HEVINA S.

DASHWOOD

Inequality, leadership,
and the crisis in
Zimbabwe
IN A 1997 ARTICLE CO-AUTHORED with Cranford Pratt, we noted the
importance of the leadership in explaining how Zimbabwe (and
Tanzania) had been able to avoid a descent into military dictatorship or
civil war.' In that article, I pointed to the importance of Mugabe's policy of reconciliation towards whites in the uncertain period after 1980,
when the liberation struggle for black-majority rule ended. However,
given the economic power of whites in the economy, the policy of reconciliation has translated into whites maintaining their economic
dominance so that the gross inequalities in income and opportunity
inherited from the colonial past have persisted.
The implementation after 1990 of market-based reforms through
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) reinforced
structural inequalities by ignoring the centrality of land redistribution

As of I July 2002, Assistant Professor,Department ofPolitics,Brock University; authorof

numerous articlesand a book on Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of
Transformation). My current research,finded by SSHRC, is on corporatesocial responsibility
andits implicationsfr developing countries.I would like to express my huge intellectualdebt to
CranfordPratt,notjustfor his guidancein writing this article,but alsofor his largerrole infurtheringmy academic career, includinghis centralrol on my dissertationcommittee.
1 Hevina S.Dashwood and Cranford Pratt, 'Leadership, participation and conflict

management: Zimbabwe and Tanzania,' in Robert O. Matthews and Taisier Ali, Civil
Wars in Africa (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1999), 22454.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Spring 2002

Hevina S. Dashwood

to rural development and poverty alleviation. 2 Pratt and I therefore

concluded that: 'unless Zimbabwe experiences remarkable rates of economic growth, there is every likelihood that at some point powerful
opposition forces will challenge the government on its economic and
3
social welfare policies ... and thereby generate increased repression.'
There is no question that Mugabe's leadership - and his resort to violence before and after the March 2002 presidential elections - is a central factor in explaining Zimbabwe's current political and economic
crisis. Decisions such as the unbudgeted payouts to the war veterans,
the military intervention into the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), the resort to violence prior to the 2000 general elections, and
the progressive deterioration in the rule of law prior to the presidential
elections are all attributable to Mugabe and his military supporters.
However, the tendency to reduce all of Zimbabwe's problems to the
role of Mugabe and the decisions he has made seriously over-simplifies
the current deep-seated problems. While most international attention
on Zimbabwe is directed to the political situation, especially the
manipulation of the electoral system in the run-up to the presidential
elections, and the escalating human rights abuses, relatively less attention is paid to the inherited inequalities in land and income distribution as a contributing factor.'
Most critical of these is the highly inequitable distribution of land
ownership, where a white minority owns the largest share of the most
arable land. In seeking to resolve these problems, the government
attempted to respond to contradictory domestic and international
pressures, which often pulled it in different directions. The domestic
succession crisis, poor international leadership, and socio-economic
inequalities all need to be factored into a convincing explanation of
Zimbabwe's crisis. Mugabe's removal, whether sooner or later, will not
solve the country's problems.

loss of the ruling elite's earlier commitment to the welfare of the poor majority
was a further factor. See, Dashwood, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of
Transformation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2000).
2 The

3 Dashwood and Pratt, 'Leadership, participation and conflict management,' 245-6.

4 For an example of an analysis that reduces everything to Mugabe's leadership,
see Robert Rotberg, 'Africa's mess, Mugabe's mayhem,' Foreign Affairs
79(September/October 2000), 47-61. See also Martin Meredith, Robert Mugabe
and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: Public Affairs 2002).

210

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC PRESSURES

From a short-term perspective, it might be understandable for an outside observer to conclude that the current lawlessness in Zimbabwe,
including land invasions of white-owned commercial farms, is directly
attributable to Mugabe's desire to stay in power. While this assessment
would be correct, it over-simplifies the situation, and ignores the need
to separate the issue of Mugabe's succession from the long-simmering
issue of equitable land reform. The two issues are entangled, though
separable, and are all the more complex because of the involvement of
external donors in land reform.
Contradictory societal pressures in a context of economic decline
meant that, from the late 1980s, the government has faced very difficult governance challenges.5 Although the government was still officially responding to the needs of the poor through land reform and
other social measures, it was facing strong pressure from middle class
blacks who wanted to play a greater role in the economy. Demands for
policies supporting black advancement or indigenization grew
stronger after the implementation of ESAP in the early 1990s, when it
quickly became apparent that the main beneficiaries of the reforms
were the mostly white economic elites who dominated the mining,
manufacturing, and commercial agricultural sectors.
After 1990, a number of groups promoting black empowerment
were formed, including the Indigenous Business Development Centre
(IBDC) and the Indigenous Business Women's Organization (IBWO).
These groups were interested in promoting a black bourgeois class, not
in income distribution or in lifting the black majority out of poverty.
Faced with well-connected and well-organized demands for more generous credit schemes to promote black entrepreneurs, the government
responded by diverting scarce resources to this group.
The introduction of the Commercial Farm Resettlement
Programme in the mid-1990s was a highly controversial example of
the government bowing to the demands of the better-off in society.
Faced with arguments from the Indigenous Commercial Farmers
Union (ICFU) that the government's original resettlement programme
merely perpetuated subsistence farming, the Commercial Farm
Resettlement Programme entailed leasing entire large-scale farms to
5 For more details, see Dashwood, 'Social welfarism, poverty alleviation and political stability in Zimbabwe,' Canadian Journal ofDevelopment Studies 2o(no 3,1999),
567-92.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring 2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

211

Hevina S. Dashwood

blacks for commercial farming. That many members of the ruling elite
were direct beneficiaries of the programme only highlighted their own
interest in responding to demands for indigenization. 6The scheme distracted the government away from the original redistributive goals of
land reform, and it entailed a serious diversion of resources away from
the resettlement of deserving farmers in the communal areas.
A further concern surrounding the government's land reform programme is that, in the early 1990s, the original criterion for deciding
who should be given land shifted from social need to economic efficiency. Faced with questionable evidence that existing resettlement
schemes had failed, pressure emerged to distribute land to proven
farmers, rather then to landless peasants, the rural unemployed, and
war veterans who had fought in the liberation struggle. The argument
that the resettlement areas (RAs) were just as impoverished as the communal areas (CAs) led the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU) to insist
that only farmers who had succeeded in the CAs should be chosen for
resettlement. Although ZFU ostensibly represented all CA farmers, it
tended to represent the interests of the better-off farmers, those who
had managed to produce a surplus for the market. This constituency,
which account for approximately 20 per cent of all CA farmers, or
roughly 100,000 farmers, would very quickly have soaked up a large
portion of any land available for redistribution (even under the current
process).
The effect of this shift in orientation towards proven farmers was
similar to that of the Commercial Farm Resettlement Scheme; it
siphoned off already very limited resources to the better-off segments
of society. The Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), which represented
the mostly white commercial farmers, was happy to see the resulting
near paralysis in the efforts at land reform and actively tried to obstruct
the government's efforts to acquire more land for redistribution.
The majority of peasant farmers had no effective representation. It
was, therefore, left to a more powerful group, the Zimbabwe National
Liberation War Veterans Association, to confront Mugabe in August
1997 on his government's land reform policies. As supposed beneficiaries of the land reform programme, they were specifically concerned
about the lack of progress on land redistribution and the way in which
6 For an excellent account of these diverse pressures, see B. Ikubolajeh Logan and
Daniel Tevera, 'Neoliberalism, regime survival, and the environment: economic
reform and agricultural transformation in Zimbabwe in the 199os,' Canadian Journal
ofAfrican Studies 35(no 1, 2001), 99-138.

212

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

it had been captured by black political and economic elites. A wellorganized and powerful group, with members still active in the army
and police forces, they demanded that 20 per cent of all land earmarked for redistribution should go to war veterans. Faced with the
prospect of a bloodless coup, Mugabe gave in; in addition to the
promise of land, he offered the war vets a ZWD 50,000 lump-sum pension and a ZWD 2,000 monthly allowance.
The immediate impetus behind the war veterans' show-down with
Mugabe was the discovery earlier in 1997 that billions of dollars had
been looted from the War Victim's Compensation Fund by members
of the ruling and military elite. Many war veterans not lucky enough to
be in the army or the police were quite destitute, and news of this latest example of corruption proved to be the last straw. Although they
initially promoted their own interests, the war vets soon emerged as
self-proclaimed champions of subsistence farmers in the CAs.
The war vets appealed to those elements within Mugabe's
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party
who supported a more radical and fast-paced land reform programme.
Their demands provided the back-drop for the government's
announcement in November 1997 that it planned to designate 1,471
commercial farms for compulsory acquisition. Incidents of land invasions by peasant farmers began to be reported early in 1998. At that
time, it was actually some ZANU-PF members of parliament from rural
constituencies who were instigating the squatting. Aware that the government's record on land reform was testing the patience of their peasant supporters, the members were prepared to add their pressure for
the government to move more quickly on land reform.
In short, Mugabe was facing pressure from the war vets and some
members of his own party to push the land reform agenda faster and in
a more radical form. At that time, the government did not yet appear
to be aware of the extent of its unpopularity. Obviously, in a country in
which elections are won or lost in the rural areas, politicians were concerned about the effect of the lack of progress over land reform on their
popularity. But the issue of land reform was not directly linked to the
electoral survival of Mugabe (and ZANU) until 1999.
In the late 1990s, a diverse group of opposition forces began to coalesce around a variety of issues. Based initially in the urban areas, these
opposition forces were not primarily concerned with the failure of the
government to make reasonable progress on land redistribution.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

213

Hevina S. Dashwood

Rather, the opposition consisted of urban workers and middle-class

professionals concerned about their declining standard of living in the
face of economic deterioration and other disaffected groups (including
whites) upset with the government's economic mismanagement. This
largely urban-based opposition, then, was not particularly concerned
with the welfare of the very poor in the rural areas.
The emergence of popular opposition nicely illustrates the difficult
policy dilemmas that confronted the government. Trapped by the
unwillingness of the major donors to finance Mugabe's promise to the
war vets, the government sought to pass a 'war veterans' levy through
parliament, which would have entailed tax increases for workers. The
working poor, who felt that they had already suffered enough with the
introduction of market-based reforms, took part in December 1997 in
mass demonstrations against the government. This and subsequent
demonstrations were organized by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU), which became the organizational nucleus in
September 1999 of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
Initially, the ZCrU positioned itself in opposition to the government
because of concerns over the excessive tax burden on the working poor,
including the war vets levy, and because of hardships endured after the
implementation of ESAP. Increasingly, however, the ZCTU, under the
leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, confronted larger concerns about the
government's overall mismanagement of the economy. This paved the
way for an eventual alliance between an organization representing
workers and other more privileged groups in society, including white
commercial farmers and the business class. It is not certain if the
alliance would have been possible were it not for the enormous
unpopularity of the ruling party and its president.
Many of the more privileged members of the MDC were also members of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). Established in
1998 to help draft a new constitution for the country, its members
were mostly professionals, such as lawyers. However, the ZCTU was also
a member, as were other non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
interested in re-writing the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979.
When, after extensive national consultations, it emerged that many
Zimbabweans thought that the president's power should be curtailed,
the government responded by creating its own Constitutional
Commission, which put its draft constitution before a national referendum in February 2000.

214

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring 2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

The narrow defeat of the government's constitution proved to be the

turning point in the political situation. Confronted with clear and tangible evidence that ZANU-PF was enormously unpopular, it became
clear to the government that it would have to take drastic steps if it
hoped to win the general elections slated for June 2000. From this
point forward, the fortunes of ZANU-PF and of Mugabe would be intertwined with the issue of land reform. After the February referendum,
both acts of politically inspired violence and the incidence of land
invasions accelerated rapidly. The government was especially angry
when it realized that white commercial farmers were supporting the
MDC, but it also became clear that demonstrating a strong commitment to rapid land reform was the government's best chance of winning over the crucial rural areas. When that alone was not enough,
ZANU-PF and its supporters willingly used fear and intimidation.
The MDC's threat to ZANU-PF was evident in the June 2000 elections,
when it won 47 of the 120 contested seats. That success revealed the
ability of the MDC to appeal not just to urban workers and economic
elites, but also to urban and rural professionals, farm workers, students, and rural communities in areas where ZANU-PF has for long been
in trouble - Matabeleland, Manicaland and Masvingo. The troubles
there stem partly from the fact that Matabeland is populated by the
Ndebele, who have not forgotten the atrocities committed by the army
in the mid-1980s. ZANU-PF's problems in those areas also stem from
the fact that there are serious divisions within the ruling party, which
have been played out especially in Manicaland and Masvingo.
Precisely because the MDC represents such a diverse group of people,
it is not at all clear that even if its presidential candidate, Morgan
Tsvangirai, had been victorious in the elections in March 2002 that
would have easily translated into a coherent policy platform. In short, a
new leader, even under the best of circumstances, would encounter huge
difficulties in reconciling the contradictory pressures exerted on the government. Most significantly, with many supporters amongst white commercial farmers and businesses, the extent of the MDC's commitment to
even moderate land redistribution can be questioned. Already, tensions
exist among members of the MDC about the pace and form of land
reform. Since the MDC is in opposition, such tensions have stayed below
the surface, but the contradictions would quickly become apparent if
the MDC were ever able to form a government. Tragically, regardless of
the election results, Zimbabwe could soon be engulfed in civil war.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

215

Hevina S. Dashwood

THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES:

THE IFIs AND MAJOR DONORS

There were numerous opportunities during the 1990s for the donor
community to take on a greater leadership role with respect to land
redistribution.7 Britain, which is mainly responsible for funding land
reform, was reluctant to provide further financing unless the programme was consistent with market principles. The government, on
the other hand, was moving away from market principles, through, for
example, compulsory acquisition of large-scale farms. Since the other
major donors followed Britain's lead, no foreign capital was forthcoming to finance land reform.
The unhelpful role of the international financial institutions (IFIs)
cannot be ignored. There were serious flaws in the design of ESAP
(1991-5), the most significant of which was the failure to incorporate
rural development, including land redistribution, as a necessary and
integral part of the structural adjustment exercise. The error of not
supporting land redistribution was acknowledged by the World Bank
in its own evaluation of the first phase of structural adjustment.
Although the IFIs claimed that they were committed to land redistribution, no resources were earmarked for that purpose. Since the government was asked to reduce its budget deficit substantially, it was
faced with serious resource constraints, which allowed it to allocate
only small amounts to land redistribution. By ignoring the centrality
of land redistribution to rural development and poverty alleviation,
ESAP failed to address a fundamental structural impediment to equitable growth in Zimbabwe. Instead, it helped to reinforce the politically, socially, economically, and morally unsustainable status quo.
The introduction of ESAP has added legitimacy to voices that argue
that blacks should be able to engage in commercial farming instead of
being relegated to 'peasant' production in the communal and resettlement areas. Thus, not only has structural adjustment benefited white
owners of capital, it has also helped a black elite more interested in
large-scale commercial farming than redistribution. The vision of the
large-scale commercial farming sector as essential to the maintenance

7 This section draws on Dashwood, 'Zimbabwe and sustainable peacebuilding,' in

Robert O. Matthews and Taisier Ali, eds, Peacebuilding in Africa (forthcoming;
Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
8 World Bank, Performance Audit Report: Zimbabwe - StructuralAdjustment
Program (Washington DC: World Bank, 30 June 1995), 33.

216

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring 2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

of agricultural productivity and for foreign exchange earnings has been

perpetuated by both blacks and whites with a vested interest in largescale commercial farming.'
However, a 1991 World Bank report established that less than 50
per cent of net prime agricultural arable lands in the commercial farming sector were adequately utilized." Based on its findings, the Bank
concluded that the commercial farming sector could supply 3.5m
hectares of its current 11.2m hectares for redistribution without risking present levels of production. The Bank's report indicated, however,
a preference for land to be transferred through market forces, rather
than government intervention (which, of course, would have the effect
of maintaining the status quo). In 1992, the Bank offered to support
land redistribution, but it favoured market principles, together with
rules favouring subdivision, over compulsory acquisition.
The government, which had decided it was necessary to move in the
direction of compulsory land acquisition, was not receptive to the
Bank's proposals. In 1992, the government introduced the Land
Acquisition Act, which allowed compulsory acquisition of land that
was under utilized or derelict, and provided for compensation to commercial farmers. Yet, the act was widely condemned by white farmers,
whose legal challenges prevented the government from making much
progress on land redistribution. White farmers have been slow to
accept the need for land redistribution, changing their stance only after
the 1997 land designation exercise and the commencement of squatting in 1998. An important window of opportunity between 1992 and
1997, when the government was still prepared to respect property
rights and pay compensation, was therefore lost by white farmers and
the international community.
The key donor with historic responsibility for land reform, Britain,
had serious reservations about the first phase of land reform. Even
though most of the money promised in 1981 was used up by 1988,
Britain refused to contemplate further funding until the first loan
phase came formally to an end, in 1996. Britain's concerns about land
redistribution are centred round three main issues: a concern that land
9 Sam Moyo, 'The political economy of land acquisition and redistribution in
Zimbabwe, 199o-1999,' Journalof Southern African Studies 26(March

2000), 5-28

io World Bank, Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Memorandum, Southern Africa

Department, Agricultural Operations Division, Report No 9429, (Washington DC:
World Bank 1991).
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Spring 2002

217

Hevina S. Dashwood

redistribution be squarely focused on poverty alleviation; strong opposition to the Commercial Farm Resettlement Programme, which has
benefited the black elite; and an insistence that land redistribution
respect market principles, a concern shared by the other donors."
In preparation for the second phase of land redistribution in 1998,
the government produced a major planning document, the Land
Reform and Resettlement Programme, Phase II (LRRP-II).' 2 A major
donors' conference was held from 9-11 September 1998, but was
clouded by the government's earlier decision to intervene in the
Congo. Furthermore, in consultations prior to the conference, the
donors had signalled serious reservations about the LRRP-II. The LRRPII document reflected a serious effort to respond to the deficiencies
identified in earlier resettlement efforts, by providing, for example, for
the right of private tenure over resettled land. However, the donors
objected to the top-down, centrally administered features of the programme, which they thought would make it inefficient and unsustainable. Donors favoured a bottom-up, community-driven approach that
was consistent with market principles. While donors were prepared to
support the need for land redistribution in principle, the consultations
leading up to the conference revealed serious disagreements between
the government and the donors over the process by which land redistribution should proceed.
At the donor conference, it appeared that a compromise had been
reached in a 24-month 'Inception Phase,' to be implemented immediately. The objective of the inception phase was to test 'complementary
approaches' preferred by the donors; a bottom-up, community driven,
market-friendly approach to land reform. The intention was that current government resettlement models should be implemented alongside alternative beneficiary-initiated models.' 3 Among the principles
agreed to were that the programme should be implemented in a transparent, fair, and sustainable manner.
The communiqu6 issued after the conference called for the 'immediate implementation of resettlement, beginning with the 118 farms
11 United Kingdom, Department of International Development, Land Resettlement

in Zimbabwe: Background Briefing

(2000).

Government of Zimbabwe, Land Reform and Resettlement Programme: Phase II

(Harare: September 1998).
12

13 Communique, issued by the government of Zimbabwe and donors attending the

Donors Conference on Land Reform, Harare, September 1998.
218

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring 2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

on offer,' a reference to farms voluntarily offered to the government,

including those not contested from the 1997 designation exercise. 4
The government understood this to mean that the donors would fund
the acquisition of those farms. However, the only pledge made at the
conference was that of the World Bank, which pledged us$5m to support the market-friendly, complementary approaches to land reform.
The failure of the other donors to pledge money left the government
with the impression that the donors were not serious about funding
land redistribution.
For their part, the donors believed that the government had undertaken not to confiscate farms. However, in November 1998, after the
one-year limitation period was over, the government moved to acquire
the 800 farms remaining on the original 1997 designation list. This
gready soured relations with donors and effectively stalled the inception phase process. The process was also hindered by the fact that the
Commercial Farmers' Union failed to hold up its end of the bargain.
Both the government and donors were led to believe that the CFU
would voluntarily offer land for redistribution. However, the CFU,
sensing the lack of donor support for the LRRP-II, took a wait and see
attitude and thus was thought to have been bargaining in bad faith.
After the donors' conference, the government launched an extensive
consultation process with stakeholders, donors, NGOs, and land reform
experts to prepare the planning document for the inception phase. The
Inception Phase Framework Plan was released in March 1999."5
However, it was not until November 1999 that aTechnical Support Unit
(TSU), which was meant to be a one-stop co-ordinating unit for land
reform, was set up. The slow pace reflected serious divisions within the
government over how to proceed and infighting over who should staff
the TSU and where it should be located. The donors were also slow to
respond to the publication of the inception phase document. In March
1999, the European Union (EU) urged Britain to make a commitment to
the government's programme, but it failed to do so."' Without British
support, no other donor was prepared to fund the inception phase, and
the CFU failed to offer land in support of the programme.
14 Ibid.
15 Government of Zimbabwe, Inception Phase Framework Plan:
March 1999).

1999-2000

(Harare:

16 Confidential interview with representative of the European Union to Zimbabwe,

Harare, August 2000.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

219

Hevina S. Dashwood

Without outside financing to compensate commercial farmers

whose land had been designated for acquisition, the government was
faced with the politically untenable options of not moving forward in
a substantive way on land redistributions or of moving forward but
with the implication that it could not afford to compensate commercial farmers. The government chose the latter option, and the stage was
set for a more radical process of land redistribution.
By the time the TSU was set up in November 1999, the government
had taken a stronger stance on land reform. At about the same time,
the government released its version of the draft constitution, in which
it revealed its intention to confiscate farms without compensation,
using the argument that compensation was Britain's responsibility. The
number of land invasions continued to increase in 1999, but it was not
until after the results of the February 2000 referendum that a systematic, government-organized campaign of land invasions began.
When the invasions turned violent in mid-March, the IFIs and
donors adopted a highly co-ordinated stance towards the government.
By July 2000, all the donors had frozen new funding to the
Zimbabwean government. There had not been the same degree of coordination at the 1998 donors conference, despite appearances. It is
true that Britain had decided even before the conference that it would
not support the government's LRRP-II. It is also true that Britain
indulged in some arm-twisting of the EU mission's more progressive
members, including Denmark and Sweden. The EU role has diminished the possibility for 'like-minded' middle powers, including
Canada, to take a more progressive stance.' 7To the annoyance of other
donors, the World Bank broke ranks by pledging $5m, the maximum
allowed without having to obtain permission from its board.
After the land invasions turned violent, the donors coalesced
around a single position. All donors, including the Bank, have frozen
all funding to the government, in light of the murders and land invasions. The donors are also not supporting any NGOs, including private
policy institutes that appear to support the government. The donors
formulated two minimum conditions that have to be met before any
funding will be restored: the restoration of law and order and a return
to macro-economic stability, including a shadow programme with
the IMF that would monitor the government's progress in meeting
17 Interview with Kathryn Dunlop, Canadian high commissioner to Zimbabwe,

Harare, August 2000.

220

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring 2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

specified economic targets before more substantial funding would be

forthcoming. There is some variation amongst the donors in terms of
whether other issues, such as the intervention in the Congo, should be
linked to the restoration of funding.
The position of the donors during the 1990s, and particularly since
2000, reveals an ideologically based preference for the market-driven
process. Yet past experience reveals that the market has thrown up only
marginal lands for redistribution, which goes a long way in explaining
why the first phase of land reform was not uniformly successful."' To
support their claim that the government should not be directly
involved in the programme, the donors have exaggerated the shortcomings of the first phase.' 9 Furthermore, it is unclear precisely which
communities the donors would place their faith in. As research on
poverty alleviation projects that rely on local-level initiatives has
revealed, it tends to be the better-off in communities, such as teachers
and others with salaried jobs, successful farmers, political leaders,
including 'traditional' leaders and local council members, who are best
placed to devise plans for projects intended to alleviate poverty.
The fixation of donors on the need to protect private property rights
of the commercial farmers also reveals a privileging of civil and political liberties over the right to subsistence. In the cries for a return to law
and order, there has been absolute silence on the right of very poor
Zimbabweans to subsistence.2" Nor does there appear to be any concession to the idea that if the 'rule of law' supports an unjust distribution of land that denies the right to subsistence of a substantial number of Zimbabweans, they may well be justified in challenging those
property rights.
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL
RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS

The role that donors played in exacerbating the already volatile situation over land reform was eclipsed by the on-going political violence
18 Moyo, 'The political economy of land acquisition.'
19 Claims that the first phase of land reform was unsuccessful depend, in part, on

the criteria used to define 'success.' See Bill H. Kinsey, 'Land reform, growth and
equity: emerging evidence from Zimbabwe's resettlement programme,'Journal of
Southern African Studies 250une 1999), 173-96.
2o For a classic elaboration of the importance of attaching equal weight to both
subsistence rights and the right to physical security, see Henry Shue, Basic Rights,
Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton NI: Princeton University
Press 1981).

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Spring2002

221

Hevina S. Dashwood

and deterioration in civil liberties that marked the run-up to the presidential elections held on 9 and 10 March 2002. International and
regional responses shifted from an initial concern over the 'Fast Track
Land Reform Programme' initiated after the June 2000 general elections to alarm over the widespread and systematic human rights abuses perpetrated in the run-up to those elections.
At the same time, a human tragedy is unfolding, as disruptions to
agricultural production brought about by the land invasions and the
serious deterioration in the economy as a whole have left many
Zimbabweans struggling to survive. In the vulnerable rural areas of
Matabeleland and Masvingo especially, hundreds of thousands of
Zimbabweans are now reported to be starving.2' Efforts by humanitarian agencies to provide food relief are being thwarted by the government, which fears that the opposition will take political advantage of
such deliveries.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE

South Africa has played a critical mediatory role at both the regional
and international levels in handling the political and economic crisis in
Zimbabwe. The president of South African, Thabo Mbeki, has been
actively seeking in diplomatic corridors to mediate between the conflicting interests over Zimbabwe. Initially, he attempted to pursue a
policy of quiet diplomacy in dealing with Mugabe. For his efforts, he
was roundly criticized, and a split was created within his government
over the issue.22
On a visit to Zimbabwe in August 2000, Mbeki privately appealed
to Mugabe to end the violence and lawlessness surrounding land invasions. He seemed to have left with the impression that his private
appeals had some impact, as he stated to the press that he was confident Mugabe would address the situation.P Instead, Mugabe stepped
up the invasions."4

United Nations, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 'WFP

emergency
operation delayed' (South Africa: United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 3 January 2002).
21

22 'Zimbabwe crisis splits South Africa's ruling ANC,'

Financial Gazette (Harare),

25

May 2000.
23 'Mugabe says war vets to be removed from farms,' ibid, 3 August 2000.
24 'Mugabe misleads Mbeki,' Zimbabwe Independent (Harare), 4 August 2000.

222

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

In response to criticisms of his 'soft' approach, and perhaps emboldened by the public attack on Zimbabwe the United States secretary of
state, Colin Powell, made when he was on South African soil in May
2001, Mbeki has openly raised the issue of the illegality surrounding
the land invasions. Yet, for economic and political reasons, South
Africa must tread carefully in how it handles the situation.
Of all the countries in the region, South Africa stands to lose the most
should Zimbabwe descend into chaos. For historic reasons, there is a significant amount of trade between the two countries. In 1964, when
Rhodesia was about to issue a unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI), a Preferential Trade Agreement was signed with South Africa.
During the UDI years, as a counter to international sanctions, Rhodesia
built up a substantial manufacturing base, and South Africa was the
major market. In turn, Zimbabwe is South Africa's largest regional market for its exports. Annual cross-border trade is valued at us$1.3 billion.25
From an economic standpoint, the importance to South Africa of
Zimbabwe as an export market reduces its leverage in negotiations
with Mugabe. When Zimbabwe could no longer afford to pay its fuel
and electricity bills, South Africa quietly began to pay them because it
does not want to see the complete collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. Nor is it anxious to encounter Zimbabwean refugees should the
food crisis render people desperate. The presence of Zimbabweans in
South Africa is a sensitive issue; the perception among locals is that
Zimbabweans take jobs when unemployment in South African is
already high. For decades, educated Zimbabweans have sought the
greater economic opportunities that (even apartheid) South Africa
could provide. Any significant influx of refugees could create political
difficulties for the South African government.
The main explanation for South Africa's careful approach, however,
relates to its own land problem. As in Zimbabwe, the pattern of land
ownership is skewed in favour of whites. The issue of equitable land
ownership is a politically sensitive one in South Africa, and there is
substantial support amongst poor blacks for the invasions of farms in
Zimbabwe.
South Africa has taken a different approach to its land problem then
Zimbabwe, preferring a process of land restitution, under which people
who can prove that land was taken from them by whites can seek restitution. This process has so slow that only a small number of claims have
25 'South Africa's anxious eyes on Zimbabwe,' Economist, 15 April 2000, 39.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring 2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

223

Hevina S. Dashwood

been processed. (Successful claimants might merely receive financial

compensation, rather then getting their land back.) Mbeki must therefore be sensitive to his own country's political and economic realities.
Mbeki has made some progress in persuading the donor community
that it would serve South Africa's interests, as much as Zimbabwe's, to
bring about a resolution to the land crisis in Zimbabwe. Mbeki worked
hard to broker a breakthrough in British-Zimbabwe relations, as diplomatic relations have become severely strained." In September 2001, he
seemed to have succeeded when his efforts in the Commonwealth
resulted in an important agreement between Zimbabwe and Britain
during a Commonwealth ministers meeting in Abuja, Nigeria.
Signed on 6 September, the Abuja agreement appeared to offer a
compromise between Britain and Zimbabwe and held out the promise
that the tensions in Zimbabwe would not spill over into the southern
African region. The agreement appropriately noted that: 'Land is at the
core of the crisis in Zimbabwe and cannot be separated from other
issues of concern to the Commonwealth such as the rule of law, respect
for human rights, democracy and the economy.' 27 It called upon the
government of Zimbabwe to halt land invasions and to carry out land
reform in accordance with the law and constitution of Zimbabwe. At
the meeting, Britain reaffirmed its commitment to make a significant
financial contribution to land reform and to encourage other international donors to do the same.
As with the 1998 donor conference, however, it quickly became
apparent that the British government was not prepared to move forward in mobilizing donor support for land reform. 28 The government of
Zimbabwe, for its part, remained suspicious of British intentions and
did not appear to take any concrete steps to stop the land invasions.
Finally, the United Nations Development Programme, which was mandated to hold discussions on a land reform programme, indicated that
it would not be possible to move forward unless the government abandoned the fast track land reform process. In an atmosphere lacking in
trust and confidence in the other side's sincerity, it quickly became
apparent that the loosely worded Abuja agreement would not succeed.
26 Dumisani Muleya, 'Mugabe tones down rhetoric,' Zimbabwe Independent, 15
June 2001.
27

Commonwealth, Text of theAbuja Agreement on Zimbabwe (Abuia: 6 September

2001).
28

224

Munyaradzi Huni, 'Abuja: UK drags feet,' Sunday Mail (Harare), 14 October 2001.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

Inequality and leadership in Zimbabwe

The continuing deterioration in Zimbabwe's political situation,

involving repeated efforts by the ruling party to curtail the ability of
the opposition to compete in free and fair elections, made it possible
for South Africa to come out more firmly in condemnation of
Zimbabwe. By focusing on human rights atrocities and attacks on
opposition members, rather then on the issue of land invasions, by
December 2001, Mbeki was able to make a forceful appeal to the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the
Commonwealth to punish Zimbabwe if it did not take steps to ensure
that free and fair elections took place.2 9 Still, Mbeki continued to avoid
a public condemnation of Mugabe, even after clear evidence of electoral fraud was forthcoming. SADC, however, remains divided on how
to deal with Zimbabwe; Malawi and Mozambique sided with South
Africa in favour of public condemnation, and Namibia and Angola
(Zimbabwe's allies in the DRC) opposed such a move. Meanwhile, the
opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, called upon the international
community to impose sanctions to punish the leadership.
A number of countries subsequently imposed 'smart' sanctions,
which target the foreign assets of members of the ruling elite, but not
the economy as a whole. In the United States, the Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Act was signed into law by President
George W Bush, having easily cleared both Congress and the Senate.
The European Union moved ahead with sanctions after Zimbabwe
refused to accept the head of its observer mission team. Other countries, such as Canada, have followed suit in the face of evidence of electoral fraud during the presidential elections.
At the Commonwealth heads of government meeting on 30 January
2002, the issue of whether or not Zimbabwe should be suspended
from the Commonwealth was debated. Britain and Australia strongly
advocated suspending Zimbabwe, but African members resisted (with
Canada somewhere between these positions). During the March
Commonwealth meeting, Britain and Australia again forcefully argued
for Zimbabwe's immediate suspension. Once again, African members
were reluctant to take such a step until after the presidential elections."
In a compromise position endorsed by Canada, a decision on suspen29

Sandra Nyaira, 'Mbeki calls for more pressure on Mugabe,' Herald (Harare), 1

December

2001.

30 Itaya Musengeyi, 'African leaders attack Blair over Zimbabwe,' Herald, 4 March
2002.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

Spring 2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016

225

Hevina S. Dashwood

sion was deferred until after the elections, pending the report of the
Commonwealth observer team. In the face of compelling evidence
that massive electoral fraud and intimidation had occurred, as detailed
in the Commonwealth report, the decision was reached to suspend
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for one year.
CONCLUSION

In December 2001, Mbeki expressed in public his concern that, in the

absence of free and fair elections, Zimbabwe might descend into civil
strife. 3 ' His concerns are well-founded. However, it is not at all clear
that the military would have accepted the results if Tsvangirai had
clearly won. Furthermore, while the opposition has denounced any
resort to violence, it is unclear whether the leadership of the MDC
would be able to prevail, should its rank and file members decide to
resort to violence. In the immediate post-election period, violence has
been directed primarily at opposition supporters as retribution.
Mugabe is clearly moving quickly in an attempt to forestall the
prospect of violent opposition to his continued rule.
This very negative scenario points to the role of leadership and to
Mugabe's decision to contest the presidential elections as major contributing factors in the crisis. As was demonstrated, international leadership was also lacking at critical moments when it might have been
possible to move the much needed land reform programme forward.
Had the international community, in particular Britain, seriously
engaged with the Zimbabwean government over land reform, much of
the ammunition used by Mugabe in his campaign position that only
he is serious about delivery on land reform would have been denied
him. Instead, he was able to use with some credibility the issue of land
in order to influence the crucial rural vote.
The structural contradictions and policy dilemmas bedevilling the
ZANU-PF government will remain under any new government.
Although there would likely be much more international good will
(and financial support) under a new government, the land question
will not easily be resolved. Ultimately, the response of the people of
Zimbabwe will decide what the future holds for their country in the
aftermath of the presidential elections.

31 Staff Reporter, 'Mbeki warns Mugabe,' Daily News (Harare),

226

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

29

November 2001.

Spring2002

Downloaded from ijx.sagepub.com at MACALESTER COLLEGE LIBRARY on March 19, 2016