleep.
The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant who was kissing her
and fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and went back to sleep. When she woke
up, she found the P5,000.00 which accused-appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio
Delantar, when the latter came to pick her up.
On June 29, 1996, Rosilyn again went to the Ritz Towers. During that visit, accused-appellant
took photographs of Rosilyn. He asked her to pose with her T-shirt pulled down thereby
exposing her breasts. He also took her photographs with her T-shirt rolled up to the pelvis but
without showing her pubis, and finally, while straddled on a chair facing the backrest, showing
her legs.
Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke up and found the P5,000.00 left by
accused-appellant on the table. She recalled that earlier that morning, she felt somebody
caressing her breasts and sex organ.
On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz Towers. Rosilyn had to
wait for accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to 1:00 a.m. He again dressed her with
the long white shirt similar to what he was wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant

kissed her lips and inserted his tongue into her mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina, causing her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to
sleep.
The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her body, he fondled
her breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and shoved his hand away.
After bathing her, accused-appellant had breakfast. Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00.
As soon as Simplicio arrived, Rosilyn gave her the money and then they left for school.
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant was
waiting in his bedroom. He took off Rosilyns clothes, including her panties, and dressed her
with a long T-shirt similar to what he was wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant
kissed Rosilyn on the lips, inserted his tongue in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he
made Rosilyn lie on the bed, spread her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He
inserted his finger in her vagina and mounted himself between her legs with his hands rested on
her sides. After that, he lifted his shirt, then pointed and pressed his penis against her vagina.
Accused-appellant made thrusting motions, which caused Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accusedappellant told her to sleep.
In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did
not wake up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the table, and she gave this to
Simplicio when he came to fetch her.
On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m.
Accused-appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that evening. The two
did not return.
The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their
boarders. Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she executed a sworn
statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against
accused-appellant.
On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at Camp Crame. The
examination yielded the following results:
EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with pinkish
brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and
soft
GENITAL

There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic,
fleshy type hymen, with shallow healed laceration at 3 o'clock position and deep healed
laceration at 8 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal
is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is firm and closed.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.ix[9]
During the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that it was
his brother, Dominador Jun Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at accused-appellants
Dakak office and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant insisted that he was in the
province on the dates Rosilyn claimed to have been sexually abused. He attributed the filing of
the charges against him to a small group of blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him,
and to his political opponents, particularly Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly
determined to destroy his political career and boost their personal agenda.
More specifically, accused-appellant claims that on June 16, 1996, he was on the Philippine
Airlines (PAL) 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog. He stayed in Dipolog until June 18,
1996. He submitted in evidence airline ticket no. 10792424,x[10] showing that he was on board
Flight PR 165; the said flights passengers manifest,xi[11] where the name JALOSJOS/RM/MR
appears; and photographs showing accused-appellants constituents welcoming his arrival and
showing accused-appellant talking with former Mayor Hermanico Carreon and Fiscal
Empainado.
Accused-appellant further alleges that on June 28, 1996, he again took the 9:40 a.m. flight from
Manila to Dipolog City. On the same flight, he met Armando Nocom of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Upon arrival and after talking to his representatives, he proceeded to his residence
known as Barangay House in Taguinon, Dapitan, near Dakak Beach resort, and spent the night
there.
On June 29, 1996, accused-appellant attended the fiesta at Barangay San Pedro. He stayed in the
house of Barangay Captain Mila Yap until 5:30 p.m. Then, together with some friends, he visited
the Rizal Shrine and the Pirate Bar at Dakak Beach Resort. Thereafter, he retired in the
Barangay House in Taguilon.
On June 30, 1996, accused-appellant alleges that he attended a city-wide consultation with his
political leaders at the Blue Room of Dakak, which lasted till the afternoon. In the evening, he
went home and slept in the Barangay House.
On July 1, 1996, he attended the whole day celebration of Dipolog Day. He spent the night in
the Barangay House.

On July 2, 1996, he attended the inauguration of the reception hall of Dakak Beach Resort. The
blessing ceremony was officiated by Assistant Parish Priest Adelmo Laput.
On July 3, 1996, he was the guest in the inaguration of the 3 Engineering District of Dapitan
City. After the mass, he visited the Jamboree site in Barangay Taguilon, Dapitan City.
rd

He further contended that after his arrival in Dipolog on June 28, 1996, there was never an
instance when he went to Manila until July 9, 1996, when he attended a conference called by the
President of the Philippines.
Accused-appellant likewise alleged that on July 21, 1996, he took the 5:00 a.m. flight of PAL
from Manila to Dumaguete City. From there, he was flown by a private plane to Dipolog, where
he stayed until the President of the Philippines arrived.
To buttress the theory of the defense, Dominador Jun Jalosjos testified that he was the one, and
not accused-appellant, whom Rosilyn met on three occasions. These occurred once during the
first week of May 1996, at accused-appellants Dakak office where Rosilyn and Simplicio
Delantar were introduced to him by Eduardo Suarez, and twice at the Ritz Towers when he
interviewed Rosilyn, and later when Rosilyn and Simplicio followed up the proposed entry of
Rosilyn into the show business.
Dominadors admission of his meetings with Rosilyn on three instances were limited to
interviewing her and assessing her singing and modeling potentials. His testimony made no
mention of any sexual encounter with Rosilyn.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in the two (2)
counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He
is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases.
2.

Accordingly, he is sentenced to:

2a.

suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.

2b.
indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases.
3.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-1993, the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y
GARCIA, as principal in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the
Child Abuse Law. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases;

4.

Accordingly he is sentenced to:

4.a.
suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term of from eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum;
4.b.
indemnify the victim, MA ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases;
5.
In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-1998, the
prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO
JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore, on the ground of
reasonable doubt, the accused in these cases is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.xii[12]
Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND
UNTRUTHS.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN THE
CLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS

COMMITTED AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.xiii[13]
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with
utmost caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires no less than moral
certainty beyond any scintilla of doubt. This applies with more vigor in rape cases where the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and is not allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is
the rape victim herself that is actually put on trial. The case at bar is no exception. Bent on
destroying the veracity of private complainants testimony, the errors assigned by accusedappellant, particularly the first three, are focused on the issue of credibility.
Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 961995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts of lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that
the trial court sustained his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted
her stories and the rest of her testimony ought not to be believed. Stated differently, accusedappellant urges the application of the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in part,
false in everything).xiv[14]
The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law
and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence.xv[15] Thus, in People v. YansonDumancas,xvi[16] citing People v. Li Bun Juan,xvii[17] this Court held that:
... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with
respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G.
No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1
Moore on Facts, p. 23:
18.Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of facts are not bound to
believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject
other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the
truth Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but
may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief. (p. 945)xviii[18]
Being in the best position to discriminate between the truth and the falsehood, the trial court's
assignment of values and weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be given credence.
Significantly, it should be borne in mind that the issue at hand hinges on credibility, the
assessment of which, as oft-repeated, is best made by the trial court because of its untrammeled
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the witness stand.
On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the trial court stated:
Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it should not believe Rosilyn
when she claimed she was raped. Testimonies of rape victims especially those who are young

and immature deserve full credence (People v. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 (1993) considering that
no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. (People v. Buyok, 235 SCRA 622 [1996]).
When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was able to narrate spontaneously in
detail how she was sexually abused. Her testimony in this regard was firm, candid, clear and
straightforward, and it remained to be so even during the intense and rigid cross-examination
made by the defense counsel.xix[19]
Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyns direct and redirect testimonies were rehearsed and
lacking in candidness. He points to the supposed hesitant and even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on
cross and re-cross examinations. He added that she was trained to give answers such as, Ano
po?, Parang po, Medyo po, and Sa tingin ko po.
Accused-appellants arguments are far from persuasive. A reading of the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and
lascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and
natural words customary of children of her age. The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant
as uttered by Rosilyn are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of
child witnesses like her.
At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the witness stand, may
have given some ambiguous answers, they refer merely to minor and peripheral details which do
not in any way detract from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had been molested
and subjected to lascivious conduct by accused-appellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind
that even the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At times,
far from eroding the effectiveness of the evidence, such lapses could, indeed, constitute signs of
veracity.xx[20]
Then, too, accused-appellant capitalizes on the alleged absence of any allegation of rape in the
five (5) sworn statements executed by Rosilyn as well as in the interviews and case study
conducted by the representatives of the DSWD. In particular, accused-appellant points to the
following documents:
(1)Sworn statements dated August 22 and 26, 1996, executed before SPO5 Milagros A. Carrasco
of the Pasay City Police;
(2)
Sworn statements dated September 5, 11, and 19, 1996, executed before NBI Agents
Cynthia L. Mariano and Supervising NBI Agent Arlis E. Vela;
(3)

The Initial Interview of Rosilyn by the DSWD dated August 30, 1996;

(4)

DSWD Final Case Study Report dated January 10, 1997.

It must be stressed that rape is a technical term, the precise and accurate definition of which
could not have been understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without the assistance of a lawyer, who
could explain to her the intricacies of rape, she expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits
and consequently disclose with proficient exactitude the act or acts of accused-appellant that
under the contemplation of law constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the present
case where there was no exhaustive and clear-cut evidence of full and complete penetration of
the victims vagina. It may well be that Rosilyn thought, as any layman would probably do, that
there must be the fullest penetration of the victims vagina to qualify a sexual act to rape.
In People v. Campuhan,xxi[21] we ruled that rape is consummated by the slightest penetration of
the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis. There need not be
full and complete penetration of the victims vagina for rape to be consummated. There being no
showing that the foregoing technicalities of rape was fully explained to Rosilyn on all those
occasions that she was interviewed by the police, the NBI agents and DSWD social workers, she
could not therefore be expected to intelligibly declare that accused-appellants act of pressing his
sex organ against her labia without full entry of the vaginal canal amounted to rape.
In the decision of the trial court, the testimony on one of the rapes is cited plus the courts
mention of the jurisprudence on this issue, to wit:
Q:You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back was
rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?
A:
He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari
ko. (underscoring supplied)
Q:

And, after doing that: Idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; what else did he do?

A:
After that, Itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.
(underscoring supplied)
(pp. 23, 25 to 30, TSN, 16 April 1997)
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without full penetration
of the male organ into the vagina of the woman. It is enough that there be proof of the entrance
of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. (People vs. Mangalino,
182 SCRA 329; People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535; People vs. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393).
Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ suffices to warrant a
conviction. (People vs. Galimba, G.R. No. 111563-64, February 20, 1996 citing People vs.
Abonada, 169 SCRA 530). Hence, with the testimony of Rosilyn that the accused pressed
against (idiniin) and pointed to (itinutok) Rosilyns vagina his sexual organ on two (2)
occasions, two (2) acts of rape were consummated.xxii[22]
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Rosilyns purpose in executing the affidavits on August
22 and 26, 1996 before the Pasay City Police was to charge Simplicio Delantar, not accusedappellant. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, it is preposterous to expect Rosilyn to make an

exhaustive narration of the sexual abuse of accused-appellant when he was not the object of the
said complaint.
Additionally, Rosilyns statements, given to the NBI on September 11 and 19, 1996, concerned
mainly the identification of pictures. There was thus no occasion for her to narrate the details of
her sexual encounter with accused-appellant.
As to the interviews and studies conducted by the DSWD, suffice it to state that said meetings
with Rosilyn were specially focused on the emotional and psychological repercussions of the
sexual abuse on Rosilyn, and had nothing to do with the legal actions being prepared as a
consequence thereof. Thus, the documents pertaining to said interviews and studies cannot be
relied upon to reveal every minute aspect of the sexual molestations complained of.
At any rate, the inconsistencies between the affidavits and Rosilyns testimony, if at all they
existed, cannot diminish the probative value of Rosilyns declarations on the witness stand. The
consistent ruling of this Court is that, if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit of a
witness and her testimonies given in open court, the latter commands greater weight than the
former.xxiii[23]
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to impress upon this Court that Rosilyn
gave the name Congressman Romeo Jalosjos as her abuser only because that was the name given
to her by the person to whom she was introduced. That same name, accused-appellant claims,
was merely picked up by Rosilyn from the name plate, plaque, and memo pad she saw on
accused-appellants office desk. Accused-appellant presented his brother, Dominador Jun
Jalosjos, in an attempt to cast doubt on his culpability. It was Dominador Jun Jalosjos who
allegedly met and interviewed Rosilyn at the Dakak office. In advancement of this theory,
accused-appellant cites the fact that out of a total of 16 pictures presented to Rosilyn for
identification, she picked up only 4, which depict Dominador Jun Jalosjos. In the same vein,
accused-appellant claims that the resulting cartographic sketch from the facial characteristics
given by Rosilyn to the cartographer, resembles the facial appearance of Dominador Jun
Jalosjos. Accused-appellant also points out that Rosilyn failed to give his correct age or state
that he has a mole on his lower right jaw.
Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively and
unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification during the trial
cannot be diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accusedappellant as her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was
introduced and on the name she saw and read in accused-appellants office. Verily, a persons
identity does not depend solely on his name, but also on his physical features. Thus, a victim of
a crime can still identify the culprit even without knowing his name. Similarly, the Court, in
People v. Vasquez,xxiv[24] ruled that:
It matters little that the eyewitness initially recognized accused-appellant only by face [the
witness] acted like any ordinary person in making inquiries to find out the name that matched
[appellants] face. Significantly, in open court, he unequivocally identified accused-appellant as
their assailant.

Even in the case of People v. Timon,xxv[25] relied upon by accused-appellant to discredit his
identification, this Court said that even assuming that the out-of-court identification of accusedappellant was defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it.
In light of the foregoing, Rosilyns failure to identify accused-appellant out of the 16 pictures
shown to her does not foreclose the credibility of her unqualified identification of accusedappellant in open court. The same holds true with the subject cartographic sketch which,
incidentally, resembles accused-appellant. As noted by the trial court, accused-appellant and his
brother Dominador Jalosjos have a striking similarity in facial features. Naturally, if the sketch
looks like Dominador, it logically follows that the same drawing would definitely look like
accused-appellant.
Likewise, Rosilyns failure to correctly approximate the age of accused-appellant and to state
that he has a mole on the lower right jaw, cannot affect the veracity of accused-appellants
identification. At a young age, Rosilyn cannot be expected to give the accurate age of a 56 yearold person. As to accused-appellants mole, the Solicitor General is correct in contending that
said mole is not so distinctive as to capture Rosilyns attention and memory. When she was
asked to give additional information about accused-appellant, Rosilyn described him as having a
prominent belly. This, to our mind, is indeed a more distinguishing feature that would naturally
catch the attention of an eleven year-old child like Rosilyn.
In his fifth assigned error, accused-appellant insists that the words idinikit, itinutok, and
idiniin-diin, which Rosilyn used to describe what accused-appellant did to her vagina with his
genitals, do not constitute consummated rape. In addition, the defense argued that Rosilyn did
not actually see accused-appellants penis in the supposed sexual contact. In fact, they stressed
that Rosilyn declared that accused-appellants semen spilled in her thighs and not in her sex
organ.
Moreover, in his Reply Brief, accused-appellant, citing People v. Campuhan, argued that,
assuming that his penis touched or brushed Rosilyns external genitals, the same is not enough to
establish the crime of rape.
True, in People v. Campuhan,xxvi[26] we explained that the phrase, the mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute
carnal knowledge, means that the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part
of the entry of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the
mons pubis or the pudendum. We further elucidated that:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer
convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin
skin which does not have any hairs but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia

majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape
to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus,
a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.xxvii[27]
In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of accused-appellant went
beyond strafing of the citadel of passion or shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency, as
depicted in the Campuhan case, and progressed into bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is
invasion enough,xxviii[28] there being, in a manner of speaking, a conquest of the fortress of
ignition. When the accused-appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyns wide-spread legs,
unfetteredly touching, poking and pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position
would then be naturally wide open and ready for copulation, it would require no fertile
imagination to belie the hypocrisy claimed by accused-appellant that his penis or that of someone
who looked like him, would under the circumstances merely touch or brush the external genital
of Rosilyn. The inevitable contact between accused-appellants penis, and at the very least, the
labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina when the
idiniin part of accused appellants sex ritual was performed.
The incident on June 18, 1996 was described by Rosilyn as follows:
PROS. ZUNO:
Q.And, after kissing your lips; after kissing you in your lips, what else did he do?
A.

After that, he was lifting my shirt.

Q.

Now, while he was lifting your shirt, what was your position; will you tell the court?

A.

I was lying, sir.

Q.

Lying on what?

A.

On the bed, sir.

Q.

And, after lifting your shirt, what else did he do?

A.

He spread my legs sir.

Q.

And, after spreading your legs apart; what did he do?

A.

After that, he lifted his shirt and held his penis.

Q.

And while he was holding his penis; what did he do?

A.

He pressed it in my vagina.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
May we request that the vernacular be used?
A.

Tapos po, idinikit-dikit po niya yong ari niya sa ari ko.

PROS. ZUNO:
May I respectfully move that the word: idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko, be
incorporated?
Q.
And while he was doing that; according to you, idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari
mo; what did you feel?
A.

I was afraid and then, I cried.

Q.

Will you tell the Court why you felt afraid and why you cried?

A.

Because I was afraid he might insert his penis into my vagina.

Q.
And, for how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, which according to you,
idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?
COURT:
Place the Tagalog words, into the records.
A.

Sandali lang po yon.

Q.

What part of your vagina, or ari was being touched by the ari or penis?

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q.
You said that you felt I withdraw that question. How did you know that Congressman
Jalosjos was doing, idinikit-dikit niya yung ari niya sa ari ko?
A.

Because I could feel it, sir.

Q.
Now, you said you could feel it. What part of the vagina in what part of your vagina
was Congressman Jalosjos, according to you, idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari mo?
A.

In front of my vagina, sir.

Q.

In front of your vagina? O.K.; will you tell the Court the position?

Will you describe the position of Congressman Jalosjos when he was doing that.
Idinikit-dikit niya sa ari ko?
A.

Ide-demonstrate ko po ba?

FISCAL ZUNO:
Q.

Can you demonstrate?

xxx

xxx

xxx

A.
He was holding me like this with his one hand; and was holding his penis while his other
hand, or his free hand was on the bed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

PROS. ZUNO:
Now, according to you, you dont know how to say it; or what was done to you. Now, will you
tell the Court how can you describe what was done to you?
A.

After he dinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; itinutok naman niya ito.

Q.

O.K. you said itinutok niya ito; what else did he do?

PROS. ZUNO:
She is now trying to describe.
COURT:
Translate.
A.

He seems to be parang idinidiin po niya.

Q.
Now, what did you feel, when according to you; as I would quote: parang idinidiin
niya?
A.

Masakit po.

Q.

And, just to make it clear in Tagalog: Ano itong idinidiin niya?

COURT:
Q.

Sabi mo itinutok. Nakita mo bang itinutok?

A.

I saw him na nakaganuon po sa ano niya.

PROS. ZUNO:
Q.

O.K., clarify. You said nakaganuon siya what do you mean by nakaganuon siya?

A.

He was holding his penis, and then, that was the one which he itinutok sa ari ko.

PROS. ZUNO:
Q.
And, when you said idinidiin po niya; to which you are referring? What is this
idinidiin niya?
A.

Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.

Q.

And what did you feel when you said: he was idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko?

A.

Masakit po.

COURT:
The answer is masakit po.
Proceed.
PROS. ZUNO:
Q.

Where did you feel the pain?

A.

Inside my ari po. (Sa loob po ng ari ko.)

xxx

xxx

xxx

PROS. ZUNO:
Q.

And then, after that, what else did he do

A.

After that, he touched my breast, sir.

Q.

And, after touching your breast, what did he do?

A.
And after that I felt that he was (witness demonstrating to the court, with her index finger,
rubbing against her open left palm)
Q.

And after doing that, what else did he do?

A.

After that, he instructed me to go to sleep.

xxx

xxx

A.

I put down my clothes and then, I cried myself to sleep, sir.

xxx

Q.
Why did you cry? Will you tell the court, why did you cried after putting down your
clothes?
A.

Because I felt pity for myself.

(Naaawa po ako sa sarili ko.)

xxx

xxx

x x x.

(Emphasis supplied.)xxix[29]
Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accused-appellant would not tax the
sketchy visualization of the nave and uninitiated to conclude that there was indeed penile
invasion by accused-appellant of Rosilyns labia. On that occasion, accused-appellant was
similarly ensconced between the parted legs of Rosilyn, except that, this time, Rosilyn was
conveniently rested on, and elevated with a pillow on her back while accused-appellant was
touching, poking and pressing his penis against her vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions
employed by accused-appellant, the resulting pain felt by Rosilyn in her sex organ was no doubt
a consequence of consummated rape.
The pertinent portions of Rosilyns account of the July 20, 1996 incident is as follows:
PROS. ZUNO:
x x xx x x

xxx

Q.
The moment when Cong. Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, what was your
position?
INTERPRETER:
The witness is asking he (sic) she has to demonstrate?
FISCAL ZUNO:
Q.

Ipaliwanag mo lang?

A.

My back was rested on a pillow and my legs were spread apart.

Q.
You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back
was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?
A.
ko.

He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari

Q.
And what did you feel when he was doing that which according to you and I would quote
in Tagalog: idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?
A.

I was afraid sir.

Q.

And, after doing that: idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko, what else did he do?

A.

After that, itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.

Q.
You said: Congressman Jalosjos itinutok niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; at idiniin-diin
niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; Now, while he was doing that act, what was the position of
Congressman Jalosjos?
A.
His two (2) hands were on my side and since my legs were spread apart; he was inbetween them, and doing an upward and downward movement.
(Witness demonstrated a pushing, or pumping movement)
Q.
For how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, pushing or pumping movement
while his penis, or ang ari niya ay nakatutok at idinidiin-diin yong ari niya sa ari mo?
A.

I dont know.

Q.
And what did you feel when Congressman Jalosjos was making that movement, pushing,
or pumping?
A.

I felt pain and then I cried.

Q.

Where did you feel the pain?

A.

Inside my vagina, sir.

xxx

xxx

x x x.xxx[30]

The childs narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of idinikit-dikit niya was
followed by itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya. The idiniin-diin niya was succeeded by
Masakit po. Pain inside her ari is indicative of consummated penetration.

The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what took place at the
appellants room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the
complainants testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.
In the case of People v. Campuhan, the victim put up a resistance --- by putting her legs close
together --- which, although futile, somehow made it inconvenient, if not difficult, for the
accused-appellant to attempt penetration. On the other hand, the ease with which accusedappellant herein perpetrated the sexual abuse, not to mention the absence of time constraint,
totally distinguishes the instant case from Campuhan. Here, the victim was passive and even
submissive to the lecherous acts of accused-appellant. Thus, even assuming that his penis then
was flaccid, his act of holding, guiding and assisting his penis with his one hand, while touching,
poking and pressing the same against Rosilyn's vagina, would surely result in even the slightest
contact between the labia of the pudendum and accused-appellant's sex organ.
Considering that Rosilyn is a self-confessed sex worker, and the circumstances of the alleged
sexual assault at bar, the defense argued that it is highly improbable and contrary to human
experience that accused-appellant exercised a Spartan-like discipline and restrained himself from
fully consummating the sexual act when there was in fact no reason for him not to do so. In the
same light, the defense likewise branded as unnatural the testimony of Rosilyn that accusedappellant contented himself with rubbing his penis clipped between her thighs until he reached
orgasm and desisted from fully penetrating her, when Rosilyn was then entirely at his disposal.
The defense seems to forget that there is no standard form of behavior when it comes to
gratifying ones basic sexual instinct. The human sexual perversity is far too intricate for the
defense to prescribe certain forms of conduct. Even the word perverse is not entirely precise,
as what may be perverse to one may not be to another. Using a child of tender years who could
even pass as ones granddaughter, to unleash what others would call downright bestial lust, may
be utterly nauseating and repulsive to some, but may peculiarly be a festive celebration of
salacious fantasies to others. For all we know, accused-appellant may have found a distinct and
complete sexual gratification in such kind of libidinous stunts and maneuvers.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a longer period penetrated Rosilyn
for fear of perpetrating his name through a child from the womb of a minor; or because of his
previous agreement with his suking bugaw, Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no
penetration, otherwise the latter would demand a higher price. This may be the reason why
Simplicio Delantar gave his mocking fatherly advice to Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant
inserts his penis into her sex organ, while at the same time ordering her to call him if accusedappellant would penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would prompt Simplicio to
demand a higher price, which is, after all, as the Solicitor General calls it, the peculiarity of
prostitution.
The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant ejaculated on her
thighs and not in her vagina, only proves that there was no rape. It should be noted that this
portion of Rosilyns testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of acts of
lasciviousness, and not the rape charges. In any event, granting that it occurred during the twin

instances of rape on June 18 and July 20, 1996, the ejaculation on the victims thighs would not
preclude the fact of rape.
There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did not see the penis of accusedappellant. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted portions of the transcripts, Rosilyn
unequivocally testified that accused-appellant held his penis then poked her vagina with it. And
even if she did not actually see accused-appellants penis go inside her, surely she could have felt
whether it was his penis or just his finger.
We now come to the issue of whether or not Rosilyn was below twelve (12) years of age at the
time the rape complained of occurred. To bolster the declaration of Rosilyn that she was then
eleven years old, the prosecution presented the following documents:
(1)Rosilyns birth certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;xxxi[31]
(2)Rosilyns baptismal certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;xxxii[32]
(3)Master List of Live Births stating that Ma. Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 to
Librada Telen as the mother;xxxiii[33]
(4)Marked pages of the Cord Dressing Room Book;xxxiv[34]
(5)Summary of the Cord Dressing Book, showing her birthday as May 11, 1985 and her parents
(Librada Telen and Simplicio Delantar) patient file number (39-10-71);xxxv[35]
(6)Record of admission showing her parents patient number (39-10-71) and confinement at the
Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital from May 5-14, 1985.xxxvi[36]
It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the
presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said birth
certificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11,
1997.xxxvii[37] However, it appears that the said decision has been annulled and set aside by the
Court of Appeals on June 10, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45289. The decision of the Court of
Appeals was appealed to this Court by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 140305.
Pending the final outcome of that case, the decision of the Court of Appeals is presumed valid
and can be invoked as prima facie basis for holding that Rosilyn was indeed eleven years old at
the time she was abused by accused-appellant.
However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample
proof of the complainants age in the records.
Rosilyns Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban,xxxviii
[38] we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence that

can help establish the age of the victim, such as the baptismal certificate, school records, and
documents of similar nature, can be presented.
And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are
inadmissible to prove her age, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord Dressing Book of Dr.
Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital where Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her
date of birth was May 11, 1985. These documents are considered entries in official records,
admissible as prima facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of Rosilyns testimony as
to her age.
Thus, Rule 130, Section 44, of the Rules of Court states:
Entries in official records. --- Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty especially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, et al., (Phil), Inc., et al.,xxxix[39] the Court laid down the requisites for the
application of the foregoing rule, thus:
(a)That the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
(b)
That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c)
That the public office or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
In order for a book to classify as an official register and admissible in evidence, it is not
necessary that it be required by an express statute to be kept, nor that the nature of the office
should render the book indispensable; it is sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to
be kept. Thus, official registers, though not required by law, kept as convenient and appropriate
modes of discharging official duties, are admissible.xl[40]
Entries in public or official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or
records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof.xli[41] It is not necessary to
show that the person making the entry is unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order
that the entry may be admissible in evidence, for his being excused from appearing in court in
order that public business be not deranged, is one of the reasons for this exception to the hearsay
rule.xlii[42]
Corollary thereto, Presidential Decree No. 651, as amended by P.D. No. 766,xliii[43] mandates
hospitals to report and register with the local civil registrar the fact of birth, among others, of
babies born under their care. Said Decree imposes a penalty of a fine of not less that P500.00
nor more than P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months nor more than six (6)

months, or both, in the discretion of the court, in case of failure to make the necessary report to
the local civil registrar.
Hence, under the above-cited P.D. 651, as amended, in connection with Rule 30, Section 44, of
the Rules of Court, it is clear that the Cord Dressing Room Book where the fact of birth, name of
the mother and other related entries are initially recorded, as well as the Master List of Live
Births of the hospital, are considered entries in official record, being indispensable to and
appropriate modes of recording the births of children preparatory to registration of said entries
with the local civil registrar, in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
It matters not that the person presented to testify on these hospital records was not the person
who actually made those entries way back in 1985, but Amelita Avenante, the records custodian
of the hospital in 1995. To reiterate, these records may be proved by the presentation of the
record itself or by a certified copy or the legal keeper thereof. Proof of the unavailability of the
person who made those entries is not a requisite for their admissibility. What is important is that
the entries testified to by Avenante were gathered from the records of the hospital which were
accomplished in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
Therefore, the Cord Dressing Room Book and the Master List of Live Births of the hospital are
admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein.
The preparation of these hospital documents preceded that of the birth and baptismal certificates
of Rosilyn. They establish independent and material facts prepared by unbiased and
disinterested persons under environmental circumstances apart from those that may have
attended the preparation of the birth and baptismal certificates. Hence, these hospital records, to
reiterate, are sufficient to support the testimony of Rosilyn as to her age.
Consequently, the testimony of Simplicio Delantar that the entries in the birth certificate of
Rosilyn are false and that he merely made them up, particularly her date of birth, was correctly
disregarded by the trial court. It should be noted that the criminal charges for child abuse filed
by Rosilyn against him was the direct cause of his incarceration. This raises a possibility that
Simplicio falsely testified in the present case, to get even with Rosilyn.
Likewise, the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of Gloria Binay and Angelito
Intruzo because the defense failed to prove that they were knowledgeable as to the circumstances
of Rosilyns birth. Their testimonies consist mainly of observations tending to show that
Rosilyns appearance belie her claim that she was born on May 11, 1985.
In the four instances of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed on June 29, June 30, July 2,
and July 3, 1996 (Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, and 96-1997, respectively),
the trial court acquitted accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt as the defense was
able to prove that accused-appellant was not in Manila but either in Dipolog or Dapitan City at
the time the lascivious acts were supposedly committed. The evidence of the defense established
that accused-appellant flew to Dipolog on June 28, 1996, and stayed there until July 9, 1996.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1991 and 96-1998, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness allegedly
committed both in the early mornings of June 19 and July 21, 1996, Rosilyn merely testified that
she felt somebody touching her private part but failed to identify the person who was performing
those lecherous acts as she was too sleepy to wake up. Hence, accused-appellant was likewise
acquitted in these cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
With respect, however, to the acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 15 and 22,
1996, and in the evening of June 14, 15, 18, and 21, 1996, as well as the rape perpetrated on June
18, 1996 and July 20, 1996, accused-appellant failed to account for his whereabouts. A careful
review of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that accused-appellant did not
give any testimony as to where he was at the time these crimes were committed. Clearly,
therefore, the trial court correctly disregarded his unsubstantiated defense of denial, which
cannot prevail over his positive identification by Rosilyn as the culprit.
As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 16, 1996,
accused-appellant claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed the same because he
flew to Dipolog on that day. The records disclose, however, that accused-appellants flight was
at 9:40 a.m. The possibility, therefore, of accused-appellants having performed the lascivious
acts on the victim before he went off to the airport is not at all precluded. For his failure to prove
the physical impossibility of his presence at the Ritz Towers in the morning of June 16, 1996,
when the sexual abuse of Rosilyn was committed, his defense of alibi must fail.
Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether male or female, who for money
or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxxxxx

xxx

(b)
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraphs
3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x
x . (Emphasis supplied.)
In People v. Optana,xliv[44] the Court, citing the case of People v. Larin,xlv[45] explained the
elements of the offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, as
follows:

1.The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected other sexual
abuse.
3.

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA
7610, children are persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of their age or mental disability or condition.
Lascivious conduct is defined under Article XIII, Section 32 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulation of R.A. 7610, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips, fondling her breast,
inserting his finger into her vagina and placing his penis between her thighs, all constitute
lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court
correctly convicted accused-appellant of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child
Abuse Law, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993,
charging him with the above-described lascivious acts.
The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, where the
victim is below 12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-appellant inserted his
finger into the complainants vagina. These insertions took place in 1996. A year later, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it
indicates state policy on rape. The Revised Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 now classifies
the crime as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor, not necessarily the victim or her
parents, can prosecute the case.
The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which are now set forth
and contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have also been increased.
Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court
correctly imposed on accused-appellant the maximum penalty of fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, which is within the medium period of
reclusion temporal medium, pursuant to our ruling in Dulla v. Court of Appeals.xlvi[46]
Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law, accused-appellant may enjoy a minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code.xlvii[47] However, the trial court erroneously fixed the minimum term of
the indeterminate sentence at eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor
in its medium period. In the aforesaid case of Dulla,xlviii[48] we held that the penalty next lower
in degree to reclusion temporal medium is reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is
from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, for
violation of Article III, Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, accused-appellant shall suffer the
indeterminate sentence of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was
penalized under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1.By using force or intimidation;
2.

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.

When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx.

In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates
the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes
that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent
consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years
old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of
force and intimidation or the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The
absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the sexual act will
not mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.xlix[49]
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn
was only eleven years of age at the time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof
of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances of
accused-appellant, was of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with
eleven year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to accused-appellant's civil liability, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court
for each count of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 should be increased
from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.l[50] On the other hand, the award of the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages for each count of statutory rape was correct.
In People v. Lor,li[51] citing the cases of People v. Victor,lii[52] and People v. Gementiza,liii[53]
we held that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other
proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. Said
civil indemnity is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by
the court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion.liv[54] Hence, accused-appellant should be
ordered to pay the offended party another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape
and acts of lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, is AFFIRMED. Likewise, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989,
96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
acts of lasciviousness in six counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified,
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the
indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the additional
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness. Finally, the award of moral damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness is
increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G.

JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1[1] is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply
to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon
to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative
privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of
House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular will
cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or
interest not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to
taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by
the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their
voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend
sessions of the U.S. Congress.
1

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof

and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the
duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions
when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty
to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is
to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office,
by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress,
and in going to and returning from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from

arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to
and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within
carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to
wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to
the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a
recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its
failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The
requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been
removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend sessions
is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but
a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties,
as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2[2], which states, inter
alia, that

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason
of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted
ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising
from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive
suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and
warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3[3] it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After
conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. 4[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office
cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if
permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he fled
and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives
for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it
is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is
invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would
be a mockery of the aims of the States penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons, to wit:

3
4

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the

Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend
him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist
in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center,
Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case,
accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises,
to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the
purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting
mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was
assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going
to and from the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed
to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court
in Martinez v. Morfe:5[5]
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by
policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
5

Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them

to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the
dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense,
they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be
treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public
interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear
that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer
that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the
Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an
obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course
is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each
and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of
the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to
respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied
with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House
of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214,
North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] interdepartment coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration
Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents."
Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills
and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his
mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints
upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should
not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to
perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional
equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws."6[6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7[7] The organs of government may
not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate
of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on
the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling
under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. 8[8]
6
7
8

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.10[10]
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a
person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. 11[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the
accused.12[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any
prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his
own pleasure and will.13[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will
depriving him of his power of locomotion14[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss
of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior
barrier."15[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individuals status in society.16[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job
of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to
provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.17[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants claim
that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the
police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

17

i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
xii
xiii
xiv
xv
xvi
xvii
xviii
xix

xx
xxi
xxii
xxiii
xxiv
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
xxviii
xxix
xxx
xxxi
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxv
xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviii

xxxix
xl
xli
xlii
xliii
xliv
xlv
xlvi
xlvii
xlviii
xlix
l
li
lii
liii
liv