East Asia (2011) 28:175190

DOI 10.1007/s12140-010-9132-x

Decoding the Evolutionary Path of Chinese Foreign

Policy, 19492009: Assessments and Inferences
Jae Ho Chung

Received: 10 June 2010 / Accepted: 10 December 2010 / Published online: 5 January 2011
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Chinese foreign policy has made a grand transition during the post-Mao
reform era. Chinese foreign policy of the 21st century has become much more open
and pragmatic in its relations with the outside world, more extensive in its reach and
coverage, highly diversified in its functions and partners, more committed to
international norms than before, and much more sophisticated in its dealing with the
international community. Yet, the precise balance between the changes and
continuities is still quite difficult to gauge. Furthermore, despite crucial visible
changes, concerns and worries - even some fears - are discernible with regard to the
rise of China. In the last 60 years, Beijing has sought hard to sustain consistencies
(shizhong ruyi) in its foreign policy. Perhaps, that is the best clue the world has in
inferring the future trajectory of Chinese foreign policy.
Keywords Anti-hegemonism . Chinese foreign policy . Chinese military . Greatpower diplomacy . Multilateralism . Siege mentality . Soft power . US-China relations
With the ascent of China - almost to the verge of G-2 the world is closely watching
every move that Beijing makes. As China is fast filling in the vacuum created by the
implosion of the Soviet Union almost 20 years ago, Chinese foreign policy has
already begun to generate global impact in an increasing number of issue-areas
including global financial and monetary policy, energy, and climate change.
Daunting as it may seem, it is both timely and worthwhile to examine and assess
the 60 years of evolution in Chinese foreign policy since the founding of the
Peoples Republic in 1949.1

By evolution, it is meant to refer to adaptive and path-dependent processes based on both learning and
historical coincidence. Chinese foreign policy is thus considered here to have followed an evolutionary
path rather than that of sudden ruptures.
J. H. Chung (*)
Department of International Relations, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea
e-mail: cjhir@snu.ac.kr

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Foreign policy is composed of both words and deeds and there are always some
disparities between the two, thereby making it generally difficult for scholars and
analysts to derive useful inferences and implications. This study seeks to focus more
upon deeds (i.e., specific outcomes that can be empirically substantiated) in
identifying and assessing the evolutionary path of Chinese foreign policy since
behavior is a more important and meaningful predictor of Beijings external relations
than rhetoric.
This article consists of three sections. The first surveys the evolutionary path of
Chinese foreign policy for the last 60 years, which has largely revolved around the
memories of national humiliation and aspirations for a great-power status. The
second section provides assessments of the key changes in Chinese foreign policy in
both temporal (i.e., Maoist versus reform periods) and issue-area terms. The third
section, on the basis of the former two, derives some inferences as to the future
trajectory of Chinese foreign policy.

Sixty Years of Chinese Foreign Policy: Tracing the Evolutionary Path

The 60 years (19492009) of Chinas foreign policy can be divided into two periods:
(1) that of exclusive strategies (19491982); and (2) that of cumulative
strategies (19822009). As to the former, the exclusive strategies refer to the
fact that the core policy of the 1950s, allying with the Soviet Union to resist the
United States (yibiandao), was totally replaced by that of the 1960s, namely
opposing both the Soviet revisionism and American imperialism (fandui dixiufan).
During the 1970s, again, a new strategy of aligning with the United States to
counter the Soviet threat (yitiaoxian) replaced the policy of the 1960s. In sum, the
core strategies of China during these three decades were mutually exclusive in nature
[90, 94].
During this earlier period, Chinese foreign policy had revolved around the two
pillars of ideology and national security. While the ideological component of
Chinese foreign policy paled considerably during the 1970s, it is still difficult to
refute that Beijings external relations had been highly ideological and dogmatic
during the three decades of these exclusive strategies. More important than ideology
was, of course, Chinas preoccupation with sovereignty and national security.
Beijings separation with Moscow in the late 1950s had much to do with the
formers pursuit of autonomy from the latters directing. Chinas secluded
diplomacy (i.e., against both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) during the tumultuous
1960s, which many realists have found it rather difficult to explain, ended only when
the Chinese perceived threat of the Soviets far surpassed anything else ([43], p. 65).
Chinas clandestine efforts for rapprochement with the United States and the
surprise visits to China by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon in the early 1970s
were very much indicative of the extent to which Beijing became flexible as far as
national security was concerned [5, 88]. These dramatic episodes subsequently
paved way for the U.S. lifting of trade and investment bans on China, for Beijings
extensive educational exchanges with the West, and for Premier Zhou Enlais grand
scheme of four modernizations. While the long hiatus between these visits and the
Sino-American normalization in 1979 were caused by Taipeis effective lobbying, as

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well as by complex domestic political dynamics in both Beijing and Washington,

there is no doubt that these crucial events set the stage for a new era of Chinese
foreign policy.
Taking the 1979 watershed at its face value is perhaps too much of accepting
the official rhetoric uncritically. While certain principal changes had indeed
been introduced in the late 1970s particularly regarding foreign economic
relations and the designation of special economic zones more fundamental
transformations took place in 1982 when Beijing announced the so-called
independent and autonomous diplomacy (duli zizhu waijiao) toward the United
States and the Soviet Union. The backbone of this new policy line was that Beijing
was to pursue its foreign policy goals irrespective of power dynamics vis--vis the
great powers. As Hu Yaobang, then the General Secretary, commented at the
Twelfth Party Congress in 1982, China is willing to cooperate with any of the two
superpowers if they provide benefits in deeds rather than words ([30], p. 212,
[37], pp. 2223, [39], pp. 14753).
The reform era (19822009) thus far was that of cumulative strategies in the
sense that the core line of the earlier period was not supplanted by that of the later
period; rather, the latter was planted and grew on the basis of the former. That is to
say, the independent and autonomous diplomacy of the 1980s was not replaced by
the friendly neighbor diplomacy (mulin waijiao) of the 1990s adopted after the
Tiananmen tragedy. And the friendly neighbor diplomacy of the 1990s was further
complemented by the tenet of peaceful development (heping fazhan) of the 2000s.
Similarly, the most recent policy line of attaining a harmonious world (hexie
shijie) is in no contradiction with any of the earlier principles of post-Mao Chinese
diplomacy ([8, 38, 113], pp. 4347).
Lingering Historical Memories and Aspirations for a Great-Power Status
Considerable degrees of continuity from both the traditional era and the Maoist
period are embedded in Chinese foreign policy of today. If the most fundamental
ingredient of Chinese foreign policy can be said to be the constant search for
independence and autonomy, it undoubtedly reflects the lingering historical
memories of national humiliation since the Opium War and the deep-seated fears
of losing sovereignty ever again ([31], p. xvii, [34], p. 3, [46]). While debates on
Chinas national humiliation still go unabated, it is difficult to refute the fact that
Chinese leaders had held such memories and perceptions since the founding of the
Peoples Republic. It was in this context that, though with some temporal variations,
Chinese foreign policy has revolved around three concentric circles of anti-foreign,
anti-Western and anti-hegemonic stances (see Fig. 1). The more deeply these
unpleasant memories are seated in the Chinese mind and more constantly they are
reproduced, the stronger emphasis is bound to be placed on the pursuit of
independent and autonomous diplomacy ([53, 55, 69, 77, 78, 91, 101].
If the last 30 years is any useful guide, China has been making unstinted efforts
toward building its power in economic, diplomatic, military and cultural domains as
if that was the only way to get its national pride redeemed. A close look at the
writings of Chinese international relations scholars suggests that their mainstream view has been generally in line with realist interpretations and

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Fig. 1 Principal components of

Chinese foreign policy

prescriptions ([7], pp. 74-80, [96], ch. 4, [56]). That is, in order to safeguard
sovereignty in the world of anarchy, the aggrandizement of power was deemed to
precede everything else. Preoccupations with sovereignty nearly to the verge of siege
mentality have kept the Chinese from accepting interferences and intervention from
the outside. Hence, the constant search for independence and autonomy.2
China is also well known for its hypersensitivity to territorial sovereignty. Cases
of Chinas involvement in large-scale armed conflicts suggest that the intensity of its
military commitment was much higher with territory-related disputes than otherwise
([42], pp. 11-12). While Chinas stance on territorial disputes gradually became more
flexible and milder during the reform era as the situations in the South China Sea
well demonstrate it is not all that clear if China is only putting aside (gezhi)
those sensitive issues for the time being ([25], pp. 133-6).
Preoccupations with independence, autonomy, sovereignty and territorial integrity
are but one side of a coin. The other side, of course, is the longing for regaining a
great-power status that the Middle Kingdom had enjoyed for a long time ([98], ch.
4). A couple of interesting clues can be noted in this regard. China has long
advocated the multi-polarization and democratization of international relations
(shijie duojihua he guoji guanxi minzhuhua) as a way of avoiding the faults of
unilateralism and hegemonism ([112], pp. 2940). These announcements notwithstanding, as Deng Xiaoping himself commented, [I]rrespective of its number (four
or five), China cannot but be a pole of the multi-polar system that there isHowever
you figure, China is one of the poles (siji ye hao wuji ye hao suowei duoji
zhongguo suan yiji zenmoyang suan ye suan yiji) ([19], pp. 3545). In a nutshell,
China does aspire to regain a great-power status.
According to a 2006 survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),
88.9 percent of the 7,061 respondents agreed that they were proud of the
international status that China was currently occupying ([51], p. 61). Yet, in terms
of official policy line, China has been highly cautious in admitting or showing off
this newly attained status. For instance, Beijing continues to use the indicator of per
capita income (on a par with Zambia) in efforts to deny a great-power status and
2

Such mentality was vividly demonstrated on the eve of the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989. In the face of
student demonstrators and proponents of democracy, Chinese leaders went paranoid with the thought that
the crisis was being manipulated by outside (presumably Western) forces that wished to topple China once
again. See [62], pp. 356-357. For Chinas similar concern with U.S. intentions in Central Asia, see [106],
pp. 334-335.

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instead keeps highlighting its developing-nation status. Additionally, despite the

long-standing invitation, China refrained from joining the G-8 officially. Furthermore, while Beijing generally welcomes the new G-20 structure as a better reflection
of the changing realities and a more appropriate forum for contemporary
international relations, it abhors the designation of G-2 and even terms it as a
mutant of the China threat thesis ([11], pp. 109118, [67, 107]).
Behind such calculated modesty are aspirations for a great-power status lurking.
And for China, the short cut to attaining this goal has always been the cultivation of
power initially hard and increasingly soft and smart in recent years [20]. Most
importantly, China seeks to maintain its independence and autonomy in making
foreign and security policies. According to a study, the concept of pole (ji) refers
to the autonomous decision-making authority in addition to the possession of strong
military and economic powers. In contrast, a center of capability (liliang zhongxin)
is often used to refer to powerful nations without full autonomy in foreign and
security policy-making ([33], pp. 27790, [95], pp. 2426).

Assessing the Changes in the Reform Era: A Balance Sheet

Remarkable - and somewhat unexpected - successes of the reform and opening
necessitate a close look at the substantive changes that have taken place in Chinas
foreign relations during the last three decades. Several distinct yet inter-related
characteristics jointly illustrate the principal changes and their notable
consequences in Chinas foreign relations. First, above all, the emergence of
pragmatism i.e., the demise of Communist ideology and the rise of national
interests rationally defined can be said to have been the foremost variable in
the new equation. Traditional realist concerns, such as national sovereignty,
territorial integrity and military modernization, are still very important but,
relative to the Maoist era, economic development, interdependence, and
sustainable growth have also become crucial goals of the Chinese government
([76, 97], ch. 4). Behind the rise of pragmatic diplomacy lay the emancipation of
mind (sixiang jiefang), through which the making and implementation of foreign
policy became increasingly more practical than rhetorical and dogmatic. As in
other domains of Chinese politics and society, the importance of this aspect cannot
be overemphasized ([18], pp. 89, [99], pp. 113).
Second, pragmatism and de-ideologization led to Beijings unstinted effort to
maximize economic interactions and exchanges with the outside world. The
centrality of this shift away from the Maoist autarchy is best demonstrated by the
fact that China is now the largest trading nation in the world and the total amount of
foreign investment committed in China, as of 2007, reached US$ 955 billion. The
share of foreign trade in Chinas total GNP rose from a mere 9.8 percent in 1978 to
60 percent in 2008 ([54, 111], pp. 5, 723). That is to say, three-fifths of all goods and
services produced in China were related to foreign trade. Earlier successes reinforced
the leaderships confidence in the opening policy over time, thereby further
constricting the room for the return of ideological dogmatism.
Third, the aforementioned two factors in turn led to a significantly widened range
of foreign relations for Beijing. If the core partners of Chinas foreign relations had

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largely been confined to the socialist bloc and a handful of European nations in
Maoist China, the post-Mao strategy of omni-directional opening (quanfangwei
kaifang) introduced a whole new dimension to Chinese diplomacy. The number of
countries with which China normalized relations increased from 99 in 1978 to 172 in
2008, an increase of 73 nations that included such nations as the United States, Saudi
Arabia, South Korea, South Africa, Singapore, Israel and so on ([110], p. 368).
Fourth, the rise of non-ideological and pragmatic diplomacy also meant that
reciprocity (huhui) became the core tenet of Chinas foreign relations. Chinas
relations with the Third World during the last three decades are best indicative of this
crucial change. It is widely known that Maoist China had provided enormous aid for
African nations, including the financial support for the construction of the TanzaniaZambian railway. The reform era witnessed a constant reduction of aid going to the
Third World, however. The share of the Third World aid in government budgets
dropped from 7.2 percent in 1973 to 0.5 percent in 1983 ([36, 52], p. 244). In 1999,
57 percent of Chinas foreign trade was conducted with Asian nations but none of
Chinas top ten trade partners were Third World nations.
As is widely noted in recent years, a great reversal is currently being made:
Chinas policy of providing active support for the Third World is making a visible
comeback. Enormous aid-in-grant packages are being offered to African and Latin
American nations in efforts to make contributions on a par with Beijings fastgrowing economic capabilities.3 Whether it is for soft or smart power, Chinas
current goal is certainly very different from the Maoist period: it is no longer purely
ideological. China wants natural resources and energy, as well as political support,
from these nations and, therefore, it is highly interest-based. Beijing no longer
actively supports anti-government rebellions there although they may often have to
condone them grudgingly ([4, 22, 49, 60]).
Fifth, in spite of the remarkable aggrandizement of both economic and military
power during the last 30 years, Chinas involvement in military conflicts and explicit
show of force have been largely decreasing compared to the Maoist era when
Beijing had sincerely acted on the tenet that the best deterrence is belligerence
([42], p. 27, [92], p. 202). The war with Vietnam in 1979 was perhaps the only postMao military engagement on a large scale while others were either unilateral show of
force (i.e., missile launches over the Taiwan Strait in 1995) or small-scale scuffles
(the 2001 EP-3 incident, the 2009 Impeccable incident, and so on). China continues
to discount the threat it faces from the outside (although it has since 2001 underlined
the growing level of internal threat) and emphasizes the defensive nature of its
military strategy and modernization ([10], pp. 85-97, [93], pp. 48-58). Of course,
assessments may vary since these changes can be interpreted either as an outcome of
Chinas positive learning over the years and gradual conversion to international
norms or, alternatively, as Beijings well-calculated tactical move to placate the
China threat thesis until its ascent becomes complete.
With regard to Chinas nuclear strategy, debates go unabated whether its goal still
remains to be minimum deterrence or it is making a gradual transition to that of
limited deterrence ([41, 81], pp. 2327). In fact, we are getting some confusing
3

China has provided over 2,000 aid projects for 110 nations, and reduced or cancelled the debts worth 20
billion yuan for developing nations. See [50].

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signals on this crucial issue. Officially, China still appears to stick to the principle of
minimum deterrence as it emphasizes no first use of nuclear weapons (xianzhi
buyong) and no use or threat to non-nuclear powers ([109], p. 51). The total
number of warheads in Chinas nuclear stockpile also decreased from 435 in 1993 to
around 200 in 2006. Yet, the overall share of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles has been increasing in recent years, compared to that of long-range and
intercontinental ballistic ones. Additionally, the technological progress in developing
multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and decoy warheads, as well as
ground-based mid-air defense, is also notable [63]. The foreign policy implications
of these changes in Chinas military and nuclear strategy perhaps need a longer timeframe to assess ([74], p. 86).
Sixth, Chinas enmeshment with international organizations has been increasing
rapidly during the reform era. While this does not necessarily mean that Beijings
emphasis on bilateral relations has waned (discussed in detail below), Chinas
growing awareness that international institutions were not merely puppets of the
United States drove Beijing to get actively and, often, proactively involved in many
of these. In fact, overall, the level of Chinas participation in international institutions
has been much higher than previously expected ([40], p. 14). Chinas accession to
the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP: 1978), International Monetary Fund
(IMF: 1980), World Bank (1980), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO:
1980), Asian Development Bank (ADB: 1986), United Nations Environment Plan
(UNEP: 1992), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1997), and World Trade Organization (WTO: 2001) is most notable ([48], p. 226,
[66, 68, 103], pp. 73133).
Chinas involvement in international institutions was not confined to economic
and commercial domains. While Beijing had generally been passive and reserved, if
not critical, toward joining international regimes on arms control and disarmament,
such a stance changed considerably since 1992. Most importantly, China joined the
three most crucial international covenants in the military-security arena: the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty (NPT: 1992), the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT:
1996), and the chemical weapons convention (CWC: 1997). Additionally, China also
joined the Zangger Committee (1998), the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG: 2004), the
Outer Space Treaty (1983), the Antarctic Treaty (1983), the Seabed Arms Control
Treaty (1991), and so on. Compared to the Maoist era when China agreed on only 34
international covenants, the figure skyrocketed to 185 during 1979-1999. All these
signify Beijings drastically changed stance on viewing, if not complying with,
international and multilateral norms on non-proliferation and arms control ([28, 48],
p. 232, [58], pp. 7880, [70], p. 69).
Seventh, Chinas position on multilateral institutions and diplomacy has also
changed significantly during the last three decades of reform. During the Maoist era,
China belonged only to a few multilateral institutions composed mainly of socialist
states. In the reform period, however, Beijing has adopted two key measures in this
regard. On one hand, China took initiatives in establishing new multilateral
institutions, of which the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the ChinaAfrica Forum, and the Six-Party Talks are the principal examples ([12, 16], pp. 156
60, [80]). On the other, China has also been keen to joining a wide range of
multilateral institutions and frameworks initiated by other states, most notably

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APEC, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus three, the East Asian
Summit, and so on.
It should be noted that one principal goal of China in its effort toward
international organizations and multilateral diplomacy has been to increase its say
and capacity to set international agendas ([24], pp. 2645, [64], pp. 47683). One
key indicator as such is the ratio of Chinas abstention in the United Nations Security
Councils voting on a wide range of policy issues. As Table 1 well demonstrates, in
tandem with its increased say, the rate of Chinas abstention has consistently
decreased since the early 1990s.
Eighth, as hinted earlier, Beijings new stance on international organizations and
multilateral diplomacy does not mean correspondingly reduced attention to bilateral
dynamics. Given that regional identity has been particularly weak, if not absent, in
East Asia compared to Europe, bilateral relations still occupy a very crucial position
in Chinese external strategies. For instance, the White Book published annually by
the Policy Research Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Ministry devotes a lions share to
detailed descriptions of Beijings dyadic relations with 172 nations.4
Chinas sustained attention to bilateral relations can also be inferred from the
ever-growing complex list of partnership arrangements that Beijing has designated
for a wide range of dyadic relations with many countries. While decoding this
complicated hierarchy of different types of partnerships is almost impossible for
outsiders, China may have certain logic of its own in using the concept to substitute
for the alliance that it has been strongly opposed to ([105], p. 503).
Ninth, the soft-power dimension of Chinese foreign policy needs to be discussed.
Among others, three key aspects can be mentioned in this regard. For one, China has
devoted huge state resources to establishing certain positive images of the state
(guojia xingxiang) in recent years [89]. The task involves close monitoring of
overseas media reports on China and publishing immediate rebuttals to negative
reports. It also entails integrating Chinas foreign policy into the new four principles
of civilized, democratic, harmonious and developmental diplomacy. Furthermore,
China has sought to enhance its international image by boosting efforts for
international rescue and disaster relief. While these efforts are still in an incipient
stage, the proactive role of the state in sculpting these images is indisputable ([3, 86],
pp. 37).
Another measure entails the diffusion of Chinese cultural values and virtues
overseas. The most notable example is the establishment of state-sponsored
Confucius Institutes. How successful this effort has been in raising Chinas soft
power overseas, however, remains to be empirically assessed [100]. Related are
Beijings efforts to publish a wide range of white papers (baipishu) to explain
Chinas positions on such sensitive issue-areas as human rights, women rights,
Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, religious freedom, space development, intellectual property
rights, family planning, and so on ([89], p. 75).
Yet another measure in Chinese soft-power diplomacy is more interesting with
much broader implications. Foreign perceptions of China have predominantly been
4
For instance, Zhongguo waijiao (2008) devotes 36.5% of the space (154 pages out of the total of 422) to
the discussions of bilateral relations whereas the comparable figure on the discussion of Chinas
multilateral diplomacy was 12.3% (52 pages).

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Table 1 Rate of Chinas abstention in UN voting on human rights issues

Period

Frequency

Annual Average

% in P5

1991-96

29

64

1997-2006

23

38

2000-2006

10

1.6

27

Source: adapted from Dong-ryul Lee, Jungguk eui UN woegyo (Chinas United Nations Diplomacy) in
Taeho Kim et al., Jungguk woegyo yongu eui saeroun yongyok (New Areas of Research on Chinese
Foreign Policy) (Seoul: Nanam, 2008), p. 152

such that it is an authoritarian state with high levels of repression and secrecy. China,
however, has been fighting against such negative images on its own front. During
the reform era, China joined several key international covenants on human rights,
including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (ratified in 1980), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1982),
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1982), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (1983), the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1983), the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(1988), the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value (1990), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (1991), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (2001) ([20], p. 85).
China still is of the position that human rights are not necessarily universally
applicable virtues but contingent upon the specific conditions of each state
([23], pp. 914, [87], pp. 2429). And that is precisely why China has yet to ratify
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that it already signed in 1998. It should
be admitted that, as the degree of domestic political liberalization has steadily
increased over the years, Chinas attention to human rights has also expanded. Yet,
to be on a par with expectations of the international community, there still remains
much room for further improvement.
Tenth, whereas China has been largely consistent in restraining the projection of
military power overseas during the reform era, Beijings views and policies toward
the UN-endorsed peace-keeping operations have been changing rather considerably.
In the 1980s, a shift was made from maintaining the position of non-financialsupport, non-voting and non-participation to adopting that of financial support,
voting and participation. During the 1990s, another shift was made to providing
personnel support and taking active part in peace-keeping operations overseas
regarding non-traditional security threats like genocide and piracy [8].
In sum, Chinese foreign policy of the 21st century has become much more open
and pragmatic in its relations with the outside world, more extensive in its reach and
coverage, highly diversified in its functions and partners, more committed to
international norms than before, and much more sophisticated in its dealing with the
international community. Yet, the precise balance between the changes and
continuities is still quite difficult to gauge. Even the question of whether such

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changes are only for short- to mid-term tactical purposes remains to be explored
from a macro-historical perspective.

Chinas Great-Power Diplomacy: Inferential Trajectories

The foregoing discussions have outlined many positive signs and desirable
progresses that were readily discernible from Chinas foreign relations of the last
three decades. These crucial changes notwithstanding, concerns and worries and
even some fears with regard to the rise of China still linger. Although a wide range
of variables still remain to condition or constrain the elongated process of its ascent,
the rise of China - i.e., Chinas enhanced capabilities and influence and related
synergies - is probably not a matter of whether but one of when, given the consistent
trend of the last three decades ([6, 17]). Obviously, as in the case of two sides of a
coin, both hopes and concerns co-exist with regard to the future trajectory of Chinese
foreign policy.
Many pundits attribute the future of Chinas foreign policy to the evolving
dynamics of US-China relations. A widely subscribed view as to the impact of
Chinas rise forewarns the inevitability of Sino-American competition or confrontation. This apocalyptic view entails realist logic that the rise of China, regardless of
its intentions and preferences, is bound to reduce the room for Americas strategic
maneuvering, thereby precipitating a clash of Titans ([2, 14, 26, 57], ch. 10, [98],
p. 2). Many beg to differ, however. Some argue that Chinas rise may lead to a
peaceful power transition although uncertainties loom large in the long haul ([32],
pp. 111, [71, 114]). Others suggest that Chinas diplomacy is far more subtle and
sophisticated so that Beijing will see to it that the external environments remain
sufficiently favorable to its peaceful rise, thereby avoiding explicit conflicts with
the United States by all means ([21, 27, 29], chs. 56, [59]). Still others contend that
Chinas rise, even in the long run, will not suffice to replace the role of America in
Asia ([73, 82]).
This is certainly one area where most uncertainties are found. On the other hand,
it seems that US-China relations are perhaps overemphasized in delineating the
future trajectory of Beijings foreign policy [83]. More importantly, whichever
perspective is chosen, in tandem with the ascent of China, the dominant logic
guiding the economic and security affairs in the world has been bifurcating.
Particularly in the Asia-Pacific, regardless of Beijings intentions, the region as a
whole is facing an intricate dilemma of having to balance economic benefits from
cooperating with China against security gains from allying with the United States
([35, 47]).
Debates are intense as to how the world and its sub-regions are positioning
themselves vis--vis a rising China. These discussions more often resemble the
analogy of a glass that is only half full. That is to say, given high uncertainties
related to the future of China and of Sino-American relations, a majority of
secondary and tertiary states seek to maintain an opportunistic hedging stance
([44, 75, 84]). Generally speaking, such concerns and worries are closely related to
the regional states insufficient confidence in that the aforementioned changes in
Chinas foreign policy goals and behavior are long-term and strategic and, therefore,

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unlikely to change easily. In a nutshell, fears do exist and may even increase over
time as to what if China should revert to the past practices of dominance and
dogmatism once it has risen to the apex ([1, 45]. [107], ch. 11) .
Such worries are particularly prominent in the countries that share borders with
China. Three reasons account for this. First, generally speaking, distance matters: the
security dilemma is naturally more intense for countries that border on each other.
Second, available records show that the Peoples Republics projection of military
force was largely more proactive toward neighboring states (such as Vietnam and
India) than toward extra-regional states (such as the United States and Europe) ([72],
pp. 1819). Given that, despite Chinas pronounced rhetoric of friendly neighbor
policy, concerns and worries have multiplied over time in the Asia-Pacific region.
Third, deep-seated memories of Chinese dominance and, more importantly, the
newly growing historical controversies between China and some regional states are
adding fuel to these generic concerns and worries about the rise of China.5 Viewed
in this light, Chinas opening and all-round diplomacy have been relatively
successful in enriching and socializing with her neighbors (fulin and mulin,
respectively) but not necessarily in reassuring them (anlin) about the security
implications of its ascent ([14], pp. 6619).
It may perhaps become unavoidable, down the road, that Chinas ever-elevated
status will make it increasingly more difficult for the regional states to deal with
Beijing on an equal footing, the long-standing rhetoric of the five principles
notwithstanding. It is particularly so when an increasingly large number of Chinese
scholars and analysts believe that the outside world only has very limited influence
over Chinas developmental path ([104], p. 25). It seems that the main audience of
Chinas anti-hegemonic discourse (bu chengba bu dangtou) should not be other
great powers (e.g., the U.S. and Russia) but smaller nations, particularly those
situated on the periphery of China.
If the power transition should become a real possibility in the future, what kind of
a leading power will China choose to become? Some argue that, once it reaches the
top of the hierarchy, China with more experiences of having been at the apex than
the U.S. will become a more subtle but sophisticated empire whose rule is likely to
last longer. Indeed, and fortunately, quite a few Chinese scholars have engaged in
serious pondering about this crucial question. The wealthier and stronger China
becomes, the larger the perceptual disparity between China and her regional
neighbors may get. Will China then continue to be a modest giant, refraining from
being showy and audacious? Will Beijing continue to stick to the long-standing
principle of remaining affinitive despite differences (he er butong) ([61, 65, 79,
85, 102])?
On a more behavioral level, will China continue to hold on to the principle of no
messing around if not messed first (ren bu fan wo wo bu fan ren)? Once China sits
at the top, will the operational definition of fan change? The whole world is holding
its breath and watching closely when and in what shape the crouching dragon will
5

While David Kang (in his China Rising) suggests that fears of Chinas rise are lacking in East Asia, I
would argue that it is not the lack of fears per se but rather the absence of explicit display of fears that the
regional states possess. For South Koreas such concerns and worries due to the Koguryo controversy
since 2004, see [15].

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East Asia (2011) 28:175190

come out at the end of its elongated process of ascent. In the last 60 years, Beijing
has sought hard to maintain consistencies (shizhong ruyi) in conducting its
external relations. Perhaps that is the best clue the world may have in inferring the
future trajectories of Chinese foreign policy.
Acknowledgments The research for this article was supported by the John D. and Katherine T.
MacArthur Foundations Asia Security Initiative Grant to Seoul National University (2009-12). The author
acknowledges useful comments from Gordon Cheung, Shiping Tang, and two anonymous reviewers.

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