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2d 59
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance
in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), Tenth Circuit R.
10(e). The cause is therefore submitted without oral argument.
The issue in this case is whether the decision of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services that the plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial
evidence.
Plaintiff filed claims for disability benefits in 1979 and 1980 alleging that she
was unable to work due to arthritis. Her claims were denied. At plaintiff's
request, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge who determined,
on the basis of the evidence presented and his observations of the plaintiff, that
she was disabled. The administrative law judge held further hearings after the
Appeals Council remanded the case because of an error of law, and again
determined that plaintiff was entitled to disability benefits commencing
November 11, 1977. The Appeals Council rejected the recommended decision.
Although the council found that plaintiff suffers from arthritis, hypertension
and obesity, it found these conditions not to be disabling. The district court
affirmed.
4
Plaintiff's primary complaint is one of disabling pain due to her arthritis. The
Appeals Council, stating that pain is not disabling unless "clinical and
laboratory data" establish findings that may reasonably account for the pain,
rejected plaintiff's allegations. Record, vol. 2, at 11. The Council found that
"the limited findings regarding [plaintiff's] arthritic condition ... fail to
substantiate her allegations of totally disabling pain." Id. In reaching its
conclusion, the Council focused exclusively on the objective results of
diagnostic tests, including the degree to which plaintiff could bend and flex and
the degree of thinning of joint space as demonstrated by the X-rays. In ignoring
the subjective element of pain, even if unsubstantiated by objective medical
evidence, the Council abused its discretion. Celebreeze v. Warren, 339 F.2d
833 (10th Cir.1964). Subjective pain must be evaluated with due consideration
for credibility, motivation, and medical evidence. Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d
In the present case, the allegations of pain are supported by medical evidence.
Arthritis is known to be a painful disorder. Plaintiff's treating physician and one
of the defendant's consulting physicians concluded that plaintiff is totally
disabled by arthritic pain.* Dr. Rosenbaum, who has treated the plaintiff since
1976, reported that she suffers from loss of lumbo-sacral flexion, marked
restriction in cervical rotation and generalized pain due to her arthritis. He
concluded that she is unable to perform any meaningful work and that her
disability is permanent. Dr. Scialla, who examined the plaintiff for the
defendant in 1978, agreed that she suffers from arthritis and concluded that "it
would be very difficult for her to perform productive work on an eight hour
basis even at a sedentary level." Record, vol. 2, at 185.
10
The administrative law judge, who saw the plaintiff and heard her testimony,
found her complaints of pain to be credible and recommended that she be
granted disability benefits. While the administrative law judge's determination
of credibility is not binding on the Council, it is a factor which must be
considered in determining whether the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. As the Supreme Court has stated, "evidence supporting a conclusion
Neither Dr. Rosenbaum nor Dr. Scialla explicitly stated that plaintiff is disabled
by pain caused by arthritis. However, since plaintiff's complaint to them was
one of pain, their determinations of disability implicitly include determinations
of disabling pain