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HUMINT Advantage
Contention Three - is Human Intelligence
The squo relies Big Data surveillance. That means info
overload & less HUMINT.
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston Marathon
Bombing: The former NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding traditional
intelligence-gathering effortsand allowing terrorists to succeed, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Snowden on Monday suggested that if the National Security Agency focused more on
traditional intelligence gatheringand less on its mass-surveillance programsit
could have thwarted the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker,
speaking via video to a Harvard class, said that a preoccupation with collecting bulk
Edward
[targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has
have value,
which we have a specific cause for investigating , and that's something that we need
to look carefully at how to balance," Snowden said.
technical methods,
be attributed to an absence of human intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances
in technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering platform;
however human intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs
The world is a dangerous place , plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states;
competition for scarce resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals of conventional armaments; and deep-
seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other
reason, government
officials leaders seek information about the capabilities andan especially elusive topicthe
intentions of those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation.
That is the core purpose of espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or
internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to provide leaders with data that can
help advance the national interest the opportunity side of the security equation.
Through the practice of espionagespying or clandestine human intelligence : whichever is one's
favorite termthe central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for
achieving a more thorough understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National
governments study information that is available in the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for
example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw puzzle. Many of the
pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be
several missing pieces perhaps the most important ones.
in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired
or with
intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign
agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations
officers). -_
Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of
Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft,
most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predatoroften armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill
what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory:
listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs"
concealed within sparkling cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.
Techint attracts
the
most funding in
Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over
humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be recruited by the United States in most
every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of international
based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is
organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its
value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's
security.
laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth
security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown
to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons
could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their
persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would
have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized
ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of
such plagues? HUMAN
argument, both because personal freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there's not
So here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What would the United
States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast
surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements of
regardless.
destruction that can make it remarkably easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a
spy on them from the safety of Fort Meade, we'd probably be doing a lot
more of this.
(Note to students: Fort Meade internally referenced is a United States Army
installation thats home to NSA and other intelligence agencies.)
The most common justification given by governments for mass surveillance is that these
tools are indispensable for fighting terrorism. The NSAs ex-director Keith Alexander says big data is
what its all about . Intelligence agencies routinely claim that they need massive amounts of data on all of
us to catch the bad guys, like the French brothers who assassinated the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo, or the murderers of Lee Rigby,
the British soldier killed by two men who claimed the act was revenge for the UKs involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But the assertion that big data is what its all about when it comes to predicting rare events is
not supported by what we know about how these methods work, and more importantly, dont work.
Analytics on massive datasets can be powerful in analysing and identifying broad patterns, or
events that occur regularly and frequently, but are singularly unsuited to finding unpredictable,
erratic, and rare needles in huge haystacks. In fact, the bigger the haystack the more massive the
to
finding such exceptional events , and the more they may serve to
direct resources and attention away from appropriate tools and
methods. After Rigby was killed, GCHQ, Britains intelligence service, was criticised by many for failing to stop his killers, Michael
Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. A lengthy parliamentary inquiry was conducted, resulting in a 192-page report that lists all the
ways in which Adebolajo and Adebowale had brushes with data surveillance, but were not flagged as two men who were about to kill
a soldier on a London street. GCHQ defended itself by saying that some of the crucial online exchanges had taken place on a
platform, believed to be Facebook, which had not alerted the agency about these men, or the nature of their postings. The men
apparently had numerous exchanges that were extremist in nature, and their accounts were suspended repeatedly by the platform
for violating its terms of service. If only Facebook had turned over more data, the thinking goes. But that is misleading, and makes
sense only with the benefit of hindsight. Seeking larger volumes of data, such as asking Facebook to alert intelligence agencies
every time that it detects a post containing violence, would deluge the agencies with multiple false leads that would lead to a data
Otherwise, the signal is worse than useless. Millions of Facebooks billion-plus users
post violent content every day, ranging from routinised movie violence to atrocious violent rhetoric.
data from all such occurrences would merely flood the agencies with false positives
erroneous indications for events that actually will not happen.
takes time and effort to sift through these millions of strands of hay to confirm that they are, indeed, not needles especially
when we dont even know what needles look like. All that the investigators would have would be a lot of open leads with no
resolution, taking
carried out by platforms like Facebooks are haphazard, semi-automated and unreliable indicators. The flagging system misses a lot
more violent content than it flags, and it often flags content as inappropriate even when it is not, and suffers from many biases.
Relying on such a haphazard system is not a reasonable path at all. So is all the hype around big data analytics unjustified? Yes and
no. There are appropriate use cases for which massive datasets are intensely useful, and perform much better than any alternative
we can imagine using conventional methods. Successful examples include using Google searches to figure out drug interactions that
would be too complex and too numerous to analyse one clinical trial at a time, or using social media to detect national-level swings
in our mood (we are indeed happier on Fridays than on Mondays). In contrast, consider the lone wolf attacker who took hostages
at, of all things, a Lindt Chocolat Caf in Sydney. Chocolate shops are not regular targets of political violence, and random, crazed
men attacking them is not a pattern on which we can base further identification. Yes, the Sydney attacker claimed jihadi ideology
and brought a black flag with Islamic writing on it, but given the rarity of such events, its not always possible to separate the jihadi
rhetoric from issues of mental health every eras mentally ill are affected by the cultural patterns around them. This isnt a job for
big data analytics. (The fact that the gunman was on bail facing various charges and was known for sending hate letters to the
families of Australian soldiers killed overseas suggests it was a job for traditional policing). When confronted with their failures in
2AC Materials
Most of the discussion around the revelations about the data collection activities of the NSA has been about the
threat to our civil rights and the potential damage abroad to U.S. political and business interests. Relatively
little
data in the fight against terrorism or other threats to the United States. Faith in the power
(especially the predictive power) of more data is of course a central tenet of the religion of big data and it looks like
find criminals, and find them quickly, by tracing their electronic tracks. That assumption is
unrealistic. Massive quantities of data add cost and complexity to every kind of
analysis, often with no meaningful improvement in the results.
Indeed, data quality problems and
University of Illinois, 2006 (What hope for HUMINT?, Washington Times, May 8th,
accessible online at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/8/20060508091537-5575r/?page=all, accessed on 6-30-15)
CIA housecleaning should continue
happening at the same time will be significant budgetary shifts from high-tech remotesensing intelligence operations, to human-intelligence collection, the traditional CIA
mission. Because the entrenched CIA senior bureaucracy remains resistant to
change, its also fair to ask if the CIA can improve its human-intelligence collection
Assuming Mike Hayden is confirmed as the new director, basic
even if we spend a lot more money on it. The answer in the shorter term three
to 10 years is probably no, and whether we can do it for the longer term is not at all clear yet. Why such a
negative assessment? Looking at how we have done in the past with human intelligence provides at least an
indicator of our probable success: Our archenemy for 50 years, the Soviet Union, proved very hard to collect against
using human sources. And, for most of the Cold War we seemed oblivious to this: Many sources we used were
double agents and played us like an organ, as the expression goes.
intelligence pay for it can too often become the only way , because it
is simply easier. And, we have probably paid a lot of money over the years for bad
information much of it planted with us by double agents. Traditionally, we have been
unable to develop long-term, well-placed sources in other countries . The reason is that the
time required sometimes 20 years seems beyond our comprehension and the ability of our government to
We have the wrong kind of people doing the work: Despite being the most culturally diverse free nation in the
world, we seem to send blond-haired, blue-eyed people to do intelligence field work. They simply cant do the
mission in todays world however, they seem to rise to leadership positions without difficulty. What should we do?
(1) We have to take a very critical look at ourselves. This cannot be done objectively by the CIA and the other
agencies because their primary focus is on the very short term getting more money to spend. The president
consulting with the Intelligence Committees in Congress should call together a group of experts, including
counterintelligence experts, and chart out a long-term HUMINT collection strategy. We should get their guidance,
Congress should fund it and the president carry it out. (2) It isnt written in stone that the traditional HUMINT roles,
missions and collection authorities of the various intelligence agencies should stay the same. In fact, everything
should be on the table and no agency should expect its traditional HUMINT mission will remain intact. On paper at
least, the new director of national intelligence (DNI) would seem empowered to direct this kind of reallocation of
mission. (3) Too often, our intelligence collections overseas are based on second- and third-hand reports, and often
obtained from host or other nations intelligence services. As these reports are analyzed and similarities are seen
and written about, its easy to see how we can be misled by group speak reporting, mostly controlled by sources
we have no way of assessing. Spying is spying: We should do more of it on our own throughout the world and get
our own, firsthand information. (4) Most HUMINT collections should be controlled centrally: Local authorities
overseas including the U.S. ambassador in the country concerned and the regional military commander should
not, ordinarily, be in the loop for such activities. (5) There has been way too much emphasis on open source
reporting, and its become a crutch for a number of agencies. Many so-called open sources are manipulated by
those opposed to us, whether we consider them our friends or not. And, way too often, open source reporting
just means someone reading a foreign newspaper then writing an intelligence report on it. Will these
them right we may be 15 or 20 years away from developing a true world class HUMINT collection capability: as
good, for example as some of our key adversaries have had against us for years.
stay on task and do it right not just fling our money in a different
these sources are the first to go and not be replaced. These sources are vital to our
security, they cannot be put on ice and immediately called up and
put in place to meet each new threat, whether officially assigned or as nonofficial
cover agents (NOCs). This takes time, and the time to do it is now. Complete the
FBIs reorganization of its data gathering and data mining electronic capability. Past
efforts have failed to transform this extremely valuable resource into a system that
can supply needed intelligence to CIA and other key agencies. Need to share is
just as important as need to know. The cost is high, but well worth it. Pre-emptive
and preventive intelligence. The intelligence gathered by modern digital technology
on a rapid basis should be made available to all personnel charged with spotting
suspected terrorists at various points of entry as will those on the watch lists
seeking to fly on commercial aircraft. Any useful intelligence gathered abroad must
be promptly conveyed to security officers looking for suspected individuals and
cargo so that the prompt and preventive policy can be more effective. Improve
National Estimates. The longer-view estimates have often been neglected by
consumers at the White House and elsewhere in favor of the current intelligence
that seems to be more readily actionable. The NIEs have real, though less apparent
value, in spotting trends and conditions that could result in hostile action against
the United States and should be elevated in quality and presentation. Retention of
objectivity. We may expect in a troubled world during this century that our leaders
may want to cherry-pick the intelligence to support a previously determined
program for action. Intelligence officers must not only be seen to be objective; they
must protect the work product from distortion by the consumers that can only
undermine its credibility. This can be a tough assignment, but it must be done. Our
satellites project important imagery and signals intelligence that expand our
understanding of potentially hostile activities and should be enhanced wherever
possible. They do not, however, replace the need for on-the-ground intelligence
about the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. A well-placed human source
can be of critical importance in explicating the purpose of such activities detected
by our electronic eyes and ears. Similarly, human intelligence can also be an
important factor in helping our electronic tools focus upon unusual plans or
activities on the ground. Each is important in early detection and analysis. Together,
they can make an important contribution to the safety of our nation by avoiding
surprise and miscalculation of the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries and
are thus indispensable to our policy-makers in reaching sound decisions in the best
interest of our country. Public source information must also be factored in. But if we
want to avoid surprises like Pearl Harbor and 9/11 we must have access to closely
guarded secrets. Humint cannot be an afterthought.
the Department of Justice said that the Moalin case was part of a
broader investigation into Shabaab funding . Senator Ron Wyden, of Oregon, who, like Leahy, has
pressured the N.S.A. to justify bulk surveillance, said, To suggest that the government needed to
spy on millions of law-abiding people in order to catch this individual is simply not
true. He continued, I still havent seen any evidence that the dragnet surveillance of
Americans personal information has done a single thing to improve U.S. national
security. Representative James Sensenbrenner, of Wisconsin, who introduced the Patriot Act in the House,
agreed. The intelligence community has never made a compelling case that bulk
collection stops terrorism, he told me. Khalid al-Mihdhars phone calls to Yemen
months before he helped hijack American Airlines Flight 77, on 9/11 , led Obama,
Alexander, Feinstein, and others to suggest that Section 215 could have prevented the
attacks. We know that we didnt stop 9/11, Alexander told me last spring. People were trying, but they didnt
have the tools. This tool, we believed, would help them. But the PCLOB found that it was not
necessary to collect the entire nations calling records to find Mihdhar. I asked William Gore,
budget request,
who was running the F.B.I.s San Diego office at the time, if the Patriot Act would have made a difference. Could we
have prevented 9/11? I dont know, he said. You
Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, has called this the peace-of-mind
metric. Michael Leiter, who led the National Counterterrorism Center under George W. Bush
and Obama, told me that Section 215 was useful but not indispensable : Could we live without
James
Section 215? Yes. Its not the most essential piece. But it would increase risk and make some things harder. In
the N.S.A. has used Section 215 to collect records from hotels,
car-rental agencies, state D.M.V.s, landlords, credit-card companies, and the like ,
according to Justice Department reports. Once the N.S.A. has the phone metadata, it can
addition to phone metadata,
circulate them through a shared database called the corporate store. To some, this
sounds less like fire insurance and more like a live-in fire
Documents released by Snowden and published by the Washington Post show that the
N.S.A. accounted for $10.5 billion of the $52.6 billion black budget, the top-secret
budget for U.S. intelligence spendin g, in 2013. About seventeen billion dollars of the
black budget goes to counterterrorism each year , plus billions more through the
unclassified budgets of the Pentagon , the State Department, and other agencies,
plus a special five-billion-dollar fund proposed by Obama last year to fight the Islamic State
in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The maximalist approach to intelligence is not limited to the
N.S.A. or to Section 215. A central terrorist watch list is called the Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment, or TIDE. According to a classified report released by the Web site the Intercept, TIDE, which is kept
by the National Counterterrorism Center, lists more than a million people . The C.I.A., the N.S.A.,
and the F.B.I. can all nominate new individuals . In the weeks before the 2013 Chicago
Marathon, analysts performed due diligence on all of the records in TIDE of
people who held a drivers license in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin . This was based
on the lessons learned from the Boston Marathon . In retrospect, every terrorist attack
leaves a data trail that appears to be dotted with missed opportunities. In the case of 9/11, there
question.
was Mihdhars landlord, the airport clerk who sold Mihdhar his one-way ticket for cash, and the state trooper who
difficulty of anticipating a spectacular and unprecedented attack. The 9/11 Commission called this a failure of the
imagination. Finding needles, the commission wrote in its report, is easy when youre looking backward,
It is much easier
after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals . After the event, of course, a
deceptively so. They quoted the historian Roberta Wohlstetter writing about Pearl Harbor:
signal is always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster has occurred. But
individual transactions to appear normal, reasonable, and legitimate, Ted Senator, a data scientist who worked on
an early post-9/11 program called Total Information Awareness, said, in 2002. Since then, intelligence officials have
often referred to lone-wolf terrorists, cells, and, as Alexander has put it, the terrorist who walks among us, as
Skinner, a
former C.I.A. case officer who works with the Soufan Group, a security company,
told me that this image is wrong. We knew about these networks, he said, speaking of the
though Al Qaeda were a fifth column, capable of camouflaging itself within civil society. Patrick
security . It sounds great when you say youre monitoring every phone call in the
United States. You can put that in a PowerPoint. But, actually, you have no
idea whats going on . By flooding the system with false
positives , big-data approaches to counterterrorism might actually make it harder
to identify real terrorists before they act . Two years before the Boston
Marathon bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers alleged to have committed the
attack, was assessed by the citys Joint Terrorism Task Force . They determined that he
was not a threat. This was one of about a thousand assessments that the Boston J.T.T.F.
conducted that year, a number that had nearly doubled in the previous two years ,
according to the Boston F.B.I. As of 2013, the Justice Department has trained nearly three
hundred thousand law-enforcement officers in how to file suspicious-activity
reports. In 2010, a central database held about three thousand of these reports; by
2012 it had grown to almost twenty-eight thousand . The bigger haystack
makes it harder to find the needle , Sensenbrenner told me. Thomas Drake, a
former N.S.A. executive and whistle-blower who has become one of the agencys most vocal critics,
told me, If you target everything, theres no target . Drake favors what
he calls a traditional law-enforcement approach to terrorism, gathering more
intelligence on a smaller set of targets. Decisions about which targets matter, he said,
should be driven by human expertise, not by a database. One alternative to data-driven
counterterrorism is already being used by the F.B.I. and other agencies. Known as
c ountering v iolent
prosecution for sending a few thousand dollars to Somalia. On June 1st, Section 215 and the roving wiretap
provision of the Patriot Act will expire. Sensenbrenner told me that he doesnt expect Congress to renew either
unless Section 215 is revised. If
(Glenn Greenwald is a journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times
best-selling books on politics and law. His most recent book, No Place to Hide, is about the
U.S. surveillance state and his experiences reporting on the Snowden documents around the
world. Prior to his collaboration with Pierre Omidyar, Glenns column was featured at The
Guardian and Salon. He was the debut winner, along with Amy Goodman, of the Park Center
I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism in 2008, and also received the 2010 Online
Journalism Award for his investigative work on the abusive detention conditions of Chelsea
Manning. For his 2013 NSA reporting, he received the George Polk award for National
Security Reporting; the Gannett Foundation award for investigative journalism and the
Gannett Foundation watchdog journalism award; the Esso Premio for Excellence in
Investigative Reporting in Brazil (he was the first non-Brazilian to win), and the Electronic
Frontier Foundations Pioneer Award. Along with Laura Poitras, Foreign Policy magazine
named him one of the top 100 Global Thinkers for 2013. The NSA reporting he led for The
Guardian was awarded the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for public service what a baller , No Place
to Hide, http://www.simoleonsense.com/snowden-the-nsa-and-the-u-s-surveillancestate/ - some dude transcribed parts of the book here so swag, ak.)
Surveillance
stopping terror more difficult . Democratic Congressman Rush Holt, a physicist and
one of the few scientists in Congress, has made the point that collecting everything
about everyones communications only obscures actual plots
being discussed by actual terrorists . Directed rather than indiscriminate
surveillance would yield more specific and useful information . American dying in a
terrorist attack is infinitesimal, considerably less than the chance of being struck by
lightning. John Mueller, an Ohio State University professor who has written extensively about the
balance between threat and expenditures in fighting terrorism, explained in 2011: The number of
people worldwide who are killed by Muslim-type terrorists, Al Qaeda wannabes, is maybe a
few hundred outside of war zones. Its basically the same number of people who die
drowning in the bathtub each year. More American citizens have undoubtedly died
overseas from traffic accidents or intestinal illnesses , the news agency McClatchy reported,
than from terrorism. After the trouble-free Olympics, Stephen Walt noted in Foreign Policy that the outcry
was driven, as usual, by severe exaggeration of the threat. He cited an essay by John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart
in International Security for which the authors had analyzed fifty cases of purported Islamic terrorist plots against
the United States, only to conclude that virtually
watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of being able to
watch specific people for which we have a specific cause for investigating ,
and
that's something that we need to look carefully at how to balance ," Snowden said.
HUMINT key
HUMINT key to success to counter state and non-state threats.
Wilkinson 13
Kevin R. Wilkinson United States Army War College. The author is a former Counterintelligence
Company Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. This thesis paper was overseen by
Professor Charles D. Allen of the Department of Command Leadership and Management. This
manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies
Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle
States Association of Colleges and Schools Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the
United States Army - March 2013 - http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590270
In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever . As employed
during the Cold War, a significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now
discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and
GEOINT alone.
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months
conventional conflict and on the verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of
insurgents, employed asymmetrical warfare . The continuation of conventional warfare paired with the
of
The world is a dangerous place , plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states;
competition for scarce resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals of conventional armaments; and deep-
seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other
officials leaders seek information about the capabilities andan especially elusive topicthe
intentions of those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation.
That is the core purpose of espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or
internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to provide leaders with data that can
help advance the national interest the opportunity side of the security equation.
reason, government
in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired
intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign
agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations
officers). -_
Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of
Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft,
most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predatoroften armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill
what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory:
listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs"
humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be recruited by the United States in most
every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of international
based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is
organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its
value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's
security.
laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth
and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control.
get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the
security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown
to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons
could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their
persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would
have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized
ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of
such plagues? HUMAN
approaching the time when it will be attempting to manage the entire planet for sustainability. Half the worlds
human population is living marginally or worse, and yet Renner (2003a) reports that military expenditures are on
the rise. In 2001, a conservative estimate of world military expenditures was US$839 billion, of which the United
States spends 36% and those states considered hostile to the United States spend 3% (Renner, 2003a). Even so,
expenditures for the military are expected to continue rising (Stevenson and Bumiller, 2002; Dao, 2002). Even 25%
of these funds would provide a much needed programme to develop alternative energy sources, which would also
diminish the perceived need for resource wars. Renner and Sheehan (2003) state that approximately
recent years
were triggered
25%
or exacerbated
of
by
resource exploitation.
Hussein persisted as a political leader by using resource money (in this case, oil) to
maintain power by a variety of methods, including murder. The use of resource funds to maintain power is all too
common (e.g. Le Billon, 2001). Ending such misuse of power and the resultant conflicts has proven impossible
because it is difficult to displace the power elite (e.g. United Nations Security Council, 2002).
This is a persuasive line of reasoning on the face of it, but it ignores the realities of
how markets really work. If the global market were in fact able to prevent resource wars, the
past half-century should have been a period of near-perfect peace. But resource disputes
have instead erupted repeatedly , and continue to do so. Just in the past twenty years,
resource disputes have erupted over oil in Nigeria, Algeria, Colombia, Yemen, Iraq/Kuwait,
and Sudan; over' timber and natural gas in Indonesia (Aceh); and over copper in
Bougainville/Papua New Guinea -and this is far from being an exhaustive list. In classical
theory , all actors within a market system act rationally in pursuit of their own
interests, and no one buys or sells without an expectation of benefit. In the real world ,
however, buyers and sellers enter the marketplace with unequal levels of power .
economic
Some economic players have wealth and weapons, while others don't; as a result, some have figurative -if not
literal -guns to their heads persuading them to act in ways that are clearly not in their own interest. Lest we forget:
the essence of the European colonial system was the maintenance of unequal terms of trade through military
duress. While nearly all of the old colonial governments were overthrown after World War II in favor of indigenous
regimes, much of the essential structure of colonialism remains in place. Indeed, some would argue that the new
institutions of global trade (the World Trade Organization, together with lending agencies like the World Bank) are
just as effective as the old colonial networks at transferring wealth from resource-rich poor nations to militarily
powerful rich consuming nations, and that the
conflict
within and between nations. The new post-colonial international system works to maintain and
deepen inequalities of wealth primarily through control (on the part of the wealthy, powerful nations) over the rules
and terms of trade, and over the currencies of trade.
It has long been an argument of the civil liberties crowd that bulk data gathering was counterproductive, if not counter- intuitive. The argument was couched in language suggesting that to collect it
all , as the then NSA director James Clapper famously decried, was to, in effect, gather nothing, as the choking
amounts of information collected would be so great as to be unable to
be analyzed effectively. This assertion is supported by William Binney, a
a former NSA official, logging more than three decades at the
agency. In alluding to what he termed bulk data failure, Binney said that an analyst today can run one simple
query across the NSAs various databases, only to become immediately overloaded
with information. With about four billion people (around two-thirds of the worlds population) under the NSA and partner
agencies watchful eyes, according to his estimates, there is far too much data being collected.
founder of Contrast Security and
Thats why they couldnt stop the Boston bombing , or the Paris shootings,
The data was all there the NSA is great at going back over it forensically for years to
Binney is in a position to know, earning his
stripes during the terrorism build up that culminated with the 9/11 World Trade
Center bombing in 2001. He left just days after the draconian legislation known as the USA Patriot Act was enacted by
because the data was all there
see what they were doing before that. But that doesnt stop it.
Congress on the heels of that attack. One of the reasons which prompted his leaving was the scrapping of a surveillance system on
which he long worked, only to be replaced by more intrusive systems.
AT: Accumulo
( ) Accumulos not responsive to our human intel internal link.
Even if NSA can process a large quantity of data, the qualitys
low unless HUMINTs involved.
( ) Accumulo fails Boston Marathon proves it doesnt find the
needle.
Konkel 13
Frank Konkel is the editorial events editor for Government Executive Media Group and a technology
journalist for its publications. He writes about emerging technologies, privacy, cybersecurity, policy
and other issues at the intersection of government and technology. He began writing about technology
at Federal Computer Week. Frank is a graduate of Michigan State University. NSA shows how big 'big
data' can be - FCW - Federal Computer Week is a magazine covering technology - Jun 13, 2013 http://fcw.com/articles/2013/06/13/nsa-big-data.aspx?m=1
As reported by Information Week, the NSA relies heavily on Accumulo, "a highly distributed, massively parallel
processing key/value store capable of analyzing structured and unstructured data" to process much of its data. NSA's modified
Accumulo, based on Google's BigTable data model, reportedly makes it possible for the
agency to analyze data for patterns while protecting personally identifiable information names, Social Security
version of
numbers and the like. Before news of Prism broke, NSA officials revealed a graph search it operates on top of Accumulo at a
Carnegie Melon tech conference. The graph is based on 4.4 trillion data points, which could represent phone numbers, IP addresses,
locations, or calls made and to whom; connecting those points creates a graph with more than 70 trillion edges. For a human being,
that kind of visualization is impossible, but for a vast, high-end computer system with the right big data tools and mathematical
algorithms, some signals can be pulled out. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, publicly
stated that the government's collection of phone records thwarted a terrorist plot inside the United States "within the last few
years," and other media reports have cited anonymous intelligence insiders claiming several plots have been foiled.
Needles in endless haystacks of data are not easy to find , and the
NSA's current big data analytics methodology is far from a flawless
as evidenced by the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more
The bombings were carried out by Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan
Tsarnaev, the latter of whom was previously interviewed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation after the Russian Federal Security Service notified the agency in 2011 that he was a follower of radical Islam.
The brothers had made threats on Twitter prior to their attack as well, meaning
several data points of suspicious behavior existed, yet no one detected a pattern in
time to prevent them from setting off bombs in a public place filled with people. "We're still in the genesis of big data, we haven't
system,
than 200.
even scratched the surface yet," said big data expert Ari Zoldan, CEO of New-York-based Quantum Networks. "
ways, the technology hasn't evolved yet, it's still a new industry."
In many
databases are gaining popularity due to their ability to store and process large
data sets more efficiently than relational databases. Apache Accumulo is a NoSQL
database that introduced a unique information security featurecell-level access control. We study
Accumulo to examine its cell-level access control policy enforcement mechanism. We survey existing Accumulo
applications, focusing on Koverse as a case study to model the interaction between Accumulo and a client application. We
conclude with a discussion of potential security concerns for Accumulo applications. We argue that Accumulos cell-level
access control can assist developers in creating a stronger information security policy, but Accumulo cannot provide
securityparticularly enforcement of information flow policieson its own. Furthermore,
NoSQL
heterogeneous
popular patterns for interaction between Accumulo and its clients require diligence on the part of developers, which may otherwise
lead to unexpected behavior that undermines system policy. We highlight some undesirable but
reasonable confusions stemming from the semantic gap between cell-level and table-level policies, and between policies for endusers and Accumulo clients.
identification of potential security concerns may help future studies learn more about Accumulo information security and lead to
development of more secure Accumulo based applications.
Fund HUMINT CP
1nc
Text: The USFG should substantially boost the HUMINT budget.
Solves the Aff their only internal link to HUMINT is a resource
tradeoff. We resolve that.
Koch1
et al; Andrew R. Koch is the Senior Vice President for Defense and Homeland Security issues at Scribe.
An expert on communications and the media, as well as market assessments for domestic and
international defense clients, he leads Scribes practice in providing such services as development and
implementation of strategic communications planning, media outreach support, as well as evaluation
of defense companies and related government programs. Scribe is a Strategic Advising firm. Article
Title: Chronic HUMINT under funding blamed for security failures - Janes Defence Weekly - vol. 36,
no. 12, 37153, p. 4
In the aftermath of the carnage in New York and Washington DC (September 11, 2001) hundreds of questions will be asked as to
how such an audacious and co-ordinated attack could have happened. This latest act of terrorism, although the most horrific to
use
of terrorist methods to strike at weaknesses in the societies of western countries - has been a worry of
strategic planners in the US for most of the 1990's. One possible contributing factor to this
failure of the intelligence and security system could be the lack of resources the US has
devoted to human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities throughout the past decade. While national technical
means continued to receive high levels of funding for surveillance satellites, signals intelligence flights
and other eavesdropping technologies, human-based intelligence capabilities have withered.
Areas such as analysis, linguistic skills, cultivation of agent networks, and 'tradecraft' were all of
paramount importance during the Cold War, particularly before the advent of space-based intelligence assets, but have
suffered a lack of resources of late. This shortfall has been exacerbated by the growing demand that increased
technical intelligence has placed on people who must process the vast amounts of resulting data and prioritise it. The US
intelligence community must work to close the gap between the amount of raw
intelligence it can gather and the quantity it can process, analyse, and disseminate.
date, is not the first time that the US Government has been caught unaware. Indeed the subject of 'asymmetric warfare' - the
2nc- solvency
HUMINT requires better integration with tech and more
funding only the cp solves
Sano, 14
Association of Former Intelligence Officer, Former Deputy Director National
Clandestine Service Central Intelligence Agency. Bachelors Degree in Political
Science and a Masters in Asian Studies from St. Johns University and a Masters of
International Affairs from Columbia University. (John, Guide to the Study of
Intelligence The Changing Shape of HUMINT Draft, Association of Former
Intelligence Officers, 11/24/14)//KTC
The Intelligence Community will continue to undergo change. Influenced as much by domestic politics as
intentions can only come from the recruitment of human sources. Even information stored digitally often requires
human access; and even with data that is extracted electronically, there is still the requirement to interpret those
documents and how they fit into the larger context. Human beings are essential to all processes and operations
whether they are public or privately based. As such they are the first and last line of security. They are also the first
challenges continue to grow, those tasked with addressing them will need to adjust at a much more rapid rate. This
applies both to field operatives as well as to their managers. As described above, the differences in experience and
cultural expectations will continue to exacerbate the relationship, but only temporarily as the old guard, or digital
Traditional approaches to
espionage while forming the bedrock for HUMINT, will have to be further augmented. The next
generation of operatives and their managers will need to be more familiar with, if not adept
at, technological augmentation. Augmentation, not replacement. While the tendency to rely increasingly
on technology to make HUMINT collection more efficient is commendable, adherence to the core
principals will ensure that human operations remain as secure as possible. Constrained
budgets, while often cyclical in nature, will likely remain flat, if not decreased, over the next several
years or longer. The Intelligence Community, for many years immune to the exigencies of financial
debate within Congress particularly during times of crises is no longer exempt. While the old adage,
there will always be money for good operations will remain fairly constant, what
constitutes good operations may likely shift dependent upon the prevailing political
wind and the prioritization of competing requirements (both operational and structural/administrative). In
addition, hiring and promotions within the IC are contingent to a significant degree on the
availability of funds. While both will continue hiring dependent on attrition rates and promotions on
immigrants gradually gives way to the new guard, or digital natives.
performance metrics the availability of both will be diminished. The impact on the future generation of officers
cannot be underestimated. With a workforce that can be expected to remain, on average 7 years, any limitations on
advancement could have a deleterious effect on morale as well as retention. Todays IC officers are however,
exceptionally adaptive, and resilient. Though they may stay for a shorter period of time than their predecessors,
their accomplishments
Case Frontline
There are
The haystack is the entire country , he said. We are looking for needles;
but, increasingly the needles are unavailable to us . The needles will be even
harder to find, if Congress weakens the Patriot Act, by reducing the intelligence
available to national security, and law enforcement agencies. With the rise of the Islamic State and its
global recruiting tools, intelligence agencies should be allowed to join the big data
revolution, Mr. Crovitz wrote. Edward Snowdens data theft raised privacy alarms; but, by now its clear
that no one working for the National Security Agency (NSA), leaked confidential data other than
Snowden himself, Mr. Crovitz correctly observes. He evaded the 300 lawyers and compliance officers who monitor
extend the Patriot Act or, to water it down. Instead, they should update it to maximize both privacy, and
intelligence, Mr. Crovitz argues. Technology now
should insist that the NSA ensure its data are used properly no more Snowdens but,
give the agency authority to catch up to how the private sector uses data.
Politicians should update the Patriot Act by permitting the intelligence use of data to
prevent terrorism. Mapping Terror Networks: Why Metadata And The Haystack Matters
also
Philip Mudd, former Deputy Director of the CIAs Counter-Terrorism Center, and Senior Intelligence Adviser to the
FBI, [at the time his article was published], wrote an Op-Ed in the Dec. 30, 2014 Wall Street Journal noting that the
CIA, FBI, and the entire U.S. Intelligence Community and national security establishment had devoted countless
hours as to how best can [we] clarify [and posture ourselves regarding] the blurring picture of an emerging terror
conspiracy [aimed at the United States] originating overseas, or inside the United States. How
can we
identify the key players (network/link analysis) and the broader network of their
fundraisers [enablers], radicalizers, travel facilitators and others.quickly enough so that they
cant succeed?, as well as protect civil liberties. And, Mr. Mudd adds, how do we ensure that
weve mapped the network enough to dismantle it?; or at a minimum, disrupt it ?
Mr. Mudd observes, in essence,
needle . Last year, Federal Appeals Court Judge William H. Pauley ruled NSA metadata collection lawful; and
added, the
government needs a wide net that can isolate gossamer contacts among
suspected terrorists in an ocean of seemingly disconnected data; HUMINT is the more
desirable method of collecting this kind of information but, gathering critical HUMINT is often
difficult and time consuming, not to mention that the Obama administration has been great at droning
You cant
get critical HUMIINT if you stick your head in the sand and
terrorists; but, hasnt added a single individual to Guantanamo Bay Prison. Dead men tell no tales.
refuse to establish an interrogation facility for this very purpose. Treating terrorists as criminals to
be tried in a normal court of law is absurd, counterproductive, and dangerous. As Mr. Mudd wrote at the time,
mapping a network of people is simple in concept; but, complex in practice: find the key operators, and then find
the support group. Map a network poorly, and you may miss peripheral players who will recreate a conspiracy after
the core of conspirators are arrested.
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack here on the U.S. homeland the more we seem to lose the
raison d tere for why we passed the Patriot Act in the first place. As the Intelligence Community
and Law Enforcement authorities with respect to the mass collection of phone data are allowed to atrophy and
erode our ability to ferret out and discover potential terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland also decay. I am
not sure I know the right answer as to where the balance lied between the protection of civil liberties, versus the
requirement to collect enough data that enables our intelligence and law enforcement professionals to
and,
perhaps a
Patriot Act on steroids . It is easy to criticize law enforcement and intelligence agencies desires
for greater authority and flexibility in regards to the collection of data; but, how you see it depends on where you
sit. If you are charged with protecting the American homeland, it is a very difficult balancing act with few clear
answers.
argumentin both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnationis hardly a straw man, as Thomas HomerDixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do
social scientists and policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. Ive triggered this debate because
conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big
implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often even larger implications for public
policy. Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Husseins invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource conflict in
recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare
Department of Commerce (James, Trojan Horses: Using Current U.S. Intelligence Resources To Successfully
Infiltrate Islamic Terror Groups, International Affairs Review Vol. 14 No.2 Fall 2005)//KTC
Research Service report exemplifies this mindset: While U.S. policymakers are emphasizing the need for rapid
intelligence overhaul to close the HUMINT deficit, the United States is fighting a War on Terror with other countries
Signals intelligence and imagery satellites have their uses in the counterterrorism mission,
rapid nature and lack of warning that defines the current security environment: National security used to be
considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might.
Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved
into place. Now threats can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered in a country
on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless
scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of the United States.i
jeopardy. Regional dialects, local cultural sensitivities and six-degrees-of-separation within small populations all
work against an operative attempting to secure a terrorist leaders trust. Recognizing these difficulties, Rich Trojan
Horses 143 ard Betts summarizes this operational reality: More
backdoor ripe for exploitation is the dependence of Islamic extremists on illicit activities and services to fund, train,
the capacity to do The Achilles heel of terror groups is their dependence on criminal or other interconnected
terrorist groups to provide certain services to them, specifically weapons and drug smuggling. 144 International
Affairs Review so. This backdoor should be envisioned just as the name connotes: an alternative entrance that is
easier to sneak into than the front door. In the world of computer programming, a backdoor is an undocumented
way of gaining access to a program, online service or an entire computer system. The backdoor is written by the
A backdoor is a
potential security risk.o When hackers discover backdoors in software programs, they
exploit them. The U.S. intelligence community should adopt the hackers approach;
infiltration agents should be looking for similar types of alternative access routes .
programmer who creates the code for the program. It is often only known by the programmer.
The NSAs data collection practices have much of America and certainly the tech community on edge, but sources
situation isnt as bad as it seems . Yes, the
agency has a lot of data and can do some powerful analysis, but, the argument goes, there are strict
limits in place around how the agency can use it and who has access. Whether thats good
enough is still an open debate, but heres what we know about the technology thats underpinning all that data. The
technological linchpin to everything the NSA is doing from a data-analysis
familiar with the agencys technology are saying the
perspective is Accumulo an open-source database the agency built in order to store and
analyze huge amounts of data. Adam Fuchs knows Accumulo well because he helped build it during a nine-year stint with the NSA;
hes now co-founder and CTO of a company called Sqrrl that sells a commercial version of the database system. I spoke with him
earlier this week, days before news broke of the NSA collecting data from Verizon and the countrys largest web companies.
The
NSA began building Accumulo in late 2007, Fuchs said, because they were trying to
do automated analysis for tracking and discovering new terrorism suspects. We had a set of
applications that we wanted to develop and we were looking for the right infrastructure to build them on, he said. The problem was
those technologies werent available. He liked what projects like HBase were doing by using Hadoop to mimic Googles famous
BigTable data store, but it still wasnt up to the NSA requirements around scalability, reliability or security. So, they began work on a
project called CloudBase, which eventually was renamed
Accumulo.
operating at
thousands-of-nodes scale within the NSAs data centers. There are multiple instances each storing
tens of petabytes (1 petabyte equals 1,000 terabyes or 1 million gigabytes) of data and its the backend of the agencys most widely
analyzing trillions of data points in order to build massive graphs that can detect the
connections between them and the strength of the connections. Fuchs didnt talk about the size of the NSAs graph, but he did say
the database is designed to handle months or years worth of information and let
its easy to see where this type of analysis would be valuable in determining
how far a suspected terrorists network might spread and who might be involved.
call records,
Were not quite sure how much data the two programs
are actually
at least
from a volume perspective. Take the PRISM program thats gathering data from web properties
including Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo and AOL. It seems the NSA would have to
be selective in what it grabs. Assuming it includes every cost associated with running the program, the $20
million per year allocated to PRISM, according to the slides published by the Washington Post, wouldnt be
nearly enough to store all the raw data much less new datasets created from
analyses from such large web properties. Yahoo alone , Im told, was spending over
$100 million a year to operate its approximately 42,000-node Hadoop environment, consisting of hundreds of
petabytes, a few years ago. Facebook users are generating more than 500 terabytes of
new data every day. Using about the least-expensive option around for mass storage
cloud storage provider Backblazes open source storage pod designs just storing 500 terabytes of Facebook data a day would
cost more than $10 million in hardware alone over the course of a year. Using higherperformance hard drives or other premium gear things Backblaze eschews because its concerned primarily about cost and
scalability rather than performance would cost even more. Even at the Backblaze price point, though, which is pocket change for
the NSA, the agency would easily run over $20 million trying to store too many emails,
chats, Skype calls, photos, videos and other types data from the other companies its working with.
Generation of actionable intelligence from large data sets requires efficient analysis. Manual analysis of large data
sets to develop these insights is unsustainably resource intensive. In January 2014, the deputy director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency noted, Were looking for needles within haystacks while trying to define what the
Peshawar, Pakistan,
e-mail to an address in Aurora, Colo., outside Denver. It took them to Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old former coffee
cart operator, who was asking a Qaeda facilitator about how to mix ingredients for a flour-based explosive,
which the police stopped Mr. Zazi on the George Washington Bridge, let him go, and after several false starts,
arrested him in New York. He eventually pleaded guilty to plotting to carry out backpack bombings in the citys
subway system. It is that kind of success that President Obama seemed to be referring to on Friday in California
when he defended the National Security Agencys stockpiling of telephone call logs of Americans and gaining
access to foreigners e-mail and other data from Microsoft, Google, Yahoo and other companies. He argued that
modest
were able to glean critical information, said a senior intelligence official, who spoke on the condition
of anonymity. It was through an e-mail correspondence that we had access to only
through Prism. John Miller, a former senior intelligence official who now works for CBS News, said on CBS
This Morning, Thats how a program like this is supposed to work. Veterans of the Obama intelligence agencies
the large collections of digital data are vital in the search for terrorists . If youre
looking for a needle in the haystack, you need a haystack , Jeremy Bash, chief of staff
to Leon E. Panetta, the former C.I.A. director and defense secretary , said on MSNBC on Friday.
say
describing four instances when the NSAs surveillance programs have had an impact: (1) when an intercepted email
from a terrorist in Pakistan led to foiling a plan to bomb of the New York subway system; (2) when NSAs programs
helped prevent a plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange; (3) when intelligence led to the arrest of a U.S. citizen
who planned to bomb the Danish Newspaper office that published cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad;
and (4) when the NSAs programs triggered reopening the 9/11 investigation. So what are the practical applications
of internet and phone records gathered from two NSA programs? And how can metadata actually prevent terrorist
attacks? Metadata does not give the NSA and intelligence community access to the content of internet and phone
communications. Instead, metadata is more like the transactional information cell phone customers would normally
see on their billing statementsmetadata can indicate when a call, email, or online chat began and how long the
communication lasted. Section 215 of the Patriot Act provides the legal authority to obtain business records from
phone companies. Meanwhile, the NSA uses Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to authorize its
international threat. Even more useful than hindsight is a crystal ball that gives
instance,
focus new investigative activities on the most promising locations at the most
probabilistically promising day and time. Logistic regression is a very popular means
of data mining because it can solve problems involving categorical variables (e.g.,
variables that can be described by a yes/no answer or male/female answer). This technique can be
applied to rapidly evaluate all financial transaction records belonging to classes of
interest to the investigator. The results can be displayed in a number of graphical formats so that
commonalties among the subset of the variables selected become evident. Using logistic regression, graphic views
of only the trends in the data, rather than the data itself, are displayed in multi-dimensional format using
distinguishing shapes and colors without the need for the investigator to sort through the underlying data.
more apparent and timely . This approach will also serve to expedite the
investigation process by reducing the amount of time spent manually
searching for case leads or patterns of illicit activity.
( ) Statistics prove
Mayer, 13
(Jane, The New Yorker, Susan Landau is an American mathematician and engineer,
and Professor of Social Science and Policy Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute,
Whats the Matter with Metadata?, http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/whats-the-matter-with-metadata, June 6, 2013, ak.)
metadata has led
to breakthroughs. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the master planner of the September
11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, got picked up by his cell phone, Landau said.
Many other criminal suspects have given themselves away through their metadata
For the law-enforcement community, particularly the parts focussed on locating terrorists,
trails. In fact, Landau told me, metadata and other new surveillance tools have helped cut
the ultimate correlation tool," a former U.S. counterterrorism official said. " It is literally
causation is almost always indirect . People, groups and countries rarely fight
over natural resources directly; instead, resource stress causes various forms of social dislocation-including widening gaps between rich and poor, increased rent-seeking by elites, weakening of states and deeper
resource stress is a necessary cause of violence is easily refuted by finding cases of violence not preceded by
resource stress. At various points in his article, Victor uses exactly these strategies to debunk the link between
resources and war.
environmental-scarcity-leads-to-violence
of lesser kinds of armed conflict (causing increases in the chances of such conflict by from 4 percent to 8 percent);
(John, 2015, Former Deputy Director, National Clandestine Service, CIA, Guide to the Study of
Intelligence: The Changing Shape of HUMINT, Draft of paper, http://www.afio.com/publications/SANO%20Changing
%20Shape%20of%20HUMINT%20DRAFT%202015Jan28.pdf)//RTF
Managing this younger, more technically astute, workforce can be problematic for a
number of reasons not the least of which is the dramatic generational difference
when it comes to learning. Todays workforce thinks and processes information
significantly differently from its predecessors . As Dr. Bruce Perry of Baylor College of Medicine has
stated, Different kinds of experiences lead to different brain structures.2 As such todays workforce
receives information much faster than their predecessors. And while reception does
not always equal comprehension, it does present an issue for managers as well as
for IC instructors. Education within the world of HUMINT is in large measure
anecdotally based, with instruction incorporating legacy-based scenarios, or tribal memories to
emphasize key points. While useful, it is often a technique that many younger
practitioners of espionage find unfamiliar, even ineffective . Growing up on a regular
diet of technology driven information todays clandestine officer is better connected
and more adept at multitasking and networking than previous generations .
Adjusting to this significant divide is often difficult, for most instructors view
education in much the same way as they themselves were taught via lectures, step-bystep logic and tell-test instruction. Todays officers are more comfortable with procedures
that they grew up with TV, Internet, video cams, cell phones and all the other accruements associated
with the digital age. What does this mean? Aside from the way todays officers want to learn, it
also impacts expectations. Todays clandestine service officer expects to access any
information, anytime, anywhere, and on any device. Aside from the obvious security
aspects, there is also the problem of managing these expectations attempting to
inculcate the proper balance of security vs. expediency, not to mention patience
within an increasingly impatient workforce is no easy task, but nonetheless critical
aspect of any clandestine activity.
HUMINT is a bad form of intelligence gathering 7 reasons
Turner 5 -Dr. Michael A. Turner teaches at both San Diego State University and the University of
San Diego. He is also a consultant to the United States Government on national security matters.
Until 2006, Dr. Turner was the Director of International Relations Program at Alliant International
University in San Diego, CA. Before joining Alliant, Dr. Turner was a senior CIA officer, attached both to
the analytical directorate as well as to elements supporting the Director of Central Intelligence. At
varying times, Dr. Turner has taught strategic affairs at the University of Maryland, the University of
Virginia, John s Hopkins University, the University of Southern California, and the Air War College. Dr.
Turners research interests include intelligence and national security, American foreign policy, Middle
East as well as Central and South Asian Politics, and counterterrorism policy. Dr. Turner teaches both
graduate and undergraduate international relations courses. (Michael A., Why Secret Intelligence
Fails, pg 92, accessed 6-30-15)//KTC
into question the benefits of such an activity in relation to its cost . Three, HUMINT
information is highly perishable and therefore has a low threshold of utility. Four,
HUMINT is often vulnerable to deception and double- agent operations . Five, spying
is illegal everywhere, and case officers who have been caught in the process of recruitment
have embarrassed the U.S. government and damaged relations with both unfriendly and friendly
governments. Six, espionage is risky to the lives of the intelligence agents and their assets.
Seven, because HUMINT assets are often employed in covert actions , espionage
operations sometimes become corner shed in political controversies at home. Eight,
many people believe that spying is ethically wrong, an activity that diminishes the moral standing of
the United States around the globe.
The more you know about NSA's Accumulo system and graph analysis, the less likely you
are to suspect Prism is a privacy-invading fishing expedition. It's understandable that democracyloving citizens everywhere are outraged by the idea that the U.S. Government has back-door access to digital details surrounding
email messages, phone conversations, video chats, social networks and more on the servers of mainstream service providers
including Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Facebook, YouTube, Skype and Apple. But the more you know about the technologies being used
by the National Security Agency (NSA), the agency behind the controversial Prism program revealed last week by whistleblower
Edward Snowden, the less likely you are to view the project as a ham-fisted effort that's "trading a cherished American value for an
unproven theory," as one opinion piece contrasted personal privacy with big data analysis.
set
valuable information might remain out of reach to intelligence analysts who would otherwise have to wait for sanitized data sets
scrubbed of personally identifiable information. Sponsor video, mouseover for sound [ Want more on the Prism controversy? Read
NSA Prism: Inside The Modern Surveillance State. ] As InformationWeek reported last September, the NSA has shared Accumulo with
the Apache Foundation, and the technology has since been commercialized by Sqrrl, a startup launched by six former NSA
employees joined with former White House cybersecurity strategy director (and now Sqrrl CE0) Ely Khan. "The reason NSA built
Accumulo and didn't go with another open source project, like HBase or Cassandra, is that they needed a platform where they could
tag every single piece of data with a security label that dictates how people can access that data and who can access that data,"
said Khan in an interview with InformationWeek. Having left government employment in 2010, Kahn says he has no knowledge of
referring to in a statement on the Prism disclosure that mentioned "numerous safeguards that protect privacy and civil liberties." Are
They Catching Bad Guys? So the NSA can investigate data with limits , but what good is partial information?
One of Accumulo's strengths is finding connections among seemingly unrelated information. "By bringing data sets together,
[Accumulo] allowed us to see things in the data that we didn't necessarily see from looking at the data from one point or another,"
Ironically, about the same time these two programs were being exposed, Internet companies such as
were solving the big data storage and analysis problem . In November of 2006,
Google published a paper on BigTable, a database with petabytes of capacity capable of indexing the Web and supporting Google
Earth and other applications. And
the
work at Yahoo to catch up with Google's GFS file systemthe basis for BigTableresulted in
data being captured by the NSA's operations, but they lacked something critical to intelligence
operations: compartmentalized
a better version
security (or any security at all, for that matter). So in 2008, NSA set out to create
of BigTable,
database, based on key-value pairs. It's a design similar to Google's BigTable or Amazon's DynamoDB, but
Accumulo
has special security features designed for the NSA , like multiple
levels of security access. The program is built on the open-source Hadoop platform and other Apache products. One of
those is called Column Visibilitya capability that allows individual items within a row of data to have different classifications. That
allows users and applications with different levels of authorization to access data but see more or less information based on what
each column's "visibility" is. Users with lower levels of clearance wouldn't be aware that the column of data they're prohibited from
Accumulo also can generate near real-time reports from specific patterns
in data. So, for instance, the system could look for specific words or addressees in e-mail messages that come
viewing existed.
from a range of IP addresses; or, it could look for phone numbers that are two degrees of separation from a target's phone number.
spit those chosen e-mails or phone numbers into another database, where NSA
workers could peruse it at their leisure. In other words, Accumulo allows the NSA to
do what Google does with your e-mails and Web searchesonly with everything that flows across
the Internet, or with every phone call you make. It works because of a type of server process
called "iterators." These pieces of code constantly process the information sent to them and send back reports on
Then it can
emerging patterns in the data. Querying a multi-petabyte database and waiting for a response would be deadly slow, especially
because there is always new data being added.
data elves.
( ) No NSA data overload - Accumulo checks.
Kelly 12
Jeff Kelly is a Principal Research Contributor at The Wikibon Project and a Contributing Editor at
SiliconANGLE. He focuses on trends in Big Data and business analytics. His research has been quoted
and referenced by the Financial Times, Forbes, CIO.com, Network World, GigaOM, TechTarget and more
Accumulo: Why The World Needs Another NoSQL Database Wikibon Blog August 20 th http://wikibon.org/blog/breaking-analysis-accumulo-why-the-world-needs-another-nosql-database/
If youve been unable to keep up with all the competing NoSQL databases
developed at the N ational S ecurity A gency. You may be wondering why the world needs yet another
database to handle large volumes of multi-structured data. The answer is, of course, that no one of these
NoSQL databases has yet checked all the feature/functionality boxes that most enterprises require before deploying
a new technology. In the Big Data world, that means the ability to handle the three Vs (
volume,
variety and velocity ) of data, the ability to process multiple types of workloads (analytical vs.
transactional), and the ability to maintain ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability) compliance at
scale. With each new NoSQL entrant, hope springs eternal that this one will prove the NoSQL messiah. So what
Accumulo is capable of
maintaining consistency even as it scales to thousands of
nodes and petabytes of data ; it can both read and write data in near real-
With its much-discussed enthusiasm for collecting large amounts of data , the NSA naturally
found much interest in the idea of highly scalable NoSQL databases. But the U.S. intelligence
agency needed some security of its own, so it developed a NoSQL data store called Accumulo , with builtin policy enforcement mechanisms that strictly limit who can see its data. At the OReilly StrataHadoop World conference this week in New York, one of the former National Security Agency developers behind the software, Adam
Fuchs, explained how Accumulo works and how it could be used in fields other than intelligence gathering. The agency contributed
the softwares source code to the Apache Software Foundation in 2011. Every single application that we built at the NSA has some
concept of multi-level security, said Fuchs, who is now the chief technology officer of Sqrrl, which offers a commercial edition of the
software. The NSA started building Accumulo in 2008. Much like Facebook did with its Cassandra database around the same time,
the NSA used the Google Big Table architecture as a starting point. In the parlance of NoSQL databases, Accumulo is a simple
key/value data store, built on a shared-nothing architecture that allows for easy expansion to thousands of nodes able to hold
petabytes worth of data. It features a flexible schema that allows new columns to be quickly added, and comes with some advanced
approach allowed the NSA to categorize data into its multiple levels of classificationconfidential, secret, top secretas well as who
in an organization could access the data, based on their official role within the organization. The database is accompanied by a
policy engine that decides who can see what data. This model could be used anywhere that security is an issue. For instance, if used
in a health care organization, Accumulo can specify that only a patient and the patients doctor can see the patients data. The
patients specific doctor may change over time, but the role of the doctor, rather than the individual doctor, is specified in the
The NSA found that the data-centric approach greatly simplifies application
development, Fuchs said. Because data today tends to be transformed and reused for different analysis applications, it
database.
makes sense for the database itself to keep track of who is allowed to see the data, rather than repeatedly implementing these rules
in each application that uses this data.