Opening Packet HSS -2015

1AC document - Freedom Act

Af

Constructing your 1AC

Opening notes to students

How to build a 1AC from this file

One of our major goals at camp is to teach many different aspects that pop-up in
contemporary surveillance debates.
At first, this can be daunting as this document has a lot of moving parts. But
hopefully the first few pages of this file will make it all a little less overwhelming.
Here are some tips:

First start by choosing a plan text

There are ten options included. Some options are more strategic than others. We
will discuss the upsides and downsides of each in lab time.
When choosing a plan text, one big question youll want to consider is whether to
have a narrow plan text (tackling a small number of current surveillance practices ) or a
broader plan text (tackling several or all current surveillance practices).

Second read (only) one of the two inherency and solvency

options
Theres one if your plan is broad and another one if your plan is narrow. Most of
the time, this will be presented in the opening portion of the 1AC before you read
the advantages (but thats up to you).

Third Heres list of the advantages in the packet.

No one will have time to read all of the advantages in an 8 minute 1AC, so youll
need to pick and choose your favorites. Some advantages have longer and
shorter version to assist with time allocation. Other advantages have different
impact modules. At camp, consider mixing it up and reading different advantages
and modules in the various practice debates.
Conceptually, here is a good way to think about the 1AC advantage options:
Quality of Life advantages
o Privacy advantage longer version
o Privacy advantage shorter version
o Bigotry advantage longer version
o Bigotry advantage shorter version
The Journalism advantage designed to give an nice angle if you think
your opponent may go for the Kritik.
Advantages involving US image:
o India advantage financial markets impact
o India advantage cyber impact
o India advantage Democracy impact
o Global Internet Advantage economy impact

Global Internet Advantage democracy impact

Please note that a few of the cards in the India and Global Internet Advantages
overlap. If you are reading both of those advantages in the same 1AC, take a
moment to double-check and confirm that you are not reading the same piece of
evidence more than once.

Glossary and Important Note

Note to students
The next page presents a glossary.
Glossaries are often important for topic familiarization but especially so for this
years topic. Heres why:
There are many different ways that the Aff could argue that current laws protecting
against surveillance are insufficient.
I will use the example of the USA FREEDOM Act. The Freedom Act became a Law
very recently it passed on June 2nd, 2015. It was designed to enhance privacy
protection against federal surveillance. In order to pass the Congress, the Freedom
Act went through many changes. Many privacy advocates argue that the new
Freedom Act fails especially in relation to the original version of the bill.
In some instances, the author of an article will rattle off four or five different reasons
that they feel the current Freedom Act will not work. Then, in another article, a
different author may rattle off a different laundry list of five items where three items
overlap with evidence youve already read but two items do not.
For debaters, this presents three concerns:

First unnecessary duplication.

The Affirmative doesnt want to read a 3rd card saying the Freedom Act fails
because it lacks sufficient Pen Register protections. Once will usually be enough.

Second strategic consistency.

Affirmatives will want to avoid reading inherency cards that say Freedom Act fails
due to lack of Pen Register protections if the version of the Affirmative plan being
read fails to change Pen Register protections.

Third confusion.
Honestly, there are so many laws and investigative tools about privacy that this can
all turn into acronym soup. A familiarized Affirmative might be able to digest it all
but it could be puzzling to an unfamiliar judge or to a new novice on the team.

Organizationally, I cooked-up with the following solution:

For each piece of evidence in Inherency Solvency backline section, I use a set of
acronyms in the F6 header (the block header but not in the F7 tag).
Hopefully, this allows the student quickly differentiate between the different reasons
why the Freedom Act fails. But, it should also avoid situations where the student is
verbally presenting five confusing acronyms into the tag of a 2AC card.
In order to understand what each acronym means, I have placed a Glossary on
the next page.

Glossary
If the F6 block header has one or more of the following acronyms, here is what it
referencing:

The USA FREEDOM ACT A recently passed bill that stands for "Uniting and
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnetcollection and Online Monitoring Act. The Act implemented many reforms but
most prominently it (arguably) ended the ability of federal intelligence agencies to
store certain phone data (phone metadata see below). Instead, it required
phone companies, not government agencies, to hold on to that data. Federal
intelligence agencies can search the phone company records if they granted a
warrant authorizing their request. The Affirmative in this packet will argue that
current Freedom Act is insufficient and that the original draft of the Freedom Act
provided better safeguards.

The PATRIOT ACT Its official title is the USA PATRIOT Act an acronym that
stands for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001". The Patriot Act is an act
of Congress that was signed into law by President George W. Bush in October of
2001. It is widely viewed as a reaction to the events of September 11 th, 2001. The
Patriot Act does many, many things but, on this topic, it is perhaps most relevant
because it increased the authority of intelligence agencies to engage in
surveillance.

EO 12333 This stands for Executive Order 12333. It was signed by President
Ronald Reagan and established broad new surveillance authorities for the
intelligence community, outside the scope of public law. It was amended three times
by President George W. Bush. These cards will argue that the Status Quo fails
because EO 12333 creates a loophole permitting excessive surveillance.

FAA or FAA-Section 702 FAA stands for the FISA Amendments Act of
2008. This an acronym within an acronym. So, a little backstory:
o

The F.I.S.A. is an acronym standing for The Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978. That act does many things but is most apt
to come-up because it created a separate set of "secret courts" called
the FISC (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts). Its hearings are
closed to the public but it handles many requests for surveillance
warrants from federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

o
o

The F.I.S.A. law itself passed in 1978 but it has often been amended
since then.
One reason that the FAA of 2008 comes up is Section 702 of the FAA.
Section 702 authorizes PRISM (explained below). Section 702 is
designed to gather intelligence on foreign citizens, but is often accused
of gathering intelligence on US citizens. Many argue that because
Section 702 is understood to permit gathering information about a
foreign person, it can be used to gather information regarding US
persons.

Language argues that the Status Quo fails because the language or definitions of
current laws are not strict enough. Here, the Affirmative would usually argue that
when language has wiggle room federal agencies will seek to gain as much
intelligence a possible often at the expense of privacy. The most common example
of insufficient language is SST which is explained below.

Meta-data. Metadata is traditionally defined as data about data. Translation: The

NSA probably isnt listening to your phone calls or reading your email. Instead, the
metadata program givs intelligence access to information about phone calls. That
includes the phone numbers of both caller and recipient, the number of any calling
cards used, the time and duration of calls and the international mobile subscriber
identity (a unique identifier embedded in a phone SIM card) number. Email
metadata includes each messages to, from, cc and timestamp information. It also
includes the IP address each email was sent from, which reveals where a computer
is located. Status quo metadata programs do not allow the Government to listen in
on phone calls or read emails. The information acquired does not include the
content of any communications or the identity of any subscriber.

Minimization argues that the Status Quo fails because so-called superminimization procedures are not in place. Super-minimization requires intelligence
agencies to delete all information gathered on persons that are subsequently
determined to have not been relevant to the federal investigation at hand. Absent
these super-minimization protections, intelligence agencies could arguably retain
that information and use it in different investigations.

Multiple Authorities - argues that the Status Quo fails because of several different
programs that authorize surveillance. These cards are probably best run in
conjunction with an Affirmative plan that seeks to ban or eliminate many
surveillance programs.

NSLs - National Security Letters. These cards will argue that the Status Quo fails
because the FBI currently has the authority to issue NSLs. These letters are served
on communications service providers (like phone or internet companies) by the FBI
to compel provision of communication or Internet activity. An NSL cannot demand
the content of a call, but can compel provision of metadata. Recipients of NSLs may
be subject to a gag order that forbids them from revealing the letters' existence to
the public. No approval from a judge is required for the FBI to issue an NSL, but the
recipient of the NSL can still challenge the nondisclosure requirement in federal
court.

Pen Register or Trap and Trace device - A device that decodes or records
electronic information like outgoing numbers from a telephone. A pen register
technically was a device that recorded data from telegraph machines. But the term
has survived and applies to modern communication. These cards will argue that the
Status Quo fails because the law provides insufficient protection against bulk
collection of data obtained from Pen Register or Trap and Trace devices.

PRISM PRISM is a US surveillance program under which the National Security

Agency (NSA) collects Internet communications from at least nine major US Internet
companies. PRISM requests for internet data are authorized under Section 702 of
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (see FAA or FAA-Section 702 above). The
program is intended to identity foreign citizens but the program is often accused
of inadvertently gathering intelligence on US citizens. According to The Washington
Post, US intelligence analysts search PRISM data using terms intended to identify
targets whom the analysts suspect with at least 51 percent confidence to not be
U.S. citizen.

Signal Args these cards speak to the image or perception of the law as seen by
the US public or foreign countries.

SST - Specific Selector Terms. These cards will argue that the Status Quo fails
because the law allows searches to be conducted with broad selector terms like
a zip code, an area code, or the IP address of a web hosting service that hosts
thousands of web sites. These broad searches stumble onto much more data. Some
privacy advocates want to demand an SST which would require searches that are
much more narrow (i.e. an individuals name).

***For summer camp students I also want to talk about two

more programs.
(please take notes here:)

1AC Inherency and Solvency

Section

1AC Version if the plan is narrow

Contention One
Contention One the Status Quo fails, and the Af solves.
The Freedom Act recently became Law. This new Freedom Act
wont substantially reduce bulk surveillance. Safeguards from
the original Freedom Act are needed.
New York Times 15
(editorial board of New York Times The Opinion Pages of New York Times More Excuses on the
Patriot Act - May 1st - http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/opinion/more-excuses-on-the-patriotact.html?smid=fb-share&_r=2)

designers have a term minimal viable product to describe early versions

of things like iPhone apps that they can rush to market. The idea is to get something out
and refine it as they go along. Thats the argument being made for a measure in Congress
that would modify the Patriot Act to make it somewhat harder for the government to
conduct mass surveillance of Americans without regard to whether they committed
any misdeeds. Sure, there are compromises, Americans are told, but we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the
Software

good. The bill is a critical first step toward reining in surveillance by the National Security Agency and is a basis for more reform,
said Human Rights Watch.

Except the Constitution is not Candy Crush.

The same

idea lets do what we can and improve it later was used to shove the original Patriot Act through Congress. It was used to
justify the inadequate changes later made to the act, many of which made it more intrusive on Americans rights. In 2008, we got a
reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, that provided retroactive cover for the illegal surveillance of innocent

The new bill, the USA

Freedom Act, was passed by the House Judiciary Committee on Thursday in a 25-to-2 vote and sent to the floor for what
seems like near-certain approval. It does contain useful changes to Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which
Americans conducted under President George W. Bush behind the false flag of counterterrorism.

was cynically misinterpreted by the Bush administration to cover the collection of millions of telephone records in the United States
and elsewhere. Section 215 will expire on June 1 if Congress does not act, but that is unlikely. The new bill would narrow the kinds of
records, including so-called metadata from phone calls, that the intelligence agencies can collect without bothering to obtain a
warrant even from the obliging FISA court, which virtually always grants one. It adds transparency measures related to government
surveillance programs, and provides for more oversight of those programs.

But many of those provisions are

weaker than in earlier versions of the bill , and weaker than they need to be.
The House committee rejected amendments designed to provide greater safeguards for civil liberties including one from a
Republican that would have required the government to get a warrant before searching collected communications for information
about Americans.

The bill does not end the bulk collection of surveillance

data under Section 215. Rather, it limits those operations, which, in addition to eroding
the Bill of Rights, have been shown to be worthless in protecting America. The American Civil Liberties Union believes

the bill

doesnt sufficiently tighten the definition of the terms used to

justify data collection , or properly limit the retention of
information about people who are not suspected of
wrongdoing, or require meaningful disclosure of so-called backdoor searches of databases by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. It does not appoint an advocate to argue before the FISA court on behalf of civil liberties; instead, it simply appoints a
panel of experts to advise the court, where only the government is allowed to present a case, in secret.

The new Freedom Act fails. Pen register, super-minimization,

and SST standards from the original draft of the Freedom Act
would solve.
Greene 15
(et al; David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney and Civil Liberties Director for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation. David is also an adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where
he teaches classes in First Amendment and media law and an instructor in the journalism department
at San Francisco State University. David has significant experience litigating First Amendment issues in
state and federal trial and appellate courts and is one of the country's leading advocates for and
commentators on freedom of expression in the arts. ACLU v. Clapper and the Congress: How The
Second Circuits Decision Affects the Legislative Landscape - Electronic Frontier Foundation - May 11,
2015 - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/aclu-v-clapper-and-congress-how-second-circuitsdecision-affects-legislative)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper has determined that the NSAs telephone
records program went far beyond what Congress authorized when it passed Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2001.
The court unequivocally rejected the governments secret reinterpretation of Section 215. Among many important
findings, the court found that Section 215s authorization of the collection of business records that are relevant to
an authorized investigation could not be read to include the dragnet collection of telephone records. The court also
took issue with the fact that this strained application of the law was accomplished in secret and approved by the
secret and one-sided Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court). EFF filed amicus briefs in this case in both
the district and circuit courts, and we congratulate our colleagues at the ACLU on this significant victory. The
Second Circuits opinion stands as a clear sign that the courts are ready to step in and rule that mass surveillance is

The Second Circuits decision , however, also marks a significant

change in the context of the ongoing legislative debate in Congress. Above all, it is clear
illegal. Thats great news.

that Congress must do more to rein in dragnet surveillance by the NSA. Clean
Reauthorization First, the Second Circuits opinion should stop the idea of a "clean
reauthorization" (a reauthorization with no reforms ) of Section 215, which is set to expire
June 1. Last month, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Intelligence Chair Richard Burr
introduced S. 1035, a bill that would extend the current language of Section 215 through 2020, thereby continuing
the mass spying rubber-stamped by the FISA Court. The morning of the Second Circuit decision, both Senators took
to the Senate floor to vehemently defend the bulk collection program and push for a clean reauthorization. But a
clean reauthorization is much more complicated now. Congress cant pretend that the Second Circuit's narrow
reading of relevant to an authorized investigation doesnt exist. Its likely that if Congress merely does a clean
reauthorization of Section 215, then the district court in ACLU v. Clapper will enjoin the government from using
Section 215 as authorization for the call records dragnet, because the district court is bound by the Second Circuit
decision. However, if a reauthorization made it clear that Congress intended to reject the Second Circuits narrow
reading of the law, it could cause further confusion and the government could argue that Congress has fully
embraced the dragnet. Were encouraging people to call Congress and tell their lawmakers to reject Senator
McConnell's clean reauthorization in order to avoid the risk that Congress might reject the Second Circuits decision

The USA Freedom Act Must Be Strengthened

In light of the Second Circuits

EFF asks Congress to strengthen its proposed reform of Section 215, the USA Freedom
Act. Pending those improvements, EFF is withdrawing our support of the bill. Were urging Congress to
roll the draft back to the stronger and meaningful reforms included in the 2013
version of USA Freedom and affirmatively embrace the Second Circuits opinion on the limits of Section
215. Most importantly, the Second Circuits correct interpretation of the law should be expressly embraced
by Congress in order to avoid any confusion going forward about what the key terms in the statute
mean, especially the terms relevant and investigation. This recognition could be in the bill itself or, less
decision,

preferably, in legislative history. The House Judiciary Committee has already included such language in its report to

the full House of Representatives, but now the Senate must include the language in the bill or in its own legislative
history.
help

This easy task

will make sure that the law is not read as rejecting the Second Circuits reading and

will

ensure that the USA Freedom Act actually accomplishes its goal of ending

bulk collection. The House Report on USA Freedom, issued today, takes a step forward by stating that:
Congress decision to leave in place the relevance standard for Section 501 orders should not be construed as
Congress intent to ratify the FISA Courts interpretation of that term. These changes restore meaningful limits to
the relevance requirement of Section 501, consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper. Ensuring that the Senate doesn't move away from the legislative history should be a top
priority as the bill moves forward. But thats the bare minimum Congress must do. The Second Circuit, and
especially Judge Sacks concurrence, noted a lack of both transparency and a true adversary in the FISA Court. The
2014 and 2013 USA Freedom Act had stronger FISA Court reforms, particularly around the creation of a special
advocate who would argue against the government in the FISA Court. The Second Circuits opinion also emphasizes
that typical subpoenas seek only records of "suspects under investigation, or of people or businesses that have
contact with such subjects." Under the current USA Freedom Act, the government can collect records of a "second
hop,"the numbers, and associated metadata, that have been in contact with the numbers collected initially
without any additional authorization. The bill should be changed so that the government must file another
application for any further records it wants to collect. Automatically obtaining a "second hop" is unacceptable
because it sweeps in too many peoples records.

The current

USA

Freedom Act is also out-of-sync

with the courts narrow view of permissible collection of records because it lacks a
rigorous definition of the " specific selection term" the government can use
to identify the records it wants to collect. This can be addressed by two changes: (1)

drawing upon last year's definition in the USA Freedom Act ; and, (2)
closing down potential loopholes like the definition of "address" or the use of a "person" to include a corporate
person.

Restoring Important Parts of 2013s USA Freedom Act This

is also an opportunity and a new context for Congress to address the shortcomings of the

new ly introduced USA Freedom Act that we previously wrote about. Congress should put
back key provisions that were dropped along the way as well as remove those that were
introduced at the behest of the intelligence community.

First, the "super minimization"

procedures , which were key privacy procedures that mandated the

deletion of any information obtained about a person not connected to the
investigation, should be reintroduced. Key provisions establishing a higher legal

standard and compliance assessment for the use of pen register/trap-and-trace

devices , legal standing to sue the government over surveillance practices, and the original transparency
provisions allowing government and corporate disclosure of surveillance orders

resuscitated.

should also be

1AC Version if the plan broader (and

ends surveillance)

Contention One
Contention One the Status Quo fails, and the Af solves.
The Freedom Act recently became Law. The new Freedom Act
wont substantially reduce surveillance. Pen register, superminimization, and SST standards from the original draft of the
Freedom Act are needed.
Greene 15
(et al; David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney and Civil Liberties Director for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation. David is also an adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where
he teaches classes in First Amendment and media law and an instructor in the journalism department
at San Francisco State University. David has significant experience litigating First Amendment issues in
state and federal trial and appellate courts and is one of the country's leading advocates for and
commentators on freedom of expression in the arts. ACLU v. Clapper and the Congress: How The
Second Circuits Decision Affects the Legislative Landscape - Electronic Frontier Foundation - May 11,
2015 - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/aclu-v-clapper-and-congress-how-second-circuitsdecision-affects-legislative)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper has determined that the NSAs telephone
records program went far beyond what Congress authorized when it passed Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2001.
The court unequivocally rejected the governments secret reinterpretation of Section 215. Among many important
findings, the court found that Section 215s authorization of the collection of business records that are relevant to
an authorized investigation could not be read to include the dragnet collection of telephone records. The court also
took issue with the fact that this strained application of the law was accomplished in secret and approved by the
secret and one-sided Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court). EFF filed amicus briefs in this case in both
the district and circuit courts, and we congratulate our colleagues at the ACLU on this significant victory. The
Second Circuits opinion stands as a clear sign that the courts are ready to step in and rule that mass surveillance is

The Second Circuits decision , however, also marks a significant

change in the context of the ongoing legislative debate in Congress. Above all, it is clear
illegal. Thats great news.

that Congress must do more to rein in dragnet surveillance by the NSA. Clean
Reauthorization First, the Second Circuits opinion should stop the idea of a "clean
reauthorization" (a reauthorization with no reforms ) of Section 215, which is set to expire
June 1. Last month, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Intelligence Chair Richard Burr
introduced S. 1035, a bill that would extend the current language of Section 215 through 2020, thereby continuing
the mass spying rubber-stamped by the FISA Court. The morning of the Second Circuit decision, both Senators took
to the Senate floor to vehemently defend the bulk collection program and push for a clean reauthorization. But a
clean reauthorization is much more complicated now. Congress cant pretend that the Second Circuit's narrow
reading of relevant to an authorized investigation doesnt exist. Its likely that if Congress merely does a clean
reauthorization of Section 215, then the district court in ACLU v. Clapper will enjoin the government from using
Section 215 as authorization for the call records dragnet, because the district court is bound by the Second Circuit
decision. However, if a reauthorization made it clear that Congress intended to reject the Second Circuits narrow
reading of the law, it could cause further confusion and the government could argue that Congress has fully
embraced the dragnet. Were encouraging people to call Congress and tell their lawmakers to reject Senator
McConnell's clean reauthorization in order to avoid the risk that Congress might reject the Second Circuits decision

The USA Freedom Act Must Be Strengthened

In light of the Second Circuits

EFF asks Congress to strengthen its proposed reform of Section 215, the USA Freedom
Act. Pending those improvements, EFF is withdrawing our support of the bill. Were urging Congress to
roll the draft back to the stronger and meaningful reforms included in the 2013
version of USA Freedom and affirmatively embrace the Second Circuits opinion on the limits of Section
215. Most importantly, the Second Circuits correct interpretation of the law should be expressly embraced
by Congress in order to avoid any confusion going forward about what the key terms in the statute
mean, especially the terms relevant and investigation. This recognition could be in the bill itself or, less
decision,

preferably, in legislative history. The House Judiciary Committee has already included such language in its report to
the full House of Representatives, but now the Senate must include the language in the bill or in its own legislative
history.
help

This easy task

will make sure that the law is not read as rejecting the Second Circuits reading and

will

ensure that the USA Freedom Act actually accomplishes its goal of ending

bulk collection. The House Report on USA Freedom, issued today, takes a step forward by stating that:
Congress decision to leave in place the relevance standard for Section 501 orders should not be construed as
Congress intent to ratify the FISA Courts interpretation of that term. These changes restore meaningful limits to
the relevance requirement of Section 501, consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper. Ensuring that the Senate doesn't move away from the legislative history should be a top
priority as the bill moves forward. But thats the bare minimum Congress must do. The Second Circuit, and
especially Judge Sacks concurrence, noted a lack of both transparency and a true adversary in the FISA Court. The
2014 and 2013 USA Freedom Act had stronger FISA Court reforms, particularly around the creation of a special
advocate who would argue against the government in the FISA Court. The Second Circuits opinion also emphasizes
that typical subpoenas seek only records of "suspects under investigation, or of people or businesses that have
contact with such subjects." Under the current USA Freedom Act, the government can collect records of a "second
hop,"the numbers, and associated metadata, that have been in contact with the numbers collected initially
without any additional authorization. The bill should be changed so that the government must file another
application for any further records it wants to collect. Automatically obtaining a "second hop" is unacceptable
because it sweeps in too many peoples records.

The current

USA

Freedom Act is also out-of-sync

with the courts narrow view of permissible collection of records because it lacks a
rigorous definition of the " specific selection term" the government can use
to identify the records it wants to collect. This can be addressed by two changes: (1)

drawing upon last year's definition in the USA Freedom Act ; and, (2)
closing down potential loopholes like the definition of "address" or the use of a "person" to include a corporate
person.

Restoring Important Parts of 2013s USA Freedom Act This

is also an opportunity and a new context for Congress to address the shortcomings of the

new ly introduced USA Freedom Act that we previously wrote about. Congress should put
back key provisions that were dropped along the way as well as remove those that were
introduced at the behest of the intelligence community.

First, the "super minimization"

procedures , which were key privacy procedures that mandated the

deletion of any information obtained about a person not connected to the
investigation, should be reintroduced. Key provisions establishing a higher legal

standard and compliance assessment for the use of pen register/trap-and-trace

devices , legal standing to sue the government over surveillance practices, and the original transparency
provisions allowing government and corporate disclosure of surveillance orders

resuscitated.

should also be

The current Freedom Act is too narrow. Its limited to phone

collection and not other bulk collection programs.
Kopstein 15
Joshua Kopstein is a journalist and researcher. His work focuses on Internet law and disorder,
surveillance and government secrecy. He has written pieces for Slate Magazine and The New Yorker.
USA Freedom Act gives NSA everything it wants and less - Al Jazeera Americas The Scrutineer
June 2nd http://america.aljazeera.com/blogs/scrutineer/2015/6/2/usa-freedom-act-gives-nsaeverything-it-wants--and-less.html
The Senate adopted the House version of the bill, which had been watered down at the behest of intelligence agencies, and President

Obama signed the

Freedom Act into law later this evening. While far from what most would recognize as reform, at the end of the day, the bill is probably more of a victory for
transparency than it is for privacy. That's because the Freedom Act has focused almost exclusively on ending one
single National Security Agency program under one single authority: The secret bulk collection of
Americans' phone records under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, revealed almost exactly two years ago by Edward Snowden. Section 215 and two
other emergency post-9/11 surveillance provisions briefly lapsed Sunday night after the Senate failed to reauthorize them. The new law replaces the
NSAs bulk data collection with a program that requires telecom companies to retain
the data and grant access to intelligence agencies through more targeted court
orders. The other surveillance powers roving wiretaps and the so-called lone wolf provision remained unused even as surveillance hawks raised apocalyptic warnings about
letting them expire. Two independent White House panels have found that the metadata collection program has never helped to foil a terrorist plot. A major appellate court decision also
ruled the program was illegal, and that it merely served to create a vast data bank of extremely sensitive information specifically, phone numbers and when and how often they
were called about millions of innocent Americans. In other words,

the bulk phone records program was on its way out

no matter what. The court ruling could have been a big opportunity to push for
an end to all domestic bulk collection under the Patriot Act, not just phone records.
But additional privacy protections had been negotiated away in the House, and
Senate advocates were not given a chance to add them back. The result renders the
Freedom Act a missed opportunity to address countless other NSA authorities, such as
Executive Order 12333 and Section 702 of the F ISA A mendments A ct, ones we know (again, thanks to Snowden)
continue to collect many other types of data.

The new Freedom Act will fail definitions are too watereddown to check mass surveillance. The original Freedom Act
solves.
Tummarello 14
Internally quoting Harley Geiger, senior counsel at the Center for Democracy and Technology and Kevin
Bankston, policy director of the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute. Kate Tummarello
is a technology reporter for POLITICO Pro. Previously, she has written about technology for The Hill,
Communications Daily and Roll Call. She's a graduate of Hamilton College, where she studied public
policy. NSA reform legislation 'watered down'? - The Hill - 05/20/14 http://thehill.com/policy/technology/206686-privacy-advocates-pull-support-for-watered-down-usafreedom

Privacy advocates who have pushed for legislation to reform U.S. government
surveillance are backing away from a House bill that they say has been "watered down" as it

Though the original legislation intended to end sweeping

surveillance programs, the bill the House will vote on as early as this week allows for mass
surveillance on a slightly smaller scale, according to Harley Geiger, senior counsel
at the Center for Democracy and Technology. The bill the USA Freedom Act, sponsored by
heads to the floor.

was originally written to prohibit the

U.S. government's sweeping surveillance program. But after moving through the House Judiciary and
Intelligence committees, where it saw some changes but retained the support of privacy advocates, last minute negotiations
between House leadership and the Obama administration have left the bill with weakened language when
Patriot Act author Rep. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.)

it comes to banning mass surveillance , advocates say. On Tuesday, Sensenbrenner filed a

managers amendment at the House Rules Committee to be considered on the floor in place of the bill that passed the Judiciary
and Intelligence committees. Sensenbrenners amendment still prohibits bulk collection but would
allow government officials to search for records using a discrete term , such as a term specifically
identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device, used by the Government to limit the scope of the information or tangible
things sought. While

the standard in Sensenbrenner's amendment is more specific than the one under current law, it

leaves too much room for interpretation, as opposed to earlier versions

of the bill , Geiger said. It may keep the intelligence community from sweeping surveillance on a national level, but it is
ambiguous enough to allow for large scale collection, he said. Ambiguity is what got
us into this mess in the first place , he said, referring to a controversial National Security Agency program that
collected information about Americans phone calls. The U.S. government determined that data about
all Americans phone calls was relevant to intelligence investigations under
current surveillance laws and, therefore, could be collected. "We cannot in good
conscience support this weakened version of th e USA Freedom Act, where key reforms
especially those intended to end bulk collection and increase transparency have been

substantially watered down ," Kevin Bankston, policy director of the New America Foundation's Open
Technology Institute, said. Bankston said his group is "gravely disappointed that, rather than respecting the wishes of the unanimous
Judiciary and Intelligence committees, the House leadership and the Obama Administration have chosen to disrupt the hard-fought

Geiger also expressed frustration at the way last

minute negotiations have led to a weaker bill. He pointed to bipartisan support for the original USA
Freedom Act and the international backlash that came after last years revelations about
U.S. surveillance. Despite all of that, the bill has been watered down to provide only
mild reform, he said.
compromise that so many of us were willing to support just two weeks ago."

Plan text options

Choose a plan text that you like

Plan options
Plan Option #1:
The United States federal government should pass the original version of the USA
FREEDOM Act (H.R.3361)

Plan Option #2:

The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic
surveillance by strengthening the USA FREEDOM Act to:
require use of a specific selection term to satisfy the reasonable,
articulable suspicion standard
require that information collected through pen register or trap and trace
devices via emergency authorizations be subject to the same procedural
safeguards as non-emergency collections.
require super minimization" procedures that delete information obtained
about a person not connected to the investigation.

Plan Option #3:

Regarding its monitoring of United States persons, the United States federal
government should:
require use of a specific selection term to satisfy current reasonable,
articulable suspicion standards
require that information collected through pen register or trap and trace
devices via emergency authorizations be subject to the same procedural
safeguards as non-emergency collections.
require super minimization" procedures that delete information obtained
about a person not connected to the investigation

Plan Option #4:

Bulk collection of domestic metadata by United States federal intelligence agencies
should cease.

Plan Option #5:

In the absence of an individually-tailored warrant obtained via use of a specific

selector term, federal intelligence agencies should cease collection of domestic
phone, internet, email, and-or associated electronic records.

Plan Option #6:

In the absence of an individually-tailored warrant obtained via use of a specific
selector term, federal intelligence agencies should cease collection of domestic
phone, internet, email, and associated electronic records. This should include, but
not be limited to, ending the monitoring of United States persons under Sections
214 and 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act; Executive Order 12333; and Section 702 of
the FISA Amendments Act.

Plan Option #7:

The United States Supreme Court should hold that domestic surveillance conducted
by federal intelligence agencies cannot meet the reasonable, articulable suspicion
standard without having used a specific selection term and that domestic
surveillance conducted by federal intelligence agencies is in violation of the 4th
Amendment if:
it collects information through pen register or trap and trace devices via
emergency authorizations that were not subject to the same procedural
safeguards as non-emergency collections; and-or
if it fails to delete information obtained about a person not connected to the
investigation.

Plan Option #8:

The United States Supreme Court should hold that domestic surveillance conducted
by federal intelligence agencies violates the 4th Amendment if it collects domestic
phone, internet, email, and-or associated electronic records in the absence of an
individually-tailored warrant obtained via use of a specific selector term.

Plan Option #9:

The United States federal government should hold that domestic surveillance
conducted by federal intelligence agencies violates the 4th Amendment if it collects
domestic phone, internet, email, and-or associated electronic records in the

absence of an individually-tailored warrant obtained via use of a specific selector

term.

Plan Option #10:

The United States Supreme Court should hold that no statute presently authorizes
federal intelligence agencies to engage in bulk collection of domestic phone,
internet, email, and-or associated electronic records.

1AC - Privacy Advantage

Privacy Advantage 1AC, longer

version

Privacy Advantage longer version

Contention # ____ is Privacy
Privacy outweighs.
- Utilitarian impact calc is skewed; and
- Reject Surveillance as a structural matter of power
even when its reformed, innocents are powerless
unless neutral oversights in place.
Solove 7
Daniel Solove is an Associate Professor at George Washington University Law School and holds a J.D.
from Yale Law School. He is one of the worlds leading expert in information privacy law and is well
known for his academic work on privacy and for popular books on how privacy relates with information
technology. He has written 9 books and more than 50 law review articles From the Article Ive Got
Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy - San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 745 GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 289 available from download at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998565

the nothing to hide argument . The reasoning of this argument is that

when it comes to government surveillance or use of personal data, there is no privacy
violation if a person has nothing sensitive, embarrassing, or illegal to conceal. Criminals involved
in illicit activities have something to fear, but for the vast majority of people, their activities are not illegal or
It is time to return to

embarrassing. Understanding privacy as I have set forth reveals the flaw of the nothing to hide argument at its roots. Many
commentators who respond to the argument attempt a direct refutation by trying to point to things that people would want to hide.
But the problem with the nothing to hide argument is the underlying assumption that privacy is about hiding bad things.

Agreeing with this assumption concedes far too much ground and leads to an
unproductive discussion of information people would likely want or not want to hide. As Bruce Schneier aptly notes,
the nothing to hide argument stems from a faulty premise that privacy is about
hiding a wrong.75 The deeper problem with the nothing to hide argument is that it myopically views privacy as a form of
concealment or secrecy. But understanding privacy as a plurality of related problems demonstrates that concealment of bad things
is just one among many problems caused by government programs such as the NSA surveillance and data mining. In the categories

The NSA programs involve problems of information

collection, specifically the category of surveillance in the taxonomy. Wiretapping involves audio surveillance of peoples
in my taxonomy, several problems are implicated.

conversations. Data mining often begins with the collection of personal information, usually from various third parties that possess
peoples data. Under current Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, when the government gathers data from third
parties, there is no Fourth Amendment protection because people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in information exposed
to others.76 In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank
records because [a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.77 In Smith v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court held that people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial because they know that
they must convey numerical information to the phone company, and therefore they cannot harbor any general expectation that
the numbers they dial will remain secret.78 As I have argued extensively elsewhere, the lack of Fourth Amendment protection of
third party records results in the governments ability to access an extensive amount of personal information with minimal limitation
or oversight.79 Many scholars have referred to information collection as a form of surveillance. Dataveillance, a term coined by
Roger Clarke, refers to the systemic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or
communications of one or more persons.80 Christopher Slobogin has referred to the gathering of personal information in business

Surveillance can create chilling effects on free speech , free

association, and other First Amendment rights essential for democracy. 82 Even
surveillance of legal activities can inhibit people from engaging in them. The value
records as transaction surveillance.81

of protecting against chilling effects is not measured simply by focusing on the

particular individuals who are deterred from exercising their rights. Chilling effects
harm society because, among other things, they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed
and the degree of freedom with which to engage in political activity. The nothing to hide
argument focuses primarily on the information collection problems associated with the NSA programs. It contends that limited
surveillance of lawful activity will not chill behavior sufficiently to outweigh the security benefits. One can certainly quarrel with this
argument, but one of the difficulties with chilling effects is that it is often very hard to demonstrate concrete evidence of deterred
behavior.83 Whether the NSAs surveillance and collection of telephone records has deterred people from communicating particular
ideas would be a difficult question to answer. Far too often, discussions of the NSA surveillance and data mining define the problem
solely in terms of surveillance. To return to my discussion of metaphor, the problems are not just Orwellian, but Kafkaesque.

The

NSA programs are problematic even if no information people want to hide is

uncovered.

In The Trial,

the problem is not inhibited behavior, but rather a sufocating

powerlessness and vulnerability created by the court systems use of personal

data and its exclusion of the protagonist from having any knowledge or participation in the process. The harms consist of those
created by bureaucraciesindifference, errors, abuses, frustration, and lack of transparency and accountability. One such harm, for
example, which I call aggregation, emerges from the combination of small bits of seemingly innocuous data.84 When combined, the
information becomes much more telling about a person. For the person who truly has nothing to hide, aggregation is not much of a
problem. But in the stronger, less absolutist form of the nothing to hide argument, people argue that certain pieces of information
are not something they would hide. Aggregation, however, means that by combining pieces of information we might not care to

the allure of data

mining for the government is its ability to reveal a lot about our personalities and
activities by sophisticated means of analyzing data. Therefore, without greater transparency in data mining , it is hard to
claim that programs like the NSA data mining program will not reveal information people
might want to hide, as we do not know precisely what is revealed. Moreover, data mining aims to be predictive of
conceal, the government can glean information about us that we might really want to conceal. Part of

behavior, striving to prognosticate about our future actions. People who match certain profiles are deemed likely to engage in a
similar pattern of behavior. It is quite difficult to refute actions that one has not yet done. Having nothing to hide will not always

Another problem in the taxonomy, which is implicated by the NSA

program, is the problem I refer to as exclusion.85 Exclusion is the problem caused when people are prevented from
dispel predictions of future activity.

having knowledge about how their information is being used, as well as barred from being able to access and correct errors in that
data. The NSA program involves a massive database of information that individuals cannot access. Indeed, the very existence of the
program was kept secret for years.86 This kind of information processing, which forbids peoples knowledge or involvement,
resembles in some ways a kind of due process problem. It is a structural problem involving the way people are treated by
government institutions. Moreover, it creates a power imbalance between individuals and the government. To what extent should
the Executive Branch and an agency such as the NSA, which is relatively insulated from the political process and public

This issue is not about whether the information

gathered is something people want to hide, but rather about the power and the
structure of government. A related problem involves secondary use. Secondary use is the use of data obtained for
accountability, have a significant power over citizens?

one purpose for a different unrelated purpose without the persons consent. The Administration has said little about how long the
data will be stored, how it will be used, and what it could be used for in the future. The potential future uses of any piece of personal
information are vast, and without limits or accountability on how that information is used, it is hard for people to assess the dangers
of the data being in the governments control. Therefore, the problem with the nothing to hide argument is that it focuses on just
one or two particular kinds of privacy problemsthe disclosure of personal information or surveillanceand not others. It assumes a
particular view about what privacy entails, and it sets
to distinguish here between two

the terms for debate in a manner that is often unproductive. It is important

ways of justifying a program such as the NSA surveillance

and data

mining program. The first way is to not recognize a problem. This is how the nothing to hide argument worksit denies even the
existence of a problem. The second manner of justifying such a program

is to acknowledge the problems but

contend that the benefits of the NSA program outweigh the privacy

harms . The first justification influences the second, because the low value given to privacy is based upon a narrow view of
the problem.

The key misunderstanding is that the nothing to hide argument views privacy in a

particular wayas a form of secrecy,

as the right to hide things. But there are many

other types of harm involved beyond exposing ones secrets to the government . Privacy
problems are often difficult to recognize and redress because they create a panoply of types of harm. Courts, legislators, and others
look for particular types of harm to the exclusion of others, and their narrow focus blinds them to seeing other kinds of harms. One

of the difficulties with the nothing to hide argument is that it looks for a visceral kind of

injury as opposed to a structural one . Ironically, this underlying conception of injury is shared by
those arguing in favor of the conflicting interests
to privacy. For example, law professor Ann Bartow argues that I have failed to describe privacy harms in a
both those advocating for greater privacy protections and

compelling manner in my article, A Taxonomy of Privacy, where I provide a framework for understanding the manifold different
privacy problems.87 Bartows primary complaint is that my taxonomy frames privacy harms in dry, analytical terms that fail to
sufficiently identify and animate the compelling ways that privacy violations can negatively impact the lives of living, breathing
human beings beyond simply provoking feelings of unease.88 Bartow claims that the taxonomy

does not have

enough dead bodies and that privacys lack of blood and death, or at least of
buckets of money, distances privacy harms from other categories of tort law.
Most privacy problems lack dead bodies. Of course, there are exceptional cases such as the murders of
broken bones and

Rebecca Shaeffer and Amy Boyer. Rebecca Shaeffer was an actress killed when a stalker obtained her address from a Department of
Motor Vehicles record.90 This incident prompted Congress to pass the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994.91 Amy Boyer was
murdered by a stalker who obtained her personal information, including her work address and Social Security number, from a
database company.92 These examples aside, there is not a lot of death and gore in privacy law. If this is the standard to recognize a
problem, then few privacy problems will be recognized. Horrific cases are not typical, and the purpose of my taxonomy is to explain
why most privacy problems are still harmful despite this fact. Bartows objection is actually very similar to the nothing to hide
argument. Those advancing the nothing to hide argument have in mind a particular kind of visceral
privacy harm, one where privacy is violated only when something deeply embarrassing or discrediting is revealed. Bartows

quest for horror stories represents a similar desire to find visceral privacy harms. The problem is that not
all privacy harms are like this. At the end of the day,
harms will be difficult in many cases.

privacy is not a horror movie, and demanding more palpable

Yet there is still a harm worth addressing, even if it is

not sensationalistic.

In many instances, privacy is threatened not by singular egregious acts, but by a slow

series of relatively minor acts which gradually begin to add up. In this way, privacy problems resemble certain environmental harms
which occur over time through a series of small acts by different actors. Bartow wants to point to a major spill, but gradual pollution
by a multitude of different actors often creates worse problems. The law frequently struggles with recognizing harms that do not
result in embarrassment, humiliation, or physical or psychological injury.93 For example, after the September 11 attacks, several
airlines gave their passenger records to federal agencies in direct violation of their privacy policies. The federal agencies used the
data to study airline security.94 A group of passengers sued Northwest Airlines for disclosing their personal information. One of their
claims was that Northwest Airlines breached its contract with the passengers. In Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., the court rejected
the contract claim because broad statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract claims, the passengers
never claimed they relied upon the policy or even read it, and they failed to allege any contractual damages arising out of the
alleged breach.95 Another court reached a similar conclusion.96 Regardless of the merits of the decisions on contract law, the
cases represent a difficulty with the legal system in addressing privacy problems. The disclosure of the passenger records
represented a breach of confidentiality.97 The problems caused by breaches of confidentiality do not merely consist of individual
emotional distress; they involve a violation of trust within a relationship. There is a strong social value in ensuring that promises are
kept and that trust is maintained in relationships between businesses and their customers. The problem of secondary use is also
implicated in this case.98 Secondary use involves data collected for one purpose being used for an unrelated purpose without
peoples consent. The airlines gave passenger information to the government for an entirely different purpose beyond that for which
it was originally gathered. Secondary use problems often do not cause financial, or even psychological, injuries. Instead, the harm is
one of power imbalance. In Dyer, data was disseminated in a way that ignored airline passengers interests in the data despite
promises made in the privacy policy. Even if the passengers were unaware of the policy, there is a social value in ensuring that
companies adhere to established limits on the way they use personal information. Otherwise, any stated limits become meaningless,
and companies have discretion to boundlessly use data. Such a state of affairs can leave nearly all consumers in a powerless
position. The harm, then, is less one to particular individuals than it is a structural harm. A similar problem surfaces in another case,
Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank.99 A group of plaintiffs sued Chase Manhattan Bank for selling customer information to third parties
in violation of its privacy policy, which stated that the information would remain confidential. The court held that even presuming
these allegations were true, the plaintiffs could not prove any actual injury: [T]he harm at the heart of this purported class action,
is that class members were merely offered products and services which they were free to decline. This does not qualify as actual
harm. The complaint does not allege any single instance where a named plaintiff or any class member suffered any actual harm due
to the receipt of an unwanted telephone solicitation or a piece of junk mail.100 The courts view of harm, however, did not account

When balancing privacy against security, the privacy harms are

characterized in terms of injuries to the individual, and the interest in security is often
characterized in a more broad societal way. The security interest in the NSA
programs has often been defined improperly. In a Congressional hearing, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
for the breach of confidentiality.
often

stated: Our enemy is listening, and I cannot help but wonder if they are not shaking their heads in amazement at the thought that
anyone would imperil such a sensitive program by leaking its existence in the first place, and smiling at the prospect that we might
now disclose even more or perhaps even unilaterally disarm ourselves of a key tool in the war on terror.101 The balance between
privacy and security is often cast in terms of whether a particular government information collection activity should or should not be

The issue, however, often is not whether the NSA or other government agencies should be
allowed to engage in particular forms of information gathering; rather, it is what kinds of
barred.

oversight and accountability we want in place when the government engages in searches
and seizures. The government can employ nearly any kind of investigatory activity with a warrant supported by probable
cause. This is a mechanism of oversightit forces government officials to justify their
suspicions to a neutral judge or magistrate before engaging in the tactic. For example, electronic surveillance law
allows for wiretapping, but limits the practice with judicial supervision, procedures to minimize the breadth of the wiretapping, and
requirements that the law enforcement officials report back to the court to prevent abuses.102 It is these procedures that the Bush
Administration has ignored by engaging in the warrantless NSA surveillance. The question is not whether we want the government
to monitor such conversations, but whether the Executive Branch should adhere to the appropriate oversight procedures that
Congress has enacted into law, or should covertly ignore any oversight. Therefore, the security interest should not get weighed in its
totality against the privacy interest. Rather, what should get weighed is the extent of marginal limitation on the effectiveness of a
government information gathering or data mining program by imposing judicial oversight and minimization procedures. Only in
cases where such procedures will completely impair the government program should the security interest be weighed in total, rather

too often, the balancing

of privacy interests against security interests takes place in a manner that severely
than in the marginal difference between an unencumbered program versus a limited one. Far

shortchanges the privacy interest while inflating the security interests . Such is
the logic of the nothing to hide argument.

When the argument is unpacked, and its

underlying assumptions examined and challenged, we can see how it shifts

the debate to its terms , in which it draws power from its unfair advantage. It is
time to pull the curtain on the nothing to hide argument. Whether explicit or not, conceptions of privacy underpin
nearly every argument made about privacy, even the common quip Ive got nothing to hide. As I have sought to demonstrate in
this essay, understanding privacy as a pluralistic conception reveals that we are often talking past each other when discussing
privacy issues. By focusing more specifically on the related problems under the rubric of privacy, we can better address each
problem rather than ignore or conflate them.

The nothing to hide argument

represents a

way of

singular and

narrow

speaks to some problems, but not to others. It

conceiving of privacy, and it wins by

excluding consideration of the other problems often raised in

government surveillance and data mining programs. When engaged with directly, the nothing to hide
But when confronted
with the plurality of privacy problems implicated by government data collection and use beyond
surveillance and disclosure, the nothing to hide argument, in the end, has nothing to say.
argument can ensnare, for it forces the debate to focus on its narrow understanding of privacy.

Put privacy before security. The ballot should create a side

constraint where ends dont justify the means. This is
especially applies to data collection in the absence of probable
cause.
Albright 14
Logan Albright is the Research Analyst at FreedomWorks, and is responsible for producing a wide
variety of written content for print and the web, as well as conducting research for staff media
appearances and special projects. He received his Masters degree in economics from Georgia State
University. The NSA's Collateral Spying Freedom Works - 07/08/2014 http://www.freedomworks.org/content/nsas-collateral-spying
In short, the report, based on information obtained by Edward Snowden, reveals that during the course of its ordinary, otherwise

the NSA also collected data on large numbers of people who were
not specifically targeted. The agency calls this practice incidental surveillance. I call it
collateral spying. The report found that, on average, 9 out of every 10 people spied on were not the
intended target. The NSA has the legal authority to obtain a warrant based on
legal surveillance operations,

probable cause in order to surveil an individual. No one is disputing that. But when
this targeting results in collateral spying on vast numbers of innocents, in the absence of
probable cause and the corresponding warrants, that is a major problem. The NSA has asserted that such
incidental data collection is inevitable, and to a certain extent thats likely true. It is understandable that in some situations

should obviously be
minimized as far as possible , and at the very least the information should
be immediately purged from government databases , not stored for

the NSA may learn information about people other than the direct target, but this

years on end. In any case, the whole situation is indicative of the agencys cavalier attitude towards individual rights.
While national security is a concern we all share, the ends do not justify the means when
those means involve violate the constitutional protections afforded to citizens by our nations founders. It
is not okay to violate the rights of an innocent in the process of
achieving a broader goal, even if that goal is noble. The way the NSA has
been behaving is Machiavellian in the most literal sense. In his 16th century political treatise, The Prince, Niccolo
Machiavelli recognized a harsh reality of politics that still plagues us half a millennium later, writing, A prince wishing to keep his
state is very often forced to do evil. Taking Machiavellis advice as a green light for immoral behavior has been
the problem with governments throughout history, a problem the founding fathers sought to avoid by setting down precise
guidelines for what the government could and could not do in the form of a Constitution. The disregard of these rules, and

the

argument that there should be a national security exception to the Fourth

Amendment, undermines the entire purpose of the American experiment, and restores the European-style
tyrannies the revolutionaries fought against.

Even within a utilitarian framework, privacy outweighs for two

reasons:
First Structural bias. Their link inflates the security risk and
their impacts an epistemologically wrong.
Solove 8
Daniel Solove is an Associate Professor at George Washington University Law School and holds a J.D.
from Yale Law School. He is one of the worlds leading expert in information privacy law and is well
known for his academic work on privacy and for popular books on how privacy relates with information
technology. He has written 9 books and more than 50 law review articles From the Article: Data
Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate - University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 74, p. 343, 2008 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990030

Data mining is one issue in a larger debate about security and privacy. Proponents of data
mining justify it as an essential tool to protect our security. For example, Judge Richard Posner argues that [i]n an era of global
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the government has a compelling need to gather, pool, sift, and search vast quantities of information, much of it personal.9
Moreover, proponents of security measures argue that we must provide the executive branch with the discretion it needs to protect us. We cannot second guess every decision made by
government officials, and excessive meddling into issues of national security by judges and oth-ers lacking expertise will prove detrimental. For example, William Stuntz contends that
effective, active governmentgovernment that innovates, that protects people who need protecting, that acts aggressively when action is neededis dying. Privacy and transparency
are the diseases. We need to find a vaccine, and soon.10 Stuntz concludes that [i]n an age of terrorism, privacy rules are not simply unaffordable. They are perverse.11 We live in an
age of balancing, and

the

prevailing

view

is that most rights and civil liberties are not absolute.12 Thus,

liberty must be balanced

against security. But there are systematic problems with how the balancing occurs that

inflate the importance of the security interests and diminish

the value of the liberty interests .

In this essay, I examine some common difficulties in the way that liberty is balanced

against security in the context of data mining. Countless discussions about the tradeoffs between security and liberty begin by taking a security proposal and then weighing it against

liberty interests are cast as individual rights and balanced

against the security interests, which are cast in terms of the safety of society as a whole. Courts and
what it would cost our civil liberties. Often, the

commentators defer to the governments assertions about the effectiveness of the security interest. In the context of data mining, the liberty interest is limited by narrow understandings
of privacy that neglect to account for many privacy problems.

As a result, the balancing concludes with a victory in

favor of the security interest. But

as I will argue, important dimensions of data minings security benefits require more scrutiny, and the

privacy concerns are significantly greater than

acknowledged. These problems undermine the balancing process and
skew
results toward the security side of the scale.
currently

have

ed the

Debates about data mining

begin with the assumption that it is an essential tool in protecting our security. Terrorists lurk among us, and ferreting them out can be quite difficult. Examining data for patterns will
greatly assist in this endeavor, the argument goes, because certain identifiable characteristics and behaviors are likely to be associated with terrorist activity. Often, little more is said,
and the debate pro-ceeds to examine whether privacy is important enough to refrain from using such an effective terrorism-fighting tool. Many discussions about security and liberty
proceed in this fashion. They commence by assuming that a particular security measure is effective, and the only remaining question is whether the liberty interest is strong enough to
curtail that measure. But given the gravity of the security concerns over terrorism, the liberty interest has all but lost before it is even placed on the scale. Judge Richard Posner argues
that judges should give the executive branch considerable deference when it comes to assessing the security measures it proposes. In his recent book, Not a Suicide Pact: The
Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,13 Posner contends that judicial restraint is wise because when in doubt about the actual or likely consequences of a measure, the
pragmatic, empiricist judge will be inclined to give the other branches of government their head.14 According to Posner, [j]udges arent supposed to know much about national
security.15 Likewise, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule declare in their new book, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts,16 that the executive branch, not Congress or
the judicial branch, should make the tradeoff between security and liberty.17 Moreover, Posner and Vermeule declare that during emergencies, [c]onstitutional rights should be relaxed
so that the executive can move forcefully against the threat.18 The problem with such deference is that, historically, the executive branch has not always made the wisest national
security decisions. Nonetheless, Posner and Vermeule contend that notwithstanding its mistakes, the executive branch is better than the judicial and legislative branches on institutional
competence grounds.19 Judges are generalists, they observe, and the political insulation that protects them from current politics also deprives them of information, especially
information about novel security threats and necessary responses to those threats.20 Posner and Vermeule argue that during emergencies, the novelty of the threats and of the
necessary responses makes judicial routines and evolved legal rules seem inapposite, even obstructive.21 Judicial routines and legal rules, however, are the cornerstone of due
process and the rule of lawthe central building blocks of a free and democratic society. At many times, Posner, Vermeule, and other strong proponents of security seem to focus almost
exclusively on what would be best for security when the objective should be establishing an optimal balance between security and liberty. Although such a balance may not promote
security with maximum efficiency, it is one of the costs of living in a constitutional democracy as opposed to an authoritarian political regime. The executive branch may be the
appropriate branch for developing security measures, but this does not mean that it is the most adept branch at establishing a balance between security and liberty. In our constitutional
democracy, all branches have a role to play in making policy. Courts protect constitutional rights not as absolute restrictions on executive and legislative policymaking but as important
interests to be balanced against government interests. As T. Alexander Aleinikoff notes, balancing now dominates major areas of constitutional law.22 Balancing occurs through various
forms of judicial scrutiny, requiring courts to analyze the weight of the governments interest, a particular measures effectiveness in protecting that interest, and the extent to which the
government interest can be achieved without unduly infringing upon constitutional rights.23 For balancing to be meaningful, courts must scrutinize both the security and liberty
interests. With deference, however, courts fail to give adequate scrutiny to security interests. For example, after the subway bombings in London, the New York Police Department began
a program of random searches of peoples baggage on the subway. The searches were conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. In MacWade v
Kelly,24 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the program against a Fourth Amendment challenge. Under the special needs doctrine, when exceptional
circumstances make the warrant and probable cause requirements unnecessary, the search is analyzed in terms of whether it is reasonable.25 Reasonableness is determined by
balancing the government interest in security against the interests in privacy and civil liberties.26 The weight of the security interest should turn on the extent to which the program
effectively improves subway safety. The goals of the program may be quite laudable, but nobody questions the importance of subway safety. The critical issue is whether the search
program is a sufficiently effective way of achieving those goals that it is worth the tradeoff in civil liberties. On this question, unfortunately, the court deferred to the law enforcement
officials, stating that the issue is best left to those with a unique understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. 27 In
determining whether the program was a reasonably effective means of addressing the government interest in deterring and detecting a terrorist attack on the subway system,28 the
court refused to examine the data to assess the programs effectiveness.29 The way the court analyzed the governments side of the balance would justify nearly any search, no matter
how ineffective. Although courts should not take a know-it-all attitude, they should not defer on such a critical question as a security measures effectiveness. The problem with many
security measures is that they are not wise expenditures of resources. A small number of random searches in a subway system of over four million riders a day seems more symbolic
than effective because the odds of the police finding the terrorist with a bomb are very low. The government also argued that the program would deter terrorists from bringing bombs on
subway trains, but nearly any kind of security measure can arguably produce some degree of deterrence. The key issue, which the court did not analyze, is whether the program would
lead to deterrence significant enough to outweigh the curtailment of civil liberties. If courts fail to question the efficacy of security measures, then the security interest will prevail nearly
all the time. Preventing terrorism has an immensely heavy weight, and any given security measure will provide a marginal advancement toward that goal. In the defer-ence equation, the
math then becomes easy. At this point, it is futile to even bother to look at the civil liberties side of the balance. The government side has already won. Proponents of deference argue
that if courts did not defer, then they would be substituting their judgment for that of executive officials, who have greater expertise in understanding security issues. Special expertise in
national security, however, is often not necessary for balancing security and liberty. Judges and legislators should require the experts to persuasively justify the security measures being
developed or used. Of course, in very complex areas of knowledge, such as advanced physics, nonexperts may find it difficult to understand the concepts and comprehend the
terminology. But it is not clear that security expertise involves such sophisticated knowledge that it would be incomprehensible to nonexperts. Moreover, the deference argument
conflates evaluating a particular security measure with creating such a measure. The point of judicial review is to subject the judgment of government officials to critical scrutiny rather
than blindly accept their authority. Critical inquiry into factual matters is not the imposition of the judges own judgment for that of the decisionmaker under review.30 Instead, it is
forcing government officials to explain and justify their policies. Few will quarrel with the principle that courts should not second guess the decisions of policy experts. But there is a
difference between not second guessing and failing to critically evaluate the factual and empirical evidence justifying the government programs. Nobody will contest the fact that
security is a compelling interest. The key issue in the balancing is the extent to which the security measure furthers the interest in security. As I have argued elsewhere, whenever courts
defer to the government on the effectiveness of a government security measure, they are actually deferring to the government on the ultimate question as to whether the measure
passes constitutional muster.31 Deference by the courts or legislature is an abdication of their function. Our constitutional system of government was created with three branches, a
design structured to establish checks and balances against abuses of power. Institutional competence arguments are often made as if they are ineluctable truths about the nature of
each governmental branch. But the branches have all evolved considerably throughout history. To the extent a branch lacks resources to carry out its function, the answer should not be
to diminish the power of that branch but to provide it with the necessary tools so it can more effectively carry out its function. Far too often, unfortunately, discussions of institutional
competence devolve into broad generalizations about each branch and unsubstantiated assertions about the inherent superiority of certain branches for making particular
determinations. It is true, as Posner and Vermeule observe, that historically courts have been deferential to the executive during emergencies.32 Proponents of security measures often
advance what I will refer to as the pendulum theorythat in times of crisis, the balance shifts more toward security and in times of peace, the balance shifts back toward liberty. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.33 Judge Posner contends that the
liberties curtailed during times of crisis are often restored during times of peace.34 Deference is inevitable, and we should accept it without being overly concerned, for the pendulum
will surely swing back. As I argue elsewhere, however, there have been many instances throughout US history of needless curtailments of liberty in the name of security, such as the
Palmer Raids, the Japanese Internment, and the McCarthy communist hearings.35 Too often, such curtailments did not stem from any real security need but because of the personal
agendas and prejudices of government officials.36 We should not simply accept these mistakes as inevitable; we should seek to prevent them from occurring. Hoping that the pendulum
will swing back offers little consolation to those whose liberties were infringed or chilled. The protection of liberty is most important in times of crisis, when it is under the greatest threat.
During times of peace, when our judgment is not clouded by fear, we are less likely to make unnecessary sacrifices of liberty. The threat to liberty is lower in peacetime, and the need to
protect it is not as dire. The greatest need for safeguarding liberty is during times when we least want to protect it. In order to balance security and liberty, we must assess the security

It is often merely
assumed without question that the secu-rity threat from terrorism is one of the gravest dangers
we face in the modern world. But this assumption might be wrong. Assessing the risk of harm from terrorism is very difficult because
terrorism is such an irregular occurrence and is constantly evolving. If we examine the data from previous terrorist attacks, however, the threat of terror ism
interest. This involves evaluating two componentsthe gravity of the security threat and the effectiveness of the security measures to address it.

has been severely overstated.

terrorism in the United States,

For example, many people fear being killed in a terrorist attack, but based on statistics from

the risk of dying from terrorism is miniscule. According to political scientist John Mueller, [e]ven with

the September 11 attacks included in the count . . . the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s (which is when the State Department began its
accounting) is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.37

Add up the

eight deadliest terrorist attacks in US history, and they amount to fewer than four
thousand fatalities.38 In contrast, flu and pneumonia deaths are estimated to be around sixty thousand per year.39 Another forty thousand die in auto accidents
each year.40 Based on our experience with terrorism thus far, the risk of dying from terrorism is very low on the
relative scale of fatal risks.

assessment of risk.

Dramatic events and

media attention can cloud a rational

The year 2001 was not just notable for the September 11 attacks. It was also the summer of the shark bite, when extensive

media coverage about shark bites led to the perception that such attacks were on the rise. But there were fewer shark attacks in 2001 than in 2000 and fewer deaths as well, with only
four in 2001 as compared to thirteen in 2000.41 And regardless of which year had more deaths, the number is so low that an attack is a freak occurrence. It is certainly true that our past
experience with terrorism might not be a good indicator of the future. More treacherous terrorism is possible, such as the use of nuclear or biological weapons. This complicates our
ability to assess the risk of harm from terrorism. Moreover, the intentional human conduct involved in terrorism creates a sense of outrage and fear that ordinary deaths do not engender.
Alleviating fear must be taken into account, even if such fear is irrationally high in relation to other riskier events such as dying in a car crash. But enlightened policy must not completely

most policymakers
find it quite difficult to assess the threat of terrorism modestly. In the face of widespread public panic, it is hard
give in to the panic and irrational fear of the moment. It should certainly attempt to quell the fear, but it must do so thoughtfully. Nevertheless,

for government officials to make only moderate changes. Something dramatic must be done, or political heads will roll. Given the difficulty in assessing the security threat in a more

if panic and fear might lead to the

gravity of the threat being overstated, we should at least ensure that the measures taken
to promote security are sufficiently effective to justify the cost. Unfortunately, as I will discuss in the next section, rarely do discussions about the
rational manner, it is imperative that the courts meaningfully analyze the effectiveness of security measures. Even

sacrifice of civil liberties explain the corresponding security benefit, why such a benefit cannot be achieved in other ways, and why such a security measure is the best and most rational
one to take.

Little scrutiny is given to security measures. They are often just accepted as a given, no matter how illineffective they might be. Some ineffective security measures are largely symbolic, such as the New York City subway search program. The

conceived or

searches are unlikely to catch or deter terrorists because they involve only a miniscule fraction of the millions of daily passengers. Terrorists can just turn to other targets or simply
attempt the bombing on another day or at another train station where searches are not taking place. The vice of symbolic security programs is that they result in needless sacrifices of
liberty and drain resources from other, more effective security measures. Nevertheless, these programs have a virtuethey can ameliorate fear because they are highly visible.
Ironically, the subway search programs primary benefit was alleviating peoples fear (which was probably too high), albeit in a deceptive manner (as the program did not add much in
the way of security).

Data mining represents another kind of security measure, one that currently has little proven effectiveness and

little symbolic value. Data mining programs are often not visible enough to the public to quell much fear. Instead, their benefits come primarily from their actual effectiveness in reducing
terrorist threats, which remains highly speculative. Thus far,

data mining is not very accurate

in the behavioral predictions

it makes. For example, there are approximately 1.8 million airline passengers each day.42 A data mining program to identify terrorists with a false positive rate of 1 percent (which would
be exceedingly low for such a program) would flag eighteen thousand people as false positives. This is quite a large number of innocent people. Why is the government so interested in
data mining if it remains unclear whether it will ever be very accurate or workable? Part of the governments interest in data mining stems from the aggressive marketing efforts of
database companies. After September 11, database companies met with government officials and made a persuasive pitch about the virtues of data mining.43 The technology sounds

just because data

mining might be effective for businesses trying to predict customer behavior does
not make it effective for the government trying to predict who will engage in
terrorism. A high level of accuracy is not necessary when data mining is used by businesses to target marketing to consumers, because the cost of error to individuals is
quite dazzling when presented by skillful marketers, and it can work quite well in the commercial setting. The problem, however, is that

minimal. Amazon.com, for example, engages in data mining to determine which books its customers are likely to find of interest by comparing bookbuying patterns among its customers.
Although it is far from precise, it need not be because there are few bad consequences if it makes a wrong book recommendation. Conversely, the consequences are vastly greater for

I do not believe that the case has been made that data mining is a
wise expenditure of security resources. Those who advocate for security should be just as outraged as those on the liberty side of the
government data mining. Ultimately,

debate. Although courts should not micromanage which security measures the government chooses, they should examine the effectiveness of any given security measure to weigh it
against the liberty costs. Courts should not tell the executive branch to modify a security measure just because they are not convinced it is the best one, but they should tell the

The very point of protecting liberty is to

demand that sacrifices to liberty are not in vain and that security interests, which
compromise civil liberties, are sufficiently effective to warrant the cost.
executive that a particular security measure is not effective enough to outweigh the liberty costs.

Second - Relative certainty. The disad only may cause violence

- surveillance definitely does. Privacy is paramount for dignity
and protecting our unique individuality.
Schneier 6
Bruce Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, a
program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute and the CTO of Resilient
Systems. He is the author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.
Commentary, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED, May 18, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,70886-0.html

The most common retort against privacy advocates -- by those in favor of ID checks,
cameras, databases, data mining and other wholesale surveillance measures -- is this line: "If you aren't
doing anything wrong, what do you have to hide?" Some clever answers: "If I'm not
doing anything wrong, then you have no cause to watch me." "Because the government gets to
define what's wrong, and they keep changing the definition." "Because you might do something wrong
with my information." My problem with quips like these -- as right as they are -- is that they
accept the premise that privacy is about hiding a wrong. It's not. Privacy is an

inherent human right, and a requirement for maintaining the human condition with
dignity and respect. Two proverbs say it best: Quis custodiet custodes ipsos? ("Who watches the watchers?")
and "Absolute power corrupts absolutely." Cardinal Richelieu understood the value of surveillance when he famously said, "If one
would give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find something in them to have him hanged." Watch
someone long enough, and you'll find something to arrest -- or just blackmail -- with.

Privacy is important because

without it, surveillance information will be abused : to peep, to sell to marketers and
to spy on political enemies -- whoever they happen to be at the time. Privacy protects us from abuses by
those in power, even if we're doing nothing wrong at the time of surveillance. We do
nothing wrong when we make love or go to the bathroom. We are not deliberately hiding anything when we seek out private places
for reflection or conversation. We keep private journals, sing in the privacy of the shower, and write letters to secret lovers and then
burn them.

Privacy is a basic human need.

A future in which privacy would face constant assault

was so alien to the framers of the Constitution that it never occurred to them to call out privacy as an explicit right. Privacy was
inherent to the nobility of their being and their cause. Of course being watched in your own home was unreasonable. Watching at all
was an act so unseemly as to be inconceivable among gentlemen in their day. You watched convicted criminals, not free citizens.
You ruled your own home. It's intrinsic to the concept of liberty.

For if we are observed in all matters, we are

constantly under threat of correction, judgment, criticism, even plagiarism of our own

uniqueness . We become children, fettered under watchful eyes, constantly fearful that -- either
now or in the uncertain future -- patterns we leave behind will be brought back to
implicate us, by whatever authority has now become focused upon our once-private
and innocent acts. We lose our individuality , because everything we do is
observable and recordable. How many of us have paused during conversation in the past fourand-a-half years, suddenly aware that we might be eavesdropped on? Probably it was a phone
conversation, although maybe it was an e-mail or instant-message exchange or a conversation in a public
place. Maybe the topic was terrorism, or politics, or Islam. We stop suddenly, momentarily
afraid that our words might be taken out of context, then we laugh at our paranoia
and go on. But our demeanor has changed, and our words are subtly altered. This is the loss of
freedom we face when our privacy is taken from us. This is life in former East Germany, or life in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. And it's our

Too many wrongly characterize the

debate as "security versus privacy." The real choice is liberty versus control .
future as we allow an ever-intrusive eye into our personal, private lives.

Tyranny, whether it arises under threat of foreign physical attack or under

constant domestic authoritative scrutiny, is still tyranny. Liberty requires security without
intrusion, security plus privacy. Widespread police surveillance is the very definition of a police
state. And that's why we should champion privacy even when we have nothing to hide.

The 4th Amendment outweighs. An ethical ballot cant even

consider their security impact. That would treat privacy as
mere inconvenience obliterating liberty.

Smith 14
Peter J. Smith IV attorney for the law firm LUKINS & ANNIS and Lead Council for This brief was was
signed by the entire legal team, which includes four attorneys from the ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION and three additional attorneys from the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF in the matter of Smith v. Obama before the United States Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. October 16th available at: https://www.eff.org/document/smiths-reply-brief

The government argues that it would be more convenient for law enforcement if the
courts established a bright-line rule that extinguished all privacy in information
shared with others. See Govt Br. 40. The government is surely right about this. The Bill of Rights exists,
however, not to serve governmental efficiency but to safeguard individual liberty. Cf.

[T]he mere fact that law

enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself
justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment . (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393 (1978))); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (Our cases have historically recognized that the warrant
requirement is an important working part of our machinery of government,
not merely an inconvenience to be somehow weighed
against the claims of police efficiency. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1041 (2013) (

443, 481 (1971))). Notably, the government made the same appeal for a bright-line rule in Jones and Maynard, see, e.g., Brief for
the United States at 13, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, but the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit rejected it.

Reject those privacy violations as an a priori imperative. Also

proves that the disads all hype.
Wyden 14
(et al; This amicus brief issued by three US Senators - Ron Wyden, Mark Udall and Martin Heinrich.
Wyden and Udall sat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and had access to the meta-data
program. BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE SENATOR RON WYDEN, SENATOR MARK UDALL, AND SENATOR
MARTIN HEINRICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, URGING REVERSAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals - Appeal
from the United States District Court District of Idaho The Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District
Judge, Presiding Case No. 2:13-cv-00257-BLW Sept 9th, 2014 This Amicus Brief was prepared by
CHARLES S. SIMS from the law firm PROSKAUER ROSE LLP. This pdf can be obtained at:
https://www.eff.org/document/wyden-udall-heinrich-smith-amicus)

Respect for Americans privacy is not a matter of convenience, but a

Constitutional imperative . Despite years of receiving classified briefings and

asking repeated questions of intelligence officials in both private and public settings, amici
have seen no evidence that bulk collection accomplishes

anything that other less intrusive surveillance authorities could not . Bulk
collection is not only a significant threat to the constitutional liberties of Americans,
but a needless one.9

Reject utilitarianism. It shatters all ethics and justifies the

worst atrocities.
Holt 95
(Jim Holt is an American philosopher, author and essayist. He has contributed to The New York Times,
The New York Times Magazine, The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, The American Scholar,
and Slate. He hosted a weekly radio spot on BBC for ten years and he writes frequently about politics
and philosophy. New York Times, Morality, Reduced To Arithmetic, August 5, p. Lexis)

Can the deliberate massacre of innocent people ever be condoned? The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945,
resulted in the deaths of 120,000 to 250,000 Japanese by incineration and radiation poisoning. Although a small fraction of the victims were soldiers, the
great majority were noncombatants -- women, children, the aged. Among the justifications that have been put forward for President Harry Trumans
decision to use the bomb, only one is worth taking seriously -- that it saved lives. The alternative, the reasoning goes, was to launch an invasion. Truman
claimed in his memoirs that this would have cost another half a million American lives. Winston Churchill put the figure at a million. Revisionist historians
have cast doubt on such numbers. Wartime documents suggest that military planners expected around 50,000 American combat deaths in an invasion.
Still, when Japanese casualties, military and civilian, are taken into account, the overall invasion death toll on both sides would surely have ended up
surpassing that from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scholars will continue to argue over whether there were other, less catastrophic ways to force Tokyo to
surrender. But given the fierce obstinacy of the Japanese militarists, Truman and his advisers had some grounds for believing that nothing short of a fullscale invasion or the annihilation of a big city with an apocalyptic new weapon would have succeeded. Suppose they were right. Would this prospect have

In the debate over the question, participants on both

playing the numbers game. Estimate the hypothetical number of lives saved
by the bombings, then add up the actual lives lost. If the first number exceeds the second, then Truman did the right thing; if
justified the intentional mass killing of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
sides have been

the reverse, it was wrong to have dropped the bombs. That is one approach to the matter -- the utilitarian approach. According to utilitarianism, a form of

the goodness or evil of an action is determined solely by

its consequences. If somehow you can save 10 lives by boiling a baby, go ahead
moral reasoning that arose in the 19th century,

and boil that baby . There is, however, an older ethical tradition , one rooted in JudeoChristian theology, that takes a quite different view. The gist of it is expressed by St. Pauls condemnation of those who say, Let us do evil, that good may

Some actions, this tradition holds, can never be justified by their consequences; they are
absolutely forbidden. It is always wrong to boil a baby even if lives are saved
thereby. Applying this absolutist morality to war can be tricky. When enemy soldiers are trying to enslave or kill us, the principle of self-defense
come.

permits us to kill them (though not to slaughter them once they are taken prisoner). But what of those who back them? During World War II, propagandists
made much of the indivisibility of modern warfare: the idea was that since the enemy nations entire economic and social strength was deployed behind
its military forces, the whole population was a legitimate target for obliteration. There are no civilians in Japan, declared an intelligence officer of the
Fifth Air Force shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, a time when the Japanese were popularly depicted as vermin worthy of extermination. The boundary
between combatant and noncombatant can be fuzzy, but the distinction is not meaningless, as the case of small children makes clear. Yet is wartime
killing of those who are not trying to harm us always tantamount to murder? When naval dockyards, munitions factories and supply lines are bombed,
civilian carnage is inevitable. The absolutist moral tradition acknowledges this by a principle known as double effect: although it is always wrong to kill
innocents deliberately, it is sometimes permissible to attack a military target knowing some noncombatants will die as a side effect. The doctrine of
double effect might even justify bombing a hospital where Hitler is lying ill. It does not, however, apply to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Transformed into
hostages by the technology of aerial bombardment, the people of those cities were intentionally executed en masse to send a message of terror to the
rulers of Japan. The practice of ordering the massacre of civilians to bring the enemy to heel scarcely began with Truman. Nor did the bomb result in
casualties of a new order of magnitude. The earlier bombing of Tokyo by incendiary weapons killed some 100,000 people. What Hiroshima and Nagasaki

utilitarian thinking

did mark, by the unprecedented need for rationalization they presented, was the triumph of
in the conduct of war. The
conventional code of noncombatant immunity -- a product of several centuries of ethical progress among nations, which had been formalized by an
international commission in the 1920s in the Hague -- was swept away. A simpler axiom took its place: since war is hell, any means necessary may be
used to end, in Churchills words, the vast indefinite butchery. It

ofends

our deep-seated intuitions about

is a moral calculus that, for all its logical consistency,

the sanctity of life -- our conviction that a person is always

to be treated as an end, never as a means. Left up to the warmakers, moreover,

utilitarian calculations are susceptible to bad-faith reasoning: tinker with the

numbers enough and virtually any atrocity can be excused in the

national interest. In January, the world commemorated the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, where mass slaughter was
committed as an end in itself -- the ultimate evil. The moral nature of Hiroshima is ambiguous by contrast. Yet in the postwar era, when governments do

the bombs sinister legacy is plain: it has inured

us to the idea of reducing innocents to instruments and morality to arithmetic.
not hesitate to treat the massacre of civilians as just another strategic option,

Privacy Advantage 1AC shorter

version

Privacy Advantage shorter version

Contention # ____ is Privacy
Privacy outweighs.
- Utilitarian impact calc is biased. It inflates the disads
risk; and
- Reject Surveillance as a structural matter of power
even when reformed, innocents experience powerless
unless neutral oversights in place.
Solove 7
Daniel Solove is an Associate Professor at George Washington University Law School and holds a J.D.
from Yale Law School. He is one of the worlds leading expert in information privacy law and is well
known for his academic work on privacy and for popular books on how privacy relates with information
technology. He has written 9 books and more than 50 law review articles From the Article Ive Got
Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy - San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 745 GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 289 available from download at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998565

the nothing to hide argument . The reasoning of this argument is that

when it comes to government surveillance or use of personal data, there is no privacy
violation if a person has nothing sensitive, embarrassing, or illegal to conceal. Criminals involved
in illicit activities have something to fear, but for the vast majority of people, their activities are not illegal or
It is time to return to

embarrassing. Understanding privacy as I have set forth reveals the flaw of the nothing to hide argument at its roots. Many
commentators who respond to the argument attempt a direct refutation by trying to point to things that people would want to hide.
But the problem with the nothing to hide argument is the underlying assumption that privacy is about hiding bad things.

Agreeing with this assumption concedes far too much ground and leads to an
unproductive discussion of information people would likely want or not want to hide. As Bruce Schneier aptly notes,
the nothing to hide argument stems from a faulty premise that privacy is about
hiding a wrong.75 The deeper problem with the nothing to hide argument is that it myopically views privacy as a form of
concealment or secrecy. But understanding privacy as a plurality of related problems demonstrates that concealment of bad things
is just one among many problems caused by government programs such as the NSA surveillance and data mining. In the categories

The NSA programs involve problems of information

collection, specifically the category of surveillance in the taxonomy. Wiretapping involves audio surveillance of peoples
in my taxonomy, several problems are implicated.

conversations. Data mining often begins with the collection of personal information, usually from various third parties that possess
peoples data. Under current Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, when the government gathers data from third
parties, there is no Fourth Amendment protection because people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in information exposed
to others.76 In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank
records because [a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.77 In Smith v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court held that people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial because they know that
they must convey numerical information to the phone company, and therefore they cannot harbor any general expectation that
the numbers they dial will remain secret.78 As I have argued extensively elsewhere, the lack of Fourth Amendment protection of
third party records results in the governments ability to access an extensive amount of personal information with minimal limitation
or oversight.79 Many scholars have referred to information collection as a form of surveillance. Dataveillance, a term coined by
Roger Clarke, refers to the systemic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or
communications of one or more persons.80 Christopher Slobogin has referred to the gathering of personal information in business

Surveillance can create chilling effects on free speech , free

association, and other First Amendment rights essential for democracy. 82 Even
surveillance of legal activities can inhibit people from engaging in them. The value
records as transaction surveillance.81

of protecting against chilling effects is not measured simply by focusing on the

particular individuals who are deterred from exercising their rights. Chilling effects
harm society because, among other things, they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed
and the degree of freedom with which to engage in political activity. The nothing to hide
argument focuses primarily on the information collection problems associated with the NSA programs. It contends that limited
surveillance of lawful activity will not chill behavior sufficiently to outweigh the security benefits. One can certainly quarrel with this
argument, but one of the difficulties with chilling effects is that it is often very hard to demonstrate concrete evidence of deterred
behavior.83 Whether the NSAs surveillance and collection of telephone records has deterred people from communicating particular
ideas would be a difficult question to answer. Far too often, discussions of the NSA surveillance and data mining define the problem
solely in terms of surveillance. To return to my discussion of metaphor, the problems are not just Orwellian, but Kafkaesque.

The

NSA programs are problematic even if no information people want to hide is

uncovered.

In The Trial,

the problem is not inhibited behavior, but rather a sufocating

powerlessness and vulnerability created by the court systems use of personal

data and its exclusion of the protagonist from having any knowledge or participation in the process. The harms consist of those
created by bureaucraciesindifference, errors, abuses, frustration, and lack of transparency and accountability. One such harm, for
example, which I call aggregation, emerges from the combination of small bits of seemingly innocuous data.84 When combined, the
information becomes much more telling about a person. For the person who truly has nothing to hide, aggregation is not much of a
problem. But in the stronger, less absolutist form of the nothing to hide argument, people argue that certain pieces of information
are not something they would hide. Aggregation, however, means that by combining pieces of information we might not care to

the allure of data

mining for the government is its ability to reveal a lot about our personalities and
activities by sophisticated means of analyzing data. Therefore, without greater transparency in data mining , it is hard to
claim that programs like the NSA data mining program will not reveal information people
might want to hide, as we do not know precisely what is revealed. Moreover, data mining aims to be predictive of
conceal, the government can glean information about us that we might really want to conceal. Part of

behavior, striving to prognosticate about our future actions. People who match certain profiles are deemed likely to engage in a
similar pattern of behavior. It is quite difficult to refute actions that one has not yet done. Having nothing to hide will not always

Another problem in the taxonomy, which is implicated by the NSA

program, is the problem I refer to as exclusion.85 Exclusion is the problem caused when people are prevented from
dispel predictions of future activity.

having knowledge about how their information is being used, as well as barred from being able to access and correct errors in that
data. The NSA program involves a massive database of information that individuals cannot access. Indeed, the very existence of the
program was kept secret for years.86 This kind of information processing, which forbids peoples knowledge or involvement,
resembles in some ways a kind of due process problem. It is a structural problem involving the way people are treated by
government institutions. Moreover, it creates a power imbalance between individuals and the government. To what extent should
the Executive Branch and an agency such as the NSA, which is relatively insulated from the political process and public

This issue is not about whether the information

gathered is something people want to hide, but rather about the power and the
structure of government. A related problem involves secondary use. Secondary use is the use of data obtained for
accountability, have a significant power over citizens?

one purpose for a different unrelated purpose without the persons consent. The Administration has said little about how long the
data will be stored, how it will be used, and what it could be used for in the future. The potential future uses of any piece of personal
information are vast, and without limits or accountability on how that information is used, it is hard for people to assess the dangers
of the data being in the governments control. Therefore, the problem with the nothing to hide argument is that it focuses on just
one or two particular kinds of privacy problemsthe disclosure of personal information or surveillanceand not others. It assumes a
particular view about what privacy entails, and it sets
to distinguish here between two

the terms for debate in a manner that is often unproductive. It is important

ways of justifying a program such as the NSA surveillance

and data

mining program. The first way is to not recognize a problem. This is how the nothing to hide argument worksit denies even the
existence of a problem. The second manner of justifying such a program

is to acknowledge the problems but

contend that the benefits of the NSA program outweigh the privacy

harms . The first justification influences the second, because the low value given to privacy is based upon a narrow view of
the problem.

The key misunderstanding is that the nothing to hide argument views privacy in a

particular wayas a form of secrecy,

as the right to hide things. But there are many

other types of harm involved beyond exposing ones secrets to the government . Privacy
problems are often difficult to recognize and redress because they create a panoply of types of harm. Courts, legislators, and others
look for particular types of harm to the exclusion of others, and their narrow focus blinds them to seeing other kinds of harms. One

of the difficulties with the nothing to hide argument is that it looks for a visceral kind of

injury as opposed to a structural one . Ironically, this underlying conception of injury is shared by
those arguing in favor of the conflicting interests
to privacy. For example, law professor Ann Bartow argues that I have failed to describe privacy harms in a
both those advocating for greater privacy protections and

compelling manner in my article, A Taxonomy of Privacy, where I provide a framework for understanding the manifold different
privacy problems.87 Bartows primary complaint is that my taxonomy frames privacy harms in dry, analytical terms that fail to
sufficiently identify and animate the compelling ways that privacy violations can negatively impact the lives of living, breathing
human beings beyond simply provoking feelings of unease.88 Bartow claims that the taxonomy

does not have

enough dead bodies and that privacys lack of blood and death, or at least of
buckets of money, distances privacy harms from other categories of tort law.
Most privacy problems lack dead bodies. Of course, there are exceptional cases such as the murders of
broken bones and

Rebecca Shaeffer and Amy Boyer. Rebecca Shaeffer was an actress killed when a stalker obtained her address from a Department of
Motor Vehicles record.90 This incident prompted Congress to pass the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994.91 Amy Boyer was
murdered by a stalker who obtained her personal information, including her work address and Social Security number, from a
database company.92 These examples aside, there is not a lot of death and gore in privacy law. If this is the standard to recognize a
problem, then few privacy problems will be recognized. Horrific cases are not typical, and the purpose of my taxonomy is to explain
why most privacy problems are still harmful despite this fact. Bartows objection is actually very similar to the nothing to hide
argument. Those advancing the nothing to hide argument have in mind a particular kind of visceral
privacy harm, one where privacy is violated only when something deeply embarrassing or discrediting is revealed. Bartows

quest for horror stories represents a similar desire to find visceral privacy harms. The problem is that not
all privacy harms are like this. At the end of the day,
harms will be difficult in many cases.

privacy is not a horror movie, and demanding more palpable

Yet there is still a harm worth addressing, even if it is

not sensationalistic.

In many instances, privacy is threatened not by singular egregious acts, but by a slow

series of relatively minor acts which gradually begin to add up. In this way, privacy problems resemble certain environmental harms
which occur over time through a series of small acts by different actors. Bartow wants to point to a major spill, but gradual pollution
by a multitude of different actors often creates worse problems. The law frequently struggles with recognizing harms that do not
result in embarrassment, humiliation, or physical or psychological injury.93 For example, after the September 11 attacks, several
airlines gave their passenger records to federal agencies in direct violation of their privacy policies. The federal agencies used the
data to study airline security.94 A group of passengers sued Northwest Airlines for disclosing their personal information. One of their
claims was that Northwest Airlines breached its contract with the passengers. In Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., the court rejected
the contract claim because broad statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract claims, the passengers
never claimed they relied upon the policy or even read it, and they failed to allege any contractual damages arising out of the
alleged breach.95 Another court reached a similar conclusion.96 Regardless of the merits of the decisions on contract law, the
cases represent a difficulty with the legal system in addressing privacy problems. The disclosure of the passenger records
represented a breach of confidentiality.97 The problems caused by breaches of confidentiality do not merely consist of individual
emotional distress; they involve a violation of trust within a relationship. There is a strong social value in ensuring that promises are
kept and that trust is maintained in relationships between businesses and their customers. The problem of secondary use is also
implicated in this case.98 Secondary use involves data collected for one purpose being used for an unrelated purpose without
peoples consent. The airlines gave passenger information to the government for an entirely different purpose beyond that for which
it was originally gathered. Secondary use problems often do not cause financial, or even psychological, injuries. Instead, the harm is
one of power imbalance. In Dyer, data was disseminated in a way that ignored airline passengers interests in the data despite
promises made in the privacy policy. Even if the passengers were unaware of the policy, there is a social value in ensuring that
companies adhere to established limits on the way they use personal information. Otherwise, any stated limits become meaningless,
and companies have discretion to boundlessly use data. Such a state of affairs can leave nearly all consumers in a powerless
position. The harm, then, is less one to particular individuals than it is a structural harm. A similar problem surfaces in another case,
Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank.99 A group of plaintiffs sued Chase Manhattan Bank for selling customer information to third parties
in violation of its privacy policy, which stated that the information would remain confidential. The court held that even presuming
these allegations were true, the plaintiffs could not prove any actual injury: [T]he harm at the heart of this purported class action,
is that class members were merely offered products and services which they were free to decline. This does not qualify as actual
harm. The complaint does not allege any single instance where a named plaintiff or any class member suffered any actual harm due
to the receipt of an unwanted telephone solicitation or a piece of junk mail.100 The courts view of harm, however, did not account

When balancing privacy against security, the privacy harms are

characterized in terms of injuries to the individual, and the interest in security is often
characterized in a more broad societal way. The security interest in the NSA
programs has often been defined improperly. In a Congressional hearing, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
for the breach of confidentiality.
often

stated: Our enemy is listening, and I cannot help but wonder if they are not shaking their heads in amazement at the thought that
anyone would imperil such a sensitive program by leaking its existence in the first place, and smiling at the prospect that we might
now disclose even more or perhaps even unilaterally disarm ourselves of a key tool in the war on terror.101 The balance between
privacy and security is often cast in terms of whether a particular government information collection activity should or should not be

The issue, however, often is not whether the NSA or other government agencies should be
allowed to engage in particular forms of information gathering; rather, it is what kinds of
barred.

oversight and accountability we want in place when the government engages in searches
and seizures. The government can employ nearly any kind of investigatory activity with a warrant supported by probable
cause. This is a mechanism of oversightit forces government officials to justify their
suspicions to a neutral judge or magistrate before engaging in the tactic. For example, electronic surveillance law
allows for wiretapping, but limits the practice with judicial supervision, procedures to minimize the breadth of the wiretapping, and
requirements that the law enforcement officials report back to the court to prevent abuses.102 It is these procedures that the Bush
Administration has ignored by engaging in the warrantless NSA surveillance. The question is not whether we want the government
to monitor such conversations, but whether the Executive Branch should adhere to the appropriate oversight procedures that
Congress has enacted into law, or should covertly ignore any oversight. Therefore, the security interest should not get weighed in its
totality against the privacy interest. Rather, what should get weighed is the extent of marginal limitation on the effectiveness of a
government information gathering or data mining program by imposing judicial oversight and minimization procedures. Only in
cases where such procedures will completely impair the government program should the security interest be weighed in total, rather

too often, the balancing

of privacy interests against security interests takes place in a manner that severely
than in the marginal difference between an unencumbered program versus a limited one. Far

shortchanges the privacy interest while inflating the security interests . Such is
the logic of the nothing to hide argument.

When the argument is unpacked, and its

underlying assumptions examined and challenged, we can see how it shifts

the debate to its terms , in which it draws power from its unfair advantage. It is
time to pull the curtain on the nothing to hide argument. Whether explicit or not, conceptions of privacy underpin
nearly every argument made about privacy, even the common quip Ive got nothing to hide. As I have sought to demonstrate in
this essay, understanding privacy as a pluralistic conception reveals that we are often talking past each other when discussing
privacy issues. By focusing more specifically on the related problems under the rubric of privacy, we can better address each
problem rather than ignore or conflate them.

The nothing to hide argument

represents a

way of

singular and

narrow

speaks to some problems, but not to others. It

conceiving of privacy, and it wins by

excluding consideration of the other problems often raised in

government surveillance and data mining programs. When engaged with directly, the nothing to hide
But when confronted
with the plurality of privacy problems implicated by government data collection and use beyond
surveillance and disclosure, the nothing to hide argument, in the end, has nothing to say.
argument can ensnare, for it forces the debate to focus on its narrow understanding of privacy.

Reject utilitarianism and put privacy before security. The ballot

should create a side constraint where ends dont justify the
means. This is especially applies to data collection in the
absence of probable cause.
Albright 14
Logan Albright is the Research Analyst at FreedomWorks, and is responsible for producing a wide
variety of written content for print and the web, as well as conducting research for staff media
appearances and special projects. He received his Masters degree in economics from Georgia State
University. The NSA's Collateral Spying Freedom Works - 07/08/2014 http://www.freedomworks.org/content/nsas-collateral-spying
In short, the report, based on information obtained by Edward Snowden, reveals that during the course of its ordinary, otherwise

the NSA also collected data on large numbers of people who were
not specifically targeted. The agency calls this practice incidental surveillance. I call it
collateral spying. The report found that, on average, 9 out of every 10 people spied on were not the
intended target. The NSA has the legal authority to obtain a warrant based on
legal surveillance operations,

probable cause in order to surveil an individual. No one is disputing that. But when
this targeting results in collateral spying on vast numbers of innocents, in the absence of
probable cause and the corresponding warrants, that is a major problem. The NSA has asserted that such
incidental data collection is inevitable, and to a certain extent thats likely true. It is understandable that in some situations

should obviously be
minimized as far as possible , and at the very least the information should
be immediately purged from government databases , not stored for

the NSA may learn information about people other than the direct target, but this

years on end. In any case, the whole situation is indicative of the agencys cavalier attitude towards individual rights.
While national security is a concern we all share, the ends do not justify the means when
those means involve violate the constitutional protections afforded to citizens by our nations founders. It
is not okay to violate the rights of an innocent in the process of
achieving a broader goal, even if that goal is noble. The way the NSA has
been behaving is Machiavellian in the most literal sense. In his 16th century political treatise, The Prince, Niccolo
Machiavelli recognized a harsh reality of politics that still plagues us half a millennium later, writing, A prince wishing to keep his
state is very often forced to do evil. Taking Machiavellis advice as a green light for immoral behavior has been
the problem with governments throughout history, a problem the founding fathers sought to avoid by setting down precise
guidelines for what the government could and could not do in the form of a Constitution. The disregard of these rules, and

the

argument that there should be a national security exception to the Fourth

Amendment, undermines the entire purpose of the American experiment, and restores the European-style
tyrannies the revolutionaries fought against.

Even in a utilitarian framework, privacy outweighs due to

relative certainty. The disad only may cause violence surveillance definitely does. Privacy is paramount for dignity
and protecting our unique individuality.
Schneier 6
Bruce Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, a
program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute and the CTO of Resilient
Systems. He is the author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.
Commentary, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED, May 18, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,70886-0.html

The most common retort against privacy advocates -- by those in favor of ID checks,
cameras, databases, data mining and other wholesale surveillance measures -- is this line: "If you aren't
doing anything wrong, what do you have to hide?" Some clever answers: "If I'm not
doing anything wrong, then you have no cause to watch me." "Because the government gets to
define what's wrong, and they keep changing the definition." "Because you might do something wrong
with my information." My problem with quips like these -- as right as they are -- is that they
accept the premise that privacy is about hiding a wrong. It's not. Privacy is an

inherent human right, and a requirement for maintaining the human condition with
dignity and respect. Two proverbs say it best: Quis custodiet custodes ipsos? ("Who watches the watchers?")
and "Absolute power corrupts absolutely." Cardinal Richelieu understood the value of surveillance when he famously said, "If one

would give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find something in them to have him hanged." Watch
someone long enough, and you'll find something to arrest -- or just blackmail -- with.

Privacy is important because

without it, surveillance information will be abused : to peep, to sell to marketers and
to spy on political enemies -- whoever they happen to be at the time. Privacy protects us from abuses by
those in power, even if we're doing nothing wrong at the time of surveillance. We do
nothing wrong when we make love or go to the bathroom. We are not deliberately hiding anything when we seek out private places
for reflection or conversation. We keep private journals, sing in the privacy of the shower, and write letters to secret lovers and then
burn them.

Privacy is a basic human need.

A future in which privacy would face constant assault

was so alien to the framers of the Constitution that it never occurred to them to call out privacy as an explicit right. Privacy was
inherent to the nobility of their being and their cause. Of course being watched in your own home was unreasonable. Watching at all
was an act so unseemly as to be inconceivable among gentlemen in their day. You watched convicted criminals, not free citizens.
You ruled your own home. It's intrinsic to the concept of liberty.

For if we are observed in all matters, we are

constantly under threat of correction, judgment, criticism, even plagiarism of our own

uniqueness . We become children, fettered under watchful eyes, constantly fearful that -- either
now or in the uncertain future -- patterns we leave behind will be brought back to
implicate us, by whatever authority has now become focused upon our once-private
and innocent acts. We lose our individuality , because everything we do is
observable and recordable. How many of us have paused during conversation in the past fourand-a-half years, suddenly aware that we might be eavesdropped on? Probably it was a phone
conversation, although maybe it was an e-mail or instant-message exchange or a conversation in a public
place. Maybe the topic was terrorism, or politics, or Islam. We stop suddenly, momentarily
afraid that our words might be taken out of context, then we laugh at our paranoia
and go on. But our demeanor has changed, and our words are subtly altered. This is the loss of
freedom we face when our privacy is taken from us. This is life in former East Germany, or life in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. And it's our

Too many wrongly characterize the

debate as "security versus privacy." The real choice is liberty versus control .
future as we allow an ever-intrusive eye into our personal, private lives.

Tyranny, whether it arises under threat of foreign physical attack or under

constant domestic authoritative scrutiny, is still tyranny. Liberty requires security without
intrusion, security plus privacy. Widespread police surveillance is the very definition of a police
state. And that's why we should champion privacy even when we have nothing to hide.

1AC Bigotry Advantage

Bigotry Advantage 1AC Longer

version

Bigotry Advantage long version

Contention # ____ is Bigotry
Warrantless surveillance boosts a distinct form of racial,
religious, and ethnic discrimination. The Negs security
interests only drive this racialized violence.
Unegbu 13
Cindy C. Unegbu - J.D. Candidate, Howard University School of Law - NOTE AND COMMENT: National
Security Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional Misstep - Howard
Law Journal - 57 How. L.J. 433 - Fall, 2013 lexis; lawrev

Picture this: you live in a society in which the government is allowed to partake in
intrusive surveillance measures without the institutionalized checks and balances upon which the
government was founded. In this society, the government pursues citizens who belong to a
particular race or ethnicity, practice a certain religion, or have affiliations with specific interest groups.
Individuals who have these characteristics are subject to surreptitious monitoring, which includes
undercover government officials disguising themselves as community members in order to attend various community events and programs. The
government may also place these individuals on watch lists, even where there is no
evidence of wrongdoing. These watch lists classify domestic individuals as potential or suspected terrorists and facilitate the
monitoring of their personal activity through various law enforcement agencies for an extended period of time. This "hypothetical"
society is not hypothetical at all; in fact, it is the current state of American

surveillance. The government's domestic spying activities have progressed

to intrusive levels, primarily due to an increased fear of terrorism . n1 This fear
has resulted in governmental intelligence efforts that are focused on political activists, racial
and religious minorities, and immigrants. n2 [*435] The government's domestic
surveillance efforts are not only geared toward suspected terrorists and those partaking in criminal activity, but reach any
innocent, non-criminal, non-terrorist national, all in the name of national security.
The government's power to engage in suspicionless surveillance and track innocent citizens'
sensitive information has been granted through the creation and revision of the National Counterterrorism Center n3 and the FBI's (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide. n4 The grant of surveillance power has resulted in many opponents, including those within
the current presidential administration, who challenge the order for numerous reasons. n5 These reasons include the inefficiency of storing citizens'
random personal information for extended periods of time, n6 the broad unprecedented authority granted to this body of government without proper
approval from Congress, n7 and the constitutional violations due to the deprivation of citizens' rights. n8 [*436] This Comment argues that the wide-

results in

sweeping surveillance authority granted to the government

a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause due to
far-reaching domestic monitoring practices. Surveillance practices, such as posing as members of the community and placing individuals on watch lists
without suspicion of terrorist activity, result in the
their

impermissible monitoring of individuals on the basis of

race or ethnicity . These practices, although done in the name of national security, an established compelling government

The
procedures are not narrowly tailored to the interest of national security because of
interest, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they are not narrowly tailored to the stated interest.

the over-inclusiveness of the measures .

Warrantless mass surveillance is racist. Vote Af to prioritize

these under-represented impacts in public debates.
Kumar & Kundnani 15
Deepa Kumar is an associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University.
She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Haymarket Books, 2012). Arun Kundnani
is research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. He is a writer and activist, and a
professor at NYU. Race, surveillance, and empire International Socialist Review - Issue #96 Spring
- http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire

articles based on whistle-blower Edward Snowdens collection of

documents from the National Security Agency (NSA) took the world by storm. Over the
Beginning in June 2013, a series of news

course of a year,

the Snowden material provided a detailed account of the massive

extent of NSAs warrantless data collection . What became clear was that the NSA
Less apparent was how this data was actually
used by the NSA and other national security agencies. Part of the answer came in July 2014 when Glenn
Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain published an article that identified specific targets of NSA
surveillance and showed how individuals were being placed under surveillance
despite there being no reasonable suspicion of their involvement in criminal
was involved in the mass collection of online material.

activity.1 All of those named as targets were prominent Muslim Americans. The following
month, Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux published another story for The Intercept, which revealed that under the
Obama administration the number of people on the National Counterterrorism Centers no-fly list
had

increased tenfold

to 47,000. Leaked classified documents showed that the NCC maintains a database of terrorism

suspects worldwidethe Terrorist Identities Datamart Environmentwhich contained a million names by 2013, double the number
four years earlier, and increasingly includes biometric data.

This database includes 20,800 persons within

the United States who are disproportionately concentrated in Dearborn,

Michigan, with its significant Arab American population. 2 By any objective standard, these were
major news stories that ought to have attracted as much attention as the earlier revelations. Yet the stories barely registered in the
corporate media landscape. The tech community, which had earlier expressed outrage at the NSAs mass digital surveillance,
seemed to be indifferent when details emerged of the targeted surveillance of Muslims. The explanation for this reaction is not hard

While many object to the US government collecting private data on ordinary

people, Muslims tend to be seen as reasonable targets of suspicion. A July 2014 poll for the
to find.

Arab American Institute found that 42 percent of Americans think it is justifiable for law enforcement agencies to profile Arab

the debate on national security

surveillance that has emerged in the United States since the summer of 2013 is woefully
inadequate, due to its failure to place questions of race and empire at the center of its
analysis. It is racist ideas that form the basis for the ways national security
surveillance is organized and deployed, racist fears that are whipped up to legitimize this
surveillance to the American public, and the disproportionately targeted racialized groups that have been most effective in
Americans or American Muslims.3 In what follows, we argue that

making sense of it and organizing opposition. This is as true today as it has been historically: race and state surveillance are
intertwined in the history of US capitalism. Likewise, we argue that the history of national security surveillance in the United States
is inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire.

Most everyone violates some law from time-to-time. Mass

surveillance results in selective enforcement that
disproportionately impacts those lacking privilege.
Stanfill 13
Mel - The author now holds a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in
Communications and Media. The Author was working on that PhD at this time of this writing. When this
piece was written, the author held an M.A. from California State University, East Bay in Media and
Cultural Studies and had Graduate minors in Gender and Womens Studies and Queer Studies. The
author also held a B.A. from University of California, Berkeley - English with Distinction in General
Scholarship. At the time of this writing, the author had published several Peer-Reviewed Publications.
The author is internally quoting Daniel J. Solove is the John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law
at the George Washington University Law School. NSA Prism Part III: Due Process and Presumed
Guilty - July 1, 2013 http://www.melstanfill.com/nsa-prism-part-iii-due-process-and-presumed-guilty/

Posing this as a due process question could be the way to get some traction in light of the nonchalance about privacy discussed last
week: The problem with NSA PRISM is that we are all being treated as guilty until proven innocent. This has been going on since
9/11, of course, with airport security being one highly visible iteration, but theres a chance that this new level of awareness of just
how much everyone is being treated as criminal without due process of law could be the straw. Solove describes the stakes well:
Even

if a person is doing nothing wrong , in a free society, that person shouldnt have to
justify every action that government officials might view as suspicious. A key
component of freedom is not having to worry about how to explain oneself all the
time. Crossing this line into blanket assumption of guilt is what animates the Stop Watching US petition, which says the
contents of communications of people both abroad and in the U.S. can be swept in without any suspicion of crime or association
with a terrorist organization, though they tie their concern to the 1st and 4th amendment and citizens right to speak and
associate anonymously, guard against unreasonable searches and seizures, and protect their right to privacy without mentioning
due process. (That people feel due process has gone out the window is clear from the fact that RootsAction sent me a petition to
President Obama not to engage in any abduction or other foul play against Snowden, ironic when the administrations line on why
theyre disappointed that Hong Kong let him leave is that they want there to be rule of law.) Wired perhaps elaborates the worstcase-scenario best: Police

already abuse the immense power they have, but if everyones

every action were being monitored, and everyone technically violates some obscure
law at some time, then punishment becomes purely selective . Those in power
will essentially have what they need to punish anyone theyd like , whenever they choose,
as if there were no rules at all. Of course, black and Latino citizens have been living under
presumed-guilty, surveilled-within-an inch-of-their-lives, selectively-punished conditions for decades:

theyre more likely to get caught at things white folks also do

and be punished more harshly for them, even as early as middle school (see Ann
Fergusons Bad Boys).

Muslim and Arab citizens have been living under it since 9/11.

Reject this discrimination as an unacceptable wrong that must

be rejected as an end onto itself.
Shamsi 14
(et al; Hina Shamsi is a lecturer-in-law at Columbia Law School, where she teaches a course in
international human rights. She is also the Director of the ACLUs National Security Project, which is
dedicated to ensuring that U.S. national security policies and practices are consistent with the
Constitution, civil liberties, and human rights. She has litigated cases upholding the freedoms of

speech and association, and challenging targeted killing, torture, unlawful detention, and post-9/11
discrimination against racial and religious minorities. Her work includes a focus on the intersection of
national security and counterterrorism policies with international human rights and humanitarian law.
She also served as Senior Advisor to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions. Hina is a
graduate of Mount Holyoke College and Northwestern University School of Law. The Perversity of
Profiling April 14th available at the ACLU website - https://www.aclu.org/blog/perversity-profiling)

evidence of
wrongdoing , the FBI has also targeted minority communities for interviews

Using

expanded

authorities that permit investigations without

actual

based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion. It has used informants to conduct surveillance in
community centers, mosques, and other public gathering places and against people exercising their First Amendment right to

among Americas minority communities, flying while

brown soon joined driving while black as a truism of government-sanctioned
discrimination and stigma. Its hard to overstate the damage done to the FBIs
relationship with minorities, particularly American Muslims. The damage, however, has spread
worship or to engage in political advocacy. And

When federal law enforcement leads in discriminatory profiling , state and

local law enforcement will follow. Nowhere is that clearer than in New York City, where the
further.

NYPD which is twice the size of the FBI launched a massive program of discriminatory

surveillance and investigation of American Muslims, mapping the places where they carry out daily
activities and sending informants to spy on mosques and Muslim community organizations, student groups, and businesses. After
the Associated Press broke a series of stories describing this program in stark and shocking detail,

the NYPD defended

itself, arguing that it was only doing what the FBI was permitted

to do.

From the ACLUs work with New Yorks Muslim

communities, we know that a generation of youth is growing up fearful of its local
police force, scared to exercise the rights to freedom of worship, speech, and association.
Again, its hard to overstate the harm.

Fortunately, the issuance of the revised Guidance on Race has been delayed and both the Justice Department and the civil rights
community have a crucial opportunity to put a spotlight on the FBI, which vigorously opposes those fighting for equality. According
to the New York Times,

the FBIs argument seems to be that it needs to identify where Somalis live to

investigate potential Somali terrorism suspects. But that argument must be

rejected for the same reason that we reject it in other contexts . Many
mass shooters are young white males, yet we rightly dont map where whites live or send
informants to majority white communities to ferret out potential mass shooters. Put another way, the FBIs
argument presumes what the Ashcroft Guidance emphatically rejects: that crime can be prevented
by

the

mass stereotyping of entire communities. Not only is that wrong , it is a ham-handed

squanders resources that should properly be devoted to investigating

actual wrongdoing.
approach that

We reject the racialized notions of Surveillance and Security.

These practices falsely construct threats and shut-down
dissent in many forms.

Kumar & Kundnani 15

Deepa Kumar is an associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University.
She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Haymarket Books, 2012). Arun Kundnani
is research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. He is a writer and activist, and a
professor at NYU. Race, surveillance, and empire International Socialist Review - Issue #96 Spring
- http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire

In the second part,

we turn our attention to the current conjuncture in which the politics of the

War on Terror shape national security surveillance practices . The

intensive surveillance of Muslim Americans has been carried out by a vast security
apparatus that has also been used against dissident movements such as Occupy

Wall Street and environmental rights activists, who represent a threat to the
neoliberal order. This is not new; the process of targeting dissenters has been a constant feature of American history. For
instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s were passed by the Federalist government against the Jeffersonian
sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged Nathan Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American

State surveillance regimes have always sought to monitor and penalize a wide range
of dissenters, radicals, and revolutionaries. Race was a factor in some but by no means all of these cases. Our
Revolution.

focus here is on the production of racialized others as security threats and the ways this helps to stabilize capitalist social

the current system of mass surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and overlaps

with other systems of racialized security surveillance that feed the mass deportation of
immigrants under the Obama administration and that disproportionately target African Americans ,
contributing to their mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander refers to as the New Jim Crow.4 We argue
that racialized groupings are produced in the very act of collecting information about
relations. Further,

certain groups deemed as threats by the national security state the Brown

terrorist , the Black and Brown drug dealer and user, and the
immigrant who threatens to steal jobs. We conclude that security has become one of
the primary means through which racism is ideologically
reproduced in the post-racial, neoliberal era. Drawing on W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we
argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized notions of security that offer a new psychological wage as
compensation for the decline of the social wage and its reallocation to homeland security.

Surveillance is racist its the modern COINTELPRO. Reject the

security justifications that prop-up these forms of violence.
Kumar & Kundnani 15
Deepa Kumar is an associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University.
She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Haymarket Books, 2012). Arun Kundnani
is research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. He is a writer and activist, and a
professor at NYU. Race, surveillance, and empire International Socialist Review - Issue #96 Spring
- http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire

As of 2008,

the FBI had a roster of 15,000 paid informants and, according to Senator Dianne Feinstein of
10,000 counterterrorism intelligence analysts in 2013.63 The

the Senate Intelligence Committee, the bureau had

proportion of these informants and analysts who are assigned to Muslim populations in the United States is unknown but is likely to

The kinds of infiltration and provocation tactics that had been practiced against Black
radicals in the 1960s are being repeated today. What has changed are the rationales
used to justify them: it is no longer the threat of Black nationalist subversion, but the
threat of Muslim radicalization that is invoked. With new provisions in the Clinton administrations 1996
be substantial.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the FBI can launch investigations of a suspected individual or organization simply for
providing material support to terrorisma vague term that could include ideological activity unrelated to any actual plot to carry

While COINTELPRO violated federal laws, today similar kinds of

investigation and criminalization of political dissent can be carried out legitimately in
the name of countering terrorism.
out violence.

Bigotry Advantage 1AC Shorter

version

Bigotry Advantage shorter version

Contention # ____ is Bigotry
Warrantless surveillance boosts a distinct form of racial,
religious, and ethnic discrimination. The Negs security
interests only drive this racialized violence.
Unegbu 13
Cindy C. Unegbu - J.D. Candidate, Howard University School of Law - NOTE AND COMMENT: National
Security Surveillance on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional Misstep - Howard
Law Journal - 57 How. L.J. 433 - Fall, 2013 lexis; lawrev

Picture this: you live in a society in which the government is allowed to partake in
intrusive surveillance measures without the institutionalized checks and balances upon which the
government was founded. In this society, the government pursues citizens who belong to a
particular race or ethnicity, practice a certain religion, or have affiliations with specific interest groups.
Individuals who have these characteristics are subject to surreptitious monitoring, which includes
undercover government officials disguising themselves as community members in order to attend various community events and programs. The
government may also place these individuals on watch lists, even where there is no
evidence of wrongdoing. These watch lists classify domestic individuals as potential or suspected terrorists and facilitate the
monitoring of their personal activity through various law enforcement agencies for an extended period of time. This "hypothetical"
society is not hypothetical at all; in fact, it is the current state of American

surveillance. The government's domestic spying activities have progressed

to intrusive levels, primarily due to an increased fear of terrorism . n1 This fear
has resulted in governmental intelligence efforts that are focused on political activists, racial
and religious minorities, and immigrants. n2 [*435] The government's domestic
surveillance efforts are not only geared toward suspected terrorists and those partaking in criminal activity, but reach any
innocent, non-criminal, non-terrorist national, all in the name of national security.
The government's power to engage in suspicionless surveillance and track innocent citizens'
sensitive information has been granted through the creation and revision of the National Counterterrorism Center n3 and the FBI's (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide. n4 The grant of surveillance power has resulted in many opponents, including those within
the current presidential administration, who challenge the order for numerous reasons. n5 These reasons include the inefficiency of storing citizens'
random personal information for extended periods of time, n6 the broad unprecedented authority granted to this body of government without proper
approval from Congress, n7 and the constitutional violations due to the deprivation of citizens' rights. n8 [*436] This Comment argues that the wide-

results in

sweeping surveillance authority granted to the government

a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause due to
far-reaching domestic monitoring practices. Surveillance practices, such as posing as members of the community and placing individuals on watch lists
without suspicion of terrorist activity, result in the
their

impermissible monitoring of individuals on the basis of

race or ethnicity . These practices, although done in the name of national security, an established compelling government

The
procedures are not narrowly tailored to the interest of national security because of
interest, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they are not narrowly tailored to the stated interest.

the over-inclusiveness of the measures .

Most everyone violates some law from time-to-time. Mass

surveillance results in selective enforcement that
disproportionately impacts those lacking privilege.
Stanfill 13
Mel - The author now holds a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in
Communications and Media. The Author was working on that PhD at this time of this writing. When this
piece was written, the author held an M.A. from California State University, East Bay in Media and
Cultural Studies and had Graduate minors in Gender and Womens Studies and Queer Studies. The
author also held a B.A. from University of California, Berkeley - English with Distinction in General
Scholarship. At the time of this writing, the author had published several Peer-Reviewed Publications.
The author is internally quoting Daniel J. Solove is the John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law
at the George Washington University Law School. NSA Prism Part III: Due Process and Presumed
Guilty - July 1, 2013 http://www.melstanfill.com/nsa-prism-part-iii-due-process-and-presumed-guilty/

Posing this as a due process question could be the way to get some traction in light of the nonchalance about privacy discussed last
week: The problem with NSA PRISM is that we are all being treated as guilty until proven innocent. This has been going on since
9/11, of course, with airport security being one highly visible iteration, but theres a chance that this new level of awareness of just
how much everyone is being treated as criminal without due process of law could be the straw. Solove describes the stakes well:
Even

if a person is doing nothing wrong , in a free society, that person shouldnt have to
justify every action that government officials might view as suspicious. A key
component of freedom is not having to worry about how to explain oneself all the
time. Crossing this line into blanket assumption of guilt is what animates the Stop Watching US petition, which says the
contents of communications of people both abroad and in the U.S. can be swept in without any suspicion of crime or association
with a terrorist organization, though they tie their concern to the 1st and 4th amendment and citizens right to speak and
associate anonymously, guard against unreasonable searches and seizures, and protect their right to privacy without mentioning
due process. (That people feel due process has gone out the window is clear from the fact that RootsAction sent me a petition to
President Obama not to engage in any abduction or other foul play against Snowden, ironic when the administrations line on why
theyre disappointed that Hong Kong let him leave is that they want there to be rule of law.) Wired perhaps elaborates the worstcase-scenario best: Police

already abuse the immense power they have, but if everyones

every action were being monitored, and everyone technically violates some obscure
law at some time, then punishment becomes purely selective . Those in power
will essentially have what they need to punish anyone theyd like , whenever they choose,
as if there were no rules at all. Of course, black and Latino citizens have been living under
presumed-guilty, surveilled-within-an inch-of-their-lives, selectively-punished conditions for decades:

theyre more likely to get caught at things white folks also do

and be punished more harshly for them, even as early as middle school (see Ann
Fergusons Bad Boys).

Muslim and Arab citizens have been living under it since 9/11.

Reject this discrimination as an unacceptable wrong that must

be rejected as an end onto itself.
Shamsi 14
(et al; Hina Shamsi is a lecturer-in-law at Columbia Law School, where she teaches a course in
international human rights. She is also the Director of the ACLUs National Security Project, which is

dedicated to ensuring that U.S. national security policies and practices are consistent with the
Constitution, civil liberties, and human rights. She has litigated cases upholding the freedoms of
speech and association, and challenging targeted killing, torture, unlawful detention, and post-9/11
discrimination against racial and religious minorities. Her work includes a focus on the intersection of
national security and counterterrorism policies with international human rights and humanitarian law.
She also served as Senior Advisor to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions. Hina is a
graduate of Mount Holyoke College and Northwestern University School of Law. The Perversity of
Profiling April 14th available at the ACLU website - https://www.aclu.org/blog/perversity-profiling)

evidence of
wrongdoing , the FBI has also targeted minority communities for interviews

Using

expanded

authorities that permit investigations without

actual

based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion. It has used informants to conduct surveillance in
community centers, mosques, and other public gathering places and against people exercising their First Amendment right to

among Americas minority communities, flying while

brown soon joined driving while black as a truism of government-sanctioned
discrimination and stigma. Its hard to overstate the damage done to the FBIs
relationship with minorities, particularly American Muslims. The damage, however, has spread
worship or to engage in political advocacy. And

When federal law enforcement leads in discriminatory profiling , state and

local law enforcement will follow. Nowhere is that clearer than in New York City, where the
further.

NYPD which is twice the size of the FBI launched a massive program of discriminatory

surveillance and investigation of American Muslims, mapping the places where they carry out daily
activities and sending informants to spy on mosques and Muslim community organizations, student groups, and businesses. After
the Associated Press broke a series of stories describing this program in stark and shocking detail,

the NYPD defended

itself, arguing that it was only doing what the FBI was permitted

to do.

From the ACLUs work with New Yorks Muslim

communities, we know that a generation of youth is growing up fearful of its local
police force, scared to exercise the rights to freedom of worship, speech, and association.
Again, its hard to overstate the harm.

Fortunately, the issuance of the revised Guidance on Race has been delayed and both the Justice Department and the civil rights
community have a crucial opportunity to put a spotlight on the FBI, which vigorously opposes those fighting for equality. According
to the New York Times,

the FBIs argument seems to be that it needs to identify where Somalis live to

investigate potential Somali terrorism suspects. But that argument must be

rejected for the same reason that we reject it in other contexts . Many
mass shooters are young white males, yet we rightly dont map where whites live or send
informants to majority white communities to ferret out potential mass shooters. Put another way, the FBIs
argument presumes what the Ashcroft Guidance emphatically rejects: that crime can be prevented
by

the

mass stereotyping of entire communities. Not only is that wrong , it is a ham-handed

squanders resources that should properly be devoted to investigating

actual wrongdoing.
approach that

1AC Journalism Advantage

Journalism Advantage - 1AC

Journalism Advantage
Contention # ____ is Journalism
Status quo mass surveillance chills journalism and crushes
government accountability.
Wong 15
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch.
Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy &
Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of
the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free
expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong
earned her law degree from New York University School of Law From the essay: Internet at a
Crossroads: How Government Surveillance Threatens How We Communicate http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/essays/internet-crossroads

joint

report published by Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union in July 2014 documented the

effects of large-scale surveillance on the practice of journalism and law in the US.
Interviews with dozens of journalists showed that increased surveillance, combined with
tightened measures to prevent leaks and government contact with media, are intimidating sources , keeping them from
insidious

talking to journalists (even about unclassified topics of public concern) out of fear that they could face retaliation, lose their security

this is having a detrimental impact

on the amount and quality of news coverage, particularly on matters related to national
security, intelligence, and law enforcement. This effect undermines the role of the fourth estate
in holding government to account. Steve Coll, staff writer for the New Yorker and dean of the
clearances or jobs, or even face prosecution. Ultimately,

Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, explained: Every

national security reporter I know

would say that the atmosphere in which professional reporters seek insight into
policy failures [and] bad military decisions is just much tougher and much chillier.
Public understanding of national security policies that are carried out in our name is

essential to the functioning of healthy democracies and open societies.

Indiscriminate collection is the vital internal link. It hampers
aggressive journalism on bad national security decisions.
Sinha 14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York
Universitys School of Law. This includes a specialization as a Scholar from NYUs Institute for

International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Toronto. Additional
authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human Rights
Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington
Director at Human Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided
key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a
vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. This card
also internally quotes Steve Coll, Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University.
From the Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming
Journalism, Law and American Democracy This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50
journalists covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New
York Times, the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at:
http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)

Every national security reporter I know would say that the atmosphere in which
professional reporters seek insight into policy failures [and] bad military decisions is just

much tougher and much chillier. Steve Coll, staff writer for The New Yorker and Dean of
the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University , February 14, 2014 Numerous US-based
journalists covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement describe the current reporting
landscape as, in some respects, the most difficult they have ever faced. This is the worst Ive seen in
terms of the governments efforts to control information, acknowledged Jonathan Landay, a veteran national security and
intelligence correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers.68 Its a terrible time to be covering government, agreed Tom Gjelten, who
has worked with National Public Radio for over 30 years.69 According to Kathleen Carroll, senior vice president and executive editor
of The Associated Press, We say this every time theres a new occupant in the White House, and its true every time: each is more
secretive than the last.70 Journalists are struggling harder than ever before to protect their sources, and sources are more reluctant
to speak. This environment makes reporting both slower and less fruitful.

Journalists interviewed for this report described

the difficulty of obtaining sources and covering sensitive topics in an atmosphere of uncertainty about the range
and effect of the governments power over them. Both surveillance and leak investigations loomed large
in this contextespecially to the extent that there may be a relationship between
the two. More specifically, many journalists see the governments power as menacing because they know little about when
various government agencies share among themselves information collected through surveillance, and when they deploy that
information in leak [what they] will do with it, observed James Asher, Washington Bureau Chief for McClatchy Co., the third largest
newspaper group in the country.72 One Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for a newspaper noted that even a decrease in leak
prosecutions is unlikely to help, unless we [also] get clear lines about what is collectable and usable.73 Others agreed. Im pretty
worried that NSA information will make its way into leak investigations, said one investigative journalist for a major outlet.74 A
reporter who covers national defense expressed concern about the possibility of a porous wall between the NSA and the
Department of Justice, the latter of which receives referrals connected to leak investigations.75 Jonathan Landay wondered whether
the government might analyze metadata records to identify his contacts.76 A national security reporter summarized the situation as
follows: Do we trust [the intelligence] portion of the governments knowledge to be walled off from leak investigations? Thats not a

While most journalists said that their difficulties began a few years ago, particularly
with the increase in leak prosecutions, our interviews confirmed that for many journalists largescale
good place to be.77

surveillance by the US government contributes substantially to the new

challenges they encounter. The governments large-scale collection of

metadata and communications makes it significantly more difficult for them to
protect themselves and their sources, to confirm details for their stories, and ultimately to inform
the public.

This erodes meaningful checks on inappropriate government

officials. It spills beyond national security into many policy
issues.
Brown 14
Bruce Brown - Counsel of Record. BRIEF OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
AND 17 MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT - The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated association of reporters. The
Reporters Committee has provided representation, guidance and research in First Amendment and
Freedom of Information Act litigation since 1970.Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama before the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Amici means friend of the court and in this context - is legal
reference to the Reporters Committee Sept 9th - https://www.eff.org/document/rcfp-smith-amicus-brief
In a report that former Washington Post executive editor Leonard Downie Jr. wrote for the Committee to Protect Journalists,

numerous journalists said surveillance programs and leak prosecutions deter sources from
speaking to them. Comm. To Protect Journalists, The Obama Administration and the Press: Leak Investigations and
Surveillance in Post-9/11 America 3 (Oct. 10, 2013), http://bit.ly/1c3Cnfg. In the report, Associated Press senior managing editor
Michael Oreskes commented: Theres

no question that sources are looking over their

shoulders. Sources are more jittery and more standoffish, not just in national security reporting.

A lot of

One of
the most pernicious efects is the chilling efect created across
government on matters that are less sensitive but certainly in
the public interest as a check on government and elected
officials. Id. Discussing the NSA surveillance programs, New York Times investigative reporter and threetime Pulitzer Prize winner David Barstow stated, I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that
stories have not gotten done because of this. Jamie Schuman, The Shadows of
skittishness is at the more routine level. Id. Washington Post national security reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran said:

the Spooks, The News Media and the Law, Fall 2013, at 9.

Aggressive press is vital to check corrupt governance

practices. It builds more accountable governance.
Sinha 14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York
Universitys School of Law. This includes a specialization as a Scholar from NYUs Institute for
International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Toronto. Additional
authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human Rights
Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington
Director at Human Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided
key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a
vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. From the
Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law
and American Democracy This card also internally quotes Steve Coll, Dean of the Graduate School of
Journalism at Columbia University. This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50

journalists covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New
York Times, the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at:
http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)

In recent decades,

the press has played an important role in checking

government and in particular, the intelligence community .

,

225 That has not

always been the case. Betty Medsger, a former Washington Post reporter whose series of stories in 1971 first revealed the FBIs targeting of dissenters, recalled that there was very little
investigative work before her articles appeared.226 Even her FBI stories derived from documents stolen by activists, rather than through Medsgers cultivation of sources inside the
intelligence community. I was given these files. I didnt have clever techniques. Nobody was trying to develop inside sources until then.227 Tim Weiner, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter
for the New York Times, who also won a National Book Award for his history of the CIA, offered an earlier timeline for the development of investigative journalism on the intelligence
community, observing that serious investigative reporting into the CIA started in the mid-1960s, and then seriously expanded a decade later.228 Phil Bennett elaborated:

The

growth of the intelligence community and of a more critical, more adversarial press
occurred in tandem, on overlapping timelines. Although there have been state secrets since the founding of the Republic, the current institutional structure that
manufactures and protects those secrets emerged near the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. For the most part, at first journalists did little to contest the

the Vietnam War led some journalists to see secrecy as a tool for
the government to deceive the public. The Pentagon Papers case ratified this view. Disclosing government
secrets then became a central part of the birth of modern investigative reporting.
This has carried over to the digital era .229 Ultimately, the governments own
investigations into the intelligence community in the mid-1970smost famously among them,
government's monopoly on secrets. But

the Church Committee in the Senateprovided a sound basis for ongoing and active
investigative work by journalists on the intelligence community ever since.230 Those

inquiries revealed significant

intelligence community

and widespread

misconduct by the

dating back decades. By offering the public significant and early insight into objectionable practices by the FBI,

Medsgers stories formed a major part of the environment that gave rise to those investigations,231 complementing pressure resulting from the Vietnam War and Seymour Hershs 1974

But coverage of the intelligence community has recently (once again)

become more challenging to undertake. It seems to me that at some point it became very difficult again to cover these institutions and get inside
reporting on the CIA.232

sources, Medsger observed.233 Many journalists who spoke to us expressed a strong commitment to their work, and were unwilling to be dissuaded from continued efforts to cover
increasingly difficult beats. Im not in any way going to stop reporting, remarked Adam Goldman. In most cases, I am not the vulnerable one, added Steve Aftergood.234 Peter Maass
also identified a silver lining: Even though its harder, its also very exciting. Were being given an amazing opportunity to do exciting work that could help shape society for years to
come.235 Nevertheless,

the effects that surveillance and leak investigations have

working to undermine efective

democratic

had

on coverage are

participation and governance. What

makes government better is our work exposing information ,

It makes
the country less safe. Institutions work less well, and it
increases the risk of corruption. Secrecy works against all of
us.
National security journalism is especially
important for a functioning,
accountable system
Theres a real loss to the public
argued

Dana Priest, a Pulitzer Prize-winning national security reporter at the Washington Post.236 Its not just that its harder for me to do my job, though it is.

also

237 Charlie Savage added,

democratically

well, noting,

.238 Steve Coll agreed as

, the voters. For James Asher, The role of the press is to be challenging and

It is thus inherently important for journalists to seek out certain information that the
government treats as sensitive and, when appropriate, share it with the public. Kathleen Carroll also emphasized the responsibility typically
demonstrated by journalists who work on national security topics. This is not a bunch of bratty journalists trying to
undermine legitimate government operations , she argued. Moreover, though she believes that a governments actions on behalf
critical.240

of the people it serves should be public, [m]ost news organizations [including her outlet, the Associated Press] will recognize that certain things the government is doing need to remain
secret, at least for now.

The disputes take place because the government idea of what should

remain secret is much more sweeping. 241

Building more accountable government not sweeping

rejecting it is vital to check a laundry list of existential risks.
Eckersley 4
Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Melbourne, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books,
pp. 3-8

While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric
analyses of global ecological degradation,

I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states

have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty
years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive

arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who

seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more
lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war , social and
role in world affairs, and his
somehow

economic in

justice, or environmental degradation. 10 As Bull argued, given that

the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the
state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or
subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it."" In any event, rejecting
the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the
emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global
ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major
sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green

transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or
not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek
to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into
the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to

Of course, it would be unhelpful to be come

singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of
governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is
ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.

necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local,

Nonetheless, while
the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially
significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoplesas expressed in the
national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change.

principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a
momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an
indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining
all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life
chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in
securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these

Given that
the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and
societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale
that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to
dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis.

deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart
Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and
nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels,
and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems
to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state
power. Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the

coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic
sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined
sociologically in terms of its ends* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are
peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by
subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular

a
contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an
rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was

increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 In contrast to Weber,
my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the
democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and
associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that
seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states
possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily

whether the use of the state's

coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is
imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event,

the manner in which it is exercised , and whether it is

managed in public , transparent, and accountable ways a judgment that must be

exercised,

The coercive arm of

the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade
made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings.

privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of
and protect the environment. In short, although the political autonomy of states is
there are still few social institution that can match the same
degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along
more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution,
corporate power,

widely believed to be in decline,

the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. Statesparticularly when
they act collectivelyhave the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism.
They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the
neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green
political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system.
While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by
offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17

Unlike the current Freedom Act, the original Act is perceived

by sources as sufficient to restore trust.
HRW 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. US Senate: Salvage Surveillance
Reform House Bill Flawed - Human Rights Watch - May 22, 2014
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)

It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform , Human Rights Watch said today. The
version of the USA Freedom Act that the US House of Representatives passed on May 22, 2014,

fail to end mass data collection. The version the House

passed is a watered-down version of an earlier bill that was designed to end
bulk collection of business records and phone metadata. The practice has been almost
universally condemned by all but the US security establishment. This so-called reform bill wont
restore the trust of Internet users in the US and around the world, said
Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch . Until
Congress passes real reform, US credibility and leadership on
Internet freedom will continue to fade . The initial version of the bill
aimed to prohibit bulk collection by the government of business records, including phone
could

ultimately

metadata.

The bill only addressed one component of the surveillance programs revealed by
However, it

the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections.

had broad support as a first step, including from Human Rights Watch.
On May 7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, followed by

the version the House

passed could leave the door wide open to continued indiscriminate data collection
practices potentially invading the privacy of millions of people without justification, Human Rights
Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While better than alternative bills offered,

Watch said.

1AC - Global Internet Freedom

Advantage

Global Internet Advantage - 1AC

Econ module

Global Internet Advantage Econ module

Contention # ____ is Global internet freedom
New Freedom Act fails to restore USs global credibility on
Internet freedom. The original version solves by closing SST
loopholes.
Brinkerhof 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Noel Brinkerhoff is a Political
reporter and writer covering state and national politics for 15 years. With Support of Obama
Administration, House NSA Surveillance Reform Bill Includes Gaping Loopholes AllGov May 26 th http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/with-support-of-obama-administration-house-nsa-surveillancereform-bill-includes-gaping-loopholes-140526?news=853242)

Lawmakers in the

House of Representatives claim they have addressed the problems of the

bulk collection of data, made so famous last year by
whistleblower Edward Snowden. But the legislation adopted to end this controversial
U.S.

National Security Agencys (NSA) notorious

practice contains huge loopholes that could allow the NSA to keep
vacuuming up large amounts of Americans communications records, all with the blessing of
the Obama administration. Dubbed the USA Freedom Act, the bill overwhelmingly approved by the House

was criticized for not going far enough to keep data out
of the hands of government. This so-called reform bill wont restore the
trust of Internet users in the U.S. and around the world, Cynthia Wong,
senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch (HRW), said.
Until Congress passes real reform , U.S. credibility and leadership on
Internet freedom will continue to fade. Julian Sanchez, a researcher at the Cato Institute, a
(303 to 121)

libertarian think tank, warned that the changes could mean the continuation of bulk collection of phone records by another name.
The

core problem is that this only ends bulk collection in the sense the intelligence

community uses that term, Sanchez told Wired. As long as theres some kind of target ,
they dont call that bulk collection, even if youre still collecting millions of

recordsIf they say give us the record of everyone who visited these thousand
websites, thats not bulk collection, because they have a list of targets. HRW says
the bill, which now goes to the Senate for consideration, contains ambiguous definitions about what can and
cannot be collected by the agency. For instance,

an earlier version more clearly defined the

scope of what the NSA could grab under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which has formed the legal basis for
gathering the metadata of phone calls. Under

an earlier version of the USA Freedom Act,

the government would have been required to base any demand for phone metadata
or other records on a specific selection term that uniquely describe[s] a
person, entity, or account. Under the House version, this definition was broadened to
mean a discrete term, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device, used by the
government to limit the scope of information sought, according to Human Rights Watch. This definition is too openended and ambiguous to prevent the sort of creative interpretation by intelligence agencies that has been used to
justify overbroad collection practices in the past, the group claims. The New America Foundations Open
Technology Institute is similarly disappointed in the final House bill. Taken together, the Institute wrote, the changes to
this definition may still allow for massive collection of millions of Americans private
information based on very broad selection terms such as a zip code, an area

code , the physical address of a particular email provider or financial institution , or

the IP address of a web hosting service that hosts thousands of web
sites.

The US can alter global practices that threaten internet

freedom but only when US image is seen as less hypocritical.
Wong 13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch.
Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy &
Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of
the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free
expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong
earned her law degree from New York University School of Law Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW
website at this address: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internetfreedom

Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as

problematic as listening to the content of peoples phone calls or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long
recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized
data can be easily combined and analyzed.

The revelations have also exposed glaring contradictions about

the US Internet freedom agenda.

This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically

denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though

the widening rift between US values and actions has real,

unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights movement, the Internets impact on rights crystalized in 2005
there is hypocrisy on both sides,

we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the
Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
forcefully objected to the Chinese governments actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In
the end, that incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some
companies to improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of government
after

demands for data. US support was critical back then , but it is hard to
imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal
has damaged the US governments ability to press for better corporate practices as
technology companies expand globally. It will also be more difficult for companies to
resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as complicit in mass US
infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the
same cooperation that the US receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user
data locally or maintain a local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the

there is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just
India began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone
and Internet communications in the country, without much clarity on safeguards to
protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the governments problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over
the last few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has
drawn particular ire. Now the government is preparing new regulations that would make it
easier to get data from Internet companies and identify individual users online. The Obama administration and US
companies could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey. Instead,
the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass
surveillance and conscripting the help of the private sector.
Chinese government are overstated,

months before the NSA scandal broke,

(Note to students: conscripting means compulsory enlistment of companies for

state service.)

Washington will inevitably push for global Internet freedom

but US image is vital. The Internet freedom agendas key to
the Global Economy.
Kalathil 10
Shanthi Kalathil - Adjunct Faculty and Adjunct Lecturer in the Communication, Culture, and Technology
(CCT) Master of Arts Program at Georgetown University. Kalathil has extensive experience advising the
U.S. government, international organizations and nonprofits on supporting civil society, independent
media, technology, transparency and accountability. Previously a senior Democracy Fellow at the U.S.
Agency for International Development and she has authored or edited numerous policy and scholarly
publications, including the edited volume Diplomacy, Development and Security in the Information
Age. She has taught courses on international relations in the information age at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies and Georgetown University. Kalathil holds degrees from U.C. Berkeley and the
London School of Economics and Political Science Internet Freedom: A Background Paper October
2010 - Available via:
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/Internet_Freedom_A_Background_Pape
r_0.pdf

As use of the Internet has grown exponentially around the world, so too have concerns
about its defining attribute as a free and open means of communication . Around the
world, countries, companies and citizens are grappling with thorny issues of free expression,
censorship and trust. With starkly different visions for the Internet developing, this era
presents challengesand also opportunitiesfor those who wish to ensure the Internet
remains a backbone of liberty and economic growth. U.S. officials have

made clear their vision for the Internet s future. President Obama, in a speech
before the UN General Assembly, said that the U.S. is committed to promoting new
communication tools, so that people are empowered to connect with one another and, in
repressive societies, to do so with security. We will support a free and open Internet, so individuals have the information
to make up their own minds. His words were reinforced by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski: It is essential that we
preserve the open Internet and stand firmly behind the right of all people to connect with one another and to exchange
ideas freely and without fear.1

Indeed, a free, widely accessible Internet stands at the heart of

both global communication and

global commerce. Internet freedom enables dialogue and direct

trade and
economic growth. Conversely, censorship and other blockages stifle both expression and
innovation. When arbitrary rules privilege some and not others, the investment climate suffers. Nor can access be expanded if
diplomacy between people and civilizations, facilitating the exchange of ideas and culture while bolstering

end users have no trust in the network. However, making reality live up to aspirations for Internet freedom can prove difficult.

global initiativesspearheaded by governments, private sector and civil societyare attempting to

enshrine the norms, principles and standards that will ensure the Internet remains a public space
for free expression. At the same time, other norms are fast arisingparticularly
those defined by authoritarian countries that wish to splinter the Internet into independently controlled
fiefdoms. Even as Internet access has expanded around the world, many governments
are attempting to control, regulate and censor the Internet in all its forms: blogs, mobile communication,
social media, etc. Such governments have devoted vast resources to shaping the
Internets development within their own borders, and they are now seeking to shape
the Internet outside their borders as well. Indeed, Internet experts are worried that national governments of all
stripes will increasingly seek to extend their regulatory authority over the global Internet, culminating in a balkanized
Internet with limited interoperability. Hence, the next few years present a distinct
window of opportunity to elevate the principles of the free exchange of ideas, knowledge and commerce on
the Internet. While U.S. leadership within this window is vital , a global effort is necessary to ensure that
these norms become a standard part of the Internets supporting architecture.
Numerous

Global economic decline risks nuclear war.

Merlini 11
[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board
of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to
2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and
Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and
nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI:
10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal
Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF
Download PDF (~357 KB)
View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?',
Survival, 53:2, 117 130]

Two neatly opposed

scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate

the range of

possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian
system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and
traditional

conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear

weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic

and

system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second
with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first.
Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection
of outside interference would likely be amplified , emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of
financial

Great Depression,

multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or
India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become
unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be
sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

The new Freedom Act wont solve US image. Protections from

the original version do solve, even without protections for
persons outside the US.
Ries 14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights
Program. Also internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human
rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at
the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet
Freedom. She conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a
particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy &
Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that
advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT,
Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC).
There, she contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and
freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law.
Also internally quoting Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger Brian Ries
is Mashables Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at
Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to cover revolutions,
disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that
won two Webby Awards for Best News Site. Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That
Congress Just Passed - Mashable - May 22, 2014 http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsasurveillance-bill/)
As a result,

many of its initial supporters pulled their support. We supported the

original USA Freedom act, even though it didnt do much for nonUS persons, Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security &
Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the

original version as a good step to end bulk collection. However,

in its current version, it's not even clear that this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added
that Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill something he said is a real
problem.

"Where there is vagueness in a law,

you can count on the administration

to exploit it," Johnson said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a
more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the
out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many including members of both parties who rightly
believe the bill does not go far enough without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee
bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply
called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." The

ban on bulk collection was deliberately

watered down to be ambiguous and exploitable, said Center for Democracy and Technology
Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. We

withdrew support for USA FREEDOM when the bill morphed

into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans with
no connection to a crime or terrorism. And Cynthia Wong , senior Internet researcher at
Human Rights Watch, said, This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of
Internet users in the US and around the world. Until Congress passes real

reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will

continue to fade.

Unlike the current Act, the original bill does solve US image.
This holds even if plans about bulk collection instead of
every surveillance practices.
HRW 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. US Senate: Salvage Surveillance
Reform House Bill Flawed - Human Rights Watch - May 22, 2014
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)

It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform , Human Rights Watch said today. The version
of the USA Freedom Act that the US House of Representatives passed

on May 22, 2014,

could

ultimately

fail to

end mass data collection. The version the House passed is a watered-down
version of an earlier bill that was designed to end bulk collection of business
records and phone metadata.

The practice has been almost universally condemned by all but the US security establishment.

This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of Internet users in the US and

around the world, said Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at

Human Rights Watch . Until Congress passes real reform , US

credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade .
The initial version of the bill aimed to prohibit bulk collection by the government
The bill only addressed one component of the surveillance
programs revealed by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections. However, it had
of business records, including phone metadata.

broad support as a first step, including from Human Rights Watch.

On May

7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While

the version the House passed could leave the door wide open to
continued indiscriminate data collection practices potentially invading the privacy of
millions of people without justification, Human Rights Watch said.
better than alternative bills offered,

Global Internet Adv - 1AC Democracy

version

Global Internet Advantage Democracy module

New Freedom Act fails to restore USs global credibility on
Internet freedom. The original version solves by closing SST
loopholes.
Brinkerhof 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Noel Brinkerhoff is a Political
reporter and writer covering state and national politics for 15 years. With Support of Obama
Administration, House NSA Surveillance Reform Bill Includes Gaping Loopholes AllGov May 26 th http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/with-support-of-obama-administration-house-nsa-surveillancereform-bill-includes-gaping-loopholes-140526?news=853242)

Lawmakers in the

House of Representatives claim they have addressed the problems of the

National Security Agencys (NSA) notorious bulk collection of data, made so famous last year by
whistleblower Edward Snowden. But the legislation adopted to end this controversial
U.S.

practice contains huge loopholes that could allow the NSA to keep
vacuuming up large amounts of Americans communications records, all with the blessing of
the Obama administration. Dubbed the USA Freedom Act, the bill overwhelmingly approved by the House

was criticized for not going far enough to keep data out
of the hands of government. This so-called reform bill wont restore the
trust of Internet users in the U.S. and around the world, Cynthia Wong,
senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch (HRW), said.
Until Congress passes real reform , U.S. credibility and leadership on
Internet freedom will continue to fade. Julian Sanchez, a researcher at the Cato Institute, a
(303 to 121)

libertarian think tank, warned that the changes could mean the continuation of bulk collection of phone records by another name.
The

core problem is that this only ends bulk collection in the sense the intelligence

community uses that term, Sanchez told Wired. As long as theres some kind of target ,
they dont call that bulk collection, even if youre still collecting millions of
recordsIf they say give us the record of everyone who visited these thousand
websites, thats not bulk collection, because they have a list of targets. HRW says

the bill, which now goes to the Senate for consideration, contains ambiguous definitions
cannot be collected by the agency. For instance,

about what can and

an earlier version more clearly defined the

scope of what the NSA could grab under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which has formed the legal basis for
gathering the metadata of phone calls. Under

an earlier version of the USA Freedom Act,

the government would have been required to base any demand for phone metadata
or other records on a specific selection term that uniquely describe[s] a
person, entity, or account. Under the House version, this definition was broadened to
mean a discrete term, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device, used by the
government to limit the scope of information sought, according to Human Rights Watch. This definition is too openended and ambiguous to prevent the sort of creative interpretation by intelligence agencies that has been used to
justify overbroad collection practices in the past, the group claims. The New America Foundations Open
Technology Institute is similarly disappointed in the final House bill. Taken together, the Institute wrote, the changes to
this definition may still allow for massive collection of millions of Americans private
information based on very broad selection terms such as a zip code, an area

code , the physical address of a particular email provider or financial institution , or

the IP address of a web hosting service that hosts thousands of web
sites.

The US can alter global practices that threaten internet

freedom but only when US image is seen as less hypocritical.
Wong 13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch.
Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy &
Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of
the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free
expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong
earned her law degree from New York University School of Law Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW
website at this address: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internetfreedom

Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as

problematic as listening to the content of peoples phone calls or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long
recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized
data can be easily combined and analyzed.

The revelations have also exposed glaring contradictions about

the US Internet freedom agenda.

This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically

denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though

the widening rift between US values and actions has real,

unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights movement, the Internets impact on rights crystalized in 2005
after we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the
Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
there is hypocrisy on both sides,

forcefully objected to the Chinese governments actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In
the end, that incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some
companies to improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of government
demands for data. US support was critical back then , but it is hard to
imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal
has damaged the US governments ability to press for better corporate practices as
technology companies expand globally. It will also be more difficult for companies to
resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as complicit in mass US
infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the
same cooperation that the US receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user
data locally or maintain a local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the

there is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just
India began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone
and Internet communications in the country, without much clarity on safeguards to
protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the governments problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over
the last few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has
drawn particular ire. Now the government is preparing new regulations that would make it
easier to get data from Internet companies and identify individual users online. The Obama administration and US
companies could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey. Instead,
the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass
surveillance and conscripting the help of the private sector.
Chinese government are overstated,

months before the NSA scandal broke,

(Note to students: conscripting means compulsory enlistment of companies for

state service.)

US global democracy promotion is inevitable. Success in the

internet freedom agenda is key to a successful push.
Fontaine 11
(et al; Richard Fontaine graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in International Relations from Tulane
University. He also holds a M.A. in International Affairs from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, and he attended Oxford University. He is a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations and has been an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at
Georgetown Universitys School of Foreign Service. He is currently the President of President of the
Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Internet Freedom A Foreign Policy Imperative in the
Digital Age June, 2011 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_InternetFreedom_FontaineRogers_0.pdf)

The United States has a long history of providing diplomatic and financial support for the
promotion of human rights abroad, including the right to free expression. While each presidential
administration emphasizes human rights to differing degrees, during recent decades they have all consistently
held that human rights are a key U.S. interest. Promoting freedom of the Internet
expands human rights support into cyberspace, an environment in which an ever-

greater proportion of human activity takes place.

The United States advocates for freedom of the Internet

because it accords not only with American values, but also with rights America believes are intrinsic to all humanity.

the U.S. government has programmatically

and rhetorically

For years,

supported democracy

promotion abroad. The State Department routinely disburses millions of dollars

in funding for democracy-building programs around the world , many of which are aimed explicitly
at expanding free expression. Presidential and other speeches regularly refer to the American
belief in the universality of this right; to cite but one example, a March 2011 White House statement on Syria
noted that, The United States stands for a set of universal rights, including the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.8 The
Obama administrations 2010 National Security Strategy specifically called for marshaling the Internet and other information
technologies to support freedom of expression abroad,9 and the Bush administration adopted a policy of maximizing access to
information and ideas over the Internet.10 Americas interest in promoting freedom via the Internet comes from the same

Despite inevitable inconsistencies and difficult tradeoffs,

the United States continues to support democracy. The Bush administrations 2006 National Security Strategy
committed to support democratic institutions abroad through transformational diplomacy.11 President Obama, after
entering office with an evident desire to move away from the sweeping tone of his
predecessors freedom agenda, nevertheless told the U.N. General Assembly in 2009 that there are basic
principles that are universal; there are certain truths which are self-evident and the United States of America will never
waver in our efforts to stand up for the right of people everywhere to determine
their own destiny.12 To the extent that supporting Internet freedom advances Americas
democracy-promotion agenda, the rationale for promoting online freedom is clear.
fundamental belief in democratic values and human rights.

However, cause and effect are not perfectly clear and the United States must choose its policies under conditions of uncertainty.

Both the Bush and Obama administrations have wagered that by promoting global Internet
freedom
on balance,

the United States will not only operate according to universal values but

will promote tools that

may,

benefit societies over the autocrats that oppress them .

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton urged countries to join us in the bet we have made, a bet that an open Internet will lead

Given the evidence we discuss

throughout this report, this bet is one worth making.

to stronger, more prosperous countries.13

Global democracy consolidation checks inevitable extinction.

Diamond 95
(Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia
nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through
increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global
ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional
threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in
a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not
aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.

governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they

are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor
terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass
destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and
enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their

and the rule of law, democracies are the only

reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity
can be built.
own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights,

The new Freedom Act wont solve US image. Protections from

the original version do solve, even without protections for
persons outside the US.
Ries 14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights
Program. Also internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human
rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at
the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet
Freedom. She conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a
particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy &
Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that
advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT,
Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC).
There, she contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and
freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law.
Also internally quoting Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger Brian Ries
is Mashables Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at
Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to cover revolutions,
disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that
won two Webby Awards for Best News Site. Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That
Congress Just Passed - Mashable - May 22, 2014 http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsasurveillance-bill/)
As a result,

many of its initial supporters pulled their support. We supported the

original USA Freedom act, even though it didnt do much for nonUS persons, Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security &
Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the

original version as a good step to end bulk collection. However,

in its current version, it's not even clear that this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added
that Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill something he said is a real
problem.

"Where there is vagueness in a law,

you can count on the administration

to exploit it," Johnson said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a
more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the
out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many including members of both parties who rightly

believe the bill does not go far enough without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee
bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply
called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." The

ban on bulk collection was deliberately

watered down to be ambiguous and exploitable, said Center for Democracy and Technology
Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. We

withdrew support for USA FREEDOM when the bill morphed

into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans with
no connection to a crime or terrorism. And Cynthia Wong , senior Internet researcher at
Human Rights Watch, said, This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of
Internet users in the US and around the world. Until Congress passes real

reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will

continue to fade.

Unlike the current Act, the original bill does solve US image.
This holds even if plans about bulk collection instead of
every surveillance practices.
HRW 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. US Senate: Salvage Surveillance
Reform House Bill Flawed - Human Rights Watch - May 22, 2014
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)

It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform , Human Rights Watch said today. The version
of the USA Freedom Act that the US House of Representatives passed

on May 22, 2014,

could

ultimately

fail to

end mass data collection. The version the House passed is a watered-down
version of an earlier bill that was designed to end bulk collection of business
records and phone metadata.

The practice has been almost universally condemned by all but the US security establishment.

This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of Internet users in the US and

around the world, said Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at

Human Rights Watch . Until Congress passes real reform , US
credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade .

The initial version of the bill aimed to prohibit bulk collection by the government
of business records, including phone metadata. The bill only addressed one component of the surveillance
programs revealed by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections. However, it had
broad support as a first step, including from Human Rights Watch.

On May

7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While

the version the House passed could leave the door wide open to
continued indiscriminate data collection practices potentially invading the privacy of
millions of people without justification, Human Rights Watch said.
better than alternative bills offered,

1AC - India advantages

India Adv - 1AC - financial markets

scenario

India Advantage - financial markets scenario

Contention # ____ is India
The US can alter Indias surveillance practices by pressuring
global internet companies to demand privacy. But, this only
works when US is less hypocritical.
Wong 13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch.
Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy &
Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of
the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free
expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong
earned her law degree from New York University School of Law Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW
website at this address: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internetfreedom

Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as

problematic as listening to the content of peoples phone calls or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long
recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized
data can be easily combined and analyzed.

The revelations have also exposed glaring contradictions about

the US Internet freedom agenda.

This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically

denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though

the widening rift between US values and actions has real,

unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights movement, the Internets impact on rights crystalized in 2005
after we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the
Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
forcefully objected to the Chinese governments actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In
the end, that incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some
companies to improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of government
there is hypocrisy on both sides,

demands for data. US support was critical back then , but it is hard to
imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal
has damaged the US governments ability to press for better corporate practices as
technology companies expand globally. It will also be more difficult for companies to
resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as complicit in mass US
infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the
same cooperation that the US receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user
data locally or maintain a local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the

there is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just
months before the NSA scandal broke, India began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone
and Internet communications in the country, without much clarity on safeguards to
Chinese government are overstated,

protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the governments problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over
the last few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has
drawn particular ire. Now the government is preparing new regulations that would make it
easier to get data from Internet companies and identify individual users online. The Obama administration and US
could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey.
Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass
surveillance and conscripting the help of the private sector.
companies

(Note to students: conscripting means compulsory enlistment of companies for

state service.)

Independently, US bulk surveillance sets precedent that causes

indiscriminate surveillance in India.
Sinha 14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York
Universitys School of Law. This includes a specialization as a Scholar from NYUs Institute for
International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Toronto. Additional
authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human Rights
Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington
Director at Human Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided
key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a
vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. From the
Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law
and American Democracy This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists
covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times,
the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
The questions raised by surveillance are complex . The government has an obligation to protect
national security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the

international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the states authority
to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights. The
same time,

current, large-scale , often indiscriminate US

carries enormous costs. It erodes

for

global digital

approach to

surveillance

privacy and sets a terrible example

countries like India , Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of
expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in
other

advocating internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an

important foreign policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents, US surveillance
programs are also doing damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most
dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all
protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.

Indias surveillance is not narrowly-targeted. This

indiscriminate, bulk collection hurts Indias financial markets.
Trivedi 13
Anjani Trivedi. The author holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a
Bachelors Degree in Mathematics from MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York
Times and CNN International. This piece internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director
for Human Rights Watch; Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive
director of Indias Centre for Internet and Society. In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the
Radar Time Magazine 6-30-13 - http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillanceslips-under-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB

CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media engagement
and phone calls on landlines and cell phones, among other communications. That means 900 million landline and cell-phone
users and 125 million Internet users. The project, which is being implemented by the governments Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national lawenforcement agencies save time and avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of Telecommunications annual report. This has been in the works since 2008, when C-DOT
started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older report. The government set aside approximately $150 million for the system as part of its 12th five-year plan, although the
Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within the internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively hush-hush topic, a project official unauthorized
to speak to the press tells TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender to solicit bidders for communication-interception
systems in every state and union territory of India. The system requirements included live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing and voice recognition.

Civil-liberties groups concede that states often need to undertake targetedmonitoring operations. However, the move toward extensive surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications, suggests that
governments are now casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives, according to Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive
communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are out of the realm of judicial authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or
accountability on the part of the state, a recent U.N. report stated. India is no stranger to censorship and monitoring tweets, blogs, books or songs are frequently blocked and
banned. India ranked second only to the U.S. on Googles list of user-data requests with 4,750 queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal requests from the government
increased by 90% over the previous reporting period. While these were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require such a legal process. In recent times,
Indias democratically elected government has barred access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and
arrested citizens for liking Facebook posts and tweeting. Historically too, censorship has been Indias preferred means of policing social unrest. Freedom of expression, while broadly
available in theory, Ganguly tells TIME, is endangered by abuse of various India laws. There is a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between citizens and the state, says Anja
Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where no checks and balances [are] in place, that is troubling. The potential for misuse and
misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously. Currently, Indias laws relevant to interception disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to safeguard
individuals constitutional rights, a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New Delhi gang-rape incident in December,
when the government shut down public transport near protest grounds and unlawfully detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the
governments worries too are on the rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to 330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. As [governments] around the world grapple with the
power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance, Ganguly explains. Indias junior minister for telecommunications
attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that most people may not be aware of because its
slightly technical. A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he did not feel safe. The minister, though, insisted that it would safeguard your
privacy and national security. Given the high-tech nature of CMS, he noted that telecom companies would no longer be part of the governments surveillance process. India currently

new system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which allows for
surveillance system is not only an abuse of privacy rights

does not have formal privacy legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring. The
monitoring communication in the interest of public safety. The
and security-agency overreach, critics say,

but also counterproductive in terms of security.

In the process of collecting data to monitor criminal activity, the data itself may
become a target for terrorists and criminals a honeypot, according to Sunil Abraham,
executive director of Indias Centre for Internet and Society. Additionally, the
wide-ranging tapping undermines financial markets , Abraham says, by
compromising confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual property. Whats more, vulnerabilities will
have to be built into the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way for such a system. Whether the nations patchy infrastructure
will be able to handle a complex web of surveillance and networks, no one can say. That, Abraham contends, is
what attackers will target.

Financial markets key to Indias Economy.

Goyal 14
Dr. Sakshi Goyal, former Faculty member at the Kaling Institute of Management Studies, Faridabad,
Haryana (India). Indian Financial Markets: A Global Perspective - Journal of Business Management &

Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR) - Volume 3, No.6, June 2014 - ISSN No: 2319-5614. Available at:
http://www.borjournals.com/a/index.php/jbmssr/article/viewFile/1729/1078

Financial markets are a vital part of an economy making it possible for industry,
trade and commerce to flourish without any obstacle in terms of resources. Today most economies around the
world are judged by the performance of their financial markets. The financial markets have indicators in
place that reflect the performance of companies whose securities are traded in those markets. The financial markets also serve a vital purpose in the growth and development of a
company, which wants to expand. Such companies with expansion plans and new projects are in need of funding and the financial market serves as the best platform from which a
company can determine the feasibility of such possibilities

Krishnan (2011) mentioned that, the economic literature acknowledged that efficient

and developed financial markets could lead to increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of savings in the economy. Better functioning financial

There is a growing body of empirical analyses,

including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country studies, and cross-country
systems ease the external financing constraints that impede firm and industrial expansion.

comparisons, which prove this strong, positive link between the functioning of the

financial system and long-run economic growth. In addition, they better

allocate resources, monitor managers and exert corporate control, mobilize savings, and facilitate the exchange of goods
and services. A capital market is a market for securities (debt or equity), where business enterprises (companies) and governments can raise long-term funds. It is
defined as a market in which money is provided for periods longer than a year as the raising of short-term funds takes place on other markets (e.g., the money market). The capital
market includes the stock market (equity securities) and the bond market (debt) The capital market of a country can be considered as one of the leading indicators in determining the
growth of its economy. As mentioned by C.Rangarajan, Ex Governor, RBI (1998), The growth process of any economy depends on the functioning of financial markets which also helps to
augment its Capital formation. According to Professor Hicks, the industrial Revolution in England was ignited more by the presence of liquid financial market than the technological
investment. He writes interestingly- What happened in the Industrial Revolution is that the Range of fixed capital goods that were used in production Began noticeably to increase. But
fixed capital is sunk; it is embodied in a particular form, from which it can only gradually be released. In order that people should be willing to sink large amounts of capital it is the
availability of liquid funds which is crucial. This condition was satisfied in England ...by the first half of the eighteenth century The liquid asset was there, as it would not have been even
a few years earlier Thus, liquidity is a very important component of Financial Market and plays a very vital role in the long run economic development of any country as it helps not only
in promoting the savings of the economy but also to adopt an effective channel to transmit various financial policies by creating liquidity in the market. Therefore Financial System of any
country should be well developed, competitive, efficient and integrated to face all shocks. The financial system and infrastructure of any country at any time can be considered as the
result of its own peculiar historical evolution. This evolution is resulted by continuous interaction between all the participants existing in the system and public policy interventions. The
evolution of Indian financial markets and the regulatory system has also followed a similar path. India began with the central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as the banking sector
regulator, and the Ministry of Finance as the regulator for all other financial sectors. Today, most financial service providers and their regulatory agencies exist. The role of regulators has
evolved over time from that of an instrument for planned development in the initial stage to that of a referee of a relatively more modern and complex financial sector at present. Over
this period, a variety of financial sector reform measures have been undertaken in India, with many important successes. An important feature of these reforms has been the attempt of
the authorities to align the regulatory view the needs of the country and domestic factors. These reforms can be broadly classified as steps taken towards: a) Liberalizing the overall
macroeconomic and regulatory environment within which financial sector institutions function. b) Strengthening the institutions and improving their efficiency and competitiveness. c)
Establishing and strengthening the regulatory framework and institutions for overseeing the financial system.The history of Indian capital markets spans back 200 years, around the end
of the 18th century. It was at this time that India was under the rule of the East India Company. The capital market of India initially developed around Mumbai; with around 200 to 250
securities brokers participating in active trade during the second half of the 19th century. There are a number of factors that have paved path for India market growth. After the economic
liberalization, policies were undertaken in the 1990s, the economy of the country has been steadily rising which has led to more demands and supply circles. This has introduced diverse
market sectors and industries in the country, which has led to a competitive consumer market. Through this research paper, an attempt is made to understand the evolution of Global
financial system with more emphasis on Indian markets. It also aims to study the global perspective of financial markets of any country and to understand that how a countrys financial
markets is integrated with the other world markets. Also the concept of efficiency is highlighted which says that a country whose financial markets are well integrated with the world
markets are more efficient as compared to one whose financial markets are not very well integrated. Lastly the paper concludes by leaving scope and opportunities to understand these
global concepts in an easier way to the reader and further can be used for extensive research. A financial system or financial sector functions as an intermediary and facilitates the flow

the areas of surplus to the areas of deficit. A Financial System is a composition of various institutions, markets, regulations and laws, practices, money manager,
analysts, transactions and claims and liabilities. Indian Financial market can be considered as one of the oldest across the globe and is
of funds from

experiencing favorable time during

the

recent years, which have prospered

the economy of the country to a great extent.

Presently, India is rated by six international credit

rating agencies, namely Standard and Poors (S&P), Moodys Investor Services, FITCH, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), the Japanese Credit Rating agency (JCRA), and the Rating
and Investment Information Inc., Tokyo( R&I).

Indian economic upheaval sparks nuclear war with Pakistan

risks of accident, miscalc, and unauthorized theft all increase.
Busch 4
Please note that an updated edition of this book was re-released in Feb of 2015, but the original date
was placed in the citation. Dr. Nathan Busch, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for
American Studies at Christopher Newport University. The author holds a Ph.D. in International relations
from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science from Michigan State University. The author
previously held the position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting Faculty,
National Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory. This piece of evidence internally quotes
George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It also
internally quotes Franois Heisbourg. He chairs the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the Londonbased International Institute for Strategic Studies. His career has included positions in government
(member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in
the defense industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF; senior vice president for strategy at Matra

Dfense Espace) and in academia (professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris, director of the IISS).
He is also a member of the International Commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
and has sat on a number of national and international blue-ribbon bodies. From the book: No End in
Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation - p. 202-209
In addition,

because the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear

weapons, the risks of accidental use could be very high during a crisis situation, at
least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in
conjunction with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to the deliver)' vehicles
(gravity bombs or missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing
them for launch. All these procedures require training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control
arrangements, it is not at all clear that the Indian military would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time
constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these dangers would be lessened, but more serious
dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed

India would need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety
mechanisms to prevent such an accidental launch, and it is simply not known how
much effort India is devoting, or will devote, to this area. 195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage
missiles.

Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it would be impossible to deploy the current configuration of either missile to allow
for a rapid response. This significantly reduces the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during normal
circumstances, though

the risks of accidental launches would probably increase significantly if they

were fueled during a crisis situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and
Agni-II missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose
such a deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These risks would depend on the extent to
which India integrates use-control devices into its weapons to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India is
currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such usecontrol devices, if a nuclear crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it still might be tempted to mate warheads on its
missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still remains to be seen what type of deployment option it would choose.
According to a statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India would not keep its weapons on a "hairtrigger alert," though he did suggest that these weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of surviving
a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch would be relatively small during normal
circumstances.198 But these risks would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate the
warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce
risks of accidental use during peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military during a crisis could significantly
increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option
Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a rapid-response option,
Pakistan would probably adopt a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear
weapons as well. But even if India were to deploy its weapons (in field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about
survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapid-response capability. If such an event were to occur, the risks of
Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan currently has the technical

Just as in India, it is also unlikely

that Pakistan's nuclear devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents. 201
Because Pakistan's warheads are based on an early Chinese warhead design, they
probably do not contain one-point safety designs , IHE, or fire-resistant pits. If Pakistan
were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be an unacceptable risk of an
accidental detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its
capacity to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs.

missiles, either because it chose to establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar
concerns would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The

current risks of

unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively
small because they have a very small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear
establishments. But there are a number of factors that could increase risks of unauthorized use in
the future. Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are
both actively developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain sophisticated use-control
devices to prevent unauthorized use. Instead, the

nuclear controls

in both countries

appear to be based on

guards, gates, and guns . As we have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases, while the "3 G's"
might be sufficient during normal circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable
during political, economic , and social upheaval s. The Russian case has demonstrated that severe
domestic upheavals can undermine central controls and weaken the infrastructures that previously maintained

security for nuclear weapons. In particular, such upheavals can undermine the loyalty of
guards and workers at nuclear facilities, especially if the state collapses economically and can
no longer afford to pay those employees. Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have
taken the necessary steps to prevent such weaknesses from arising in their nuclear
controls. Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear controls rely on the "3 G's" while reportedly lacking
the

there could be a significant risk of thefts of

nuclear weapons during severe upheavals. The Russian analogy is particularly

personnel reliability programs,

relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After the nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999,
the Pakistani economy came close to collapsing and remained quite unstable for the next several years.202 In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international
foreign aid to Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion, massive economic disparities, and continuing low levels of
foreign investment, there still is significant cause for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and economic
stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event
to occur, there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic
militants.204 In the events following the September 11 attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in
Afghanistan, there were serious concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by
reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence community with the Taliban
regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president Musharraf appears to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001,
President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and intelligence officers with ties
to the Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless continued to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to
the seriousness of these risks, President Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the
United States has offered to advise Pakistan on methods for securing its nuclear stockpile. ' If the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan
had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in the more
extreme elements in his country.

One also cannot rule out the possibility that terrorists might choose to

target nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan, especially if domestic instability

were to increase.

Both India and Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists

are increasingly well-armed and have targeted critical infrastructures and military bases in the past.209 Although current defenses
at both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facilities are probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist attacks,210

if the defenses at the

facilities were weakened by domestic upheavals, then the risks of successful
terrorist attackseither for purposes of theft or sabotagecould increase significantly. But even
the physical protection systems at other nuclear facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover,
most sensitive

if such extreme events did not occur, the tightly controlled decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in
both India and Pakistan could potentially allow unauthorized use, particularly during crises. In India, some of these risks have been
minimized by the formalization of its command structure, though the military units are still fairly inexperienced with handling these
weapons.212 Moreover,
established,

because India probably still lacks

clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and

resilient communication channels, there would still be a fairly high risk

of unauthorized use arising from confusion or miscommunication during a

crisis. These concerns will probably remain for some time to come, though the specific risks could eventually be improved,
depending on the training the military receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops. Because Pakistan is currently
under military rule, and its nuclear weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear
decision-making and command-and-control systems. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and
control as well. The lack of a clear operational use doctrine, combined with inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized
use during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decision-making and communications systems adequate
for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed
in time to be of use in a rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear]
missiles."213 The risks or unauthorized use would increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles.
Risks of decapitation and questions about the survivability of the nuclear forces would probably cause both India and Pakistan to
deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These systems would significantly increase difficulties in
command and control, especially because their weapons lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the risks of
decapitation, Pakistan is likely to adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number
of military officials.215 As the number of people authorized to launch nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear
weapons that has not been commanded by the central authorities.216

The greatest concerns have been

raised about a possible inadvertent use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The combined
effects of mutual mistrust, very short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable CBMs

According to George Perkovich,

a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Kargil
make the risks of inadvertent use quite severe, especially during crisis situations.

proved that having nuclear weapons would not deter new conflicts.

It also

showed that unless such conflicts themselves were prevented, the possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange would

Due
to continual mistrust between the two countries, each would be likely to
misinterpret military movements, missile tests, or accidental detonations as an impending attack
by the other side. The risks of misinterpreting each other's motives are compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear
also increase given both states' relatively poor systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command and control."217

forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets. For example, because the runways at Pakistani Air Force bases could be
destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218 India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability.

During an acute crisis, Pakistan might be faced with a "use them or lose them"
dilemma, in that it would need to attack rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate
altogether. For this reason, Pakistani officials would be extremely

suspicious of any Indian actions that could be interpreted as

preparations for an attack. Because the flight time of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes,
Pakistani leaders would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own attack.219 These conditions thus
create an ongoing environment in which inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence
systems, which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani
intelligence reported that India's exercise was merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive
nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In
addition, their intelligence systems have sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we have seen, during the
Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops positioned at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999
Kargil war, Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had positioned themselves at
strategic locations in the Kargil heights. These intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either side were surprised
by comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive positioning during the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to
overreact and mistakenly conclude that an attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially Pakistan) is confident that an
invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across the border: Each of these scenarios would
greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil war,
however, India has recently made significant investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such

The dangers of miscalculations and intelligence failures are

increased by the crude early-warning systems employed by both countries,
particularly Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998,
failures by India in the future.221

Pakistan reported that it had detected an air force attack on its radars and warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its
Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might have been circulated in order to justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could
have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and
unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan in August 1998.
The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an
Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however. Scholars have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not only
the U.S. concern about inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has
serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable earlywarning systems, India or Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable sources, increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But
even if India and Pakistan had reliable early-warning systems, the risks of inadvertent war would still be extremely high. If Indian or
Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have very little time to decide what to do before the aircraft
reached their targets. In addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking bombers carried

Pakistan) could face a "use them or lose

them" scenario and be tempted to launch a nuclear attack to ensure that its nuclear
capability was not destroyed.224 Thus, even if India and Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, the
conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side (especially

risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high. If India and Pakistan were to deploy their nuclear
weapons on missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for
deterrence against the People's Republic of China), the risks of inadvertent use would become even worse. Because the flight time
for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than five minutes,225 Indian and Pakistani leaders would have virtually no
time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the missiles hit their targets.226 The

According to Francois Heisbourg, once theater

strategic situation will resemble the Cuban missile crisis ,
except that it "would be permanent rather than tempo-rary, would occur without adequate C3I in place, and
psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous.
missiles are deployed in South Asia, the

with political leadership located less than five minutes from mutual

Armageddon." 227

(Note to students: 3 Gs internally referenced stands for guards, gates, and

guns as a security measure to protect an installation. C3I also internally
referenced stands for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence).

Even a limited nuclear war between India & Pakistan causes

extinction smoke and yields prove
Toon 07
(et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- Atmospheric effects and societal consequences
of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism Atmospheric Chemistry &
Physics April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the
detonation of small nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world
has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential
exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and
an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized)
explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be
targeted in a nuclear conflict.

We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are

likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100

times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses for
full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons , if the small weapons are
targeted at city centers. A single small nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by
orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of

regional nuclear exchange

involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global

could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those

worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a counterforce nuclear war
between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be
abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban
firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection.
Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating , and
then might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales . We also anticipate
substantial perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make
here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the
nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange

hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global

community. They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as
well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked
international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting
recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and
improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist.
We then provide the first comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging
smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate changes that might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of
this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the weapons used over Japan during the Second World War
(WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear devices. Moreover,
North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment a necessary precursor to weapons
construction. Thirty-two other countries that do not now have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons,
some in a relatively short period of time. For these nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield
equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed,
in some case, the casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of weapons carrying
several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas
contaminated and effectively uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local radiation

unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt
weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded human history (Robock et al., 2007). An
individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below we
first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation
from an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons
were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be
generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated uncertainties.

We have attempted

to employ realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do not have access to the war plans
of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear
weapons. There are obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a
regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible
scenarios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of regional conflict.

In the present

analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a
regional nuclear exchange between two newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations.

are aware of the

potential disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial
confrontation. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates, the possible number and
We do not justify these scenarios any further except to note that

most

citizens and politicians today

combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities
substantiates the idea that such scenarios as we propose are executable.

The new Freedom Act wont solve US image. Protections from

the original version do solve, even without protections for
persons outside the US.
Ries 14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights
Program. Also internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human
rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at
the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet
Freedom. She conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a
particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy &
Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that
advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT,
Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC).
There, she contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and
freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law.
Also internally quoting Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger Brian Ries
is Mashables Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at
Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to cover revolutions,
disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that
won two Webby Awards for Best News Site. Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That
Congress Just Passed - Mashable - May 22, 2014 http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsasurveillance-bill/)
As a result,

many of its initial supporters pulled their support. We supported the

original USA Freedom act, even though it didnt do much for nonUS persons, Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security &
Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the

original version as a good step to end bulk collection. However,

in its current version, it's not even clear that this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added
that Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill something he said is a real

problem.

"Where there is vagueness in a law,

you can count on the administration

to exploit it," Johnson said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a
more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the
out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many including members of both parties who rightly
believe the bill does not go far enough without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee
bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply
called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." The

ban on bulk collection was deliberately

watered down to be ambiguous and exploitable, said Center for Democracy and Technology
Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. We

withdrew support for USA FREEDOM when the bill morphed

into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans with
no connection to a crime or terrorism. And Cynthia Wong , senior Internet researcher at
Human Rights Watch, said, This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of
Internet users in the US and around the world. Until Congress passes real

reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will

continue to fade.

Unlike the current Act, the original bill does solve US image.
This holds even if plans about bulk collection instead of
every surveillance practices.
HRW 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. US Senate: Salvage Surveillance
Reform House Bill Flawed - Human Rights Watch - May 22, 2014
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)

It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform , Human Rights Watch said today. The version
of the USA Freedom Act that the US House of Representatives passed

on May 22, 2014,

could

ultimately

fail to

end mass data collection. The version the House passed is a watered-down
version of an earlier bill that was designed to end bulk collection of business
records and phone metadata.

The practice has been almost universally condemned by all but the US security establishment.

This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of Internet users in the US and

around the world, said Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at

Human Rights Watch . Until Congress passes real reform , US
credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade .
The initial version of the bill aimed to prohibit bulk collection by the government
The bill only addressed one component of the surveillance
programs revealed by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections. However, it had
of business records, including phone metadata.

broad support as a first step, including from Human Rights Watch.

On May

7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While

the version the House passed could leave the door wide open to
continued indiscriminate data collection practices potentially invading the privacy of
millions of people without justification, Human Rights Watch said.
better than alternative bills offered,

India Advantage 1AC, CyberScenario

India Advantage - Cyber-Scenario

Contention # ____ is India
The US can alter Indias surveillance practices by pressuring
global internet companies to demand privacy. But, this only
works when US is less hypocritical.
Wong 13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch.
Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy &
Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of
the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free
expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong
earned her law degree from New York University School of Law Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW
website at this address: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internetfreedom

Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as

problematic as listening to the content of peoples phone calls or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long
recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized
data can be easily combined and analyzed.

The revelations have also exposed glaring contradictions about

the US Internet freedom agenda.

This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically

denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though

the widening rift between US values and actions has real,

unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights movement, the Internets impact on rights crystalized in 2005
after we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the
Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
forcefully objected to the Chinese governments actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In
the end, that incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some
companies to improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of government
there is hypocrisy on both sides,

demands for data. US support was critical back then , but it is hard to
imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal
has damaged the US governments ability to press for better corporate practices as
technology companies expand globally. It will also be more difficult for companies to
resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as complicit in mass US
infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the
same cooperation that the US receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user
data locally or maintain a local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the

there is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just
months before the NSA scandal broke, India began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone
and Internet communications in the country, without much clarity on safeguards to
Chinese government are overstated,

protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the governments problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over
the last few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has
drawn particular ire. Now the government is preparing new regulations that would make it
easier to get data from Internet companies and identify individual users online. The Obama administration and US
could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey.
Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass
surveillance and conscripting the help of the private sector.
companies

(Note to students: conscripting means compulsory enlistment of companies for

state service.)

Independently, US bulk surveillance sets precedent that causes

indiscriminate surveillance in India.
Sinha 14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York
Universitys School of Law. This includes a specialization as a Scholar from NYUs Institute for
International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Toronto. Additional
authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human Rights
Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington
Director at Human Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided
key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a
vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. From the
Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law
and American Democracy This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists
covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times,
the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
The questions raised by surveillance are complex . The government has an obligation to protect
national security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the

international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the states authority
to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights. The
same time,

current, large-scale , often indiscriminate US

carries enormous costs. It erodes

for

global digital

approach to

surveillance

privacy and sets a terrible example

countries like India , Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of
expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in
other

advocating internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an

important foreign policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents, US surveillance
programs are also doing damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most
dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all
protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.

Indias surveillance is not narrowly-targeted. This

indiscriminate, bulk collection becomes a honeypot for
cyber-targeting.
Trivedi 13
Anjani Trivedi. The author holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a
Bachelors Degree in Mathematics from MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York
Times and CNN International. This piece internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director
for Human Rights Watch; Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive
director of Indias Centre for Internet and Society. In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the
Radar Time Magazine 6-30-13 - http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillanceslips-under-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB

CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media

engagement and phone calls on landlines and cell phones, among other communications. That means 900
million landline and cell-phone users and 125 million Internet users. The project, which is being implemented by the
governments Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national law-enforcement agencies save time and
avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of Telecommunications annual report. This has been in the works since
2008, when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older report. The government set aside approximately
$150 million for the system as part of its 12th five-year plan, although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within the
internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively hush-hush topic, a project official unauthorized to
speak to the press tells TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender
to solicit bidders for communication-interception systems in every state and union territory of India. The system requirements
included live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing and voice recognition.

Civil-liberties

groups concede that states often need to undertake targeted- monitoring

operations. However, the move toward extensive surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications,
suggests that governments are now casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives, according to Meenakshi Ganguly,
South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are
out of the realm of judicial authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability
on the part of the state, a recent U.N. report stated. India is no stranger to censorship and monitoring tweets, blogs, books or
songs are frequently blocked and banned. India ranked second only to the U.S. on Googles list of user-data requests with 4,750
queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal requests from the government increased by 90% over the previous reporting
period. While these were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require such a legal process. In recent
times, Indias democratically elected government has barred access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number
of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and arrested citizens for liking Facebook posts and tweeting. Historically too,
censorship has been Indias preferred means of policing social unrest. Freedom of expression, while broadly available in theory,
Ganguly tells TIME, is endangered by abuse of various India laws. There is a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between
citizens and the state, says Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where no checks and
balances [are] in place, that is troubling. The potential for misuse and misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously.
Currently, Indias laws relevant to interception disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to safeguard individuals
constitutional rights, a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New
Delhi gang-rape incident in December, when the government shut down public transport near protest grounds and unlawfully
detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the governments worries too are on the
rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to 330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. As [governments] around the world
grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,
Ganguly explains. Indias junior minister for telecommunications attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent
Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that most people may not be aware of because its slightly
technical. A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he did not feel safe. The minister, though,
insisted that it would safeguard your privacy and national security. Given the high-tech nature of CMS, he noted that telecom
companies would no longer be part of the governments surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy
legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring. The

new

system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885,

which allows for monitoring communication in the interest of public safety. The

surveillance system is not only

an abuse of privacy rights and security-agency overreach , critics say, but also

counterproductive in terms of security. In the process of collecting

data to monitor criminal activity, the data itself may become a target for terrorists and
criminals a honeypot, according to Sunil Abraham, executive director of
Indias Centre for Internet and Society. Additionally, the wide-ranging tapping

undermines financial markets , Abraham says, by compromising

confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual property. Whats more, vulnerabilities will have to be built into
the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way for such a system. Whether the nations patchy infrastructure
will be able to handle a complex web of surveillance and networks, no one can say. That, Abraham
contends,

is what attackers will target.

(Note to students: CMS internally referenced is Indias new surveillance

system. CMS stands for Central Monitoring System.)

A hack on the CMS will eventually succeed. That escalates to

mass de-stabilization of India.
Dilipraj 13
Mr E. Dilipraj is a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is also pursuing his
PhD at the Centre for Latin American Studies from JNU, New Delhi. This evidence is internally quoting
Sunil Abraham, who is the Executive Director of the Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre
for Internet and Society. The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that
works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with
disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness. Sunil Abraham also founded Mahiti in
1998, a company committed to creating high impact technology and communications solutions. Sunil
was elected an Ashoka fellow in 1999 to 'explore the democratic potential of the Internet' and was also
granted a Sarai FLOSS fellowship in 2003. Between June 2004 and June 2007, Sunil also managed the
International Open Source Network, a project of United Nations Development Programme's Asia-Pacific
Development Information Programme serving 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Between
September 2007 and June 2008, he managed ENRAP an electronic network of International Fund for
Agricultural Development projects in the Asia-Pacific facilitated and co-funded by International
Development Research Centre, Canada. Also internally quoting Mr. Sachin Pilot, Indias Minister of
State for Communications and Information Technology. Modified for potentially objectionable language.
CYBER WARFARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY - AIR POWER Journal Vol. 8 No. 3, MONSOON 2013 (JulySeptember) available at:
http://www.academia.edu/7534559/CYBER_WARFARE_AND_NATIONAL_SECURITY__AN_ANALYSIS_OF_INCIDENTS_BETWEEN_INDIA_AND_PAKISTAN

security providers for the

cyber space have always been lacking in vigilance to provide security to their
countrys cyber networks and infrastructures. Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of the Bangalore-based Centre for
Internet and Society, said during an interview to Al Jazeera, The Indian government has a
very low level of cyber awareness and cyber security. We dont take cyber security
as seriously as the rest of the world. The problem of cyber attacks by the hacking groups would not
be a big problem if it stopped with the hacking and defacing of websites. But, in reality, it
moves on to the next stages. The same people who carry out hacking and website
defacing jobs may get involved in cyber espionage and data mining against their enemies.
These people may also volunteer their expert services to the terrorist organisations in return for
money and other forms of remuneration. According to a cyber security professional working with one
While aggression is the only tactic followed by the hacker groups in both countries, on the contrary, the

of Indias intelligence agencies , We once sat down to check the Delhi [internet] Backbone. We found

thousands of systems compromised. All were government systems, Research

and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence... we dont realise how much damage has already happened. The lack of awareness and the
lethargic approach in monitoring and providing security to the cyber networks by India led to thousands of compromised computers across the country.

The infection ranges from small Viruses, Botnets to that of Stuxnet level malwares which
can hamper the total operations of the network connected to the compromised
computer. It has been observed that out of the 10,000 Stuxnet infected Indian computers, 15 were located at critical infrastructure facilities.
These included the Gujarat and Haryana Electricity Boards and an ONGC offshore oil rig. Though Stuxnet reached the
networks of these infrastructures, thankfully, it did not activate itself on them. In
other words, India was only a few flawed lines of code away from having its power
and oil sectors crippled (destroyed). The list of new malwares goes on Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, etc and many more are in the
process of coding; their abilities to operate as cyber weapons are incredible and, at the same time,
unbearable, if not protected against properly. Assuming that the hacker groups get access such malwares, then the
situation would become extremely dangerous for the national security as it is equivalent to

terrorists getting access to nuclear weapons. While talking about the same, Mr.
Sachin Pilot , Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology
said: The entire economies of some countries have been (destroyed) paralysed by viruses
from across the border. We have to make ourselves more resilient. Power, telecom, defence,
these areas are on top of our agenda. A careful study of the series of hacking on one anothers websites and networks
by the private hacking groups of India and Pakistan would reveal a basic fact that something which
started as a small act of hate has now taken on a much different shape in the form of personal
revenge, economic profits, a race to show off technical supremacy, and anti-national propaganda. This was very much
evident from one unwanted event that disturbed the internal security of India in August 2012. The Indian government was alerted by the exodus after
thousands of people from the northeast gathered at railway stations in various cities all over the country after being threatened by the rounds of SMS and
violent morphed pictures that were being circulated on more than 100 websites. The SMS threatened the northeastern people living in various cities in
India of a targeted attack on them, asking them to go back to their homeland, whereas the pictures circulated on the internet were images of some violent
bloodshed. Out of the various SMS that were in circulation, one said: It is a request to everyone to call back their relatives, sons and daughters in
Bangalore as soon as possible. Last night, four northeastern guys were killed by Muslims in Bangalore (two Manipuri, two Nepali). Two Nepali girls were
kidnapped from Brigade Road. The reports say that from August 20, marking Ramzan, after 2 pm, they are going to attack every northeastern person. The
riot started because of the situation in Assam.32 Another SMS said: Many northeast students staying in Pune were beaten up by miscreants believed to be
Muslims following the Assam riots. Heard that it is happening in Muslim areas like Mumbai, Andhra Pradesh, Bangalore. At Neelasandra, two boys were
killed and one near passport office.33 The Government of India reacted soon on this matter and a 43-page report was prepared by intelligence agencies
along with the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and India Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) which traced several doctored
images to Pakistan. The origins of these morphed images were later traced back in specific to Lahore, Rawalpindi and other Pakistani cities by the Indian
intelligence agencies. "From all available forensic evidence, we are fairly convinced that all those postings came from Pakistan," said an official of NTRO.

Another senior official who has been involved in India's Pakistan watch for several
years said,

It has been happening for several months now.

This is a low cost, very efective way of

destabilising us. They don't need to send terrorists and explosives to create
mayhem. Internet has been a very effective platform for instigating communal
divisions in India. They also have a multiplier efect , first resulting in anger and hatred,
then riots and, finally, many taking to terrorism. This act of unnecessary involvement by Pakistan-based elements is seen as cyber terrorism and
cyber psychological warfare against India to cause internal security disturbance and

in the country.

eventually

to create

a huge crisis

This incident which created major turmoil in the internal security of the country is the biggest example of the adverse

effects of wrong use of cyber technology.

(Note to students: CMS internally referenced is Indias new surveillance

system. CMS stands for Central Monitoring System.)

Mass instability in India sparks nuclear war with Pakistan

risks of miscalc, accidents, and unauthorized theft all increase.
Busch 4
Please note that an updated edition of this book was re-released in Feb of 2015, but the original date
was placed in the citation. Dr. Nathan Busch, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for
American Studies at Christopher Newport University. The author holds a Ph.D. in International relations
from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science from Michigan State University. The author
previously held the position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting Faculty,
National Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory. This piece of evidence internally quotes
George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It also
internally quotes Franois Heisbourg. He chairs the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the Londonbased International Institute for Strategic Studies. His career has included positions in government
(member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in
the defense industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF; senior vice president for strategy at Matra
Dfense Espace) and in academia (professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris, director of the IISS).
He is also a member of the International Commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
and has sat on a number of national and international blue-ribbon bodies. From the book: No End in
Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation - p. 202-209
In addition,

because the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear

weapons, the risks of accidental use could be very high during a crisis situation, at
least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in
conjunction with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to the deliver)' vehicles
(gravity bombs or missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing
them for launch. All these procedures require training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control
arrangements, it is not at all clear that the Indian military would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time
constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these dangers would be lessened, but more serious
dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed

India would need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety
mechanisms to prevent such an accidental launch, and it is simply not known how
much effort India is devoting, or will devote, to this area. 195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage
missiles.

Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it would be impossible to deploy the current configuration of either missile to allow
for a rapid response. This significantly reduces the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during normal
circumstances, though

the risks of accidental launches would probably increase significantly if they

were fueled during a crisis situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and
Agni-II missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose
such a deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These risks would depend on the extent to
which India integrates use-control devices into its weapons to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India is
currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such usecontrol devices, if a nuclear crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it still might be tempted to mate warheads on its
missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still remains to be seen what type of deployment option it would choose.
According to a statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India would not keep its weapons on a "hairtrigger alert," though he did suggest that these weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of surviving
a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch would be relatively small during normal
circumstances.198 But these risks would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate the
warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce
risks of accidental use during peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military during a crisis could significantly
increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option
Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a rapid-response option,
Pakistan would probably adopt a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear
weapons as well. But even if India were to deploy its weapons (in field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about
survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapid-response capability. If such an event were to occur, the risks of
Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan currently has the technical

Just as in India, it is also unlikely

that Pakistan's nuclear devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents. 201
Because Pakistan's warheads are based on an early Chinese warhead design, they
probably do not contain one-point safety designs , IHE, or fire-resistant pits. If Pakistan
capacity to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs.

were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be an unacceptable risk of an

accidental detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its
missiles, either because it chose to establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar
concerns would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The

current risks of

unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively
small because they have a very small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear
establishments. But there are a number of factors that could increase risks of unauthorized use in
the future. Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are
both actively developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain sophisticated use-control
devices to prevent unauthorized use. Instead, the

nuclear controls

in both countries

appear to be based on

guards, gates, and guns . As we have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases, while the "3 G's"
might be sufficient during normal circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable
during political, economic, and social upheaval s. The Russian case has demonstrated that severe
domestic upheavals can undermine central controls and weaken the infrastructures that previously maintained
the security for nuclear weapons. In particular, such upheavals can undermine the loyalty of
guards and workers at nuclear facilities, especially if the state collapses economically and can
no longer afford to pay those employees. Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary
steps to prevent such weaknesses from arising in their nuclear controls. Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear

there could be
a significant risk of thefts of nuclear weapons during severe
upheavals. The Russian analogy is particularly relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After

controls rely on the "3 G's"

while reportedly lacking personnel reliability programs,

the nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the Pakistani economy came close to collapsing and remained quite
unstable for the next several years.202 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed
economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international foreign aid to Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39
billion, massive economic disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign investment, there still is significant cause for concern
about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and economic stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be
significant risks of a collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event to occur, there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear
weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic militants.204 In the events following the September 11 attacks and
President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan, there were serious concerns about a potential collapse
of Pakistani nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some elements of the
Pakistani military and intelligence community with the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president
Musharraf appears to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001, President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by
removing high-level military and intelligence officers with ties to the Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless continued to raise
concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to the seriousness of these risks, President Musharraf ordered an
emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the United States has offered to advise Pakistan on methods for
securing its nuclear stockpile. ' If the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have

One also cannot

rule out the possibility that terrorists might choose to target nuclear facilities in India and
found it increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in the more extreme elements in his country.

Pakistan,

especially if domestic instability were to increase.

Both India and

Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have targeted critical
infrastructures and military bases in the past.209 Although current defenses at both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons storage
facilities are probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist attacks,210 the physical protection systems at other nuclear

if the defenses at the most sensitive facilities were weakened

by domestic upheavals, then the risks of successful terrorist attacks either for purposes of
theft or sabotagecould increase significantly. But even if such extreme events did not occur, the tightly
facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover,

controlled decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could potentially allow
unauthorized use, particularly during crises. In India, some of these risks have been minimized by the formalization of its command

because India
resilient communication

structure, though the military units are still fairly inexperienced with handling these weapons.212 Moreover,
probably still

lacks

clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and established,

channels, there would still be a fairly high risk of

unauthorized

use arising from

confusion or miscommunication during a crisis. These concerns will probably remain for
some time to come, though the specific risks could eventually be improved, depending on the training the military receives and the

degree of professionalism among the troops. Because Pakistan is currently under military rule, and its nuclear weapons are
controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear decision-making and command-and-control systems.
Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear operational use doctrine,
combined with inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized use during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine,
nor are there decision-making and communications systems adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the
nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed in time to be of use in a rapidly changing situation, which
would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213 The risks or unauthorized use would increase if
India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and questions about the survivability of
the nuclear forces would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their
nuclear forces. These systems would significantly increase difficulties in command and control, especially because their weapons
lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the risks of decapitation, Pakistan is likely to adopt a "delegative" system,
where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215 As the number of people authorized to
launch nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been commanded by the central
authorities.216

The greatest concerns have been raised about a possible inadvertent

use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The combined effects of mutual mistrust, very short flight times for
missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable CBMs make the risks of inadvertent use quite severe,

According to George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Kargil proved that having nuclear
especially during crisis situations.

weapons would not deter new conflicts.

It also showed that unless such conflicts themselves

were prevented, the possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange would also increase given both states' relatively poor

Due to continual mistrust between

the two countries, each would be likely to misinterpret military movements, missile tests, or
accidental detonations as an impending attack by the other side. The risks of misinterpreting each
systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command and control."217

other's motives are compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets.
For example, because the runways at Pakistani Air Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218

During an acute crisis, Pakistan might be

faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma , in that it would need to attack
India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability.

rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate altogether. For this reason, Pakistani officials

would be extremely suspicious of any Indian actions that could

be interpreted as preparations for an attack. Because the flight time of Indian
bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani leaders would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their
own attack.219 These conditions thus create an ongoing environment in which inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both
countries have unreliable intelligence systems, which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during the
Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence reported that India's exercise was merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian
intelligence overlooked the defensive nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused each side to
escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their intelligence systems have sometimes failed to detect major troop movements
altogether. As we have seen, during the Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops positioned at
their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil war, Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months
after they had positioned themselves at strategic locations in the Kargil heights. These intelligence failures could have two
consequences. First, if either side were surprised by comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive positioning during
the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to overreact and mistakenly conclude that an attack is imminent. And second, if one
side (especially Pakistan) is confident that an invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across
the border: Each of these scenarios would greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive
intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil war, however, India has recently made significant investments in its intelligence-

The dangers of
miscalculations and intelligence failures are increased by the crude early-warning
systems employed by both countries, particularly Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this
gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such failures by India in the future.221

point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan reported that it had detected an air force attack on its radars and
warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might have been circulated in order to
justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the
risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the
U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan in August 1998. The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared
Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however. Scholars
have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not only the U.S. concern about inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan,
but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to foster nervousness than
calm. To the extent that they lack reliable early-warning systems, India or Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable
sources, increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But even if India and Pakistan had reliable early-warning systems, the risks of
inadvertent war would still be extremely high. If Indian or Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have
very little time to decide what to do before the aircraft reached their targets. In addition, because there would be a great deal of
uncertainty about whether attacking bombers carried conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side (especially

Pakistan)

could face a "use them or lose them" scenario and be tempted to launch a nuclear
attack to ensure that its nuclear capability was not destroyed. 224 Thus, even if India and
Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, the risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high.
If India and Pakistan were to deploy their nuclear weapons on missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of
Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for deterrence against the People's Republic of China), the risks of inadvertent use would
become even worse. Because the flight time for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than five minutes,225 Indian and
Pakistani leaders would have virtually no time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before

According to
Francois Heisbourg, once theater missiles are deployed in South Asia, the strategic situation will
resemble the Cuban missile crisis, except that it "would be permanent rather than tempo-rary, would occur
without adequate C3I in place, and with political leadership located less than five minutes
the missiles hit their targets.226 The psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous.

from mutual Armageddon." 227

(Note to students: 3 Gs internally referenced stands for guards, gates, and

guns as a security measure to protect an installation. C3I also internally
referenced stands for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence).

Even a limited nuclear war between India & Pakistan causes

extinction smoke and yields prove
Toon 07
(et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- Atmospheric effects and societal consequences
of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism Atmospheric Chemistry &
Physics April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the
detonation of small nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world
has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential
exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and
an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized)
explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be
targeted in a nuclear conflict.

We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are

likely to construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100

times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses for
full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons , if the small weapons are
targeted at city centers. A single small nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by
orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of

regional nuclear exchange

involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global

could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those

worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a counterforce nuclear war
between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be
abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban
firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection.
Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating , and
then might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales . We also anticipate
nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange

substantial perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make
here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the
hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global

community. They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as
well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked
international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting
recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and
improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist.
We then provide the first comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging
smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate changes that might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of
this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the weapons used over Japan during the Second World War
(WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear devices. Moreover,
North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment a necessary precursor to weapons
construction. Thirty-two other countries that do not now have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons,
some in a relatively short period of time. For these nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield
equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed,
in some case, the casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of weapons carrying
several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas
contaminated and effectively uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local radiation
unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt
weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded human history (Robock et al., 2007). An
individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below we
first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation
from an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons
were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be
generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated uncertainties.

We have attempted

to employ realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do not have access to the war plans
of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear
weapons. There are obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a
regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible

In the present
analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a
scenarios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of regional conflict.

regional nuclear exchange between two newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations.

most citizens and politicians today are aware of the

potential disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial
confrontation. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates, the possible number and
We do not justify these scenarios any further except to note that

combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities
substantiates the idea that such scenarios as we propose are executable.

The new Freedom Act wont solve US image. Protections from

the original version do solve, even without protections for
persons outside the US.
Ries 14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights
Program. Also internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human
rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at
the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet
Freedom. She conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a
particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy &
Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that
advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT,
Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC).
There, she contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and
freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law.
Also internally quoting Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger Brian Ries
is Mashables Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at

Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to cover revolutions,
disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that
won two Webby Awards for Best News Site. Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That
Congress Just Passed - Mashable - May 22, 2014 http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsasurveillance-bill/)
As a result,

many of its initial supporters pulled their support. We supported the

original USA Freedom act, even though it didnt do much for nonUS persons, Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security &
Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the

original version as a good step to end bulk collection. However,

in its current version, it's not even clear that this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added
that Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill something he said is a real
problem.

"Where there is vagueness in a law,

you can count on the administration

to exploit it," Johnson said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a
more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the
out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many including members of both parties who rightly
believe the bill does not go far enough without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee
bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply
called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." The

ban on bulk collection was deliberately

watered down to be ambiguous and exploitable, said Center for Democracy and Technology
Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. We

withdrew support for USA FREEDOM when the bill morphed

into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans with
no connection to a crime or terrorism. And Cynthia Wong , senior Internet researcher at
Human Rights Watch, said, This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of
Internet users in the US and around the world. Until Congress passes real

reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will

continue to fade.

Unlike the current Act, the original bill does solve US image.
This holds even if plans about bulk collection instead of
every surveillance practices.
HRW 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights

Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to

uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. US Senate: Salvage Surveillance
Reform House Bill Flawed - Human Rights Watch - May 22, 2014
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)

It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform , Human Rights Watch said today. The version
of the USA Freedom Act that the US House of Representatives passed

on May 22, 2014,

could

ultimately

fail to

end mass data collection. The version the House passed is a watered-down
version of an earlier bill that was designed to end bulk collection of business
records and phone metadata.

The practice has been almost universally condemned by all but the US security establishment.

This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of Internet users in the US and

around the world, said Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at

Human Rights Watch . Until Congress passes real reform , US
credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade .
The initial version of the bill aimed to prohibit bulk collection by the government
The bill only addressed one component of the surveillance
programs revealed by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections. However, it had
of business records, including phone metadata.

broad support as a first step, including from Human Rights Watch.

On May

7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While

the version the House passed could leave the door wide open to
continued indiscriminate data collection practices potentially invading the privacy of
millions of people without justification, Human Rights Watch said.
better than alternative bills offered,

India Advantage 1AC, Democracy

Scenario

India Advantage - Democracy Scenario

Contention # ____ is India
The US can alter Indias surveillance practices by pressuring
global internet companies to demand privacy. But, this only
works when US is less hypocritical.
Wong 13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch.
Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy &
Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of
the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free
expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the
organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong
earned her law degree from New York University School of Law Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW
website at this address: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internetfreedom

Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as

problematic as listening to the content of peoples phone calls or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long
recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized
data can be easily combined and analyzed.

The revelations have also exposed glaring contradictions about

the US Internet freedom agenda.

This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically

denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though

the widening rift between US values and actions has real,

unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights movement, the Internets impact on rights crystalized in 2005
after we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the
Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
forcefully objected to the Chinese governments actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In
the end, that incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some
companies to improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of government
there is hypocrisy on both sides,

demands for data. US support was critical back then , but it is hard to
imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal
has damaged the US governments ability to press for better corporate practices as
technology companies expand globally. It will also be more difficult for companies to
resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as complicit in mass US
infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the
same cooperation that the US receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user
data locally or maintain a local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the

there is reason to worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just
months before the NSA scandal broke, India began rolling out a centralized system to monitor all phone
and Internet communications in the country, without much clarity on safeguards to
Chinese government are overstated,

protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the governments problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over
the last few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has
drawn particular ire. Now the government is preparing new regulations that would make it
easier to get data from Internet companies and identify individual users online. The Obama administration and US
could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey.
Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass
surveillance and conscripting the help of the private sector.
companies

(Note to students: conscripting means compulsory enlistment of companies for

state service.)

Independently, US bulk surveillance sets precedent that causes

indiscriminate surveillance in India.
Sinha 14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch
and the Human Rights Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York
Universitys School of Law. This includes a specialization as a Scholar from NYUs Institute for
International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Toronto. Additional
authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human Rights
Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington
Director at Human Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided
key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a
vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. From the
Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law
and American Democracy This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists
covering intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times,
the Associated Press, ABC, and NPR. JULY 2014 available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
The questions raised by surveillance are complex . The government has an obligation to protect
national security, and in some cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the

international human rights and constitutional law set limits on the states authority
to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to undermine so many other rights. The
same time,

current, large-scale , often indiscriminate US

carries enormous costs. It erodes

for

global digital

approach to

surveillance

privacy and sets a terrible example

countries like India , Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of
expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages US credibility in
other

advocating internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an

important foreign policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents, US surveillance
programs are also doing damage to some of the values the United States claims to hold most
dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all
protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.

Absent surveillance reform that boosts privacy, Indias

standing as a leader in democracy will fall
Kaul 14
Mahima Kaul, heads the Cyber and Media Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
and is also the editor of its monthly Cyber Monitor. The Initiative provides a vibrant platform for all
stakeholders to discuss internet-related issues in India. It also runs India's biggest internet policy
platform: Cyfy: The India Conference on Cyber Security and Cyber Governance, which brings
governments, business, academia and civil society participation from over 12 countries to New Delhi,
every October. She is Member, India Project Advisory Committee Member for Association for
Progressive Communications (APC) and the European Union's project "Advancing Internet Freedoms"
which looks at internet freedom in India, Pakistan and Malaysia. The author holds an M.A.
Communication Policy, University of Westminster, and a B. A. Political Science & History, McGill
University. Ensuring Privacy in a Regime of Surveillance - From the publication: Cyfy - March 30, 2014
http://cyfy.org/ensuring-privacy-in-a-regime-of-surveillance/

This paper examines the legality of surveillance structures in India today (including mass
surveillance programmes), and an expanding e-government project, and juxtaposes them against
the missing privacy legal framework that is needed in a liberal democracy such as India.
It concludes that accountability mechanisms and laws are needed to safeguard a
society that is increasingly adapting to mass surveillance and the lack of privacy. In India, as is the case globally, there is no
doubt that a necessary argument must and will be made for being able to use the same technologies for policing and security as are
used to perpetrate crimes and acts of terror. With increasing Internet penetration in the country, India released its first Cyber
Security Policy in 2013, flagging the biggest areas of concerns for the country, including protecting critical information infrastructure
and training more cyber security personnel. There is also growing concern in the country about the security of mobile networks
given the increasing number of cheap and unverified products entering the market. With the increasing frequency of terror attacks
on Indian soil there is a necessity for law enforcement officials to be able to investigate suspects with speed. At the same time, there
is also a need and desire to use digital technologies to make governance more effective and efficient for the citizenry. Therefore,
there are two broad aspects that need to be examined. The first relates to the surveillance mechanisms that exist via previous
legislation, and new mass surveillance schemes that are being built by leveraging current technology. The second concerns the
mass (and secure) collection of citizen data to build governance tools for smoother delivery of public services. A recent NATO
publication flagged the problems with the first issue well: State-sponsored

surveillance tends to be
discounted as a passive or invisible intrusion, but when conducted on a pervasive scale, it is an activity
that can severely harm rights in several dimensions. First, the invasion of privacy occurs at the point of intrusion and
capture of material, not only at the point of access or use of information. The inability to direct ones communications to only those
who are intended recipients is a serious loss of control over ones identity and autonomy; everyone has experienced the sensation of
literally being a different person when in public, as opposed to among intimates. The uncertainty over which communications will
be accessed when, and by whom, can also chill the exercise of many rights: freedom of expression, access to information,
association with others, religious belief and practice, and assembly, for example.1 India has a number of laws that offer a basis for
the kinds of surveillance that exists in the country. Some of these are listed below: The Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 was drafted to
cover the use of telegraphy, phones, communication, radio, telex and fax in India. Section 5 of the act allows for legal wiretapping,
and the guidelines state that only the home secretary, either of the Government of India or of a state government, can give an order
for lawful interception. The order for the wiretapping is valid for a period of two months and should not exceed six. The Indian
Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1993 does not permit anyone to own wireless transmission apparatus without a license, and in Section 7
gives power to any officer specially empowered by the central government to search any building, vessel or place if there is reason
to believe that there is any wireless telegraphy apparatus which has been used to commit an offence. The Indian Post Office Act of
1898, Section 26, confers powers of interception of postal articles for the public good. Section 91 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, grants other powers to the police; it states that: Whenever any court or any officer in charge of a police station
considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry,
trial or other proceeding under this code by or before such court or officer, such court may issue a summons, or such officer a
written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and
produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order. The most recent and currently controversial
legislation is the Information Technology Act of 2000, amended in 2008 after the horrific Mumbai terror attack. Currently, the act
contains some sections that require persons to reveal personal information without much room for recourse. Section 44 lays out
punishment and fines in case of failure to furnish any document, return or report to the controller or the certifying authority. Section
66a lists out punishment upto three years with a fine for sending any communication through electronic means which could be
considered grossly offensive, menacing, false information for annoyance, inconvenience, hatred, ill-will and so on. Section 80 gives
police and senior government officials the power to enter any public place and search and arrest without warrant any person found
therein who is reasonably suspected or having committed or of committing or about to commit an offence under this act. However,

in 2013, information about a mass surveillance scheme being rolled out by the

( CMS ) was launched in 2009, but

became public knowledge four years later. According to reports and interviews, the CMS will automate already
existing data from other interception and monitoring programmes, and will have a non-erasable command log
of all provisioning activities. Simply put, CMS targets private information of individuals
since it will enable real-time tracking of online activities , phone calls, text messages and
even social media conversations.2 Further, CMS will not need permission from nodal officers of the Telecommunication
Government of India came to light.

The Central Monitoring System

Service Providers (TSPs), and will provision requests from all law and enforcement agencies. It isnt quite clear what the legal basis
of CMS is, but it has been suggested that it will operate under Section 52 (2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, which as we know allows
for interception of (telegraphic) messages for various reasons including public emergency and public safety. It has not been
created by, or answers to, Parliament. According to available information, the CMS can tap information from various other
monitoring and interception schemes across India. These include the Crime and Criminal Tracking Networks and Systems (CCTNS),
Lawful Intercept and Monitoring Program (LIM), Telephone Call Interception System (TCIS) and the Internet Monitoring System (IMS).
The various department/agencies that will have access to all this gathered data, through CMS, include the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Enforcement Directorate,
Intelligence Bureau, Narcotics Control Bureau, National Intelligence Agency, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Ministry of Home Affairs,
the Military Agencies of Assam and Jammu & Kashmir, and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). As reported in The Hindu, The
CMS will have unfettered access to the existing Lawful Interception Systems (LIS) currently installed in the network of every fixed
and mobile operator, ISP, and International Long Distance service provider. Mobile and long distance operators, who were required
to ensure interception only after they were in receipt of the authorization, will no longer be in the picture. With CMS, all
authorizations remain secret within government departments. This means that government agencies can access in real time any
mobile and fixed line phone conversation, SMS, fax, website visit, social media usage, Internet search and email, including partially
written emails in draft folders, of targeted numbers. This is because, contrary to the impression that the CMS was replacing the
existing surveillance equipment deployed by mobile operators and ISPs, it would actually combine the strength of two, expanding
the CMSs forensic capabilities multiple times.3 At the same time, limited resources to store citizen data are becoming a thing of the
past. New technologies like cloud computing have allowed space for storage to increase exponentially. Therefore, as the capacity of
the state to accumulate data increases, for example with MeghRaj, a National Cloud launched by the Government of India in
February 2014, it will be able to expand its e-government services. Therefore, the common refrain among privacy experts and other
stakeholders is that the crux of the matter lies in India passing an all-inclusive privacy law. This, they believe, would take into
account not just protection for the individual viz-a-viz civil and criminal laws in India, but ensure there are privacy safeguards in the
ambitious projects that the government of India is undertaking with regards to citizens private data. These would include the
massive rollout of e-governance projects under the National e-Government Programme, which includes 31 mission mode projects
that seek to, in the first phase, digitize all available citizen data (such as land records and health records) for respective ministries,
and then, in the second phase, build responsive and efficient government service delivery platforms. In some states this means
accessing healthcare through smartcards, while in others citizens can access and pay their electricity bills online. For example,
Bhoomi, an e-government project in Karnataka under the revenue department has already computerized over 20 million land
records of over 6.7 million farmers. These digitized ministries will soon not function as islands. The NATGRID the National
Intelligence Grid is a system that will connect several government departments and data-bases to collect comprehensive patterns
of intelligence that can be readily accessed by intelligence agencies. While this means a single point to access citizen data from a
variety of sources, it also allows a single window to steal this personal information. Then there is the controversial UID Universal ID
card that the Government of India plans on issuing to every resident of India, after collecting his or her biometric data. Simply put,
the UID will become a citizen identifier. This means that the government will now be able to confirm that it is indeed citizen x who
is making phone calls or sending emails of some interest to the authorities, by immediately identifying the person through biometric
data available with the state. Conversely, this also means that the state now has not just biometric data on its people, but it will be
linked to all their communication data in an easy-to-find manner. All this is happening without a comprehensive privacy law passed
by the Indian Parliament. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution declares that no citizen can be denied his life and liberty except by
law, and the right to privacy has been interpreted to be part of that. Further, Article 43A of the IT Act directs corporate bodies who
possess, deal or handle any sensitive personal data to implement and maintain reasonable security practices, failing which they
would be liable to compensate those affected by any negligence attributable to this failure. This must necessarily extend to the
government as well. It is instructive to refer to the Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy, chaired by Justice A.P. Shah, former
Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court.4 The report suggested a conceptual framework for privacy regulation in India, touching upon
five salient points. Technological neutrality and interoperability with international standards: the privacy act should not refer to any
specific technologies and should be generic enough to adapt to changes in society, helping build trust of global clients and users.
Multi-dimensional privacy: the privacy act must include concerns related to a number of platforms including audio, video, personal
identifiers, DNA, physical privacy and so on. Horizontal applicability: any legislation must extend to the government and private
sector. Conformity with privacy principles: this means that the data controller should be accountable for the collection, processing
and use of the data, therefore, guaranteeing privacy. Co-regulatory enforcement regime: establishing the office of a privacy officer is
also recommended as the primary authority for the enforcement of provisions in the act. However, it is also suggested that industry
specific self-regulation organizations also be established. The document also refers to court judgments from Indian courts that have
helped shape some form of privacy safeguards into the system. For example, in the 1997 case, PUCL vs Union of India, the court
observed: Telephone-tapping is a serious invasion of an individuals privacy. It is no doubt correct that every government,
howsoever democratic, exercises some degree of sub rosaoperation as a part of its intelligence outfit, but at the same time citizens
right to privacy has to be protected from being abused by the authorities of the day. The court then placed restrictions on the class
of bureaucrats who could authorize such surveillance and also ordered the creation of a review committee, which would look at all
surveillance measures authorized under the act. The Shah Report lays out a road map of acts passed by the Indian Parliament that
would need to be reviewed for balance between individual privacy and national security. For example, when reviewing the UID
scheme, the report points out that citizens should be informed if their data is breached. They should also be informed about where
and how their data will be used, and notified of any changes in UIDs privacy policy. These and other suggestions are then placed in
a broader regulatory framework that imagines a privacy commissioner for India. At the same time it is pertinent to remember that
while

there is no privacy law to safeguard citizens, the government itself does not have a legal framework for

the kind of mass surveillance India is moving towards. As pointed out by privacy experts: The two
laws covering interception are the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 and the Information Technology Act of 2000, as amended in 2008,
and they restrict lawful interception to time-limited and targeted interception. The targeted interception both these laws allow
ordinarily requires case-by-case authorization by either the home secretary or the secretary of the department of information
technology.5 Where do these competing interests end up? There is no privacy law to shield citizens from upgraded mass
surveillance technology and systems, which themselves constantly need updated legal grounding. Ironically, just before the
Snowden revelations, in his April 2013 report to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations, Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue
noted that he was deeply concerned by actions taken by states against individuals communicating via the Internet, frequently
justified broadly as being necessary to protect national security or to combat terrorism. While such ends can be legitimate under
international human rights law, surveillance often takes place for political, rather than security reasons in an arbitrary and covert
manner.6 The report also highlights the fact that national legal standards that impose little or no judicial oversight, or allow
warrantless surveillance powers in the name of national security without any particular demonstration of a genuine need or threat
and that every individual should also be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may
control their files. Today, the concept of privacy is also undergoing a sea change due to the increasing ease with which citizens and
customers are handing over data to governments and businesses. This has been seen with information shared on social media 93
million Indians are on Facebook and was seen in the almost unquestioned way in which e-governance projects were welcomed in
the early days without any flags being raised about any data security or privacy safeguards in the design. In his essay, The Real
Privacy Problem,7 writer Evgeny Morozov wrestles with the evolving concept of privacy. He writes of a privacy scholar named
Spiros Simitis who grappled with data protection in the 1980s, and the three ideas he grappled with. The first was that with virtually
every employee, taxpayer, patient, bank customer, welfare recipient, or car driver handing over their personal data to private
companies (and of course, government) privacy was now everyones problem. The second was that CCTV and other recording
technologies like smart cards were normalizing surveillance, weaving it into our everyday life. The third was that by allowing
everyday activities to be recorded, citizens were actually allowing long-term strategies of manipulation intended to mould and
adjust individual conduct. Ultimately, while technology itself is always faulted for being the cause of privacy failures, the truth is

projects are created without

thinking of who could have unwarranted access to information, or how the information could be used and
abused outside the scope of what it is collected for, is when the problems truly begin. Privacy safeguards,
transparency about the intent and extent of a project (even when it was intended for surveillance) injects accountability
that these gaps enter the system through poor legislation. As discussed, when

into a system that remains static, despite the dynamic leaps in technology.

should India want to retain its

spirit and

This is the best way forward

label of being a liberal

democracy.

If Indian democracy faltered, it would ruin the global

democratic model
Gupta 13
Deepankar Gupta is an Indian sociologist. He is currently Distinguished Professor at Shiv Nadar
University and director, Centre for Public Affairs and Critical Theory. He was formerly Professor in the
Centre for the Study of Social Systems, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. For a brief period from
19931994, he was also associated with the Delhi School of Economics as Professor in the Department
of Sociology. The importance of being Indian: Despite its warts, Indias democracy has fired global
imagination for over six decades The Times of India - Mar 30, 2013 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/The-importance-of-being-Indian-Despite-its-warts-Indiasdemocracy-has-fired-global-imagination-for-over-six-decades/articleshow/19281689.cms?

When India dared to birth democracy , many thought it was premature and that it would soon
be history. Sixty-six action-filled years later, India's democracy is now a little too old to die
young. What is more, the world watches every move we make ; in fact,

cannot have enough of us. This is not because India is efficient and affluent - far from it. Rather, it is

the way India goes wrong that fires global imagination. In any other country
of comparative vintage and want, ethnicity, once introduced, would have run wild. Indian politici-ans too have repeatedly
played this dirty trick, but our democracy has limited its appeal. The
ultra corrupt may be ultra rich but because of India's judiciary and the press they often wake
up in jail to swill bad tea. Even army officers might face court martial if they mess with the rules. Political bosses, and their
cronies, are forever bending and twisting the law, but for all their power and pelf, they can never quite ignore it. Indian
politicians err time and again, but their overbites serve as object lessons because

procedures hold. This not only pulls us out of periodic crises with a just-back-from-the-dentist feel, but also
tells the world, the advanced West included, how easily democracy can be lost. If
India had been another underperforming tin-pot dictatorship, it would not have

been the thought experiment it is today.

Take a look at the following: Corruption,

assaults and poli-tical conspiracies happen worldwide, but when they strike India they excite the mind like nothing else. For
example, South Africa is a serious centre of gang rapes, or "jack rolling" in the local lingo, but that does not cause an international
stir. Yet the news of the December rape and murder in Delhi ricocheted within minutes across the world. This was not because the
protests were passionate, or because the police should have gone to a finishing school. What was being observed was whether our
Cons-titution would hold. Eventually it did; false cases were withdrawn and, boorish cops notwithstanding, no bullets were fired.
Ethnic intolerance again is an international affliction. When Putin tells Russian minorities to put up or shut up he gets a standing
ovation at home and hardly any press abroad. In Burma, Rohingya Muslims foxhole themselves in fear, but that does not make big
news. With India it is different. If the western world was horrified with the 2002 Gujarat killings, it was because our free press and
civil society, also gifts of democracy, brought things out in the open. Corruption in China is monumental. It periodically fells bridges
and schools, killing hundreds. Brazil has a homicide rate three times higher than India's and political violence in Russia is just too

it is only when India goes wrong that

tongues wag the mind just about everywhere. That India can make this happen again and again is
what makes us special. Had we been too perfect, we would be Scandinavia, and
nothing unique. On the other hand, had we been too violent, we would have been just
another Honduras, or maybe Zimbabwe. But because our stubborn demo-cracy has held to its frame, our leadership
bad to be true. The world may condemn all of this, and it does. However,

blunders light up the sky. This is our real USP! India's imperfections make for its significance. In terms of economic
underdevelopment and dodgy politicians, we have a fair amount in common with many troubled nations, some of whom are our
neighbours. But even in the darkest of times, we hardly expect military coups and mass arrests, as they do. To their credit, millions

Advanced
democracies too owe us a debt of gratitude. For years India has acted as a not-for-profit
laboratory so that they might remember the fundamentals of citizenship that made them rich and
of Chinese bloggers also noticed that Delhi's anti-rape agitations did not turn Vijay Chowk into a Tiananmen Square.

kept them that way. It is now payback time and they should tell us how exactly they set up universal health and education that

When democracies reach out to each other this way, the world
becomes a better place and friendships stay secure. This is something that neither G-20 nor Brics
served their citizens so well.

meets can do as it is in the nature of the economic beast to cross wires and compete. For starters, South Africa is as unhappy with
Brazilian chickens flying in as it is with China's promiscuity with other African countries. The distant hope of a Brics Development
Bank or of currency swaps will not blow these fears out of the water.

Democracy checks inevitable extinction.

Diamond 95
(Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Coeditor of The Journal of Democracy , Promoting
Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia
nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through
increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global

ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional
threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in
a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not
aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they
are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor
terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass
destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and
enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their

and the rule of law, democracies are the only

reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity
can be built.
own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights,

The new Freedom Act wont solve US image. Protections from

the original version do solve, even without protections for
persons outside the US.
Ries 14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights
Program. Also internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human
rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at
the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet
Freedom. She conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a
particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy &
Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that
advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT,
Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC).
There, she contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and
freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law.
Also internally quoting Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger Brian Ries
is Mashables Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at
Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to cover revolutions,
disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that
won two Webby Awards for Best News Site. Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That
Congress Just Passed - Mashable - May 22, 2014 http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsasurveillance-bill/)
As a result,

many of its initial supporters pulled their support. We supported the

original USA Freedom act, even though it didnt do much for nonUS persons, Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security &
Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the

original version as a good step to end bulk collection. However,

in its current version, it's not even clear that this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added
that Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill something he said is a real
problem.

"Where there is vagueness in a law,

you can count on the administration

to exploit it," Johnson said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a
more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the
out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many including members of both parties who rightly
believe the bill does not go far enough without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee
bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply
called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." The

ban on bulk collection was deliberately

watered down to be ambiguous and exploitable, said Center for Democracy and Technology
Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. We

withdrew support for USA FREEDOM when the bill morphed

into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans with
no connection to a crime or terrorism. And Cynthia Wong , senior Internet researcher at
Human Rights Watch, said, This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of
Internet users in the US and around the world. Until Congress passes real

reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will

continue to fade.

Unlike the current Act, the original bill does solve US image.
This holds even if plans about bulk collection instead of
every surveillance practices.
HRW 14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She
conducted much of the organizations work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus
on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances
corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the
Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organizations work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. US Senate: Salvage Surveillance
Reform House Bill Flawed - Human Rights Watch - May 22, 2014
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)

It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform , Human Rights Watch said today. The version
of the USA Freedom Act that the US House of Representatives passed

on May 22, 2014,

could

ultimately

fail to

end mass data collection. The version the House passed is a watered-down

version of an earlier bill that was designed to end bulk collection of business
records and phone metadata. The practice has been almost universally condemned by all but the US security establishment.
This so-called reform bill wont restore the trust of Internet users in the US and

around the world, said Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at

Human Rights Watch . Until Congress passes real reform , US
credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade .
The initial version of the bill aimed to prohibit bulk collection by the government
The bill only addressed one component of the surveillance
programs revealed by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections. However, it had
of business records, including phone metadata.

broad support as a first step, including from Human Rights Watch.

On May

7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While

the version the House passed could leave the door wide open to
continued indiscriminate data collection practices potentially invading the privacy of
millions of people without justification, Human Rights Watch said.
better than alternative bills offered,